## 1

#### The telos of the 1ac’s politics is the strike – that naturalizes capital’s control and is parasitic on political organizing.

**Eidlin 20** Barry Eidlin (assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and the author of Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada), 1-6-2020, “Why Unions Are Good – But Not Good Enough,” Jacobin, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing

**Labor unions have long occupied a paradoxical position within Marxist theory. They are an essential expression of the working class taking shape as a collective actor and an essential vehicle for working-class action. When we speak of “the working class” or “working-class activity,” we are often analyzing the actions of workers either organized into unions or trying to organize themselves into unions. At the same time, unions are an imperfect and incomplete vehicle for the working class to achieve one of Marxist theory’s central goals: overthrowing capitalism. Unions by their very existence affirm and reinforce capitalist class society. As organizations which primarily negotiate wages, benefits, and working conditions with employers, unions only exist in relation to capitalists. This makes them almost by definition reformist institutions, designed to mitigate and manage the employment relationship, not transform it.** Many unions have adapted to this conservative, managerial role. Others have played key roles in challenging capital’s power. Some have even played insurgent roles at one moment and managerial roles at others. When unions have organized workplace insurgencies, this has sometimes translated into political pressure that expanded democracy and led to large-scale policy reforms. In the few revolutionary historical moments that we can identify, worker organization, whether called unions or something else, has been essential. Thus, labor unions and movements have long been a central focus of Marxist debate. At its core, the debate centers around the role of unions in class formation, the creation of the revolutionary working-class agent. The debate focuses on four key questions. First, to what degree do unions simply reflect existing relations of production and class struggle, or actively shape those relations? Second, if unions actively shape class struggle, why and under what conditions do they enhance or inhibit it? Third, how do unions shape class identities, and how does this affect unions’ scope of action? Fourth, what is the relation between unions and politics? This question is comprised of two sub-questions: to what degree do unions help or hinder struggles in the workplace becoming broader political struggles? And how should unions relate to political parties, the more conventional vehicle for advancing political demands? The following is a chapter from [The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190695545.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190695545) (Oxford University Press, 2019). It assesses Marxist debates surrounding trade unions, oriented by the four questions mentioned previously. It proceeds historically, first examining how Marx and Engels conceived of the roles and limitations of trade unions, then tracing how others within Marxism have pursued these debates as class relations and politics have changed over time. While the chapter includes some history of labor unions and movements themselves, the central focus is on how Marxist theorists thought of and related to those movements. Marx and Engels wrote extensively about the unions of their time, although never systematically. The majority of their writings on unions responded to concrete labor struggles of their time. From their earliest works, they grasped unions’ necessity and limitations in creating a working-class agent capable of advancing class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This [departed](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/wusa.12021) from previous variants of socialism, often based in idealized views of rebuilding a rapidly eroding community of artisanal producers, which did not emphasize class organization or class struggle. Writing in The Condition of the Working Class in England about emerging forms of unionism, Engels observed that even though workers’ primary struggles were over material issues such as wages, they pointed to a deeper social and political conflict: What gives these Unions and the strikes arising from them their real importance is this, that they are the first attempt of the workers to abolish competition. They im ply the recognition of the fact that the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon the competition of the workers among themselves; i.e., upon their want of cohesion. And precisely because the Unions direct themselves against the vital nerve of the present social order, however one-sidedly, in however narrow a way, are they so dangerous to this social order. **At the same time, Engels saw that, even as union struggles “[kept alive] the opposition of the workers to the … omnipotence of the bourgeoisie,” so too did they “[compel] the admission that something more is needed than Trades Unions and strikes to break the power of the ruling class.”** Here Engels articulates the crux of the problem. First, unions are essential for working-class formation, creating a collective actor both opposed to the bourgeoisie and capable of challenging it for power. **Second, they are an insufficient vehicle for creating and mobilizing that collective actor.** Marx and Engels understood that unions are essential to working-class formation because, under capitalism, the system of “free labor,” where individual workers sell their labor power to an employer for a wage, fragments relations between workers and makes them compete with each other. As described in the Communist Manifesto, the bourgeoisie “has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment,’” leaving workers “exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.” While workers organized based on other collective identities, such as race, ethnicity, or religion, only unions could unite them as workers against the source of their exploitation — the bourgeoisie. Unions serve “as organized agencies for superseding the very system of wage labor and capital rule.” But just as unions could allow the proletariat to take shape and challenge the bourgeoisie for power, Marx and Engels also saw that they were a partial, imperfect vehicle for doing so for two reasons. **First, unions’ fundamentally defensive role, protecting workers against employers’ efforts to drive a competitive race to the bottom, meant that they** [**limited themselves**](https://www.amazon.com/Wage-Labour-Capital-Value-Price-Profit/dp/0717804704) **“to a guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it.” Thus, even militant trade unions found themselves struggling for “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage” without challenging the bourgeoisie’s fundamental power, particularly the wage labor system**. And some layers of the trade union officialdom were content to fight for privileges for their small segment of the working class, leaving most workers behind. **Second, unions’ focus on wages and workplace issues tended to reinforce a division between economic and political struggles. This division was explicit with the more conservative “old” unions in Britain, which “bar[red] all political action on principle and in their charters.” But even with more progressive formations, such as the early nineteenth century’s Chartists, or the late nineteenth century’s “new” unions, Marx and Engels saw that the transition from workplace struggles to politics was not automatic.** For one, it varied across national contexts. Engels observed that French workers were much more likely to mobilize politically, while English workers “fight, not against the Government, but directly against the bourgeoisie.” But beyond national variation, they saw a recurring pattern of division, separating economic and political struggles by organization. Reflecting on the early to mid-nineteenth century English working-class movement, Engels noted a threefold divide between “socially-based” Chartists, “politically-based” Socialists, and conservative, craft-based trade unions. While the Chartists were “purely a working-men’s [sic] cause freed from all bourgeois elements,” they remained “theoretically the more backward, the less developed.” Socialists may have been more theoretically sophisticated, but their bourgeois origins made it difficult to “amalgamate completely with the working class.” Although young Engels thought an alliance of Chartism and socialism was underway, the alliance proved elusive. By the 1870s, Marx opined that politically, the English working class was “nothing more than the tail of the great Liberal Party, i.e., henchmen of the capitalists.” Likewise, Engels had soured on the English working class. **Both saw promise in the militant worker protest in the United States at the time, seeing the seeds of a nascent labor party. But that too fell short. Thus, unions failed in Marx and Engels’s central task: the formation of “a political organization of the working class as a whole.”**

