#### The three pillars of social death define the slave nature of Blackness explaining how Blackness is always situated as an object of accumulation and fungibility in civil society excluded from humanity

**Wilderson 20** Dr. Frank B. Wilderson III, University of California, Irvine “Afro Pessimism” [Originally published](https://www.google.com/search?safe=strict&rlz=1C5CHFA_enUS852US852&q=afropessimism+originally+published&stick=H4sIAAAAAAAAAOPgE-LVT9c3NMwwT8tLyikr1pLPTrbST8rPz9YvL8osKUnNiy_PL8q2KihNyskszkhNWcSqlJhWlF-QWlycmZtZnKuQX5SZnpmXmJNTqQBXBACK1-7lVwAAAA&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiqmJ3av5HpAhUSWa0KHb97DLQQ6BMoADAQegQIDxAC): April 7, 2020 B1ACK ZD

**The three constituent elements of slavery—naked (or gratuitous) violence, general dishonor, and natal alienation—make the temporal and spatial logic of the entity** (a character or persona in a narrative) and of setting untenable, **impossible to** conceive (as in birth) and/or conceive of (as in **assume any coherence**). **The violence of slavery is not precipitated as a result of any transgression that can be turned into an event (which is why I have argued that this violence is gratuitous, not contingent); the dishonor embodied by the slave is not a function of an event either; his or her dishonor is general, it is best understood as abjection rather than as degradation (the latter implies a transition);** and since a slave is natally alienated, she is never an entity in the met- anarrative genealogy. **Afropessimism is a theoretical lens that clarifies the irreconcilable difference between, on the one hand, the violence of capitalism, gender oppression, and White supremacy** (such as the colonial utility of the Palestinian Nakba or the Sand Creek massacre\*) **and, on the other hand, the violence of anti-Blackness (the Human necessity for violence against Black people**). The antagonism between the postcolonial subject and the settler cannot—and should not—be analogized with the violence of **social death: that is the violence of slavery, which did not end in 1865 for the simple reason that slavery did not end in 1865. Slavery is a relational dynamic—not an event and certainly not a place** in space like the South; just as colonialism is a relational dynamic—and that rela- tional dynamic can continue to exist once the settler has left or ceded governmental power. And these two relations are secured by radically different structures of violence. **Afro Pessimism offers an analytic lens that labors as a corrective to Humanist assumptive logic**. It provides a theoretical apparatus that allows Black people to not have to be bur- dened by the ruse of analogy—because **analogy mystifies, rather than clarifies, Black suffering.** Analogy mystifies Black peoples’ relationship to other people of color. Afro Pessimism labors to throw this mysti- fication into relief—without fear of the faults and fissures that are revealed in the process. Let me put it another way: **Human Life is dependent on Black death for its existence and for its conceptual coherence**. There is no world without Blacks, yet there are no Blacks who are in the world. The Black is indeed a sentient being, but the hobble of **Humanist thought is a constitutive disavowal of Blackness as social death, a dis- avowal that theorizes the Black as degraded human entity** (for exam- ple, as an oppressed worker, a vanquished postcolonial subaltern, or a non-Black woman suffering under the disciplinary regime of patriar- chy). The Black is not a sentient being whose narrative progression has been circumscribed by racism, colonialism, or even slavery, for that matter. **Blackness and Slaveness are inextricably bound in such a way that whereas Slaveness can be disimbricated from Blackness, Black- ness cannot exist as other than Slaveness.**

#### Morgan 16 gives the link – the aff’s understanding of empathetic relations of vulnerability as necessary for Human identity is a monstrous intimacy that buttresses the fungibility of Black life by masquerading colonial relations as civic compassion – this ruse of good-faith conceals a perverse sentimental identification with Black suffering which reduces Black lives to problems to be solved

Martina 15 (Egbert Alejandro Martina, Rotterdam-based scholar-activist and cultural critic, co-founder of Mediacate, a media literacy organization, which hosts workshops, and a monthly reading group at the Cultural Embassy in Amsterdam, founding member of ERIF, a foundation that conducts critical research of media expressions, and provides anti-racist education for a broader audience, November 9, 2015, “Thinking Care,” <https://processedlives.wordpress.com/2015/11/09/thinking-care/>) gz

Through the sentimental depiction of Black suffering, we all have been conditioned to relate to the emotionally-charged sensory stereotypes of Blacks in a distinct manner. Black ‘humanity’ has consequently become synonymous with, and often understood through, help and charity within popular imagination. This affective relation remains largely untroubled in anti-racist organizing. Black people are often reduced to their pain, and Black suffering is routinely instrumentalized as a means to ‘raise awareness’. Within this framework, “I care” isn’t as straightforward as it may seem. Julie Ellison warns us that “emotion makes racial distinctions.” My aim is to make visible the anti-Black dynamics in the intimate politics of care.

