# The Impossible Bomb 1AC

## 1AC

### Track 1 is the Framing

#### The ONLY role of this space is to endorse the best grammar of suffering to challenge the capitulation of anti-blackness within civil society. Prefer:

#### 1] Non-black people ought to engage the praxis of the affirmative through self-abolition – the call to embrace the pathology of blackness functions as a negative identity politics that seeks to open up the possibility of an undercommon.

Aarons ‘16 (Kieran Aarons, PhD candidate in Philosophy at DePaul University, MA in Theory and Criticism from the University of Western Ontario, 2-29-16, “No Selves to Abolish: Afro-Pessimism, Anti-Politics, and the End of the World,” http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/no-selves-to-abolish-afropessimism-anti-politics-and-end-world, footnotes 12, 18, 21, and 23 included in curly braces, modified) | Saurish

[We live in a period in which] the struggle to *defend* one’s condition tends to merge with the struggle against one’s condition. [8] I take it to be a libertarian axiom of our times that, where it is desired, autonomous organisation around one’s own characteristic grammar of suffering is a non-negotiable condition of struggle. [9] What interests me is how groups can orient themselves in their struggles around the specificity of the suffering they experience, without attempting to lay claim to a positivity for themselves on the basis of transindividual objects unavailable to Black flesh, thereby crowding out a linkage between these other struggles and Blackness. How can non-Black persons who are struggling against the miserable lives they are offered do so in ways that do not, as Wilderson puts it, ‘fortify and extend the interlocutory life’ of the anti-Black existential commons? A few preliminary theses can be outlined from outset, which take the form of rhetorical and practical strategies that must be avoided across the board. 1. We must reject any appeal to the register of ‘innocence’. To claim that someone deserves freedom or protection because of an absence of transgression – that one is experiencing ‘undeserved’ oppression – implicitly distances oneself from the a priori or gratuitous nature of the violence that the Black body magnetises, the tautological absence of any pretence that occasions it. This would be a baseline: stop defending one’s ‘innocence’. [10] 2. Should a chain of local revolts spread and intensify to the point where it manages to destitute the constituted power structures enveloping us, collapsing their symbolic hold over the hearts and minds of its subjects and exposing the coup de force that always underpins them, we must attack any effort to replace it with a newly signifying ‘constituent power’. As some friends stated recently, The legitimacy of ‘the people’, ‘the oppressed’, the ‘99%’ is the Trojan horse by which the constituent is smuggled back into insurrectionary destitution. This is the surest method for undoing an insurrection – one that doesn’t even require defeating it in the streets. To make the destitution irreversible, therefore, we must begin by abandoning *our own legitimacy*. We have to give up the idea that one makes the revolution in the name of something, that there’s a fundamentally just and innocent entity which the revolutionary forces would have the task of representing. One doesn’t bring power down to earth in order to raise oneself above the heavens. [11] 3. In other words, the revolutionary process must not be understood as the constitution of a new law or constituent social body, but should rather be measured by our capacity to destitute the governmental and economic mechanisms of labour, and of the capture of life more broadly. Beyond the simple destruction of power lies its deactivation. [12] {[12] To destitute an order of relations is first of all to deprive it of any relevance, to strip it of any significance. However, far from a strictly negative project, destitution is inseparable from the positive elaboration of a *new evaluation of the important and the interesting, the alluring and the repugnant, the tolerable and the intolerable*. Although such a process must inevitably originate in the frontal negation of an insurrectional sequence deposing the forces of order and immobilising the infrastructure of the economy, it can ultimately be ‘fulfilled’ only through the elaboration of a divergent mode of living itself, one shot through with an anomic [i.e. law-less] idea of happiness. On anomic fulfilment, see Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies (forthcoming in English).} 4. We must call into question the entire framework of expropriation in the widest sense of the term: the expropriation of once-possessed land, of culture, of relational capacity and of labour from the hands of the State and the capitalist, patriarchal class. We must no longer envision the remedy for suffering as entailing the *recovery* of a lost wholeness, entitlement or plenitude of which one is presently deprived. This is undoubtedly a more difficult conversation (particularly in the case of indigenous struggles), but one which I think is worth having. In the past 15 years of radical feminist, anarchist, queer and left-communist theory, we can see a widespread tendency to gravitate in the direction of thoughts such as these. What cuts across these tendencies and links them to one another beyond their otherwise significant differences is the way people have begun to wrestle seriously with a fundamental tension that will animate any future revolutionary or insurrectional practice to come, namely, the tension between autonomy and self-abolition. Though with very different emphases, this tension between autonomist organisation and identity abolitionism can be found in Tiqqun, in US insurrectionary queer anarchism of the late 2000’s (e.g. the informal Bash Back! network), recent currents in materialist and nihilist feminism, as well as in communisation theory (journals like Théorie Communiste, Troploin, Meeting, Riff Raff, Endnotes, Blaumachen, Sic, etc.). A few quotes might serve to illustrate this tension: Autonomy is a means by which we develop shared affinities as a basis for abolishing the relations of domination that make that self-organization necessary. And yet, even as we do this, we want to be freed of the social relations that make us into women, queers, women of colour, trans\*, et cetera. We want to be liberated from these categories themselves, but experience teaches us that the only way out is through. LIES: A Journal of Materialist Feminism [13] Identity Politics are fundamentally reformist and seek to find a more favourable relationship between different subject positions rather than to abolish the structures that produce those positions from the beginning. Identity politicians oppose ‘classism’ while being content to leave class society intact. Any resistance to society must foreground the destruction of the subjectifying processes that reproduce society daily, and must destroy the institutions and practices that racialise and engender bodies within the social order. […] With the revolution complete and the black flag burned, the category of queer must too be destroyed. […] [Bash Back] isn’t about sustaining identities, it’s about destroying them. Queer Ultraviolence: A Bash Back! Anthology [14] [I]t is no longer possible to imagine a transition to communism on the basis of a prior victory of the working class as working class. […] There is nothing to affirm in the capitalist class relation; no autonomy, no alternative, no outside, no secession. […] [I]n any actual supersession of the capitalist class relation we ourselves must be overcome; ‘we’ have no ‘position’ apart from the capitalist class relation…[I]t is a rupture with the reproduction of what we are that will necessarily form the horizon of our struggles. Endnotes [15] Despite tremendous and certainly irreconcilable differences between these groups, what these theoretical camps share is the assumption that an overcoming of the existing conditions of suffering and exploitation will ultimately require not a valorisation, empowerment, or even autonomisation of presently existing oppressed subject positions, but rather the simultaneous abolition of the conditions of oppression and the social relations and the identities they produce: the liquidation rather than the consolidation and empowerment of identity. This emphasis on the liquidation of present forms of desire, self-identification, and subjectification is arguably something relatively ‘new’. For example, it very clearly runs counter to classical anarchism’s emphasis on individual self-expression, freedom and the like. As some friends recently pointed out, For more than a century, the figure of the anarchist indicate[d] the most extreme point of western civilization. The anarchist is the point where the most hard-lined affirmation of all western fictions – the individual, freedom, free will, justice, the death of god – coincides with the most declamatory negation. The anarchist is a western negation of the west. [16 We might do well to ask whether, from an afropessimist point of view, insurrectional anarchism, queer theory and communisation theory remain ‘humanist negations of the Human’? If so, is this necessarily so My hypothesis is this: to the extent that they can escape this, it is in the direction of a thought of self-abolition. That is, to the extent that struggles actively refuse to validate, affirm, or strengthen the forms of subjectivity presently produced under capitalism, white supremacy and cis-sexist patriarchy, these struggles can be *potentially* aligned with – or at least, *less likely to stomp all over* – the Black struggle against its own objecthood. [17] Self-abolition therefore constitutes the *only* possible horizon for a non-Black struggle that does not reinforce anti-Blackness. This leads to what might be characterised as a *negative identity politics*. [18] {[18] As should by now be clear, it would seem to be an unavoidable conclusion of afropessimist theory that this bar on positive identity politics apply to Black bodies as much as anyone else. However, this is so less as a strategic constraint (as with other Subjects) than as a historically a priori impossibility for bodies positioned as killable objects. It is black objecthood that creates a situation wherein every positive Black identity politics struggling to secure visibility within the political (or the space of civil society) must be purchased through a gesture of structural self-adjustment to a non-Black grammar of suffering. Hence the tendency (which forms the program of the Black bourgeoisie) toward what Fanon described as ‘hallucinatory whitening’ On the latter concept, see Wilderson, Red White And Black, 74-76.} Put differently, when read through an afropessimist logic (as I understand it), what is vital in the queer, anarchist or communist tendencies toward self-abolition is generally not their theorisation of race, which often remains unsatisfactory, [19] but their tendency to locate the means and aims of revolutionary struggle in the immediate self-abolition of and by their respectively oppressed group per se. Though this may take its point of departure from a grammar of suffering marked by the exploitation of variable capital, or the marginalisation of one’s queer identity, both of which constitute ‘Human grammars’ on Wilderson’s reading, by refusing to regard the plenitude of existing subjectivity (labour power, or the marginalised subjectivity of queers, etc.) [20] as in need of affirmation, they at least *potentially* avoid recomposing the human community around this same grammar and community, thereby opening up the possibility for an overlap with the struggle against White supremacy from other directions. Since it draws its affective coordinates *not* from Black suffering (analogy) but from a disidentification with the human community emerging *from* the position in which it occupies, self-abolition remains a regulative idea rather than an actionable maxim. The role of it as an idea is to confer a sort of negative coherency on empirical acts. Again, that this must be ideational rather than empirically empathic is necessitated by the ‘ruse of analogy’, i.e. the fact that Black suffering cannot appear phenomenally to non-Black bodies except on condition of being ‘structurally adjusted’ to non-Black grammars. Hence there is only an indirect or ideational liaison between these paradigms, i.e. between the self-abolitionism of non-Black life and the anti-political program of the slave that Wilderson (drawing from Césaire) distils into the phrase: ‘the end of the world’. As distinct ideas, self-abolition and the end of the world are not synthetic or integral. Instead, they are perhaps best conceived of as parallel vectors, parallel precisely insofar as their potential crossing constitutes a presently unthinkable vanishing point in socio-historical conjuncture. Despite this paradigmatic distance, the past year has witnessed moments that defy this schema, moments in which, under the aleatory impetus of an event, the social hostility configuring each line leads them to converge. This is what happened during the seventeen-day revolt in the San Francisco Bay Area following the Darren Wilson non-guilty verdict in December of 2014, in which diverse groups of people were led to collectively block freeways, rail lines, roads and ports, to frontally attack the police, as well as to paralyze [pacify] the quotidian functioning of the metropolis through the widespread looting and destruction of commercial spaces. Such intensely conflictual ruptures enact a kind of larval, potential, and fugitive convergence between paradigmatic lines, yet whose miserable separation must resume as soon as order is restored on the ground, and the situation becomes once again governable. \*\* I will close with some tentative theses: 1. That we find ourselves fighting a common enemy does not mean that we have a common *experience* of that enemy, nor does it preclude the possibility that we may actually ~~stand~~ [remain] in antagonistic relations to one another at another level. We must therefore reject any model of solidarity premised on reciprocal recognition, on empathy, sympathy or charity, or on the assumption of common interests. 2. The only consistent and honest fight is one we engage in for our own reasons, oriented immanently around our own idea of happiness. By the latter is meant not an individual psychological state, but rather the affective complicity and feeling of increased power that arises between people who, based on a shared perception of the lines of force surrounding them, act together to polarise situational conflicts in pursuit of ungovernable forms of life, in whatever experimental forms this might take in the present. 3. If we [21] fight because our own lives compel us to, and it is our own idea of happiness that orients us in these struggles, what is left of ‘anti-racist solidarity’? While the notion of a ‘solidarity’ with Black suffering cannot be stripped of a certain paradigmatic incoherence, if it means anything at all it must be premised not on an attempt to identify, recognise, or render visible Black suffering, but on a *disidentification with ourselves*. That self-abolition is a regulative Idea means that it is inexistent in the present. If my struggles can be said to align themselves with Black struggle, this is not in the moment I declare my ‘support’ for it, or my willingness to be ‘authorised’ by whatever initiative the nearest Black person is calling for. [22] Rather, it is when we collectively clear the path for an assault on the conditions that enforce those identities which paradigmatically constitute a ‘self’ that we contribute to making things easier for others. {[21] This ‘we’ aims to take seriously the paradigmatic differences positioning us, and yet at the same time wishes to be cautious about implying any unnecessary exclusiveness that would not in fact reflect the situation on the ground, in the streets, and our lives. It may be that this tension does not lend itself to any easy resolution.} 4. At what Wilderson refers to as the ‘paradigmatic’ level, the geometry of self-abolitionist solidarity is therefore one of parallel rather than convergent lines. My own struggles and those of the friends I’m closest to proceed as if along a parallel line with the Black body’s struggle against objecthood or enslavedness, a struggle which we must make every effort to avoid obstructing as we continue to dismantle the conditions reproducing our own identities. Perhaps we can put things this way: the meeting point between Blackness’s war on enslavedness and those who might envision themselves as its ‘allies’ is not in a paradigmatic commonality to affirm between us; it lies, rather, in what we wish to negate in ourselves that might free the way for us all to find something more powerful than the selves presently available to us and denied to them**.** [23] [23] Taking up Wilderson and Sexton’s insights regarding the absence of black subjectivity or ‘standpoint’, Fred Moten concedes that if the ‘nothingness’ of blackness consists in its ‘(negative) relation to the substance of subjectivity-as-nonblackness (enacted in antiblackness)’, then there is indeed no emancipation conceivable in the form of an affirmative black subjectivity. However, for Moten this is an insight that remains to be fulfilled: what is needful is not the recovery of, but practical and theoretical ‘refusal of standpoint’, refusal that clears the way for the elaboration of an ‘existence without standing’, a thinking ‘outside the desire for a standpoint’. Blacks, he argues, ‘must free [themselves] from ontological expectation’, cease being entranced by the denial of their own subjectivity, and refuse the allure of Blackness as a ‘property that belongs to Blacks’**.** What is necessary is to ‘find the self, and kill it’, by which he means ‘the self that [blacks] cannot have and cannot be, but against which [they] are posed as the occupant of no position’. It is in abandoning the desire for legible subjectivity that we open the possibility of elaboration of an undercommons, whose modern day ‘maroons’ wage a ‘war of apposition’ grounded on an ethics of ‘dispossessive intimacy’. See Fred Moten, ‘Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)’, in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 112:4, Fall 2013, and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, *The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study* (New York: Autonomedia, 2013). Moten’s work will form the basis of a forthcoming follow-up article. 5. This nonlinear thought of self-abolition is not a re-centring of white or non-Black identity, but rather decentring and multiplication of the fronts from which the material and symbolic apparatus of Humanity can be destituted.

