## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative should defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution

#### Vio- they defend more than the res- read the method. “to affirm a method of withdrawal from systems of violence”.

#### Standards:

#### 1] Topicality’s key to preserving competitive debate –

#### A) Letting the aff pick the topic ex post facto is bad and incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism. The ability to select anything to say is bad for debate and makes the terms affirmative and negative meaningless. Being forced to switch-sides is debate’s greatest value and it solves all of their exclusion offense

#### B) their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs – that’s bad because research isn’t infinite, it monopolizes prep, and creates a structural skew in their favor – not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus every 2 months.

#### 2) Competitive equity – it’s important to sustain the activity – some level of equity must exist – if it didn’t, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way

#### 3) Engagement – they transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny. Switch side debate solves

#### That’s a voter on fairness- the only stasis point is the resolution and vague argumentation means the aff can be extraT and solve all neg ground.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive speech docs open source with highlighting on the NDCA LD wiki within an hour after debating for TOC bid tournaments.

#### Violation – they don’t- tab says they’ve debated at penn and they haven’t disclosed Harvard. This first screenshot was taken 20 minutes after pairings, they then decided to disclose but not any other rounds so they don’t meet the interp.

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

#### Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

Antonucci 5 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://cedadebate.org/pipermail/mailman/2005 December/060990.html]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

#### Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – otherwise you could have highlighted unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### Fairness is a voter – its constitutive of any competitive activity based on skills, wins, and losses – unfair practices skew the judge’s ability to determine the better debater

#### Drop the debater to set a norm – if you lose you’ll open source from now on

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and begs the question of what’s reasonable requiring judge intervention

#### No neg rvi – otherwise the 6 minute 2nr can collapse to a short shell and get away with infinite 1nc abuse via sheer brute force and time spent on theory

## 3

#### Text- We advocate for the entirety of the 1AC minus the reading of the Berardi Evidence

**Their Berardi Evidence says that Suicide is the best weapon against the current social order and praises Islamic jihadists for engaging in the practice,**

Berardi 12 Fremont reads yellow

Berardi,9( Berardi is a writer and theorist based in Bologna. His work revolves mainly around the aesthetics of the contemporary psychosphere.) Franco. & Genosko, Gary. & Thoburn, Nicholas. (2012). After the future. Edinburgh ; Oakland, CA. ; Baltimore, MD : AK Pr//rctAK

