NOCEMEBR LD NEG: This will be the end

Interp - The letter “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” – the resolution must be proven true in all instances, not one particular instance

CCC Capital Community College [a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation], “Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles AG

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

“Government” is a generic indefinite singular.

Leslie 12 Leslie, Sarah-Jane. “Generics.” In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian Russell and Delia Fara, 355–366. Routledge, 2012. <https://www.princeton.edu/~sjleslie/RoutledgeHandbookEntryGenerics.pdf> SM

GENERICS VS. EXISTENTIALS The interpretation of sentences containing bare plurals, indefinite singulars, or definite singulars can be either generic as in (1) respectively or existential/specific as in (2): (1) Tigers are striped A tiger is striped The tiger is striped. (2) Tigers are on the front lawn A tiger is on the front lawn The tiger is on the front lawn. The subjects in (1) are prima facie the same as in (2), yet their interpretations in (1) are intuitively quite different from those in (2). In (2) we are talking about some particular tigers, while in (1) we are saying something about tigers in general. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. For example, if it is true that tigers are on the lawn, then it will also be true that animals are on the lawn. This is not so if the sentence is interpreted generically. For example, it is true that tigers are striped, but it does not follow that animals are striped (Lawler 1973 Laca 1990; Krifka et al 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification (in the sense of Lewis 1975) with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1) (e.g. “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (2) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g. “tigers are usually on the front lawn). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually”.)

Applies to “just governments” – upward entailment – just doesn’t mean unjust

Violation – They spec Germany

Standards:

1] Limits – You can pick any government and find a flimsy definition of it being “just”. Just is super vague and it’s easy to prove any government as just. That’s over 123 countries – there are solid affs for China, US, India, South Africa, and Russia - that explodes neg prep burdens and kills clash. Generics don’t solve- infinite pre-round prep and encourages reading the same arguments which kills education.

Stratskew – harming fairness due to high specificity

Voter education is key and goal of debate.

Fairness – a voter because debate is a comp we need to be fair.

ITUC 20**,** (International Trade Union Confederation, “World’s Worst Countries for Workers”), ITUC, 2020, https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc\_globalrightsindex\_2020\_en.pdf // MNHS NL recut DD AG

In 2020, strikes have been severely restricted or banned in 123 out of 144 countries. In a significant number of these countries, industrial actions were brutally repressed by the authorities and workers exercising their right to strike often faced criminal prosecution and summary dismissals.

we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

Drop the debater bc you can’t drop the arg on their advocacy

No rvis – they can dump on theory in the 1ar, chilling us from checking abuse

Competing interps – reasonability is arbtirary and causes race to the bottom

## I negate the resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

## **Framework**

**I value morality**

**The standard for today’s debate is minimizing existential risk.**

Extinction first:

**Sánchez ’17** (David; 2/8/17; BA in Public Policy, BA in Economics and Philosophy, expert at the Kenan Institute for Ethics, citing Nick Bostrom, PhD in Philosophy; Duke’s The Chronicle; “Existential risks”;<http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2017/02/existential-risks-questions-and-considerations>; DOA:  4/21/17) ahsBC

How often do you think about the end of the world? Some people think about it quite a bit. Within Effective Altruism circles, many people share a concern for the future of humanity. Effective Altruists attempt to combine good intentions with science and reasoning to find the best ways to do good, whether for humans or non-human animals. **Mitigation of** so-called “**existential risks” is a** huge **priority** for some of their more risk-seeking members. An existential risk, put simply, is some class of possible event that presents a risk of extinction to humanity. Nick Bostrom, Oxford philosopher and existential risk extraordinaire, defines it this way: “One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.” Some **main** classes of **existential risk include** catastrophic climate change, malicious artificial superintelligence, the emergence of malicious nanotechnology, **nuclear war** and malicious bio-tech, among others. When considering the threats posed by so-called “x-risks,” there are at least three factors to keep in mind. First, bear in mind that if humanity continues for the foreseeable future, then the number of potential people in the future will be significantly higher than the number who exist today or have existed in the past. Additionally, the expected disutility of extinction-level events is massive, meaning that even a small mitigation of those probabilities results in a huge positive. Per one interpretation of the evidence, “even if we use the most conservative of these estimates… we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1016 human lives. This implies that **the** expected **value of reducing** existential **risk by** a mere **one millionth of one percentage point is** at least **a hundred times the value of a million human lives**.” If this holds even remotely true, then surely we should keep listening. Second, consider that some experts believe the probability of extinction-level events is somewhat high. In a report released by Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, a survey of experts found the likelihood of extinction by the year 2100 to be a whopping 19 percent. While this number should be taken with a grain of salt, it is unsettling that people in the know are so pessimistic about our odds. Third, bear in mind that there are very, very few people dedicated to mitigating these existential risks. Some limited efforts exist, but they are low-staffed and underfunded. As Nick Bostrom has noted, even “a million dollars could currently make a vast difference to the amount of research done on existential risks; the same amount spent on furthering world peace would be like a drop in the ocean.” If you’re looking for a cause with a funding gap, this might be just the ticket. Looking throughout history, **we can find plenty of examples of near-nuclear war**; the Future of Life Institute compiled a nice list of the most notable. What this might show us is that our planet has almost faced near-extinction level events in the past. One reason we are all still here is because people worked to craft systems that would avoid careless mistakes or oversights. In other words, we built systems that attempted to mitigate these risks. If these systems had not been in place, and lazy fail-safes failed to prevent disaster, then what would have happened? Perhaps not outright extinction, but disaster indeed. During the Cold War, the notion of “mutually assured destruction” was not some abstract; it was a working possibility, one that humanity had to take seriously. So today, in a world with ever-advancing technology and geopolitical uncertainty, we lack a compelling reason not to take these sorts of risks seriously. The need to mitigate existential risk stands or falls with free will—if it does not exist, then there is little or no case to be made. But if it does—even to an extent—then we have every reason to at least listen to the experts. So, perhaps my thesis is that insofar as a person believes humans have free will (i.e. a degree of autonomy over their destinies), he or she likely will have reason to support causes that mitigate the risks imposed by disaster scenarios. This is not meant to take a stand on cause prioritization. It might be more worthwhile still to donate to groups that fight global health problems or empower people economically. However, excluding opportunity cost, donating time or money to mitigating these threats is likely net positive, depending on the efficacy ofS the organization or project. Given that we have not observed an existential threat play out in the past, **we might be biased towards believing that one might never emerge.** Accordingly, this is an area where rational thinking is absolutely essential. In my view, whether or not to support or donate to these causes is an open question. But if the whole of humanity is at stake, it is at least a conversation worth having.

Contention 1: MILITARY

#### **Armed forces can’t strike now**

**LII 6**

[Cornell Legal Information Institute, 2006, "10 U.S. Code § 976," Cornell Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/976]/Kankee

