# 1AC – Nicaragua

## FW

#### **The standard is mitigating structural violence**

#### **Ethical calculus should be centered on structural violence – a focus on large-scale threats of suffering or abstract questions of morality justifies infinite material violence towards disposed communities. Our framing is a pre-requisite to any other ethical theory since oppression distorts all moral reasoning**

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(Elizabeth, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about:¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they necessitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwtaca rin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the **assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency**, the urgent body becomes **literally nonsense, a non sequitur** within societies, states and worlds that will **always be more urgent**.¶ If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of **reclaiming urgency for the body**. In **detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps**, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as **private, apolitical and mundane’** (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply **political, public, and exceptional** as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that **a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait**, has the **ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures**. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new **waiting places** in our material landscape, **places like the detention center** and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning.¶ I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

## Advantage

#### Nicaraguan protesters being detained now – recent events mean discontent is on the upswing

Bertha Ramos 11/7 {Senior News Desk Journalist for CNN covering Nicaragua elections} (November 7, 2021, 6:29 PM ET)“ At least 20 people have been arrested ahead of Nicaragua elections”, Accessed Nov. 9, 8:00AM, Cnn.com, https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/nicaragua-presidential-elections-2021-daniel-ortega/index.html?utm\_term=1636371353187d1e0df64be7b&utm\_source=cnn\_Five+Things+for+Monday%2C+November+8%2C+2021&utm\_medium=email&bt\_ee=99sTBhPDY9DoBIp4oAwqMc10GyeZWF%2Fnm4B2qba2Q7c6MQ9iMFtkDQYA%2FZ1hXXqV&bt\_ts=1636371353191 //AA

Nicaragua’s Center for Human Rights reported that at least 20 people were arrested Saturday night ahead of the country’s general elections held on Sunday. Civic Alliance Nicaragua for Liberty and Democracy, an organization composed by citizens, students and human rights activists, said that one of its members is among those detained. CNN has reached out to the Ortega administration and has also contacted the National Police for comment, but has not received an answer. Some context: The country’s electoral process has been scrutinized by the US, the European Union, the OAS and the United Nations. These organizations have said that conditions in the country are not apt for free, just, and supervised elections. In addition, three opposition parties were banned and at least 39 opposition leaders have been detained between May and October of this year. Seven of those arrested were presidential candidates. Nicaragua is holding presidential and local elections on Sunday. President Daniel Ortega is seeking his third reelection and fourth consecutive term.

#### Strikes fueled protests & calls for Ortega’s resignation in 2018 but faced resistance

BBC 18. “Nicaragua Protesters Stage National Strike as Clashes Persist.” BBC News, BBC News, 15 June 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44491960. Accessed 10 Nov. 2021.//AA

A 24-hour general strike has brought much of Nicaragua to a standstill, as anti-government campaigners demand the resignation of President Daniel Ortega. Streets have been deserted and businesses closed in the capital, Managua, but violent protests have broken out in other cities. Reports say at least three people died on Thursday, bringing the total killed in eight weeks of clashes to about 160. Fresh talks aimed at ending the stand-off are due to take place on Friday. The protests began on 19 April after the government imposed cuts to pension and social security programmes. The cuts were later scrapped but the protests evolved into a rejection of the Ortega government and thousands of people have since taken to the streets. In Managua on Thursday, riot police with assault rifles patrolled mainly empty main streets where petrol stations, supermarkets and corner shops were closed. Elsewhere clashes erupted between protesters and police. A 15-year-old altar boy died in the city of Leon after being shot by security forces, the auxiliary bishop of Managua, Silvio Jose Baez, said. He also said riot police had fired indiscriminately in the streets of Nindiri, south-east of Managua. The report could not be confirmed. Reports of street battles also came from Nagarote, Masatepe and Tipitapa. Meanwhile, fresh talks between the government and opposition groups are due to take place on Friday to try to find a solution to the crisis. The country's Roman Catholic Church has previously tried to broker an agreement but all efforts have so far failed. Last month, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) visited Nicaragua and said it had seen grave violations of human rights during the protests. It said state security forces and armed third parties had used excessive force. On Thursday, Nicaragua's foreign ministry rejected the report as "biased". The street protests have become the biggest challenge to Mr Ortega's authority since he took office in 2007. He says rallies have been infiltrated by criminals and gang members. Student activists and union leaders have accused him of violent repression and called for him to step down. Mr Ortega is a former left-wing Sandinista guerrilla who helped to overthrow the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in the 1970s. However, his critics accuse him and his wife Rosario Murillo, who is his vice-president, of also behaving like dictators.