#### Recognizing a right to strike reduces revolutionary potential and fractures class organizing – turns the perm.

**Crépon 19** Mark Crépon (French philosopher), translated by Micol Bez “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Toward the Critique of Violence,’” Critical Times, 2:2, August 2019, DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331

**If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains**. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence visàvis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. **[This is the possibility] that violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.”1 In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries**. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. **Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take**. **However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles.** We might consider this to be the per fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of ques tioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benja min dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class strugles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The diference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed uncondi tionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. **The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to con tain class strugles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means.** On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufcient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. **They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that jus tifies the strike**. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) lef once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufcient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufcient rationale, allow ing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situ ation, or of a new policy. **And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.**

#### Capitalism’s successes necessitate human extinction and destroy the value to life – it’s try or die for alternative organizing

**Duzgun 20** Eren Duzgun (teaches Historical Sociology and International Relations at Leiden University, Netherlands), 4-5-2020, "Capitalism, Coronavirus and the Road to Extinction," Socialist Project, https://socialistproject.ca/2020/04/capitalism-coronavirus-and-road-to-extinction/

**Covid-19, by contrast, has begun its journey and taken its biggest toll thus far in the most advanced and affluent parts of the world**. This is to say, the contagion is no longer limited to the persistently undernourished, underdeveloped, and war-torn parts of the world; its impact is no longer restricted to a distant wet market or a third world country alone. **Instead, it has emerged and expanded in the very heart of the capitalist world order at a time when capitalism has not only been already firmly established across the globe but has been testing the eco-biological limits of the entire planet. Should things remain the same, Covid-19 and its future cousins are likely to claim the lives of not just ‘some’ people as they did in the past, but of humanity as a whole. In this sense, perhaps for the first time in modern history, the biological blitzkrieg activated by the coronavirus has thrown into sharp relief the immediately existential and undeniably global contradictions and consequences generated by capitalism.** Contradictions on a Global Scale Critical biologists and epidemiologists have put the blame on industrial agriculture as the root cause of the emergence of new pathogens since the 1990s. [According to Rob Wallace](https://climateandcapitalism.com/2020/03/11/capitalist-agriculture-and-covid-19-a-deadly-combination/), giant agribusiness and resource extraction firms have now reached the last virgin forests and smallholder-held farmlands in the world, subordinating them to the logic of capitalist markets. **The loss of the ecological diversity and complexity of these huge tracts of land has increasingly forced wild food operators to hunt in previously untouched parts of the jungle, which, in turn, has increased “the interaction with, and spillover of, previously boxed-in pathogens, including Covid-19.”** Likewise, global warming has forced or allowed pathogens to escape their natural habitat. As a result, new viruses against which we have no immunity “are being sprung free, threatening the whole world.” In short, [as John Vidal writes](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/18/tip-of-the-iceberg-is-our-destruction-of-nature-responsible-for-covid-19-aoe), “we disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it.” **That some agribusiness firms have been blatantly risking lives for profit would not come as a surprise to the critical reader**. Even [Bill Gates has been sounding the alarm](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Af6b_wyiwI) about the potentially deadly consequences of irresponsible business practices and new viruses. **Yet, what tends to remain underemphasized in these debates is that the blame belongs neither solely to ‘greedy’ firms that have driven viruses out of their natural habitat, nor to ‘short-sighted’ politicians who have not invested enough in vaccine technology or national health systems. Instead, the problem is rooted in the very structure and rationality of the system as a whole. That is, we may go extinct as a result of the ‘successes’ of the very system ‘we’ created in the first place, i.e., capitalism. How did we end up losing control of an ‘economic’ system of our own making?** This is indeed an anomaly in human history. The conception of the ‘economy’ as an autonomous sphere dictating its own rules over society did not exist in non-capitalist societies. As the economic anthropologist [Karl Polanyi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Polanyi#Works) put it, “neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there… a separate economic system in society.” The economy either “remained nameless” or had “no obvious meaning,” for the economic process and prices were instituted through non-market means, such as kinship, marriage, age-groups, status, political patronage, etc. Even “where markets were most highly developed, as under the mercantile system,” the economic system, as a rule, “[was absorbed in the social system](https://books.google.ca/books?id=SgHuxQEACAAJ)” and showed “no tendency to expand at the expense of the rest.” In this sense, the market with a distinctive logic, autonomy, and dynamic of its own was completely unknown to our ancestors, and indeed, the emergence of the idea of ‘self-regulating’ markets represented a complete reversal of the way in which past economies functioned. **In order for ‘self-regulating’ markets to ‘self-regulate’, a variety of political and institutional arrangements had to be initiated to progressively eliminate the non-market survival strategies that humans previously relied upon.