(a)In this section: (1)The term “member of the armed forces” means (A) a member of the armed forces who is serving on active duty, (B) a member of the National Guard who is serving on full-time National Guard duty, or (C) a member of a Reserve component while performing inactive-duty training. (2)The term “military labor organization” means any organization that engages in or attempts to engage in— (A)negotiating or bargaining with any civilian officer or employee, or with any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces; (B)representing individual members of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such member in the armed forces; or (C)striking, picketing, marching, demonstrating, or any other similar form of concerted action which is directed against the Government of the United States and which is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (i)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of military service of any member of the armed forces, (ii)recognize any organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with complaints and grievances of such members arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces, or (iii)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of military service of individual members of the armed forces. (3)The term “civilian officer or employee” means an employee, as such term is defined in section 2105 of title 5. (b)It shall be **unlawful** for a member of the **armed forces**, knowing of the activities or objectives of a particular military labor organization— (1)to join or maintain membership in such organization; or (2)to attempt to enroll any other member of the armed forces as a member of such organization. (c)It shall be unlawful for any person— (1)to enroll in a military labor organization any member of the armed forces or to solicit or accept dues or fees for such an organization from any member of the armed forces; or (2)to negotiate or **bargain**, or attempt through any **coercive act** to negotiate or bargain, with any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of service of such members; (3)to **organize** or attempt to organize, or **participate** in, **any strike**, picketing, march, demonstration, or other similar form of **concerted action** involving members of the armed forces that is **directed** **against** the Government of the United States and that is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (A)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of service of any member of the armed forces, (B)recognize any military labor organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with any complaint or grievance of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces, or (C)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of service in the armed forces of individual members of the armed forces; or (4)to use any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by this subsection or by subsection (b) or (d). (d)It shall be unlawful for any military labor organization to represent, or attempt to represent, any member of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces. (e)No member of the armed forces, and no civilian officer or employee, may— (1)negotiate or bargain on behalf of the United States concerning the terms or conditions of military service of members of the armed forces with any person who represents or purports to represent members of the armed forces, or (2)permit or authorize the use of any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity which is for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by subsection (b), (c), or (d). Nothing in this subsection shall prevent commanders or supervisors from giving consideration to the views of any member of the armed forces presented individually or as a result of participation on command-sponsored or authorized advisory councils, committees, or organizations. (f)Whoever violates subsection (b), (c), or (d) shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000. (g)Nothing in this section shall limit the right of any member of the armed forces— (1)to join or maintain membership in any organization or association not constituting a “military labor organization” as defined in subsection (a)(2) of this section; (2)to present complaints or grievances concerning the terms or conditions of the service of such member in the armed forces in accordance with established military procedures; (3)to seek or receive information or counseling from any source; (4)to be represented by counsel in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations; (5)to petition the Congress for redress of grievances; or (6)to take such other administrative action to seek such administrative or judicial relief, as is authorized by applicable laws and regulations.

Amendments 1997—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 105–85 substituted “shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000.” for “shall, in the case of an individual, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and in the case of an organization or association, be fined not less than $25,000 and not more than $250,000.” 1987—Subsec. (a)(1) to (3). Pub. L. 100–26 inserted “The term” after each par. designation and struck out uppercase letter of first word after first quotation marks in each paragraph and substituted lowercase letter. 1986—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 99–661 struck out the second of two commas before “(B)”. 1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–525 added cl. (B) and redesignated existing cl. (B) as (C). Findings; Purpose Pub. L. 95–610, § 1, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3085, provided that: “(a)The Congress makes the following findings: “(1)Members of the armed forces of the United States must be prepared to fight and, if necessary, to die to protect the welfare, security, and liberty of the United States and of their fellow citizens. “(2)Discipline and prompt **obedience** to lawful orders of superior officers are **essential** and time-honored **elements** of the American **military** tradition and have been reinforced from the earliest articles of war by laws and regulations prohibiting conduct detrimental to the military chain of command and lawful military authority. “(3)The processes of conventional collective bargaining and labor-management negotiation cannot and should not be applied to the relationships between members of the armed forces and their military and civilian superiors. “(4)Strikes, slowdowns, picketing, and other traditional forms of job action have no place in the armed forces. “(5)Unionization of the armed forces would be **incompatible** with the military **chain of command**, would **undermine** the role, authority, and position of the commander, and would **impair** the morale and **readiness** of the armed forces. “(6)The circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of the armed forces to perform their mission are not comparable to the circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of Federal civilian agencies to perform their functions and should be viewed in light of the need for effective performance of duty by each member of the armed forces. “(b)The purpose of this Act [enacting this section] is to promote the readiness of the armed forces to defend the United States.”

#### **Military unions wreck civilian military relations and US hegemony**

**Caforio 18**

[Giuseppe Caforio, Brigadier General with degrees in law, political science, and strategic studies (FYI, the author died ~2015, but this was republished in 2018 in an anthology book), 5-20-2018, "Unionisation of the Military: Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2\_19]/Kankee

THE OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES But if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionization issue for the armed forces? Why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel? The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which is summarized thusly by David R. Segal: Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of **unlimited liability** with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on **the firing line** **is** required to make a commitment of a **different** order **from** that made by the worker on **the assembly line**. (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 28). Bernhard Boene, in a study devoted to a different research topic (Boene, 1990), is both precise and efficacious in differentiating military "work" from civilian work. Military specificity, writes Boene, does not lie only in the area of the risks to which one supposes the combatant is exposed, but also in the limits of application of common rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression of social norms that it entails. This implies a particular type of socialization. Notwithstanding partial analogies, according to Boene, civil emergencies belong to a different reality than military ones do. An officer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a "call," consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare, acceptance of risking his life, and submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to the military profession. SOME THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE Discussing a sample survey, David Segal observes that in the United States, in the absence of a union for military personnel, there is a considerable "misfit" between soldiers' perception of the characteristics of their role and the preferred characteristics, while in an analogous sample of civilian manpower this misfit is much smaller. In examining the attempted remedies, Segal states: "Any change to be achieved through organizational interventions, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have" (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 46). According to Segal, unionization can solve this problem, but it presents two dangers that must be carefully weighed: the first is that it tends to extend its influence also to aspects of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it involves a politicisation of the personnel. Gwyn Harries Jenkins examines the consequences that unionisation would have on the operational efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three fundamental ones: 1. The creation of a dual authority structure: Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes: it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, creating a **dual authority** structure while modifying the traditional basis of **compliance**. (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 70) 2. A much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of civilian management. The new tasks and the introduction of unionization would require commanders to possess skills and orientations more and more like those of civilian managers. 3. An abdication by the officer of his traditional image. Indeed, if the officer "wishes to retain his self-image and ideas of honor, then the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with **substantial dysfunctional consequences**" (H.Jenkins, 1977, p. 71). Harries Jenkins concludes, however, by affirming that, as a radical criticism of the existing military system, "the unionization of the armed forces can only result in an improvement to an otherwise defective situation" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 69). According to William Taylor and Roger Arango (Taylor et al., 1977b), many reasons offered in the United States for or against the unionization of military personnel appear to be rhetorical and not sufficiently investigated. Those who take a negative critical stance, for example, contend that unionization would lead to a **breakdown in discipline**; **threaten the chain of command**; and, especially, **undermine** the military's **ability** to carry out its assigned mission. Through a concrete field analysis, these authors believe they can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Among the advantages are the acquisition of a greater sense of individual security, a valorization of the dignity of individuals, improved social communication, and greater competitiveness with other occupations and professions in recruiting personnel. The real **drawbacks** would essentially be reduced to two: a risk of **divisiveness** within units, due to acquired **strife** between personnel categories; and an increase in **personnel costs**. Carlo Jean (Jean, 1981) states that in itself, the creation of unions would inevitably produce increased **confrontation**; without it, the union representatives would have neither prestige nor **credibility**. He does not believe, however, that the biggest drawback that would derive from it would be that of undermining the internal cohesiveness of the armed forces and their operational capacity. According to this author military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands out of necessity to avoid internal breakup. An unacceptable corporative force would be produced that sooner or later would inevitably oppose it to the political power. The danger that a union of military personnel involves for civil society is, in his opinion, much greater than its negative implications on the efficiency of the military itself. Along the same line is the fear expressed by Sen. Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, cited essay) that unionization **might reinforce the military establishment and increase its influence over society** at large, decreasing the capacity for political control. This issue had already been treated by Cortright in another essay (Cortright and Thurmond, 1977b), where on the one hand he argued that unionization in the armed forces would help to prevent any form of separateness from civil society while noting on the other that little attention was given to the possibility that unionization substantially strengthens the military's ability to **wield** **influence**. Thurmond, again, judges the European experience negatively and asks himself how unionized troops would respond in battle. However, to remain faithful to his position, Thurmond conceives the armed forces as a separate body from civil society, argues that military personnel are not comparable to other labor force categories, and advances the fear that **union** representation of the interests of military personnel **would bring the defence budget to unacceptable levels**. Of the countries included in our study,

#### Only U.S. hegemony prevents global instability---alternatives can't maintain peace

**Haass, 17** - President of the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard, "Who Will Fill America’s Shoes?," *Project Syndicate*, 6-24-2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-leadership-successor-to-america-by-richard-n--haass-2017-06)

Still, a shift away from a US-dominated world of structured relationships and standing institutions and toward something else is under way. What this alternative will be, however, remains largely unknowable. What we do know is that **there is no alternative great power willing and able to step in and assume what had been the US role**.

