#### Use the standard and ROB of maximizing expected well-being

#### 1. Substitutability—only consequentialism explains necessary enablers.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

#### 2. Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about** the way **pleasure** feels **and** something **undeniably bad about** the way **pain** feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?”** This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “**But** what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further;** it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: **“We never ask** [a man] **what his end is in being pleased, because** we assume that **pleasure is** choice **worthy in itself.”**4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### 3. A Spec - Because government policies can create tradeoffs between the people they help and hurt, the government's unique duty is to maximize the wellbeing of the people its policies affect.

Goodin 95, Robert E. [Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of the Social Sciences at the Australian National University]. “Utilitarianism As a Public Philosophy.” Pg63. Cambridge University Press. 1995. NO URL. DOA 2-8-17.

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (or, more precisely, makes them adopt a form of utilitarianism that we would find more acceptable) than private individuals. Before proceeding with that larger argument, I must therefore say what it is that is so special about public officials and their situations that makes it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices-public and private alike- are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices. But that is all. That is enough to allow public policy makers to use the utilitarian calculus – if they want to use it at all – to choose general rules of conduct. Knowing aggregates and averages, they can proceed to calculate the utility payoffs from adopting each alternative possible general rule. But they cannot be sure what the payoff will be to any given individual or on any particular occasion. Their knowledge of generalities, aggregates and averages is just not sufficiently fine-grained for that.

#### 3. No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – people psychologically decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### 4. No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

#### There’s no intent-foresight distinction for governments.

Enoch 07 David. “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State” The Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 9-13-2007. Published by: Legal Theory

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 5. Extinction comes first!

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

6. Theory first – determines the validity of substance. Prefer util:

A] Ground – every impact functions under util whereas other ethics flow to one side exclusively. Kills fairness since we both need arguments to win and

B] Topic lit – most articles are written through the lens of util because they’re crafted for policymakers and the general public who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Key to fairness and education – the lit is where we do research and determines how we engage in the round.

## 2

#### We are quickly transitioning to full space-for-space economy where burgeoning demand and private sector incentives create a full economy in short order--the aff ends that dream

Sarang 21—Mehak Sarang; Mehak is also a Research Associate at Harvard Business School with Professor Matthew Weinzierl, researching the business and economics of the space sector; The Commercial Space Age Is Here; Feb 12 2021; Harvard Business Review; <https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here>; (AG DebateDrills)

In our [recent research](https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/jep.32.2.173_Space,%20the%20Final%20Economic%20Frontier_413bf24d-42e6-4cea-8cc5-a0d2f6fc6a70.pdf), we examined how the model of centralized, government-directed human space activity born in the 1960s has, over the last two decades, made way for a new model, in which public initiatives in space increasingly share the stage with private priorities. Centralized, government-led space programs will inevitably focus on space-for-earth activities that are in the public interest, such as national security, basic science, and national pride. This is only natural, as expenditures for these programs must be justified by demonstrating benefits for citizens — and the citizens these governments represent are (nearly) all on earth.

In contrast to governments, the private sector is eager to put people in space to pursue their own personal interests, not the state’s — and then supply the demand they create. This is the vision driving SpaceX, which in its first twenty years has entirely upended the rocket launch industry, securing 60% of the global commercial launch market and building ever-larger spacecraft designed to ferry passengers not just to the International Space Station (ISS), but also to its own promised [settlement on Mars](https://www.spacex.com/media/making_life_multiplanetary_transcript_2017.pdf).

Today, the space-for-space market is limited to supplying the people who are already in space: that is, the handful of astronauts employed by NASA and other government programs. While SpaceX has grand visions of supporting large numbers of private space travelers, their current space-for-space activities have all been in response to demand from government customers (i.e., NASA). But as decreasing launch costs enable companies like SpaceX to leverage economies of scale and put more people into space, growing private sector demand (that is, tourists and settlers, rather than government employees) could turn these proof-of-concept initiatives into a sustainable, large-scale industry.

This model — of selling to NASA with the hopes of eventually creating and expanding into a larger private market — is exemplified by SpaceX, but the company is by no means the only player taking this approach. For instance, while SpaceX is focused on space-for-space transportation, another key component of this burgeoning industry will be manufacturing.