** Most notably, the age-old communal systems of social and moral regulation needed to be eradicated, a process that systematically subordinated the ‘natural and human substance of society’, i.e., land and labour, to market relations for the first time in history. Rise of Capitalism **At the heart of the rise of capitalism, therefore, rested a ‘political’, legal, and violent process that led to the historically unprecedented characterization of land and labour as commodities. Without commodifying land and labour, i.e., without treating the planet’s living substance as commodities, it would have been impossible to view the ‘economy’ as an institutionally and motivationally self-regulating sphere of life, an almost robotic creature functioning at the expense of human lives and livelihoods. Capitalism presupposed from the very beginning a radical transformation in the human use of nature as well as in the provision of life’s essential requirements. In this sense, the danger of global extinction which we have been going through is not a temporary hiccup in an otherwise smoothly operating capitalist ecosystem but has always been a possibility built into the very structure of market society.** On the one hand, by treating land and labour as commodities, by subjecting people’s utilization of land and enjoyment of life to their ability to continuously increase market competitiveness and productivity, capitalism has enabled massive technological advancements in all spheres of life. This, in turn, has generated, above all, an unprecedented potential to feed, clothe, and accommodate an ever-increasing world population. **On the other hand, however,** [**as Ellen Wood argues**](https://monthlyreview.org/1998/07/01/the-agrarian-origins-of-capitalism/)**, by subordinating all other considerations to the imperatives of market competition, capitalism has also created poverty, homelessness, environmental destruction and pandemics**. Billions of people who could be fed and housed are subjected to immense doses of insecurity, living their lives under the constant threat of joblessness, homelessness, loss of status and starvation. **In a similar fashion, the environment that could be protected is systematically destroyed for profit, and killer viruses that could be contained are unleashed.** Undoubtedly, Covid-19 has become the archetypal example that lays bare “the destructive impulses of a system in which the very fundamentals of existence are subjected to the requirements of profit.” **Can the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ outcomes of capitalism be somewhat reconciled? Indeed, for a brief period in the Global North, it seemed they could be**. During the so-called [Golden Age of Capitalism](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-golden-age-of-capitalism-9780198287414) (1945-70), massive productivity increases (alongside working-class struggles) allowed for steady increases in wages, job security, expansion of welfare state, improvements in the living conditions of the majority of the labouring masses as well as the expansion of civil and political liberties. **Yet, this brief period of generalized prosperity and stability also facilitated the incorporation of the western working classes into the dominant capitalist ideology, causing them to turn a blind eye to the economically destabilizing, environmentally destructive, and socially degrading impact of global capitalism in the Global South.** The main ‘problem’ with the Global South has been, by and large, a question of ‘timing’. **Once capitalism was established and consolidated in the Global North, it has not only led to the birth of new and more effective forms of imperialist control and neocolonial expansion but has also irrevocably undermined the potentially positive outcomes of capitalist development elsewhere.** For example, the [MIT political economist Alice Amsden](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-rise-of-the-rest-9780195170597), a large chunk of whose work in the 1970s and 1980s sought to explain the success of the ‘Asian Tigers’, more recently concluded that the massive technological and infrastructural gap between the North and the South has literally made impossible capitalist ‘development’ of any sort in the vast majority of southern economies since the 1990s. The economic situation in the Global North has gotten progressively worse too. Under the conditions of increased global economic competition wages have been stagnating or declining since the 1970s, while decades of fiscal austerity wiping out most of the economic and social gains of the earlier period. The new reality of high unemployment, stagnant wages, long work hours and precarious jobs has been masked for a while by a debt-driven growth, the unsustainability of which has been bitterly testified by millions of people since the 2008 financial crisis. All in all, market imperatives have been regulating social reproduction almost worldwide for a long time but with no prospect of capitalist ‘development’ for an overwhelming majority of the world’s population in the South and the North alike. **Furthermore, the ecologically disastrous and socially inhumane consequences of capitalism have long outweighed the prospects of material gain in the Global South.** In this respect, what is being painfully realized in the current conjuncture is that the North is no longer able to externalize the worst consequences of such an unsustainable mode of life. The North isn’t and won’t be spared the existential threats posed by global capitalism. **The implication is that any meaningful attempt at solving the present, and future crises needs to take the bull by the horn**. There is literally no choice to be made between ‘capitalism’ and ‘capitalism with a human face’. **As long as the underlying dynamics of our lives remain the same, as long as we keep treating nature and human beings as commodities, no** [**cosmetic surgery**](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/) **will do. To the contrary, historical experience suggests that such minimal interventions will sooner or later backfire, re-legitimizing capitalism pure and simple. The only way to ‘re-embed’ our economies and save our lives from ecological collapse is by intervening in the very heart of the beast: land and human beings need to be taken out of the market. The beast is not tameable; it needs to be**[**killed**](https://monthlyreview.org/product/what_every_environmentalist_needs_to_know_about_capitalism/)**.**

