# 2021 NovDec Aff – Lacanian-Hegelian Vanguard Party

## Part 1 – Capitalism is killing us all

#### Capitalism is an existential threat – fascism, climate change, and exacerbation of exploitation are all inevitable in the neg world

**Jodi Dean, communist philosopher and political science professor at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “Red, Black and Green”, *Rethinking Marxism*, 7-16-15, kiv**

Two ideas voiced in the present discussion impress the urgency of the need for a left party oriented toward communism: racism (Buck 2015) and the Anthropocene (Healy 2015). Given anthropogenic climate change, the stakes of contemporary politics are almost unimaginably high. They range from the continued investment in extractive industries and fossil fuels constitutive of the carbon-combustion complex (see Oreskes and Conway 2014), to the dislocations accompanying mass migration in the wake of floods and droughts to the racist response of states outside what Christian Parenti (2011, 9) calls the “Tropic of Chaos” (the band around the “belt of economically and politically battered post-colonial states girding the planet’s mid-latitudes,” where climate change is “beginning to hit hard”), all the way to human extinction. That one city, state, or country brings carbon emissions under control—while certainly a step in the right direction—may be irrelevant from the standpoint of overall warming. Perhaps its carbon-emitting industries were shipped elsewhere. Perhaps another country chose to expand its own drilling operations. Climate change forces us to acknowledge that we can’t build new worlds (Helepololei). We live in one world, the heating up of which threatens humans and other species. Not all communities, economies, or ways of life are compatible. Those premised on industries and practices that continue to contribute to planetary warming have to change significantly, and soon. Forcing that change is the political challenge of our time. Given the persistence of racialized violence and the operation of the state as an instrument for the maintenance not only of capitalist modes of production but also and concomitantly of racialized hierarchy, the challenges of organizing politically across issues and identities are almost insurmountably daunting. No wonder the Left resorts to moralism and self-care instead. It’s easier to catalog difference than it is to build up a Left strong enough to exercise power, especially given the traversal of state power by transnational corporations, trade, and treaties. It’s also easier to go along with the dominant ideology of individualism, which enjoins us first and foremost to look after ourselves, than it is to put ourselves aside and focus on formulating a strategy for using collective power to occupy, reconfigure, and redirect institutions at multiple levels. Here again, not every vision of community is compatible with every other. Those premised on fantasies of racial, religious, ethnic, or linguistic purity directly oppose those premised on diversity. Those premised on reproducing structures of class hierarchy directly oppose those insisting on equality. If something like a party of the radical Left can stretch beyond Greece and Spain, if it can be imagined in North America, it will only be possible as a combination of communism, antiracism, and climate activism. I use “red, black, and green” as a heuristic for the coalition of concerns necessary for such a party. I invoke the heuristic here to double down against critics who prefer a thousand alternatives to the party form. A thousand alternatives (see Healy 2015) is no alternative. It leaves the political system we have—the one that puts all its force behind the preservation of capitalist class interests—intact. Some ideas need to be chosen, systematized into a program, and defended. Consciously reiterating the colors of the Black Liberation Flag, the red, black, and green heuristic positions itself within the histories of communist, people’s, and anticolonial struggles. Left Unity in the UK uses red, black, and green in their logo to suggest a similar constellation. The colors don’t have a fixed meaning; they have appeared differently in the histories of emancipatory egalitarian struggle. In recent struggles, red suggests a politics against debt, austerity, and corporate personhood and allies with anticapitalism and communism as well. Black pays tribute to the IWW, anarchists, black power, and movements against aggressive policing, incarceration, and the murder of African Americans. Green points to climate justice, an approach to climate change that exceeds capitalist emphases on carbon markets and green commodities to encompass the dismantling of the carbon-based economy and the global redistribution of wealth. The three colors should not be read as three separate issues or groups. They should rather be understood as a kind of mutually supporting and inflecting scaffold. An equitable response to the changing climate, for example, is incompatible with the continuation of capitalism. A communism anchored in extractive industry is incompatible with the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. Antiracism directs our attention to those most likely to be exploited and sacrificed in market-driven schemes to address climate change. It also marks the fact of the history of divisions within the Left that have stood in the way of our forging collective counterpower. Here and now, movements are pushing the organizational convergence of communist, climate, and race politics. Moral Mondays, the ongoing protests in North Carolina, bring together an array of political concerns around racial justice, cuts to public services, and the environment. These protests include marches and acts of civil disobedience. The heartbreaking reminder that “Black lives matter” calls for the abolition of structures of institutionalized power that continue to impoverish, imprison, and kill black people everywhere. Protests in Ferguson, Missouri, in the wake of the murder of Michael Brown, have turned the spotlight on the militarization of the police and the buildup of state forces for the defense of the wealthy and white against the proletarianized—poor, brown, and black. Similar buildups of police borders in the United States and abroad attempt to push back the many on the move in response to the “catastrophic convergence” of decades of violent expropriation and climate change (Parenti 2011). The demand for climate justice places the economic inequalities accompanying and constitutive of capitalist “development” at the center of global discussions of climate change. Images from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and terms like “sacrifice zones” help articulate the two. Every time an activist reminds us that issues can’t be considered in isolation or every time a student repeats the mantra of intersectionality, the Left is instructing itself to make connections and formulate a politics capable of grasping complexity and of changing the world. The party is a form for that connecting. It provides a location where we see and relate to ourselves as comrades, as solidary members of a fighting collective

## Part 2 - Strikes are a key mode of anti-capitalist action

#### Strikes unite the working class against capitalism

Lenin 1899

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/**1899**/dec/strikes.htm

**A strike teaches workers** to understand what the strength of the employers and **what the strength of the workers consists in**; it teaches them not to think of their own employer alone and not of their own immediate workmates alone but of all the employers, the whole class of capitalists and the whole class of workers. When a factory owner who has amassed millions from the toil of several generations of workers refuses to grant a modest increase in wages or even tries to reduce wages to a still lower level and, if the workers offer resistance, throws thousands of hungry families out into the street, it becomes quite clear to the workers that the capitalist class as a whole is the enemy of the whole working class and that the **workers can depend only on themselves and their united action**. It often happens that a factory owner does his best to deceive the workers, to pose as a benefactor, and conceal his exploitation of the workers by some petty sops or lying promises. A strike always demolishes this deception at one blow by showing the workers that their “benefactor” is a wolf in sheep’s clothing.

**A strike**, moreover, opens the eyes of the workers to the nature, not only of the capitalists, but of the government and the laws as well. Just as the factory owners try to pose as benefactors of the workers, the government officials and their lackeys try to assure the workers that the tsar and the tsarist government are equally solicitous of both the factory owners and the workers, as justice requires. The worker does not know the laws, he has no contact with government officials, especially with those in the higher posts, and, as a consequence, often believes all this. Then comes a strike. The public prosecutor, the factory inspector, the police, and frequently troops, appear at the factory. The workers learn that they have violated the law: the employers are permitted by law to assemble and openly discuss ways of reducing workers wages, but workers are declared criminals if they come to a joint agreement! Workers are driven out of their homes; the police close the shops from which the workers might obtain food on credit, an effort is made to incite the soldiers against the workers even when the workers conduct themselves quietly and peacefully. Soldiers are even ordered to fire   on the workers and when they kill unarmed workers by shooting the fleeing crowd in the back, the tsar himself sends the troops an expression of his gratitude (in this way the tsar thanked the troops who had killed striking workers in Yaroslavl in 1895). It becomes clear to every worker that the tsarist government is his worst enemy, since it defends the capitalists and binds the workers hand and foot. **The workers begin to understand that laws are made in the interests of the rich alone; that government officials protect those interests;** that the working people are gagged and not allowed to make known their needs; that the working class must win for itself the right to strike, the right to publish workers’ newspapers, the right to participate in a national assembly that enacts laws and supervises their fulfilment. The government itself knows full well that strikes open the eyes of the workers and for this reason it has such a fear of strikes and does everything to stop them as quickly as possible. One German Minister of the Interior, one who was notorious for the persistent persecution of socialists and class-conscious workers, not without reason, stated before the people’s representatives: “Behind every strike lurks the hydra [monster] of revolution.”[[4]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/dec/strikes.htm#fwV04E119) Every strike strengthens and develops in the workers the understanding that the government is their enemy and that the working class must prepare itself to struggle against the government for the people’s rights.

**Strikes,**therefore**, teach the workers to unite**; they show them that **they can struggle against the capitalists only when they are united**; strikes teach the workers to think of the struggle of the whole working class against the whole class of factory owners and against the arbitrary, police government. This is the reason that socialists call strikes “a school of war,” a school in which the workers learn to make war on their enemies for the liberation of the whole people, of all who labour, from the yoke of government officials and from the yoke of capital.

“A school of war” is, however, not war itself. When strikes are widespread among the workers, some of the workers (including some socialists) begin to believe that the working class can confine itself to strikes, strike funds, or strike associations alone; that by strikes alone the working class can achieve a considerable improvement in its conditions   or even its emancipation. When they see what power there is in a united working class and even in small strikes, some think that the working class has only to organise a general strike throughout the whole country for the workers to get everything they want from the capitalists and the government. This idea was also expressed by the workers of other countries when the working-class movement was in its early stages and the workers were still very inexperienced. **It is a mistaken idea.** Strikes are **one** of the ways in which the working class struggles for its emancipation, but they are not the only way; and if the workers do not turn their attention to other means of conducting the struggle, they will slow down the growth and the successes of the working class. It is true that funds are needed to maintain the workers during strikes, if strikes are to be successful. Such workers’ funds (usually funds of workers in separate branches of industry, separate trades or workshops) are maintained in all countries; but here in Russia this is especially difficult, because the police keep track of them, seize the money, and arrest the workers. The workers, of course, are able to hide from the police; naturally, the organisation of such funds is valuable, and we do not want to advise workers against setting them up. But it must not be supposed that workers’ funds, when prohibited by law, will attract large numbers of contributors, and so long as the membership in such organisations is small, workers’ funds will not prove of great use. Furthermore, even in those countries where workers’ unions exist openly and have huge funds at their disposal, the working class can still not confine itself to strikes as a means of struggle. All that is necessary is a hitch in the affairs of industry (a crisis, such as the one that is approaching in Russia today) and the factory owners will even deliberately cause strikes, because it is to their advantage to cease work for a time and to deplete the workers’ funds. The workers, therefore, cannot, under any circumstances, confine themselves to strike actions and strike associations. Secondly, strikes can only be successful where workers are sufficiently class-conscious, where they are able to select an opportune moment for striking, where they know how to put forward their demands, and where they have connections with socialists and are able to procure   leaflets and pamphlets through them. There are still very few such workers in Russia, and every effort must be exerted to increase their number in order to make the working-class cause known to the masses of workers and to acquaint them with socialism and the working-class struggle. **This is a task that the socialists and class-conscious workers must undertake jointly by organising a socialist working-class party for this purpose**. Thirdly, strikes, as we have seen, show the workers that the government is their enemy and that a struggle against the government must be carried on. Actually, **it is strikes that have gradually taught the working class of all countries to struggle against the governments for workers’ rights and for the rights of the people as a whole**. As we have said, only a socialist workers’ party can carry on this struggle by spreading among the workers a true conception of the government and of the working-class cause. On another occasion we shall discuss specifically how strikes are conducted in Russia and how class-conscious workers should avail themselves of them. Here we must point out that strikes are, as we said above, “a school of war” and not the war itself, that strikes are only one means of struggle, only one aspect of the working-class movement. From individual strikes the workers can and must go over, as indeed they are actually doing in all countries, to a struggle of the entire working class for the emancipation of all who labour. When all class-conscious workers become socialists, i.e., when they strive for this emancipation, when they unite throughout the whole country in order to spread socialism among the workers, in order to teach the workers all the means of struggle against their enemies, when they build up a socialist workers’ party that struggles for the emancipation of the people as a whole from government oppression and for the emancipation of all working people from the yoke of capital—only then will the working class become an integral part of that great movement of the workers of all countries that unites all workers and raises the red banner inscribed with the words: “Workers of all countries, unite!”