[Made In Space, Inc.](https://madeinspace.us/capabilities-and-technology/archinaut/) has been at the forefront of manufacturing “in space, for space” since 2014, when it 3D-printed a wrench onboard the ISS. Today, the company is exploring other products, such as high-quality fiber-optic cable, that terrestrial customers may be willing to pay to have manufactured in zero-gravity. But the company also recently received a [$74 million contract](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-funds-demo-of-3d-printed-spacecraft-parts-made-assembled-in-orbit) to 3D-print large metal beams in space for use on NASA spacecraft, and future private sector spacecraft will certainly have similar manufacturing needs which Made In Space hopes to be well-positioned to fulfill. Just as SpaceX has begun by supplying NASA but hopes to eventually serve a much larger, private-sector market, Made In Space’s current work with NASA could be the first step along a path towards supporting a variety of private-sector manufacturing applications for which the costs of manufacturing on earth and transporting into space would be prohibitive.

Another major area of space-for-space investment is in building and operating space infrastructure such as habitats, laboratories, and factories. Axiom Space, a current leader in this field, recently [announced](https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/26/22250327/space-tourists-axiom-private-crew-iss-price) that it would be flying the “first fully private commercial mission to space” in 2022 onboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon Capsule. Axiom was also [awarded](https://spacenews.com/nasa-selects-axiom-space-to-build-commercial-space-station-module/) a contract for exclusive access to a module of the ISS, facilitating its plans to develop modules for commercial activity on the station (and eventually, beyond it).

This infrastructure is likely to spur investment in a wide array of complementary services to supply the demand of the people living and working within it. For example, in February 2020, Maxar Technologies was awarded a [$142 million contract](https://www.builtincolorado.com/2020/02/03/maxar-technologies-142m-nasa-contract) from NASA to develop a robotic construction tool that would be assembled in space for use on low-Earth orbit spacecraft. Private sector spacecraft or settlements will no doubt have need for a variety of similar construction and repair tools.

And of course, the private sector isn’t just about industrial products. Creature comforts also promise to be an area of rapid growth, as companies endeavor to support the human side of life in the harsh environment of space. In 2015, for example, [Argotec and Lavazza](https://www.lavazza.com/en/about-us/media-centre/isspresso-successfully-completes-the-mission-coffee-in-space.html) collaborated to build an espresso machine that could function in the zero-gravity environment of the ISS, delivering a bit of everyday luxury to the crew.

To be sure, people have dreamt of using the vacuum and weightlessness of space to source or make things that cannot be made on earth for half a century, and time and again the business case has failed to pan out. Skepticism is natural. Those failures, however, have been in space-for-earth applications. For example, two startups of the 2010s, [Planetary Resources, Inc.](https://store.hbr.org/product/planetary-resources-inc-property-rights-and-the-regulation-of-the-space-economy/717053) and [Deep Space Industries](https://spacenews.com/deep-space-industries-acquired-by-bradford-space/), recognized the potential of space mining early on. For both companies, however, the lack of a space-for-space economy meant that their near-term survival depended on selling mined material — precious metals or rare elements — to earthbound customers. When it became clear that demand was insufficient to justify the high costs, funding dried up, and both companies pivoted to other ventures.

These were failures of space-for-earth business models — but the demand for in-space mining of raw building material, metals, and water will be enormous once humans are living in space (and are therefore far cheaper to supply). In other words, when people are living and working in space, we are likely to look back on these early asteroid mining companies less as failures and more as simply [ahead of their time](https://interestingengineering.com/asteroid-mining-to-shape-the-future-of-our-wealth).

#### Space colonization is the dream for any environmentalist—expanding our reach makes sustainability downright easy

Futurism 13—“The Benefits of Colonizing Space: Space Habitats and The O’Neill Cylinder”; Futurism.com; Dec 27 2013; <https://futurism.com/space-habitats-and-the-oneill-cylinder>; (AG DebateDrills)

For governmental bodies and world leaders faced with a huge and unsustainable population, the concept of a space habitat would be attractive. Using the materials available in the Solar System, there is the potential to build enough surface area within space habitats to possibly house billions and even trillions of people. Populations would have the space to expand sustainably without [destroying any current ecosystems](http://lifeboat.com/ex/space.habitats), as well as relieving the pressure off Earth to provide resources. The planetary population could be stabilized and supported with the extra space to inhabit and develop agricultural plantations for food.