#### 2018 protests failed due to government repression – movements die because of a lack of power and fear

Natalie Gallón and Matt Rivers 11/7 {Natalie Gallón is CNN's Mexico City Field Producer. Who has worked in high-profile stories for CNN like Venezuelan crisis, Matt Rivers is an international correspondent for CNN based in Mexico City who has covered key stories for CNN like the COVID crisis in Mexico and Brazil} (November 7, 2021, 10:46am ET)“A look back at Daniel Ortega's crackdown of protesters and the opposition to hold his grip on power”, Accessed Nov. 9, 8:00AM, Cnn.com, <https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/nicaragua-presidential-elections-2021-daniel-ortega/index.html?utm_term=1636371353187d1e0df64be7b&utm_source=cnn_Five+Things+for+Monday%2C+November+8%2C+2021&utm_medium=email&bt_ee=99sTBhPDY9DoBIp4oAwqMc10GyeZWF%2Fnm4B2qba2Q7c6MQ9iMFtkDQYA%2FZ1hXXqV&bt_ts=1636371353191> //AA

President Daniel Ortega, along with his wife and Vice President, Rosario Murillo, have been undermining Nicaraguan democracy for years, according to critics and human rights groups. There was the centralization of the executive branch of government, followed by the weakening of its democratic institutions. Loyalists to Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) were chosen to head the Supreme Court, the Attorney General's office and even the Supreme Electoral Council. Municipal election results in 2008 were doubted by the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) and the 2016 presidential elections weren't overseen by international observers. But the real inflection point came in 2018, when Ortega's government approved changes to the country's social security programs in an attempt to stem rising deficits within the program. Contributions by workers and employers would have increased but the amount retired workers would get in their pensions would have decreased. People of all ages took to the streets to demonstrate in massive protests. The government was forced to withdraw its proposal, but it did little to quell the anger of Nicaraguans, many of whom took the moment to express broader anger with Ortega's governance. Protests evolved into broader demands, including that Ortega step down. Instead of working with opposition groups and protesters to find a peaceful solution, Ortega's government took the opposite approach — intense and deadly crackdowns, violating human rights as pro-government armed groups arbitrarily detained hundreds who were participating in the protests. In some instances, parapolice groups would erect "obstacles to prevent the injured from gaining access to emergency medical care as a form of retaliation for their participation in the protests," the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) said in a report released that year. Churches were attacked if protesters were thought to be seeking protection inside, which the country's Catholic Church denounced. Universities became ground zero as pro-government forces attacked students who had been holed up in defiance against the government, killing at least two people in one deadly incident, human rights group CENIDH reported. According to multiple human rights groups, at least 325 people were killed during the civil unrest as Ortega's security forces used lethal force against protesters. According to Amnesty International in a report released a month after the protests began, the government used a violent repression policy against its people — a "shoot to kill" strategy. Ortega's government denied those charges. According to their "official" statistics, at least 195 people were killed, an inconsistency that remains to this day. Months after the protests began, the government was able to temporarily calm the storm working to negotiate agreements with several civil groups — the Catholic Church serving as their mediator — all with the intention to meet some of the demands and end the unrest. But the negotiations would stall with Ortega refusing to bow down to their main point — a call for early elections. The government finally agreed to allow international organizations into the country to investigate the deaths of hundreds of protesters and release some of those imprisoned on what the IACHR called "unfounded and disproportionate charges." With Ortega strengthening his hold on power in all state entities — judicial, supreme court, military, media, the excessive force against any dissent continued. The protests became a justification to enact a slew of new laws that continued to repress any form of dissent, creating fear throughout the country. **Anti-gov**ernment **protests** weresubsequently **banned**. Waving the country's flag in public or wearing its colors, a key symbol of the 2018 demonstrations, was criminalized. More than 100 university students who participated in the demonstrations were expelled from school and health care workers who had assisted the injured lost their jobs, according to the IACHR. Anyone who spoke out publicly against the government could be considered a traitor to the nation. Independent news stations also became targets. Some were raided and shut down. Journalists were imprisoned or were forced into exile. The crackdown continues: The protest movement against Ortega began to dwindle until it eventually died out, yet the systematic repression lives on. Independent media outlets and journalists continue to be harassed. Certain political parties have been disbanded. International suggestions presented to ensure free and fair elections have been ignored. "Here, the person that raises their voice gets marked or singled out as a traitor to the country," said Juan, a Nicaraguan who supported the protests and disagrees with the Ortega government. He asked CNN not use his real name in order to speak out against the administration without fear of reprisal. "They'd consider me a traitor to the country," he said when asked what would happen if the government knew he was speaking to foreign journalists. "They can make up some crime and take me to jail for who knows how many years." Juan spoke to CNN from inside his car outside his job, as he was afraid to express his true opinions inside. He said there are always people around who could report anti-government sentiment to the authorities. His fears of persecution are well founded. Human rights groups say so-called "traitors" often experience torture at the hands of the country's notoriously ruthless security forces. The government did not respond to CNN's request for comment on the allegations of torture. Hundreds of protesters and activists are believed to still be detained, according to CENIDH in a report released in February, and more than 108,000 Nicaraguans have fled the country since 2018, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