## Part 3 – The state is a necessary condition for the social subject

#### The state plays a constitutive role in recognizing the mediated relation between human subjects – this is key for forming the social cohesion necessary to effectively strike, and without it all social organizing fails

McGowan 16 (Todd is committed to the idea that theoretical exploration of questions about existence, the psyche, and society can contribute in tangible ways to the creative process. His classes often focus on major theoretical figures like Hegel, Marx, or Freud and delve into how their ideas manifest themselves in the most important films, television series, and other media texts. This is taken from his book Emancipation after Hagel)

**Hegel** ends his political philosophy with the state rather than with mutual recognition because he **sees in the state a social structure that sustains contradiction.** The state is absolute politics—the political equivalent to absolute knowing or the absolute idea. **The state form makes freedom actual** in a way that mutual recognition does not. **Though the content of states differ, the form of the state is universal.** **The contradiction of the state—it creates the subject’s singularity by thoroughly submitting its particularity to a universal law—provides the basis for the subject’s freedom. Rather than creating the illusion of eliminating contradiction in the way that mutual recognition does, the state constantly confronts the subject with it.**

**The state** does not just secure the subject’s freedom by defending the subject against others that would impinge on this freedom. It rather **plays a constitutive role in the modern subject’s freedom** insofar as **it creates a formal structure that divorces the subject fully from its private concerns**. **The state forces the subject to recognize itself through the mediation of the state structure. As members of the state, it is clear that subjects do not exist on their own apart from their relation to others. The dependence of the subject on the collective becomes evident**. Without the state, Hegel believes, the subject has no way to recognize the constitutive role that the whole plays for the assertion of the subject’s singularity.

For modern thinkers prior to Hegel, the state is a necessary interruption of the subject’s freedom and an interruption of the potential war of all against all that would transpire without it. This is the position of both Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes, who see the state as the result of an implicit contract arranged by individual subjects to protect their interests. **Hegel vehemently opposes this notion of the state as contractual, a notion that obscures the foundational role the state plays in the freedom of the subject**. With Hegel, the state becomes identical with the subject’s freedom, a freedom that disappears without the universal structure of the state as its correlate. The state is the basis for freedom because it reveals to the subject the necessity of the obstacle for this freedom to constitute itself**. One can imagine freedom without the state but not without some similar structure that functions as a shared obstacle for the collective,** which is why Hegel’s thought is completely incompatible with any form of anarchism.

When the individual subject conceives itself without reference to the state, it conceives itself initially as a being of pure self-interest, even if it ultimately wishes to subject this self-interest to the interest of the community. One can imagine the subject pursuing its self-interest, but the problem is that this pursuit is not freedom. The subject’s interests—even up to its interest in its own survival—are given to it by the society and the natural world in which the subject emerges. Hence, as Hegel sees it, self-interest has nothing to do with the subject’s freedom, which depends on the subject alienating itself from the interests that society and nature have given it. The free subject alienates itself from its own givens, and the state is the vehicle for making this alienation explicit to the subject, which is why Hegel insists on it so decisively, in contrast to a loosely bound community, which would not reveal the subject’s alienation. It is only through identifying itself with the state or some parallel collective structure that the subject recognizes that its freedom does not lie in the pursuit of its self-interest but rather in the uprooting of that pursuit.

**The state doesn’t just alienate an isolated subject. It provides a shared obstacle for all the subjects that belong to it that holds them together as a unity.** Subjects come together in the state not as an organic whole or an aggregate but as an alienated unity. They are held together through a shared way of being what they are not.

Hegel’s celebration of the state in the Philosophy of Right has proven the most ignominious aspect of his philosophy since the book’s appearance in 1821. Soon after its publication, it becomes the emblem of Hegel’s conformity to the Prussian monarchy in power at the time. It signals his refusal to use his privileged position as one of the most important philosophers in Germany to challenge authority rather than suck up to it. Even though many disciples of Hegel debunk this interpretation of the Philosophy of Right as an exercise in conformity, it has resonates because of Hegel’s unconditional embrace of the state, which cannot but strike **modern readers** as a dangerous moment of capitulation that we would like to strike from Hegel’s political philosophy.

Hegel’s celebration of the state seems like a relic of the nineteenth century, given the oppressive abuses of state power that characterize the twentieth century. The celebration of the state becomes much more difficult to justify after the state-sponsored murder of millions. But in fact the totalitarian state arises precisely from the danger that Hegel himself identifies in the Philosophy of Right—the state failing to distinguish itself as a state and becoming confused with civil society. When subjects view themselves as private individuals, as nothing but members of civil society, they open themselves to the appeal of the authoritarian leader who promises to harmonize all private relations. The state, in contrast, provides an explicit affirmation that private relations cannot be harmonious, that they must occur through the alienating mediation of the public world that highlights their unimportance. The authoritarian leader attempts to create harmony by eliminating the singularity that derives from public engagement.

**Authoritarian rule is not the evisceration of private life but its apotheosis.** Under fascist rule, no one is permitted to act as a public being but is rather forced into the cocoon of privacy. The authoritarian regime prohibits public acts like demonstrations or open debates, even while it tolerates private subterfuges, such as sexual peccadillos or drunkenness. The fact that subjects existing under authoritarian rule view their private lives as a form of resistance to this authority merely testifies to authoritarianism’s effectiveness in destroying the public world. The sacrifice of the contentiousness of the public sphere produces a social order that seems to run smoothly. This type of rule abridges the constitutive function of the state for subjectivity and treats individuals as isolated monads. But the repression of the public sphere ends up suffocating subjects living under authoritarian rule. One must have the public world of the state to be able to endure one’s private life.

Even if it doesn’t lead to authoritarianism, the great danger of modernity is not a powerful state that impinges on individual freedom but the failure to recognize the state as a state and to mistake civil society for it. In civil society (Hegel’s term for the social bond established through economic exchange), individuals benefit the whole by following their self-interest, such as when the baker profits from selling bread and the customer survives by eating it. The baker doesn’t bake for the sake of the customer, and the customer doesn’t buy bread to support the baker. Instead, the pursuit of self-interest benefits the whole and unites both parties. As capitalism has developed since Hegel wrote this, civil society has increasingly encroached on the state and placed its own logic over that of the state, so that subjects have completely fallen for the ruse that the state is nothing but the guardian of mutual self-interest. In such a society, freedom becomes increasingly hard to come by. The danger that Hegel foresaw in 1821 has come to fruition.

Though modernity gives birth to the form of the state, it also unleashes an unprecedented development of civil society through the capitalist economy. While the state and civil society develop simultaneously and often work together, their structures are fundamentally at odds with each other. Whereas civil society encourages the subject to immerse itself in its own private concerns, the state demands that the subject recognize itself first and foremost as a public being.

When one conceives of the state as an organization that one joins for the sake of mutual protection, one reduces it to the logic of civil society. Once one thinks that state membership is nothing but an option, one misses completely the constitutive role that the state plays in one’s subjectivity. This occurs when the state takes on the hue of civil society, which it has increasingly done since Hegel’s death. The state today appears as an oppressive force because it has largely become an arm of civil society, serving as the handmaiden for the forces of capitalism. When this occurs, the state loses its capacity for giving individuals an ethical basis for their existence.

When the capitalist economy displaces the state in this way, it simultaneously disguises our solidarity as subjects. Without a recognition of the necessity of the state, we come to see ourselves as involved in a pitiless war of all against all, in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Once the capitalist economy gains priority over the state form, the fundamental contradiction that defines our political being recedes from view. Capitalist subjects do not view themselves as political beings. Their individuality simply exists on its own, not through the mediation of the universal. As a result, they experience themselves as private entities. Capitalism’s assault on the public world leaves subjects immersed in their own private particularity, unaware of the psychic necessity of the public world to underwrite their privacy.

The more the state appears as an optional encumbrance, the more the subject loses touch with its freedom. Since the state restricts what the subject can do—it passes laws against theft, against drunk driving, and against other enjoyable activities—it seems as if the state has an oppositional relationship to the subject’s freedom. By giving priority to the state, Hegel claims that we are public individuals before we are private ones. Our investment in the public sphere is not an option—like the decision to vote or not—but the basis for our private existence. The priority of the state indicates that one must go through the detour of the public in order to be a private individual.

The embrace of the state is not a moment of conformity that Hegel might have avoided but the basis on which he constructs his idea of freedom. As he grants the state a central role in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel puts the finishing touch on his philosophy of freedom that begins with the Phenomenology of Spirit. This completes the turn from Kant’s subjectivist freedom (where Hegel begins) to an objective form, from freedom as pure negativity to freedom as a positive expression of this negativity. As Shlomo Avineri puts it in Hegel and the Modern State, “subjectivist philosophy has made it a rule to see freedom only in opposition to the state, overlooking what is to Hegel the immanent truth of the state as the actuality of rational freedom.” The state actualizes freedom through making the obstacle to self-interest explicit. When the subject recognizes its essential link to the state, it also recognizes that its freedom doesn’t lie down the path of self-interest.