China is a frequently mentioned candidate, but its leadership is focused mostly on consolidating domestic order and maintaining artificially high economic-growth rates to stave off popular unrest. China’s interest in regional and global institutions seems designed mostly to bolster its economy and geopolitical influence, rather than to help set rules and create broadly beneficial arrangements.

Likewise, Russia is a country with a narrowly-based economy led by a government focused on retaining power at home and re-establishing Russian influence in the Middle East and Europe. India is preoccupied with the challenge of economic development and is tied down by its problematic relationship with Pakistan. Japan is held back by its declining population, domestic political and economic constraints, and its neighbors’ suspicions.

Europe, for its part, is distracted by questions surrounding the relationship between member states and the European Union. As a result, the whole of the continent is less than the sum of its parts – **none** of which **is large enough to succeed America on the world stage**.

But the absence of a single successor to the US does not mean that what awaits is chaos. At least in principle, the world’s most powerful countries could come together to fill America’s shoes. In practice, though, **this will not happen**, as these countries lack the capabilities, experience, and, above all, a consensus on what needs doing and who needs to do it.

#### Goes nuclear---extinction

Thomas H. **Henricksen 17**, emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 3/23/17, “Post-American World Order,” <http://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order>

The tensions stoked by the assertive regimes in the Kremlin or Tiananmen Square could **spark a political or military incident** that might set off a chain reaction leading to a **large-scale war**. Historically, powerful rivalries nearly always lead to at least skirmishes, if not a full-blown war. The anomalous Cold War era **spared** the United States and Soviet Russia a direct conflict, largely from concerns that one would trigger a **nuclear exchange destroying** both states and much of **the world**. Such a repetition **might** reoccur in the unfolding three-cornered geopolitical world. It seems safe to acknowledge that an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia will persist in their geo-strategic ambitions.

What Is To Be Done?

The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union.

What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by **staying militarily and economically strong**, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ hawkish behavior that might otherwise trigger a **major conflict**. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic chess match with Russia and China will prove tense and demanding—since **all the countries boast nuclear arms** and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously.

There can be **little room for error** in fraught **crises among nuclear-weaponized** and **hostile powers**. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a **waiting game** in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a collapse, as happened to the Soviet Union.

Contention 2: Hong Kong Hedges

#### **Hong Kong doesn’t allow political strikes**

**Tang and Pang 20**

[Nickolas Tang, writer on Hong Kong’s self-determination for the Nation, and, Jun Pang, writer and researcher of migration and detention for the Nation, 3-12-2020, "‘I Am Willing to Take a Bullet for You. Are You Willing to Go on Strike for Me?’," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/hong-kong-unions-strike/]/Kankee

After the wave of political mobilization in the 1960s, the British colonial government attempted to defuse activism by strengthening social service provisions, including implementing free basic education, shorter working hours, and increasing the availability of public housing. Academic Agnes Ku notes that the government continually pointed to the example of the 1967 riots as an example of the threat of social upheaval, stressing instead the importance of state-directed efficiency, stability, and prosperity. This continued after the handover, with the government adopting policies prioritizing Hong Kong’s economic development and competitiveness, presenting them as a panacea to all social and distributive issues. Article 27 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law—the territory’s mini-constitution—guarantees residents the right to form and join associations, including trade unions. The right to form a union is reserved for those who ordinarily reside in Hong Kong; that does not necessarily include migrant workers, though some have mobilized through unions and other networks to fight for stronger protections. Notably, there are no provisions for collective bargaining for anyone, which means that negotiations between employers and trade unions are not protected by law. Furthermore, strikes are legally protected only when they **pertain solely** to **labor disputes**—which is why, for example, the Hospital Authority recently warned striking medics that they may face **repercussions** for their **politicized strike action**. Carol Ng, the chairperson of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, the largest pro-democracy union organization in Hong Kong, believes that many of the city’s unions have failed to reflect their members’ political views. “For example, there are seven unions representing railway workers in Hong Kong, but they are all pro-establishment, and disconnected from their members’ grievances,” she says. “It wasn’t until the formation of Railway Power [a pro-democracy union] last October that rank-and-file workers have a union actively supporting their demands.”

#### **Backing down on the Hong Kong strike implodes the CCP and escalates Chinese nationalism – star this card**

**Hiciano 20**

[Lery Hiciano, graduate student at Claremont, 2020, “Nearly Halfway There: The Future of Hong Kong, China, and One Country Two Systems,” Claremont Colleges, https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3513&context=cmc\_theses]/Kankee

