# 1NC Round 6

## T

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines, they cannot defend a super set of the res

#### "Resolved" requires a policy.

Merriam Webster '18 (Merriam Webster; 2018 Edition; Online dictionary and legal resource; Merriam Webster, "resolve," <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve;> RP)  
: a legal or official determination especially: a legislative declaration

#### The WTO refers to a legislative body.

**WTO:** “What is the World Trade Organization” wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/whatis\_e.htm No Date AA

**The** World Trade Organization (**WTO**) **is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations.** At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business

#### **Medicine is a substance that treats disease**

Merriam-Webster “Merriam-Webster Dictionary.” Merriam-Webster.com, 2021, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/medicine. Accessed 12 Aug. 2021.

Definition of medicine 1a: a substance or preparation used in treating disease cough medicine b: something that affects well-being he's bad medicine — Zane Grey 2a: the science and art dealing with the maintenance of health and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease She's interested in a career in medicine. b: the branch of medicine concerned with the nonsurgical treatment of disease 3: a substance (such as a drug or potion) used to treat something other than disease 4: an object held in traditional American Indian belief to give control over natural or magical forces also : magical power or a magical rite

#### Violation: indigenous music exists as separate from medicine – their ev conceeds not all indigenous music is intended as medicine AND indigenous music for med isn’t categorized as such by the WTO they have no ev and its their burden to prove

#### Vote neg for predictable limits—post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus every 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny. Two Impacts –

#### 1. Fairness—debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary for any benefit to the activity. That outweighs:

#### A] decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented. This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

#### B] probability: voting aff can’t solve any of their impacts but it can solve ours. All the ballot does is tell tab who won which can’t stop any violence or resolve subjectivity claims but can resolve the fairness imbalance in this debate.

#### 2] Dialogue—untopical AFFs allow the AFF to monopolize the free market of ideas—they can find the least contestable advocacy, they have strategic incentives to defend as little as possible, and infinite literature to create specific advocacies that are outside the predictable literature base and defeat generics—that turns debate into a monologue—that internal link turns the AFF—when AFF ideas can no longer become tested, the 1AC’s goals can’t be met because they haven’t been thoroughly vetted and refined. This means can't weigh their impacts against framework because we have no way of truth testing. Dialogue controls the internal link to engagement because there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### 3] Link turns their education offense – getting to the third and fourth level of tactical engagement is only possible with refined and well-researched positions connected to the resolutional mechanism. Repeated debates over core issues incentivize innovative argument production and improved advocacy based on feedback and nuanced responses from opponents.

#### TVA solves – reduce IP for indigenous medicines patented by western companies – this solves and was the aff I hit round 3

#### Switch-side debate solves – read the aff on the neg – Switching sides on predetermined topics it creates a forum for competition that also challenges dominant ideologies and fosters progressive thinking

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify, and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater - dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense.

#### No RVI’s – it’s illogical because your expected to be topical/fair.

#### No methodological offense – that’s extra topical, which justifies infinite Frankesntein planks to explode limits and circumvent neg offense – also means they can only access the amount of surveillance and violence that they solve

## K

#### Settlerism is an everyday process shaped by affective investments in institutions that claim jurisdiction over native land – using the WTO as an actor for the 1AC justifies this process.

Mark Rifkin, PhD, Director of the Women's and Gender Studies Program and Professor of English at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro. “Settler common sense.” Settler Colonial Studies, 2013 Vol. 3, Nos. 3–4, 322–340, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2013.810702. JJN