Care is a curious word. Its original meaning was “to be anxious, to grieve.” This sense is still very much present in the Dutch word for care, *zorg*—which also translates as burden. Care is often accompanied by an anxious worry. Consider the Dutch phrase for ‘to worry’, *zorgen maken*, which translates literally as ‘*to make cares or burdens’*. We might say that the act of caring has anxiety in it. There is a tension between the idealistic dedication that care announces and the anxiousness that care implies. Joan Tronto and Berenice Fisher define care as “*a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible*.” Similarly, Karen Struening defines care “as a social practice that is essential to the maintenance and reproduction of society.” In both definitions, care is conceived of as a means to improve on, or reproduce—rather than *undo*—civil society.

We could say, based on the cited definitions, that practices of ‘care’ are modes of social organization: they (re)produce, maintain, and repair civic relations. White anti-racism is often conceptualized as a practice of care. Meaning, within White anti-racism the aim is often to repair society, if not the ‘world’, that is to make it so that everyone shares equally in the material, and cultural spoils. However, the notion of care as repair or redistribution introduces a number of problems. Redistribution does not necessarily challenge “the ‘value’ at the heart of capitalist production.” Lindon Barrett has taught us that value requires negativity and excess, which “invariably form the ground of possibilities for value.” What does a notion of care as repair mean for people who have been constructed as ‘deprived’, a problem? Do practices of ‘care’ always look at how people and spaces have ended up being ‘in need of care’?

Both Tronto/Fisher’s and Struening’s definition do not seem to trouble the very structures of the world and civil society, which reproduce, maintain, and fix Blackness as the negation—the outside of the world and civil society. Blackness serves as the medium “through which Whiteness, the sign of humanity, intelligence, and civilization, achieves coherence.” Both Tronto/Fisher and Struening elaborate an ethics of care that takes as its point of departure a universalized humanity. Here, Sylvia Wynter’s critique of liberal humanism might prove instructive in highlighting the limitations of such a point of departure. Wynter’s argument is that,

“liberal humanism is fundamentally inadequate at comprehending the humanity of late modernity’s structurally marginalized, genetically dysselected, and ‘narratively condemned’ populations.” [x]

A liberal humanist project “*presumes* the Black’s capacity for inhabiting rationality and evolved/modern human subjectivity, while ignoring how the white liberal humanist racial schema preemptively (and permanently) posits the Black as the ‘non-evolved’ and ‘dysselected’ figure of history.” Anti-Blackness has shaped, and continues to shape, profoundly the development of an ethics of care. To think an ethics of care and living within an anti-Black world forces us to raise questions concerning the foundation on which an ethics of care itself is narrated.

There is little evidence of such a structural rethinking within contemporary discourses on care. Uma Nayaran notes that much of the discourse on an ethics of care concentrate on the implications of interpersonal care relationships, rather than “the roles [care] has historically played in justifying relationships of power and domination between groups of people, such as colonizers and colonized.” Nayaran’s critique is a call to examine the practices of ‘care’ that developed under colonialism. She warns us that “care discourse can sometimes function ideologically, to justify or conceal relationships of power and domination.” Power works through intimacies and an ethics of care by way of the distribution and circulation of empathy, compassion, and even love. One poignant example is the fantasy that re-imagined Dutch imperialism as an ‘ethical’ obligation to ‘care’ for Indonesians. Interestingly, a sense of ‘ethical’ obligation was only felt toward Indonesia. What does it mean to offer ‘care’, or ‘feel toward’, in a context of colonial domination?

The Dutch ‘ethical policy’ and its practices of ‘care’ were motivated by a moral imperative and grounded in benevolence and compassion that allowed for a re-inscription of White supremacy. Both Sara Ahmed and Lauren Berlant have drawn attention to the opaque aspects of compassion. Ahmed notes that “compassion towards the other’s suffering might sustain the violence of appropriation, even when it seems to enable a different kind of proximity to others.” Similarly, Berlant remarks that “compassion is a term denoting privilege: the sufferer is over there. You, the compassionate one, have a resource that would alleviate someone else’s suffering.” Both care and compassion establish a spatial relation between a care-giving, compassionate subject and an object of care and compassion.

