# Colombia 1AC

## FW

#### **The standard is mitigating structural violence**

#### **Ethical calculus should be centered on structural violence – a focus on large-scale threats of suffering or abstract questions of morality justifies infinite material violence towards disposed communities. Our framing is a pre-requisite to any other ethical theory since oppression distorts all moral reasoning**

Olson 15 – prof of geography @ UNC Chapel Hill

(Elizabeth, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about:¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they necessitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwtaca rin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the **assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency**, the urgent body becomes **literally nonsense, a non sequitur** within societies, states and worlds that will **always be more urgent**.¶ If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of **reclaiming urgency for the body**. In **detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps**, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as **private, apolitical and mundane’** (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply **political, public, and exceptional** as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that **a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait**, has the **ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures**. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new **waiting places** in our material landscape, **places like the detention center** and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning.¶ I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

## Advantage

#### President Duque is repressing Colombians now – national strikes are amplifying protest movements AND Duque is weak

Milton D'León 1 {Writter for the left voice who reports on Latin American conflicts}“The Rebellion in Colombia Requires a Real General Strike to Overthrow Duque - Left Voice.” Left Voice, 8 May 2021, www.leftvoice.org/the-rebellion-in-colombia-requires-a-real-general-strike-to-overthrow-duque/. Accessed 12 Nov. 2021. //AA

Colombia is now the site of the biggest protests on the continent, and a victory there will be a victory for the workers and masses of Latin America. Duque wants a truce; he forced Finance Minister Alberto Carrasquilla to resign and is preparing new measures. But he can be defeated– the demand for Duque’s resignation is now reverberating throughout the streets of the country. Although Duque ordered the militarization of the country’s cities to repress the protests, on May 4 a group of members of Congress from the pro-Uribe Democratic Center party, which brought Duque to power in 2018, asked him to declare a state of “internal unrest” in order to “address the situation.” This is what was formerly known as a “state of siege,” in which Duque would wield powers that could include suspending the terms of regional leaders, restricting demonstrations and taking control of radio and television stations, as well as the power to issue legally binding executive orders. It is estimated that on April 28, the first day of the call for a national strike and marches throughout the country, about 500,000 people took to the streets. This included 50,000 in the capital and other tens of thousands in Medellín and Cali, in addition to the masses that came out in the rest of the cities and regions in the countryside, from north to south and east to west. At least that day there were protests in more than 600 districts, those with the largest populations, out of Colombia’s 1,100 districts. But the people have expressed their discontent and indignation in all 32 departments (provinces). Wherever protests have started, they have only continued to spread. According to a recent poll, 73 percent of Colombians agree with the strike. Cali, one of the main economic and industrial centers of Colombia after Bogotá and Medellín, in Valle del Cauca, is now at the heart of the social explosion. The situation there is absolutely dramatic. The department of Valle del Cauca is among the five with the highest rates of extreme poverty. These extreme conditions, along with the worsening of the coronavirus pandemic, have led to the outbreak in Cali, the third largest city in the country. The protests have continued in more than 19 points in the city and the indigenous protests of Cauca have converged there. There have been multiple reports police infiltration to stoke violence and justify the intervention of the Armed Forces. This is a very common political practice in Colombia, and was widespread in the Bogotá protests of 2019. The security forces “used live ammunition and beat and arrested protesters in the context of a tense and volatile situation,” says a UN report on Cali. But the same events have occurred throughout the country. Duque has granted exceptional powers to the Armed Forces, which have acted as if they are fighting in war zones to “clean” the territory, and the highest authority in these areas is the military. He has done so by issuing a declaration of “Military Assistance,” a constitutional instrument that can be used only in the event of a disaster. It is the equivalent of imposing the total control of the Armed Forces in the country’s main cities. This has been condemned and rejected by the mayors of Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín, who were not even consulted and are now subject to military control. This is the current situation in different Colombian cities. The protests and roadblocks by the truckers’ union in some areas of the country have continued for the seventh consecutive day and are not even, as reported live by Manuel Rosental from one of the roadblocks between Dos Quebradas and Pereira, which lead to Manizales and Medellín. Minga indigenous marches have spread throughout different cities and have also been part of the roadblocks. As part of the protests, the indigenous movement has demolished colonial statues, like that of Spanish conquistador Sebastián de Belalcázar. The movement is announcing from all the demonstration sites that the protests will continue indefinitely. There are two daily waves of protests, which have taken place continuously: those that are carried out until the evening, and those that continue throughout the night in the most oppressed sectors, which have been subject to the fiercest repression. The latter are referred to as the “hunger marches.”