#### 2] There is no analogy for anti-blackness because the world is predicated on the devastation of black being, rendering it ahistorical and virtually blank. The grammars of exploitation and alienation ask only how we might redeem rather than dismantle this failed American experiment. As Malcolm X once said, “if you stick a knife nine inches into my back and pull it out six inches, that’s not progress.”

Wilderson 2007 [Frank B., “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s Silent Scandal” in *Warfare in the American Homeland* ed. Joy James, p. 31-2]

Slavery is the great leveler of the black subjects positionality. The black American subject does not generate historical categories of entitlement, sover­eignty, and immigration for the record. We are "off the map" with respect to the cartography that charts civil society's semiotics; we have a past but not a heri­tage. To the data-generating demands of the Historical Axis, we present a vir­tual blank, much like that which the Khoisan presented to the Anthropological Axis. This places us in a structurally impossible position, one that is outside the articulations of hegemony. However, it also places hegemony in a structurally impossible position because—and this is key—our presence works back on the grammar of hegemony and threatens it with incoherence. If every subject— even-the most massacred among them, Indians—is required to have analogs within the nations structuring narrative, and the experience of one subject on whom the nations order of wealth was built is without analog, then that sub­jects presence destabilizes all other analogs. Fanon writes, "Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder."12 If we take him at his word, then we must accept that no other body functions in the Imaginary, the Symbolic, or the Real so completely as a repository of complete disorder as the black body. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Real, for in its magnetizing of bullets the black body functions as the map of gra­tuitous violence, through which civil society is possible— namely, those bodies for which violence is, or can be, contingent. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Symbolic, for blackness in America generates no categories for the chromosome of history and no data for the categories of im­migration or sovereignty. It is an experience without analog—a past without a heritage. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Imaginary, for "whoever says 'rape' says Black" (Fanon), whoever says "prison" says black (Sexton), and whoever says "aids" says black

—the "Negro is a phobogenic object."13 Indeed, it means all those things: a phobogenic object, a past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of complete disorder. Whereas this realization is, and should be, cause for alarm, it should not be cause for lament or, worse, disavowal—not at least, for a true revolutionary or for a truly revolutionary movement such as prison abolition. If a social move­ment is to be neither social-democratic nor Marxist in terms of structure of political desire, then it should grasp the invitation to assume the positionality of subjects of social death. If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the "Negro" has been inviting whites, as well as civil society's junior part­ners, to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps. They have been, and remain today—even in the most antiracist movements, such as the prison abolition movement—invested elsewhere. This is not to say that all oppositional political desire today is pro-white, but it is usually antiblack, meaning that it will not dance with death. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the United States. This is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a negative dialec­tic: a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a "program of complete disorder." One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elabo­rated by it if, indeed, ones politics are to be underwritten by a desire to take down this country. If this is not the desire that underwrites ones politics, then through what strategy of legitimation is the word "prison" being linked to the word "abolition"? What are this movements lines of political accountability? There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by dis­order and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself. No one, for example, has ever been known to say, "Gee-whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all." Yet few so-called radicals desire to be em­braced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of blackness—and the state of political movements in the United States today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: "Gee-whiz, if only black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all." Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the foy of black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain in-orgasmic in the face of civil society—with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If through this stasis or paralysis they try to do the work of prison abolition, the work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (i.e., the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the black subject, or prison slave. In this way, social formations on the left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between workers and slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding y out scenarios of black antagonisms, simply feeding our frustration. Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demand­ing a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the black subject (whether a prison slave or a prison slave-in-waiting) gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil so­ciety, the black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that re­claims blackness not as a positive value but as a politically enabling site, to quote Fanon, of "absolute dereliction." It is a "scandal" that rends civil society asun­der. Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation) but that must, nonetheless, be pursued to the death.