What the Dutch ‘ethical policy’ illustrates is that it is perfectly possible for Whites to act in racially oppressive, violent ways “while thinking of themselves as acting morally,” because the racial polity is premised on “a *racialized* moral psychology.” To return to Sylvia Wynter’s words, “[t]he ethics of being just and kind were the ethics born out of this relation.” The Dutch ‘ethical policy’ teaches us that care and compassion—being just and kind—might both be forms of (colonial) violence. Questions that should animate our thinking as political subjects are: How do we practice care, that does not fix marginalized people as objects of care, within a system of violence and unequal power relationships? How do we care for a life that isn’t recognized as a life worth living, or a life that is foreclosed statistically? How does a contemporary ethics of care stand in relation to historical forms of care, such as ‘colonial care’ or the ‘care’ extended to the enslaved? Is it ethical to be Human when “legacies of colonialism and slavery delimit black people as nonhuman” and leave us open to gratuitous violence?

Let’s consider another way in which ‘care’ has been articulated. In 2011, professor Henk den Heijer, a historian, drew, ‘after extensive archival research’, the conclusion that “[i]t was logical from a commercial point of view to treat slaves well.” He states,

“They were considered to be valuable. A good trader tried to get his slaves to the other side of the ocean in good condition to sell for a good price. Slavery is still morally objectionable, but that does not mean they were abused.”

The fact that the West India Company had fixed ‘standards of care’ for enslaved Africans did not and does not mitigate the conditions under which the enslaved were held. Whatever exercise of ‘care’ the enslaved received was synchronous with regimes of subjection. The question should be really what does ‘caring about’ do within the context of enslavement. Under a regime of terror, coercion and control became closely associated with a form of ‘care’ that was often inadequate, unreliable, and moreover deadly. Saidiya Hartman tells us that “the barbarism of slavery did not express itself singularly in the constitution of the slave as object but also in the forms of subjectivity and circumscribed humanity imputed to the enslaved.” Hartman further notes,

“Even when the entreaty made in the name of the public good acted minimally on the behalf of the enslaved, it did so, not surprisingly, by granting these limited entitlements in a manner that ‘recognized’ black humanity in accordance with minimal standards of existence. This truncated construction of the slave as person rather than lessening the constraints of chattel status enhanced them by making personhood coterminous with injury.”

Laws intended to ‘minimize’ cruelty “allowed masters to hide behind the law and ensured that their posture of care would remain a humane fiction.” The ‘care’ that master-enslavers extended to the enslaved emphasizes and enhances the fungibility of Black life; such a form of ‘care’ is not unsimilar to the care one might extend to a car, or a book, that one values.

Christina Sharpe’s theorization of ‘monstrous intimacies’ is instructive in helping “to think through the configurations of relations that arise out of domination and that continue to structure relations across race, sex, ethnicity, and nation,” and describe the relations of care that “intensif[y] the brutal exercise of power upon the captive body.” Sharpe defines monstrous intimacies as “a set of known and unknown performances and inhabited horrors, desires and positions produced, reproduced, circulated and transmitted, that are breathed in the air and often unacknowledged to be monstrous.”

Practices of care within intimacies that are monstrous did not and do not, as Christina Sharpe tells us, “confirm or confer humanity on the black suffering body.” Sharpe draws our attention to the fact that anti-Black violence structures the intimacies that emerge between White anti-racist activists and Black people, who engage in a ‘collective’ struggle against racism. Her theorization helps us trace how the Black body has been used to articulate White subjectivities and agency as coterminous with freedom.

Thinking Black freedom demands a critical engagement with what ‘care’ might look like in a world in which Black life is valued. To imagine revolutionary practices of care that foster and ensure the flourishing of Black life means to abandon, refuse, and destroy the ‘world’. Could we imagine practices of care that do not centre on repair, but on initiating “an epistemological break with the hegemonic common sense of both civil society and the left”? What Sylvia Wynter teaches us is that any such politics of care must begin with a critique of the Human, since the category ‘Human’ has been defined in contradistinction to Black life. An ethics of care that seek to repair civil society without taking into account “how the category of ‘human’ itself remains fundamentally unethical with respect to black people” only extends that originary violence against Black lives and allows it to be rewritten as ‘care’.

#### Debate is structured by an arch of redemption built around the axis of black subjugation – the 1AC’s response to the resolution via empathetical questions prefigures the argumentative protocols that crowd out a grammar of suffering that can speak to the violence that repetitiously destroys black being – thus, the ROB is to vote for the best theoretical lexicon for understanding Black suffering.