Chapter 5: Domestic Legitimacy, The CCP, and Xi Jinping Today, Hong Kong’s democratic movements pose even less risk than before to China’s economic growth. In fact, 2019’s protest shows that an actively rebellious Hong Kong can still meet the requirements for China’s domestic market. With the 2047 date looming ever closer, the Central Government likely feels assured of eventual economic integration. The **seriousness** with which Beijing treats **Hong Kong** **protest** movements, as well as other **offenses** to China’s **territorial integrity**, are **driven** not by economic concerns, but more **foundationally** by **concern** about the CCP’s ability to **survive** into the future. Mainland reactions to the protests of 2003 and 2012 compared to the protests of 2014 and 2019 demonstrate China’s policymakers have become significantly **less tolerant** of Hong Kong demands for democracy, autonomy, and personal freedoms. The balancing act between Beijing’s **credibility**, China’s domestic security, and defense of its **territorial sovereignty** on one hand, and the need for a prosperous, placated Hong Kong on the other, is the central **issue** in Beijing’s calculations regarding the territory. The CCP betrays its anti-colonial roots when it suppresses local autonomy in the name of unification. China is not the first nation that disregarded its revolutionary origins. Zakaria’s theories are founded in the fact that the U.S underwent a similar process when it went from advocating a European-free hemisphere to seeking its own colonies. Within China, the same fears of Hong Kong secessionism and pro-independence ring even louder as Chinese officials view Hong Kong as merely an arena for Chinese nationalism to compete with local elements. As one expert put it, “Hong Kong’s resilient struggle for autonomy is seen as presenting similar challenges already apparent in China’s peripheries: terror attacks in Xinjiang, self-immolations in Tibet, and political agitation in Taiwan.”180 Xinjiang and Tibet, although different due to the role ethnicity has played in both region’s resistance to Chinese rule and subsequent Chinese tactics of repression, are fundamentally related to the issue of Hong Kong and stages on which the CCP can demonstrate its commitment to territorial integrity no matter the cost. Snyder’s most relevant observation is that states’ adherence to the myth of **domino theory** – “losses in the empire’s **periphery** can easily bring a **collapse** of power at the imperial core” – can lead to strategic blunders and over-expansion.181 He cites this as, additionally, a product of the myth of the “turbulent frontier,” the belief that the best defensive strategy is one that continuously expands into the periphery in order to tame anarchic forces seeking to undermine the state in those same territories. Some of the first moves made by the newly founded PRC were on shoring up periphery, on the national front invading Tibet and forcing the Dalai Lama into exile, reintegrating the nascent second East Turkestan Republic into Xinjiang (literally translated to “new frontier”), and the First Taiwan Crisis. Within China, the concept of untamed, peripheral, frontiers is central to the nation’s creation myth. Zhongguo, or China, most accurately translates to “middle country,” a designation derived from the old imperial system in which the Chinese emperor not only governed China, but in fact, invested legitimacy in other monarchs. Confucian maps from pre-modern China show a world in which the emperor is at the center, with each concentric ring radiating out, signifying not just physical distance, but also cultural distance, or civilizational distance. Cartographers placed Korea in the second ring, since Koreans adopted Confucianism and used Chinese characters. Semi-nomadic, semi-Confucian barbarians in areas under nominal Chinese authority made up the third ring. Beyond them, untamed nomadic settlers made up the fourth. Centralized, Chinese authorities delegating autonomy to frontier, non-Chinese groups is part of a wider web of narratives that nationalist groups promote as an integral part of China’s legacy. The PRC, deriving legitimacy from this historical tradition, no doubt was inspired by dynastic precedent. The original basis for OCTS, even before Deng offered it to Taiwan, has its roots in a 17-point proposal from 1951 to allow Tibet to maintain autonomy. That proposal itself derived from Qing imperial policy that encouraged border areas to maintain local autonomy for a short period of time, before eventual integration within China. As Ho-fung Hung states, “The “one country, two systems” formula for Hong Kong is just a tactical and transitional arrangement. What awaits Hong Kong is what Tibet has seen since 1959: forced assimilation and tight direct control by Beijing.”182 Part of the CCP’s suppression of Hong Kong’s autonomy is the use of very paternal language. Xi himself stated in a 2017 speech, “It has been 20 years since Hong Kong’s return. According to China’s tradition, a man enters adulthood at the age of 20. So today, we are celebrating the coming of age of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (HKSAR), which has grown with the vigor of a bamboo or pine tree.”183 His language is obviously patronizing, and by specifying that the HKSAR had not yet entered “adulthood,” he reduces the conflicts of the Umbrella Movement to adolescent rebelliousness. Xi’s words speak to a larger trend of thought within the ranks of the CCP. Another official once stated that Hong Kong residents’ different understanding of OCTS necessitated not just “serious attention,” but that “the people of Hong Kong should be re-enlightened about the ‘one country, two systems’ policy.”184 Behind this rhetoric, it is clear that there is growing tension within the PRC to how to resolve the issues within Hong Kong. Ultimately, the CCP finds itself at a **critical juncture**. Its **core interests**, and the lengths it goes to in order to protect them from slights, betray an **inherent insecurity** within the CCP apparatus. It has been abundantly clear for much of the decade that the way forward for the CCP and China looks very different from the path it has taken so far. The same methods of economic growth are no longer possible, the demographics of the nation are different, the global stage is changed, and institutional ossification within the CCP has only further set in. The 2019 Hong Kong protests touched on various **sensitive** **nerves** within a party that is **increasingly wary** of threats, however real or **imaginary**, to its rule. Simultaneously, the CCP is currently led by Xi Jinping, who is the first leader since Mao to abandon the party’s practices of ruling-bycommittee. The CCP Within a State-Party system such as China, the fundamental goal of the party is to survive. Following Mao, the CCP staked its **legitimacy** on economic progress, with its nationalist defense of Chinese honor in close second.185 To describe nationalism as natural, or to assume Chinese people are inherently more nationalistic than others, would be a mistake. The CCP has made it an **explicit goal** to **foster nationalism** within China through educational means and statecontrolled media. The Taiwan issue became the third rail of Chinese politics because of years of propaganda initiatives. It is such a problem that many within China, from officials to military generals to average citizens, remain convinced that “No regime could **survive** the loss of Taiwan.”186 There is no way for any observer to know if this is true, but Shirk states, “…**the myth linking the political survival of the CCP regime to Taiwan is so pervasive that it creates its own political reality**, especially in Communist Party headquarters.”187 If Taiwanese independence, something that has been the de-facto reality for seven decades, is a threat to the CCP’s survival, then Hong Kong’s moving away from China through democracy would assuredly be a setback. Hong Kong’s independence, the first time China would have lost territory following the Century of Shame, would be such a **disaster** for the party’s ability to rule that it is not mentioned as a **potential possibility**. The question of **regime survival** in the aftermath of Taiwanese, or worse, Hong Kong secession, is a question Chinese leadership is keen to avoid, hence the tension around the lack of any law in the territory supporting Article 23. The CCP’s Propaganda Ministry is ultimately responsible for the wellspring of domestic pressure that a Chinese official has termed a “hostage” situation, in which Chinese citizens, taught to care about Taiwan and Hong Kong as integral territories of China cut off by foreign powers, refuse to allow government acquiescence. The Chinese Communist Party **depends** on its nationalist image: the party fought off Japanese invasion in World War II, won the Civil War despite the KMT receiving significant amounts of foreign aid, and eventually negotiated the peaceful return of Hong Kong and Macau back to Chinese sovereignty. In the 1990s, in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the impending return of Hong Kong, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Propaganda Ministry led the “patriotic education campaign” to improve CCP legitimacy, a strategy that now severely distorts rhetoric with regards to Hong Kong democratic movements or Taiwanese elections. The Chinese professor who said that China can afford to let Taiwan go dared not voice this opinion even in a time of “soft politics” and the current domestic political situation in Mainland China is far from the softer politics that dominated pre-2008 and especially pre-Xi Jinping.188 In describing the CCP’s crisis of nationalism, Snyder states, “it may nonetheless become politically entrapped in its own rhetoric. Insofar as the elite’s power and policies are based on society’s acceptance of imperial myths, its rule would be **jeopardized** **by renouncing the myths when their side effects become costly. To stay in power and to keep central policy objectives intact, elites may have to accept some unintended consequences of their imperial sales pitch.”189 In this case, the unintended consequences include political upheaval and the potential dissolution of the stateparty** apparatus. Conventional logic dictates Chinese political survival is staked upon satisfying not the opinion of the “silent majority,” Chinese citizens who mostly likely could do without Taiwan or Hong Kong if it guaranteed continued economic growth, but instead those citizens who feel so strongly and buy into **nationalist rhetoric** so much that they may participate in mass protests against the government.190 This had led to a growing problem within Chinese policy-making: the country’s military power continues to increase relative to the United States and Taiwan, yet the party has lost control of the narrative of Taiwan’s flirtation with independence or US undermining of strategic interests.191 Furthermore, this nationalist juggernaut occurred nearly simultaneously with Taiwan’s switch from authoritarian, Chinese-facing and mainlander-dominated rule, to a democratic system in which younger generations of Taiwanese lack the romantic ideals of a reunified China.192 Ergo, the “unintended consequences” originally conceived decades ago have continuously increased in volatility. An earlier example of this would be the anti-American protests following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. 193 If such an accident were to happen today, with higher tensions, more modern weapons, and current leadership, the ensuing crisis could **quickly** spiral into **conflict**. In China’s Hong Kong, A Political and Cultural Perspective, Jiang Shigong attempts to reflect on Hong Kong’s role within China. Throughout the work, he uses the word “empire” with positive connotations, actively encouraging the CCP to incorporate elements of dynastic legitimacy and justifying the CCP’s decisions in Hong Kong by saying it ensured “patriotic people ruled Hong Kong.”194 According to him, “The return of Hong Kong was legitimate in political philosophy. Its legitimacy came from historical traditions- ‘Hong Kong as a part of China since ancient times.”195 The emphasis on history goes hand in hand with his earlier quote on “coercion” via modernity. Modernity inconveniences the government because Basic Law, the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and OCTS are not agreements that can easily be ignored. Ideally for him, the CCP could pick and choose when ‘one country’ or ‘two systems’ takes priority. However, his main thesis is that China must transform the identity of Hong Kong residents into people who first and foremost identify with the Chinese nation, or the arrangement of OCTS will never be sufficient. This is an opinion that is not unique to him, but that has circulated within policy-making circles.196 Jiang is not a harmless intellectual- he served as a researcher within the Hong Kong and Macau Liaison office, where he published several books.197 Throughout Jiang’s work, as well as in state media coverage of the city, the city’s history and independent culture is often reduced. Wai-Man Lam writes, “Hong Kong is re-emphasised, and in fact minimalised by Chinese officials as an economic city.”198 To briefly return to Anderson’s theories on nationalism and national identities, the goal of this language is to ensure that the imagined community of Hong Kong not only stays on the sub-national level, but that its existence is reduced to the imagination of just a few. Acknowledgement of democratic demands, or infractions against Basic Law, would implicitly not just support protestors, but also implicitly support the other imagined communities that the CCP hopes to erase. Even Xi himself stated, “China’s continuous and rapid development over the years provides an invaluable opportunity, an inexhaustible source of strength, and a broad space for Hong Kong’s development. As a saying in Hong Kong goes, “After leaving Suzhou, a traveler will find it hard to get a ride on a boat,” meaning an opportunity missed is an opportunity lost.”199 Hong Kong protestors waving British or American flags, Western media outlets’ favorable depiction of democratic movements, and increasing mutual suspicion all play a part in mainland depictions of the protests. News stories for The People’s Daily, all throughout the Umbrella Movement, as well as the Anti-Extradition Protests, cite “hostile foreign forces” as attempting to undermine Chinese sovereignty.200 The Simon Cheng incident during the 2019 protest illustrates how protests strike at the heart of the CCP’s PR problem, and how the divergent international and domestic audiences conflict. In August, Chinese security forces detained, interrogated, and tortured Simon Cheng, a Hong Kong resident and British consulate worker. At the Hong Kong-Shenzhen high-speed rail link, Chinese police stopped Cheng and placed him on a train going back to Shenzhen, reinforcing the increasing blurriness of the legal boundaries between Hong Kong and the Mainland.201 During interrogation, police mostly focused on his role as an agent for the British government to incite unrest in Hong Kong UK government sources found his claims credible, and Chinese police later released a tape of Cheng confessing to soliciting prostitutes, a common tactic used to shame political prisoners. The incident greatly inflamed China-UK relations, whose officials increasingly took a pro-protestor position, and it also further incited anger in the city as Cheng alleged that with him in prison were several Hong Kong protestors. 202 However, domestically, it is effective for the CCP to kidnap a consular worker as it allows them to continue to cite outside enemies. This tactic not only perpetuates myths about a hostile Western world, when the reality is a much murkier situation of aggression on both sides, but also undermines the legitimate complaints of the Hong Kong population. In one small study about news coverage of the Hong Kong protests, the writers found that there was a negative correlation between nationalism and attitudes toward democracy or pro-democratic movements.203 The same study also showed that people who were against the protests were more likely to read state news media in China. Overseas Chinese who had access to outside sources were more likely to support protestors, and less likely to cite reasons such as “foreign forces” as arguments behind the protests. However, like many other propaganda tactics, this narrative **severely limits** the government’s ability to **bargain** with protestors. To **acquiesce** in Hong Kong is **not to listen** to fellow Chinese citizens, it is to be **misled** by the West once again attempting to transform China into a liberal democracy. Therefore, the protests, Hong Kong, and democracy are inextricable from the tension in China’s relationship with the United States. Snyder’s relevant observations do not end at merely describing domino theory. His analysis of the domestic situations within Japan and Germany that led both countries down a path of world war and eventual destruction has several parallels within modern day China. He finds that late industrialization, including “large government role in in mobilizing and allocating investment, centralized financial institutions, relatively low levels of mass consumption, and economic concentration in the hands of a few giant cartels,” played a massive role in the expansion undertaken by both nations, as the melding of government and financial institutions led to a feedback loop with little space for democratic intervention.204 China’s economic rise demonstrates all of these issues: state-owned enterprises dominate the economy and a political banking sector secures cheap lines of credit for favorite firms. Successful Chinese enterprises often work in tandem with the state on matters such as trade policy and the development of technologies considered essential for the CCP’s larger goals. The limited levels of consumption in turn limit firm’s abilities to expand within China’s domestic market, and contribute to severe wealth stratification and income inequality that threatens cohesion as economic progress is confined to select urban areas primarily located on the eastern seaboard.205 The byzantine nature of the CCP, with its many councils, committees, and massive membership adds more complications with regard to China’s policy aims. As Snyder explains, a cartelized government, in which various different factions pull policy in different ways may lead to a situation in which the end result is an unintended consequence by all parties involved. In China, this is reflected in the complex process by which CCP leadership is chosen, a process that over the years has increasingly played out in the public sphere. For example, during the campaigns by Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping, both publicly criticized each other in the media, previously unheard of within internal CCP politics.206 Nien-Ching Chang Liao states, “China’s provocative behavior is driven by the dysfunctional internal dynamics of the government’s decision-making process. Certain ministries or agencies- the military, the fishing industry, the oil industry, various maritime agencies, provincial governments, and other local actors- might harbor parochial objectives of increasing their budget, promoting trade, or ensuring adequate supplies of energy.”207 The different goals of various government actors, either local officials, leaders of state-owned enterprises, or institutional actors, reflects inconsistency and unreliability. How does this relate to Hong Kong? Due to the autonomy promised within Basic Law, the Liaison Office in Hong Kong, the Office of the HKSAR in Beijing, and the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region all influence policy with regards to Hong Kong. Some believe that the Hong Kong government’s initial missteps during the early stages of 2019’s crisis were caused in part by the conflicting instructions received from different offices. 208 Therefore, not only does cartelization make China’s domestic and foreign policy unwieldly, it also played a direct role in how the situation in Hong Kong deteriorated further.