#### 3] It’s most proximate to your ballot – voting aff or neg doesn’t implement the policies or movements we discuss; however, debate does implicate the grammars we used to describe violence which makes them a prerequisite to evaluating the ethicality of any action.

#### 4] Fairness and “norms” claims are an attempt to create a white fantasy space that selectively includes only those who uphold the stability of the system.

Wilderson 2008 Frank B., Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid South End Press, pg. 406-411

Just two years ago, in December of 1999, I'd written a letter and stuffed it, late one night, in the faculty mailboxes. It began with what must have appeared to the faculty's confused eyes as a red herring. It spoke not about my excruciating encounters with them, but began, instead, out of left field by discussing the plight of two students whose troubles with the College had been the topic of recent debate. Reading of Sonia Rodriguez's and Selma Thornton's troubles with the Student Senate and its White liberal adviser Tim Harold reawakened my disdain for Cabrillo as an institution and for the English Division as one of its flagship entities. I then went on to explain how Selma and Sonia had resigned their posts in the Student Senate in protest over Harold's decision not to allow thirty students of color to have funds to travel to a conference on race at Hartnell College. Instead, Harold spent the money on T-shirts. He had also put the sign-up sheet for the conference not in the Student Center, but in some obscure location where it would never be found thus sabotaging the excursion further. This seemed like a trivial enough matter, but it compounded the hurt and sense of isolation and rebuke which so many Black and Latino students felt at Cabrillo but could not name. I felt a piqued kinship with their unspeakable pain and used the rare moment of it having turned into a tangible event as a way into what I wanted to say to the faculty and administration...and to Alice. In defense of his actions, and as a way of indicating the absurdity of Selma and Sonia's objections, Harold issued a public statement in which he did not comment (or at least the newspaper did not report his comments) on his funding priorities; rather, he simply said "The sign-up sheet was posted for a week, the same way we treat any workshop." To this, I wrote: Whereas Selma Thornton attempts an institutional analysis of the Student Senate by way of a critique of Tim Harold and his practices, Harold responds with a ready made institutional defense and, later in the article, a defense of his integrity (a personalized response to an institutional analysis). He brings the scale of abstraction back down to the level most comfortable for White people: the individual and the uncontextualized realm of fair play. It's the White person's safety zone. I'm a good person, I'm a fair person, I treat everyone equally, the rules apply to everyone. Thornton and Rodriguez's comments don't indict Harold for being a "good" person, they indict him for being White: a way of being in the world which legitimates institutional practices (practices which Thornton and Rodriguez object to) accepts, and promotes, them as timeless—without origin, consequence, interest, or allegiance—natural and inevitable. "The sign-up sheet was posted for a week, the same way we treat any workshop." The whole idea that we treat everyone equally is only slightly more odious than the discussion or how we can treat everyone equally; because the problem is neither the practice nor the debates surrounding it, but the fact that White people can come together and wield enough institutional power to constitute a "We." "We" in the Student Senate, "We" in Aptos, "We" in Santa Cruz, "We" in the English department, "We" in the boardrooms. "We" are fair and balanced is as odious as "We" are in control—they are derivations of the same expression: "We" are the police. The claim of "balance and fair play" forecloses upon, not only the modest argument that the practices of the Cabrillo Student Senate are racist and illegitimate, but it also forecloses upon the more extended, comprehensive, and antagonistic argument that Cabrillo itself is racist and illegitimate. And what do we mean by Cabrillo? The White people who constitute its fantasies of pleasure and its discourse of legitimacy. The generous "We." So, let's bust "We" wide open and start at the end: White people are guilty until proven innocent. Fuck the compositional moves of substantiation and supporting evidence: I was at a conference in West Oakland last week where a thousand Black folks substantiated it a thousand different ways. You're free to go to West Oakland, find them, talk to them, get all the proof you need. You can drive three hours to the mountains, so you sure as hell can cut the time in half and drive to the inner city. Knock on any door. Anyone who knows 20 to 30 Black folks, intimately—and if you don't know 12 then you're not living in America, you're living in White America—knows the statement to be true. White people are guilty until proven innocent. Whites are guilty of being friends with each other, of standing up for their rights, of pledging allegiance to the flag, of reproducing concepts like fairness, meritocracy, balance, **standards, norms**, harmony between the races. Most of all. Whites are guilty of wanting stability and reform. White people, like Mr. Harold and those in the English Division, are guilty of asking themselves the question. How can we maintain the maximum amount of order (liberals at Cabrillo use euphemisms like peace, harmony, stability), with the minimum amount of change, while presenting ourselves—if but only to ourselves—as having the best of all possible intentions. Good people. Good intentions. White people are the only species, human or otherwise, capable of transforming the dross of good intentions into the gold of grand intentions, and naming it "change." ...These passive revolutions, fire and brimstone conflicts over which institutional reform is better than the other one, provide a smoke screen—a diversionary play of interlocutions—that keep real and necessary antagonisms at bay. White people are thus able to go home each night, perhaps a little wounded, but feeling better for having made Cabrillo a better place...for everyone... Before such hubris at high places makes us all a little too giddy, let me offer a cautionary note: it's scientifically impossible to manufacture shinola out of shit. But White liberals keep on trying and end up spending a lifetime not knowing shit from shinola. Because White people love their jobs, they love their institutions, they love their country, most of all they love each other. And every Black or Brown body that doesn't love the things you love is a threat to your love for each other. A threat to your fantasy space, your terrain of shared pleasures. Passive revolutions have a way of incorporating Black and Brown bodies to either term of the debate. What choice does one have? The third (possible, but always unspoken) term of the debate, White people are guilty of structuring debates which reproduce the institution and the institution reproduces America a

nd America is always and everywhere a bad thing this term is never on the table, because the level of abstraction is too high for White liberals. They've got too much at stake: their friends, their family, their way of life. Let's keep it all at eye level, where whites can keep an eye on everything. So the Black body is incorporated. Because to be unincorporated is to say that what White liberals find valuable I have no use for. This, of course, is anti-institutional and shows a lack of breeding, not to mention a lack of gratitude for all the noblesse oblige which has been extended to the person of color to begin with. "We will incorporate colored folks into our fold, whenever possible and at our own pace, provided they're team players, speak highly of us, pretend to care what we're thinking, are highly qualified, blah, blah, blah...but, and this is key, we won't entertain the rancor which shits on our fantasy space. We've killed too many Indians, worked too many Chinese and Chicano fingers to the bone, set in motion the incarcerated genocide of too many Black folks, and we've spent too much time at the beach, or in our gardens, or hiking in the woods, or patting each other on the literary back, or teaching Shakespeare and the Greeks, or drinking together to honor our dead at retirement parties ("Hell, Jerry White let's throw a party for Joe White and Jane White who gave Cabrillo the best White years of their silly White lives, that we might all continue to do the same White thing." "Sounds good to me, Jack White. Say, you're a genius! Did you think of this party idea all on your own?" "No, Jerry White, we've been doing it for years, makes us feel important. Without these parties we might actually be confronted by our political impotence, our collective spinelessness, our insatiable appetite for gossip and administrative minutia, our fear of a Black Nation, our lack of will." "Whew! Jack White, we sound pathetic. We'd better throw that party pronto!" "White you are, Jerry." "Jack White, you old fart, you, you're still a genius, heh, heh, heh.") too much time White-bonding in an effort to forget how hard we killed and to forget how many bones we walk across each day just to get from our bedrooms to Cabrillo...too, too much for one of you coloreds to come in here and be so ungrateful as to tell us the very terms of our precious debates are specious." But specious they are, as evidenced by recent uproar in the Adjunct vs. Minority Hire debates, or whether or not English 100 students should be "normed." The very terms of the debates suture discussions around White entitlement, when White entitlement is an odious idea. Whites are entitled to betray other Whites, nothing else... Beyond that you're not entitled to anything. So how could you possibly be entitled to a job? How could you possibly be entitled to decide who should pass and who should fail? How could you possibly be entitled to determining where the sign-up sheet for Diversity Day buses will or will not be placed, and how funds should be allocated? Okay...so some of you want to hire a "minority" as long as s/he's "well mannered and won't stab us in the back after s/he's in our sacred house;" and some of you want to hire an adjunct (Jill or Jeffery White) because, "What the hell—they've been around as long as Jack, Joe, Jerry, and Jane White, and shucks fair is fair, especially if you're entitled." And entitlement is a synonym for Whiteness. But there's only one job, because for years you've complained about the gate, while breathing collective (meaning White) sighs of relief that it was there to protect you from the hordes. (Somewhere down the street in Watsonville an immigrant is deciding whether to give his daughter or his wife up for the boss to fuck that he might have a job picking your fruit. Somewhere up the road in Oakland a teen is going to San Quentin for writing graffiti on a wall. And you're in here trying to be "fair" to each other, while promoting diversity—whatever that means. By the time you've arrived at a compromise over norming or faculty hires—your efforts to "enlighten" whoever doesn't die in the fields or fall from the earth into prison—the sista has been raped and the brotha busted. But then you've had a difficult day as well.) So, do what you always do. Hire the most qualified candidate. Here are some questions and guidelines to speed the search committee on its way and make everyone feel entitled.