#### **Strikes were needed in June to fight Ortega**

Reuters 6/3 {Reporting by Ismael Lopez; Writing by Anthony Esposito; Editing by David Alire Garcia and Alistair Bell}“Calls Grow for Strike in Nicaragua after Opposition Leader Detained.” Reuters, Reuters, 3 June 2021, www.reuters.com/world/americas/calls-grow-strike-nicaragua-after-opposition-leader-detained-2021-06-03/. Accessed 11 Nov. 2021.//AA

A group representing Nicaraguan political prisoners and the mothers of those killed protesting President Daniel Ortega's authoritarian government called Thursday for a national strike after the house arrest of opposition leader Cristiana Chamorro. Nicaraguan police stormed into Chamorro's home on Wednesday, dramatically escalating a political battle ahead of November elections in which veteran leftist Ortega is seeking to maintain his tight grip on power. "A national strike is better than a bullet," said Grethel Gomez, standing in front of Chamorro's house, where the family members of political prisoners came to show their solidarity with the 66-year-old detained politician. Nicaragua's government did not respond to a request for comment. Earlier this week, the attorney general - a staunch Ortega ally - formally sought Chamorro's disqualification from holding public office due to the criminal investigation launched against her, and a judge immediately signed off. She has been accused by prosecutors of money laundering and a lesser citation of misrepresentation, charges she has denied. While Chamorro can appeal the disqualification, a reversal is unlikely due to Ortega's influence over the courts. Prohibiting Chamorro from running drew condemnation from U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who described it as an assault on free and fair elections. Chamorro had recently emerged as a possible unity candidate who could possibly rally a fractured opposition in the November vote to defeat Ortega, the 75-year-old leftist who has been in power since 2007 and aims to be re-elected in November for the third consecutive time, after ruling in the 1980s. She comes from a storied political lineage. Chamorro is the daughter of Violeta Chamorro, who was elected Nicaragua's president in 1990, ousting Ortega after his first stint in power, and her father was Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, assassinated in 1978 after leading for decades the pro-democracy opposition to the Somoza dictatorship.

#### A continued Ortega administration will trigger sanctions, economic decline and further repression

Oré 11/8, Diego. { Senior Correspondent, Mexico & Central America, Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters, UOL, Jornal Extra, MSN, MSN Australia, MSN Canada, MSN South Africa, Reuters, Terra, Aol, Business Insider and more}“Explainer: What Might Happen next If Ortega Wins a Fourth Term in Nicaragua’s Election?” Reuters, Reuters, 8 Nov. 2021 6:55 AM EST, www.reuters.com/world/americas/what-might-happen-next-if-ortega-wins-fourth-term-nicaraguas-election-2021-11-03/. Accessed 10 Nov. 2021. //AA