I speak of agency, of a collective actor, of singularity in the Guattarian sense, and, finally, I speak of “movement”. Movement is the process of 96 recomposition of society: the cultural process that makes possible the political unity of the different social actors who are in conflict in public space. When the social actors find a common ground of understanding and act together for a common goal, I see a movement, the active and conscious side of the process of social transformation, and also of cultural evolution. Movement is the subjective (conscious and collective) side of the recomposition of the living social sphere against the domination of the dead (capital). At the end of the zero zero decade, for the first time in my life I have been obliged to recognize that the actor is absent: you see actions, but you don’t see an actor. Actions without an actor are played in the ground of social visibility but they do not create any common ground in the space of consciousness and affectivity. Actions are performed on the theatre of social production, but the agent of recombination is not there, in the theatre, but backstage, and the consciousness of the process does not belong to the process itself. Human beings perform productive actions, but they **are not conscious** actors of what they are doing, and seem unable to join their feelings and thought in a common space of consciousness. **Capitalism has destroyed the conditions of recomposition, and society has become un-recomposable**. The noncomposability of society means that the process of subjectivation cannot take place. This is why the future has lost its zest, and people have lost all trust in it, because the future no more appears as the object of a choice, and of collective conscious action, but is a kind of unavoidable catastrophe that we cannot oppose in any way. The future is the subject of this book: I have tried to rethink what the imagination of the future was during the century marked by the struggles of labor against capitalist exploitation, and by the creation of wide areas of autonomy of society from the capitalist rule. But for the remainder of the book I’m trying to investigate the present collapse of the imagination of the future, from the point of view of the (apparently) impossible re-composition of social subjectivity. Of course I do not want to stop here, I don’t want to look like the doomsayer who only sees gloom. But I think that we have to be able to see things as they are, if we want to find a way beyond the present depressive reality. My point of view has been shaped by two centuries of progressive enlightened history: it is the point of view of an epoch and of a generation that has been always convinced of being the bearer of the fulfillment of the modern promise. But this means that I have a problem of imagination as far as the past and the future are concerned. The way I imagine and narrate time is connected to the way history has developed during the last two centuries. But the digital mutation, coupled with neoliberal ideology, has completely reframed the perception of time, and the relationship between human beings and their social environment. We can no longer think the flow of collective time in a frame of progressive becoming. 97 Of course, I see very well that the progressive process has came to a halt in the age of capitalist counteroffensive and media colonization; but, I can’t stop perceiving this as a temporary halt; I can’t stop thinking that my energies (political and cultural energies) have to be dedicated entirely to going beyond and bringing back the old progressive rhythm of history, restoring the order of civilization that I have considered eternal in the years of my cultural formation. This attitude is blinding and misleading me, and it is preventing me from understanding what is really going on in the deep structure of the social imagination. The progressive perception of historical time is a prejudice, and this prejudice is putting me on the wrong path, giving me the false impression that something can be done in order to go back to the past history of civilization. Nothing can be done, on the contrary, because the periodization that I have in mind has to be reframed. The progressive ideology was based on the idealistic premise that the history of mankind is essentially the history of the progressive realization of Reason. Now we are facing a reality that has nothing to do with the rationalization of Reason, and also has nothing to do with an evolutionary progressive vision. Evolution is not progressive. The progressive vision is based on the idea that evolution is human-oriented. Evolution is not human-oriented. Present evolution has gone beyond the limits of a human-oriented civilization because the limits of human knowability and controllability have been surpassed. Let us focus on two concepts recently introduced into the debate on labor and subjectivation. The concept of “recomposition” comes from the theoretical laboratory of Italian Operaismo. The concept of “recombination” has been proposed by Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein (1993) and by the Critical Art Ensemble (1994) in order to define the epistemology of the new technologies (namely informatics and bio-tech). I want to apply these concepts to the organization of labor in the age of networked globalization. I define recombination as the technical form of the labor process in the digital environment, whilst the word recomposition means the social and cultural process enabling the fragments of labor to become conscious subjectivity. My central thesis is the following: the recombinant form of the labor process has changed the very foundation of the conflictual nature of labor, and has displaced the social landscape in such a way that any social conscious **recomposition seems impossibl**e. We can start with the political side of the problem. During the last two decades the defeat of the left around the world has often been explained by the crumbling of socialist states, and the subsequent dissolution of the communist parties. But I think that the reason for the social and political defeat has to be found in the change in labor organization, and in the cultural mutation produced by the media colonization of the social mind. The fragmentation of the political left has been a problem, perhaps, during the last decades, and the 98 defeat of the leftist parties