## 1

### T

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must defend a hypothetical policy implementation of the aff

#### The WTO is a trade organization

**WTO No Date** (<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm>) EE

What is the WTO?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business.

#### Ought means obligation

**Merriam Webster no date** <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> EE

—used to express obligation

ought to pay our debts

#### Member means part of a group

**Merriam Webster no date** <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/member> EE

member

noun, often attributive

Definition of member

1: a body part or organ: such as

a: LIMB

b: PENIS

c: a unit of structure in a plant body

2: one of the individuals composing a group

3: a person baptized or enrolled in a church

4: a part of a whole: such as

a: a syntactic or rhythmic unit of a sentence : CLAUSE

b: one of the propositions of a syllogism

c: one of the elements of a set or class

d: either of the equated elements in a mathematical equation

#### Nation means a community with a defined territory and government

**Merriam Webster no date** (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation>) EE

b: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government

Canada is a nation with a written constitution

— B. K. Sandwell

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Fairness – post facto topic adjustment and debates about scholarship breed reactionary generics and allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage. They can specialize in 1 area of literature for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months – this crushes clash because all neg prep is based on the rez as a stable stasis point and they create a structural disincentive to do research – we lose 90% of negative ground while the aff still gets the perm which makes being neg impossible.

#### 2] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

#### 3] Small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities. Inclusion is an independent voter – you can’t debate if you can’t participate which is a prerequisite to accessing their benefits and ensures everyone gains from the activity.

#### 4] TVA: Read an aff about how race wars were created through IP exploitation from pharmaceuticals

#### Failure to integrate race and IP protections either creates shallow policy analysis or shallow theoretical analysis. The two are mutually constitutive in the context of the topic which makes a plan imperative.

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**Recalling** the concept of **medical neocolonialism** is instructive here, as **South Africa obtained** millions of **vaccine doses at a cost** of $5.25 per dose, which is more than **double the** $2.16 per dose that **E**uropean **U**nion **countries paid** to AstraZeneca.97 Moreover, since South Africans initially participated in clinical trials for the development of the drug, they should have had greater post-trial access and benefit-sharing based on fundamental principles of research referenced earlier.98 Instead, **South Africa had to pay more for a drug it ultimately will not be able to use.** The trial of the vaccine revealed comparatively low efficacy rates (under 25%) against mild and moderate cases of the disease in South Africa, a threshold that does not “meet minimal international standards for emergency use.”99 South Africa has discontinued its plans to use the AstraZeneca vaccine, given the vaccine’s ineffectualness against a newer variant of the virus that is prevalent in South Africa.100 At the time of writing, its national immunization drive is in flux. This is compounded by Moderna’s (manufacturer of one of the most expensive COVID-19 vaccines101) earlier indication that it did not plan to distribute its vaccine in South Africa.102 Significantly, a single dose of the Moderna vaccine costs approximately $32–$37 and has an efficacy of approximately 95%.103 While Moderna pledged not to enforce its patent during the COVID-19 pandemic,104 it does not own all the patents in its vaccine.105 Accordingly, Moderna cannot make credible commitments that bind other patentholders. **Conventional analyses would simply treat vaccine apartheid as driven by and fully accounted for by poverty. Such shallow analyses,** however, **tend to obscure the functioning of race and histories of subordination**, which is why the concept of medical neocolonialism is so useful. The South African example vividly illustrates how “the fruits of medical and scientific advances are stockpiled for some and denied for others.”106 By failing to take an intersectional approach, traditional analyses may not fully capture how multiple overlapping areas such as race, class, and geography may function to produce heightened subordination. The political economy explanation also does not consider how market **failures for pharmaceuticals** aimed at diseases that disproportionately impact people of color **are tied to long histories of exploitation, dispossession, and devaluation of** the lives of Black, Indigenous, and other **people of color.** **A thorough analysis of** COVID-19 **vaccine apartheid and disposability must also consider the role of the international intellectual property regime in** severely **compounding the challenges of equitable vaccine distribution**. Briefly, **the** international **i**ntellectual **p**roperty **regime provides a** twenty-year **monopoly for pharmaceuticals**.107 Until the creation of this regime, many countries did not even place patent protection on pharmaceuticals. Previously, states regarded patent rights as a national prerogative rather than a minimum international substantive regime with standards for what intellectual property rights protections countries should adopt. Recognizing this, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (**TRIPS**) Agreement grants extra implementation time to developing countries and **delayed implementation for the least-developed countries.**108 Although the DOHA Declaration, which reaffirms the TRIPS Agreement, and some TRIPS provisions were meant to create better flexibilities for public health or incentivize research and development, they have had limited effect in facilitating access to medicines,109 given the larger incentive structure toward profit maximization.110 Indeed, the creation of the international intellectual property regime and the ratification of this regime in the Doha Declaration has functioned to expand and increase U.S.-style pharmaceutical patent protection globally.111 Further, the United States often threatens to close off its market to countries that run afoul of its interpretation of what the TRIPS regime requires for protecting pharmaceuticals.112 The United States and others also advance their structural power against states in the Global South through a mix of TRIPS-plus provisions placed in bilateral and regional free-trade agreements that have imposed much more stringent requirements on countries than required by TRIPS.113