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega is poised to win a fourth consecutive term in Sunday's presidential elections, extending his run as the longest-serving ruler in the Americas until at least January 2027. Following more than three years of crackdown on dissent, the election has been criticized as anti-democratic by powers including the United States and the European Union, raising questions about what the fallout could be. Following are some possible scenarios: INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE INCREASES U.S. officials told Reuters they are working with international partners on new sanctions that could be slapped on the Ortega administration after the election, and the U.S. House of Representatives on Wednesday voted overwhelmingly in favor of legislation clamping down on Nicaragua. The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden is also reviewing Nicaragua's participation in a Central American free trade agreement (CAFTA-DR) that gives preferential treatment to exports to the United States, its main trade partner. Washington has already stopped activities aimed at improving Nicaragua's export capabilities, seen as benefiting the government. Ortega has said he will not bow to sanctions and many analysts are skeptical, with sanctions having done little to effect change in Cuba and Venezuela. "If they keep coming in a disorganized fashion, without clearly defined objectives, they won't have the desired effect of bringing about some kind of change," said Tiziano Breda, an analyst at the International Crisis Group think tank. Some analysts argue sanctions could provide a scapegoat for which Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, can blame poor economic performance. Others speculate the administration will seek to buy time by releasing opponents held in jail who their supporters say are political prisoners. Increased international isolation could ultimately end up pushing the Ortega administration closer to competitors of the United States such as China and Russia. WEAK ECONOMY Between 2000 and 2017, Nicaraguan gross domestic product grew an average 3.9% per annum, driven by remittances and foreign direct investment. But between the onset of political crisis in 2018 that led to clashes between business leaders and the administration, to 2020 and the coronavirus pandemic, GDP contracted by an accumulated 8.8%. Some analysts believe that Ortega and Murillo will seek to lift the economy by negotiating behind the scenes with leading business groups. Over the short term, Nicaragua should be able to count on support from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, even if dialogue with business yields fruit, the economic impact is likely to be modest, said Oscar Rene Vargas, a Nicaraguan political analyst at the CEREN think tank in Managua. MIGRATION RISING Further crackdowns on dissent and economic weakness could spur additional emigration to the United States. The number of Nicaraguans detained at the U.S. southern border has leapt dramatically in 2021, from 575 in January to 13,391 in July, according to official data. An increase in the number of Nicaraguans living abroad has also boosted remittances to the Central American country, and may act as an escape valve for some internal dissent. Between 2017 and 2020, money transfers from abroad grew 33% to $1.85 billion. Remittances are worth some 15% of Nicaragua's GDP, one of the highest percentages in Latin America.

#### Continued Ortega rule means denial of COVID, dismantling human rights, freedoms, abortion rights and future deadly crackdowns

HRW 20 “World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Nicaragua.” Human Rights Watch, 16 Dec. 2020, [www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/nicaragua. Accessed 11 Nov. 2021](http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/nicaragua.%20Accessed%2011%20Nov.%202021). //AA