#### Vote neg for dual power organizing – only by refusing the 1ac’s opportunistic politics can we produce actual change.

**Escalante 18** Alyson Escalante (Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist), 8-24-2018, "Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!," Forge News, https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/

If we, as socialists, truly fight for a classless world, we must smash the mechanisms which ensure class domination. **We must smash the bourgeois state. This realization led the Bolsheviks to reject the opportunism of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Menshiviks in the Soviets and they chose to overthrow the provisional government themselves. Shockingly, their revolution was successful**. After months of compromise, the workers had grown tired of the opportunist bourgeois socialists. They had seen that the dual power of the soviets and the provisional government was not tenable. One side had to take unitary power. Most importantly, the workers saw that the bourgeois government had done nothing for them: it had smashed their printing presses, it had crushed their demonstrations, it had broken their strikes. Of course, it could do nothing else, the bourgeois state is designed to do precisely this. The events of October, 1917 ought to have concretely proven that the strategy of infiltrating the bourgeois government is untenable. **Lenin and the Bolsheviks proved that the workers are willing to throw the bourgeois state away in favor of a dictatorship of the proletariat. And yet, here we are 111 years later and large factions of the largest socialist organization in the United States echo the cowardly and worthless drivelings of the Menshiviks and Socialist Revolutionaries.** Dual Power Today **I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success. To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state. What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers.** The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. **When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense. In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers**. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it. **And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers.** And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? **We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us?** The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare. And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. **When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.** Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. **Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs?** The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. **Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power.** **The movement to do this is underway**. **Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification**. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time. The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. **In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people.** **And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power**. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. **We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that**. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

#### Framing – neoliberalism infects policy education – you should prioritize epistemologically challenging it

**Ball 17** Stephen J. Ball (Distinguished Service Professor of Sociology of Education at the University College London, Institute of Education. He was elected Fellow of the British Academy in 2006; and is also Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences; and Society of Educational Studies, and a Laureate of Kappa Delta Phi; he has honorary doctorates from the Universities of Turku (Finland), and Leicester. He is co-founder and Managing Editor of the Journal of Education Policy), 2017, “Laboring to Relate: Neoliberalism, Embodied Policy, and Network Dynamics,” Peabody Journal of Education, 92:1, 29-41, DOI: 10.1080/0161956X.2016.1264802, this part is pgs. 37-39