In Walden (1854), Henry David Thoreau offers a vision of personhood divorced from the state, characterizing his experience of “Nature” during his time at Walden Pond as providing him with a sense of his own autonomous embodiment and a related set of ethical resources that enable him to reject the demands of contemporary political economy.1 The invocation of “Nature” appears to bracket the question of jurisdiction, opening into a different conceptual and phenomenological register that displaces the problem of locating oneself in relation to the boundaries of the state. However, the very feeling that one has moved beyond geopolitics, that one has entered a kind of space that suspends questions of sovereignty or renders them moot, depends on the presence of an encompassing sovereignty that licenses one’s access to that space. If the idea of “Nature” holds at bay the question of jurisdiction so as to envision a kind of place for cultivating a selfhood that can oppose state logics/politics, it also effaces the ways that experience/vision of personhood itself may arise out of the legal subjectivities put in play by the jurisdictional claiming/clearing of that space as against geopolitical claims by other polities, specifically Native peoples. Thoreau offers an example of how settlement – the exertion of control by non-Natives over Native peoples and lands – gives rise to modes of feeling, generating kinds of affect through which the terms of law and policy become imbued with a sensation of everyday certainty. This affective experience productively can be characterized as an instantiation of what more broadly may be characterized as settler common sense. The phrase suggests the ways the legal and political structures that enable non-Native access to Indigenous territories come to be lived as given, as simply the unmarked, generic conditions of possibility for occupancy, association, history, and personhood. Addressing whiteness in Australia, Fiona Nicoll argues that “rather than analysing and evaluating Indigenous sovereignty claims…, we have a political and intellectual responsibility to analyse and evaluate the innumerable ways in which White sovereignty circumscribes and mitigates the exercise of Indigenous sovereignty”, and she suggests that “we move towards a less coercive stance of reconciliation with when we fall from perspective into an embodied recognition that we already exist within Indigenous sovereignty”. 2 Addressing the question of how settlement as a system of coercive incorporation and expropriation comes to be lived as quotidian forms of non-Native being and potential, though, may require tactically shifting the analytical focus such that Indigenous sovereignties are not at the center of critical attention, even as they remain crucial in animating the study of settler colonialism and form its ethical horizon. “An embodied recognition” of the enduring presence of settler sovereignty, as well as of quotidian non-Native implication in the dispossession, effacement, and management of indigeneity, needs to attend to everyday experiences of non-relation, of a perceptual engagement with place, various institutions, and other people that takes shape around the policies and legalities of settlement but that do not specifically refer to them as such or their effects on Indigenous peoples. In order to conceptualize the mundane dynamics of settler colonialism, the quotidian feelings and tendencies through which it is continually reconstituted and experienced as the horizon of everyday potentiality, we may need to shift from an explicit attention to articulations of Native sovereignty and toward an exploration of the processes through which settler geographies are lived as ordinary, non-reflexive conditions of possibility. In Marxism and Literature, Raymond Williams argues for the necessity of approaching “relations of domination and subordination” as “practical consciousness” that saturat[es] … the whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense.3 Understanding settlement as, in Williams’s terms, such a “structure of feeling” entails asking how emotions, sensations, psychic life take part in the (ongoing) process of realizing the exertion of non-Native authority over Indigenous peoples, governance, and territoriality in ways that saturate quotidian life but are not necessarily present to settlers as a set of political propositions or as a specifically imperial project of dispossession. In the current scholarly efforts to characterize settler colonialism, the contours of settlement often appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality, and in this way, the ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as a set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials slide from view. We need to ask how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian non-Native sensations, inclinations, and trajectories. Moreover, administrative initiatives and legalities become part of everyday normalizations of state aims and mappings but in ways that also allow for an exceeding of state interests that potentially can be turned back against the state, giving rise to oppositional projects still given shape and momentum by the framings that emerge out of the ongoing work of settler occupation – such as in Walden. The essay will close with a brief reading of Thoreau’s text that illustrates how its ethical framing emerges out of, and indexes, everyday forms of settler feeling shaped by state policy but not directly continuous with it. 1. The figure of the vanishing Indian still remains prominent within US popular and scholarly discourses, both explicitly and implicitly. Within this narrative, Native peoples may have had prior claims to the land, but they, perhaps tragically, were removed from the area, or died out, or ceased to be “really” Indian, or simply disappeared at some point between the appearance of the “last” one and the current moment, whenever that may be.4 As against this tendency, scholars who seek to track the workings of settler colonialism face an entrenched inattention to the ways non-Native conceptions and articulations of personhood, place, property, and political belonging coalesce around and through the dispossession of Native peoples and normalization of (the) settler (-state’s) presence on Native lands. Insistence on the systemic quality of such settler seizures, displacements, identifications responds to this relative absence of acknowledgment by emphasizing its centrality and regularity, arguing that the claiming of a naturalized right to Indigenous place lies at the heart of non-Native modes of governance, association, and identity. However, such figurations of the pervasive and enduring quality of settler colonialism may shorthand its workings, producing accounts in which it appears as a fully integrated whole operating in smooth, consistent, and intentional ways across the socio-spatial terrain it encompasses. Doing so, particularly in considering the exchange between the domains of formal policy and of everyday life, may displace how settlement’s histories, brutalities, effacements, and interests become quotidian and common-sensical. Looking at three different models, I want to sketch varied efforts to systemize settler colonialism, highlighting some questions that emerge when they are read in light of issues of process and affect. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay – invasion is a structure not an event.” 5 Offering perhaps the most prominent definition of settler colonialism, Wolfe’s formulation emphasizes the fact that it cannot be localized within a specific period of removal or extermination and that it persists as a determinative feature of national territoriality and identity. He argues that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence”, adding, “Settler colonialism destroys to replace.” 6 Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/period of conquest, however, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society” (390), and “the process of replacement maintains the refractory imprint of the native counter-claim” (389). Yet, when and how do projects of elimination and replacement become geographies of everyday non-Native occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler-Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belonging? In characterizing settlement as a “structure”, “logic”, and a “will”, Wolfe seeks to integrate the multivalent aspects of ongoing processes of non-Native expropriation and superintendence, but doing so potentially sidesteps the question of how official governmental initiatives and framings become normalized as the setting for everyday non-Native being and action in ways that cannot be captured solely by reference to “the murderous activities of the frontier rabble” (392–3).

#### The 1AC is a micro reform of patent policy without changing the large sub structure of patents and IPR that’s founded within nation states – they only deal with music IPR meaning Indigenous people armed via larger patent system like medicine tech and ag are ignored, and their suffering is shelved aside

#### The aff sanitizes and obscures the broader system of coloniality – stating that governments have an “obligation” is a settler move to innocence

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 13 – University of South Africa Archie Mafeje Research Institute head and professor

[Sabelo J., D.Phil in African Historical Studies from University of Zimbabwe, he is a National Research Foundation (NRF) rated social scientist, a member of the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf), a Fellow of the African Studies Centre (ASC) in the Netherlands, and a Research Associate of the Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies at The Open University in the United Kingdom, “Perhaps Decoloniality is the Answer? Critical Reflections on Development from a Decolonial Epistemic Perspective,” Africanus, 43(2), 2013]