Since taking office in 2007, the government of President Daniel Ortega has dismantled nearly all institutional checks on presidential power. The Electoral Council, stacked with his supporters, has barred opposition political parties and removed opposition lawmakers. The Supreme Court of Justice has upheld Electoral Council decisions undermining political rights and allowing Ortega to circumvent a constitutional prohibition on re-election and run for a second term. In October, Congress passed two bills, proposed by President Ortega, that could seriously undermine freedom of association and free speech. The government’s response to Covid-19 included denying its impact and failing to implement measures recommended by global health experts. Initially, the government encouraged large-scale public events. It has not closed schools or ordered lockdowns or social distancing. In April, Ortega said he was against public campaigns that urged people to stay at home. A brutal crackdown by the National Police and armed pro-government groups left over 300 dead and 2,000 injured in 2018, and resulted in hundreds of arbitrary arrests and prosecutions. The Ortega government has continued to bring criminal cases against protesters and critics. Impunity for human rights abuses by the police continues. Persistent problems include severe restrictions on freedom of expression and association, political discrimination against state workers who support the opposition, and stringent abortion laws that leave no options for rape victims. Covid-19 Response Denial, inaction, and opacity have characterized the government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The government took no emergency measures in response to the pandemic and has kept schools open. Initially, Vice President Rosario Murillo encouraged people to attend massive events, including a government-organized march through Managua in April. While the government reported over 5,000 cases and more than 140 deaths, as of September, the nongovernmental organization Covid-19 Citizen Observatory (Observatorio Ciudadano Covid-19) registered twice as many suspected cases and 2,700—nearly 20 times as many—suspected deaths. Authorities have covered up suspected Covid-19 deaths, according to media, describing them as “atypical pneumonia” and sending health officials and police to conduct “express burials” of victims. The government has refused to provide information on the number of Covid-19 tests performed. Up to August 2020, the government fired at least 31 doctors from public hospitals in apparent retaliation for participation in protests or expression of disagreement with management of the Covid-19 response. During the 2018 crackdown, at least 405 doctors, nurses, and other health workers were fired from public hospitals, seemingly for providing care to protesters or criticizing the government. Crackdown on Dissent In April 2018, massive anti-government protests broke out countrywide. Police, in coordination with armed pro-government groups, brutally repressed protesters, which left a death toll of 328 people and almost 2,000 people injured, and led to hundreds of detentions. As the crackdown intensified, some individuals responded violently. Authorities reported that 21 police officers allegedly died in the context of demonstrations between April and September. Hundreds of protesters were arbitrarily arrested and detained, many for months. Many were subjected to torture and ill-treatment including electric shocks, severe beatings, fingernail removal, asphyxiation, and rape. Serious violations of due process and other rights marred prosecutions. Police abuses continued in 2020. In March, police attacked and detained demonstrators requesting release of political prisoners, media reported, and police and unidentified assailants attacked journalists. In March 2020, Melvin Alberto Urbina Saavedra died after police beat him in detention, his family reported to the Nicaraguan Human Rights Center (CENIDH), an NGO. In April, police arrested at least five and injured two demonstrators commemorating the 2018 protests in Esquipulas, Moyogalpa. In August, police summoned Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, a government critic and former foreign minister, to a police station. When Sacasa arrived, police arrested him without informing him of the charges against him and without allowing him access to a lawyer. He was also presented to the press surrounded by highly armed police officers. Sacasa was released a few hours later but remains subject to criminal prosecution for allegedly purchasing stolen goods for his antiques collection. In 2019, the Ortega administration released 492 people detained in the context of the 2018 protests, mostly under restrictions such as house arrest. A broad amnesty followed, lifting the restrictions, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported. As of September 2020, OHCHR estimated that 94 perceived critics remained incarcerated. Owing in part to the amnesty, no investigations or criminal proceedings were underway, at time of writing, to identify and convict those responsible for human rights violations related to the 2018 crackdown. In 2019, President Ortega promoted top officials implicated in abuses. Attacks on Human Rights Defenders and Independent Media Human rights defenders and other critics are targets of death threats, intimidation, online defamation campaigns, harassment, surveillance, and assault. Some human rights defenders have suffered arbitrary prosecutions marred with due process violations. The government continues to employ unnecessary and disproportionate surveillance, harassment and selective attacks, and threats against human rights defenders and anyone identified with the opposition, according to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). In October 2020, Congress passed a “foreign agents” bill, proposed by Ortega, that could be used to further suppress dissent. The law requires many people and groups that receive direct or indirect funding from abroad to register as “foreign agents” and bars them from intervening in “matters of internal politics.” The law could impact journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and political opponents. The law additionally prevents anyone registered as a “foreign agent” in the past year from running for public office. Also in October, Congress adopted a cybercrime bill that criminalizes a wide range of online communications, including by punishing with sentences of up to 5 years in prison the “publication” or “dissemination” of “false” or “distorted” information on the internet “likely to spread anxiety, anguish or fear.” In addition, Ortega said he would propose a constitutional amendment to allow life sentences for “hate crimes,” in September. These bills could further undermine the political opposition’s efforts to compete fairly in November 2021 presidential elections. In September 2019, Army Commander-in-Chief Julio César Avilés Castillo accused NGOs of being “coup-plotters.” As of June 2020, Congress had stripped 10 NGOs of legal registration, forcing them to close. The Ortega administration restricts freedom of expression for journalists and media outlets through threats, insults, physical attacks, detentions, arbitrary financial investigations, and forced closures. In March 2020, police stood by while people shouting pro-Ortega slogans attacked and robbed at least three journalists from independent news outlets covering a funeral in Managua. Also in March, Emiliano Chamorro, director of digital outlet El Portavoz Ciudadano, reported experiencing police surveillance and harassment. In July, Gerall Chávez, the co-founder of digital outlet Nicaragua Actual—who went into exile in 2018 after threats and harassment by government supporters—received threats on Facebook, including an animation that depicted him being killed. In August, three employees of the El Rama mayor’s office filed a criminal slander complaint against Kalúa Salazar, a journalist at radio station La Costeñísima, after she reported on corruption. At time of writing, Salazar awaited trial. In October, a pro-government group attacked and gravely injured journalist Verónica Chávez, from the news outlet “100% Noticias,” in Masaya as she was leaving a meeting with the opposition. Between April 2018 and April 2020, over 90 journalists have fled Nicaragua, IACHR estimates. Nicaraguan Asylum Seekers As of April 2020, more than 103,000 citizens had fled Nicaragua since April 2018, IACHR reports. In March, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported neighboring Costa Rica hosting some 77,000 Nicaraguan refugees and asylum seekers. While most fleeing Nicaraguans have gone to Costa Rica, thousands have gone to Mexico, Panama, Europe, and the United States. Women and Girls’ Sexual and Reproductive Rights Nicaragua has, since 2006, prohibited abortion under all circumstances, even if a pregnancy is life-threatening or the result of rape or incest. Women and girls who have abortions face prison terms as long as two years. Medical professionals who perform abortions face one to six years. The ban forces women and girls confronting unwanted pregnancies to seek illegal and unsafe abortions, risking their health and lives. Key International Actors Continuing human rights abuses have elicited strong regional and international condemnation. In June, the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC), with cross-regional support, renewed and strengthened the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to monitor and report on Nicaragua. The HRC condemned abuses and urged the government to resume cooperation with international human rights bodies. In September 2019, OHCHR released a comprehensive report on Nicaragua’s human rights record from August 2018 to July 2019, urging the government to guarantee civil society freedoms; reinstate shuttered NGOs and media outlets; investigate and prosecute rights abuses in the context of protests; and end arbitrary arrests, among other measures. As of September 2020, most recommendations had not been implemented, OHCHR reported, contributing to new violations and continued impunity. The OHCHR noted persistent restrictions on civic space, particularly the government’s targeting of journalists and human rights defenders, and that the 2019 Amnesty Law had furthered impunity for serious human rights abuses. In 2018, the government expelled the IACHR Special Monitoring Mechanism for Nicaragua (MESENI), the IACHR-appointed Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI), and the OHCHR. The IACHR has continued to monitor the situation in Nicaragua, including by reporting on bans on social protest; the government’s attack on freedom of expression; the lack of reliable information regarding the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic; and the stigmatization and persecution of journalists and human rights defenders; among other topics. No other international monitoring bodies have been allowed since the 2018 expulsions. In June 2019, the Organization of American States General Assembly passed a resolution that opens the door to evaluation of Nicaragua’s compliance with the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, which enables the OAS secretary general, or any member country, to convene a Permanent Council meeting to address situations where there has been an “unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state.” The resolution urged the government to take steps toward resumption of negotiations with the opposition and restoration of access for international rights-monitoring mechanisms. It called for a commission to undertake diplomatic efforts. In September 2020, the government barred the commission from entering Nicaragua. As of September 2020, the US Treasury Department had imposed targeted sanctions against 17 Nicaraguan officials responsible for abuses or corruption. Fourteen were sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order 13851 and three pursuant the Global Magnitsky Act of 2016, which allows for sanctions against human rights violators. Of the 14, 5 were also sanctioned pursuant to the Nicaraguan Human Rights and Corruption Act of December 2018. In June 2019, Canada imposed targeted sanctions against nine senior Nicaraguan officials implicated in human rights violations. In May 2020, the European Union and United Kingdom imposed sanctions against six Ortega administration officials, including travel bans and asset freezes against top officials responsible for abuse. In June, Switzerland also imposed financial and travel sanctions on six government officials. In October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning Nicaragua’s deteriorating human rights record and urging a tougher EU approach in the absence of any progress. EU member states renewed the sanctions against the regime until October 2021. In October 2020, the Organization of American States General Assembly passed a resolution setting May 2021 as the deadline for the Ortega government to implement electoral reforms necessary to guarantee free, fair, and transparent elections in November 2021.