**Within Ramya Venkataraman’s writing and presentations, there is the deployment and reiteration of a particular discursive ensemble, a set of tightly interrelated and interdependent concepts, ideas, and arguments addressed to educational reform (see Table 3). The ensemble joins up a set of arguments, assertions, and assumptions, in relation to the state and its alternative, that serve as a rationale for the processes of reform of education.** The elements of this ensemble are both local and specific as well as generic and global. **They are reiterated at almost all of the nodes in the global policy network—almost every website or network event rehearses and deploys them**. Although they are articulated and recombined in different ways and given different degrees of emphasis, they have a coherence which underpins network membership. As Marsh and Smith (2000, p. 6) put it, “networks involve the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of behaviour.” **These are made up not simply of pragmatic relations, but also constitute moral and epistemic communities.** The ensemble takes as its starting point the failures of the state, and a state of crisis in education (A)—the assertion that the government schools are ineffective and unfair. This starting point is the basis for a set of linked arguments: the replacement of bureaucracy by enterprise, through PPPs (I) and/or forms of private provision (H/G); and the need for assessment (as a way of measuring and managing the system) (B); the deployment of IT, that is, assessment software and big databases (C); at the institutional level the strategic role of leadership skills and sensibilities in driving change and raising quality (D) and to leverage for change from outside agencies, in particular from strategic philanthropy (E). The private sector is given a privileged role in all of this as agents of change and of innovation (F) through direct forms of private provision (H). Leadership, partnerships and assessment are offered as practices that “work”—for which there is evidence or stories of success in other places (J). **The state then reappears in a different form (K) as a competition state (Jessop, 2002), which facilitates, contracts, sets targets, and monitors—that makes and regulates markets. Embedded and represented in these arguments is a version of neoliberal rationality and its “state phobia” as Foucault (2010) calls it, in relation to the “old” state.** Over and against this, the competition state is imagined as lean and frugal. **Bureaucracy is displaced, innovation and creativity are “released” through the participation of business and civil society actors, and interrelated opportunities are created for reform and for profit and for “worldmaking.” The elements of a new policy ecosystem are outlined here—practices, organizations, infrastructure, and incentives that enable a market in state work. All of this is a reworking, or perhaps even an erasure, of the boundaries of state, economy, and civil society**. This rationality and its mobilization and advocacy are also realized and demonstrated in socio-material practices, which are enacted in and through network relationships. Public–private partnerships are excellent examples because they are a kind of assemblage of actors, organizations, and techniques that create and activate relationships. Ramya Venkataraman and McKinsey (India) have been active participants and partners in a variety of PPP initiatives. For example, they have participated in both the Mumbai School Excellence Programme (with Akanksha, MSDF, UNICEF, and the Mumbai Corporation) and in the South Delhi School Excellence Programme (with ARK, Bharti, Centre for Civil Society, Central Square Foundation, The Tech Mahindra Foundation, South Delhi Municipal Corporation). Both of these PPPs involve nonstate actors who take over state schools, loosely modeled on and directly informed by the U.S. charter school and English Academies programs. The work that ARK is doing in the UK is very similar to what we want to do down the road…. We now have 18 academies, with 24 en route; it’ll be 50 by 2015. And the concept of privately running— education that is publicly funded is something that ARK believes it can deliver [inaudible] it’s looking to India, we’re also seeking a similar model in South Africa and Uganda. (Amitav Virmani, Head of ARK [India] now CEO, The Education Alliance) In Mumbai we’ve been involved from end to end in the implementation. There are also other cities and states, which we are currently in discussion with for similar programs …. the state government has taken our help to craft the program …. (Ramya Venkataraman) Although these practices and the forms, stories, and ideas that underpin them are instantiated in a particular way in India in these examples, it is also possible to trace their movement through the global education policy community beyond India. One can follow them through a set of relations clustered around other reform efforts, using the same ingredients in the United States and in England. DISCUSSION This paper focuses on some of the network and discursive labor of one “traveling technocat.” Ramya Venkataraman travels across and beyond India as well as across the business, state, and third sectors, and between local, national, and international institutions. She carries with her a story made up of ideas, practices, and sensibilities that address the reform of Indian education and the Indian state, and articulates new opportunities for business and philanthropy as agents and beneficiaries of reform. **She is embedded in an apparatus of relations, finance, practices, and discourse (plots and stories), “comprising variously entangled scaled agents (of different geographical reaches)” (Cook & Ward, 2012, p. 7), which moves, changes, and develops but which coheres around a neoliberal project of reform and of creative destruction.** We are able to glimpse through these relations some of the work of assembling political rationalities, spatial imaginaries, calculative practices, and subjectivities that are “both the cause and the effect of wider transformative processes” (Cook & Ward, 2012, p. 140). Artifacts, schemes, propositions, and “programmatic” ideas move through these network relations, gaining credibility, support, and funding as they do so. These global forms are phenomena that are distinguished by their “capacity for decontextualization and recontextualization, abstractability and movement, across diverse social and cultural situations and spheres of life” (Ong & Collier, 2005, p. 7). Ramya Venkataraman’s engagements in the reform movement are diffuse, tangled, and contingent, she is a speaker at many sites and events that contribute to a reform assemblage that brings together various “things” and bodies, utterances, modes of expression, and regimes of signs. Such assemblages “stand in a dependent but contingent relationship to the grander problematizations …. They are a distinctive type of experimental matrix of heterogeneous elements, techniques and concepts” (Rabinow, 2003, p. 17). **Here the grand problematization is neoliberalism**. What is evident in Ramya’s activities is the labor involved in animating the assemblage, the efforts of articulation, persuasion, exemplification, legitimation, and problematization. Concomitantly, there is the emergence of an infrastructure of organizations, a sort of shadow state (Wolch, 1990), that can incubate, disseminate, and exchange ideas—teacher certification and training, school leadership, assessment, managing and running schools—over and against the language of more traditional forms of government and support, facilitate and legitimate the activities of non-state actors. **The mix of state, business, and third-sector actors and organizations within policy and governance is changed, not once and for all, but as part of a slow and steady movement from government to governance**. At the same time, new kinds of careers, identities, and mobilities are forged within the processes of reform and the work of networks.