Wilderson ‘16 **–** Prof of Drama and African American Studies @ UC Irvine (Frank B. III, “HSI Podcast 52,” February 25, 2016, Accessed From: <http://www.podcastgarden.com/episode/hsi-podcast-52_71843>, transcribed from audio 5:33-12:25, modified) | Saurish

But here’s why I would say that the things can’t be reconciled and why I’m fascinated with the way high school and college debaters are using it. I think it was—I don’t know what sociologist—Max Weber (you know, I quote all sorts of people except right out fascists)—I believe he said that the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all. And the way that the question is posed in the world of debate in January—the question that carries one through the entire twelve months—is posed in a way that cannot be reconciled with the basic lens of interpretation of Afropessimism**.** The question is always posed on what I call and others call an arch of redemption. In other words, the question assumes an instance of plenitude, say, the free association and the free assembly—the right to free assembly—of citizens, and then it moves from that assumption to a rupture. So it moves from equilibrium to disequilibrium, which is to say the manifestation of the surveillance state. And so the third move in the tripartite arc of narrative is, of course, the move of redemption, which is to say how can the plenitude—whether it’s a historical materialist plenitude, a social formation having its rights and liberties disrupted—how can that be restored. It’s that movement from equilibrium to disequilibrium to equilibrium restored which is precisely at the center of the critique of Afropessimism.Afropessimism is not an offering for historical redemption; it’s not an offering for the restoration of a body in need of redress the way that post-colonialism is, the way that Marxism is, the way that radical feminism is, the way that indigenism is. It’s a critique of the rhetorical structure of those lenses of interpretation, critiquing them as toa) what they don’t or are unable to say about the violence that subjugates and positions Blacks and b)why it is that they actually need Blackness as slaveness to be outside of their lens of interpretation So there’s a way in which—to come full circle to where I started—there’s a way in which the rhetorical structure of debate, the demand of debate, the protocols are already ideologically laden. It doesn’t matter what question you pour into those protocols**.** The protocols, themselves, are all ideological ~~straightjackets~~ [constrictions] which preclude the kind of investigation of suffering. In order for Black suffering to be part of the debate question, it would have to go through a structural adjustment to begin to look like the suffering of some other group**.** The way Hartman talks about this is by suggesting that what you have in the world of subalterns—degraded humans who suffer—you have narratives of the possibility of real or imagined redemption**,** which is to say, narratives which are structured around the question of how to relieve the suffering that didn’t happen before the invasion of some sorts. But what she says with respect to Blacks is that you cannot tell the story of before the invasion, before the destruction. So, without being able to do that, she says when you think of narrating Blackness, you have to think of repetition as opposed to redemption. And so when we were off the air, one of the things I said to Marquis and to Josh is that one of the foreseeable problems with the future of Afropessimism is people kind of cherry-picking from it to enhance the explanatory power of their own suffering. And that cherry-picking will actually, inevitably, leave by the wayside the very deliberate absence in Afropessimism, **and that is the absence** of redemptive theorization, which is present in everything else. Redemptive theorization is theorized through all three volumes of Das Kapital; it’s theorized in the psychoanalytic feminism of Hartman and people like Julia Kristeva; it’s theorized in the work of Ward Churchill and Vine Deloria. It’s not only theorized. I should take a step back. It’s assumed. It’s assumed. And so, these are metacritiques of relationality. What Afropessimism isa metacritique of the metacritique, to show how pure and simple relations are dependent upon—they’re parasitic—using blacks as a parasitic host.

#### The only possible demand is one that calls for the end of the world itself—the affirmative represents a conflict within the paradigm of America but refuses to challenge the foundational antagonism that produces the violence that undergirds the that same paradigm – solves the aff but aff can’t solve the K

Wilderson, ’10 [2010, Frank B. Wilderson is an Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”]

Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it would seem that the structure, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar of their demands—and, by extension, the grammar of their suffering—was indeed an ethical grammar. Perhaps their grammars are the only ethical grammars available to modern politics and modernity writ large, for they draw our attention not to the way in which space and time are used and abused by enfranchised and violently powerful interests, but to the violence that underwrites the modern world’s capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his land provided the stage upon which other violent and consensual dramas could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to call not merely the actions of the world to account but to call the world itself to account, and to account for them no less! The woman at Columbia was not demanding to be a participant in an unethical network of distribution: she was not demanding a place within capital, a piece of the pie (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather, she was articulating a triangulation between, on the one hand, the loss of her body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to becoming a “being for the captor” (206), the drama of value (the stage upon which surplus value is extracted from labor power through commodity production and sale); and on the other, the corporeal integrity that, once ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of everyone else on the street. She gave birth to the commodity and to the Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes, the world—and not its myriad discriminatory practices, but the world itself—was unethical. And yet, the world passes by her without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls her “crazy.” And to what does the world attribute the Native American man’s insanity? “He’s crazy if he thinks he’s getting any money out of us”? Surely, that doesn’t make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that he does not have a big enough gun. What are we to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically—unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Return Turtle Island to the “Savage.” Repair the demolished subjectivity of the Slave. Two simple sentences, thirteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An “ethical modernity” would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms: class struggle, gender conflict, immigrants rights. When pared down to thirteen words and two sentences, one cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of Left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—is that what can so easily be spoken is now (five hundred years and two hundred fifty million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these thirteen words not only render their speaker “crazy” but become themselves impossible to imagine. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, Left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable. In the 1960s and early 1970s the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not “Should the U.S. be overthrown?” or even “Would it be overthrown?” but rather when and how—and, for some, what—would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable quantum of ethics in the U.S. writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King, Jr., prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of SDS, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of SNCC, to Bobbie Kennedy Democrats) were accountable, in their rhetorical machinations, to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground. Radicals and progressives could deride, reject, or chastise armed struggle mercilessly and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of “success,” but they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—that the U.S. was an ethical formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (a U.S. attorney general and presidential candidate) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks. One could (and many did) acknowledge America’s strength and power. This seldom, however, rose to the level of an ethical assessment, but rather remained an assessment of the so-called “balance of forces.” The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to credibly wed the U.S. and ethics. The raw force of COINTELPRO put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, the power of Blackness and Redness to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—retreated as did White radicals and progressives who “retired” from struggle. The question’s echo lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM Warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers, or in prison cells where so many of them have been rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, thirty years, and at the gates of the academy where the “crazies” shout at passers-by. Gone are not only the young and vibrant voices that affected a seismic shift on the political landscape, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a revolutionary zeitgeist. Is it still possible for a dream of unfettered ethics, a dream of the Settlement and the Slave estate’s destruction, to manifest itself at the ethical core of cinematic discourse, when this dream is no longer a constituent element of political discourse in the streets nor of intellectual discourse in the academy? The answer is “no” in the sense that, as history has shown, what cannot be articulated as political discourse in the streets is doubly foreclosed upon in screenplays and in scholarly prose; but “yes” in the sense that in even the most taciturn historical moments such as ours, the grammar of Black and Red suffering breaks in on this foreclosure, albeit like the somatic compliance of hysterical symptoms—it registers in both cinema and scholarship as symptoms of awareness of the structural antagonisms. Between 1967 and 1980, we could think cinematically and intellectually of Blackness and Redness as having the coherence of full-blown discourses. But from 1980 to the present, Blackness and Redness manifests only in the rebar of cinematic and intellectual (political) discourse, that is, as unspoken grammars. This grammar can be discerned in the cinematic strategies (lighting, camera angles, image composition, and acoustic strategies/design), even when the script labors for the spectator to imagine social turmoil through the rubric of conflict (that is, a rubric of problems that can be posed and conceptually solved) as opposed to the rubric of antagonism (an irreconcilable struggle between entities, or positionalities, the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions). In other words, even when films narrate a story in which Blacks or Indians are beleaguered with problems that the script insists are conceptually coherent (usually having to do with poverty or the absence of “family values”), the non-narrative, or cinematic, strategies of the film often disrupt this coherence by posing the irreconcilable questions of Red and Black political ontology—or non-ontology. The grammar of antagonism breaks in on the mendacity of conflict. Semiotics and linguistics teach us that when we speak, our grammar goes unspoken. Our grammar is assumed. It is the structure through which the labor of speech is possible. Likewise, the grammar of political ethics—the grammar of assumptions regarding the ontology of suffering—which underwrite Film Theory and political discourse (in this book, discourse elaborated in direct relation to radical action), and which underwrite cinematic speech (in this book, Red, White, and Black films from the mid-1960s to the present) is also unspoken. This notwithstanding, film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume an ontological grammar, a structure of suffering. And the structure of suffering which film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume crowds out other structures of suffering, regardless of the sentiment of the film or the spirit of unity mobilized by the political discourse in question. To put a finer point on it, structures of ontological suffering stand in antagonistic, rather then conflictual, relation to one another (despite the fact that antagonists themselves may not be aware of the ontological positionality from which they speak). Though this is perhaps the most controversial and out-of-step claim of this book, it is, nonetheless, the foundation of the close reading of feature films and political theory that follows.

## **Case**

### Framework

Dm if u need