#### Continued Duque’s rule spells systemic inequality enforced by the government alongside repression and killings

Milton D'León 2 {Writter for the left voice who reports on Latin American conflicts}“The Rebellion in Colombia Requires a Real General Strike to Overthrow Duque - Left Voice.” Left Voice, 8 May 2021, www.leftvoice.org/the-rebellion-in-colombia-requires-a-real-general-strike-to-overthrow-duque/. Accessed 12 Nov. 2021. //AA

There is a general feeling that things cannot go back to normal, and the most advanced sectors are targeting the regime as a whole, which they believe is rotten at its core, and not just the government of pro-Duque and pro-Uribe forces. Duque’s government, like the entire Colombian bourgeoisie, has only one plan: more poverty for the workers and the people. They have created conditions of growing unemployment and poverty among the country’s workers, increasingly ruined the middle classes and deprived the youth of any hope for the future. They have continued to attack farm workers and small peasant producers and have condemned the exploited masses to ruin and poverty. They have done all of this to secure the profits of local and foreign capitalists. They showed complete disregard for the people’s suffering throughout the pandemic, which led to disproportionate rates of illness, poverty, and death among the impoverished classes. They have carried out hundreds of massacres and murdered more than 1,000 social activists under the state of siege and the control of the Armed Forces. They wanted more, and they got it by increasing poverty, while the rich have kept their businesses and increased their wealth by capitalizing on the pandemic. The country’s organized workers, impoverished sectors, ruined middle classes, peasants, native peoples, and youth must join forces against the Colombian bourgeoisie’s criminal plans. Carrasquilla’s resignation and the mere withdrawal of the reform plan are not enough. The minister has already been replaced by José Manuel Restrepo, who had been serving until now as Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, so he has been instrumental in imposing austerity. Duque himself has explained his objective: “It is imperative to quickly reach a democratic consensus regarding the reform of the Colombian tax system.” It is not enough for one or several ministers to resign or for the plan to be withdrawn. What must be defeated is a comprehensive plan by the Colombian bourgeoisie against the workers and the people. Another Explosion of Discontent The protesters in Colombia are demanding profound social and economic change, and these demands are what have set the movement in motion. The deepening of the crisis in Colombia was inevitable after the economy was hit by the pandemic, and the forces of repression have attempted to contain the movement by murdering protesters. The national strike and the mass demonstrations throughout the country have laid bare the extreme discontent and indignation of the workers, peasants, native people, youth, and oppressed. Colombia is experiencing a profound health, economic, and social crisis as a result of the pandemic, which has once again resulted in an explosion of social discontent. The government took on more debt throughout this period, supposedly to cope with the economic crisis in the midst of the pandemic, but the main goal was to save the capitalists’ large profits. The Sustainable Solidarity Law, which is the name given to the tax reform, was aimed at collecting about $6.3 billion to put the state’s finances “in order.” The key point is where they planned to get that money. The finance minister himself, who just resigned, had explained that 73 percent would come from individuals and the rest supposedly from corporations. In other words, the majority of the population would pay for it, a majority that is made up of the working masses. Among the controversial points was an income tax on people who earn a salary of a little more than $633, in a country where the minimum wage is $234. Among other measures, the plan also included an increase in the value-added tax on basic consumer goods, which is already 19 percent in Colombia. This would have hit the middle classes, workers, and impoverished sectors the hardest. But the demands that are being made in Colombia are no longer related to the tax reform. The demonstrations have continued, even though Duque has withdrawn the plan, because of the people’s accumulated discontent, which had already been expressed by the massive and historic protests in late 2019, led by a sector of young people who had lost all fear of state terrorism. That discontent has only increased with the pandemic and the intensification of the social and economic crisis. They have not been stopped by the bloody repression, the 30 killings, or the wounding and detention of hundreds of protesters. They have shown a fierce determination to continue the fight. The reason for this is that Colombia has been subject to the worst neoliberal policies for