in the national elections in Europe has been a symptom of this crisis. But I think that the basic problem for the progressive movement is the cultural inability to start a process of social recomposition of labor. Social composition is the cultural process of unification of the social body through the fusion of imaginary and cultural flows. The concept of composition originally comes from the field of chemical science, not from the political lexicon. In the process of social composition it is possible to find the material genesis of solidarity and lack of it. The concept of composition has been elaborated in the neo-Marxist Italian theoretical landscape of the 1960s and 1970s (Tronti, Bologna, Negri…), in opposition to the dogmatic vision of the prevailing Hegelian historicism of the Italian Communist Party. In the parlance of the Italian workerist school, the root of the autonomy of the working class, the ability to organize against exploitation, is to be found in the fusion of the cultural components of the social fabric. Myth, ideology, media, advertising; these forces are producing effects in the composition of society. They can produce effects of recomposition, when the different segments of social labor find a common ground of sensibility and of understanding, and stand united against the exploiters. They can produce effects of decomposition, when the **technological and ideological capitalist action destroys the feeling of friendship, the institutions of labor organization, and the sympathy of society for itself**. During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, world society underwent a process of internal recomposition and this made possible the autonomy of the workers’ movement from the domination of capital. Then, after the victory of Thatcher and Reagan, capital’s **counteroffensive smashed the organized force of labor**, decentralized the factories, **invaded the social brain with corporate media flows**, and finally reduced the international cycle of labor to an infinite ocean of **micro-fragments of nervous connection**. The notion of composition is very close to the Guattarian concept of subjectivation. In his books Guattari says that we should not speak of a subject, in the old Hegelo-dialectical way. The subject is not there from the beginning, as an ideal force, able to fight and to win. There are not subjects, in history, there are women, and men, poor, frail organisms trying to escape misery and death. There are conscious and sensitive organisms expressing desire and creating rhizomes. The social molecules may find a way of common understanding and common sensibility and may act like a subject, if they are able to share the same refrain, as Guattari would say. Precarity refers not only to the deregulation of the labor market and the fragmentation of work, but also the dissolution of community. A **continuous flow of info-labor runs in the global network**, and it is the general factor of capital valorization, but this flow is **not able to subjectivize**, to coagulate in the conscious action of the collective body. This is why the labor force has 99 apparently become un-recomposable. Solidarity between the workers of the world was the main basis of democracy during the past century, and the only guarantee of workers’ human rights; it no longer exists, having been destroyed by the new division and fragmentation of recombinant labor. Migrants, precarious workers, **cognitive workers: they share the same condition of weakness, in different degrees**. But they are **unable to find a common ground of solidarity and struggle**. This apparent un-recomposability of labor is the effect of the **digitalization of the process of production, and of the subsequent fractalization and precarization of labor**. In the global digital network, **labor is transformed in small parcels of nervous energy picked up by the recombining machin**e. In this sense I would say that it is **fractalized, and recombined by the techno-financial network. The workers are deprived of every individual consistency. Strictly speaking the workers no longer exist**. Their time exists, their time is there, permanently available to connect, to produce in exchange for a temporary salary. Marx’s prophecy about the “atom of time” is fulfilled. In the process of networked production we no longer find working persons, but abstract, depersonalized, fractal atoms of time available in the Net-sphere. **This is why the labor force has become un-recomposable, unable to recognize itself as a community of sensible and sensitive beings who share the same social interests and the same cultural expectations**. Is the recomposition process (that we may label a process of collective subjectivation) still possible in this new condition? The productive force of cognitive labor has been multiplied by the creation of the recombinant network. The “general intellect” to which Marx refers in the Grundrisse is the ability of knowledge to act as a value producing force. Thanks to the introduction of digital machines **capital has incorporated the product of the general brain in its system of machines**. But the living process of knowledge still resides in the mind of the individual scientist and technician. In the digital network we are dealing with a different reality: the living brains of individuals are absorbed (subsumed) inside the process of network production and submitted to a system of techno-linguistic automatisms. **Recombination is the (informational and biopolitical) technique that transforms the activity of individual brains in an abstract productive continuum**. The individual brain can act effectively only through the recombinant modality: functional recombination of fragments of cognitive labor scattered in time and space, but functionally unified inside the Net. Interoperability is the general goal of the network, and in order to connect, the recombinant fragments of living labor time have to become compatible: The core problem of getting computers to communicate with each other is, by definition, one of compatibility. As the network grows bigger, incompatibilities must be overcome… if an incompatibility emerges, it 100 produces a trigger for change requiring new technical and social negotiations. Generally however a new protocol or level is introduced that, by operating between or on top of different layers, will allow them all to coexist under a single