The expansion into space also offers up a wealth of privatized opportunities, such as access to energy and other interplanetary resources. On Earth, utilizing the Sun’s energy via solar cells is a disappointingly inefficient process with unavoidable problems associated with the atmosphere and night. In space, solar panels would have access to nearly continuous light from the Sun, and in Earth’s orbit this would give us [1400 watts of power per square meter](http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2011GeoRL..3801706K) (with 100% efficiency). This abundance of energy would mean that we could travel throughout much of the Solar System without a terribly significant drop in power.

Material resources would also be in abundance throughout the entire Solar System (especially if you include mining opportunities on Mars, Luna, and other moons). Asteroids contain almost all of the stable elements in the periodic table, and without gravity, extracting and transporting them for our uses could be done with ease. [NASA is working on a project](http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/research/technology-onepagers/in-situ_resource_Utiliza14.html) where one could manufacture fuel, building materials, water, and oxygen just from resources found the Moon. The shift from Earth based manufacturing and plantation to industries in space may not just become feasible, but incredibly economically beneficial.

#### The impact is extinction—only quickly finding solutions to climate change prevents us from reaching tipping points

Sears 21-- Sears, Nathan Alexander. "Great Powers, Polarity, and Existential Threats to Humanity: An Analysis of the Dis-tribution of the Forces of Total Destruction in International Security." (2021).

Thus, the assumption here is that a Hothouse Earth climate could pose an existential threat to the habitability of the planet for humanity (Steffen et al. 2018., 5). At what point could climate change cross the threshold of an existential threat to humankind? The complexity of Earth’s natural systems makes it extremely difficult to give a precise figure (Rockstrom et al. 2009; ). However, much of the concern about climate change is over the danger of crossing “tipping points,” whereby positive feedback loops in Earth’s climate system could lead to potentially irreversible and self-reinforcing “runaway” climate change. For example, the melting of Arctic “permafrost” could produce additional warming, as glacial retreat reduces the refractory effect of the ice and releases huge quantities of methane currently trapped beneath it. A recent study suggests that a “planetary threshold” could exist at global average temperature of 2°C above preindustrial levels (Steffen et al. 2018; also IPCC 2018). Therefore, the analysis here takes the 2°C rise in global average temperatures as representing the lower-boundary of an existential threat to humanity, with higher temperatures increasing the risk of runaway climate change leading to a Hothouse Earth. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change set the goal of limiting the increase in global average temperatures to “well below” 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. If the Paris Agreement goals are met, then nations would likely keep climate change below the threshold of an existential threat to humanity. According to Climate Action Tracker (2020), however, current policies of states are expected to produce global average temperatures of 2.9°C above preindustrial levels by 2100 (range between +2.1 and +3.9°C), while if states succeed in meeting their pledges and targets, global average temperatures are still projected to increase by 2.6°C (range between +2.1 and +3.3°C). Thus, while the Paris Agreements sets a goal that would reduce the exis 6 - tential risk of climate change, the actual policies of states could easily cross the threshold that would constitute an existential threat to humanity (CAT 2020). How do the CO2 emissions of the leading states affect the existential risk of climate change? One way to measure this would be to compare the leading states’ CO2 emissions against the global “carbon budget”—or the amount of CO2 emissions over a period of time that would keep global average temperature below the existential threshold of +2.0°C above preindustrial levels (IPCC 2018). If any of the leading state’s CO2 emissions—existing or projected—are equal to the global carbon budget, then this would constitute an absolute existential threat capability. None of the leading states appear to possess such an absolute existential threat capability. For example, the benchmark of total global annual CO2 equivalent emissions for a +2.0°C “compatible pathway” are 46 billion tonnes (bt) in 2025 and 38bt in 2030 (CAT 2020). China’s CO2 emissions are by far the largest amongst the leading states, which amounted to 10.17bt in 2019 and are expected to climb to somewhere below 15bt in the period between 2025 and 2030. China’s emissions are therefore far below the global carbon budget. Similarly, one 2019 study by the International Energy Agency estimated a remaining global carbon budget of 880 billion tonnes for having a 66% change of remaining well below 2.0°C (or 1.8°C) (Dalman 2020). Assuming China’s CO2 emissions were to remain on average at their current levels of approximately 10bt per year over the next 40 years until reaching China’s goal of “carbon neutrality” by 2060, China’s total emissions would still account for less than half of the global carbon budget. It is therefore highly unlikely that any 7 one of the leading states meets the threshold of CO2 emissions that would constitute an absolute existential threat capability, since no single state realistically accounts for the entire global carbon budget.

