## 1

#### Use the standard and ROB of maximizing expected well-being

#### 1. Substitutability—only consequentialism explains necessary enablers.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

#### 2. Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about** the way **pleasure** feels **and** something **undeniably bad about** the way **pain** feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?”** This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “**But** what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further;** it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: **“We never ask** [a man] **what his end is in being pleased, because** we assume that **pleasure is** choice **worthy in itself.”**4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### 3. Extinction comes first!

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

## 2

#### We are quickly transitioning to full space-for-space economy where burgeoning demand and private sector incentives create a full economy in short order--the aff ends that dream

Sarang 21—Mehak Sarang; Mehak is also a Research Associate at Harvard Business School with Professor Matthew Weinzierl, researching the business and economics of the space sector; The Commercial Space Age Is Here; Feb 12 2021; Harvard Business Review; <https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here>; (AG DebateDrills)

In our [recent research](https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/jep.32.2.173_Space,%20the%20Final%20Economic%20Frontier_413bf24d-42e6-4cea-8cc5-a0d2f6fc6a70.pdf), we examined how the model of centralized, government-directed human space activity born in the 1960s has, over the last two decades, made way for a new model, in which public initiatives in space increasingly share the stage with private priorities. Centralized, government-led space programs will inevitably focus on space-for-earth activities that are in the public interest, such as national security, basic science, and national pride. This is only natural, as expenditures for these programs must be justified by demonstrating benefits for citizens — and the citizens these governments represent are (nearly) all on earth.

In contrast to governments, the private sector is eager to put people in space to pursue their own personal interests, not the state’s — and then supply the demand they create. This is the vision driving SpaceX, which in its first twenty years has entirely upended the rocket launch industry, securing 60% of the global commercial launch market and building ever-larger spacecraft designed to ferry passengers not just to the International Space Station (ISS), but also to its own promised [settlement on Mars](https://www.spacex.com/media/making_life_multiplanetary_transcript_2017.pdf).

Today, the space-for-space market is limited to supplying the people who are already in space: that is, the handful of astronauts employed by NASA and other government programs. While SpaceX has grand visions of supporting large numbers of private space travelers, their current space-for-space activities have all been in response to demand from government customers (i.e., NASA). But as decreasing launch costs enable companies like SpaceX to leverage economies of scale and put more people into space, growing private sector demand (that is, tourists and settlers, rather than government employees) could turn these proof-of-concept initiatives into a sustainable, large-scale industry.

This model — of selling to NASA with the hopes of eventually creating and expanding into a larger private market — is exemplified by SpaceX, but the company is by no means the only player taking this approach. For instance, while SpaceX is focused on space-for-space transportation, another key component of this burgeoning industry will be manufacturing.

#### Space colonization is the dream for any environmentalist—expanding our reach makes sustainability downright easy

Futurism 13—“The Benefits of Colonizing Space: Space Habitats and The O’Neill Cylinder”; Futurism.com; Dec 27 2013; <https://futurism.com/space-habitats-and-the-oneill-cylinder>; (AG DebateDrills)

For governmental bodies and world leaders faced with a huge and unsustainable population, the concept of a space habitat would be attractive. Using the materials available in the Solar System, there is the potential to build enough surface area within space habitats to possibly house billions and even trillions of people. Populations would have the space to expand sustainably without [destroying any current ecosystems](http://lifeboat.com/ex/space.habitats), as well as relieving the pressure off Earth to provide resources. The planetary population could be stabilized and supported with the extra space to inhabit and develop agricultural plantations for food.

The expansion into space also offers up a wealth of privatized opportunities, such as access to energy and other interplanetary resources. On Earth, utilizing the Sun’s energy via solar cells is a disappointingly inefficient process with unavoidable problems associated with the atmosphere and night. In space, solar panels would have access to nearly continuous light from the Sun, and in Earth’s orbit this would give us [1400 watts of power per square meter](http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2011GeoRL..3801706K) (with 100% efficiency). This abundance of energy would mean that we could travel throughout much of the Solar System without a terribly significant drop in power.

