# GBX R2 – 1NC v ACCS JM

## 1

#### The only ethical demand available to modern politics is that of the Slave, the demand for the end of the world itself. This cry, born out of the belly of slave ships and the churning vertigo of constitutive genocide, exposes the grammar of the 1AC’s calls for larger institutional access as a fundamental fortification of White Settler and Slave Master civil society by its diversionary focus on the ethicality of the policies of global antiblack regimes as opposed to the a priori question of civil society’s very existence. The black body is the site of social death par excellence, having become dead by a 700-year injunction of the Middle Passage barring its subjectivity.

Wilderson, ’10 [2010, Frank B. Wilderson is an Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”]

Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it would seem that the structure, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar of their demands—and, by extension, the grammar of their suffering—was indeed an ethical grammar. Perhaps their grammars are the only ethical grammars available to modern politics and modernity writ large, for they draw our attention not to the way in which space and time are used and abused by enfranchised and violently powerful interests, but to the violence that underwrites the modern world’s capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his land provided the stage upon which other violent and consensual dramas could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to call not merely the actions of the world to account but to call the world itself to account, and to account for them no less! The woman at Columbia was not demanding to be a participant in an unethical network of distribution: she was not demanding a place within capital, a piece of the pie (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather, she was articulating a triangulation between, on the one hand, the loss of her body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to becoming a “being for the captor” (206), the drama of value (the stage upon which surplus value is extracted from labor power through commodity production and sale); and on the other, the corporeal integrity that, once ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of everyone else on the street. She gave birth to the commodity and to the Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes, the world—and not its myriad discriminatory practices, but the world itself—was unethical. And yet, the world passes by her without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls her “crazy.” And to what does the world attribute the Native American man’s insanity? “He’s crazy if he thinks he’s getting any money out of us”? Surely, that doesn’t make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that he does not have a big enough gun. What are we to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically—unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Return Turtle Island to the “Savage.” Repair the demolished subjectivity of the Slave. Two simple sentences, thirteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An “ethical modernity” would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms: class struggle, gender conflict, immigrants rights. When pared down to thirteen words and two sentences, one cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of Left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—is that what can so easily be spoken is now (five hundred years and two hundred fifty million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these thirteen words not only render their speaker “crazy” but become themselves impossible to imagine. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, Left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable. In the 1960s and early 1970s the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not “Should the U.S. be overthrown?” or even “Would it be overthrown?” but rather when and how—and, for some, what—would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable quantum of ethics in the U.S. writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King, Jr., prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of SDS, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of SNCC, to Bobbie Kennedy Democrats) were accountable, in their rhetorical machinations, to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground. Radicals and progressives could deride, reject, or chastise armed struggle mercilessly and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of “success,” but they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—that the U.S. was an ethical formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (a U.S. attorney general and presidential candidate) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks. One could (and many did) acknowledge America’s strength and power. This seldom, however, rose to the level of an ethical assessment, but rather remained an assessment of the so-called “balance of forces.” The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to credibly wed the U.S. and ethics. The raw force of COINTELPRO put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, the power of Blackness and Redness to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—retreated as did White radicals and progressives who “retired” from struggle. The question’s echo lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM Warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers, or in prison cells where so many of them have been rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, thirty years, and at the gates of the academy where the “crazies” shout at passers-by. Gone are not only the young and vibrant voices that affected a seismic shift on the political landscape, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a revolutionary zeitgeist. Is it still possible for a dream of unfettered ethics, a dream of the Settlement and the Slave estate’s destruction, to manifest itself at the ethical core of cinematic discourse, when this dream is no longer a constituent element of political discourse in the streets nor of intellectual discourse in the academy? The answer is “no” in the sense that, as history has shown, what cannot be articulated as political discourse in the streets is doubly foreclosed upon in screenplays and in scholarly prose; but “yes” in the sense that in even the most taciturn historical moments such as ours, the grammar of Black and Red suffering breaks in on this foreclosure, albeit like the somatic compliance of hysterical symptoms—it registers in both cinema and scholarship as symptoms of awareness of the structural antagonisms. Between 1967 and 1980, we could think cinematically and intellectually of Blackness and Redness as having the coherence of full-blown discourses. But from 1980 to the present, Blackness and Redness manifests only in the rebar of cinematic and intellectual (political) discourse, that is, as unspoken grammars. This grammar can be discerned in the cinematic strategies (lighting, camera angles, image composition, and acoustic strategies/design), even when the script labors for the spectator to imagine social turmoil through the rubric of conflict (that is, a rubric of problems that can be posed and conceptually solved) as opposed to the rubric of antagonism (an irreconcilable struggle between entities, or positionalities, the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions). In other words, even when films narrate a story in which Blacks or Indians are beleaguered with problems that the script insists are conceptually coherent (usually having to do with poverty or the absence of “family values”), the non-narrative, or cinematic, strategies of the film often disrupt this coherence by posing the irreconcilable questions of Red and Black political ontology—or non-ontology. The grammar of antagonism breaks in on the mendacity of conflict. Semiotics and linguistics teach us that when we speak, our grammar goes unspoken. Our grammar is assumed. It is the structure through which the labor of speech is possible. Likewise, the grammar of political ethics—the grammar of assumptions regarding the ontology of suffering—which underwrite Film Theory and political discourse (in this book, discourse elaborated in direct relation to radical action), and which underwrite cinematic speech (in this book, Red, White, and Black films from the mid-1960s to the present) is also unspoken. This notwithstanding, film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume an ontological grammar, a structure of suffering. And the structure of suffering which film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume crowds out other structures of suffering, regardless of the sentiment of the film or the spirit of unity mobilized by the political discourse in question. To put a finer point on it, structures of ontological suffering stand in antagonistic, rather then conflictual, relation to one another (despite the fact that antagonists themselves may not be aware of the ontological positionality from which they speak). Though this is perhaps the most controversial and out-of-step claim of this book, it is, nonetheless, the foundation of the close reading of feature films and political theory that follows.