### Track 2 is the Library

#### In 1821, a white physician used “an unnamed female patient-subject” to operate on a lymph node tumor – she was a 6-year-old “vulnerable enslaved child.” 1

#### In 1845, the Father of Gynecology – used seven female slaves as “experimental animals for his unproved theories” for over four years – they did not give consent. 2

#### In 1932, the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis study started and disregarded the autonomy of its 400+ Black subjects. 3

#### In 1945, an unaware Black American, Ebb Cade of North Carolina, was “injected with 4.7 micrograms of plutonium – forty-one times the normal lifetime exposure.” 4

#### In 1966, Dr. Kligman visited the Holmesburg Prison and was in “awe” at the “acres of [Black] skin” for experimentation he saw before him. 5

1 Kenny ’15 – Lecturer in 19th and 20th-century North American History @ University of Liverpool [Stephen Kenny, 11 June 2015, *How black slaves were routinely sold as ‘specimens’ to ambitious white doctors*, accessed from: https://theconversation.com/how-black-slaves-were-routinely-sold-as-specimens-to-ambitious-white-doctors-43074/] | saurish

2 Ojanuga ’93 – School of Social Work @ University of Alabama [Durrenda Ojanuga, March 1993, *The medical ethics of the 'father of gynaecology', Dr J Marion Sims*, accessed from: <https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/19/1/28.full.pdf>, pages: 29-30] | saurish

3 Hornblum ’99 – author, journalist and a former criminal justice official and political organizer [Allen Hornblum, 12 April 1999, *Acres of Skin: Human Experiments at Holmesburg Prison*, pages: 37] | saurish

4 Reverby ’13 – Marion Butler McLean Professor Emerita in the History of Ideas; Professor Emerita of Women’s and Gender Studies @ Wellesley College [Susan Mokotoff Reverby, August 2013, *Examining Tuskegee: The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy*] | saurish

5 Washington ’08 – research fellow in Medical Ethics @ Harvard Medical School, visiting Fellow @ Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health, visiting scholar @ DePaul University College of Law, American writer [Harriet A. Washington, 8 January 2008, *Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present*, pages: 226-227] | saurish

6 Bakare-Yusuf ’99 – PhD in Women and Gender Studies @ University of Warwick, Desmond Tutu Fellow and a Frankfurt Book Fair Fellow, Co-Founder and Publishing Director of Cassava Republic Press [Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, 26 July 1999, THE ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE: BLACK BODIES AND THE UNSPEAKABLE TERROR in *Feminist Theory and the Body: A Reader* (Routledge), pages: 311-317] | saurish

7 Jackson ’19 – associate Vice President for Entreprenurship & Innovation @ Clemson University, award-winning lawyer, entrepreneur and academic who blooms at the intersection of business, law and culture [Shontavia Jackson Johnson, March 2019, *The Colorblind Patent System and Black Inventors*, accessed from: https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual\_property\_law/publications/landslide/2018-19/march-april/colorblind-patent-system-black-inventors/] | saurish

#### This racialized history of Black medical experimentation and exploitation elucidates the inability of Black people to “own” their bodies, their work, or property.6 Civil society operates by positing the Black as the Other, which enables fabrications of Intellectual Property [IP] to arise – only through anti-Blackness and the rise of white supremacy is this IP regime instantiated into political order.

de jesus ’14 – digital projects librarian @ York University [nina de jesus, 24 September 2014, *LOCATING THE LIBRARY IN INSTITUTIONAL OPPRESSION*, accessed from: http://www.inthelibrarywiththeleadpipe.org/2014/locating-the-library-in-institutional-oppression/] | saurish

In locating the library in institutional oppression I’ll be focusing on only one line of criticism — white supremacy and decolonization — because of how focused my earlier sections are on the role that public libraries play (or ought to play) in maintaining a democratic (settler) state. I’m also largely depending on Andrea Smith’s understanding of how white supremacy is constituted: We may wish to rearticulate our understanding of white supremacy by not assuming that it is enacted in a single fashion; rather, white supremacy is constituted by separate and distinct, but still interrelated, logics. I would argue that the three primary logics of white supremacy in the US context include: **(1) slaveability/anti-black racism, which anchors capitalism**; (2) **genocide, which anchors colonialism**; and (3) **orientalism, which anchors war**.22 Her analytic **framework provides a three lens way to view how the library, as institution, embodies and enforces one type of oppression, white supremacy.** Namely, that libraries, being liberal institutions, are not ‘neutral’ in the ways that many of the sources cited in this paper either want them to be or believe they are. Rather, the explicit and expressed function of libraries, from their inception in the US and Canadian political structures to their existence today, is to create an informed citizenry for the sake of democracy. This allows us to finally locate the library in institutional oppression. 3.1 The Logic of Slavery Andrea Smith writes: **One pillar of white supremacy is the logic of slavery.** This logic **renders black people as inherently enslaveable—as nothing more than property**…This logic is **the anchor of capitalism**. That is, the capitalist system ultimately commodifies all workers: one’s own person becomes a commodity that one must sell in the labour market while the profits of one’s work are taken by somebody else. To keep this capitalist system in place—which ultimately commodifies most people—the logic of slavery applies a racial hierarchy to this system.23 Note one of the key claims in Smith’s discussion of the logic of slavery, that it ‘anchors capitalism’. Another way of understanding this is that **the enslavability of Black people is a necessary and foundational part of capitalism, such that slavery is not the result of capitalism, but rather that capitalism itself is structured around this logic**: [**T]he market did more than surround and detain black bodies — it also possessed them with logics of fungibility and accumulation.** Under the logic of the Atlantic slave trade, the market’s arithmetic of accumulation was sutured to the flesh, inhabiting the bodies and lives it stripped down to the sum of their biological parts for sale within the freedom of the market. For the slave, economic rationality possessed every moment of life’s terror and death’s release. Liberal distinctions between the public and private, and the economic, political, and social were fabrications for the slave, **illusions that depended on their erasure from the realm of the human.** This erasure made possible the alchemy of the market so that with its social, economic, and discursive racial mechanisms, the market could transform a human being into an object and test the limits of that object’s biological life. The fungibility of blackness meant that slaves were money, were animals, were gold, were cotton, were rum, and on and on.24 This fungibility of Blackness also, for Black people, **makes notions of intellectual property a fabrication when it comes to Black creative and intellectual work.** A reality evidenced by the history of modern/contemporary music whereby every major movement in music over the past 100+ years has happened via a process of the exploitation of Black creative labour with little benefit to their creators.25 However, because the logic of slavery structures the process of commodification within capitalism we also see that “the overall trend in intellectual property protection is broadly correlated with the rise of capitalism. In fact, some institutional features associated with capitalism had to exist prior to the full development of intellectual property rights.”26 While it is possible for intellectual property rights to exist outside of a capitalist framework, the system we currently have exists within this framework. This means that **our system of intellectual property, having arisen (at least in part) from capitalism, is necessarily structured by the logic of slavery.** All of this creates a framework through which we can begin to understand how libraries institutionalize white supremacy. Principle IV in the ALA’s Code of Ethics states “we respect intellectual property rights.”27 Of course, many people would counter this claim by saying that the manner by which libraries operate fundamentally contradicts this capitalist impulse by making ‘intellectual property’ freely accessible to the public. Except this isn’t entirely true or, rather, it doesn’t represent the entire picture. When we look at the work of libraries, we begin to see that they actually **play a significant role in not just ‘respecting intellectual property’ but in ensuring the stability of intellectual property itself.** One mechanism through which libraries do this is through the creation of ‘authority records’: “An authority record is a tool used by librarians to establish forms of names (for persons, places, meetings, and organizations), titles, and subjects used on bibliographic records.”28 While the Library of Congress (LOC) makes it clear that authority records are created with the intent to improve accessibility, the mechanism they use for this ensures that every creative work necessarily has an identifiable owner. This is necessary in a system of capital wherein everything and everyone can (and likely will be) reduced to a commodity. This is only one way that libraries come to be implicated via active participation in the logic of slavery, of capitalism, and of white supremacy. We can also see that **libraries, regardless of their making ‘knowledge’ or ‘information’ accessible for free, do not actually challenge or resist this logic.** Rather, **libraries are another institution necessary for maintaining a system of intellectual property within a larger context of white supremacy that depends on the inherent enslaveability of Black people.**