The articles constituting this volume of Africanus are diverse but they all emphasize the need for decoloniality as another perspective from which development could be interrogated and understood as discourse. What the majority of authors argue for is decolonization of the discourse of development through indigenization of the concept. An un-decolonized discourse of development presents Africans as objects rather than subjects of development. African people feature in development discourse as a problem to be solved. A humanitarian perspective has always permeated development discourse in the process hiding the structural causes of lack of development in Africa. A decolonial perspective is grounded in world-systems approach. It maintains that the modern world system that emerged in 1492 has remained racially hierarchized, Euro-American-centric, sexist, hetero-normative, Christiancentric, Western-centric, capitalist and colonial in orientation (Grosfoguel 2007). Africa and other parts of the Global South have remained peripheral and subaltern. This is why decolonial thinkers understand development as involving the decolonization of the modern world system. Decoloniality cascades from the context in which the humanity of black people is doubted and their subjectivity is articulated in terms of lacks and deficits (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). Lacking development is constitutive of a Western articulation of African subjectivity. This point is well articulated by Ramon Grosfoguel, a leading Latin American thinker and theorist who understood the articulation on subjectivity of non-Western people as unfolding in this way: We went from the sixteenth century characterization of ‘people without writing’ to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterization of ‘people without history,’ to the twentieth century characterization of ‘people without development’ and more recently, to the early twenty first century of ‘people without democracy’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 214). During the same period, those in the ‘Zone of Being’ were systematically gaining more and more fruits of modernity ‘from sixteenth century ‘rights of people,’ to ‘eighteenth century ‘rights of man,’ and to the ‘late twentieth century human rights’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 214). Decoloniality is against all vestiges of colonialism and realities of coloniality. It is a redemptive epistemology which inaugurates and legitimates the telling the story of the modern world from the experiences of colonial difference. Decoloniality materialized at the very moment in which imperialism and colonialism arrived in Africa. Decoloniality ‘struggles to bring into intervening existence an-other interpretation that bring forward, on the one hand, a silenced view of the event and, on the other, shows the limits of imperial ideology disguised as the true (total) interpretation of the events’ in the making of the modern world (Mignolo 1995: 33). Decoloniality is both an epistemic and a political project seeking liberation and freedom for those people who experienced colonialism and who are today subsisting and living under the boulder of global coloniality. Development is linked to liberation and freedom from domination and exploitation. This is why decoloniality is distinguished from the imperial version of history through its push for shifting of a geography of reason from the West as the epistemic locale from which the ‘world is described, conceptualized and ranked’ to the ex-colonised epistemic sites as legitimate points of departure in describing the construction of the modern world order (Mignolo 1995: 35). Decoloniality identifies coloniality as a key hindrance to development in Africa. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, a leading philosopher in decolonial thought, grapples with the meaning of coloniality and this is how he defined it: Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. **Coloniality**, instead, **refers to** long-standing **patterns of power** thatemerged **as a result of colonialism**, but **that define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations.** Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day (Maldonado- Torres 2007: 243). Decolonial thinkers understand the Global South as that epistemic site that received the negatives of modernity. **Coloniality is a** name for the ‘darker side’ of modernity that needs to be unmasked because it exists as ‘an embedded **logic that enforces control, domination, and exploitation** disguised **in the language of** salvation, **progress**, modernization, **and being good for everyone’** (Mignolo 1995: 6). Walter D. Mignolo argued that ‘Coloniality names the experiences and views of the world and history of those whom Fanon called les damnes de la terre (“the wretched of the earth,” those who have been, and continue to be, subjected to the standard of modernity)’ (Mignolo 1995: 8). He elaborated on the meaning of the wretched of the earth in this way: The wretched are defined by the colonial wound, and the colonial wound, physical and/or psychological, is a consequence of racism, the hegemonic discourse that questions the humanity of all those who do not belong to the locus of enunciation (and the geo-politics of knowledge) of those who assign the standard of classification and assign to themselves the right to classify (Mignolo 1995: 8). Unlike coloniality, decoloniality names a cocktail of insurrectionist-liberatory projects and critical thoughts emerging from the ex-colonised sites such as Latin America, Caribbean, Asia, Middle East, and Africa. It seeks to make sense of the position of ex-colonised peoples within the Euro- America-centric, Christian-centric, patriarchal, capitalist, hetero-normative, racially hierarchized, and modern world-system that came into being in the fifteenth century (Mignolo 2000; Grosfoguel 2007). Decoloniality seeks to unmask, unveil, and reveal coloniality as an underside of modernity that coexisted with the rhetoric of progress, equality, fraternity, and liberty. It is a particular kind of critical intellectual theory as well as political project that seeks to disentangle ex-colonised parts of the world from global coloniality (Mignolo 2011). What distinguishes decoloniality from other existing critical social theories is its locus of enunciations and its genealogy – which is outside Europe. Decoloniality can be best understood as a pluriversal epistemology of the future – a redemptive and liberatory epistemology that seeks to delink from the tyranny of abstract universals (Mignolo 2007: 159). Decoloniality informs the ongoing struggles against inhumanity of the Cartesian subject, ‘the irrationality of the rational, the despotic residues of modernity’ (Mignolo 2011: 93). As a critical social theory, decoloniality is constituted by three main concepts. The first is coloniality of power. It is a useful concept, which delves deeper into the roots of the present asymmetrical global power relations and how the present modern world order was constituted. It boldly enables a correct naming of the current ‘global political present’ as a racially hierarchized, Euro-American-centric, Christian-centric, patriarchal, sexist, capitalist, hetero-normative, hegemonic, and modern power structure that emerged in 1492. At the centre of the construction of this power structure was the bifurcation of the world into ‘Zone of Being’ and ‘Zone of None-Being’ maintained by invisible ‘abyssal lines’ (Gordon 2005; Santos 2007). The Portuguese sociologist and leading decolonial thinker had this to say about the making of the ‘Zone of Being’ and the ‘Zone of Non- Being’: Modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking. It