#### AND, in order for a post capitalist world to rise from and be sustained in face of the intensifying antagonisms of capitalism caused by strikes, the formal figure of the superfluous monarch must be occupied to prevent backsliding into fascism – McGowan continues

The state reveals to the subject that its freedom is contradictory: the subject becomes free through subjection to the state, not before or outside this subjection. Mutual recognition does not yet make the detour evident in the way the state does. This is the basic contradiction that underlies the modern state: it constitutes the individual subject through its destruction of all the individual’s particular attachments. It creates the possibility for privacy by fully submitting the subject to the public world. In the state, **individuality must emerge through contradiction. This contradiction of individuality within the state manifests itself**, for Hegel, **in the figure of the monarch**.

Hegel’s belief that the monarch retains a role in modernity represents yet another of his apparent political missteps. If one can defend the politics of his recourse to the absolute, his retention of the monarch seems beyond the pale. And yet his insistence on constitutional monarchy instead of parliamentary democracy at the end of the Philosophy of Right is part of his radical politics, not his purported conservatism. It seems impossible that there could be a serious argument for monarchy in the contemporary world. The idea of constitutional monarchy is itself dated, but Hegel’s retention of the monarch in his vision of democracy is not. It is, for him, a way to sustain the place for contradiction. **The monarch in Hegel’s politics is a form, not a content.** Democratic politics must have a position functioning like the monarch in order to avoid being swallowed up by contradiction.

The problem with **modern** parliamentary **democracy** is that it **leaves no place for the necessity of contradiction**. **It creates the impression** that everyone belongs to the social field, **that no one is excluded from the domain of representation. But** the dream of **universal inclusion always runs up against the barrier that defines any group: in order to define themselves as included, those who belong must define themselves against someone who is excluded**. **The monarch addresses this problem by embodying exclusion. The monarch has a ruling position within the society but doesn’t belong like all the other subjects.** The fact that this figure has disappeared in contemporary democracy should be counted as progress, but this progress brings with it a fundamental danger. **Without a figure that gives expression to the contradiction of the modern democratic order, the force of contradiction constantly threatens to turn democracy into fascism.**

**Fascism has an appeal rooted** not just in its act of preserving contradiction but also **in its transformation of contradiction into opposition. It turns contradiction into the disguised and more palatable form of opposition—German against Jew, American against immigrant, and so on**. **It has its origin in the tendency of** parliamentary **democracy to repress contradiction. Political engagement depends on contradiction. Subjects will seek it out in the form of fascism if parliamentary democracy represses it. This is what we have seen play out throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.**

**In order to avert this danger, Hegel’s political philosophy includes the monarch as the mark of the state’s insubstantiality**. **It is the point at which individuality manifests itself in the universality of the state, the point at which the state expresses its own self-division. The monarch lays bare the state’s absence of any self-identity. It is thus a moment of failure within the successful state.**

**Hegel gives the modern monarch a completely circumscribed function. The monarch’s gesture of simply proclaiming “I will” subjectivizes the state substance**. At this moment, it testifies to individuality within the universality of the state, its dependence on an individual in order to actualize itself. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel states, “This ‘I will’ constitutes the great difference between the ancient and modern world, and in the great edifice of the state it must therefore have its proper existence. Unfortunately, however, **this determination is regarded as only external and arbitrary**.” Modern democracy fails when it tries to function without the subjectivizing power of the monarch. When it does so, it passes itself off as a self-identical substance, thereby creating the foundation for the rise of fascism as alternate subjectivizing power.

**When the monarch recedes from the modern state, the state’s contradiction becomes invisible. Subjects lose the sense of themselves as political beings when they do not experience contradiction in the political field**. A false consensus takes over, but this consensus never holds. The repression of contradiction in politics always entails its return, usually in the form of a fascist uprising, precisely because as subjects contradiction sustains our desire, which would suffocate without it. Hegel wagers that the presence of the monarch and the contradiction that this figure represents illustrate clearly the lack of any substantial consensus.

Of all Hegel’s contemporary champions, Slavoj Žižek stands almost alone for his defense of the monarch in Hegel’s political philosophy. Rather than making excuses for the presence of the monarch, **Žižek** sees it as one of the keys to Hegel’s radicality as a thinker. He **writes,** “**The State without the Monarch would still be a substantial order—the Monarch represents the point of its subjectivation.” For Žižek, the monarch provides a path leading from the illusion of substantiality to subjectivity. He underlines its necessary because he recognizes the image of a substantial state is the primary political danger that we confront today**.

The retention of the monarch does not exhaust the political possibilities for expressing contradiction within the modern political order. It is hard to see this figure as tenable today. However, this is only one form the articulation of contradiction within democracy might take. Hegel limits himself to it because it represents the limit of his own epoch, but this in no way precludes the emergence of other possibilities. **Whatever form contradiction assumes in today’s politics, it must be as explicit as the monarch.** Otherwise, the turn to fascism and the erection of enemies will inevitably commence. The expression of contradiction is modern society’s bulwark against fascism. When contradiction recedes from view and the promise of social harmony emerges, the fascist leader appears to ensure that contradiction will manifest itself through the comfort of the friend/enemy distinction. This is a path that Hegel’s political philosophy cuts off.

## Part 4 – Plan text

#### A recognition of an unconditional right to strike means the state is completely unable to limit it and the state is nothing more than the obstacle that constitutes the social body – the “just”ness of the government is contingent on its impotence, occupying the formal role of the monarch. Thus,

#### I affirm the resolution: Resolved, A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### cross ex checks any potential abuse, prefer whole res because:

#### It’s the most common interp

#### It best represents framers intent

#### It’s the most lay, which links into circuit accessibility

## Part 5 - RotB

#### The Role of the Ballot is voting for the debater that best represents the relation to desire as subjective contradiction

**Fotaki 10** Marianna (Organization Studies Group at Manchester Business School” Why do public policies fail so often? Exploring health policy-making as an imaginary and symbolic construction” Organization 2010 17:703 Sage 713-716

So far, I have suggested that health **policies often fail because the fantasmatic foundations of the policy-making process are not acknowledged as such.** Using the example of patient choice, I have also suggested that the reasons for its re-introduction into the UK health care system and throughout Europe, despite limited success in the past, might be better understood through applying the psychoanalytic conception of subjective fantasy. In exploring the limits and possibilities of one particular policy, my aim was to demonstrate how powerful social fantasies are created and how their splitting from organizational reality enables the idealization of the health task. Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanalysis were drawn upon to put forward the article’s key arguments and to further the understanding of the less tangible processes present in public policy making. I have brought together the mental processes that Klein has described and which were then used extensively to explain organizational phenomena, with my central argument about the (unrecognized) role of the imaginary aspects of the policy-making process. Both theories in their own unique ways highlighted the role of fantasy as a necessary stimulant for policy development but also as an impediment to its realization. I have **combined the idea of fragmented subjectivity** taken from Lacan’s work **and socially sanctioned defences from object relations theory, to offer[s] an alternative conception of public policy formation and to explore the reasons behind frequent policy failures.** The Lacanian ontology of the subject was used to highlight the role of fantasy as an enabler of social projects. **Having its roots in unconscious mental life,** **fantasy becomes the stimulant driving forward public policies** such as patient choice**, even though many of these policies are bound to fail** as is the case for all imaginary projects. But **failure is not necessarily seen as an adverse outcome, but rather as an opportunity to rethink the ideas** of purposefulness and teleology **in the context of organizations and social endeavours** more generally. **The Lacanian perspective introduces the productive element held in the recognition of the inevitability of failure, by unveiling the imaginary nature of striving for idealistic policies and the liberating potential of accepting loss.** His conception of loss is so much more radical than in object relations theory, where mourning can bring some sort of reparation and make up for it. In Lacan’s work **loss originates in the longings of the individual psyche for completeness, which is unattainable, and yet this is what sustains us as desiring subjects.** If we lacked loss there would be nothing to desire. Human desire, for Lacan, **is a constitutive aspect of human subjectivity and is not driven by rational considerations**, as economists would like us to believe. If anything the subject is enmeshed in its imaginary constructs in order to deflect the reality of the human condition. Nor is it a desire for the promised outcome only, but rather (or also) for the symbol that the outcome stands for. Put differently, the incessant search in the subject is for the signified meaning and not for the signifier itself. I have suggested that many **public policies are intrinsically idealistic as they are instigated by way of setting desire in motion**. So **in the case of individual choice in health, the underlying fantasy that drives this policy is the fantasy of freedom (of choice), and by extension the fantasy of control over the uncontrollable.** **While its stated aim is to achieve diverse (and potentially conflicting) public policy objectives, the policy reflects the contradictions of human subjectivity on a societal level** as well. In other words, the patient choice paradox is that it overtly ignores the unconscious motivations implicit in the everyday reality of patient–doctor encounter (for example, by assuming that rationality over-rides patients’ fears and vulnerabilities), and yet takes (unwittingly) account of the fantasy, which is illusory but is also an indispensable aspect of our existence. The analysis moved then towards the thesis that **policy tends to be idealistic because it is not meant to withstand an immediate reality test but to express mythical, imaginary and arguably unrealizable societal aspirations and longings. In this sense the** **discrepancies and discontinuities present in patient choice policy are but an expression of the contradictions that sustain the lack, fragmentation and splitting of the subject, and so are the unspoken, conflicting and often impossible societal tasks performed by public institutions.** I have also argued that **by distancing itself from operational reality, public policy making expresses societal strife and desire on a fantasy level**, whilst health organizations are left in the position of a dependent subject, having passively to reflect it without being able to implement unworkable policies. For this reason, **the stated objectives that choice policy is expected to achieve** (such as equity and efficiency for example), **may be used to deflect attention away from the need to admit the deeper defensive role of** health care **policy** (see also Fotaki, 2006). Yet because the tacit and unspoken functions of health policy related to death anxiety and inexorable facts of life are relegated to the unconscious, **they give rise to all kinds of defensive policy rhetoric by policy makers who identify with the ideals they proclaim and then feel obliged to justify them**. While **policy makers express societal fantasies projected onto them by their constituencies**, various professional groups or patient advocates are in their own ways involved in the construction of unattainable ideals, **as they too pursue and legitimize their specific projects**. The role of fantasy in relation to patient choice seems obvious, but **can this be generalized across all policy making processes in relation to health or other areas of public policy making? The answer is an unequivocal yes.** **The fantasmatic structuration of public policy making is revealed in the difficulty of accepting the limitations that are intrinsic to human predicament** and ‘to give up the dream of being all, of living forever, of narcissistic omnipotence and of living in the world that never frustrates our desires’ (Moi, 2004: 869). **Health and social care is about dealing with the finitude of our physical bodies**. Yet these concerns are no less relevant to the education system, for example, which is unconsciously preoccupied with ensuring the survival of future generations (see Obholzer, 1994) or economic development and the idea of ‘progress’ more generally, all of which enact omnipotent fantasies of the limitless possibilities in their own distinct ways. **Being a part of the symbolic order, which is structured in lack and loss, these imaginary pursuits cannot be easily (if at all) translated into workable policy objectives. But where does this all leave policy makers and how can they purposefully integrate Lacanian and Kleinian insights by bringing them to bear on policy formation and implementation? A legitimate question is: if policies are about societal fantasies that cannot be fulfilled, would this not mean that all policies are bound to fail?** More fundamentally, aren’t policies meant to address real issues rather than fantasmatic pursuits that cannot be realized? These are important questions as public policies are first and foremost about addressing issues that most of us care about, and a great deal of effort goes into their design and articulation. **Therefore, I would not wish to suggest that policies are not about engaging with real problems. In contrast, my proposition is that socially constructed objects of fantasy are stirred up successfully only when policies concern issues that matter.** Such is the case of patient choice for example. Yet if policy-making is not to remain locked in searching for unattainable fantasms (of choice for all), originating in the imaginary reflections of the illusory self, we would have to recognize them for what they are. If, on the other hand, we carry on mis-taking them for reality, they will continue to mirror the misrecognized vision of ourselves and our society. **The unique strength of psychoanalytic thought is that it demonstrates the injustice towards the other and alienation of the subject whenever we cling to impossible fantasies originating in the imaginary (Leeb, 2008). The emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis on the other hand, lies in its power to highlight (and dispel) the imaginary nature of the subjective drive for unity, certainty and stability which underpins various societal projects.** But psychoanalysis does not only warn us about the consequences of mistaking the infinite desires of the psyche with the finitude of human bodies. More crucially **it acknowledges the productive role of fantasy, and of its failure, in the social arena. In so doing, psychoanalysis presents us with a way of bridging fantasy with reality in our social and political endeavors.** The incorporation of psychoanalytic insights, I have suggested, as a necessary means for rethinking health policy making, is not meant to supplant economic and political explanations of social and organizational life. Instead **it is offered to elucidate the co-existence and subtle interplay between psychic mechanisms and calculating rationality** that policy makers, politicians, professionals and users of services rely on to make their decisions. Both theories of Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanlaysis drawn upon in this article imply the necessity of recognizing underlying imaginary dynamics as a starting point in the journey towards realistic policy-making. To do so **we need firstly to accept the imaginary structuration of the desire to attain the unattainable. This recognition will lead to an acknowledgement and acceptance of the intrinsic instability and conflicting nature of the policy-making process, overcoming the splits between policy design and implementation**.