decades, comparable only to those applied in Chile. This neoliberal agenda was imposed against the backdrop of the “war” on drug trafficking. The rancid Colombian bourgeoisie took advantage of the bloody war against the insurgency, not only to polarize the country but also to impose state terrorism both in the city and in the countryside, where union and social movement leaders, young people voicing their demands, or peasants fighting to protect their land were identified as potential members or sympathizers of the insurgent groups. They used this strategy to launch their greatest attacks and subjugate the working class, peasants, youth, and impoverished masses of the cities. All this was carried out with the direct aid of the U.S., which has long exercised imperial control over Colombia, as best exemplified by its intervention under Plan Colombia. Hence, one of the results of this new situation of rebellion in Colombia is the weakening of what has been one of the biggest and most abject allies of U.S. imperialism in the region, not only now under Duque’s administration, but for the past several decades. This alliance has resulted in the establishment of numerous U.S. military bases on Colombian territory, the practical subordination of Colombian Armed Forces to the directives of the Southern Command, and the use of Colombia as a base of operations for launching Trump’s interventionist campaign against Venezuela in 2019. The people’s rebellion in Chile is a blow to all right-wing forces allied to imperialism in the region. The new situation that is beginning to emerge in Colombia may be a major problem for the plans of U.S. imperialism, and especially for Joe Biden. Pandemic: Greater Ruin and Poverty Since the pandemic began, all Duque has done is take advantage of the situation to advance his reactionary agenda. While he imposed a lockdown, he continued to attack mass working-class and impoverished sectors that were deprived of their livelihoods. And leaders of social movements continued to be killed throughout the country. The current unemployment rate is greater than 17 percent, although there are cities where it is higher than 20 percent, in a country where precarious and informal jobs are the norm, and access to health is a privilege. The monetary poverty index is 42.5 percent, which means that 21.2 million Colombians do not have a high enough income to meet their basic needs. In total, almost 3.6 million Colombians fell below the poverty line last year, and the Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, increased from 0.52 to 0.54, the highest figure ever recorded since the indicator began to be calculated in 2012. In addition to all this, there have been widespread protests against the delay in the vaccination campaign, which has reached only less than 10 percent of the population, far behind other countries in the region like Argentina, Chile, and Peru. The People’s Outrage Is Greater Than Their Fear of Infection On launching his latest attack, Duque misjudged the correlation of forces. He thought it was time to hit harder, believing that he could take advantage of the population’s fear of infection. But the people’s outrage at the attacks was stronger than their fear of infection by the virus. And now they have not stopped either by the bloody repression, the 30 killings (according to the Colombian NGO Temblores), the more than 80 disappearances, or the hundreds of beatings and detentions. Between the historical protests of 2019 and the recent situation, which is now seen as a true rebellion owing to the strength and extent of the protests, the national strikes and demonstrations have not ceased in Colombia. The recent events have led to a phase of continuous struggles against the neoliberal measures of Duque’s government and all its repressive policies. Repression is the central policy of the Colombian regime. It has historically exercised policies of state terrorism, committing massacres like those denounced by Indepaz (Colombian Institute of Studies for Development and Peace) in a recent report, which indicates that 35 have been committed in so far in 2021, with 132 victims. Some of these protests have had a significant impact, like those carried out during the weeks of unrest and revolt in September 2020 that resulted in 13 deaths at the hands of Duque’s forces of repression, and continued until October of that year. It was true rebellion of the youth. This is where the young people of Colombia took their first steps and gained their first experiences. They had finally lost their fear of the repressive state and the impunity of the armed groups that support the powerful elites who have used terror to subjugate the people for decades, as shown by the protests during the national strike on November 21, 2019. This was happening in a country with a militarized police force and a police-like military, where the police was a branch of the military in the war against the insurgency that imposed terror in the cities, and still plays this role today.