#### **The perception of backing down on a “core interest” magnifies the link – the aff is seen as compromising national sovereignty**

**Hiciano 20**

[Lery Hiciano, graduate student at Claremont, 2020, “Nearly Halfway There: The Future of Hong Kong, China, and One Country Two Systems,” Claremont Colleges, https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3513&context=cmc\_theses]/Kankee

Core Interests In Mainland criticisms and observations of Hong Kong’s status, several sources present a focus on the definition of “one country.” In another speech contained within The Governance of China, Xi highlights that for OCTS to function, there must be a “strong sense of one country.” He further adds that **sovereignty is not for negotiation**, and that it is China’s “**red line**.”209 The mythmaking around China’s history: the imperial system that placed Han civilization at the center of the world, which was then erased in “The Century of Shame,” in turn defines the CCP’s core interests. The **nationalist core** of CCP **legitimacy** and mythmaking is that the **party** will be the vanguard to lead China out of the ruins of that horrible period. Starting with the First Opium War and continuing until the CCP’s victory over the communists, China was the scene of some of history’s most tragic stories. The First Opium War was followed by the Second Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, Dungan Rebellion, Boxer Rebellion, the First Sino-Japanese War, the Warlord Period, the First Chinese Civil War, and the Second World War. In one century, China suffered tens of millions of deaths inflicted by combat, disease, famine, and natural disasters. Following the CCP’s victory in 1949, Chinese leaders across different eras have all **explicitly** made reference to the goal of returning the nation to its **previous heights**. Despite the party’s missteps in the 20th century, it has succeeded in rapidly moving China up in the global hierarchy. In a country such as China, a framework like OCTS is particularly groundbreaking because it is an agreement between the CCP and the people of Hong Kong. Not only that, it is also an agreement with the people of China, as it forever alters the contract between rulers and subjects by creating distinctions between the rights of different subnational entities. At the same time, it drastically widens the purview of “politics,” as the individual distinctions between subnational entities are negotiated. To do this between the PRC, a nominally communist authoritarian state, and one of the world’s most free-market cities required a significant amount of compromise to ensure a smooth transition. One writer states, “By casting **reunification** as an **uncompromisable** issue of national sovereignty, the Chinese government made this a default justification for all political, economic, social, and cultural changes. That is, reunification with Hong Kong demanded the supreme power of sovereignty to act ethically by not abiding by existing (Maoist) socialist norms and laws.” Now that the initial transition is complete, the justifications used to drive reform and originally put forward the concept of OCTS can now be used to harshly respond to the city’s democratic impulses. As the matter of reunification is “uncompromisable” to the extent that socialism is no longer at the core of the CCP, at the very least in one area, then **any attempts** to damage that relationship strike at the **heart** of the **CCP’s authority**. Since 2009, the CCP has given the general policies associated with this goal the name “core interests.”210 Starting with the territorial claims in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, they have now expanded to include regime stability, and continued economic development. The CCP is **unwilling to negotiate** on these issues. However, the full list of core interests as defined by the CCP has never been published or revealed. One army advisor stated, “as China becomes stronger, we can publicize by installments those core interests that our country can effectively safeguard”211 That quote is a clear admission that as China gains strength, the core interests will expand. In other words, there is no effective route of appeasement or clear stopping point for China’s potential expansion. However, the CCP is not only unwilling to negotiate on this vague list of issues, it also has a tendency to force others to acknowledge its position. For external audiences, the punishment for failing to follow the CCP agenda could come in the form of economic sanctions or corporate espionage. H.R McMaster, a former White House national security advisor, stated that the CCP’s tactics were “successful in part because the party is able to induce cooperation, wittingly or unwittingly, from individuals, companies, and political leaders.”212 In 2010, the CCP sanctioned Norway for the decision to award a Nobel Prize to dissident Liu Xiaobo. In another episode, Marriot International Hotels had to apologize for “violating national laws and hurting the feelings of the Chinese people” after perhaps insinuating that Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are independent from China.213 When Daryl Morey, General Manager of the Houston Rockets, tweeted his support for the 2019 Hong Kong Protests, the Houston Rockets had all their games banned from Chinese television, with threats that the same would happen to other NBA franchises. Other international firms consistently face the same pressure to conform to these narratives. Internal audiences, subject to actual enforcement of these policies, have no ability to dissent. The CCP’s track record regarding human rights and civil liberties is well-known to be abysmal. Human rights activists accurately compare it to a 21st century 1984, complete with mass surveillance, censored news & media, advanced facial recognition software, and much more. The personal costs of disagreeing can be extraordinarily high, even for something as apparently innocuous as a social media post. This also obscures whatever the true opinions of Chinese citizens may be. During the 2019 Hong Kong protests, many famous Chinese celebrities posted messages in support of the police or of the CCP.214 However, could any celebrity realistically have posted any message in support of the protestors? In a recent Athenaeum speech at Claremont McKenna College, a Chinese human rights lawyer questioned if the “resistance” had the ability to resist, if the state had made it impossible to do so. Hong Kong residents, through cases such as the disappearances of the booksellers, have already seen what awaits them under the CCP’s human rights regime. The CCP has succeeded in lasting this long by continuously adapting, however it is approaching the longest rule ever by a single party government. Minxin Pei, a foremost China expert, writes about how the CCP has survived by fueling mass consumerism, nationalism, and learning how to “fine tune” its repression tactics.215 However, with slowing economic growth and contentious power politics in the Asia-Pacific, it remains to be seen if increased repression is an effective tool with which to ensure regime survival. In South Korea and Taiwan, the authoritarian, economically focused, developmental states eventually gave way to democratic transitions. China is now nearing the point at which middle class citizens would call for democracy and greater participation in government ($10,000 per capita GDP).216 It remains to be seen whether in the face of growing potential crises, the CCP once again faces internal calls for democracy.