#### Can’t pretend that the therapeutic nature of the affirmative means that non-white identity now matters to the body politic. The archive and experiences of activists and scholars proves there is not refuge. We must sabotage such thinking within the decolonial turn in the academy.

**Marquez and Rana 17**

John D. Márquez, Junaid Rana; Black Radical Possibility and the Decolonial International. South Atlantic Quarterly 1 July 2017; 116 (3): 505–528. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-3961461[ejs]

There are other **elements of the current conjuncture of black radical possibility that deserve critical scrutiny**. Direct actions are also essential considering the growing emphasis on healing and on creating spaces within which the historically excluded feel safe or valued. **A defining element of the postcolonial condition is therapy, processes through which the colonized are encouraged to feel included or that there is some form of refuge to be offered** if we are patient and trusting enough. **By this, we mean that colonial authorities are increasingly mandated to offer space and resources for the colonized to heal, to overcome rage, in ways that make them more pragmatic and instructional, that prepare them to be more worthy of being listened to within the protocols of liberal reform, and thus that make their lives better capable of mattering to a broader spectrum of the body politic**. **As much as it remains important to flee that setup, it is also important to sabotage it. Fires, literal and figurative, do that**. The analysis made possible by Ferguson begins with the evidence itself. **The proof is often in the seeing, hearing, and feeling—in observing how protests are organized and how racialized subjects are able to instantly witness and make a decision about events of dispute and respond to them straightaway. We as scholars are similar to organizers and activists, in that how we know something is dependent not on the visual but on a range of archives**. We attain and produce knowledge not just from how we gaze on social movements voyeuristically but also from how we participate in them. As critical ethnic studies scholars, especially as scholars with deep and familial roots in communities that have been imperiled by racial/colonial violence, we work outside and within the academy. Witnessing is not only a form of direct observation; it is how we can image our methodological approach in terms of ethnography attached to radical politics. In the tradition of radical history, such an approach ties the theoretical and analytical positions of thinking through a future politics and theoretical possibility. That white supremacy has become so visible through media and digital technologies makes this all the more complicated and perhaps even unwieldy as a racial analysis. **Our commitment to working across and often against the professional and methodological protocols of academia is galvanized by the tone set by what is only the most recent roll call of black or brown lives destroyed, a list that includes Trayvon Martin, Oscar Grant**, Akai Gurley, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, John Crawford, **Sandra Bland**, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray, Alton Sterling, Philando Castile, Luis Alfonso Torres, Anastasio Hernández Rojas, Joe Nieves, **Andy López, and countless others whose names often go unmentioned.**