#### Without the monarch, the failure of complete representation leads to the exclusion of and creation of a scapegoat population, justifying violence in the promise of a non-contradictory future

**Stavrakakis 99** [Yannis Stavrakakis political theorist. @ essex school Lacan and the Political <https://philpapers.org/rec/STALAT-519> 1999 1-23-2019 AC]

In order to answer these questions it is crucial to enumerate the conditions of possibility and the basic characteristics of utopian thinking. First of all **it seems that the need for utopian meaning arises in periods of increased uncertainty, social instability and conflict, when the element of the political subverts the fantasmatic stability of our political reality. Utopias are generated by the surfacing of grave antagonisms and dislocations in the social field.** As Tillich has put it ‘**all utopias strive to negate the negative…in human existence; it is the negative in that existence which makes the idea of utopia necessary’** (Tillich in Levitas, 1990:103). Utopia then is one of the possible responses to the ever-present negativity, to the real antagonism which is constitutive of human experience. Furthermore, from the time of More’s Utopia (1516) it is conceived as an answer to the negativity inherent in concrete political antagonism. What is, however, the exact nature of this response? **Utopias are images** of future human communities **in which** these **antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them** (the element of the political) **will be forever resolved**, **leading to a reconciled and harmonious world—it is not a coincidence that, among others, Fourier names his utopian community ‘Harmony’ and that the name of the Owenite utopian community in the New World was ‘New Harmony’.** As Marin has put it, utopia sets in view an imaginary resolution to social contradiction; it is a simulacrum of synthesis which dissimulates social antagonism by projecting it onto a screen representing a harmonious and immobile equilibrium (Marin, 1984:61). This final resolution is the essence of the utopian promise. What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, **my argument will be that every utopian fantasy** **construction needs a ‘scapegoat’** **in order to constitute itself—the Nazi utopian fantasy** **and** **the production of the ‘Jew’ is a good example, especially as pointed out in Žižek’s analysis**.4 **Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination**. Put another way, **the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real:** **stigmatisation is followed by extermination**. This is not an accident. **It is inscribed in the structure of** **utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work.** If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, **if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence** (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that **it** **also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy.** To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ‘driven out through the door comes back through the window’ (is not this a ‘precursor’ of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?—VII:131).5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operation—here the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, **Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area** (seminar of 18 June 1958). In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohn’s schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. **Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the** **elimination of this group**. **The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts**. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ‘crimes’—as mentioned in Chapter 2, **the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such.**

## Part 6 – Lacanian-Hegelian Vanguard Party!!!!

#### The lacking/contradictory social body can only be sustained by voting aff. the recognition of the right to strike by the structurally monarchical “just government” is the only way to solve for the harms of capitalism and ensure contradiction is sustained by the state instead of turned into opposition by reactionary influence - the Leninist party organizes around this lack in order to facilitate anti-capitalist praxis.

**Dean 12**

**Jodi Dean, communist philosopher and political science professor at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “The Communist Horizon”, *Verso Books*, pp. 280-286 // mk**

Some depict the Leninist party as a spectre of horror, the remnant of the failed revolution the terrors of which must be avoided at all costs. In such a vision (which may not be concretely held by anyone but seems vaguely intuited by many), communism is reduced not simply to the actual (which is always necessarily ruptured, incomplete, irreducible to itself, and pregnant with the unrealized potentials of the past) but to the parody of one actuality, an actuality that has in fact changed over time and from different perspectives. Through this reduction (which is an ongoing process), actuality is displaced by an impossible figure, a figure so resolute as to be incapable of revolutionary change. Rigid, exclusive, dogmatic—it’s hard to see how such a party could even function in a revolutionary situation much less ever attract members in the first place: how would it get people to show up, to march, to write and distribute newspapers, to put their lives on the line? How would it grow or spread? In contrast, Lukács’s account of **the Leninist party suggests an organization formed as the subjectification of two lacks, the chaos of revolution and the non-knowledge of the party.** [12](#bookmark=id.tyjcwt) Lukács argues that Lenin’s party presupposes the actuality of revolution. It’s a political organization premised on the fact of revolution, on the fact that the terrain of politics is open and changing and that revolutions happen. Revolutions are not messianic events wherein long-awaited deities intervene in human affairs. They are results, conditions, and effects of politics wherein states are overthrown, dismantled, distributed, reconfigured, redirected. In the chaos of revolution, tendencies in one direction can suddenly move in a completely opposite direction. Because **the revolutionary situation is characterized by unpredictability and upheaval, no** iron **laws of history provide a map** or playbook **that revolutionaries can follow to** certain **victory**. That revolution is actual means that **decisions, actions, and judgment cannot be perpetually deferred**. When we take them, we are fully exposed to our lack of coverage in history, to the chaos of the revolutionary moment. We have to be confident that the revolutionary process will bring about new constellations, arrangements, skills, and convictions, that through it we will make something else, something we haven’t yet imagined. For the Leninist party, to wait, to postpone until we are sure, until we know, is to fail now. **The actuality of revolution requires discipline and preparation, not because the communist** party can accurately predict everything that will occur—it cannot—and not because it **has an infallible theory**—it does not. **Its theory**, like the conditions in which it is set, **is open to** rigorous **criticism**, testing, and revision. **Discipline and preparation enable the party to adapt** to circumstances **rather than be completely molded** or determined by them. The party has to be consistent and flexible because revolution is chaotic. **The actuality of revolution is** thus **a condition of constitutive non-knowledge** for which the party can prepare. It’s a condition that demands response, if the party is to be accountable to the exploited and oppressed people, if it is to function as a communist party. A communist **party is necessary because neither capitalist dynamics nor mass spontaneity** immanently **produce a proletarian revolution** that ends the exploitation and oppression of the people. A revolutionary period brings together and confuses multiple and changing groups and classes. Different spontaneous tendencies, degrees of class consciousness, and ideological persuasions converge. **The** Leninist **party doesn’t know what the people want. It’s a form for dealing with the split in the people, their non-knowledge of what they**, as a collectivity, **desire**. As Lukács writes, “**If** **events had to be delayed until the proletariat entered the decisive struggles united and clear in its aims there would never be a revolutionary situation**.”[13](#bookmark=id.3dy6vkm) What the party knows is that such a lack of knowledge must not impede action because it cannot forestall the actuality of revolution. The party, then, is an organization situated at the overlap of two lacks, the openness of history as well as its own non-knowledge. The communist party occupies this site and subjectifies it; it provides a form for political subjectivity as it works in “total solidarity with and support for all the oppressed and exploited within capitalist society.”[14](#bookmark=id.1t3h5sf) This dedication requires constant interaction with the struggling, proletarianized people. Constant interaction installs a double dynamic in the party. On the one hand, it must be strictly disciplined. On the other, it must be flexible and responsive, capable of learning from and adapting to the ever-changing situation. As it learns from the struggling masses, **the party provides a vehicle through which they can understand their actions and express their collective will**, much as the psychoanalyst provides a means for the analysand to become conscious of her desire.[15](#bookmark=id.4d34og8) One might object that my use of Lukács to present a view of the Leninist party as a form responsive to lack and contingency is selective at best. Such an objection could emphasize Lukács’s claim that “because the party, on the basis of its knowledge of society in its totality, represents the interests of the whole proletariat (and in doing so mediates the interests of all the oppressed—the future of mankind), it must unite within it all the contradictions in which the tasks that arise from the very heart of this social totality are expressed.”[16](#bookmark=id.2s8eyo1) This objection misses its target: to unite contradictions is not to resolve them. The party doesn’t resolve contradictions; it expresses them as contradictions. Leninist revolutionaries take on themselves the demands and conflicts of the revolution. They perform the revolutionary situation, in all its chaos and uncertainty. To this extent, the **Leninist party cannot be a party that makes demands on the people; it** is a party that **makes present to the people the demands they are already making** on themselves, **but can’t** yet **acknowledge.**

# Blocks

#### Neg can’t reject cap bc of fetishism of worker rltns – card abt romanticizing proletariat and inaction or smth

# Extensions

# Extra Cards

#### Mcgowan 2

Capitalism bombards us with the image of our dissatisfaction. **Challenging capitalism today doesn’t depend on focusing subjects on how dissatisfied they are with capitalist relations of production**. **This** type of **response plays into the hands of the capitalist system and the promise of a better future that it employs**. This is the response that manifested itself in the nineteenth-century critique of capitalism’s injustice and in the twentieth-century critique of capitalism’s repressiveness. Despite the vast differences between these two lines of critique, they share an emphasis on the dissatisfaction that capitalism produces, and this line of attack does fully uncover capitalism’s real psychic appeal.