consists of a system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones. The invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into two realms, the realm of “this side of the line” and the realm of “the other side of the line.” The division is such that the “other side of the line” vanishes as reality, becomes nonexistent, and is indeed produced as nonexistent. Nonexistent means not existing in any relevant or comprehensive way of being. Whatever is produced as nonexistent is radically excluded because it lies beyond the realm of what the accepted conception of inclusion considers to be its other. What most fundamentally characterizes abyssal thinking is thus the impossibility of the copresence of the two sides of the line (Santos 2007: 45). To the ‘Zone of Being’ (Euro-American world) modernity deposited its fruits of progress, civilization, modernization, industrialization, development, democracy and human rights while at the same time imposing the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid into Africa (the Zone of None-Being). The second concept is that of coloniality of knowledge. Epistemology and methodology are inextricably intertwined with imperial power. This is why Claude Ake wrote about ‘social science as imperialism’ that enabled development in Europe and America while disabling development in Africa (Ake 1979). Research into development cannot ignore delving into epistemological issues, into the politics of knowledge generation, and the fundamental question of who generates which knowledge and for what purposes. How knowledge has been used to assist imperialism and colonialism and to inscribe Euro- American-centric epistemology that consistently appropriated what was considered progressive, and displacing what was considered repugnant aspects of endogenous and indigenous knowledges remains a fertile area of research. The same is true of the important question of relevance and irrelevance of knowledge, particularly how some knowledges disempowered communities and peoples, and how others empowered individuals and communities. The point that emerges poignantly from decoloniality is that current knowledges, epistemologies and methodologies are for equilibrium rather than transformation. They are for the status quo rather than for change. The fundamental challenge facing Africa is how knowledges, epistemologies and methodologies of equilibrium can be expected to enable development in Africa. Decoloniality speaks to this quandary. The third concept is that of coloniality of being, which was articulated by Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007). This concepts enables us to delve deeper into the pertinent questions of the making of modern subjectivities, into issues of humanism, and into questions of the role played by philosophers such as Rene Descartes and the long-term implications of his motto, ‘Cogito ergo sum/I think, therefore, I am’) on conceptions of subjectivity. What is evident is that modernity endowed whiteness with ontological density far above blackness as identities. This happened as the notions of ‘I think, therefore, I am’ were mutating into ‘I conquer, therefore, I am’ and its production of ‘colonizer and colonized’ articulation of subjectivity and being (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a). From these imperial and colonial articulations of African humanity, there was a permanent questioning of the humanity of black people and this attitude and practice culminated in processes of ‘objectification’ / ‘thingification’ / ‘commodification’ of Africans as slaves (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). Therefore, the response to the question of why decoloniality in the 21stcentury, the answer is simply **that coloniality is still operative and active and needs to be decolonized**. The post-1945 juridical decolonization did not succeed to decolonize the modern world order that was formed since 1492. This is why Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argued that: What Africans must be vigilant against is the trap of ending up normalizing and universalizing coloniality as a natural state of the world. It must be unmasked, resisted and destroyed because it produced a world order that can only be sustained through a combination of violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies (Ndlovu- Gatsheni 2013b: 10). It is a question that Ramon Grosfoguel gave a more comprehensive response: One of **the most powerful myth**s of the twentieth century was the notion that the elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This led to the myth of a “postcolonial” world. The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to **live under the same “colonial power matrix**.” With juridical-political decolonization we moved from a period of ‘global **colonialism’** to the current period of “global **coloniality**.” Although “colonial administrations” have been almost entirely eradicated and the majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent states, non-European people are still living under crude European/Euro- American exploitation and domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non-Europeans remain in place and are entangled with the “international division of labour” and accumulation of capital at a world-scale (Grosfoguel 2007: 219). The celebration of ‘juridical-political’ decolonization obscures the continuities between the colonial past and coloniality – it leads to illusions of possibilities of enjoyment of ‘independence’ and ‘freedom’, ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘national identity’, as well as ‘national development’ and ‘progress’. Decoloniality pushes for transcendence over narrow conceptions of being decolonized and consistently gestures towards liberation from coloniality as a complex matrix of knowledge, power, and being. Decoloniality consistently reminds decolonial thinkers of ‘the unfinished and incomplete twentieth century dream of decolonization’ (Grosfoguel 2007: 221). Decoloniality announces the ‘the decolonial turn’ as a long existing ‘turn’ standing in opposition to the ‘colonizing turn’ underpinning Western thought (Maldonado-Torres 2011: 1). Decoloniality announces the broad ‘decolonial turn’ that involves the ‘task of the very decolonization of knowledge, power and being, including institutions such as the university’ (Maldonado-Torres 2011: 1). Maldonado-Torres elaborated on the essence of ‘decolonial turn’: The decolonial turn (different from the linguistic or the pragmatic turns) refers to the decisive recognition and propagation of decolonization as an ethical, political, and epistemic project in the twentieth century. The project reflects changes in historical consciousness, agency, and knowledge, and it also involves a method or series of methods that facilitate the task of decolonization at the material and epistemic levels (Maldonado-Torres 2006: 114). For Maldonado, ‘By decoloniality it is meant here the dismantling of relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more powerful forms of expression in the modern/colonial world’ (Maldonado-Torres 2006: 117). Like all critical social theories of society, the decolonial epistemic perspective aims to critique and possibly overcome the epistemological injustices put in place by imperial global designs, and questions and challenges the longstanding claims of Euro-American epistemology to be universal, neutral, objective, disembodied, as well as being the only mode of knowing. It is ‘an-other thought’ that seeks to inaugurate ‘an-other logic,’ ‘an-other language,’ and ‘an-other thinking’ that has the potential to liberate ex-colonised people’s minds from Euro-American hegemony (Mignolo 2005: 