## Case

#### Calls for Resurrecting the right to strike rely upon a mis-understanding of the nature of contemporary and historic labor rights. This romaniticization of WW2 labor politics ultimately leads leftist politics towards a reconciliatory response to liberal governance. Only by refusing the terms of liberal respectability politics can we collectively produce a labor movements that can topple the structures of capitalist alienation.

**White 2018** (Ahmed White, Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike, Wisconsin Law Review,2018 Wis. L. Rev. 1065 (2018), 1071-1073)//NotJacob

**Those who call for resurrecting the right to strike contend that the flourishing of strike militancy reflected, if not the inherent politics of the original Wagner Act before it was “de-radicalized,” then at least its potential.** To be sure, it is clear that the Wagner Act was a remarkable document which did more to advance workers’ rights than any statute in American history; and it was at least ambiguous on the question of the legal status of strike militancy. But what seemed like its support for worker militancy was not a product of any particular potential. Rather, it was a reflection of the difficulty that judges, legislators, and other authorities, who dedicated themselves to restraining these strikes even as they flourished, encountered in prosecuting these values amid the unique economic and political conditions of the 1930s and 1940s. These obstructive conditions were quite temporary, though, and the authorities’ efforts culminated soon enough in the near-categorical prohibition of the tactics that had made strikes so effective. It is in this way that **the history of strikes shows less in the way of de-radicalization than an encounter with the unyielding outer boundaries of what labor protest and labor rights can be in liberal society.** As this all played out, **it left in its wake a right to strike, but one whose power consists almost entirely of the ability of workers to pressure employers by withholding labor, while also maybe publicizing the workers’ issues and bolstering their morale. But while publicity and morale are not irrelevant, in the end they are not effective weapons in their own right**. Nor are they generally advanced when strikes are broken**. Moreover, the withholding of labor, unless it could be managed on a very large scale**—something the law also tends to prohibit by its restrictions on secondary boycotts, by barring sympathy strikes and general strikes—**is inherently ineffective in all but a small number of cases where workers remain irreplaceable.** Of course, **striking in such a conventional way accords with liberal notions of property and social order; but precisely because of this it is simply not coercive enough to be effective. And it is bound to remain ineffective, particularly in a context where workers far outnumber decent jobs, where mechanization and automation have steadily eaten away at the centrality of skill, where the perils that employers face in the course of labor disputes are as impersonal as the risks to workers are not, where employers wield overwhelming advantages in wealth and power over workers, where the state’s machinery for enforcing property rights and social order have never been more potent—where, in fact, capital is capital and workers are workers.** From this perspective, **the quest for an effective right to strike emerges as a fantasy**—an appealing fantasy for many, **but a fantasy no less, steeped in a misplaced and exaggerated faith in the law and a misreading of the class politics of modern liberalism.** The campaign to resurrect such a right appears, too, not only as a dead-end and a distraction, but an undertaking that risks blinding those who support viable unionism and the interests of the working class to the more important and fundamental fact that liberalism and the legal system are, in the end, **antithetical to a meaningful system of labor rights. It is for this reason that the call for an effective right to strike should be set aside in favor of more direct endorsement of militancy and a turn away from the law and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold.** The argument that follows further elaborates these main contentions about the history of striking and the nature of strikes in liberal society, augmented by a discussion of the legal terrain on which all of this has played out. It unfolds in three main parts. Part I describes how the concept of a right to strike developed in concert with the history of striking itself, how both were influenced by the evolving condition of labor, and how this history created the circumstances under which it became possible to conceive of an effective right to strike without making this possible in fact. Part II consists of a critical review of the fate of coercive and disorderly strikes, especially those featuring sit-down tactics and mass picketing. It considers how the courts, the NLRB, and Congress confronted these strikes, and how they moved with increasing vigor to proscribe them as soon as these strikes emerged as effective forms of labor protest. Part III looks more carefully at the underpinnings of this repudiation of strike militancy, finding in court rulings and other pronouncements against the strikes an opposition to coercion and disorder that, **even if sometimes invoked disingenuously, is nonetheless firmly anchored in modern liberalism and its conception of the appropriate boundaries of class protest and labor conflict. On this rests the argument that an effective right to strike is impossible and the pursuit of it, problematic.** The final part is a brief conclusion that sums up some of the implications of this argument.