Though dissatisfaction with capitalism seems necessary for any critique of the system, dissatisfaction as such inheres within the capitalist economy. Capitalist subjects remain capitalist subjects because they see themselves as dissatisfied beings in pursuit of satisfaction and thereby misrecognize the satisfaction they have found. **The critique of capitalism must begin out of our satisfaction with capitalism and not our dissatisfaction with it. But the capitalist system never avows this satisfaction. Recognizing it requires the most radical act today—that of interpretation.**

It is important never to take a system at its word. This is especially true in the case of an economic or political system, in which the workings of the system aren’t self-evident to anyone. Even when leaders are caught revealing the machinations that take place behind the scenes, we should not assume that they are giving away the keys to the kingdom. Freud’s discovery of **the unconscious implies that the subject knows what it’s doing but cannot articulate this knowledge.** As a result, **others, from the perspective of interpretation, have more insight into the subject’s designs than the subject itself. This is just as true for an economic or political system.**

The secrets of every system are present in what the system says about itself, but these statements require interpretation. They cannot be taken at face value. This imperative to interpret exists for the analysts of capitalism, despite the system’s apparent obviousness. Capitalism deceives us as to its structure and appeal by laying its cards on the table. The proponents of capitalism readily avow that it speaks to our baser instincts, to human selfishness, and to the desire for more. The most extreme of these proponents translate selfishness into a virtue, but even those who don’t see how an inducement to selfishness among individuals might create a more prosperous and thus happier collective. Greedy individuals produce a wealthy and secure social order.

This interpretation of capitalism fails because it never interprets. It simply accepts how capitalists characterize themselves and how the laws of the system explicitly structure the economy. Within the capitalist system, self-interest seems pervasive, and the benefits of the pursuit of self-interest are plain for everyone to see. But the act of interpretation requires seeing what is hidden amid obviousness. **What seems self-evident must itself become subject to interpretation, and this is what Marx does in the move from the first volume of *Capital* to the second.**

**In the first volume of *Capital*, Marx explores how capitalism views itself.** He famously points out that capitalism operates according to a single imperative. In the place of any religious duty or Kant’s categorical imperative, capitalism proclaims, “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!”[1](about:blank) Even manual laborers who are just trying to survive must, according to this transcendental imperative, concern themselves with accumulation in order to survive and possibly prosper in the future. Capitalist subjects cannot get by simply by getting by but must always concern themselves with tomorrow. One always accumulates with an eye to future prosperity, but **this capitalist imperative has a superegoic dimension to it, which means that one can never accumulate enough.** The imperative to accumulate doesn’t permit capitalist subjects to feel as if they no longer have any need to accumulate. According to the morality of capitalism, **too much is never enough.**[**2**](about:blank)

The first volume of *Capital* is an exploration of the dynamics of a system in which everyone tries to obey the imperative to accumulate. Though Marx is critical of this imperative, he doesn’t articulate an alternative. In this sense, he remains proximate to the defenders of capitalism. For the defenders of capitalism, accumulation is the first and last word. There is no other motivation for our action than accumulation or the advancement of self-interest. The structure of the capitalist economy itself seems to reveal the accuracy of this claim: it rewards those who try to accumulate and punishes those who refuse to engage in this activity.

**But accumulation is only what capitalism and its defenders claim moves the system. It is not the real engine driving capitalism. It functions ideologically to blind us to the role that satisfaction has in structuring our subjectivity.** Even when we are fully bent on accumulating, it is satisfaction that provides the basis for our accumulation. **Capitalism survives because we find our accumulation satisfying, but our focus on accumulation at the expense of satisfaction short-circuits the recognition of this satisfaction. The political task today is to wrench satisfaction from the hold of accumulation by exposing the deception involved with accumulation.**

The problem with the model of accumulation is that it hides its own manner of producing satisfaction. While the accumulating subject aims at obtaining the ultimate satisfaction in the future, this subject satisfies itself in the present through the sacrifices that it makes to obtain the object it seeks**. Accumulation serves as a cover for sacrifice**—the sacrifice of time, of energy, of resources, of freedom, and so on. In doing so, **it obscures the role that loss plays in all satisfaction.** We don’t find satisfaction in having or obtaining a privileged object through acts of accumulation but rather enjoy the object in its loss or absence. The sacrifice that accumulation demands provides satisfaction because it recreates our experience of loss, but no one who is bent on accumulation can recognize the role that loss plays.

**Capitalism’s privileging of accumulation obscures the role that traumatic loss plays in our satisfaction**. There is no satisfaction without loss. Or to put it in other terms, we are not subjects who might obtain a satisfying object but subjects who can find satisfaction only through the necessity of the object’s loss. Even when we are right next to someone we love, we enjoy what is absent in the beloved, not what is present: that part of the beloved that we can’t decipher. Capitalism’s success derives from shielding our psyches from this necessary loss and its intrinsic connection to our satisfaction. But we can recognize the disappointment that accompanies accumulation.

Whenever we accumulate enough to obtain what we desire, we inevitably find that this is not what we desire. This transformation of the object that occurs when we obtain it derives from the difference between the lost object that animates our desire and the actual objects of desire. No object of desire can ever be the lost object (which exists only insofar as it is lost), but we nonetheless inscribe this lost object within a series of empirical objects of desire that we pursue. Obtaining the object reveals the difference and thus produces disappointment and renewed pursuit of a new object of desire. **The functioning of capitalism depends on our mistaking the object of desire for the lost object. This inability to see the central role of the lost object in our desire creates subjects of accumulation who believe in the promises of the logic of accumulation. We invest ourselves psychically (and financially) in new commodities with the hope that they will provide the satisfaction that the previous commodity failed to provide, but no commodity can embody the lost object.** Every object of desire and every commodity will fail. Capitalism thrives on this failure, and we can never escape its perpetual crises without recognizing this link. **Only the turn from the logic of accumulation to the logic of satisfaction**—**with an acceptance of the lost status of the object**—**can move us beyond the crisis of capitalism**.

Capitalism is not the worst economic system that the world has produced, and it is not the cause of all our woes. Its effects are not universally doleful. Capitalism has provided the economic background for a widespread easing in the struggle to survive, the creation of vast material wealth, the political emancipation of women, the elimination of serfdom, and so on. But its triumphs have exacted an incredible toll that we do not have to continue to pay.

**The turn from accumulation to satisfaction portends the abolition of capitalism.** Of course, **the end of capitalism requires a political act, but a change in the psyche must inform this act.** Satisfaction is traumatic, but the attempt to avoid this trauma merely results in its diffusion in the form of a crisis, not in its evasion. The attempt to bypass trauma inevitably leads back to it. The more we enrich ourselves in order to escape trauma, the more crises we produce.

This way of understanding the turn from accumulation to satisfaction finds support in an unexpected location, a place where Marx writes a single sentence that conveys the foundation of capitalism and the possibility for emancipation from it. In all of Marx’s writing on capitalism, there are innumerable insights into how capitalism plays on the psyche of those who fall under its spell. Marx hopes, of course, to break this spell, especially as it infects the proletariat. But Marx’s greatest insight into capitalism and its continued survival lies buried in an obscure part of his work, as if he wanted to enact formally the point he makes: **it is through the banality of the everyday, not in the promised satisfaction of the future, that one discovers the sublime.**

The second volume of *Capital* is not a page-turner. It lacks the narrative-like structure of the first volume and the astonishing theory of surplus value and profit developed in the third volume. The aridity of the work makes it impossible to anticipate the fact that this volume contains Marx’s most important formulation. The distance from the first volume of *Capital* to the second is immense because in the second Marx turns away from capitalism’s ideological self-conception that privileges accumulation. He comes to see that subjects do not act as they do in order to accumulate but in order to satisfy themselves.

With this insight, Marx uncovers the key to the third form of the critique of capitalism. The critique of capitalism begins with its injustice and moves to its repressiveness. But the decisive problem with capitalism is not the injustice that it produces or its repressiveness. It is our inability within the capitalist dynamic to recognize how we obtain satisfaction. **As long as we remain capitalist subjects, we see ourselves as dissatisfied beings pursuing a future satisfaction. This satisfaction is embodied in the promise of the commodity.**

In the second volume of *Capital*, Marx makes a statement that summarizes capitalism and the possibility of undermining it. It is a statement worthy of Freud after 1920, and yet he made it roughly fifty years in advance of Freud writing *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. **Marx says, “For capitalism is already essentially abolished once we assume that it is enjoyment that is the driving motive and not enrichment itself.**”[3](about:blank) Here Marx understands that capitalism depends on a psychic investment in the promise of the future and that a sense of one’s satisfaction is incompatible with the continued survival of capitalism. This is his most profound statement and his most important legacy. **Until we accept that the satisfaction of loss is our driving motive, we will remain the hostages of an economy of enrichment.**

#### Thus the monarch blah blah blah

Zizek (1989)

This is also the fundamental feature of the logic of the Lacanian object: the place logically precedes objects which occupy it: what the objects, in their given positivity, are masking is not some other, more substantial order of objects but simply the emptiness, the void they are filling out. We must remember that there is nothing intrinsically sublime in a sublime object according to Lacan, a sublime object is an ordinary, everyday object which, quite by chance, finds itself occupying the place of what he calls das Ding, the impossible-real object of desire. The sublime object is 'an object elevated to the level of das Ding'. It is its structural place - the fact that it occupies the sacred/forbidden place of jouissance - and not its intrinsic qualities that confers on it its sublimity.