## Plan

#### Plan: The Republic of Nicaragua ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike

#### This entails Ortega’s congress passing a bill recognizing an unconditional right to strike, Ortega signing the bill, and the courts upholding the decision –

#### Strikes destroy power hierarchies and spillover to mobilize large movements, but unconditional strikes are key to eliminate fear

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Taking a step back, I wonder if you could talk a bit about the power of the strike and what the source of that power is. This is a basic question, but I think it is often overlooked. JB We look around us and we see bosses telling workers what to do; we see government officials telling populations what to do; we see military officials telling soldiers what to do. It’s very easy to view the world as a place where there are a small number of powerful people who have the ability to just instruct the powerless what to do. But that’s only half the story. The other half is if the soldiers won’t fight, the generals can’t have wars. If the workers won’t work, the bosses can’t produce anything or make any money. And if citizens won’t obey the commands of their public officials, and won’t keep off the grass, and won’t pay their taxes, there turns out to be a mutual dependence. The withdrawal of cooperation gives people who appear to be powerless a counter-power. But you have to organize it. Since no one can use it by themselves, you can only use this power by cooperating with other people who appear to be in the same boat. One of the most important and most powerful means of exercising this power is the strike. If workers withdraw their acquiescence and cooperation, then their employers are pretty much up a river without a paddle. Another part of the power of the strike is the ability to mobilize and inspire support from a much wider movement. At the extreme, this takes the form of a general strike. But it can also involve the participation of the community in pickets, or all kinds of other expressions that make it difficult for the government to just send in police or the National Guard. If too many people are sympathetic to the strikers, it makes it a lot harder to use that kind of repression. On that point, I think we both see the recent uptick in strikes as a very hopeful sign. At the same time, the history related in your book is filled with broken strikes, and with terrible repression and violence. How do you balance the sense of hope and untapped power that we feel around strikes with the reality that working people are not always on the winning side? JB There’s no question that in many situations a strike involves risk and sacrifice. And no one should embark upon these activities without weighing the costs. I think you find many working people go through exactly that kind of process. For example, in the period when permanent workers were being brought in as strike-breakers, a large number of people said, “Look, the dice are completely loaded against us in this situation, so we’re not going to strike.” That’s a big part of the story of the decline of strikes. Maybe they went further than necessary, or maybe they had leaders who weren’t willing to fight for other reasons. But a big part of it is a realistic weighing of conditions. When you look at it historically, in these periods you generally see a search for new strategies, new forms of organization, and new approaches that allow workers’ basic power to be used effectively again. For example, [in the 1800s] craft unions — made up of workers who had a particular skill, like carpenters or cobblers — were quite strong, but then modern industry and factories came along and their power was pretty much eliminated. Eventually they were reorganized on an industrial basis, so that everyone in the same factory, and everyone in the same company, and everyone in the same industry would be part of the same union. And they gained an ability to shut down these giant continental corporations, like General Motors and General Electric. These types of changes usually involve an experimental process, in which people test out what might work, what they might do differently. I think that’s what we’re seeing today. If teachers can make demands that draw together parents and kids and community members and janitors and nurses — and all the people who are connected with public education one way or another — maybe we can do things we couldn’t do the old way.

#### The 1AC can solve – labor strikes have historical precedent in 18 different Latin American countries - empirics

Kim et al 20 (Kim, D., Kim, M., & Villegas, C. )(2020). Organized Labor Strikes and Social Spending in Latin America: The Synchronizing Effect of Mass Protest. Latin American Politics and Society, 62(2), 99-109. doi:10.1017/lap.2019.62 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/abs/organized-labor-strikes-and-social-spending-in-latin-america-the-synchronizing-effect-of-mass-protest/239B67BBBF1B1E44A28F7829C0277111> //AJ

In a recent, pathbreaking work, Bárbara Zárate-Tenorio (2014) tackles the issue by focusing on interactions between collective protest and democracy. Drawing on the insider-outsider approach to distinguish varying policy preferences among laborers (cf. Rueda 2005), her analysis assumes that governments face two distinct sets of preferences over social policies in Latin America. While the “insiders,” formal sector workers, project targeted demands for social security and welfare benefits, the “outsiders,” informal sector workers, project unorganized and heterogeneous demands for social spending with broad, diffused appeals. As governments find less difficulty in dealing with the protests of outsiders than those of insiders, Zárate-Tenorio theorizes that labor strikes of the latter can effectively press governments in obtaining policy concessions while mass demonstrations or riots do not generate a comparable effect. A statistical analysis of 18 Latin American countries from 1970 to 2008provides substantial evidence for the proposed hypotheses. The study by Zárate-Tenorio contributes to the extant debate largely in two respects.1 First, it provides a balanced explanation of the relationship between democracy and social spending. Previous studies emphasize only one side of the story: politicians’ incentives to handle social spending as a way to enhance their political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Meltzer and Richard 1981). Zárate-Tenorio, however, studies social policy as a product of interactions between politicians and protesters in democracy. Second, with this balanced view, the analysis articulates the Latin American version of the political science truism. Instead of focusing on the independent effect of democracy, it incorporates a defining feature of Latin American labor markets: the large informal sector. Because formal sector workers are the sole beneficiaries of social security and welfare programs, the success of organized labor protest—in contrast to the ineffectiveness of the informal sector’s collective protest—demonstrates the insider-outsider issue in Latin America. Democracy in this region seems to work differentially for formal workers compared to informal sector workers, or vice versa.