#### **Authoritarianism limits the CCP’s ability to make concessions**

**Sala 19**

[Ilaria Maria Sala, journalist based in Hong Kong, 8-7-2019, "Hong Kong Strikes, and Strikes a Nerve in Beijing The Chinese government is acting as though it would come unmoored if it made any concession to the protesters.," NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/opinion/hong-kong-protests-strike-china.html]/Kankee

This is not to say that all Hong Kongers are of one mind. Demonstrations in support of the police have taken place regularly, too, if less frequently and with fewer participants. In those rallies, which are never visited by riot police officers, participants stress their support for **China**, waving Chinese flags and wielding banners that declare their roots in various Chinese cities and provinces. The fault line running through Hong Kong is, more and more, about how much the city should be allowed to maintain its distinct identity or be refashioned as China’s Hong Kong. On Tuesday, Yang Guang, the spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office in Beijing, held his office’s second news conference since the beginning of the crisis more than two months ago. Previously, the office had only one in more than two decades, after Britain handed control of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Mr. Yang didn’t address any of the protesters’ grievances or demands, such as the withdrawal of the proposed extradition bill that set off the unrest or an independent inquiry into police brutality. The mainland authorities repeated their support for the city’s chief executive and the police. They strongly condemned the violence — by protesters, that is — calling them “reckless violent groups” who will “pay the price if they play with fire.” They admonished, patronizingly, that all this striking and demonstrating was damaging Hong Kong’s economy. “Do not mistake our restraint as being soft,” Mr. Yang also said. “Do not underestimate the central government’s determination in maintaining stability.” It was a veiled threat, and an admission of weakness, too. One of the most powerful governments in the world is acting as though it would come **unmoored** if it made **any concession** to popular demands. China seems as **fragile** as only a truly authoritarian government can be.

#### **Declining credibility causes CCP war over Taiwan to distract attention – it’s a key driver of Chinese political dynamics**

**Blumenthal 20**

[Dan Blumenthal, senior fellow and the director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute9-28-2020, "China's aggressive tactics aim to bolster the Communist Party's legitimacy," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, https://www.aei.org/articles/chinas-aggressive-tactics-aim-to-bolster-the-communist-partys-legitimacy/]/Kankee

Why does China seem to be on the warpath? In the first half of the 2020, Chinese soldiers killed dozens of Indian troops over disputed borders, sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel, and launched a record number of incursions into Taiwanese airspace. Beyond military coercion, China’s belligerence included selling arms to Serbia despite concerns expressed by NATO about military dependence, pressuring the WHO to censor anti-China content, and sentencing a Canadian national to death. and placing crushing tariffs on Australia for criticizing Beijing’s handling of the coronavirus. The prevailing wisdom is that Beijing is more aggressive now because it is ascendant and the United States is distracted and declining. This “Chinese ascendancy school” argues that President Xi Jinping has successfully consolidated domestic power and built China’s military and economic might to enable his vision of an aggressive, revisionist foreign policy. But this account is **overly-simplistic**: Chinese **aggression** is not merely a result of China’s strength, but also of its **weakness**. Xi Jinping’s **overwhelming concern** with **domestic stability**, the **C**hinese **C**ommunist **P**arty**’s** (CCP) **legitimacy** and **party unity** are **crucial drivers** of **China’s bellicosity**. China has faced two disasters in 2020—the coronavirus and historic floods—which exposed its fragilities and created internal unrest. Its response to both was the same: **escalating aggression** against its neighbors. China’s economic and military power made these provocations possible, but its need to **suppress internal divisions** made them **necessary**. The question is not why China has disputes with neighbors, but why now. If China’s aggression were only a result of its economic and military strength, then it could have paused its aggressive **foreign policy** as the political leadership back in Beijing refocused on dealing with the destructive wages of the coronavirus. Typically, governments in chaos have **little time** for adventurism abroad and must focus on remedies at home. In fact, many experts predicted that China would **face inward** during 2020, to focus on restarting economic growth and preventing new coronavirus cases. Yet for the CCP, external aggression is a necessary tool to combat internal weakness. The CCP is obsessed with its fragilities, such as the threat of losing popular support and legitimacy and demands for more justice and freedoms. When Chinese people criticize their government, China must act more **aggressively** abroad. Beijing uses external aggression to fan Chinese **nationalism** and cast the CCP as the protector of the people and champion of a new era of Chinese glory. Coronavirus was a true moment of weakness for the CCP, as it exposed fissures in China’s overcentralized authoritarian political system to light. A now-infamous example of Chinese paranoia over potentially out-of-control domestic crises was the case of Dr. Li Wenliang. On February 7, Li, a doctor who warned of the coronavirus but was quickly censored by the Wuhan police, died from the virus himself. Li’s death quickly became the top trending topic on Chinese social media with hashtags such as “We want freedom of speech.” The CCP censored all mentions of Li or any coronavirus failings, fearing more organized protests. Simultaneously, the coronavirus battered China’s economic growth, which underpins the CCP’s claim to legitimacy, with an unprecedented 6.8 percent Q1 contraction. Far from the unified front which Beijing seeks to project, the coronavirus revealed the CCP’s dysfunction. For example, Dali, a midsize city, intercepted and distributed a shipment of surgical masks headed to the hard-hit municipality of Chongqing. Similarly, the City of Qingdao instructed customs officials to hold on to a shipment of masks and medical products headed to Shenyang. At the same time, Hong Kong dealt the CCP a major political embarrassment when it halted traffic coming in from the mainland. These reports demonstrate the government’s inability to enforce basic order among competing cities and provinces. In response to the tumult caused by the coronavirus crisis, the CCP mobilized popular support by **reigniting conflicts** with its neighbors. On April 2, during the peak of the coronavirus, a Chinese maritime security vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Parcel islands. Just two weeks later on April 16, China escalated a month’s long standoff with Malaysia by deploying the coast guard to a disputed oil shelf. China also stepped up its military activities targeting Taiwan—who’s coronavirus response was strong and effective—with as many as three incursions in a single week in June. These episodes were widely condemned by the international community, but greeted with nationalist revelry at home. The need to project strength and unity domestically explains the timing of China’s border dispute with India. In May, violent brawls broke out between Chinese and Indian soldiers near Sikkim. On June 15, the Indian government reported that twenty Indian soldiers were killed by Chinese soldiers in the Galwan River Valley, a disputed border region controlled by India but claimed by China. The CCP has made full use of the crisis to rally nationalism. China’s foreign ministry issued statements blaming India for the clashes and state-propaganda popularized the slogan “China is not afraid.” The Global Times, a propaganda outlet, cast the clashes as an Indian invasion, saying “India has illegally constructed defense facilities across the border into Chinese territory in the Galwan Valley region.” Importantly, Chinese state-owned news outlets were also running news about India’s poor coronavirus response at the time, in contrast to its own “successes.” The recent border clashes mirror China’s 2017 standoff with India at Doklam, a strategic point near Bhutan. During the conflict, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made statements that cast the conflict as an Indian attack upon China, and state media circulated images from the 1962 Sino-Indian War, to remind the China populace that Beijing had defeated Delhi before. The India clashes coincided with another threat to CCP legitimacy: a fight to remove pro-democracy advocates from the Hong Kong Legislative Council. China ended up harshly cracking down on the supposedly autonomous city as well. Understanding China’s weaknesses is essential for policymakers attempting to make sense of its aggression. This dynamic is not only a Xi Jinping phenomenon: China’s modern history shows that domestic crises are often followed by belligerence. A study that pre-dated Xi’s rule, with a dataset of over three thousand interactions between the United States and China, found that the CCP was twice as likely to initiate disputes when the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) experienced a substantial drop. The SSE is a barometer of elite sentiment in China because the government pledges to protect elite investments and uses SSE listings to reward party insiders. Insight into the CCP’s domestic political objectives helps determine the magnitude of the conflict and appropriate response. The editor of the Global Times wrote that a belligerent foreign policy was “necessary to satisfy the Chinese people.” Policymakers can use history to deduce what levels of aggression are “necessary” for the CCP’s goals. In India, it is unlikely that clashes will escalate into invasion because the current skirmishes satisfy the CCP’s purpose of bolstering legitimacy. However, Taiwan may be in particular **danger** from China’s reactionary aggression. This is because the ways in which conflict with Taiwan would bolster the CCP’s legitimacy align more closely with more **violent coercion**—reunification is a **core element** of the CCP’s platform and Taiwan’s clear success fighting the coronavirus is a **major blow** to Beijing’s legitimacy. Because **Taiwan’s “threat” to the CCP stems from its mere existence**, it is particularly vulnerable to reactionary aggression. Xi is a self-proclaimed follower of Mao. So, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis is a powerful example; Mao needed to generate support for the great leap forward and deflect criticism from poor economic growth. To stir the nation, Mao seized islands controlled by Taiwan and threatened an invasion of the country until restrained by American nuclear brinksmanship. Over the last three months, China has faced another crisis in the form of historic floods. The Yangtze river basin has been inundated, affecting sixty-three million Chinese and inflicting over twenty-five billion dollars in direct damages. Many Chinese have raised concerns that the government’s massive infrastructure projects have worsened the crisis by draining wetlands and promoting development in flood-prone areas. Poor transparency has stirred more backlash as the CCP has been accused of hiding the extent of damages and censoring criticism. One political commentator in Beijing even predicted that the “Chinese public will question Beijing from this year’s continuous natural and man-made disasters, and even question China’s governance model and its effectiveness.” Instead of hoping that the crisis created by the current floods will give China’s neighbors breathing space, the United States should brace itself for the possibility of renewed aggression. The CCP must prove its worthiness to the tens of millions of displaced people across China, making it prone to lashing out. Taiwan may be an appealing target; it has been spared from flooding and has been visible in assisting neighboring countries like Japan with post-flood reconstruction. Already, China has begun live-fire sea-crossing drills near Taiwan. Recognizing the nature of the problem is the first step to successfully confronting China’s threats. China’s aggression is enabled by its power but motivated by its fragility. The coronavirus crisis makes it clear that the CCP views external aggression as a key tool to shore up its domestic support and legitimacy. Instead of viewing China’s aggressions merely as a “natural” function of its supposedly inevitable ascendency, neighbors, policymakers should start examining China’s weaknesses for signs of looming threats. The United States and its allies can both better prepare for onslaughts of aggression and devise better deterrent policies.