What the object is masking, dissimulating, by its massive, fascinating presence, is not some other positivity but its own place, the void, the lack that it is filling in by its presence - the lack in the Other. And what Lacan calls 'going-through the fantasy' consists precisely in the experience of such an inversion apropos of the fantasy-object: the subject must undergo the experience of how the ever-lacking object-cause of desire is in itself nothing but an objectivication, an embodiment of a certain lack; of how its fascinating presence is here just to mask the emptiness of the place it occupies, the emptiness which is exactly the lack in the Other - which makes the big Other (the symbolic order) perforated, inconsistent.

So 'we' (who have already 'gone through the fantasy') can see that there is nothing where the consciousness thought that it saw something, but our knowledge is already mediated by this 'illusion' in so far as it aims at the empty space which makes the illusion possible. In other words, if we subtract from the illusion the illusion itself (its positive content) what remains is not simply nothing but a determinate nothing, the void in the structure which opened the space for the 'illusion'. To 'unmask the illusion' does not mean that 'there is nothing to see behind it': what we must be able to see is precisely this nothing as such - beyond the phenomena, there is nothing but this nothing itself, 'nothing' which is the subject To conceive the appearance as 'mere appearance' the subject effectively has to go beyond it, to 'pass over' it, but what he finds there is his own act of passage. Usually, these Hegelian propositions are reduced to a simple ontological elevation of the subject to the status of the substantial Essence of the totality of being: first, the consciousness thinks there is hidden, behind the phenomenal veil, another transcendent Essence; then, with the passage from consciousness to self-consciousness, it experiences how this Essence behind the phenomena, this force which animates them, is the subject himself However, such a reading, which immediately identifies the subject with the Essence hidden behind the curtain, misses the crucial fact that the Hegelian passage from consciousness to self-consciousness implies the experience of a certain radical failure: the subject (consciousness) wants to penetrate the secret behind the curtain; his effort fails because there is nothing behind the curtain, nothing which 'is' the subject.

…

There is no contradiction between this 'fatalistic' aspect of Hegelian dialectics - the idea that we are simply taking note of what has already happened - and his claim to conceive substance as subject. Both really aim at the same conjunction, because the 'subject' is precisely a name for this 'empty gesture' which changes nothing at the level of positive content (at this level, everything has already happened) but must nevertheless be added for the 'content' itself to achieve its full effectivity. This paradox is the same as that of the last grain of sand to be added before we have a heap: we can never be sure which grain is the last one; the only possible definition of the heap is that even if we take away one grain, it will still be a heap. So this 'last grain of sand' is by definition superfluous, but none the less necessary - it constitutes a 'heap' by its very superfluity. This paradoxical grain materializes the agency of the signifier - paraphrasing the Lacanian definition of the signifier (that which 'represents the subject for another signifier'), we are even tempted to say that this last, superfluous grain represents the subject for all the other grains in the heap. It is the Hegelian Monarch which embodies this paradoxical function at its purest The State without the Monarch would still be a substantial order - the Monarch represents the point of its subjectivation - but what precisely is his function? Only 'dotting the i's' in a formal gesture of taking upon himself(by putting his signature on them) the decrees proposed to him by his ministers and councillors - of making them an expression of his personal will, of adding the pure form of subjectivity, of ' It is our will ... " to the objective content of decrees and laws.14 The Monarch is thus a subject par excellence, but only in so far as he limits himself to the purely formal act of subjective decision: as soon as he aims at something more, as soon as he concerns himself with questions of positive content, he crosses the line separating him from his councillors, and the State regresses to the level of Substantiality. We can now return to the paradox of the phallic signifier: in so far as, according to Lacan, the phallus is a 'pure signifier', it is precisely a signifier of this act of formal conversion by means of which the subject assumes the given, substantial reality as his own work. This is why we could determine the basic 'phallic experience' as a certain ' everything depends on me, but for all that I can do nothing'. Let us exemplify it by reference to two cases which should be read together: the theory of the phallus found in St Augustine, and a certain well-known vulgar joke.

…

It is this very 'contradiction' that constitutes the 'phallus experience': EVERYTHING depends on me - the point of the riddle - but for all that I can do NOTHING - the point of St Augustine's theory. And from here from this notion of the phallus as pulsation between 'all' and 'nothing' - we can conceive the 'phallic' dimension of the act of formal conversion of reality as given into reality as posited. This act is 'phallic' in so far as it marks the point of coincidence between omnipotence ('everything depends on me': the subject posits all reality as his work) and total impotence (,but for all that I can do nothing': the subject can formally assume only what is given to him). It is in this sense that the phallus is a 'transcendental signifier': if, following Adorno, we define as 'transcendental' the inversion by means of which the subject experiences his radical limitation (the fact that he is confined to the limits of his world) as his constitutive power (the a priori network of categories structuring his perception of reality)

#### Dean – strikes Solidarity

https://thebaffler.com/the-poverty-of-theory/the-feminist-horizon

Women are at the forefront of the new working-class politics, the politics unfolding across the social field, from workplaces and neighborhoods to prisons and pipelines. We see it in the initiatives of hotel workers, domestic workers, restaurant workers, teachers, and nurses. We see it in the struggle against the carceral state. We see it in campaigns for environmental justice. All of these are fronts in today’s class war. The bourgeoisie, the ruling class, the 1 percent don’t have to amass in the streets. Corporations own the political system. Rich people don’t protest; they buy the politicians they need (just ask Charles Koch and Rebekah Mercer). The widespread work of radical women organizers hammers home the fact that women have always been part of the working class, whether they were working in the factories or managing consumption in the domestic sphere. Marx knew this even as some twentieth-century labor organizers forgot it. Working-class struggles always exceed union struggles—just think of tenant organizing, hunger marches, CPUSA’s anti-lynching campaigns, anti-war work, not to mention the social and community support work necessary for labor strikes to endure and succeed. Today’s crisis of social reproduction is not felt by the 1 percent, with their offshore accounts, private schools, private planes, and multiple houses. It’s felt by the proletarianized, by the people as *the rest of us*.

Under capitalism, solidarity isn’t automatic. It doesn’t follow spontaneously from the fact of shared conditions. It always has to be built, sustained, renewed. Strikes are of course a key training ground for solidarity—they require it and they inspire it. Workers have to stand together; they have to support each other to remain united even in the face of the real material hardship of striking.

And strikes depend on the families and communities of the workers as well—the workers need to see others seeing them as fighting the good fight. Solidarity, then, is unity in struggle—standing together and having each other’s back. It means not letting the capitalists with their ideologies of individualism and competition divide us. With respect to the broad terrain of today’s class war, solidarity demands commitment to collectivity, to collective struggle and collective solutions. People have to keep their eye on the enemy, the racist, patriarchal, capitalist system, and not let themselves get sidetracked into moralism, sectarianism, and what have you.

The IWS represents a broad, multi-tendency left politics that recognizes the multiple forms and sites of work and the interlocking nature of oppression. It aims to make women’s work visible, oppose the deep and varied forms of violence that pervade our society, and push us toward the reorganization of society such that “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”

#### The Role of the Ballot is voting for the debater that best represents the relation to desire – evaluate impacts based who can create the best policy while accounting for the function of desire in creating policy

**Fotaki 10** Marianna (Organization Studies Group at Manchester Business School” Why do public policies fail so often? Exploring health policy-making as an imaginary and symbolic construction” Organization 2010 17:703 Sage 713-716