common framework. (Terranova 2004: 58-9) De-singularization of living thought and activity is mandatory for access to the network. In the global network there are not working persons, but an infinite brain-sprawl, an ever-changing mosaic of fractal cells of available nervous energy. The person is nothing but the residue – therefore precarious – of the process of valorization. From the point of view of subjectivation, the productive and functional potency of cognitive labor, its interoperability, seems to be inversely proportional to its social and political recomposability. The collective brain is functionally recombined in the sphere of the Net. But at the social and affective level the social brain appears unable to recompose, to find common strategies of behavior, incapable of common narration and of solidarity. Therefore, the expansion of the productive potency of the general intellect coincides with a schizoid fragmentation of the collective brain, incapable of recomposing as conscious subjectivity, unable to act in a conscious collective way. During modernity, the industrial labor force was composed by persons, bearers of individual ability to perform tasks, and also bearers of physical needs, and political rights, like the right to unionize, negotiate, and strike. Today, the labor force can be described as a **sprawl of nervous energy, of depersonalized time available to cellular recombination**. This time has been fractalized and compatibilized and so made recombinable. In order to inter-operate the individual mind has to become a cell of the networked mind, a compatible fractal: this implies a technological mutation but also a psychic mutation of the living mind. As Christian Marazzi has explained in his books, language and capital tighten their relationship: language becomes the economic resource, the productive force, and the market. This is why I speak of **semiocapital: the kingdom of signs and the kingdom of production tend to coincide**. Language undergoes a mutation, which is a technological mutation but also a psychic one. In the human psyche, as Freud says, the access to language has much to do with affection and primarily with the body of the mother. What about the linguistic relationship between the mother and child, when the Infosphere is saturated with info-stimuli, and the presence of the mother becomes so scarce? In Show and Tell Machine, published in 1977, the American anthropologist Rose Goldsen argued that we are giving birth to human beings that will learn more words from machines than from mothers. In the first decade of the new century this generation has occupied the stage of social activity, and is ready to become compatible with the digital flow. 101 For the new generation access to language has more and more to do with inorganic connection, and less and less to do with the body of the mother. In her book L’ordine simbolico della madre [The Symbolic Order of the Mother], Luisa Muraro (1991) discovers the intimate relationship between signifier and signified, between sign and meaning, between word and affection. I believe in the meaning of the word “water” and I acknowledge the relationship between the signifier “water” and the liquid meaning because I trust in my mother. She has certified the relation between signifier and signified. What happens when the relation is broken, when the access to language is separated from the body and from affection, reduced to mere inter-operability between mechanic segments of an-emotional exchange? I say that language is in this way made precarious, frail, unable to grasp the emotional meaning of words. Actually the generation that is now entering the social sphere seems **psychologically frail** and **scarcely fit to link emotion and verbal exchange**. The huge multiplication of tools for communication, the digital saturation of the info-sphere, has dramatically reduced the spaces and the times of bodily interaction between persons. **Let us think of the crowd of people sitting in the subway every mornin**g. They are precarious workers moving towards the industrial and financial districts of the city, towards the places where they are working in precarious conditions. Everyone wears headphones, everybody looks at their cellular device, everybody sits alone and silent, never looking at the people who sit close, never speaking or smiling or exchanging any kind of signal. They are traveling alone in their lonely relationship with the universal electronic flow. Their **cognitive and affective formation has made of them the perfect object of a process of de-singularization**. They have been **pre-emptied and transformed into carriers of abstract fractal ability to connect, devoid of sensitive empathy so to become smooth, compatible parts of a system of interoperability**. Although **they suffer** from nervous aggression, and **from the exploitation that semiocapitalism is imposing on them**, although they suffer from the separation between functional being and sensible body and mind, they seem **incapable of human communication and solidarity;** in short, they seem unable to start any process of conscious collective subjectivation. The info-sphere is the dimension of intentional signs surrounding the sensible organism. Sensibility is an interface between organism and world, and particularly we may see it as the ability to understand the meaning of what cannot be said through words: the point of connection between sensitivity and language. Sensibility rather than judgment is the place of the mental mutation produced by the info-sphere. Changes of perception are intertwined with the technological architecture surrounding the perceptive organism. Prior to modernity, a regime of slow transmission characterized the info-sphere and man’s psychic time and expectations of events and signals. The acceleration of semiotic transmission and the **proliferation of sources of information 102 transformed the perception of living time. The info-sphere became more rapid and dense, and sensibility underwent a process of increasing exposure to the flow of info-stimuli**. Due to an intensification of electronic signals, sensibility was dragged into a vertigo of simulated stimulation that **increased its speed to panic levels**. **The perception of the other and its body is reshaped**, too. Pressure, acceleration and automation affect gestural, postural behavior and the whole of social proxemics, the