## Case

#### The 1AC begins its method at localized resistance which feeds neoliberal flows and corrupts radical agendas.

**Evans and Reid 14** [Brad Evans, professor of international relations at the University of Lapland, Finland and Julian Reid, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Bristol, *Resilient Life*, 2014, p. 102-4]

The significance of linking self-worth and achievement to the ‘social norm’ cannot be underestimated as it allows us to illustrate the differences between the learning processes of resilience as compared to a properly critical pedagogy which would encourage children to question the fundamental tenets of power and inequality in the world. **Strategies of** **resilience** when applied to children **take the form of training exercises which enable them to deal with the localized effects of their vulnerability** and the forms of attachments and dependencies they have created which amplify the problems. The examples of youths falling into membership of inner-city gangs become a prime example of a vulnerable child that has fallen through the cracks. Countering this is **the idea of** ‘**educational resilience’**, **defined as the ‘heightened likelihood of success in school** and other life accomplishments **despite environmental adver**sities brought about by early traits, conditions, and experiences’.20 But how exactly do we measure success? **Is the educationally resilient the vulnerable subject who goes on to fulfill their neoliberal potential, or is it the subject who goes to war with the system that seeks to render them resilient as such**? **Resilience**, as we have learned, **is more a code for social compliance than a political ambition to transform the very sources of inequality and injustices experienced by marginalized populations**. We find this **in early educational theories** where **resilience is again conflated with strategies of resistance** such that the resilient child, individualistically conceived, pathologically outlives its conditions of impoverishment to exhibit social achievement in ways that are altogether in tune with the normal functioning of society.21 Indeed, more than simply learning to cope in conditions of impoverishment and vulnerability, as Steven Condly succinctly puts it in an approving review of the prevailing mainstream educational approaches, the doctrine of **resilience offers new ways to assess qualities**, competences and capabilities, **as ‘resilient children tend to possess an above average** **intelligence** and have a temperament that endears them to others and that also does not allow them to succumb to self-pity’.22 What of course qualifies as ‘self-pity’ in another setting could easily be read as a conscious attempt to challenge that which is beyond the control or individual responsibility of the particular subject. Sheila Martineau is attuned to this and writes of the political dangers of resilience in education with considerable foresight: ‘Though resilience conveyed anomalous childhood behaviour in the context of traumatic events in the 1970s, it has become detached from the traumatic context … dangerously, resilience has become constructed as a social norm modelled on the behavioural norms and expectations of the dominant society’.23 **Resilience, in other words, becomes a normalized standard for mapping out (ab)normal behaviours such that the very terms of success are loaded with moral claims to a specific maturity, wherein the maturity itself is qualified through one’s ability to connect to the liberal order of things and partake in the world such that to resist means, without contraction, that one successfully learns to conform.** Or to put it in more critical terms, **since the ‘solution’ is to teach children to overcome ‘obstacles’ to personal development without ultimately challenging wider relations of power, the resilient child** (which, although said to include all children, overwhelmingly concentrates on those from poorer, culturally and racially distinct backgrounds) **encounters policies which, instead of ‘treating the individual’, end up by virtue of its logic ‘blaming the victim’.2**4 Disadvantage as such becomes once again the means to author new forms of discrimination that plays the vulnerable card to remove any political claims that things could be otherwise. Today **we can situate these earlier demands for resilience within the strategic context of what** Henry **Giroux calls the ‘war on youth’**. Indicative of **the neoliberal** assault on the education **system** more generally, Giroux maintains that **youth has become a privileged object for power in a way that seeks to strip away any sense of critical awareness and political agency at the earliest possible stages of intellectual development**. As he wr**it**es, since ‘**neoliberalism is also a pedagogical project designed to create particular subjects, desires, and values defined largely by market considerations’**, **questions of ‘destiny’ become ‘linked to a market-driven logic in which freedom is stripped down to freedom from government regulation, freedom to consume**, and freedom to say anything one wants, regardless of how racist or toxic the consequences might be’.25 **This has a profound bearing upon education policy as ‘Critical thought and human agency are rendered impotent as neoliberal rationality substitutes emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to political problems’.**26 Hence, within this ‘depoliticized discourse, youths are told that there is no dream of the collective, no viable social bonds, only the actions of autonomous individuals who can count only on their own resources and who bear sole responsibility for the effects of larger systemic political and economic problems’. Whilst education therefore should have a pedagogical commitment to the globally oppressed, **what takes its place is a substitution for education that produces vulnerable consumers whose very training renders the political impossible.**

#### Treating environmental destruction as war is a counterproductive strategy that legitimizes ecocide because ALL is FAIR in love and WAR.