So far, I have suggested that health **policies often fail because the fantasmatic foundations of the policy-making process are not acknowledged as such.** Using the example of patient choice, I have also suggested that the reasons for its re-introduction into the UK health care system and throughout Europe, despite limited success in the past, might be better understood through applying the psychoanalytic conception of subjective fantasy. In exploring the limits and possibilities of one particular policy, my aim was to demonstrate how powerful social fantasies are created and how their splitting from organizational reality enables the idealization of the health task. Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanalysis were drawn upon to put forward the article’s key arguments and to further the understanding of the less tangible processes present in public policy making. I have brought together the mental processes that Klein has described and which were then used extensively to explain organizational phenomena, with my central argument about the (unrecognized) role of the imaginary aspects of the policy-making process. Both theories in their own unique ways highlighted the role of fantasy as a necessary stimulant for policy development but also as an impediment to its realization. I have **combined the idea of fragmented subjectivity** taken from Lacan’s work **and socially sanctioned defences from object relations theory, to offer[s] an alternative conception of public policy formation and to explore the reasons behind frequent policy failures.** The Lacanian ontology of the subject was used to highlight the role of fantasy as an enabler of social projects. **Having its roots in unconscious mental life,** **fantasy becomes the stimulant driving forward public policies** such as patient choice**, even though many of these policies are bound to fail** as is the case for all imaginary projects. But **failure is not necessarily seen as an adverse outcome, but rather as an opportunity to rethink the ideas** of purposefulness and teleology **in the context of organizations and social endeavours** more generally. **The Lacanian perspective introduces the productive element held in the recognition of the inevitability of failure, by unveiling the imaginary nature of striving for idealistic policies and the liberating potential of accepting loss.** His conception of loss is so much more radical than in object relations theory, where mourning can bring some sort of reparation and make up for it. In Lacan’s work **loss originates in the longings of the individual psyche for completeness, which is unattainable, and yet this is what sustains us as desiring subjects.** If we lacked loss there would be nothing to desire. Human desire, for Lacan, **is a constitutive aspect of human subjectivity and is not driven by rational considerations**, as economists would like us to believe. If anything the subject is enmeshed in its imaginary constructs in order to deflect the reality of the human condition. Nor is it a desire for the promised outcome only, but rather (or also) for the symbol that the outcome stands for. Put differently, the incessant search in the subject is for the signified meaning and not for the signifier itself. I have suggested that many **public policies are intrinsically idealistic as they are instigated by way of setting desire in motion**. So **in the case of individual choice in health, the underlying fantasy that drives this policy is the fantasy of freedom (of choice), and by extension the fantasy of control over the uncontrollable.** **While its stated aim is to achieve diverse (and potentially conflicting) public policy objectives, the policy reflects the contradictions of human subjectivity on a societal level** as well. In other words, the patient choice paradox is that it overtly ignores the unconscious motivations implicit in the everyday reality of patient–doctor encounter (for example, by assuming that rationality over-rides patients’ fears and vulnerabilities), and yet takes (unwittingly) account of the fantasy, which is illusory but is also an indispensable aspect of our existence. The analysis moved then towards the thesis that **policy tends to be idealistic because it is not meant to withstand an immediate reality test but to express mythical, imaginary and arguably unrealizable societal aspirations and longings. In this sense the** **discrepancies and discontinuities present in patient choice policy are but an expression of the contradictions that sustain the lack, fragmentation and splitting of the subject, and so are the unspoken, conflicting and often impossible societal tasks performed by public institutions.** I have also argued that **by distancing itself from operational reality, public policy making expresses societal strife and desire on a fantasy level**, whilst health organizations are left in the position of a dependent subject, having passively to reflect it without being able to implement unworkable policies. For this reason, **the stated objectives that choice policy is expected to achieve** (such as equity and efficiency for example), **may be used to deflect attention away from the need to admit the deeper defensive role of** health care **policy** (see also Fotaki, 2006). Yet because the tacit and unspoken functions of health policy related to death anxiety and inexorable facts of life are relegated to the unconscious, **they give rise to all kinds of defensive policy rhetoric by policy makers who identify with the ideals they proclaim and then feel obliged to justify them**. While **policy makers express societal fantasies projected onto them by their constituencies**, various professional groups or patient advocates are in their own ways involved in the construction of unattainable ideals, **as they too pursue and legitimize their specific projects**. The role of fantasy in relation to patient choice seems obvious, but **can this be generalized across all policy making processes in relation to health or other areas of public policy making? The answer is an unequivocal yes.** **The fantasmatic structuration of public policy making is revealed in the difficulty of accepting the limitations that are intrinsic to human predicament** and ‘to give up the dream of being all, of living forever, of narcissistic omnipotence and of living in the world that never frustrates our desires’ (Moi, 2004: 869). **Health and social care is about dealing with the finitude of our physical bodies**. Yet these concerns are no less relevant to the education system, for example, which is unconsciously preoccupied with ensuring the survival of future generations (see Obholzer, 1994) or economic development and the idea of ‘progress’ more generally, all of which enact omnipotent fantasies of the limitless possibilities in their own distinct ways. **Being a part of the symbolic order, which is structured in lack and loss, these imaginary pursuits cannot be easily (if at all) translated into workable policy objectives. But where does this all leave policy makers and how can they purposefully integrate Lacanian and Kleinian insights by bringing them to bear on policy formation and implementation? A legitimate question is: if policies are about societal fantasies that cannot be fulfilled, would this not mean that all policies are bound to fail?** More fundamentally, aren’t policies meant to address real issues rather than fantasmatic pursuits that cannot be realized? These are important questions as public policies are first and foremost about addressing issues that most of us care about, and a great deal of effort goes into their design and articulation. **Therefore, I would not wish to suggest that policies are not about engaging with real problems. In contrast, my proposition is that socially constructed objects of fantasy are stirred up successfully only when policies concern issues that matter.** Such is the case of patient choice for example. Yet if policy-making is not to remain locked in searching for unattainable fantasms (of choice for all), originating in the imaginary reflections of the illusory self, we would have to recognize them for what they are. If, on the other hand, we carry on mis-taking them for reality, they will continue to mirror the misrecognized vision of ourselves and our society. **The unique strength of psychoanalytic thought is that it demonstrates the injustice towards the other and alienation of the subject whenever we cling to impossible fantasies originating in the imaginary (Leeb, 2008). The emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis on the other hand, lies in its power to highlight (and dispel) the imaginary nature of the subjective drive for unity, certainty and stability which underpins various societal projects.** But psychoanalysis does not only warn us about the consequences of mistaking the infinite desires of the psyche with the finitude of human bodies. More crucially **it acknowledges the productive role of fantasy, and of its failure, in the social arena. In so doing, psychoanalysis presents us with a way of bridging fantasy with reality in our social and political endeavors.** The incorporation of psychoanalytic insights, I have suggested, as a necessary means for rethinking health policy making, is not meant to supplant economic and political explanations of social and organizational life. Instead **it is offered to elucidate the co-existence and subtle interplay between psychic mechanisms and calculating rationality** that policy makers, politicians, professionals and users of services rely on to make their decisions. Both theories of Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanlaysis drawn upon in this article imply the necessity of recognizing underlying imaginary dynamics as a starting point in the journey towards realistic policy-making. To do so **we need firstly to accept the imaginary structuration of the desire to attain the unattainable. This recognition will lead to an acknowledgement and acceptance of the intrinsic instability and conflicting nature of the policy-making process, overcoming the splits between policy design and implementation**.

#### Banning LAWs is a recognition of how the death drive and repetition compulsion structure our enjoyment – this is the only way to orient the frustration of our desire away from material violence

**McGowan 13 Todd**, Associate Prof. of Arts and Sciences @ U. of Vermont, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press, July, 20**13**, pp. 283-286) <http://art3idea.psu.edu/metalepsis/texts/mcgowan_enjoying.pdf>

There is no path leading from the death drive to utopia. The death drive undermines every attempt to construct a utopia; it is the enemy of the good society. It is thus not surprising that political thought from Plato onward has largely ignored this psychic force of repetition and negation. But this does not mean that psychoanalytic thought concerning the death drive has only a negative value for political theorizing. It is possible to conceive of a positive politics of the death drive. The previous chapters have attempted to lay out the political implications of the death drive, and, on this basis, we can sketch what a society founded on a recognition of the death drive might look like. Such a recognition would not involve a radical transformation of society: in one sense, it would leave everything as it is. In contemporary social arrangements, the death drive subverts progress with repetition and leads to the widespread sacriﬁce of self-interest for the enjoyment of the sacriﬁce itself. This structure is impervious to change and to all attempts at amelioration. But in another sense, the **recognition of the death drive would change everything. Recognizing the centrality of the death drive would not eliminate the proclivity to sacriﬁce for the sake of enjoyment, but it would change our relationship to this sacriﬁce.** Rather than being done for the sake of an ultimate enjoyment to be achieved in the future, it would be done for its own sake. **The fundamental problem with the effort to escape the death drive and pursue the good is that it leaves us unable to locate where our enjoyment lies.** By positing a future where we will attain the ultimate enjoyment (either through the purchase of the perfect commodity or through a transcendent romantic union or through the attainment of some heavenly paradise), we replace the partial enjoyment of the death drive with the image of a complete enjoyment to come. There is no question of fully enjoying our submission to the death drive. We will always remain alienated from our mode of enjoying. As Adrian Johnston rightly points out, “Transgressively ‘overcoming’ the impediments of the drives doesn't enable one to simply enjoy enjoyment.” But we can transform our relationship to the impediments that block the full realization of our drive. We can see the impediments as the internal product of the death drive rather than as an external limit. **The enjoyment that the death drive provides**, in contrast to the form of enjoyment proffered by capitalism, religion, and utopian politics**, is at once inﬁnite and limited**. This oxymoronic form of enjoyment operates in the way that the concept does in Hegel’s Logic. The concept attains its inﬁnitude not through endless progress toward a point that always remains beyond and out of reach but through including the beyond as a beyond within itself. As Hegel puts it, "The universality of the concept is the achieved beyond, whereas that bad inﬁnity remains afflicted with a beyond which is unattainable but remains a mere progression to inﬁnity.” That is to say, the concept transforms an external limit into an internal one and thereby becomes both inﬁnite and limited. **The inﬁnitude of the concept is nothing but the concepts own self-limitation.** The enjoyment that the death drive produces also achieves its inﬁnitude through self-limitation. It revolves around a lost object that exists only insofar as it is lost, and it relates to this object as the vehicle for the inﬁnite unfurling of its movement. **The lost object operates as the self-limitation of the death drive through which the drive produces an inﬁnite enjoyment**. Rather than acting as a mark of the drives ﬁnitude, the limitation that the lost object introduces provides access to inﬁnity. **A society founded on a recognition of the death drive would be one that viewed its limitations as the source of its inﬁnite enjoyment rather than an obstacle to that enjoyment. To take the clearest and most traumatic example in recent history, the recognition of the death drive in 1935 Germany would have conceived the ﬁgure of the Jew not as the barrier to the ultimate enjoyment that must therefore be eliminated but as the internal limit through which German society attained its enjoyment.** As numerous theorists have said, the appeal of Nazism lay in its ability to mobilize the enjoyment of the average German through pointing out a threat to that enjoyment. The average German under Nazism could enjoy the ﬁgure of the Jew as it appeared in the form of an obstacle, but it is possible to recognize the obstacle not as an external limit but as an internal one. In this way, the figure of the Jew would become merely a ﬁgure for the average German rather than a position embodied by actual Jews. Closer to home, **one would recognize the terrorist as a ﬁgure representing the internal limit of global capitalist society.** Far from serving as an obstacle to the ultimate enjoyment in that society, the terrorist provides a barrier where none otherwise exists and thereby serves as the vehicle through which capitalist society attains its enjoyment. The absence of explicit limitations within contemporary global capitalism necessitates such a ﬁgure: if terrorists did not exist, global capitalist society would have to invent them. But recognizing the terrorist as the internal limit of global capitalist society would mean the end of terrorism. This recognition would transform the global landscape and deprive would-be terrorists of the libidinal space within which to act. Though some people may continue to blow up buildings, they would cease to be terrorists in the way that we now understand the term. **A self-limiting society would still have real battles to ﬁght**. There would remain a need for this society to defend itself against external threats and against the cruelty of the natural universe. Perhaps it would require nuclear weapons in space to defend against comets or meteors that would threaten to wipe out human life on the planet. **But it would cease positing the ultimate enjoyment in vanquishing an external threat or surpassing a natural limit. The external limit would no longer stand in for a repressed internal one.** Such a society would instead enjoy its own internal limitations and merely address external limits as they came up. **Psychoanalytic theory** never preaches, and it cannot help us to construct a better society. But it **can help us to subtract the illusion of the good from our own society. By depriving us of this illusion, it has the ability to transform our thinking about politics.** With the assistance of psychoanalytic thought, we might reconceive politics in a direction completely opposed to that articulated by Aristotle, to which I alluded in the introduction. In the Politics, Aristotle asserts: “Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good."3 Though later political thinkers have obviously departed from Aristotle concerning the question of the content of the good society, few have thought of politics in terms opposed to the good. This is what psychoanalytic thought introduces. If we act on the basis of enjoyment rather than the good, this does not mean that we can simply construct a society that privileges enjoyment in an overt way. An open society with no restrictions on sexual activity, drug use, food consumption, or play in general would not be a more enjoyable one than our own. That is the sure path to impoverishing our ability to enjoy, as the aftermath of the 1960s has made painfully clear. One must arrive at enjoyment indirectly. A society centered around the death drive would not be a better society, nor would it entail less suffering. Rather than continually sacriﬁcing for the sake of the good, we would sacriﬁce the good for the sake of enjoyment. **A society centered around the death drive would allow us to recognize that we enjoy the lost object only insofar as it remains lost**

#### Sublimation means deifying an ordinary concept to a point of unreachability by investing it with desire.

**McGowan 16 Todd, Associate Prof. of Arts and Sciences @ U. of Vermont, “Capitalism and desire: the psychic costs of free markets” Columbia University Press, 2016 // MK**

**Every society makes use of sublimity. The sublime serves as the engine for social organization and for individual activity within that organization**. Without some indication of the sublime, a society would become idle and cease even to reproduce itself. **The sublime gives the subject the capacity for enjoyment by convincing it that its life is not simply a series of empty physical processes.** The subject’s capacity for satisfaction emerges along with the idea of the sublime and can’t endure without this idea. The end of the sublime would mark the end of subjectivity itself in addition to the social order in which the subject exists. As subjects of the signifier, we need a reason to go on, and sublimity provides that reason for us.