disposition and interaction of bodies in space. At the foundation of social proxemics lies a way of elaborating, hiding, exciting or repressing eroticism. Social proxemics intervene to change the disposition of the bodies that meet in the street and are nearby in the office or at school. Societies experience conditions of varying degrees of tension and aggressiveness also according to how they develop eroticism in the circulation of bodies. Throughout the history of civilization, **perception has been molded by artificial regimes of images and techniques of representation**. Through digital technology the image begins to **proliferate vertiginously and our faculty of imagination undergoes vortices of acceleration**. The image should not be considered as the brute perception of empirical data brought to our visual attention by matter: it is rather the effect of a semi-conscious elaboration. The technical mode in which we receive and elaborate images acts upon the formation of the imaginary. The imaginary in turn shapes the imagination, the activity whereby we produce images, and imagine worlds and thus make them possible in real life. The **repertoire of images at our disposal limits, exalts, amplifies or circumscribes the forms of life and events that, through our imagination, we can project onto the world, put into being, build and inhabit**. Techno-communicative and psycho-cognitive mutations are as interdependent as the organism and its ecosystem. The conscious organism is also sensuous; it is a bundle of sensitive receptors. The world we inhabit increasingly resembles the outcome of a projective zapping where we combine sequences of different linguistic derivations. The social unconscious does not easily adapt to this transformation of the info-sphere, because the social investment of desire is structured around the nucleus of identity, and this nucleus is fleeing and dissolving in all directions. Suddenly awoken by the eruption of semiotic proliferation, and deprived of the filters that the critical and disciplinary mind of modernity once possessed, the conscious organism reacts with panic. The communicative power of digital technology produces an excess of information with respect to the time of attention socially available. How is sensibility redefined and how does it adapt to over stimulation? I think that the **effect of semiocapitalist acceleration and over-exploitation of nervous energies is exhaustion. Nervous breakdown, psychopathology, panic, depression, suicidal epidemic**. “A titanic battle is about to begin, a Darwinian 103 struggle between competing psychopathies”, says Ballard in Super-Cannes, the book about the psychic catastrophe of the virtual class, published in the year 2000. Exhaustion: Re-Reading Baudrillard The concept of exhaustion entered public discourse in the 1970s with the publication of Limits to Growth, the Report of the Club of Rome: Under the direction of a team of systems analysts based at Massachusetts Institute of Technology…, the report gave voice to the prevailing consensus that Fordist manufacture had entered a period of irreversible decline. But it also brought something palpably new to the analysis. If there was a crisis in the offing, it was not one that could be measured in conventional economic terms – a crisis in productivity or economic growth rates – but rather a wholesale crisis in the realm of reproduction. For the Club of Rome what was at stake was no less than the continuing reproduction of the earth’s biosphere and hence the future of life on earth. The **most visible signs of the impending crisis were therefore to be found in the existence of all kind of ecological disequilibria, exhaustion, and breakdown, from rising levels of pollution to famine and the increase in extinction rates**. (Cooper 2008: 15-16) The Report refers to the physical resources, not to the dangers of overexploitation of the nervous energies of the social mind. But the Report cried havoc, because for the first time the intrinsic impossibility of unlimited growth was revealed. In her remarkable book, Melinda Cooper relates the concept of **exhaustion to the biological field, and also to the field of mental energy.** Cooper writes: Twenty years later, armed with more sophisticated modeling tools, the same team came up with a slightly more nuanced prognosis for the future. **Limits to growth, they now argued, were time-like rather than space-like**. This meant that **we might have already gone beyond the threshold at which an essential resource such as oil could be sustainably consumed, long before we would notice its actual depletion**. In fact, it was highly probable according to the report’s author, that we were already living beyond our limit, in a state of suspended crisis, innocently waiting for the future to boomerang back in our faces. Time is in fact the ultimate limit in the world’s model. (Cooper 2008: 16-17) Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here 104 touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation. Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. […] The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today **the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation.** The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its **simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value,** this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus **assured a second life**, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2) Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain 105 is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely. The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. **Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape**: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The **system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide.** So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: 106 No **need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy** it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view **exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption**. Radicalism could **abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.** The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of 107 death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I **think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange**. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good