This goes nuclear and leads to extinction.

Talmadge 18 [Caitlin, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-China War Could Spiral Out of Control,” accessible online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>, published Nov/Dec 2018]//re-cut by Elmer

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a **military confrontation**—resulting, for example, **from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan**—**no longer seems** as **implausible** as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. **China**, by contrast, not only has **nuclear weapons**; it has also **intermingled** them **with its conventional** military **forces**, **making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other**. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. **Conventional forces** can threaten nuclear forces in ways that **generate pressures to escalate**—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. **If U.S. operations endangered** or damaged China’s **nuclear forces,** Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, **Beijing might** reluctantly **conclude** that limited **nuclear escalation**—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—**was** a **viable** option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The **most worrisome flash point** for a U.S.-Chinese war **is Taiwan**. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored **U.S. strategy** to ensure a conventional victory **would** likely **endanger** much of China’s **nuclear arsenal** in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in **wartime developments** that could **shift** **China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions.** If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline. If such escalation appears far-fetched, China’s history suggests otherwise. In 1969, similar dynamics brought China to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In early March of that year, Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards amid rising tensions over a disputed border area. Less than two weeks later, the two countries were fighting an undeclared border war with heavy artillery and aircraft. The conflict quickly escalated beyond what Chinese leaders had expected, and before the end of March, Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear threats to pressure China to back down. Chinese leaders initially dismissed these warnings, only to radically upgrade their threat assessment once they learned that the Soviets had privately discussed nuclear attack plans with other countries. Moscow never intended to follow through on its nuclear threat, archives would later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed otherwise. On three separate occasions, they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow sent representatives to talks in Beijing, China suspected that the plane transporting the delegation was in fact carrying nuclear weapons. Increasingly fearful, China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon in the Lop Nur desert and put its rudimentary nuclear forces on alert—a dangerous step in itself, as it increased the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch. Only after numerous preparations for Soviet nuclear attacks that never came did Beijing finally agree to negotiations. China is a different country today than it was in the time of Mao Zedong, but the 1969 conflict offers important lessons. China started a war in which it believed nuclear weapons would be irrelevant, even though the Soviet arsenal was several orders of magnitude larger than China’s, just as the U.S. arsenal dwarfs China’s today. Once the conventional war did not go as planned, the Chinese reversed their assessment of the possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree bordering on paranoia. Most worrying, China signaled that it was actually considering using its nuclear weapons, even though it had to expect devastating retaliation. Ambiguous wartime information and worst-case thinking led it to take nuclear risks it would have considered unthinkable only months earlier. This pattern could unfold again today.

Starr 15

https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a **nuclear winter would cause** most **humans** and large animals **to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event** similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. The results of such a scenario are obvious. **Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans** and animals **to starve** to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that **no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill** most people and animals on the planet.  Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

## 1st OFF: Water DA

A right to strike would mean that water workers in India and Pakistan could strike. This would be devastating for both countries water supply and the quality of the water; both countries are already in need of water. Waterproject confirms this:

https://thewaterproject.org/water-crisis/water-in-crisis-india

Regardless of improvements to drinking water, many other **water sources are contaminated** with both bio and **chemical pollutants**, and over [21% of the country's diseases are water-related](http://www.ananthapuri.com/article.asp?title=Water-Problem-in-India&id=48). Furthermore, only **33% of the country has access to** traditional **sanitation**. One concern is that **India** may [**lack overall long-term availability of replenishable water resources**](http://www.ias.ac.in/currsci/oct102007/932.pdf). While India's aquifers are currently associated with replenishing sources, the country is also a major grain producer with a great need for water to support the commodity. As with all countries with large agricultural output, excess water consumption for food production **depletes the overall water table**. Many rural communities in India who are situated on the outskirts of urban sprawl also have little choice but to drill wells to access groundwater sources. However, any [water system adds to the overall depletion of water](http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/Seg/PB2ch03_ss2.htm). There is no easy answer for India which must tap into water sources for food and human sustenance, but India's overall **water availability is running dry**. In addition, **water scarcity in India is expected to worsen** as the overall population is expected to increase to 1.6 billion by year 2050. To that end, global **water scarcity is expected to become a leading cause of national political conflict in the future**, and the prognosis for India is no different.