#### In fact – the affirmative’s romanticization of the strike without understanding the cooptation of the right to strike is empirically wrong. A right to strike does not prevent permanent replacement of striking workers, nor the criminalization of coercive strikes tactics for being too “violent!” Let’s stop repeating the mistakes of the last 40 years of labor politics and instead imagine alternative political horizons for liberation.

**White 2018** (Ahmed White, Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike, Wisconsin Law Review,2018 Wis. L. Rev. 1065 (2018), 1127-1131)//NotJacob

One of the outstanding ironies in a story rich with many is that the very things which made the prospect of an effective right to strike seem for a time **so viable—the unlawful, illiberal, and altogether intolerable coerciveness of sit-down strike and mass picketing, especially—are also what made this concept impossible to ever realize.** As we have seen, **effective strikes could build the labor movement, validate the Wagner Act, secure the New Deal, and in many ways change America. But they could not make themselves legitimate.** So it is **that workers have found themselves with a right to strike that equals little more than a right to quit work**—and maybe lose their jobs or their houses and savings in the balance. **They have a right to strike,** as Steinbeck’s character, Mac, complained**, but they “can’t picket”—at least, not in a way that is really apt to change anything.** And **so they do not strike—in fact, under these circumstances they usually should not strike.** The proof of this is readily evident, not only in the dramatic decrease in strikes since the 1970s, but in the sad regularity with which even the most vibrant strikes have ended in defeat for workers. **Phelps Dodge (1983**), **Greyhound (1983 and 1990**), **Hormel (1985-1986**), **Caterpillar (1992, 1993, and 1994-1995**), **Detroit Daily News/Daily Free Press (1995-1997)**—th**ese are but the most notable of a litany of vibrant strikes since the 1970s that ended in failure.**306 They are, in fact, the definitive labor struggles of this period, overshadowing a much smaller number of comparable disputes, like the strikes at United Parcel Service in 1997 and Verizon in 2016 that—often shaped by uniquely favorable labor dynamics—ended in something resembling victory for the union.**307 Each of these big and unsuccessful strikes was motived by very modest, in fact anti-concessionary, goals and well-supported by workers and the larger public alike.** **And each featured mass picketing and other attempts at militancy. But these tactics were met with injunctions, civil suits, mass arrests, and criminal prosecutions, which ended the protests and left the employers free to exert their vast advantages in material wealth and political power, end the disputes on their terms, and leave thousands of strikers unemployed.308 It is true that the last year or so has witnessed what many people have declared to be a miniature strike wave, that has been widely celebrated by unionists and their allies as a welcome departure from past trends and portent, many hope, of a sustained resurgence of labor activism.**309 Headlined by statewide teachers strikes in West Virginia, Oklahoma, and Arizona, all in the first part of 2018, the strikes commanded a great deal of media coverage, at least compared to what labor disputes usually receive nowadays.310 However, closer inspection suggests that this wave is mainly an artifact of wishful thinking exacerbated by the novelty for many people nowadays of seeing these strikes reported in the media. For in fact, the number of strikes over the last couple of years has remained close to the level that has prevailed for several decades now.311 Perhaps more significant in putting these strikes in proper context is a reflection on their character. **None have been organizing strikes.** All of these strikes have been over contracts and working conditions, with many driven by workers’ opposition to concessions and ended with less than spectacular gains by the strikers.312 Moreover, the strikes which comprise this supposed wave have been disproportionately mounted by government workers—teachers, mainly—who are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act. For this reason, several of the strikes have been unlawful, as state law typically denies such workers the right to strike anyway. But at the same time—and this may be the most crucial point—**none of these strikes has unfolded in an especially militant way, at least by historical standards. There have been no big sit-down strikes, no threatening episodes of mass picketing, no routing of “scabs,” no destruction of property.** Which is all to say that the kinds of strikes that built the labor movement eighty or more years ago remain thoroughly in check. **There is little hope within the prevailing political and juridical order that things could ever be any different.