**Romaine 09** (Suzanne Romaine is an American linguist known for work on historical linguistics and sociolinguistics. From 1984 to 2014 she was Merton Professor of English language at the University of Oxford. “War and Peace in the Global Greenhouse: Metaphors We Die By”. November 17, 2009)

**The Third World War** has begun. It **is being waged against the earth**. At stake is the survival of the human species. These dramatic images and war cries are suggested in the titles of many books on the environment, such as Threats without Enemies: Facing Environmental Insecurity (Prins, 1993). Similarly, the authors of The Limits to Growth (Meadows, 1972), Beyond Limits (Meadows, Meadows, & Randers, 1992), and The Population Explosion (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1990) warned of widespread hunger and economic disruption as a result of population growth and resource depletion. The name of the organization called **Greenpeace explicitly links environmental action with war** and peace. Greenpeace regarded the sinking of its ship, Rainbow Warrior, in the Auckland, New Zealand, harbor as an act of war requiring retaliation. Similarly, the pressure group calling itself Friends of the Earth exists by virtue of its metaphorical opposition to those perceived as earth's enemies. **Friends are allies in the metaphorical "war on the environment," and their objective is to rescue it from the enemies** who seek to destroy it. **But just who are the enemies and who are the friends? That depends on your political point of view** and, as I show later in this article, on your principles of moral accounting. Popular critics of the environmental movement such as **Rush Limbaugh** have seen things differently. Limbaugh **rejected the metaphor** "ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IS WAR" through the use of metaphors that also have war as their source: "ARGUMENT IS WAR" and "POLITICS IS WAR": Environmentalists paint humans as an aberration; as the natural enemy of nature. . . . What they [environmentalists] really want to do is attack our way of life. Their primary enemy: capitalism. . . . Their appeals and their scare tactics are designed to transform people into foot soldiers in the army of doomsday environmentalism. (Limbaugh, 1992, p. 153) Now there are two metaphorical "wars." **The "real" "war," as Limbaugh saw it**, however, **is a discursive and political one, in which a liberal left attacks the conservative worldview.** The liberal left is portrayed as a group of criminals, thugs, muggers, and so on, trying **to convince the public through propaganda** ("ARGUMENT IS WAR") that they should become soldiers in the environmental war. I turn now to a set of specific examples illustrating how these and other war metaphors interact in news reports about the Rio summit. The underlying metaphor running throughout an article by Crispin Tickell (1992, p. 24), former adviser to the U.K. government on environmental affairs, published in The Sunday Observer, could be summarized as "ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION IS WAR." He began by speaking of a "fog over the international jousting grounds of negotiation" and "battle cries" of "contenders." The contenders are the developed countries, who in Tickell's words "pitched one camp," and the developing countries, who "pitched another," as if they were opposing armies on a physical battlefield. He said that the developed countries are less vulnerable to environmental change, but nevertheless, they could "scarcely prosper in a world, where they would be a shrinking proportion of its population, subject to invasion, infiltration and the pollution of others" (p. 24). This example of Greenspeak relies on the interaction of "ARGUMENT IS WAR," "POLITICS IS WAR," and "SPORT IS WAR." The jousting grounds evoke a medieval competition between knights in armor on horseback. We understand war as a competitive game, like chess, or as a sport, like football or boxing. The playing fields of Eton, one of England's leading public schools, are conceptualized as a battleground for training sportsmen to be soldiers. Like wars, games have strategies, winners, losers, and risks. **Particular aspects of the environment, such as forests or species like the spotted owl, often become** rallying points as **metaphorical casualties**, as in these next two media reports. The header for Time magazine's article "Whose Woods Are These?" said: "The fight is not just about spotted owls anymore. Conservationists step up an all-fronts campaign to save America's forests" (Lemonick, 1991, p. 70). Another metaphor comes into play here, whose origins as far as I know lie in McLuhan and Fiore's (1968) claim that "TECHNOLOGY IS WAR." Here, technology functions as a metonym for weapons. Although they did not discuss metaphors as such, what McLuhan and Fiore meant by this is that every new technology necessitates a new war. Thus, the technology that necessitates this war on the woods is the chain saw, which has made it possible to destroy forests at a greater speed than ever before.' In this particular case, the relentless clearing of the forest is destroying the habitat of the spotted owl of the Pacific Northwest.