#### A general national strike is needed now – 1AC key to circumvent union bureaucracy which will force Duque into resignation

Milton D'León 3 {Writter for the left voice who reports on Latin American conflicts}“The Rebellion in Colombia Requires a Real General Strike to Overthrow Duque - Left Voice.” Left Voice, 8 May 2021, www.leftvoice.org/the-rebellion-in-colombia-requires-a-real-general-strike-to-overthrow-duque/. Accessed 12 Nov. 2021. //AA

Petro has thus sought to show moderation and has at times been silent in response to the extent and intensity of the protests — that is when he’s not declaring that “it’s time for a hug” in the midst of the brutal repression — to avoid “tarnishing” his candidacy. On May 3, at a press conference, he addressed Duque with the following words: “What I want to say to Duque is that this is the most critical moment. He can overcome it from his seat with grace, with his head held high, being honest with society. He shouldn’t fall into the trap they’re setting for him.” And he added, “Don’t fall into that historical trap, or your name will be tarnished for centuries to come. Keep your head and we can save many human lives and promote peace simply by doing things right, simply by speaking to each other, simply by ignoring the siren of violence that is vandalism.” In other words, he is seeking to establish a dialogue when the masses on the streets are not only demanding Duque’s resignation but also want to remove the entire corrupt Colombian bourgeoisie from power. It can be defeated. The protesters are demanding Duque’s resignation and threatening a general strike. They’ve had enough of the union bureaucracy’s pacts and truces. The national strike and protests carried out on May 5 had been called by the National Strike Committee (CNP) in a joint conference of the labor federations CUT, CGT, CTC, and Fecode, under increasing pressure from the ongoing protests throughout the country. In Cali, the city where the protests have been the strongest, protesters are already demanding a strike for an indefinite period: “We recognize that we have won the first battle with the government’s decision to withdraw the Tax Reform plan, but we will NOT have won the fight until Duque’s entire project is withdrawn, which includes a Labor Reform, Health Reform and Pension Reform, and until justice is done for the people who have been killed, injured and detained in the intense protests,” says a statement issued by Cali organizers. They have taken the position that now is not the time for a truce. Unfortunately, the trade union bureaucracy in the National Strike Committee has made it a habit to refer to the protests as a “strike.” So far their entire policy, after the intense protests, has been to make truces and agreements, as we saw with the long process of “dialogue” with the government after November 21, 2019, which gave Duque time to recover and put a temporary stop to the protests. They have thus worked to contain the protests. The defeat of the government thanks to the resolute actions of the working class and the oppressed would be an enormous victory that would substantially change the correlation of forces and make it possible to strive for more. But this is not the aim of the union leaderships, which claim to be leading the protests, although it is certainly the objective of the masses on the streets. The unions have not called to actually stop production and block airports, seaports and roads. They have only made calls to demonstrate, with no organization other than that of the protest actions called for a given day. It is the masses on the streets, the outraged population, that is blocking traffic in the cities on the main avenues, as well as the highways in areas of the countryside. The union federations do not have a policy of organizing workers in their workplaces, at each production site, to advance toward a true, forceful general strike. Protests on the streets and on the main highways are not enough. The workers, peasants, indigenous people, and oppressed need to join forces to defeat the plans of Duque’s government and big business and ensure that it is not the workers and the oppressed majorities who end up paying for the crisis. There should be no truce with the bloody regime of the oligarchy. To do this, the working class must be at the center of the struggle. The strategic path to victory requires the Colombian working class to join the peasantry, indigenous peoples, and impoverished urban sectors in the struggle with their own methods, avoiding any deviation. There is a limit to the ongoing protests. To defeat the repressive government and make it possible to meet the demands of the people, including those made by the most advanced sectors in Cali (cancellation of the government’s entire plan, trial and punishment of those responsible for the repression, etc.), it is necessary to call a general strike with the participation of the entire working class and oppressed masses, stopping production and services, to defeat the plans of the government and large corporations. It is necessary to hit the capitalists where it hurts, by stopping the entire economy. The support for this course of action is increasing. For example, a truckers’ strike was organized in practically the entire country. To move toward a true national strike, this should be replicated in factories, at companies, and in every workplace, in addition to the protests on the streets and highways. There is an increasingly evident need to organize strike committees elected by the workers at each workplace and by region. These committees should be centralized with the aim of building a true national strike committee or command, to take forceful actions based on local committees and with representatives elected by the rank and file. All these struggles and mass actions cannot continue to be in the hands of the union bureaucracy or other sectors that are not seeking the definitive defeat of the government, which is what they have shown the entire time. In some cases, they merely seek to better pave the way for their candidate of choice in the next presidential elections. It is necessary to create real working-class institutions, establishing strike committees and centralizing them by departments and regions. In several cities, progress has been made in terms of organization, with the establishment of people’s assemblies and departmental committees to coordinate protests actions. The workers’ and people’s alliance has been forged on the streets. It needs to be organized, and this will only be achieved if the working class shows its strength. Coordination with these types of territorial organizations for the organization of a general strike is essential for the working class. It is increasingly urgent to coordinate and centralize the forces that have been put in motion at the national level with representatives of workers and the people elected by the rank and file, to issue resolutions and vote on a set of demands and an emergency plan of the working class to defeat Duque. The ongoing repression is brutal, with dozens of protesters killed and hundreds wounded, in addition to the disappearances and thousands of detentions. In this situation, workers, peasants, students, indigenous people, and the oppressed masses all have the right to defend themselves. To do this, it is essential to set up self-defense committees under the control of organizations of workers, peasant, indigenous people, and the masses, in the struggle for the development of organizations for the self-determination of the sectors participating in the struggle. The aim is to defend the right to demonstrate, which is under attack by the repression, and to protect all protesters. As revolutionaries, we aim to bring down this capitalist state, which is merely an instrument used to protect the interests of the exploiters, by expropriating the expropriators and establishing a government of the workers and the exploited. However, there are sectors that believe that this deplorable, anti-democratic, and oligarchic regime that has existed for decades in Colombia can be changed through the people’s vote.