Material resources would also be in abundance throughout the entire Solar System (especially if you include mining opportunities on Mars, Luna, and other moons). Asteroids contain almost all of the stable elements in the periodic table, and without gravity, extracting and transporting them for our uses could be done with ease. [NASA is working on a project](http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/research/technology-onepagers/in-situ_resource_Utiliza14.html) where one could manufacture fuel, building materials, water, and oxygen just from resources found the Moon. The shift from Earth based manufacturing and plantation to industries in space may not just become feasible, but incredibly economically beneficial.

#### The impact is extinction—only quickly finding solutions to climate change prevents us from reaching tipping points

Sears 21-- Sears, Nathan Alexander. "Great Powers, Polarity, and Existential Threats to Humanity: An Analysis of the Dis-tribution of the Forces of Total Destruction in International Security." (2021).

Thus, the assumption here is that a Hothouse Earth climate could pose an existential threat to the habitability of the planet for humanity (Steffen et al. 2018., 5). At what point could climate change cross the threshold of an existential threat to humankind? The complexity of Earth’s natural systems makes it extremely difficult to give a precise figure (Rockstrom et al. 2009; ). However, much of the concern about climate change is over the danger of crossing “tipping points,” whereby positive feedback loops in Earth’s climate system could lead to potentially irreversible and self-reinforcing “runaway” climate change. For example, the melting of Arctic “permafrost” could produce additional warming, as glacial retreat reduces the refractory effect of the ice and releases huge quantities of methane currently trapped beneath it. A recent study suggests that a “planetary threshold” could exist at global average temperature of 2°C above preindustrial levels (Steffen et al. 2018; also IPCC 2018). Therefore, the analysis here takes the 2°C rise in global average temperatures as representing the lower-boundary of an existential threat to humanity, with higher temperatures increasing the risk of runaway climate change leading to a Hothouse Earth. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change set the goal of limiting the increase in global average temperatures to “well below” 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. If the Paris Agreement goals are met, then nations would likely keep climate change below the threshold of an existential threat to humanity. According to Climate Action Tracker (2020), however, current policies of states are expected to produce global average temperatures of 2.9°C above preindustrial levels by 2100 (range between +2.1 and +3.9°C), while if states succeed in meeting their pledges and targets, global average temperatures are still projected to increase by 2.6°C (range between +2.1 and +3.3°C). Thus, while the Paris Agreements sets a goal that would reduce the exis 6 - tential risk of climate change, the actual policies of states could easily cross the threshold that would constitute an existential threat to humanity (CAT 2020). How do the CO2 emissions of the leading states affect the existential risk of climate change? One way to measure this would be to compare the leading states’ CO2 emissions against the global “carbon budget”—or the amount of CO2 emissions over a period of time that would keep global average temperature below the existential threshold of +2.0°C above preindustrial levels (IPCC 2018). If any of the leading state’s CO2 emissions—existing or projected—are equal to the global carbon budget, then this would constitute an absolute existential threat capability. None of the leading states appear to possess such an absolute existential threat capability. For example, the benchmark of total global annual CO2 equivalent emissions for a +2.0°C “compatible pathway” are 46 billion tonnes (bt) in 2025 and 38bt in 2030 (CAT 2020). China’s CO2 emissions are by far the largest amongst the leading states, which amounted to 10.17bt in 2019 and are expected to climb to somewhere below 15bt in the period between 2025 and 2030. China’s emissions are therefore far below the global carbon budget. Similarly, one 2019 study by the International Energy Agency estimated a remaining global carbon budget of 880 billion tonnes for having a 66% change of remaining well below 2.0°C (or 1.8°C) (Dalman 2020). Assuming China’s CO2 emissions were to remain on average at their current levels of approximately 10bt per year over the next 40 years until reaching China’s goal of “carbon neutrality” by 2060, China’s total emissions would still account for less than half of the global carbon budget. It is therefore highly unlikely that any 7 one of the leading states meets the threshold of CO2 emissions that would constitute an absolute existential threat capability, since no single state realistically accounts for the entire global carbon budget.

## 3

#### Kant Negates

#### 1] Acquisition of property can never be unjust – to create rights violations, there must already be an owner of the property being violated, but that presupposes its appropriation by another entity—that’s a contradiction in conception

Feser 1, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

#### 2] Self-ownership justifies the appropriation of property – our freedom necessitates being able to set and pursue external things as our ends, including exercising our rights on property. Restricting this arbitrarily limits our freedom which is unjust.