#### The example of the HeLa Bomb demonstrates the implicit structures of anti-Blackness that formulate possession over Black bodies – only a pessimistic analysis that begins and ends at the black positionality has the revolutionary potential to unravel the political and social dimensions that create flaws within medicine.

Harvey ’16 – Assistant Professor in African American Studies @ University of California, Irvine; Ph.D. in Politics @ University of California, Santa Cruz [Sandra Harvey, 5 October 2016, *The HeLa bomb and the science of unveiling*, accessed from: <https://doi.org/10.28968/cftt.v2i2.28803>, pages: 5-13] | saurish

The first “HeLa Bomb” and its fallout The story of Henrietta Lacks and the HeLa cell line is not a new one. In 1951, George Gey, the director of tissue culture research at Johns Hopkins University, discovered the sample of cancerous cells he had received from Lacks’s cervical biopsy divided continuously within the correct conditions, something no other cells were known to do at the time. The discovery opened the possibilities for in vitro studies exponentially. Narratives of the cell line and the identity of the woman from whom the cells were taken emerged fairly soon after and quite strategically. In fact, one of the earliest narratives of the HeLa cell line and the identity of Henrietta Lacks was publicized to garner support and funding for the Foundation for Infantile Paralysis and its efforts to find a poliovirus vaccine; the discovery of the HeLa cell line and the lab technology developed to keep the cells dividing were the greatest contributions to the effort’s success. The foundation’s director Roland Berg convinced Gey, who was uncomfortable with publicizing Lacks’s name, that the story of the HeLa cells must also include a story of the cell “donor.” How else could the foundation garner interest? The cell line discovery story needed to also be a personal story. In a letter to Gartler, Berg explained that it was “axiomatic in presenting this type of material to the public that to inform them you must also interest them. As one who has been writing for the public for the past fifteen years in this field, I have learned that you do not engage the attention of the reader unless your story has basic human-interest elements. And the story of the HeLa cells, from what little I know of it now, has all those elements” (Berg, 1953). Thus, since the cells’ “discovery,” foundations, science journalists, science studies and cultural studies scholars, and even (or especially) the scientists who have used her cells to further their own research have told and retold stories of Henrietta Lacks and her cells. During this early period, however, race was not central to the HeLa narratives (Landecker, 2007). In fact, the identity of the woman from whom the cells originated was unclear and often misstated. **Some authors referred to her as Henrietta Lakes or Helen Lane; others named her Helen L.** Even as Roland Berg attempted to convince Gey to reveal the woman’s background publically, he referred to her as “Mrs. Lakes” (Berg, 1953). Further, because Lacks was not explicitly described as black, she was assumed by most to be a white woman, as the Foundation for Infantile Paralysis no doubt tacitly implied—the “unsung heroine of medicine” (Landecker, 2007, p. 164). Indeed, Berg wrote, “Here is a situation where cancer cells—potential destroyers of human life—have been channeled by medical science to a new, beneficent course, that of aiding the fight against another disease” (Berg, 1953). In science literature, **“HeLa” began to refer not to the specific cancerous cells of a black woman’s cervix, but to the universal, “generalized human or cellular subject”** (Landecker, 2007, p. 165). Even Gey’s attempt to keep Lacks’s name and information private contributed to the fabrication of this symbolic woman. He assured Berg, “an interesting story could still be built around a fictitious name” (Gey, 1953). In this period, HeLa’s was a story of how any individual— presumably, of course, a white individual—could contribute to scientific advancement and, thus, the progress of the nation. This raises the question of how the HeLa cell line became racially fixed as black. Rebecca Skloot’s now widely read and critiqued book, The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks (2011), had a chapter on this particular moment— the 1966 Second Decennial Review Conference on Cell Tissue and Organ Culture—yet she did not elaborate on its cultural and political significance. She, however, recognized that it was an important event in the scientific community and thus named the five-page chapter she dedicated to it, “The HeLa Bomb,” appropriating the term scientists used informally to refer to the scandal of HeLa contamination. Race, specifically blackness, was at the center of Gartler’s presentation. In his research, he had compared both phenotypes and genotypes of twenty sample cell lines and found them to be sharing the same phenotype variations. More specifically, of the two principal variants, the samples had a type that appeared most frequently in the “American Negro male population” (Gartler, 1968, p. 750). In March 1966, Gartler wrote to Gey to confirm the race of the woman from whom the HeLa cells were taken and concluded, “I have not ascertained the racial origin of all the lines examined; it is known, however, that at least some were thought to have been derived from Caucasians (KB, WISH, Prostate, CMP) and at least one (HeLa) from a Negro” (Gartler, 1968, p. 750).7 Through the framework of racial biostatistics, Gartler concluded that the sample cell lines had been taken over by HeLa cells and marked by a phenotype most commonly held by black men. He made no comment about any sex discrepancy. Instead, the narrative told by cell culture scientists and popular science journalists was one of white cells vulnerable to contamination and disappearance by aggressive, duplicitous black cells.8 Prudent scientists should be vigilant of the cell lines and tissue cultures in their own laboratory, the narrative warned. Gartler argued that much of the work using cell lines that assumed a particular origin was “open to serious question…[and] would be best discarded” (p. 175). **Upon HeLa’s unveiling, many researchers and funders were concerned about the validity of their work.** Popular science journalist Michael Rogers reported, “Careers had been built on the basis of human tissue culture research, papers written and published, grants and fellowships received—and now, abruptly arose the possibility that the fundamental unit of study might not have been even vaguely what it was supposed to be” (1976, p. 50). However, scientists’ reactions to HeLa cells passing were also affected by socio-cultural imaginaries. The fallout from Gartler’s accusation blurred the lines between the professional, the personal, and the ideals and practices of disinterested scientific inquiry for the cell tissue community and the biotechnology industrial complex more broadly. For example, during the conference, one of the affected cell lines that Gartler identified was fellow scientist Leonard Hayflick’s WISH line, which was derived from tissue originally in the amniotic sac of Hayflick’s infant daughter. Upon hearing Gartler’s presentation, Hayflick’s concern for his cell line turned to racial paranoia. Worried about the possibility of in vivo rather than in vitro contamination, he called his wife during the conference break to ask whether he was, in fact, his daughter’s biological father. As he retold the anecdote during his own presentation, “She assured me that my worst fears were unfounded” (Skloot, 2011, p. 156). The room, reportedly, “erupted in laughter, and no one said anything else publicly about Gartler’s findings” (Skloot, 2011, p. 156). **Racial and sexual anxiety turned to comedy as the threat of miscegenation was temporarily covered over.** It was not just that HeLa appeared to the scientific community as a passing actant, but that it had the capacity to make passing subjects out of others—for example, Hayflick’s daughter. The link between HeLa contamination and the destruction of professional careers and scientific progress emerged through **the racialization, gendering, and hypersexualization** of both the cells and their human source. Suturing the cells to the subject, this anthropomorphism drew from tropes of black female hypersexuality and labor. The narratives were rampant in popular science journalism, but also existed in the traffic between scientists, science journalism, and cultural studies. One journalist wrote that for a cell culture lab to receive a letter from Walter Nelson-Rees, a cell culturist who dedicated his work to the detection of HeLa contamination, was like receiving “a note from the school nurse informing the parents that little Darlene had VD” (Michael Gold, quoted in Landecker, 2007, p. 172). In an essay for the London Review of Books, novelist Anne Enright recounted a series of websites that explained how to detect the papillomavirus DNA in HeLa cells. She reflected, “I think this means that Henrietta Lacks had genital warts. I think this means that she slept around” (Enright, 2000, p. 9, emphasis in original). Additionally, in an article for the feminist philosophy journal Hypatia, cellular biologist Lisa Weasel described HeLa cells as “a laboratory workhorse” that, although unreliable, performed the role of control group (Weasel, 2004, p. 185). **HeLa and Henrietta Lacks were contagious and were so together because of the discursive slippage between the narratives of the cellular material and the woman as subject.** As Michael Rogers’s particularly sensationalist journalistic account of HeLa contamination argued, “In life, the HeLa source had been black and female. Even as a single layer of cells in a tissue culture laboratory, she remains so” (1976, p. 50). These tropes animated scientific discourse as well. For example, in an interview with Michael Rogers, Nelson-Rees underscored just how toilsome the task had become, acknowledging, “I hoped I’d never have to look another HeLa in the face” (Rogers, 1976, p. 51). If the cells had at one time signified the universal human cellular subject, the unveiling of their passing resulted in a confrontation between scientists and the particularities of their object of study. Racial phobia and its concomitant desires manifested in a black woman’s face returning the gaze. The uncanny moment of the passing object violently and obscenely ruptures any assumptions of science’s inherent goodness. In returning to the question of how the uncovering of this cell line came into discourse through a bomb metaphor, one must ask after the biopolitical work that this metaphor enacts. To take the bellicose reference literally is to assume the HeLa passing as a warlike moment in the midst of the compiling of biomaterials for medical research. As the basis for his argument about biopolitics, Michel Foucault insisted that medicine itself is “a political intervention-technique with specific powereffects” (2003, p. 252). The underlying biopolitics of defending society is a matter of “destroying that [sort] of biological threat that those people over there represent to our race” (Foucault, 2003, p. 257). Thus, to think of the HeLa passing as a bomb within the historical context of the time—1966— is to think the passing threat together with other bomb threats and detonations of the time: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the escalation of the Vietnam War between 1963 and 1969, and the bomb that ripped through Birmingham’s 16th St. Church in 1963. During the Cold War and black uprisings against Jim Crow, the threat of a nuclear bomb encouraged duck and cover practices and hypervigilance against the communist that might be lurking in our own backyard—“Red Under the Bed.” The metaphor projects the threat of a black woman and worker, who passes undetected in the sample of cervical cells. Within the passing narrative, HeLa threatens the sort of categorization necessary for biopolitics of the sovereign state and for the integrity and coherency of the individual, knowing subject. Within the context of war, the threat of HeLa passing constituted the possibility of not knowing who the other was, not knowing how to identify and target the other or, even worse, to discover that one was the other.9 With this frame of reference, **surveillance and regulation become critical techniques that bind medicine and science to a larger national and geopolitical project**—one that biologists see themselves as taking on. For example, in an article in Science, journalist Rhitu Chatterjee refered to Roland Nardone, a cell biologist at the Catholic University of America in Washington, DC as “the Paul Revere of cell contamination” (Chatterjee, 2007, p. 929). To this day, so critical is the threat of contamination that Nardone authored and widely disseminated a white paper titled, “Eradication of Cross-Contaminated Cell Lines: A Call for Action” in which he characterized the 1970s as a decade full of “revelations” of cell contamination and “concealment of knowledge [of wide spread contamination] and manipulation [of results] through editing” (Nardone, 2007, p. 2). Washington reporter David Dickson wrote that the reluctance to authenticate cell samples resulted in “corruption of scientific literature…forgery…falsifying data…fraud against the federal government…[and] a criminal offense” (Dickson, cited in Nardone, 2007, p. 2). Nardone recommended that government, private funding institutions, scientific journals, professional societies, laboratory directors, and academic department heads contribute to the surveillance and authentication of cell samples (Nardone, 2007, p. 4). In these ways, scientific practice and the practices and ideologies of nationalism and accumulation are mutually informed phenomena. What is more, this form of knowledge production must be understood as a moral task that enables the proliferation of the human over the unpredictability of nature and is objects. The epigraph to Michael Gold’s book, A Conspiracy of Cells, cites Francis Bacon on this ethics of knowing: “If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; But if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties” (Gold, 1986). The quotation is placed opposite a full-length image of Henrietta Lacks in a suit with her hands on her hips. The promise of modern scientific research invokes a moral disposition towards knowing; it asserts that one be humble, that one make no assumptions. This particular ethics of knowing begins with a presumption of humility and gives rise to a deserving subject capable of knowing the truth about the world itself as object.10 However, Gold’s use of Bacon’s quotation to offer a solution to HeLa contamination disavows the ethic’s epistemological investment in mastery. I am reminded of another Francis Bacon quotation that feminist scholar Anne McClintock underscores: “My only earthly wish…is to stretch the deplorably narrow limits of man’s dominion over the universe to their promised bounds…leading to you Nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave” (McClintock, 1995, p. 23). **Bacon’s remark reveals modern science’s colonial underpinnings by positing a female and othered Nature to be discovered by and contained under the dominion of Europe’s man.** Bacon’s sentiment is rooted in what McClintock calls “porno-tropics,