#### B]

#### The impact is fairness—a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity, b] probability – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins, c] it internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater because dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense

#### No rvis—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

#### They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

## 2

#### The hyperreal surrounds us and repeated simulations have created binaries that prevent us from pursuing radical change

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After describing a novel sociological position that regards semiology, rather than capital, as the key component of domination (Baudrillard [1968] 1998),  Baudrillard’s radical social theory emerges in light of considerations of consumerism, media, information and technology—all of which conspire to create what Baudrillard calls a ‘hyperreal’ society. This is a contemporary world where all boundaries, categories and values implode into the ‘end of the social’. Baudrillard (1972) begins elaborating this theory in an article titled ‘Design and Environment or How Political Economy Escalates into Cyberblitz’ (Baudrillard, 1972, Chapter 10). In this essay, he points to the importance of ‘the passage out of a metallurgic into a semiurgic society’ (Ibid.: 185). Here, consumer objects take on a life of their own ‘as an embodiment and functional part of a system of signs, independent of its status as a commodity’ (Kellner, 1989: 76). He uses the German Bauhaus movement as an example to anticipate the ‘universal semantisation of the environment in which everything becomes the object of a calculus of function and signification’ (Baudrillard, 1972: 185-86). This is achieved by the synthesis ‘of form and function, beauty and utility, of art and technology’ in the design of objects that produces a functionalised universe whereby the meaning and function of every object is determined by its place in the system. As a result, ‘the whole environment becomes a signifier, objectified as an element of signification’ (Ibid.: 186-87). This is analogous to Derrida’s concept of ‘difference’ whereby meaning is never present ‘in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself’ (Derrida, 1965: 27). Essentially, objects, words and images have no direct relationship to the things in which they refer, they inherent meaning only by interacting with one another in an ongoing system of contrast. Baudrillard refers to this system as a ‘cybernetic code’, and argues that reality itself is shut out from this system of because the system is wholly self-referencing. This code creates ‘a functionalised, integrated and self-reproducing universe’ of meaning, controlled by simulacra and simulation. And, like Derrida’s text, there is nothing outside of the code In ‘The Orders of Simulacra’, Baudrillard (1995) outlines the stages of the transition from traditional society to the contemporary society defined by simulations (Baudrillard, 1995). First, according to Baudrillard, the feudal era had a fixed social order established by a hierarchy of obligatory signs indicating social class and rank. Here, a ‘natural law of value’ dominates the stage. Simulacra, a representation of another image, first emerge as ‘counterfeits’ of the real. For example, representations of class, law or value are said to be grounded in nature: art imitates life and democracy is legitimised by ‘natural rights’. Baudrillard indicates, however, that the inherent goal of simulacra is to produce a controllable and universal system of power. At this stage, counterfeit simulacra is working ‘only on substance and form, not yet on relations or structures’, but its evolution will create ‘a pacified society, ground up into a deathless substance … that will guarantee an eternity of … cultural hegemony’ (Baudrillard, 1983b: 91). Next, the second-order of simulacra appears during the industrial revolution. Importantly, infinite reproducibility is introduced into society. For example, exact replicas of objects are produced by assembly lines and automation. No longer is there nostalgia for a natural order; nature is to be dominated by production; counterfeit simulacra are now obsolete. Most importantly, however, the infinite reproducibility of objects, augmented by the rise of capitalism, enables the emergence of the cybernetic code and contemporary society. Baudrillard claims that ‘we are in the third-order simulacra’, where simulation models come to constitute the world and all referential finalities are abolished (Ibid.: 100-01): God, Man, Nature, History, Society and others. This is because images are only understood by reference to other images. Thus, society has moved from ‘a capitalist-productivitist society to a neo-capitalist cybernetic order’ (Ibid.: 111). As a result of this code, images no longer refer to an object; rather, they refer to another commutable image on the code. But, through models contained in common societal narrative and institutional discourse, simulations are able to produce a ‘reality effect’, which conceals the fact they are merely referring to other simulations (Bogard, 1996: 10). For example, the code continually sets up simulations of events, which test individuals and ‘[inscribe] them into the simulated order’ through a ‘process of signalisation’ (Kellner, 1989: 80). For example, every advertisement, choice of commodity, choice of entertainment, and political candidate presents a chance for a binary response of affirmation or negation. It is in this way that individuals are inserted into a dominating ‘coded system of similarities and dissimilarities, of identities and programed differences’ (Ibid.). Thus, Baudrillard’s contemporary social theory is distinguishable from previous determinist social theories that postulate powerful individuals, classes, or corporations manipulating the public for certain ends. Instead, Baudrillard suggests that social organisation is determined by individual’s responses to the pre-coded messages that are derived from simulations of economics, politics, culture or the banal decisions of everyday life (Baudrillard, 1983b: 111). Importantly for the third-order of simulacra, the binary system of the code creates a ‘deterrence model’ in which all ‘radical change is ruled out, since the very fact of an option between different political parties, [for example], acts as a deterrent against demands for radical social change’ (Kellner, 1989: 81). This is the end of society as traditionally theorised.