Feser 3, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

V. Some Implications If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop-erty rights: We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers, talents, energies, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right, given the SOP, not to have our self-owned powers nullified —we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all). Furthermore, [they] has mixed [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control, and is himself solely responsible for whatever value or utility the resource has come to have. Thus, [they] has a presumptive right to it, and, if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his own- ership is accordingly (more or less) full. The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with exist- ing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case what- soever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of prop- erty just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

## Case

### A2 Ward

#### This is the most consequentialist arg I’ve seen—there’s uniqueness of the OST and an argument that the consequence of private companies owning space is a monopoly. Thus, categorical imperative doesn’t care—monopolization is not an a priori point

### A2 Cordelli

#### Winning ward is consequentialist takes this arg out, it’s an impact to a link

#### Resources aren’t equally divided so prefer property rights – [A] without the concept of ownership there is no one to value resources in the first place, which creates a contradiction – things like market prices which require ownership create value but this is impossible if everyone owns the same things [B] there’s no way to measure resources equally – hold them to a high burden of proof and assume that they’re wrong if they can’t provide a coherent explanation of how to divide resources.

Feser, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

Another, and at first sight more promising, interpretation of common ownership is to suppose that we do not “collectively own everything” so much as we each own our own individual and equally divided portions of external resources, a construal Cohen calls “equal division” owner- ship.13 But which portions exactly does each person own, and why those? Do we all get equal amounts of zinc and copper, for instance, or does one person get the copper, another the zinc, and so forth? And how are “resources” individuated in the first place? Is my backyard one resource or many, since it might include not only a lawn and a couple of trees, but also hidden oil and mineral deposits? For that matter, is a can of oil itself one resource or many, since I could use part of it for fuel, another part for lubrication, a third to make paint, etc.? (And why a can of oil, rather than a barrel or a thimbleful?) Do resources get gathered up again and redi- vided every time a new person is born, so as to maintain equality in distribution? Do we move people’s homes periodically so that we can carve up the land again every so often to guarantee equal plots for new- borns? (Why land, anyway? What if I want to live on a houseboat? Do we all get equal portions of the surface of the oceans, so as to leave this option open for everyone?) To avoid these problems, do we simply divvy up the “cash value” of all resources? How do we know what that value is independently of a system of market prices, which presupposes private ownership and the inequalities that go along with it? And since, given changing needs and circumstances, that value is itself perpetually chang- ing, do we need constantly to re-collect and redistribute wealth so as to reflect the “current” economic value of resources? Yet if a demand for equal outcomes is what motivates the equal-division model in the first place, even such periodic “resetting” of the system would not be enough to satisfy such a demand; for as Cohen observes, given inequalities in persons’ (self-owned) natural endowments, even an initial equal distri- bution of basic resources will still result in significant inequalities of wealth.14 In this case, what is the point of insisting on initial equal-division com- mon ownership?15 (There seems to be little point, at any rate, if one grants the thesis of self-ownership, or at least grants that the thesis is plausible enough that the critic of Nozick is best advised to look else- where for a way of undermining his anti-egalitarian and anti-redistributive conclusions.)16 These questions seem unanswerable, perhaps even in principle unanswer- able. But even if one insists otherwise, the issue here is not (or is not primarily) whether some scheme of common ownership can after all be made coherent and practicable. Rather, the issue is that given the diffi- culty of seeing how this can be done—given the work, intellectual and physical, required to institute a common-ownership scheme—it is coun- terintuitive in the extreme to suggest that the world just starts out com- monly owned, to suggest that the assumption of common ownership is the natural default assumption to make. Nor are taking resources as initially unowned and taking them as initially commonly owned even on a par as starting points in the theory of property. Nozick’s opponents accuse him of being “blithe” in his assumption that resources are initially unowned,17 but their assumptions are, if anything, more glib. Nozick, however, has good reason for his facile assumption: We clearly need to do something to get ownership started, and the “we” who do it are typically specific individuals acting on specific and isolated bits of the extra-personal world. The natural conclusion to draw from this is that the world starts out unowned, and that it is precisely and only the people who actually do something to change this fact who come to own the particular parts of the world on which they act.18 At the very least, this, I suggest, is the natural default position to take, with the common-ownership advocate being the one who needs to justify his moving off of it. But then, as I have argued, the natural default position to take on initial acquisition is also that it is never unjust.19

#### Contradiction in conceptions come first—otherwise Kant’s theory falls apart and allows things like lying. This offense is definitely a contradiction in will, it’s talking about violation of other’s rights

### Segobaetso

#### Neoliberalism and capitalism is not immoral—it solves economic disparities and environmental issues. Even if they beat back this ev—it proves their arg is consequentialist.