**ABLEIST DISCOURSE IS ROOTED WITHIN THE PRIVILEGE OF WHITENESS**

DZODAN writer for REDLIGHTPOLITICS 2k14

Flavia-writer, public speaker located in Amsterdam; “Whiteness as Social Disease and Ableism; RED LIGHT POLITICS; January 23; <http://www.redlightpolitics.info/post/74275329463/whiteness-as-social-disease-and-ableism>

I want to preface this by saying that throughout this reflection, when I use “whiteness” I mean it as shorthand, inspired in bell hooks’ definition, for “white supremacist, heteronormative, cissupremacist, capitalist, Imperialist patriarchy” (see here [Trudy’s compiled list of origins of definitions](http://www.gradientlair.com/post/64435736292/black-women-womanist-black-feminist-epistemology) and here for [bell hooks’ own usage of these ideas in one example of her own writing](http://thefeministwire.com/2013/10/17973/)). I understand that **“whiteness” usually means different things to different people** but this is what I have in mind when I speak about it. Whiteness as “system of interlocked oppressions”.

Yesterday [I shared Sarah Kendzior’s excellent post about media cruelty and exclusion](http://www.redlightpolitics.info/post/74175568511). **A number of people objected to** the ableism in the piece, mostly, **the conflation of sociopathy to racism/ misogyny/ transphobia**, etc (you can see it in the reblogs of my post but I also saw the objections pop up on Twitter). Last week, a woman of color, in a private space, asked if people thought that referring to racism **as** sociopathy was **ableist.** The question was based, I presumed, in [the definition of sociopathy](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001919/) as one in “which a person has a long-term pattern of manipulating, exploiting, or violating the rights of others”. The responses (all of them), said yes. Equating racism to sociopathy was ableist. **In all these instances** described, **the** respondents pointing out the ableism were white.I realized **in these incidents** that **there seems to be a disconnect and lack of understanding of the framework to explain what we are experiencing** as PoC. **The ableism highlighted in these situations might be technically correct. These could be interpreted as ableist ways of describing social problems, unless the “observer” was implicated by virtue of being on the receiving end of these behaviors.** I am not trying to gloss over the implication for mental health and for the stigmas associated with mental illness. **Yet,** I also realized that for many of us, myself included, **whiteness can only be described as a social disease. We lack words to explain this in ways that do not further stigmatize people**. I am aware that saying racism is sociopathic could be interpreted as ableist and yet, how do we describe a culture wide phenomenon that kills us? how do we describe a political system founded on our shared inhumanity? how do we describe an oppression that is rooted in lack of empathy and love towards us? Again, this is not to gloss over ableism but what words do we have to pick from? **One of the consequences of epistemic injustice is that we do not have accepted frameworks to explain our lives. By “accepted”, I mean,** frameworks that are society-wide accepted and recognized as valid throughout academia, mainstream media and public discourses including but not limited to policy and laws**. So, in this denial of our knowledge and theories, we are left gasping for air. Here we stand looking for words that would encompass the gravity of what we experience.**

Tim Wise, someone whose work is awful, [has spoken about the pathology of privilege](http://vimeo.com/25637392) and this is where Tim Wise’s phony and shallow activism comes through. Privilege is not the pathology. Privilege is the symptom of whiteness as a social disease that kills us. The outcome of our systemic Othering and eventual deaths is the privilege. Wise, ever the apologist, falls into [the white trap I’ve written about this past week](http://www.redlightpolitics.info/post/73958557454/racism-is-a-problem-of-communication-and-other) claiming that racism is bad not because it kills PoC, racism is bad for white people because [it causes them mental illnesses](http://www.mediaed.org/assets/products/137/transcript_137.pdf):

That’s what white privilege does to white folks. But that’s not all. It also creates an intense anxiety, like a mental dysfunction, an emotional anxiety, and distress. If you are privileged after all, if you are the top dog, if you have all the advantage, you are constantly afraid of who’s gaining on you. You’re constantly afraid of who’s coming to take what you have. You’ve got to close the border. They’re coming to take our stuff.  We’ve got to worry about terrorists. They’re coming to take our stuff. We got to get them before they get us; preventative war. We’ve got to stop them. That’s what privilege will do for you because those who have it are constantly anxious. A study in June of 2004, in the journal of the American Medical Association, which received very little attention, found that in the United States the rates of anxiety disorder, depression, and substance abuse related mental disorders are twice the global average, five times the rate in Nigeria. How is it that the most powerful and privileged people on earth can have so much more anxiety than people who live in war torn areas, civil war, political corruption, amazing problems, often famine, all kinds of hardships, that for the most part, we don’t see at least in the same abundance, let’s say, in the United States? And yet, it is here that the greatest level of anxiety exists. I would suggest that the reason that happens is because it’s the privilege that generates the anxiety.