Same goes for Pakistan: These countries cannot allow for any further worsening of the supply through strikes. British Strikes prove that a strike would be devastating:

Flynn 83

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25041870

Unfortunately, while the British authorities were organizing their drops of water, the labor unions were organizing the water workers. In January, the demands by the water workers resulted in the first nationwide strike of water workers in Britain. Unauthorized strikes had occurred sporadically during the past 5 years, but the 1983 strike was the first to be **formally endorsed by a national labor union**. The effects were dramatic. Within a few days, **more than 50 000 dwellings** were being **forced to rely on standpipes or nearby houses. More than 7 million people were being advised to boil their water for drinking and cooking. A number of wastewater treatment plants were discharging untreated wastes to rivers and estuaries.**

This only amplifies the water crisis and makes it harder to recover from. Decreased water supply and more contaminated water will only increase tensions between India and Pakistan:

Climate diplomacy 19

https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/water-conflict-and-cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan

Fears of **future water shortages** due to the construction of dams are **causing diplomatic tensions between India and Pakistan**. Divisive political narratives in both India and Pakistan are generally seen to **increase the likelihood of conflict**. In India, a narrative of Pakistani-affiliated Islamic terror cells attacking civilians has been used to justify backing away from diplomacy and even threatening to reduce Pakistan’s water supply ([Al Jazeera, 2019](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/india-reiterates-plan-stop-sharing-water-pakistan-190221193059359.html); [Roy, 2019](https://www.news18.com/news/india/can-india-revoke-indus-water-treaty-unilaterally-news18-explainer-2045325.html)). Meanwhile, nationalist media in Pakistan have blamed floods in the country on poor water management in India ([Mustafa et al., 2017](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/pw125-contested-waters-subnational-scale-water-conflict-in-pakistan.pdf)). Pakistanis also fear that India will use its upstream dams to control how much water flows down into Pakistan via the Indus. It is this **inherent suspicion and mistrust between the two states** that has also been used to provoke anti-Indian sentiment in Pakistan, **providing fertile ground for further** hostility and **conflict** ([Katchinoff, 2010](http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2010/04/parched-and-hoarse-indus-negotiations-continue-to-simmer/)).

Water strikes basically increase high tensions and create the ground for a water war. Any Indo-Pak conflict goes nuclear:

Hall 19

https://www.dw.com/en/water-wars-are-india-and-pakistan-heading-for-climate-change-induced-conflict/a-47203933

The [dispute over the Kashmir region](https://www.dw.com/en/fresh-violence-in-kashmir-exposes-the-need-for-diplomacy/a-45729938) — a flashpoint between India and Pakistan for more than six decades — is hugely intertwined with water security. Both countries claim the whole region, but each only controls a part of it. While the IWT has managed to survive the wars and other hostilities, it is increasingly being strained to its limit. **Pakistan has accused India of throttling its water supply** and violating the IWT by constructing dams over the rivers flowing into Pakistan from Kashmir. "Any **country with nuclear weapons**, if they're **backed into a corner because they have no water** — that's **really dangerous,"** said Jeff Nesbit, author and executive director of non-profit climate communication organization Climate Nexus. **'A matter of survival'** For Sherry Rehman, Parliamentary Leader of the left-wing opposition Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the Senate, **water security**, especially in South Asia, "has become **a** regional **security threat**." "We are now facing challenges brought about by climate change which were not a primary focus during the negotiations for the Indus Water Treaty," she told DW. "It has become a matter of survival," she continued. "Aside from the lack of formal dialogue, the rhetoric floating around suggesting **a** possible **water war is particularly alarming."**

Lalwani 21

https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/america-cant-ignore-the-next-indo-pakistani-crisis/

U.S. official strategy documents identify India as a [vital and critical](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf) node in Washington’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific to balance China’s rise. But the region within which it resides remains one of the most **risk-prone**. The nuclear-armed Indian-Pakistani rivalry has produced several crises testing the last five presidents, and since the end of the Cold War, this rivalry composes the most commonly recurring pair in the [International Crisis Behavior database](https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/). Thirty years ago, the intelligence community judged this region the “[**most probable**](https://www.c-span.org/video/?38273-1/global-spread-weapons)**” location for a nuclear exchange**, a judgment that was [reinforced](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/opinion/kashmir-india-pakistan-nuclear.html) after the 2019 near miss. [Several](https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525408.pdf) [studies](https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web_1.pdf) [over](https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/InvestigatingCrises.pdf) the [past](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626690) [decade](https://www.stimson.org/2020/from-kargil-to-balakot-southern-asian-crisis-dynamics-and-future-trajectories/) have assessed that South Asia is acutely **prone to false optimism, miscalculation, and conflict escalation**, even **to the nuclear level**. The close geography of both countries compresses time for decision-making in crises and incentivizes quick reactions. Conventional, precision-strike capabilities at standoff distances are at the ready and lure officials into thinking punitive or retaliatory strikes can be easy and clean. Both countries also appear to be embracing more **aggressive**[**nuclear**](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00340)[**doctrines**](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.38). Another feature of the subcontinent is intensified nationalism. South Asian leaders may be more sensitive to [public pressure](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/25/after-terrorists-attacked-kashmir-will-india-seek-vengeance-or-de-escalation/) for escalation even as [**Indian**](https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/barack-obama-hiroshima-speech-india-nuclear-weapon-terrorism-atomic-attraction-2831348/)**and**[**Pakistani**](http://gallup.com.pk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/29.03.19-English.pdf)**publics** may be increasingly **supportive of nuclear weapons use**. The most recent crisis is instructive. On Feb. 14, 2019, a Kashmiri suicide bomber killed 40 Indian paramilitary troops, an attack for which the Pakistan-based terrorist organization [Jaish-e-Mohammad claimed credit](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/magazine/masood-azhar-jaish.html). The Indian military retaliated against Pakistan 12 days later with an [airstrike](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/world/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir-airstrikes.html) on what it claimed was a terrorist training camp within undisputed Pakistani territory. The next day Pakistani jets [dropped munitions](https://theprint.in/defence/indian-army-commanders-left-brigade-hq-minutes-before-paf-bomb-fell-in-compound-27-feb/241324/) on empty fields near an Indian brigade headquarters close to the Line of Control and an aerial skirmish ensued, resulting in the downing of an Indian MiG-21 and Pakistan’s [capture of the Indian pilot](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan-aircraft.html). In the fog and friction of war, an Indian Mi-17 helicopter with six soldiers aboard was also [accidently shot down](https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/shooting-down-our-own-chopper-big-mistake-says-iaf-chief/article29593737.ece) by an Indian air defense unit. Tensions escalated as India [reportedly](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-crisis-insight/india-pakistan-threatened-to-unleash-missiles-at-each-other-sources-idUSKCN1QY03T) threatened missile strikes and demanded the immediate return of the pilot, while Pakistan threatened retaliation “[three times over](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-crisis-insight/india-pakistan-threatened-to-unleash-missiles-at-each-other-sources-idUSKCN1QY03T).” Indian [naval **nuclear assets**](https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-deployed-nuclear-missile-armed-submarine-during-standoff-with-pakistan-2009178) may have **also** been **activated**.

Nuclear war causes extinction: Cross apply the Starr 15 card which proves.

Violation – They specify a condition

Standards:

1] Limits – You have to affirm everywhere or you are just running a pic which neg ground because it proves reason to negate. Limits are key to fairness.

2] strat skew – I cannot prep every single exception that the aff might make. Kills clash when you don’t affirm everywhere. Stopping strat skew Is key to education

Voters:

Fairness – fairness is a voter because debate is a competition, and the round must be fair for me to engage.

Education – education is a voter because by making these squirrely exception args, you decrease the amount of substantive clash I can engage with. Less clash means less education, and education is the goal of debate.

Drop the debater – 1] set better norms for debate 2] indicts the debater 3] time skew 4] checks back abuse practices

No rvis – they can dump on theory in the 1ar, chilling us from checking abuse; you should not win off of being abusive otherwise you just incentivize being abusive and prepping theory.

Competing interps – reasonability is arbtirary and causes race to the bottom