Pinker 18 (Stephen, professor of psychology at Harvard, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, EM) \*\*Modified for gendered language

In the stacked layer graph in figure 8-5, the thickness of the bottom slab represents the number of people living in extreme poverty, the thickness of the top slab represents the number not living in poverty, and the height of the stack represents the population of the world. It shows that the number of poor people declined just as the number of all people exploded, from 3.7 billion in 1970 to 7.3 billion in 2015. (Max Roser points out that if news outlets truly reported the changing state of the world, they could have run the headline NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN EXTREME POVERTY FELL BY 137,000 SINCE YESTERDAY every day for the last twenty-five years.) We live in a world not just with a smaller proportion of extremely poor people but with a smaller number of them, and with 6.6 billion people who are not extremely poor. Figure 8-5: Extreme poverty (number), 1820–2015 Sources: Our World in Data, Roser & Ortiz-Ospina 2017, based on data from Bourguignon & Morrison 2002 (1820–1992) and the World Bank 2016g (1981–2015). Most surprises in history are unpleasant surprises, but this news came as a pleasant shock even to the optimists. In 2000 the United Nations laid out eight Millennium Development Goals, their starting lines backdated to 1990.25 At the time, cynical observers of that underperforming organization dismissed the targets as aspirational boilerplate. Cut the global poverty rate in half, lifting a billion people out of poverty, in twenty-five years? Yeah, yeah. But the world reached the goal five years ahead of schedule. Development experts are still rubbing their eyes. Deaton writes, “This is perhaps the most important fact about wellbeing in the world since World War II.”26 The economist Robert Lucas (like Deaton, a Nobel laureate) said, “The consequences for human welfare involved [in understanding rapid economic development] are simply staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.”27 Let’s not stop thinking about tomorrow. Though it’s always dangerous to extrapolate a historical curve, what happens when we try? If we align a ruler with the World Bank data in figure 8-4, we find that it crosses the x-axis (indicating a poverty rate of 0) in 2026. The UN gave itself a cushion in its 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (the successor to its Millennium Development Goals) and set a target of “ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere” by 2030.28 Ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere! May I live to see the day. (Not even Jesus was that optimistic: he told a supplicant, “The poor you will always have with you.”) Of course that day is a ways off. Hundreds of millions of people remain in extreme poverty, and getting to zero will require a greater effort than just extrapolating along a ruler. Though the numbers are dwindling in countries like India and Indonesia, they are increasing in the poorest of the poor countries, like Congo, Haiti, and Sudan, and the last pockets of poverty will be the hardest to eliminate.29 Also, as we approach the goal we should move the goalposts, since not-so-extreme poverty is still poverty. In introducing the concept of progress I warned against confusing hard-won headway with a process that magically takes place by itself. The point of calling attention to progress is not self-congratulation but identifying the causes so we can do more of what works. And since we know that something has worked, it’s unnecessary to keep depicting the developing world as a basket case to shake people out of their apathy—with the danger that they will think that additional support would just be throwing money down a rat hole.30 So what is the world doing right? As with most forms of progress, a lot of good things happen at once and reinforce one another, so it’s hard to identify a first domino. Cynical explanations, such as that the enrichment is a one-time dividend of a surge in the price of oil and other commodities, or that the statistics are inflated by the rise of populous China, have been examined and dismissed. Radelet and other development experts point to five causes.31 “In 1976,” Radelet writes, “Mao single-handedly and dramatically changed the direction of global poverty with one simple act: he died.”32 Though China’s rise is not exclusively responsible for the Great Convergence, the country’s sheer bulk is bound to move the totals around, and the explanations for its progress apply elsewhere. The death of Mao Zedong is emblematic of three of the major causes of the Great Convergence. The first is the decline of communism (together with intrusive socialism). For reasons we have seen, market economies can generate wealth prodigiously while totalitarian planned economies impose scarcity, stagnation, and often famine. Market economies, in addition to reaping the benefits of specialization and providing incentives for people to produce things that other people want, solve the problem of coordinating the efforts of hundreds of millions of people by using prices to propagate information about need and availability far and wide, a computational problem that no planner is brilliant enough to solve from a central bureau.33 A shift from collectivization, centralized