## Plan

#### Plan: The Republic of Colombia ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike

#### Strikes destroy power hierarchies and spillover to mobilize large movements, but unconditional strikes are key to eliminate fear

Mark Engler 19 {Mark Engler is a writer based in Philadelphia, an editorial board member at Dissent, and the coauthor of This Is an Uprising.. Jeremy Brecher is a leading labor historian and writer who co-founded Global Labor Strategies, a resource center providing research and analysis on globalization, trade and labor issues. He also serves as Humanities Scholar-in-Residence at Connecticut Public Television and Radio.}“There’s Still Power in a Strike. AN INTERVIEW WITH JEREMY BRECHER” Jacobinmag.com, 2019, jacobinmag.com/2019/04/strike-jeremy-brecher-interview-teachers. Accessed 11 Nov. 2021. //AA

Taking a step back, I wonder if you could talk a bit about the power of the strike and what the source of that power is. This is a basic question, but I think it is often overlooked. JB We look around us and we see bosses telling workers what to do; we see government officials telling populations what to do; we see military officials telling soldiers what to do. It’s very easy to view the world as a place where there are a small number of powerful people who have the ability to just instruct the powerless what to do. But that’s only half the story. The other half is if the soldiers won’t fight, the generals can’t have wars. If the workers won’t work, the bosses can’t produce anything or make any money. And if citizens won’t obey the commands of their public officials, and won’t keep off the grass, and won’t pay their taxes, there turns out to be a mutual dependence. The withdrawal of cooperation gives people who appear to be powerless a counter-power. But you have to organize it. Since no one can use it by themselves, you can only use this power by cooperating with other people who appear to be in the same boat. One of the most important and most powerful means of exercising this power is the strike. If workers withdraw their acquiescence and cooperation, then their employers are pretty much up a river without a paddle. Another part of the power of the strike is the ability to mobilize and inspire support from a much wider movement. At the extreme, this takes the form of a general strike. But it can also involve the participation of the community in pickets, or all kinds of other expressions that make it difficult for the government to just send in police or the National Guard. If too many people are sympathetic to the strikers, it makes it a lot harder to use that kind of repression. On that point, I think we both see the recent uptick in strikes as a very hopeful sign. At the same time, the history related in your book is filled with broken strikes, and with terrible repression and violence. How do you balance the sense of hope and untapped power that we feel around strikes with the reality that working people are not always on the winning side? JB There’s no question that in many situations a strike involves risk and sacrifice. And no one should embark upon these activities without weighing the costs. I think you find many working people go through exactly that kind of process. For example, in the period when permanent workers were being brought in as strike-breakers, a large number of people said, “Look, the dice are completely loaded against us in this situation, so we’re not going to strike.” That’s a big part of the story of the decline of strikes. Maybe they went further than necessary, or maybe they had leaders who weren’t willing to fight for other reasons. But a big part of it is a realistic weighing of conditions. When you look at it historically, in these periods you generally see a search for new strategies, new forms of organization, and new approaches that allow workers’ basic power to be used effectively again. For example, [in the 1800s] craft unions — made up of workers who had a particular skill, like carpenters or cobblers — were quite strong, but then modern industry and factories came along and their power was pretty much eliminated. Eventually they were reorganized on an industrial basis, so that everyone in the same factory, and everyone in the same company, and everyone in the same industry would be part of the same union. And they gained an ability to shut down these giant continental corporations, like General Motors and General Electric. These types of changes usually involve an experimental process, in which people test out what might work, what they might do differently. I think that’s what we’re seeing today. If teachers can make demands that draw together parents and kids and community members and janitors and nurses — and all the people who are connected with public education one way or another — maybe we can do things we couldn’t do the old way.