56). Decoloniality helps in unveiling epistemic silences, conspiracies, and epistemic violence hidden within Euro-American epistemology and affirms the epistemic rights of the African people that enable them to transcend global imperial designs. **Decoloniality is re-emerging during the current** age of ‘**epistemic break’**. The term ‘epistemic break’ is drawn from the French theorist Michel Foucault. It refers to **a ‘historical rupture which occurs when one epistemic system breaks down and another** begins **to take its place’** (Mills 1997: 145). It is a very relevant concept that captures the epistemic crisis haunting the modern world order today and encapsulates the enormity of the crisis of Euro-American epistemologies unleashed on the world by modernity. This epistemic rupture is well captured by Immanuel Wallerstein who argued that: It is quite normal for scholars and scientists to rethink issues. When important new evidence undermines old theories and predictions do not hold, we are pressed to rethink our premises. In that sense, much of nineteenth-century social science, in the form of specific hypotheses, is constantly being rethought. But, in addition to rethinking, which is “normal,” I believe we need to “unthink” nineteenth-century social science, because many of its presumptions—which, in my view, are misleading and constrictive – still have far too strong a hold on our mentalities. These presumptions, once considered liberating of the spirit, serve today as the central intellectual barrier to useful analysis of the social world (Wallerstein 1991: 1). The key point is that Euro-American epistemologies predicated on fundamentalist rationalism are in a deep crisis. In his recent book titled The end of conceit: western rationality after postcolonialism, Patrick Chabal admitted that whenever Europeans try to make sense of the current problems facing Europe it becomes clear that ‘the instruments we use are no longer fit for the job. The instruments – that is, the social sciences we employ to explain what is happening domestically and overseas – are both historically and conceptually out of date’ (Chabal 2012: viii). **The whole world is at an epistemological crossroads** characterised by the end of Euro-American conceit that created some form of epistemological certainty. As argued by Chabal (2012: 3), ‘**Western societies are no longer sure of how to see themselves.’ This uncertainty opens the way for projection of decoloniality** as the first humanistic-oriented philosophy of liberation gesturing towards another world that is pluriversal, another logic that is freed from racism and the birth of a new humanism. This volume of Africanus is inspired by this new utopic-decolonial momentum gesturing towards deeper structural decolonization and pluriversalism freed from racial hierarchization of human beings. The first article is by the language specialist Finex Ndhlovu and is focused on the important question of African regional integration and pan-African unity. He deploys decoloniality to argue the crossborder languages that have been promoted as vehicles for African economic and political integration are actually carrying dominant ideologies of Westphalian statism and the Berlin consensus that are not easily amenable to regional integration. He challenges the conventional view of the African Academy of Languages (Acalan) of projecting vehicular cross-border languages as a means by which such problems as disunity could be resolved. Ndhlovu argues that ‘One of the biggest challenges that come with these developments is that of cultivating intercultural communication, cross-linguistic understanding and social cohesion among the hitherto linguistically and culturally multiverse peoples of the African continent.’ He goes further to note that vehicular cross-border languages (those languages that are common to two or more states and domains straddling various usages) suffer from the same limitations as those currently besetting national languages because they are ‘conceived as isomorphic, monolithic and countable entities that do not accommodate other language forms’ and their ‘cross-border status is defined in terms of existing nation-state boundaries that they purport to transcend’. Ndhlovu’s intervention begins to reveal coloniality hidden in some of the celebrated mechanism chosen as levers for achieving regional integration and pan-African unity. This critical thinking is very important as it enable Africans to avoid another false start that is not informed by genuine decoloniality. What epistemologies and knowledges underpin mainstream development discourse? This question is directly addressed by Seth Opong from Ghana who argues for indigenizing knowledges as the first step towards attainment of endogenous development. He defines endogenous knowledge ‘as knowledge about the people, by the people and for the people’. This definition is important as it distinguishes those knowledges imposed on Africa from outside those knowledges generated by Africans. Opong’s contribution proposes that ‘the African scholar should adopt a problem-oriented approach in conducting research as opposed to the current method-oriented approach that prevent the African from examining pertinent African problems’. Opong correctly notes that ‘contextually relevant knowledge is the basis for national development’. His article is therefore a most relevant intervention on the level of epistemology, pedagogy and methodology as they impinge on the question of development in Africa. Morgan Ndlovu’s article on the pertinent theme of production and consumption of cultural villages in South Africa addresses the question of coloniality that is hidden within the tourism industry. He begins with questioning whether those who fought against colonialism really understood the complexity of the structure of power they were fighting against and the character of the modern world system that enabled colonialism. This becomes a pertinent question when one considers that today decolonization exists as myth and an illusion. The reality is that of coloniality on a global scale. His core argument is the concept of cultural villages in South Africa cannot be understood outside the broader global experiences of ‘museumification’ of identity and ‘culturalization’ of politics’. Morgan Ndlovu’s article takes us to the tourist industry as a component of development in Africa and consistently reveals how staging culture is shot through by coloniality, which makes it impossible for Africans to reap any tangible developmental dividends. This is why he concludes that ‘The manner in which the establishment of cultural village is produced and consumed in South Africa microcosmically represents the general picture of how cultural identity and the political economy are hierarchical ordered in the non-existent post-apartheid dispensation.’ Sarah Chiumbu’s contribution targets the media as another domain of coloniality that needs decolonization. When decolonial thinkers use the term decolonization they do not confine it to decolonial issues of juridical-political independence. They extend it to issues of power, knowledge and being. This is why Chiumbu’s specific focus is no media reform in southern Africa that continues to generate animated debates between agents of neo-liberalism and those of African liberation is very important. Coloniality of power is causing a lot of confusion in the debates on media reform and democracy, with the neo-liberal paradigm continuing to work towards obscuring the workings of power and disguising its ideological underpinnings. Chiumbu correctly notes that ‘This masking does not leave room to problematize global structures directing knowledge production and media policy reforms.’