control, government monopolies, and suffocating permit bureaucracies (what in India was called “the license raj”) to open economies took place on a number of fronts beginning in the 1980s. They included Deng Xiaoping’s embrace of capitalism in China, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its domination of Eastern Europe, and the liberalization of the economies of India, Brazil, Vietnam, and other countries. Though intellectuals are apt to do a spit take when they read a defense of capitalism, its economic benefits are so obvious that they don’t need to be shown with numbers. They can literally be seen from space. A satellite photograph of Korea showing the capitalist South aglow in light and the Communist North a pit of darkness vividly illustrates the contrast in the wealth-generating capability between the two economic systems, holding geography, history, and culture constant. Other matched pairs with an experimental group and a control group lead to the same conclusion: West and East Germany when they were divided by the Iron Curtain; Botswana versus Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe; Chile versus Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro—the latter a once-wealthy, oil-rich country now suffering from widespread hunger and a critical shortage of medical care.34 It’s important to add that the market economies which blossomed in the more fortunate parts of the developing world were not the laissez-faire anarchies of right-wing fantasies and left-wing nightmares. To varying degrees, their governments invested in education, public health, infrastructure, and agricultural and job training, together with social insurance and poverty-reduction programs.35 Radelet’s second explanation of the Great Convergence is leadership. Mao imposed more than communism on China. He was a mercurial megalomaniac who foisted crackbrained schemes on the country, such as the Great Leap Forward (with its gargantuan communes, useless backyard smelters, and screwball agronomic practices) and the Cultural Revolution (which turned the younger generation into gangs of thugs who terrorized teachers, managers, and descendants of “rich peasants”).36 During the decades of stagnation from the 1970s to the early 1990s, many other developing countries were commandeered by psychopathic strongmen with ideological, religious, tribal, paranoid, or self-aggrandizing agendas rather than a mandate to enhance the well-being of their citizens. Depending on their sympathy or antipathy for communism, they were propped up by the Soviet Union or the United States under the principle “He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”37 The 1990s and 2000s saw a spread of democracy (chapter 14) and the rise of levelheaded, humanistic leaders—not just national statesmen like Nelson Mandela, Corazon Aquino, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf but local religious and civil-society leaders acting to improve the lives of their compatriots.38 A third cause was the end of the Cold War. It not only pulled the rug out from under a number of tinpot dictators but snuffed out many of the civil wars that had racked developing countries since they attained independence in the 1960s. Civil war is both a humanitarian disaster and an economic one, as facilities are destroyed, resources are diverted, children are kept out of school, and managers and workers are pulled away from work or killed. The economist Paul Collier, who calls war “development in reverse,” has estimated that a typical civil war costs a country $50 billion.39 A fourth cause is globalization, in particular the explosion in trade made possible by container ships and jet airplanes and by the liberalization of tariffs and other barriers to investment and trade. Classical economics and common sense agree that a larger trading network should make everyone, on average, better off. As countries specialize in different goods and services, they can produce them more efficiently, and it doesn’t cost them much more to offer their wares to billions of people than to thousands. At the same time buyers, shopping for the best price in a global bazaar, can get more of what they want. (Common sense is less likely to appreciate a corollary called comparative advantage, which predicts that, on average, everyone is better off when each country sells the goods and services that it can produce most efficiently even if the buyers could produce them still more efficiently themselves.) Notwithstanding the horror that the word elicits in many parts of the political spectrum, globalization, development analysts agree, has been a bonanza for the poor. Deaton notes, “Some argue that globalization is a neoliberal conspiracy designed to enrich a very few at the expense of many. If so, that conspiracy was a disastrous failure—or at least, it helped more than a billion people as an unintended consequence. If only unintended consequences always worked so favorably.”40 To be sure, the industrialization of the developing world, like the Industrial Revolution two centuries before it, has produced working conditions that are harsh by the standards of modern rich countries and have elicited bitter condemnation. The Romantic movement in the 19th century was partly a reaction to the “dark satanic mills” (as William Blake called them), and since that time a loathing of industry has been a sacred value