See? White folks suffer more than those Black folks in Nigeria or in war thorn, famine suffering countries! (really? how did he get away with the inherent white supremacy of this statement?! and worse, how did he become mandatory reading material in educational institutions across the Western world?! I know the answer, these are the rhetorical questions I ask myself in disbelief).

**How do we**, as PoC **define a system where you are viewed and treated as the disease and as the reason for the disease** (which is what Tim Wise implies, by proximity, in his statements above)? Because if white folks experience anxiety and mental health issues due to a desperation to preserve their privilege, aren’t we somewhat responsible for their perceived suffering as well? **How do we steer clear of this language to explain “whiteness as a system that immunizes itself from our existence”? Yes, these are all disease related metaphors and yet, which other metaphors do we have to illustrate something that kills us?** Moreover, how do those of us who bear the marks of this whiteness while simultaneously dealing with mental health issues and the associated stigmas find an appropriate framework that doesn’t stigmatize us in one of our intersecting oppressions?

**In the Journal of Disability Studies Quarterly, Phil Smith writes** about “Whiteness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies”. [From his paper](http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/491/668):

Racism is defined bluntly and cogently as “an ideological ethnocentric diseased set of beliefs

“A diseased set of beliefs”. And then, further on, this:

It is very true **that minorities are at greater risk for acquiring disability labels and losing ability capacities, often as a result of impoverishment** (O’Connor 1993). **Difficulty in obtaining services for African Americans may include issues including impoverishment, discrimination, and services that are not culturally competent**.[…]

**And race has been tied in basic ways to understandings and metaphors of developmental disability.** For example, prior to the label of Down syndrome used by modernist medical science, the term Mongolism was the dominant term. **The construction of people with disabilities as freaks is “steeped in racism, imperialism, and handicapism…”. Psychiatric survivors have also experienced a “potent fusion of insanity and blackness” as the result of racialized terror felt by Whites.**

**Race and disability have resided in the same social terrains throughout their history, especially so in educational territories. Eugenicist, modernist science has been instrumental in conflating the cultural topography of disability and race.** For example, research has shown over and over that there is a relationship between eligibility for special education services and race […]

One of the most recent of these studies revealed that “…black public school students are three times as likely as whites to be identified as mentally retarded and in need of special-education services…” (Tato 2001, Paragraph 4). Another source notes that African-American students are mis-identified as being mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed at much higher rates than whites […]

I could go on quoting more race based ableist stigmas from this paper but I won’t. My point is made: ableist discourses rest on a foundation of racist Othering**. This is not to say that white people are not oppressed by ableism. This is to say that whiteness** (see my first paragraph for the working definition) **will do away with their own if, by proximity, they can be linked to “us”. And if that is not the textbook definition of a culture that exhibits a “**long-term pattern of manipulating, exploiting, or violating the rights of others**”, then what other words are we left to use to define it?**

#### The alternative is to confront the terror of antiblackness. It may not speak to the particular of the aff, but blackness can confront the totality.

Sexton 10

Sexton, Jared. (2010). People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery. Social Text. 28. 31-56. 10.1215/01642472-2009-066.