#### The only ethical response is decolonization.

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework.

We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36).

To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

*when you take away the punctuation*

*he says of*

*lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land*

*its acreage and location*

*you take away its finality*

*opening the possibility of other futures*

-Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012)

Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

#### Representations and epistemology perpetuate settler practices – the way we understand and discuss the structures around us overdetermines our praxis – s

Seawright 14 Gardner Seawright is a doctoral candidate in the Education, Culture, and Society department at the University of Utah. “Settler Traditions of Place: Making Explicit the Epistemological Legacy of White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism for Place-Based Education.” EDUCATIONAL STUDIES, 50: 554–572, 2014, American Educational Studies Association. JJN

Situating Settler Traditions Settler traditions of place are an epistemic genealogy—the ethics, logics, and ideologies foundational to a knowledge system that have been passed down across generations, a knowledge framework that establishes what is known (the socially constructed commonsense of a culture), how things come to be known (the process of attaining new knowledge), how the world is to be interpreted according to what is known (the social construction of reality), and how the self is known in relation to perceived reality (the politics of self). Tradition is used as a conceptual tool allowing for domination to be empha- sized as an on-going historical process, while also allowing for epistemology as tradition to simultaneously be evolutionary and a cherished cultural artifact. As a cultural product, settler traditions of place are transmitted across generations through discipline, teaching, modeling and other forms of direct and subtle so- cial communication resulting in normalized habits, beliefs, values, and practices. In speaking about “western cultural traditions,” Val Plumood (2002) argues that there are “epistemic and moral limitations” embedded in these traditions—these normalized habits—that perpetuate hierarchized notions of the world that privi- lege white-hetero-landowning males (99). As Martusewicz et al. (2011) explain, these subtle discourses manifest as taken-for-granted cultural assumptions that are rooted in racism, sexism, classism that intertwine with and reflect the cultivation of violent relationships with the more-than-human world and natural systems that we depend on for life (119). The tradition in question here is the social air that penetrates the Western world, interacting with human beings whether they want it to or not. Using tradition as a metaphor for epistemology allows me to emphasize the way epistemology can im- pact every aspect of life while remaining removed from a deterministic position. Embedded in discourse, tradition appears as ever-present; despite this, individual social actors have the agency to break tradition. Consequently, in the same way that an individual breaks from familial, cultural, or religious tradition and faces the ramifications for transgressing, epistemic transgression can also incur social fallout and cause friction. When an individual epistemically transgresses, they employ an epistemic praxis (the operationalization of an alternative or critical epistemology) that goes against the grain and is counter to the tradition that defines the social environment. For conversations concerning the cultivation of criticality (like the one herein) this break in tradition is absolutely desirable and can inspire what Jose ́ Medina (2013) calls epistemic friction. Epistemic friction is contained in those uncomfortable moments in which our taken-for-granted assumptions about the world begin to crack. These moments can be transformative and cat- alyze critical consciousness to imagine and hopefully actualize an alternative epistemology.

## Case

#### The ROB is to vote for the better debater – anything else is arbitrary and self-serving and has no basis in the format in debate. They can access their offense and win that their offense makes them the better debater in which case you vote aff, but defaulting the ROB based off 1AC offense is illogical

#### Drop the debater – read Tuck and Yang – my opponent replicates violence

#### 1] Co-option of decol – Tuck and Yang

#### 2] Doesn’t decol land,

#### 3] Them reading the 1AC is a co-option of indigenous struggles similar to the strucutres they indite

#### 1] Their Reed 4 evidence is a specific instance of indigenous people attempts to copy right their own music – it justifies distancing indigenous politics from the state in order to truly let it thrive

#### 2] Changes to copyright laws for indigenous music is painfully nowhere near what is needed.

#### 3] Progress is superficial – Stanley is insufficennt to provide a coherent connection from indigenous patenting on music to even a cultural revivial at large, because the forms of music a) can’t induce a revival by themselves b) are influenced by western music

#### 4] This rate of progress makes true indigenous gains impossible – the aff can never result in decol and their piecemeal injection of indigenous knowledge isn’t helpful when juxtaposed against the alt – they are a micro legislative reform that does nothing to help indigenous so reject the perm which waters down the alt – they aren’t a move to decol, because they enable a settler move to innocence by enacting the aff, and provide for settler reconciliation. Our critism is centered around settler uncomfortability, and refusing for settlers to ease their guilt in any way outside of decol.

#### 5] Removal of IP reentrenches their harms – it enables further usuage of indigenous made music for the advertisments and sales campaigns for western companies. It justifies further settler-adoption fantasies through the removal of the barriers that prevent it from occuring

#### 6] They don’t change the structures responsible for these harms BUT

#### Rhetoric of extinction in western spaces is a tool used to offer pleasure to those in the western world – it normalizes images of violence that allows replication of indigenous genocide

Audra Mitchell 17, [Wilfrid Laurier professor. Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology, Balsillie School of International Affairs], 9-27-2017, “Decolonizing against extinction part II: Extinction is not a metaphor – it is literally genocide,” <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2017/09/27/decolonizing-against-extinction-part-ii-extinction-is-not-a-metaphor-it-is-literally-genocide/> //AA