” a structure of colonial epistemology that allows the knowing subject to project his fantasies, desires, taboos, and phobias onto the colonial space ripe for discovery and mastery (1995, p. 23). To have dominion over and make visible its veiled, feminized interior is to “know” or be certain about the occulted other. As such, Nature and women occupy a similar position in colonial and scientific discourse—each existing for the sole purpose of being known and thus possessed, contained, and enjoyed. This process of knowledge accumulation is not a disinterested practice of empiricism but a psycho-political-economic acting out of the phantasy of mastery. The biopolitics that shape scientists’ search for HeLa contamination and journalists’ actions in retelling the story of Henrietta Lacks and the HeLa cells must also be read alongside patterns of black surveillance in the US. The term “passing” emerges in antebellum runaway slave narratives about the “tendency” of black slaves to pass themselves off as free to escape bondage.11 Some did so by literally forging paper passes, while others tried hiding their blackness from public perception by passing for white, for native, or for immigrant. The passing slave was a fugitive slave. Thus, **the passing accusation is one form of unveiling, which assumes that the most important properties of a black subject/object are fugitivity and fraud**. In the more contemporary case of Henrietta Lacks, both scientists and science journalists used her blackness and her sexuality to describe the cells’ tendency to be out-of-control and deceptive. Nonetheless, in their practice of detecting HeLa, scientists and journalists cannot rely on the visual to confirm the cells’ racial “truth.” Cellular biologists track this interiority through the material “data” of Lacks’s cells. The centrality of visual evidence in scientific progress maintains that the regulatory technique of unveiling has become more precise in identifying, grasping the truth of the subject or matter, and tracing its every move. The western gaze is taken up in DNA fingerprinting, a practice science journalist Rithu Chatterjee argued “has become the standard tool for authenticating cell lines” as well as identifying criminal and foreign bodies (2007, p. 929). **The “digital epidermalization” of biometric surveillance renders bodies as racialized, “digitized code,” demanding that they respond to the questions, “Who are you?” and “Are you who you say you are?”** (Brown, 2015, p. 109). While the HeLa passing emerges as a crisis of security and instability, the passing narrative works to contain and regulate the incalculability and unwieldiness of blackness, gender, and sexuality. The accusation of passing reasserts the human’s ability, even its moral imperative, to trace and manage nature’s order of things so that they might not ever unexpectedly “stare you in the face.” Thus, Gartler’s revelation of HeLa contamination was, paradoxically, a story of the stability and predictability of other noncancerous human cells. The 1966 presentation concluded with just this argument. He reasserted that his findings demonstrated “the remarkable stability of normal human cultures, that is, the virtual absence of spontaneous cellular transformation among them” (Gartler, 1968, p. 175). Gartler suggested that “the incorporation of stable genetic markers in material to be cultured is the best guarantee against contamination” (Gartler, 1968, p. 175, my emphasis). What scientists needed to do was identify and categorize the stable cell characteristics that would also allow them to grasp the truth of the cell (and limit black female sexuality). Once this was accomplished, there would be no cases of “mistaken identity” or “identity theft,” as Chatterjee would later describe the HeLa phenomenon (Chatterjee, 2007).