of C. P. Snow’s Second Culture of literary intellectuals.41 Nothing in Snow’s essay enraged his assailant F. R. Leavis as much as this passage: It is all very well for us, sitting pretty, to think that material standards of living don’t matter all that much. It is all very well for one, as a personal choice, to reject industrialization—do a modern Walden if you like, and if you go without much food, see most of your children die in infancy, despise the comforts of literacy, accept twenty years off your own life, then I respect you for the strength of your aesthetic revulsion. But I don’t respect you in the slightest if, even passively, you try to impose the same choice on others who are not free to choose. In fact, we know what their choice would be. For, with singular unanimity, in any country where they have had the chance, the poor have walked off the land into the factories as fast as the factories could take them.42 As we have seen, Snow was accurate in his claims about advances in life and health, and he was also right that the appropriate standard in considering the plight of the poor in industrializing countries is the set of alternatives available to them where and when they live. Snow’s argument is being echoed fifty years later by development experts such as Radelet, who observes that “while working on the factory floor is often referred to as sweatshop labor, it is often better than the grand[parent] of all sweatshops: working in the fields as an agricultural day laborer.” When I lived in Indonesia in the early 1990s, I arrived with a somewhat romanticized view of the beauty of people working in rice paddies, together with reservations about the rapidly growing factory jobs. The longer I was there, the more I recognized how incredibly difficult it is to work in the rice fields. It’s a backbreaking grind, with people eking out the barest of livings by bending over for hours in the hot sun to terrace the fields, plant the seeds, pull the weeds, transplant the seedlings, chase the pests, and harvest the grain. Standing in the pools of water brings leeches and the constant risk of malaria, encephalitis, and other diseases. And, of course, it is hot, all the time. So, it was not too much of a surprise that when factory jobs opened offering wages of $2 a day, hundreds of people lined up just to get a shot at applying.43 The benefits of industrial employment can go beyond material living standards. For the women who get these jobs, it can be a liberation. In her article “The Feminist Side of Sweatshops,” Chelsea Follett (the managing editor of HumanProgress) recounts that factory work in the 19th century offered women an escape from the traditional gender roles of farm and village life, and so was held by some men at the time “sufficient to damn to infamy the most worthy and virtuous girl.” The girls themselves did not always see it that way. A textile mill worker in Lowell, Massachusetts, wrote in 1840: We are collected . . . to get money, as much of it and as fast as we can. . . . Strange would it be, if in money-loving New England, one of the most lucrative female employments should be rejected because it is toilsome, or because some people are prejudiced against it. Yankee girls have too much independence for that.44 Here again, experiences during the Industrial Revolution prefigure those in the developing world today. Kavita Ramdas, the head of the Global Fund for Women, said in 2001 that in an Indian village “all there is for a woman is to obey her husband and relatives, pound millet, and sing. If she moves to town, she can get a job, start a business, and get education for her children.”45 An analysis in Bangladesh confirmed that the women who worked in the garment industry (as my grandparents did in 1930s Canada) enjoyed rising wages, later marriage, and fewer and better-educated children.46 Over the course of a generation, slums, barrios, and favelas can morph into suburbs, and the working class can become middle class.47 To appreciate the long-term benefits of industrialization one does not have to accept its cruelties. One can imagine an alternative history of the Industrial Revolution in which modern sensibilities applied earlier and the factories operated without children and with better working conditions for the adults. Today there are doubtless factories in the developing world that could offer as many jobs and still turn a profit while treating their workers more humanely. Pressure from trade negotiators and consumer protests has measurably improved working conditions in many places, and it is a natural progression as countries get richer and more integrated into the global community (as we will see in chapters 12 and 17 when we look at the history of working conditions in our own society).48 Progress consists not in accepting every change as part of an indivisible package—as if we had to make a yes-or-no decision on whether the Industrial Revolution, or globalization, is a good thing or bad thing, exactly as each has unfolded in every detail. Progress consists of unbundling the features of a social process as much as we can to maximize the human benefits while minimizing the harms. The last, and in many analyses the most important, contributor to the Great Convergence is science and technology.49 Life is getting cheaper, in a good way. Thanks to advances in know-how, an hour of labor can buy more