#### The 1AC can solve – labor strikes have historical precedent in 18 different Latin American countries - empirics

Kim et al 20 (Kim, D., Kim, M., & Villegas, C. )(2020). Organized Labor Strikes and Social Spending in Latin America: The Synchronizing Effect of Mass Protest. Latin American Politics and Society, 62(2), 99-109. doi:10.1017/lap.2019.62 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/latin-american-politics-and-society/article/abs/organized-labor-strikes-and-social-spending-in-latin-america-the-synchronizing-effect-of-mass-protest/239B67BBBF1B1E44A28F7829C0277111> //AJ

In a recent, pathbreaking work, Bárbara Zárate-Tenorio (2014) tackles the issue by focusing on interactions between collective protest and democracy. Drawing on the insider-outsider approach to distinguish varying policy preferences among laborers (cf. Rueda 2005), her analysis assumes that governments face two distinct sets of preferences over social policies in Latin America. While the “insiders,” formal sector workers, project targeted demands for social security and welfare benefits, the “outsiders,” informal sector workers, project unorganized and heterogeneous demands for social spending with broad, diffused appeals. As governments find less difficulty in dealing with the protests of outsiders than those of insiders, Zárate-Tenorio theorizes that labor strikes of the latter can effectively press governments in obtaining policy concessions while mass demonstrations or riots do not generate a comparable effect. A statistical analysis of 18 Latin American countries from 1970 to 2008provides substantial evidence for the proposed hypotheses. The study by Zárate-Tenorio contributes to the extant debate largely in two respects.1 First, it provides a balanced explanation of the relationship between democracy and social spending. Previous studies emphasize only one side of the story: politicians’ incentives to handle social spending as a way to enhance their political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Meltzer and Richard 1981). Zárate-Tenorio, however, studies social policy as a product of interactions between politicians and protesters in democracy. Second, with this balanced view, the analysis articulates the Latin American version of the political science truism. Instead of focusing on the independent effect of democracy, it incorporates a defining feature of Latin American labor markets: the large informal sector. Because formal sector workers are the sole beneficiaries of social security and welfare programs, the success of organized labor protest—in contrast to the ineffectiveness of the informal sector’s collective protest—demonstrates the insider-outsider issue in Latin America. Democracy in this region seems to work differentially for formal workers compared to informal sector workers, or vice versa.

#### Strikes are work stoppages

Guerin, Lisa 13. “Strikes.” Www.nolo.com, Nolo, 18 Apr. 2013, [www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/strikes.html. Accessed 7 Nov. 2021](http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/strikes.html.%20Accessed%207%20Nov.%202021). //AA

A strike is a work stoppage caused by employees' refusal to work, typically to protest an employer decision (to close a plant, freeze wages, cut benefits, impose unpopular work rules, or refuse to improve working conditions, for example). The right to strike is protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), but not all strikes are legal. Whether a strike is lawful depends on the purpose of the strike, whether the collective bargaining agreement includes a "no-strike" clause, and the conduct of the strikers.

#### No completely just government can exist –

Michael F. Cannon 13 {Michael F. Cannon is the Cato Institute’s director of health policy studies. Cannon has been described as “an influential health‐​care wonk” (Washington Post), “ObamaCare’s single most relentless antagonist” (New Republic), “ObamaCare’s fiercest critic” (The Week), and “the intellectual father” of King v. Burwell (Modern Healthcare).} “There’s No Such Thing as ‘Good Government.’” Cato Institute, 7 June 2013, www.cato.org/blog/there-no-such-thing-good-government-ron-fournier-edition. Accessed 11 Nov. 2021.

\*\*Edited for gendered language

Maybe Fournier needs to brush up on his Common Sense: Society in every state is a blessing, but Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil… Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence… For were the impulses of conscience clear, uniform and irresistibly obeyed, man [one] would need no other lawgiver; but that not being the case, he [one] finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his [their] property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he [one] is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him[them], out of two evils to choose the least. Translation: there’s no such thing as “good government.”

## Method

#### Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures.

Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.¶ Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.¶ This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.¶ What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?¶ Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.¶ The Art of Scenario Analysis¶ We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.¶ While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.¶ Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).¶ Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present.¶ Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry¶ The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.¶ Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8¶ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools.¶ In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas.¶ The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance.¶ The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### Methodological pluralism is a necessary aspect of critique.

**Bleiker ’14** (Roland, professor of international relations at the University of Queensland. “International Theory between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2. June 17, 2014.)

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather thanintegrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. **T**hey can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

## UV

#### 1] Yes 1AR theory – anything else allows infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.

#### 2] Reasonability on 1NC theory with the brightline of link and impact turn ground – there are infinite bidirectional interps that I can never meet – the four minute 1AR doesn’t have enough time to line by line every argument, make offense, and go for substance.