**The act of sublimation occurs when the subject creates an object that is out of reach, but it is precisely the status of being out of reach that serves to animate the subject. If we did not have an object that we could not obtain,** we would cease to be active subjects because **we would find ourselves with no incentive to act.** Everything would be attainable, and nothing would be worth attaining**. Sublimation provides a way for the subject to fail, and the subject satisfies itself by repeating a necessary failure.** It produces satisfaction for the subject, but this satisfaction is never that of obtaining the object.[1](about:blank)

Traditional society based on rigid social hierarchies and capitalist society are radically distinct. But both share the need for the sublime. If capitalism simply eliminated the sublimity of traditional society, it would not be able to provide any enjoyment for its subjects, and they would never invest themselves in its perpetuation. Because there are **people devoted to capitalist society**, we know that it has not eliminated sublimity altogether. And **yet, the situation with regard to the sublime is not what it once was.** The site of sublimity has undergone a transformation, and in the process, our understanding of the sublime has shifted as well.

In traditional societies, gods, leaders, or priests bore sublimity. People followed their commands because these commands emanated from a site that transcended the brute material world and gave significance to that world. Though some people continue to treat political or religious leaders as sublime figures today, this status has for the most part been lost in the epoch of capitalist modernity. A popular music star or famous athlete is more likely to appear sublime than a president or a priest, but this type of sublimity is contingent and confined to a limited number of fans. **Capitalism allows for the beheading of kings**, the mockery of presidents, the critique of popes, and the denunciation of preachers. **All of traditional society’s bastions of sublimity find themselves exposed to desecration under capitalism.** Capitalist society appears to function without the necessary ingredient for social reproduction. **But sublimity doesn’t disappear under capitalism,** even though it seems like it does.

The transformation in the sublime that capitalism effectuates creates a more palatable version of sublimity for the subject. Just as capitalism gives us love in the less traumatic form of romance, it gives us the sublime without the awe-inspiring and terrorizing figure that we must obey. **Capitalism sustains sublimity, but it subtracts the traumatic figure in which subjects experience this sublimity**. Even though capitalist sublimity lacks the power to produce the extreme versions of satisfaction produced by the traditional sublime, it gives it to us in a more tolerable package. This is the bargain the capitalist subject accepts: a less terrifying sublime in exchange for a lessened satisfaction that derives from the sublime.

Capitalism’s transformation of the sublime is not self-evident, even though everyone can see that we no longer live in a world of kings or priests. But a seeming contradiction in Marx’s thought reveals the complex operation that capitalism performs in regard to the sublime. To grasp the nature of the capitalist sublime—that is, to see why **people invest themselves to profoundly in the self-destructiveness of the capitalist system**—one must confront this point at which Marx speaks against himself. The tradition of this type of reading of Marx begins with Louis Althusser, but we must take it in a new direction.

## Part 5 – let me read psychoanalysis you cowards

#### Stop reading “Psychoanalysis is non-falsifiable” backfiles – they literally never have warrants, and no other ethical theory is held to this arbitrary standard – I will be either reading theory or making this an independent voter if you do this

#### There’s no reason Theory should be evaluated above substance – ethical frameworks should be able to interact with how we evaluate fairness and education

Ben **Koh 13**  [Nsd\_update, NSD Update, xx-xx-xxxx, "Breaking Down Borders: Rethinking the Interaction Between Theory and Ethics" <a class="vglnk" href="http://nsdupdate.com/2013/breaking-down-borders-rethinking-the-interaction-between-theory-and-ethics/]Accessed11-2-2020"

**First: Fairness is at its basis is an ethical concept**. For instance at its basis, fairness as Rawls explains is, “a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to certain rules and thus voluntarily restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission.” That is to say, **the basis of fairness rises from benefiting from cooperation.** **In** the **debate** context**, the “benefit”** as Rawls refers to **could be the actual ability to debate**, or speaking without interference etc. In the same way that **it’s considered immoral under most ethical systems to take without recompense, fairness is relevant due to it being the “recompense.**” Additionally, equality’s importance is as a moral concept. **The utterance that we ought to both start with the same amount of speaking time is morally relevant for it guides or at least constrains our actions**, or the rightness and wrongness thereof (i.e. if I go a minute longer in the NR, I would usually be dropped or at least penalized due to its wrongness). **Second, Fairness is normative:** **A) The idea that there is a consequence to a certain unfair act implies its relevance to our action.  Debaters** **generally don’t** **read theory just because they wanted to point out something interesting or amusing, they do so to win or to rid the round of the problematic argument. B) The voluntary concession of the basic rules for the round renders fairness as being “obligatory.”** Loland explains, “the obligation of fairness does not arise unconditionally. One basic premise is that the **parties are voluntarily engaged**. They have chosen participation in favor of nonparticipation and have **thus more or less tacitly agreed to follow the commonly accepted rules and norms** of the practice play the game. Loland further explains that “in sporting games, the predominant distributive norm is meritocratic. The norm on equal tratemnt, then, becomes a necessary condition for a game to take place. To be able to evaluate the relevant inequalities satisfactorily, participants have to compete on the same terms. **All competitors ought to be given equal opportunity to perform.”** The implication is that an argument that questions ethical assumptions (or even more basically assumptions at all) needs to be open to criticism. In the same way debaters now take into account the theoretical implications of their frameworks (i.e. the line of arguments centered around whether or not “ought is defined as maximizing well-being” is a fair interpretation), **debaters should take into account the ethical implications of their theory arguments**. Analyzing the way we debate theory further exposes these assumptions. **Theory is debated typically in a very utilitarian fashion**. **Debaters tend to weigh between theory standards under assumed criterions of “what would a policy maker do,” how easy the calculation is, etc.** They answer the question of drop the debater vs. drop the argument commonly in terms of solvency, whether or not there is a deterrent effect, etc. It’s no surprise in my mind that most “LARPers” are generally as proficient on the LARP as they are on the theory debate due to the reproduction of skill. **To keep theory argumentation at a standstill in its variation is to deny the basic value in LD in the first place**. There’s no reason why we should not question the assumption of how we debate or think about theory in the same way we question the assumptions of right and wrong in LD. A question that follows then is what occurs if we debate theory in a more Kantian sense? Or a more Nietzschean one? Etc. I’m not persuaded by the idea that ethical arguments cannot apply to the context of theory debate. Examples: 1) If the argument against consequentialism is true that there are infinite consequences, is norm setting ever possible? 2)    If an intention based framework is true, and the violation was not made intentionally, should the one violating still be held culpable for the violation3)   A polls framework would outline why community consensus is most ethically relevant. If a certain practice is common, would that implicate its moral permission? Beyond the voter, **concepts like competing interpretations,** which in some variations claims that only one interpretation is objectively/ absolutely true, **could easily be criticized with postmodern arguments**. Massumi (a Deleuzian contemporary) would probably argue that the attempt to instill a certain worldview of the round is indicative of state philosophy, where  “The end product would be ‘a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society’ – each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State. Prussian mind-meld.” Security K type arguments that criticize the idea of deterrence claiming that mindset is the root cause of the threats it attempts to be prevented can easily apply to drop the debater justifications about norm setting. **Apprehension to introduce this type of argumentation** into the debate sphere **can be tracked most likely to the tendency of judges to either a) paradigmatically assume fairness is important** to avoid annoying and assumptive debates about whether or not fairness is a voter or b) judges not voting on these arguments frequently in the past. However, **this line of thought I present does not attempt to claim that fairness is absolutely not a voter**. This type of argument generally does not contest if theory itself is unfair or resolvable in a theoretical way, i.e. in the fashion most “fairness not a voter” arguments are made. **The goal rather is to reframe the lens of which we analyze theory debates, or analyze “fairness not a voter arguments.”** The application fosters discussion about what fairness ethically should imply, not in attempt to create more “frivolous theory debates” or figure out ways to make theory irresolvable. In fact, this mindset would produce better philosophical discussion. **By examining the full implication of an ethical argument, debaters could more fully understand what it means to argue X or Y is the correct moral framework beyond just the resolution at hand**. Whereas debate about animal rights or compulsory voting does allow for that form of philosophical analysis, this viewpoint allows for full education of ethics to even more frequent, real world concerns of fairness and education. Additionally, most of the historical unwillingness is probably rooted in tendency for debaters to use this avenue of argumentation in a blippy fashion. However **in the same way that arguments that are more fleshed out or have definitive warrants are given priority over others, debaters ought to argue this similarly**. Rather than treating ethical arguments against theory as a “back up strategy,” this should become a more full, centralized approach. The purpose of this article is that fairness as an ethical idea, with the same ethical discussion, etc., should not be absent from questioning. The implementation, function, correctness of a conception of fairness, etc., should all be open for debate in the same way that we try to figure out if death is really morally bad after all. The even broader implication is that LD debate should continue to foster questioning. To take a firm stance on basic assumptions is to deny the role of philosophical questioning in the first place. To quote Rebar Niemi, “the notion that any one of us could set some determinate standard for what debate should be is preposterous, uneducational, sanctimonious, and arrogant. I think that the notion that we should teach the already privileged population of debate to be inflexible, dogmatic, and exclusive in their belief sets creates worse citizens, worse people, and ultimately a worse world.”

#### Thus, Theory is a sublimation of the vague concept of the “norms of debate”; Theory is rarely read to absolve debate of abuse – this doesn’t mean to reject all theory, but I should be able to argue against a theory shell that uses the “rules of debate” as a floating signifier to ideologically paper over responding to substance.

#### https://lithub.com/why-strikes-matter/