#### This is an independent voter without the counterplan advocacy as well.

#### The Absolute insidious rhetoric that this card uses to discuss the attacks during 9/11 has to be rejected, The card above blatantly praises the Jihadists who killed themselves and took thousands of innocent lives for them, If this is the end goal of their system and this is how they want to attack capitalism it should be wholesale rejected from the debate space in general. Suicide is never a viable way to solve any problem and even the fronting of this as some abstract solution is harmful to debaters.

## Util

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### Prefer it:

#### 1-Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness— if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 2-Extinction comes first!

**Pummer 15** [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

**There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now**, whatever general moral view we adopt**: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war.** How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that **we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world.** According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. **Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here.** If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how **reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people.** Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, **this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake.** **Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter.** Even John Rawls wrote, “**All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.**” **Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view.** **They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk**, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. **Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). **To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being.** To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – **suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being**, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But **once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.** Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** **What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts?** I’ve just argued that **there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree.** But **even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one** (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), **they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk.** Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.** Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. **It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if**, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, **all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world.** While there are some non-crazy **views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness**, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless **seem to be fairly implausible views.** And **even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve.** Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. **Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast.** We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. **If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period.** Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. **Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.**” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

## Case

#### The ROB is to determine whether the material action of the aff is a good idea. Their ROB makes it impossible to be negative and kills fairness. It shifts the burden from negating the resolution to negating their model of asian melancholy which is bad because a) its incredibly arbitrary b) its impossible for the neg to read new ways that its has occurred. Making every debate on the topic about asian melancholy makes it hard to learn about the topic and policy education which is k2 real world advocacy skills. Their model of debate does this so its self-defeating.

### Cap Good

#### Transition is impossible – lack of support, consumption habits, and elite power domination- this card answers their Berardi evidence

Burch-Hansen 18

(Hubert Buch-Hansen, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy,” Ecological Economics, Volume 146, April 2018, pp. 157-163)

Political projects do not become hegemonic just because they embody good ideas. For a project to become hegemonic, (organic) intellectuals first need to develop the project and a constellation of social forces with sufficient power and resources to implement it then needs to find it appealing and struggle for it. In this context, it is worth noting that degrowth, as a social movement, has been gaining momentum for some time, not least in Southern Europe. Countless grassroots' initiatives (e.g., D'Alisa et al., 2013) are the most visible manifestations that degrowth is on the rise. Intellectuals – including founders of ecological economics such as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly, and more recently degrowth scholars such as Serge Latouche and Giorgos Kallis – have played a major role in developing and disseminating the ideas underpinning the project. A growing interest in degrowth in academia, as well as well-attended biennial international degrowth conferences, also indicate that an increasing number of people embrace such ideas.

Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required.

It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97).

While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an anti-market project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power.

Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23).

In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project.

The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989).

6. Consent It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project.

Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense.

Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this.

At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.

### Turn – CCS

#### CCS. Markets are key.

Gregory F. Nemet et al. 16, Associate Professor, La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Martina Kraus, German Institute for Economic Research Vera Zipperer, German Institute for Economic Research, November, 2016, The Valley of Death, the Technology Pork Barrel, and Public Support for Large Demonstration Projects, La Follette School Working Paper No. 2016-007