#### Strikes are work stoppages

Guerin, Lisa 13. “Strikes.” Www.nolo.com, Nolo, 18 Apr. 2013, [www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/strikes.html. Accessed 7 Nov. 2021](http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/strikes.html.%20Accessed%207%20Nov.%202021). //AA

A strike is a work stoppage caused by employees' refusal to work, typically to protest an employer decision (to close a plant, freeze wages, cut benefits, impose unpopular work rules, or refuse to improve working conditions, for example). The right to strike is protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), but not all strikes are legal. Whether a strike is lawful depends on the purpose of the strike, whether the collective bargaining agreement includes a "no-strike" clause, and the conduct of the strikers.

#### No completely just government can exist –

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\*\*Edited for gendered language

Maybe Fournier needs to brush up on his Common Sense: Society in every state is a blessing, but Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil… Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence… For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform and irresistibly obeyed, man [one] would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he [one] finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his [their] property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he [one] is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him[them], out of two evils to choose the least. Translation: there’s no such thing as “good government.”

## Method

#### Our heuristic means we learn about the State without being it. It won’t entrench dominant norms BUT WE ALSO don’t’ invert the error and NEVER learn about them

Zanotti 14 (Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance.“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World” – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated “Version of Record” is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database.)

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and **contingent struggles** that are constituted **within** the scripts of **government**al **rationalities** and at the same time exceed and **transform them**. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. **Government**ality **as a heuristic** focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also **foster** an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity **on the consequences** of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So **my position leads not to apathy but to hyper and pessimistic activism.**’’84

#### Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures.

Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.¶ Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.¶ This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.¶ What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?¶ Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.¶ The Art of Scenario Analysis¶ We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.¶ While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.¶ Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).¶ Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present.¶ Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry¶ The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.¶ Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8¶ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools.¶ In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas.¶ The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance.¶ The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### **Prioritize reform that changes material conditions – pure academic theorization is privileged**

Delgado 9 – Chair of Law at the University of Alabama Law School, J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, his books have won eight national book prizes, including six Gustavus Myers awards for outstanding book on human rights in North America, the American Library Association’s Outstanding Academic Book, and a Pulitzer Prize nomination.  Professor Delgado’s teaching and writing focus on race, the legal profession, and social change, 2009, “Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want, Arguing about Law”, p. 588-590

2. The CLS critique of piecemeal reform Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society. Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just. In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.“ To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to ﬁnd rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. **The** CLS **critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong.** Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand. **The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them.** A court order **directing a housing authority** to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more **to them** than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office**.** It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence. Indeed, some incremental changes may bring revolutionary changes closer, not push them further away. Not all small reforms induce complacency; some may whet the appetite for further combat. The welfare family may hold a tenants’ union meeting in their heated living room. **CLS scholars’ critique of piecemeal reform often misses these possibilities, and neglects the question of whether total change, when it comes, will be what we want.**

#### Methodological pluralism is a necessary aspect of critique.

**Bleiker ’14** (Roland, professor of international relations at the University of Queensland. “International Theory between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014.)

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather thanintegrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. **T**hey can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

## UV

#### 1] Yes 1AR theory – anything else allows infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.

#### 2] Reasonability on 1NC theory with the brightline of link and impact turn ground – there are infinite bidirectional interps that I can never meet – the four minute 1AR doesn’t have enough time to line by line every argument, make offense, and go for substance.

**3] Reject skep/permissibility – it’s an abhorrent view of the world that makes the debate space horrible – justifies enabling oppression - Olsen**

#### 4] If its logical, Permissibility and presumption affirm.

**A] Freeze- otherwise we would not be able to justify morally neutral actions since there isn’t a prohibition and we would have to prove an obligation.**

**B] Trivialism- statements are true until proven false, if I told you my name you’d believe me**

#### **5] The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best proves the desirability of the resolution by comparing the world of the affirmative to the world of the negative. To clarify, it’s comparative worlds.**

#### The Role of the judge is to vote for the best debater in this round - Anything else is self-serving and arbitrary & moots 1AC offense