**The upshot of this predicament is that obscuring the structural position of the category of blackness will inevitably undermine multiracial coalition building as a politics of radical opposition and, to that extent, force the question of black liberation back to the center of discussion. Every analysis that attempts to understand the complexities of racial rule and the machinations of the racial state without accounting for black existence within its framework — which does not mean simply listing it among a chain of equivalents or returning to it as an afterthought — is doomed to miss what is essential about the situation. Black existence does not represent the total reality of the racial formation — it is not the beginning and the end of the story — but it does relate to the totality;** it indicates the (repressed) truth of the political and economic system. That is to say, the whole range of positions within the racial formation is most fully understood from this vantage point, not unlike the way in which the range of gender and sexual variance under patriarchal and heteronormative regimes is most fully understood through lenses that are feminist and queer.75 What is lost for the study of black existence in the proposal for a decentered, “postblack” paradigm is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of black suffering and of the struggles — political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so on — that have sought to transform and undo it. What is lost for the study of nonblack nonwhite existence is a proper analysis of the true scale and nature of its material and symbolic power relative to the category of blackness.76 **This is why every attempt to defend the rights and liberties of the latest victims of state repression will fail to make substantial gains insofar as it forfeits or sidelines the fate of blacks, the prototypical targets of the panoply of police practices and the juridical infrastructure built up around them. Without blacks on board, the only viable political option and the only effective defense against the intensifying cross ﬁre will involve greater alliance with an antiblack civil society and further capitulation to the magniﬁcation of state power**. At the apex of the midcentury social movements, Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton wrote in their 1968 classic, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation, that black freedom entails “the necessarily total revamping of the society.”77 For Hartman, thinking of the entanglements of the African diaspora in this context, the necessarily total revamping of the society is more appropriately envisioned as the creation of an entirely new world: **I knew that no matter how far from home I traveled, I would never be able to leave my past behind. I would never be able to imagine being the kind of person who had not been made and marked by slavery. I was black and a history of terror had produced that identity. Terror was “captivity without the possibility of ﬂight,” inescapable violence, precarious life. There was no going back to a time or place before slavery, and going beyond it no doubt would entail nothing less momentous than yet another revolution**.78

#### The 1AC and any perm forecloses the possibility of radical questioning about the ethicality of civil society by structurally adjusting the black body through the “political action” that ceases to be “inclusive” – the aff’s starting point places the black body upon a psychologically traumatic, dielectric state of abandonment that forecloses black liberation – if we win that their scholarship produces this structural violence that is an independent reason to vote negative

**Wilderson ‘10** (Frank B Wilderson III- Professor at UC irvine- Red, White and Black- p.  **8-10)**

I have little interest in assailing political conservatives. Nor is my ar- gument wedded to the disciplinary needs of political science, or even sociology, where injury must be established, first, as White supremacist event, from which one then embarks on a demonstration of intent, or racism; and, if one is lucky, or foolish, enough, a solution is proposed. If the position of the Black is, as I argue, a paradigmatic impossibility in the Western Hemisphere, indeed, in the world, in other words, if a Black is the very antithesis of a Human subject, as imagined by Marxism and psy- choanalysis, then his or her paradigmatic exile is not simply a function of repressive practices on the part of institutions (as political science and sociology would have it). This banishment from the Human fold is to be found most profoundly in the emancipatory meditations of Black people's staunchest "allies," and in some of the most "radical" films. Here—not in restrictive policy, unjust legislation, police brutality, or conservative scholarship—is where the Settler/Master's sinews are most resilient. The polemic animating this research stems from (1) my reading of Native and Black American meta-commentaries on Indian and Black subject positions written over the past twenty-three years and ( 2 ) a sense of how much that work appears out of joint with intellectual protocols and political ethics which underwrite political praxis and socially engaged popular cinema in this epoch of multiculturalism and globalization. The sense of abandonment I experience when I read the meta-commentaries on Red positionality (by theorists such as Leslie Silko, Ward Churchill, Taiaiake Alfred, Vine Deloria Jr., and Haunani-Kay Trask) and the meta-commentaries on Black positionality (by theorists such as David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe) against the deluge of multicultural positivity is overwhelming. One suddenly realizes that, though the semantic field on which subjec- tivity is imagined has expanded phenomenally through the protocols of multiculturalism and globalization theory, Blackness and an unflinching articulation of Redness are more unimaginable and illegible within this expanded semantic field than they were during the height of the F B I ' S repressive Counterintelligence Program ( C O I N T E L P R O ) . On the seman- tic field on which the new protocols are possible, Indigenism can indeed lO become partially legible through a programmatics of structural adjust- ment (as fits our globalized era). In other words, for the Indians' subject position to be legible, their positive registers of lost or threatened cultural identity must be foregrounded, when in point of fact the antagonistic register of dispossession that Indians "possess" is a position in relation to a socius structured by genocide. As Churchill points out, everyone from Armenians to Jews have been subjected to genocide, but the Indigenous position is one for which genocide is a constitutive element, not merely an historical event, without which Indians would not, paradoxically, "exist." 9 Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims suc- cessfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today's Blacks in the United States as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrat- ing how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the state has come to pass. In other words, the election of a Black president aside, police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of H I V infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived expe- rience of Black life. But such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on "solid" ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to "facts," the "historical record," and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political sci- ence, history, and public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the "solid" plank of "work" is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of "claims against the state"—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put an- other way, No slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a position against which Hu- manity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal in- tegrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of re- lationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy but on the one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the person who best explains the reality that produces the phenomenon of anti-blackness – if I win their starting point is flawed, they don’t get to weigh their affirmative.