** Perhaps the right to strike could be made effective if it were fundamentally reconfigured in illiberal, corporatist terms. The right could conceivably be reconfigured such that the government might intervene more aggressively and make the workers protests effective—for example, stepping in to decide by adjudication, mediation, or arbitration which side should win a strike. Elements of this approach, which was vigorously opposed by IWW and AFL unionists alike in the early twentieth century, can be found internationally, in industry-specific statutes like the Railway Labor Act, and in labor statutes that apply to government workers, although most often when the law goes down this path it all but dispenses with the right to strike anyway, treating it as a redundancy, a tool without a purpose. As Senator Wagner himself perceived, alignment between the excessive reliance on the authority of the state to manage labor relations and the denigration of the right to strike was both dysfunctional and dangerous. As he put it back in the summer of 1937, defending the recently-passed statute that bore his name and the right that he placed at the center of it, [t]he outlawry of the right to strike is a natural concomitant of authoritarian governments. It occurs only when a government is willing to assume definitive responsibility for prescribing every element in the industrial relationship—the length of the day, the size of the wage, the terms and conditions of work.**313 Clearly no such regime will be instituted in any event, not least because, as interest in such schemes in the twentieth century makes clear, support for this kind of corporatist intervention in labor disputes has itself been an elite reaction against strike militancy that currently does not exist. Where does this leave workers and unions, possessed of a right they cannot afford to surrender but cannot rely on as a means of advancing their interests and standing in society?** Are they bound like Steinbeck’s strikers to meet defeat, albeit in a more peaceful way? Maybe. In one of his many commentaries on the sit-down strikes as they raged across the country in the spring of 1937, Walter Lippmann took time to analyze one of the speeches in which James Landis had argued that the tactic might well become a new right, in the same way that the right to strike in general had been created through its persistent assertion in the face of opposition and incredulity. No revolutionary, Lippmann nonetheless understood what Landis apparently did not: that the right Landis spoke of was revolutionary in its conception, and therefore not just an impracticality but a contradiction. “Never in the history of the law has rebellion been made lawful. Only the rights demanded by the rebels have been legalized,” said Lippman.314 **As the labor scholars who call for the restoration of an effective right to strike have all understood, the tactics that made such strikes possible were tolerated only so long as there was not a functional system of labor rights in place, one that could stand alone in courts and hearing rooms.** **Once this was the case—once the rebel unionists’ aims, or at least those imputed to them, were realized—the sit-down strikes were predictably banned, and then so were mass picketing, secondary boycotts, and so forth**. Thus it is that in cases like Fansteel and the debates on Taft-Hartley, sit-down strikers, mass picketers, and the like were presented as enemies of the labor law. **Even more recent attacks on the right to strike, such as complaints in the 1980s about union violence going uncensored and the modest moves by the NLRB to rein in this, too, have been inevitably justified not in terms of overthrowing the system of labor rights but managing it, reconciling its virtues with the normative and juridical mandates of liberal society. And so it is that the right to strike—the right to an effective strike—has been sacrificed not in the name of capitalist hegemony but on liberalism’s altar of labor peace. Unfortunately, so far as the interests of workers go, these are the same thing.**

#### 1] This just proves that the aff’s politics aren’t warranted - most cases of strikes are when employees are replaceable, and that’s exactly what the employer will do. Firing workers is not liberation because then they have to end up toiling under the capitalist economy. It’s a repetitive cycle - the state legalizes any resistance within its borders to make you think that change is happening, but workers still work for the same employers and are vulnerable to even further exploitation.

#### 2] Their alienation arguments don’t make sense - a right to strike isn’t going to solve alienation because workers don’t get the means of production, they only resist any abuses that the managers inflict upon them, but they still end up going back to work for the same companies and the same managers under the same system. This is another link into the cap K because their politics fractures any revolutionary potential, and this is the main thesis of our K - the only way for resisting alienation and true liberation is to deconstruct capitalism itself through dual power - otherwise workers are never going to be free.