### Track 3 is the Metaphor of Impossibility

#### This is Wilderson in ‘10

Professor of Drama and African American Studies @ UC Irvine [Frank B. Wilderson III, “Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms” pg. 1-5) | NJW

WHEN I WAS a young student at Columbia University in New York there was a Black woman who used to stand outside the gate and yell at Whites, Latinos, and East and South Asian students, staff, and faculty as they entered the university. She accused them of having stolen her sofa and of selling her into slavery. She always winked at the Blacks, though we didn't wink back. Some of us thought her outbursts bigoted and out of step with the burgeoning ethos of multicultural-ism and "rainbow coalitions." But others did not wink back because we were too fearful of the possibility that her isolation would become our isolation, and we had come to Columbia for the precise, though largely assumed and unspoken, purpose of foreclosing on that peril. Besides, people said she was crazy. Later, when I attended the University of California at Berkeley, I saw a Native American man sitting on the sidewalk of Telegraph Avenue. On the ground in front of him was an upside-down hat and a sign informing pedestrians that here they could settle the "Land Lease Accounts" that they had neglected to settle all of their lives. He, too, was "crazy**."** Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it would seem that the structure, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar of their demands—and, by extension, the grammar of their suffering—was indeed an ethical grammar. Perhaps their grammars are the only ethical grammars available to modern politics and modernity writ large, for they draw our attention not to the way in which space and time are used and abused by enfranchised and violently powerful interests, but to the violence that underwrites the modern world’s capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his land provided the stage upon which other violent and consensual dramas could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to call not merely the actions of the world but the world itself to account, and to account for them no less! The woman at Columbia was not demanding to be a participant in an unethical network of distribution: she was not demanding a place within capital, a piece of the pie (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather, she was articulating a triangulation between two things. On the one hand was the loss of her body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to becoming a "being for the captor,"1 the drama of value (the stage on which surplus value is extracted from labor power through commodity production and sale). On the other was the corporeal integrity that, once ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of everyone else on the street. She gave birth to the commodity and to the Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes, the world—not its myriad discriminatory practices, but the world itself—was unethical. And yet, the world passes by her without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls her "crazy." And to what does the world attribute the Native American mans insanity? "He's crazy if he thinks he's getting any money out of us"? Surely, that doesn't make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that he does not have a big enough gun. What are we to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically—unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Give Turtle Island back to the "Savage." Give life itself back to the Slave. Two simple sen-tences, fourteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An "ethical modernity" would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms, such as class struggle, gender conflict, and immigrants' rights. One cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmogra-phies of socially and politically engaged directors, the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—is that what can so easily be spoken is now (500 years and 250 million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these fourteen words not only render their speaker "crazy" but become themselves impossible to imagine.

#### Thus, like the lady in front of Columbia demanding her couch, the aff places the impossible demand that the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

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#### Check all T/Theory interps in CX – infinite interps exist, including bidirectional ones – means that I can never meet. This deters frivolous theory and means we can debate substance and functions as terminal defense to all theory shells.

### Track 4 is the Demand

#### IP laws are a parasitic operation that has always been and can only be anti-black. The demand to reduce intellectual property WILL GET CIRCUMVENTED but that’s precisely the point: the act of posing the demand requires us to recognize the inability for liberal inclusionism to alter the positionality of blackness within the symbolic order because the Library itself, and not the myriad of its unethical practices, is a plantation.

Newman ’13 – BA @ York University, MA @ Texas State University, PhD Candidate @ University of California, Santa Barbara in Department of History [Kurt Newman, 14 September 2013, *Whiteness as Intellectual Property: Some Notes Towards a History of Copyright Law’s Racial Unconscious*, accessed from: <https://s-usih.org/2013/09/whiteness-as-intellectual-property/>] | saurish \* bracketed for inclusion \*

Thus, if we are searching out the racial politics of American popular music and intellectual property law, we could do worse than to train our focus on the pioneering Swing Era bandleader Paul Whiteman. Whiteman—jazz’s prototypical white man–is significant for many reasons: his arrangements were important contributions to the swing language, and he famously introduced many of Gershwin’s most famous compositions to the world. Whiteman was a longstanding campaigner for intellectual property rights in musical interpretations and arrangements, and the defendant in a key copyright case, 1939’s RCA v. Whiteman. But Whiteman’s most historically important role may have been as the greatest venture capitalist in the field of “whiteness as intellectual property.” Here, we are interested in the links between Whiteman the legal crusader and Whiteman the preeminent practitioner of interracial cultural entrepreneurialism, and in the ways he leveraged his whiteness to propertize the resources of African American musical innovators. I attend primarily to Whiteman’s self-representation and his reception by African American intellectuals, rather than Whiteman’s legal campaigns, and argue that **the reach of intellectual property as an organizing paradigm extends far beyond the courtroom**—that, in fact, **“whitening” was coordinated with racialized conceptions of authorship**, the nature of the musical text, **and aesthetic value**. Progressive cultural critic Gilbert Seldes summed up Whiteman’s significance as racial mediator in a piece written for The Dial in 1923: So far in their music, the negroes have given their response to the world with an exceptional naiveté, a directness of expression which has interested our minds as well as touched our emotions; they have shown comparatively evidence of the function of their intelligence… Nowhere is the failure of the negro to exploit his gifts more obvious than in the use he has made of the jazz orchestra; for, although nearly every negro jazz band is better than nearly every white band, no negro band has yet come up to the level of the best white ones, and the leader of the best of all, by a little joke, is called Whiteman (Gilbert Seldes, “Toujours Jazz,” The Dial, August 1923). Langston Hughes saw things differently: White Man! White Man! Let Louis Armstrong play it– And you copyright it And make the money (Langston Hughes, “White Man,” The New Masses, December 15, 1936). Hughes refined this acerbic take in an essay written twenty years later, in response to rock and roll’s replay of Swing Era intellectual property politics: It is nothing new for American whites to take [Black] American Negro songs, words, and styles, and appropriate them for their own. This **began more than a hundred years ago**… Almost as fast as the Negro originates something new in the world of music, **the whites take it and go, sometimes even claiming it as their own creation**… A white band in Chicago in the early 1920s claimed to be the originators of jazz… in New York a bit later Paul Whiteman took unto himself the title of ‘The King of Jazz’… Some of the poor guys who created jazz and are still living, are on relief. (Langston Hughes, “Highway Robbery Across the Color Line in Rhythm and Blues,” The Chicago Defender, July 2, 1955, 9). Hughes was actually being rather kind. He might have called attention to Paul Whiteman’s 1930 film, The King of Jazz, featuring a cartoon segment wherein Whiteman travels to the “African jungle” and is crowned “King of Jazz” by the natives. Whiteman himself occasionally acknowledged something like **“whiteness as intellectual property.”** He famously told the African American bandleader Fletcher Henderson (who was sometimes called the “Paul Whiteman of the Race”): “if you were white, you would make a million dollars.” “A million dollars,” coincidentally, is the sum that white college students told social scientist Andrew Hacker that they would demand in compensation if they woke up one day to discover that they had accidentally been turned into African Americans. This anecdote, in turn, lies at the heart of Cheryl Harris’s groundbreaking article “Whiteness as Property” (Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” Harvard Law Review, June 1993, 1-75). Harris makes a powerful case for “whiteness as property” in relation to property’s function as a “right to exclude,” looking at the evolution of “whiteness” as a precious, selectively distributed resource, from Plessy to Bakke. Her research, bolstered by more recent work by Ira Katznelson, George Lipsitz, and David Freund, provides a powerful ground for historical inquiries into racism’s “cash value.” But how did “whiteness as property” become “whiteness as intellectual property?” In an earlier essay here about the pragmatic innovations of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the area of copyright jurisprudence in the early years of the twentieth century, I stressed the revolutionary character of Holmes’s insistence that the taste of every class was to be treated with respect. By 1909, the class struggle in intellectual property law had been temporarily settled, with the leveling forces of popular culture victorious over more traditional commitments to fine art. The new currents in copyright jurisprudence shifted the terrain of struggle from conflicts over “high” and “low” to battles between large and small media corporations, and between managers and cultural workers. With the consolidation of these developments, the gendered and racialized character of intellectual property assumed new political salience. Women, who were not guaranteed the right to publish books in their own names (motivating the formation of the Lucy Stone League in the 1920s under the leadership of Ruth Hale to agitate for women’s right to publish under their own names) were among the most important cultural workers of the 1910s and 1920s. Lacking many of the legal protections of literary paternity, women cultural workers were seen by Hollywood studio heads, mass-market publishers, and stage producers as uniquely good investments. As with gender politics, **the racial politics of intellectual property law largely took shape around structural advantages that allowed white male cultural entrepreneurs to claim credit for, and thus propertize and authorize, the creative work of less socially powerful others.** Whiteman was perhaps the most vigorous speculator in this area. Beginning with a chance encounter with jazz music in the Bay Area during the World War I era, Whiteman crafted a self-identity as an “interpretive musician”—a shaper and molder of raw materials (typically, **materials that were “raw” to the extent that they were African American**), the creative processing of which (or “sweetening”) added up to a Lockean mixture of labor and nature meriting authorial status. Whiteman’s famous Aeolian Hall concert of 1924 seems to have represented a turning point in the epistemological maturation of “whiteness as intellectual property.” By conscious design, Whiteman arranged the program around “smooth”/”rough” and “civilized”/”wild” distinctions that remain central to popular music’s aesthetic self-understanding. Famous for premiering Gershwin’s “Rhapsody in Blue,” **the Aeolian Hall concert was a self-conscious attempt to “whiten” African American music**, or (in language suggesting that passing from black to white is a thoroughly gendered business), **an effort to “make a lady out of jazz.”** Whiteman’s orchestra began with a performance of “Livery Stable Blues,” adapted from a 1917 recording by the Original Dixieland Jazz Band. The ODJB was a white group led by clarinetist Nick LaRocca, who later assumed the mantle of jazz’s inventor. In his 1924 memoir Jazz, Whiteman borrowed a page from LaRocca’s playbook, coming close to claiming paternity over all of jazz music. Like the ODJB, Whiteman’s Aeolian Hall performance featured a variety of raucous imitations of barnyard sounds—**playing on racist associations of “blackness” and “animality.”** Whiteman consciously chose “Livery Stable Blues” as the concert opener in order to display, over the course of the rest of the performance, the subsequent “improvements” in jazz scoring. Later, Whiteman performed the popular song, “Whispering” in two versions—“legitimate scoring vs. jazzing”—so as to display a “melodic, harmonious, modern theme jazzed into a hideous nightmare.” The evening was structured to validate white claims to having “improved” jazz, and thus like John Locke’s agrarian capitalist claiming ownership of “turf his horse had cut,” **to assert legal ownership of the music.** Beyond simple avarice, would-be musical “improvers” like Whiteman were motivated by changing historical conditions in the decades after World War I. Beginning with the nineteenth century minstrel show, and vaudeville’s array of racialized buffoonery, American entertainment culture had long been defined by a central tension between original and forgery, repetition and difference. As Cedric Robinson and Clyde Woods have argued, **at the heart of this regime of racial representation lurked a central contention: that the victim enjoys his or her victimization.** In such representations, **the African American grotesque takes pleasure in his humiliation and degradation** (as does the Irish gorilla, the Jewish shylock, and the idiot hayseed). No one enjoys racism, according to the logic of such entertainments, as much as its victims. This regime of racial representation (connected, in complex ways, with the railroad corporations, Northern banks, the Southern prison-industrial complex, and the cotton economy) required constant renewal and refreshment, as well as regular explosions of spectacular violence. **What this regime could not tolerate—what would be entirely fatal to the entire operation—was the free expression of the complex and fully human personhood of African Americans.** Thus, when musicians like Whiteman worked to maintain their monopoly on the legitimate means of translating African American music to white America, **via the mechanisms of copyright law**, they were functioning within a well-established pattern of mediating the aesthetic expression of African Americans (which often meant, in practical terms, censoring or distorting its content) **in order to preserve minstrelsy’s empire.** As the gramophone, radio, and automobile led to increased opportunities for African American cultural workers to present their own aesthetic projects across the country, without the intermediating brokerage of white “translators,” this regime of racial representation was imperiled. This created a real crisis for both aggressive defenders of popular culture’s racism and those who, like Whiteman, saw themselves as genuinely committed to aesthetic appropriation as evidence of interracial friendship (however curious such commitments were in the face of Whiteman’s tendency to feature blackface minstrelsy sequences in his concerts throughout the 1920s and 1930s). Musicians like Whiteman, then, were fighting for the preservation of “whiteness as intellectual property” on two fronts: seeking to preserve their roles as folkloric or anthropological mediators, and also to preserve their roles as commercial “co-authors.” What is perhaps most intriguing about Whiteman’s cultural prospecting is that he made no effort to obscure his promiscuous borrowing. Whiteman’s remark to Fletcher Henderson was meant as an expression of jocularity, not cruelty. Whiteman regularly went to see the Duke Ellington band play in Harlem in the 1920s and 1930s. Thomas DeLong writes that Whiteman used to urge his collaborator Ferde Grofe to “make notes of what Ellington’s outfit was playing, but Grofe had little or no success at capturing its distinctive sound and syncopation.” Whiteman and Grofe admitted that due to the timbral complexity of Ellington’s music, they couldn’t steal “even two bars of the music.” But, by implication, had they been able to capture the sounds on paper, they would have felt no compunction about taking them. In this light, it is interesting to read the Chicago Defender’s coverage of Paul Whiteman in the 1920s and 1930s. A certain internalization of Whiteman’s claim to have redeemed jazz seems to have taken hold among some of the African American intelligentsia. For example, an opinion piece by Dave Peyton from 1929 celebrates Whiteman as it launches a complaint against the segregation and ghettoization of African American music by record labels. Peyton argues that African American musicians had been forced by record companies to play “discordant noises,” as opposed to the “legitimate instrumentation” and “wholesome music” of white jazz musicians like Paul Whiteman. For Peyton, **Whiteman’s “refinements” represented not a whitewashing of jazz, but a purification of African American music traditions.** The problem was that white-owned record labels would not allow African American bands to emulate Whiteman, encouraging instead musical “bad habits.”