## Case

#### The way that your affirmative has coopted the language of anti-blackness is evidence that you are using the language of other structural antagonisms for their strategic value and not to have the discussion about anti-blackness, which is unethical – this is not in their evidence – you should not fall for their rhetoric of pessimism when its not backed by their ev

#### Off solvency –

#### 1] if you are not an interruption and are simply a continuation of what people have already done, there is no radicality to the aff – you should vote on presumption 🡪 the aff doesn’t garner any offense since debate has not imploded and this aff has been read for more than 3 years

#### 2] you’ve spread in this round – proves that you use norms, form and content that debaters have used for years – this dilutes your radicality and decimates your sabotage of the debate space

#### 3] there has to be some marginal use to debate if you’re in the activity – your aff is not radical in this space

#### Disability drive is based off the death drive which is absurd nonsense---nonverifiable and no lash-out

Rob Weatherill 99, Psychotherapist in private practice since 1978, "The Death Drive: New Life for a Dead Subject?", Google Books, p. 126-128

Ian Suttie was the most vociferous opponent of the death instinct. He severely criticised Freudian theory on a number of counts, seeing in it a personal bias, 'an expression of subjective antipathy in line with Freud's systematic denial of love' (Suttie 1935: 213). He viewed this as a stark contrast to psychoanalytic practice which, he argued, heals through love.¶ Hate, for Suttie (as for Balint, below), was connected with the extreme anxiety aroused by a threat to the child's love of the mother, rather than an end in itself. Hate is the only weapon the child has avail- able against a parent it experiences as more powerful. As Suttie suggests: 'Its purpose is not death-seeking or death-dealing, but the preservation of the self from the isolation which is death' (Suttie 1935: 44).¶As a concept, the death instinct is useless, and 'doubly perverse since it is scientifically unjustified' (Suttie 1935: 213). Furthermore, Freud's account of its origin is unempirical; he asks us to imagine, in 'scientific terms', that atoms have an 'anti-social' organisation and attempt to pursue death. The theory flies in the face of evolution, despite its evocation of physiological processes such as catabolism. It makes no sense because—Suttie repeatedly stressed—love and hate are motivations of a whole organism, not of particles or of physiological functions.¶ As well as the apparent split between Freudian theory and practice, Suttie focused on the contradiction inherent in the theory itself. The supposed seeking for a return to an inanimate existence, which Freud postulated, is also assumed to be projected outwards in order to protect primary narcissism. The death wish thus 'becomes death-dealing rather than dissolution seeking, i.e. anger rather than desire' (Suttie 1935:215). Klein's personal response to his attack on the validity of the death instinct, Suttie claims, was to ask 'What does it matter?' (Suttie 1935: 215). This only added fuel to Suttie's suspicion that the death instinct is pure fantasy, a speculation, a meaningless and absurd abstraction.¶Other commentators, besides Suttie, have noted the gap between theory and practice in relation to the death instinct. It is apparent that Freud never made the death instinct a sine qua non in clinical work, as he did with sexuality, the Oedipus Complex, and other mental mechanisms. The death instinct is clinically silent. Freud himself acknowledged the uncertainty of his speculations, of his borrowings from biol- ogy, and the possibility of abandoning the hypothesis in the future. Perhaps Freud's isolated position as a pioneer, and therefore vulnera- ble to dissension from his followers, over-determined his need to con- firm drive theories through biological principles. His death instinct theory was more likely determined by his need to maintain a basic dualism of instincts in his theory, by his own fear of death, and his experiences of the horror of aggression in the First World War.