food, health, education, clothing, building materials, and small necessities and luxuries than it used to. Not only can people eat cheaper food and take cheaper medicines, but children can wear cheap plastic sandals instead of going barefoot, and adults can hang out together getting their hair done or watching a soccer game using cheap solar panels and appliances. As for good advice on health, farming, and business: it’s better than cheap; it’s free. Today about half the adults in the world own a smartphone, and there are as many subscriptions as people. In parts of the world without roads, landlines, postal service, newspapers, or banks, mobile phones are more than a way to share gossip and cat photos; they are a major generator of wealth. They allow people to transfer money, order supplies, track the weather and markets, find day labor, get advice on health and farming practices, even obtain a primary education.50 An analysis by the economist Robert Jensen subtitled “The Micro and Mackerel Economics of Information” showed how South Indian small fishermen increased their income and lowered the local price of fish by using their mobile phones at sea to find the market which offered the best price that day, sparing them from having to unload their perishable catch on fish-glutted towns while other towns went fishless.51 In this way mobile phones are allowing hundreds of millions of small farmers and fishers to become the omniscient rational actors in the ideal frictionless markets of economics textbooks. According to one estimate, every cell phone adds $3,000 to the annual GDP of a developing country.52 The beneficent power of knowledge has rewritten the rules of global development. Development experts differ on the wisdom of foreign aid. Some argue that it does more harm than good by enriching corrupt governments and competing with local commerce.53 Others cite recent numbers which suggest that intelligently allocated aid has in fact done tremendous good.54 But while they disagree on the effects of donated food and dollars, all agree that donated technology—medicines, electronics, crop varieties, and best practices in agriculture, business, and public health—has been an unalloyed boon. (As Jefferson noted, he who receives an idea from me receives instruction without lessening mine.) And for all the emphasis I’ve placed on GDP per capita, the value of knowledge has made that measure less relevant to what we really care about, quality of life. If I had squeezed a line for Africa into the lower right corner of figure 8-3, it would look unimpressive: the line would curve upward, to be sure, but without the exponential blastoff of the lines for Europe and Asia. Charles Kenny emphasizes that the actual progress of Africa belies the shallow slope, because health, longevity, and education are so much more affordable than they used to be. Though in general people in richer countries live longer (a relationship called the Preston curve, after the economist who discovered it), the whole curve is being pushed upward, as everyone is living longer regardless of income.55 In the richest country two centuries ago (the Netherlands), life expectancy was just forty, and in no country was it above forty-five. Today, life expectancy in the poorest country in the world (the Central African Republic) is fifty-four, and in no country is it below forty-five.56 Though it’s easy to sneer at national income as a shallow and materialistic measure, it correlates with every indicator of human flourishing, as we will repeatedly see in the chapters to come. Most obviously, GDP per capita correlates with longevity, health, and nutrition.57 Less obviously, it correlates with higher ethical values like peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance.58 Richer countries, on average, fight fewer wars with each other (chapter 11), are less likely to be riven by civil wars (chapter 11), are more likely to become and stay democratic (chapter 14), and have greater respect for human rights (chapter 14—on average, that is; Arab oil states are rich but repressive). The citizens of richer countries have greater respect for “emancipative” or liberal values such as women’s equality, free speech, gay rights, participatory democracy, and protection of the environment (chapters 10 and 15). Not surprisingly, as countries get richer they get happier (chapter 18); more surprisingly, as countries get richer they get smarter (chapter 16).59 In explaining this Somalia-to-Sweden continuum, with poor violent repressive unhappy countries at one end and rich peaceful liberal happy ones at the other, correlation is not causation, and other factors like education, geography, history, and culture may play roles.60 But when the quants try to tease them apart, they find that economic development does seem to be a major mover of human welfare.61 In an old academic joke, a dean is presiding over a faculty meeting when a genie appears and offers him one of three wishes—money, fame, or wisdom. The dean replies, “That’s easy. I’m a scholar. I’ve devoted my life to understanding. Of course I’ll take wisdom.” The genie waves his hand and vanishes in a puff of smoke. The smoke clears to reveal the dean with his head in his hands, lost in thought. A minute elapses. Ten minutes. Fifteen. Finally a professor calls out, “Well? Well?” The dean mutters, “I should have taken the money.”