Extinction has become an emblem of Western, and white-dominated, fears about ‘the end of the(ir) world’. This scientific term is saturated with emotional potency, stretched and contorted to embody almost any nightmare, from climate change to asteroid strikes. In academic and public contexts alike, it is regularly interchanged with other terms and concepts – for instance, ‘species death’, global warming or ecological collapse. Diffused into sublime scales – mass extinctions measured in millions of (Gregorian calendar) years, a planet totalized by the threat of nuclear destruction – ‘extinction’ has become an empty superlative, one that that gestures to an abstract form of unthinkability. It teases Western subjects with images of generalized demise that might, if it gets bad enough, even threaten us, or the figure of ‘humanity’ that we enshrine as a universal. This figure of ‘humanity’, derived from Western European enlightenment ideals, emphasizes individual, autonomous actors who are fully integrated into the global market system; who are responsible citizens of nation-states; who conform to Western ideas of health and well-being; who partake of ‘culture’; who participate in democratic state-based politics; who refrain from physical violence; and who manage their ‘resources’ responsibly (Mitchell 2014). Oddly, exposure to the fear of extinction contributes to the formation and bolstering of contemporary Western subjects. Contemplating the sublime destruction of ‘humanity’ offers the thrill of abjection: the perverse pleasure derived from exposure to something by which one is revolted. Claire Colebrook detects this thrill-seeking impulse in the profusion of Western blockbuster films and TV shows that imagine and envision the destruction of earth, or at least of ‘humanity’. It also throbs through a flurry of recent best-selling books – both fiction and speculative non-fiction (see Oreskes and Conway 2014; Newitz 2013; Weisman 2008). In a forthcoming intervention, Noah Theriault and I (2018) argue that these imaginaries are a form of porn that normalizes the profound violences driving extinction, while cocooning its viewers in the secure space of the voyeur. Certainly, there are many Western scientists, conservationists and policy-makers who are genuinely committed to stopping the extinction of others, perhaps out of fear for their own futures. **Yet extinction is not quite real for Western**, and especiallywhite, **subjects; it is a fantasy of negation that evokes thrill,** melancholy, anger **and existential purpose**. It is a metaphor that expresses the destructive desires of these beings, and the negativity against which we define our subjectivity. But extinction is not a metaphor: it is a very real expression of violence that systematically destroys particular beings, worlds, life forms and the relations that enable them to flourish. These are real, unique beings, worlds and relations – as well as somebody’s family, Ancestors, siblings, future generations – who are violently destroyed. Extinction can only be used unironically as a metaphor by people who have never been threatened with it, told it is their inevitable fate, or lost their relatives and Ancestors to it – and who assume that they probably never will. This argument is directly inspired by the call to arms issued in 2012 by Eve Tuck and Wayne K. Yang and more recently by Cutcha Risling-Baldy. The first, seminal piece demonstrates how settler cultures use the violence of metaphorical abstraction to excuse themselves from the real work of decolonization: ensuring that land and power is in Indigenous hands. Risling-Baldy’s brilliant follow-up extends this logic to explain how First People like Coyote have been reduced to metaphors through settler appropriation. In both cases, engagement with Indigenous peoples and their relations masks moves to innocence: acts that make it appear as if settlers are engaging in decolonization, while in fact we are consolidating the power structures that privilege us. In this series, want to show how Western, and white-dominated, discourses on ‘extinction’ appear to address the systematic destruction of peoples and other beings while enacting moves to innocence that mask their culpability and perpetuate structures of violence. As I argued in Part I of this series, extinction is an expression of colonial violence. As such, it needs to be addressed through direct decolonization, including the dismantling of settler colonial structures of violence, and the resurgence of Indigenous worlds. Following Tuck, Yang and Risling-Baldy’s lead, I want to show how and why the violences that drive extinction have come to be invisible within mainstream discourses. Salient amongst these is the practice of genocide against Indigenous peoples other than humans.…it is literally genocide. What Western science calls ‘extinction’ is not an unfortunate, unintended consequence of desirable ‘human’ activities. It is an embodiment of particular patterns of structural violence that disproportionately affect specific racialized groups. In some cases, ‘extinction’ is directly, deliberately and systematically inflicted in order to create space for aggressors, including settler states. For this reason, it has rightly been framed as an aspect or tool of colonial genocides against Indigenous human peoples. Indeed, many theorists have shown that the ‘extirpation’ of life forms (their total removal from a particular place) is an instrument for enacting genocide upon Indigenous humans (see Mazis 2008; Laduke 1999; Stannard 1994). Specifically, the removal of key sources of food, clothing and other basic materials makes survival on the land impossible for the people targeted. Nehiyaw thinker Tasha Hubbard (2014) makes a qualitatively distinct argument. She points out that the Buffalo are First People, the elder brothers of the Nehiyaw people (and other Indigenous nations – see Benton-Banai 2010). Starting in the mid-1800s, the tens of millions of buffalo that ranged across Turtle Island were nearly eliminated through strategic patterns of killing carried out by settler-state-sponsored military and commercial forces. Their killing was linked to governmental imperatives to clear and territorially annex the Great Plains by removing its Indigenous peoples. As Hubbard points out, methods of destroying buffalo herds included large-scale killing, but also the disruption of their social structures, the destruction of the ecosystems on which they rely, and the removal of calves. These acts involve each of the components of the definition of genocide enshrined in the UN Genocide Convention: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. From Hubbard’s viewpoint, rooted in Nehiyaw philosophy and ethical-legal principles, the systematic destruction of the buffalo is not like genocide, nor is it exclusively a tool for carrying out genocide against human peoples. It is genocide in its own right: an attempt to destroy a particular First People and the possibilities of its continuity. In other words, the deliberate and systematic attempt to eliminate the buffalo, enacted by settler states, simultaneously enacted genocide against Indigenous peoples and their nonhuman relatives. Genocides of Indigenous peoples (human and otherwise) continue apace in contemporary settler states, transformed into multiple manifestations. For instance, they are integral to ‘biosecurity’ strategies designed to police the biological boundaries of these states and their citizens. Laced with racializing and xenophobic rhetoric (Subramaniam 2001), strategies such as culling or planned eradications are intended to remove ‘invasive’ or ‘foreign’ life forms in order to protect ‘Native’ ones. Many of the ‘invasive’ life forms targeted for destruction were transported to unfamiliar