Because the ultimate (but not immediate) goal of supporting demonstrations is to facilitate widespread adoption, demand a6nd thus markets are of course key (Kingsley et al., 1996). In climate change, policies are central to those markets (Taylor et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2015), thus credibility in those policies is also central (Rai et al., 2010; Finon, 2012). But it is striking how many demonstration programs confronted markets that involved negative shocks around the time that projects came on-line—we see it in synfuels, biofuels, and solar thermal electricity (Figure 9), and CCS (Figure 10). The 1.9 year average lag from project initiation to time on-line is crucial. It would be a mistake to assume a Hotelling price path in which prices of an exhaustible resource (e.g. oil, atmospheric storage of CO2) rise at a constant pure rate of time preference. In this case the relevant price is the level at which avoided CO2 emissions are remunerated. Rather the experience of the past suggests we are more likely to see shocks and boom–bust cycles (Krautkraemer, 1998; Zaklan et al., 2011). We see it in our data in the prices related to each demonstration program (Figure 8). Lupion and Herzog (2013) attribute the failure of the NER300 program to stimulate the construction of any CCS projects to 4 factors: competition with renewables, project complexity, low carbon prices, and a combination of fiscal austerity and weak climate policy around the global financial crisis. Note that three of the four problems involved future demand, not the funding structure itself. Demonstrations need markets that pay off innovation investments not just under a steadily increasing Hotelling-style market, but under a broad range of market conditions. Features of robust demand pull include niche markets (Kemp et al., 1998), hedging across jurisdictions (Nemet, 2010), and flexible production (Sanchez and Kammen, 2016). Government price guarantees have played an important role as we have seen on synfuels, solar thermal electricity, and on a smaller scale, photovoltaics.

#### Try or die for CCS to solve warming- this turns their Berardi evidence

Moniz 9/23/19 - 13th Secretary of Energy (2013 to 2017) and is the founder and CEO of the Energy Futures Initiative

Fredd Krupp is president of the Environmental Defense Fund, Ernest Moniz, “Cutting Climate Pollution Isn’t Enough — We Also Need Carbon Removal,” Text, TheHill, September 23, 2019, <https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/462609-cutting-climate-pollution-isnt-enough-we-also-need-carbon-removal>.

It has been almost four years since the Paris climate agreement was signed. But as leaders gather in New York this week for the United Nations Climate Change Summit, the world remains far off track from meeting the Paris objective of limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius -- and pursuing efforts at 1.5 degrees.

To meet that target, the world must achieve a 100 percent clean economy — one that produces net zero emissions, or no more climate pollution than can be removed from the atmosphere — soon after mid-century, with the United States and other advanced economies reaching that milestone no later than 2050. It’s a daunting but doable task.

The consequences of falling short are enormous. This year, the U.S. government’s fourth National Climate Assessment documented the huge economic and social impacts of unchecked warming. The Pentagon has repeatedly warned of the impacts on national security and our troops.

Achieving a 100 percent clean economy will require a swift transition to renewables and other zero-carbon energy sources. But we also need to face the reality that meeting the Paris target will require taking carbon out of the atmosphere at massive scale. In part, that’s because eliminating emissions will be very challenging for some sectors, especially the transportation industry and agriculture. Removing carbon from the atmosphere would also bring concentrations down, helping to stabilize the climate at safer levels. So, the push for clean energy must be supplemented by a suite of technologies known as carbon dioxide removal (CDR).

It is not a question of what we’d prefer. It’s a question of insurmountable math.

The crucial role carbon removal must play is becoming more widely recognized. The 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report stressed the importance of carbon removal, and the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine late last year estimated that ten billion tons of CO2 will need to be pulled from the atmosphere annually by 2050, and double that by 2100. For context, today’s global emissions are less than 40 billion tons per year. If the 10 billion tons of CO2 from CDR were stored underground, that would be roughly double the world’s annual oil production.

The good news is that there are a surprisingly large number of promising pathways for carbon dioxide removal. Nature-based approaches include reforestation and forest management as well as agricultural practices that increase carbon stored in soils. Some of the attendant challenges include competition for land and permanence of the carbon sequestration.

Technological approaches include direct air capture — machines that actually suck carbon from the air — and technologically-enhanced natural processes, such as plants genetically modified with deep roots to fix carbon in the soil; enhanced mineralization, which uses certain reactive rocks to bind with carbon from the air; and accelerated ocean uptake in phytoplankton. These technologies are immature and require considerable research, development and demonstration to ensure viability and affordability at very large scale.

Despite the urgency, there is no dedicated federal effort to develop these crucial technologies; existing programs are piecemeal and largely focused on sequestering emissions from industrial and electricity generating sources.