#### Also, the fact that they have Kantian ethicists written in the card doesn’t get rid of the fact that this is consequentialist. It makes presuppositions of the impacts of capitalism- a not non-controversial debate.

### Util offense

#### Worst case, asteroid debris doubles what we already have—most likely it’ll be orders of magnitudes less. The impact is tiny-prefer this ev for empirics

Fladeland et al 19-- Logan Fladeland [UBC, Department of Physics and Astronomy], Aaron C. Boley [UBC, Department of Physics and Astronomy], and Michael Byers [UBC, Department of Political Science]; “Meteoroid Stream Formation Due to the Extraction of Space Resources from Asteroids,” December 2019, <https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1911/1911.12840.pdf>; (AG DebateDrills)

Should large NEAs be targeted for resource extraction, then they could, in principle, produce streams with number fluxes that exceed the sporadic meteoroids, although it would require prodigious mass release from the asteroid. We have only considered a flat mass distribution for the amount of material that is ejected at each �, and have assumed that each bin has 1% of the asteroid’s original mass in the stream. For the six particle sizes that we consider, the hypothetical Ryugu stream would thus have a mass of about 2.7 × 10OQ kg. Over the envisaged 10 yr of mining, this 10−7 10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100 101 102 10−10 10−9 10−8 10−7 10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100 Cumulative Number Flux (# km−2 s−1 ) Meteoroid Mass (g) HYPOTHETICAL Meteoroid Fluxes From Mining Several Example C−Type Asteroids Ryugu Bennu 2005 YU55 1989 UQ Grün Model would require 7.4 × 10s kg per day on average or the consumption of roughly 6200 m3 per day for � = 1200 kg/m3 (about a soccer pitch that is one metre deep). The total stream mass (6%) would be equivalent to stripping the entire surface of the asteroid to about 18 m deep. The hypothetical stream from 2005 YU55 is about an order of magnitude less in mass, as well as the corresponding average daily volume consumption (slightly larger than a 25 m x 25 m x 1 m volume). This hypothetical stream’s number flux also exceeds the sporadics for the smallest �, despite the lower mass compared with Ryugu. Such mining would still require multiple machines and significant infrastructure, the feasibility of which is not known. Regardless, the potential for large-scale mining is being explored (e.g., [24,25]). Apart from technical feasibility, there would need to be sufficient demand for ISRU to require such prodigious resource extraction, which will depend strongly on future space traffic, which is also unknown. In some ways, the results are reassuring, in that the sporadic meteoroid population could be far more significant than any streams produced from asteroid mining, if proper limits are put in place. However, we do not want to dismiss the possibility of secondary effects that could result in large mass expulsions caused by manipulating the asteroid’s surface. These hypothetical streams also have significant differences when compared with some of the major (and real) meteoroid streams [26]. For example, relative speeds tend to only have �tbetween about 4 and 14 km/s, lower than the major streams, although this is without considering focusing due to Earth. We have also ignored the possibility of mining small asteroids (in the tens of metre diameter range), which at face value might be more tractable, at least initially. Even if the entire asteroid is effectively reduced to meteoroids, the mass of the stream would be much smaller than that considered here. On the other hand, small asteroids will likely be selected from the population that comes within a few lunar distances of Earth, meaning the resulting streams could be significant despite their mass.

#### Attacks don’t escalate

--no retaliation – nukes are categorically different than space bc existential

--space is like cyber – attacks are unfortunate but not worthy of a nuke response

--nuke threats not credible bc nobody thinks space is at that lvl

Lewis, 13 – Senior fellow and Program Director at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies

James A. Lewis, “Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace,” in Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, September 2013. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a587431.pdf>

Unlike other military technologies, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat. If used, damage and casualties would be massive. In contrast, neither cyberattacks nor ASAT attacks pose the same level of destructiveness; they certainly are not existential threats. If there was some way credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons after a cyberattack, deterrence might be possible. However, a nuclear threat in response to these attacks would not be proportional and the threat to use nuclear weapons is likely to be discounted by opponents. There are powerful norms that constrain the use of these weapons, and therefore, a threat to use nuclear weapons in response to cyberattacks would be dramatic but not credible. Calls for a nuclear response to cyberattacks would be dismissed as frivolous. Threats to use military force to retaliate against an act that would not be considered as justifying the use of force in self-defense under international law or practice will likely be dismissed by opponents as bluster.