#### The act of making impossible demands affirms a strategy capable of reorienting society towards liberation. The decision to act, knowing that failure may ensue, is a necessary tactic for revolutionary politics.

Taryn ’14 (Jordan, "The Politics of Impossibility: CeCe McDonald and Trayvon Martin— the Bursting of Black Rage." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2014.)Wardn/NJW

The politics of impossibility is a way to name our era of neoliberal individualist, post- race and post-feminist time. In other words we live in a post – post impossible political reality; I see the possibility in impossibility as a larger political strategy that is interested in a strategic reorganization of society towards liberatory pursuits. To understand what is possible in the impossibility is to become comfortable with the possibility of failure. One must not think only of the outcome of an action instead the possibility in impossible politics is focused upon the decision to act, with the intention that action may result in something, but knowing deep inside it may result in failure or something else entirely. Hence the need for a politics of impossibility that is expansive in its interventions in our current moment; it requires a diversity of tactics for non-beings within a complex web of relationality and kinship. I find our era of impossibility, with all of its sharp edges and devastating reality, hopeful; it is not too soon... or too late to begin to think of the implications of a politics that calls into question the very foundation of the nation- state.

#### Thus, impossible demands un-imagining the imaginable are key to the destruction of civil society as we know it

Murillo III ’20 – assistant professor of African American Studies @ University of California, Irvine [John Murillo III, Fall 2020, *Untimely Dispatch* from *the Middle of Nowhere* from *Propter Nos Volume 4: Invention*, accessed from: https://trueleappress.com/2020/12/11/propter-nos-volume-4-2020/, pages: 78-79] | saurish

I/we have performed our impossible alchemy thusly: (nigredo) disintegrate our core materials—time, space, and work—shedding the ashen detritus inessential to our work and leaving only what we need; (albedo) the distillation of what remains—untime, nowhere, and refraction—into the material we can synthesize into a greater conceptualization; and (rubedo) the synthesization of a new, vexing, abstract material that might reshape our understanding of Black existence and imaginative creation—destructive writing. While we knew and know **our work aims to produce an alternative theory of Black creation that embraces and works with the destructive forces** that make us **untimely and displace us into nowhere**, we perhaps (re)discover that **our work is its own negotiation of destruction**, our own staging of these principles of destructive writing. That invisible force suturing the fragments surrounding us into a field, that unseen thing that amplified the call of the fragments we sought out and were able to hold and behold, that animating element of untimeliness, refraction, and being nowhere: that undergirds the whole of this work, argumentatively and creatively, **is destruction**, and in our endeavor to make time and space for our considerations, we contemplate and imagine and write toward an answer to our most difficult set of questions. How to tell a shattered story, one not meant to be passed on or passed on? How to “un-tell” a story that must be told?16 **How to tell an impossible story?** Perhaps it is not exactly as Sharpe says. Perhaps the goal is not to ‘imagine the unimaginable’17 but, as part of the same refusal NourbeSe writes and performs, **to radically un-imagine the imaginable**. How to defend the dead, the dying, and we who live untimely lives in the middle of nowhere? By becoming everybody? No. **By destroying everything** Cowrie shells drag across the hard, wet wood. A constellation has been traced in water. A spell has been cast. A conjuring has taken place. We bear the water and the witness. We are a clamor of fragments in the oceanic dark. **Telling and writing impossible stories is destructive work.** Telling, writing, and living impossible stories is destructive, dangerous work when deathliness, untimeliness, and stankiness are the conditions of whenever and wherever we try to be. To really listen to Ursa Corregidora’s blues18 and **take the leap into the Black hole toward total destruction is to leap toward the singular possibility of radical, unimaginable, and impossible creation.** Only in the dark and clamoring shatter, **only from the nowhere of there and the untimeliness of then, might we really make time and space for one another.** Nothing less, nowhere else, and with no time to spare, we leap.