The National Academies recommended the rapid establishment of a robust, focused, scalable and accelerated federal research program spanning the Departments of Energy and Agriculture, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Science Foundation, among others. Such a program would encompass the full range of technological pathways that can remove CO2 from the environment. ‘’Clearing the Air,’’ an analysis of CDR’s value and a proposed plan to deploy it, has been completed by the Energy Futures Initiative. Over the next decade, the program scale would be about a billion dollars a year.

Carbon dioxide removal is not a magic bullet. We must do everything we can to deploy innovative low- and zero-carbon methods to generate electricity, heat homes, fuel vehicles, and power industry, creating new economic opportunities in the process. Tackling the climate crisis also requires placing a declining limit and a price on carbon pollution, as well as a significant increase in energy technology innovation and deployment across the board.

But CDR is also not a “Plan B.” It is a critical part of any “Plan A” for climate, a necessary complement to emission reduction. It can provide more flexibility and optionality in policy planning, which could ease the transition to a carbon-neutral economy while minimizing transition costs and providing greater assurance that science-based climate goals can be met in a timely manner. It would eventually enable a net negative global economy that could bring the atmospheric carbon concentrations down — and global temperatures with it.

We have delayed meaningful action for far too long. As a result, the scale and urgency of the challenge is such that we cannot simply work on doing better in the future. We need to correct what we did in the past. Carbon removal is the enabler.

### AT: Growth Unsustainable—Resources

#### Human ingenuity makes resource holdings greater than consumption could ever exhaust—their ev ignores our undiminished potential for innovation

Lomborg ’12 Bjørn Lomborg, Adjunct Professor at Copenhagen Business School and head of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, “Environmental Alarmism, Then and Now,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2012, Vol. 91, Issue 4, pp. 24-40, ebsco

THE BASIC point of The Limits to Growth seemed intuitive, even obvious: if ever-more people use ever-more stuff, eventually they will bump into the planet's physical limits. So why did the authors get it wrong? Because they overlooked human ingenuity. The authors of The Limits to Growth named five drivers of the world system, but they left out the most important one of all: people, and their ability to discover and innovate. If you think there are only 280 million tons of copper in the ground, you'll think you'll be out of luck once you have dug it out. But talking about "known reserves" ignores the many ways available resources can be increased. Prospecting has improved, for example. As recently as 2007, Brazil found the Sugar Loaf oil field off the coast of São Paulo, which could hold 40 billion barrels of oil. Extraction techniques have also been improving. The oil industry now drills deeper into the ground, farther out into the oceans, and higher up in the Arctic. It drills horizontally and uses water and steam to squeeze out more from existing fields. And shale gas can now be liberated with new fracking technology, which has helped double U.S. potential gas resources within the past six years. This is similar to the technological breakthrough of chemical flotation for copper, which made it possible to mine ores that had previously been thought worthless, and similar to the Haber-Bosch process, which made nitrogen fixation possible, yielding fertilizers that now help feed a third of humanity. Aluminum is one of the most common metallic elements on earth. But extracting it was so difficult and expensive that not so long ago, it was more costly than gold or platinum. Napoleon III had bars of aluminum exhibited alongside the French crown jewels, and he gave his honored guests aluminum forks and spoons while lesser visitors had to make do with gold utensils. Only with the invention of the Hall-Héroult process in 1886 did aluminum suddenly drop in price and massively increase in availability. Most often, however, ingenuity manifests itself in much less spectacular ways, generating incremental improvements in existing methods that cut costs and increase productivity. None of this means that the earth and its resources are not finite. But it does suggest that the amount of resources that can ultimately be generated with the help of human ingenuity is far beyond what human consumption requires. This is true even of energy, which many think of as having peaked. Costs aside, for example, by itself, the Green River Formation in the western United States is estimated to hold about 800 billion barrels of recoverable shale oil, three times the proven oil reserves of Saudi Arabia. And even with current technology, the amount of energy the entire world consumes today could be generated by solar panels covering just 2.6 percent of the area of the Sahara.

# 2nr