lands through colonial patterns of settlement and global trade flows. However, this logic of elimination (Wolfe 2006) is often perverted, turned against Indigenous\* beings whose flourishing impedes the expansion or consolidation of the colonial state. For instance, Deborah Bird Rose (2011 a, 2011 b) shows how this form of violence is continually waged against flying foxes, who are framed by the settler state as “pest[s] whose extinction is [deliberately] sought”. This act of elimination involves explicit genocidal ideation, or the imagination of the destruction of a people. Rose characterizes it as a “matter of imagining a world without [dingoes or flying foxes], then setting out to create it” (Rose 2011a). The Australian settler state has used multiple tactics to induce terror and preclude flourishing amongst flying foxes, from the emission of high-pitched electronic signals to smearing trees with python excrement (Rose 2011b). Indeed, in 2014, I lived near to the roosting site of a group of flying foxes in Turrbal and Jagera Country (suburban Brisbane to settlers). Such nesting places are called ‘colonies’ , reflecting a Western scientific rhetoric that frames Indigenous peoples as ‘invaders’ of the settler state. The trees that housed the nesting site backed onto a municipal facility, whose fence had been covered with barbed wire, in which many of the bats snared their wings and starved to death. This ‘security’ measure – designed to protect the facilities relied upon by urban settlers from the intrusion of flying foxes – is a powerful weapon for precluding ongoing flourishing of Indigenous other-than-human peoples. I learned from neighbours that this ‘colony’ had previously been ‘moved’ from several other sites around the city, suffering significant declines in population each time. Indeed, despite reported declines of 95% in flying fox communities in Queensland and neighbouring New South Wales, the Queensland settler state legalized the shooting of the bats in 2012 by fruitgrowers. Of course, in some cases, the elimination of life forms is not as targeted or intentional – it may take the form of land-based extractive violence, the creep of ocean acidification, the decimation of rainforests by climate change. Proponents of a Eurocentric definition of genocide could argue that these events lack intention. Indeed, within international law, intention to commit genocide is a necessary criteria for conviction. However, theorists of critical genocide studies have long argued that this definition is inadequate: it brackets out a great many of the acts, logics and structures that produce the destruction of unique peoples. According to Tony Barta, definitions of genocide that focus on ‘purposeful annihilation’, and in particular on physical killing, have “devalu[ed] all other concepts of less planned destruction, even if the effects are the same” (Barta 2000, 238). For this reason, he shifts the focus from ‘genocidal intention’ to ‘genocidal outcome’ – that is, from the abstract assignation of genocidal agency to the felt and embodied effects of eliminative violence. It is the focus on intent, he contends, that allows white Australians to imagine that their relationship with Aboriginal people is non-genocidal despite overwhelming evidence of systematic and deliberate racialized destruction over several centuries. In contrast, an approach based on ‘genocidal outcomes’ makes it possible to account for complex causality and weak intentionality – that is, for myriad acts mediated by subtle, normalized structures that, together, work to eliminate a people. I want to argue that the same logic applies to nonhuman peoples: the destruction of a life form, its relations with other beings and its possible futures is a genocidal outcome, whether or not intention can be identified. Similarly, Christopher Powell (2007) argues that, since a ‘genos’ is a “network of practical social relations, destruction of a genos means the forcible breaking down of those relationships…these effects could be produced without a coherent intent to destroy. They could result from sporadic and uncoordinated actions whose underlying connection is the production of a new society in which there is simply no room for the genos in question to exist. They might even result from well-meaning attempts to do good” (Powell 2007, 538) As I have argued elsewhere, extinction is defined by the breaking of relations and the systematic destruction of the conditions of plurality that nurture co-flourishing worlds. Whether inflicted out as a deliberate act of extirpation, or as the convergent effect of eliminative logics expressed over centuries and enormous spatial scales, extinction is the destruction of relations and the heterogenous societies they nurture. Understood in this way, ‘extinction’ is not a metaphor for genocide or other forms of large-scale violence: it is a distinct manifestation of genocide. Masking the genocidal logics that drive extinction involves several moves to innocence (Tuck and Yang 2012). Treating extinction as something short of genocide entrenches Eurocentric understandings of personhood that are limited to homo sapiens, which is itself an act of violence against these peoples. Ironically, the entrenchment of this dichotomy also enables the logic of ‘dehumanization’, in which human communities are likened to reviled nonhumans (for instance, cockroaches) in order to motivate violence against them. As I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell 2014), the logic of generalised ‘dehumanisation’ is uniquely effective in Western frameworks in which the lack of ethical status for beings other than humans removes obstacles to their mass destruction. Within worlds in which human and nonhuman persons are linked through complex systems of law, treaties, protocols and long-standing relations, this claim is illogical. Within Western settler states, however, it functions as a means of justifying ongoing violence against Indigenous peoples and their relations. In addition, by framing extinction as a problem for a universal figure of ‘humanity’ (more on this to follow…) mainstream discourses of extinction obscure its profound entwinement with race and racializing structures. These examples make it clear that eliminative violence is targeted on specific groups of people and their other-than-human relations, as defined by the aggressors. Indeed, patterns of genocidal violence extend racializing categories, hierarchies and eliminative impulses to other-than-human peoples. Just as approaching gender violence separately from race effaces their intersection, understanding extinction as distinct from race is deeply misleading. This is not only because racialized people are more likely to suffer from the effects of ‘extinction’ and other forms of environmental racism (which they are). It is also because the eliminative violence that drives extinction extend and enact race beyond the category of homo sapiens by defining particular groups against white settler norms and as threats to the settler society. To approach extinction separately from issues of race is, therefore, to miss one of its most defining features. Extinction is not a metaphor – in many cases, it is quite literally genocide enacted against Indigenous peoples and their other-than-human relations. To treat it as a metaphor is to obscure and participate in the structures of violence that drive it. From this perspective, in addition to active decolonisation efforts, and the resurgence of Indigenous peoples, addressing extinction also requires attacking the genocidal, racializing, eliminative logics that are diffused throughout settler (and other) states. It also requires honouring the unique relations, worlds and peoples that are targeted by these discourses and practices.