#### Their attempt to identify an exploiter and exploited is misguided and also provides the foundation for power relations

Baudrillard 87 Forget Foucault

In fact, the whole analysis of power needs to be reconsidered. To have power or not, to take it or lose it, to incarnate it or to challenge it: if this were power, it would not even exist. Foucault tells us something else; power is something that functions; " ... power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" ( The History of Sexuality, p. 93). Neither central, nor unilateral, nor dominant, power is distributional; like a vector, it operates through relays and transmissions. Because it is an immanent, unlimited field of forces, we still do not understand what power runs into and against what it stumbles since it is expansion, pure magnetization. However, if power were this magnetic infiltration ad infinitum of the social field, it would long ago have ceased meeting with any resistance. Inversely, if it were the one-sidedness of an act of submission, as in the traditional "optic," it would long ago have been overthrown everywhere. It would have collapsed under the pressure of antagonistic forces. Yet this has never happened, apart from a few "historical" exceptions. For "materialist" thinking, this can only appear to be an internally insoluble problem: why don't "dominated" masses immediately overthrow power? Why fascism? Against this unilateral theory (but we understand why it survives, particularly among "revolutionaries" -they would really like power for themselves), against this native vision, but also against Foucault's functional vision in terms of relays and transmissions, we must say that power is something that is exchanged. Not in the economical sense, but in the sense that power is executed according to a reversible cycle of seduction, challenge, and ruse (neither axis nor indefinite relay, but a cycle). And if power cannot be exchanged in this sense, it simply disappears. We must say that power seduces, but not in the vulgar sense of a complicit form of desire on the part of those who are dominated-this comes down to basing it in the desire of others, which is really going overboard in taking people for idiots-no, power seduces by that reversibility which haunts it, and upon which a minimal symbolic cycle is set up. Dominators and dominated exist no more than victims and executioners. (While exploiters and exploited do in fact exist, they are on different sides because there is no reversibility in production, which is precisely the point: nothing essential happens at that level.) With power there are no antagonistic positions: it is carried out according to a cycle of seduction.

#### The affirmatives attempt at subjectivity-based change is complicit in the overproduction of meaning – the amassing of facts and evidence – and especially truth – only make the world more unreal. Thus, the role of the ballot is to decide the ethicality of debate's communicative form, which is prior to all of the content based arguments they've made.

**Baudrillard 81** (Jean, “*Simulacra and Simulations*,” pg. 79-81)

We live in a world where there is more and more information, and less and less meaning. Consider three hypotheses. Either information produces meaning (a negentropic factor), but cannot make up for the brutal loss of signification in every domain. Despite efforts to reinject message and content, meaning is lost and devoured faster than it can be reinjected. In this case, one must appeal to a base productivity to replace failing media. This is the whole ideology of free speech, of media broken down into innumerable individual cells of transmission, that is, into "antimedia" (pirate radio, etc.). Or information has nothing to do with signification. It is something else, an operational model of another order, outside meaning and of the circulation of meaning strictly speaking. This is Shannon's hypothesis: a sphere of information that is purely functional, a technical medium that does not imply any finality of meaning, and thus should also not be implicated in a value judgment. A kind of code, like the genetic code: it is what it is, it functions as it does, meaning is something else that in a sense comes after the fact, as it does for Monod in Chance and Necessity. In this case, there would simply be no significant relation between the inflation of information and the deflation of meaning. Or, very much on the contrary, there is a rigorous and necessary correlation between the two, to the extent that information is directly destructive of meaning and signification, or that it neutralizes them. The loss of meaning is directly linked to the dissolving, dissuasive action of information, the media, and the mass media. The third hypothesis is the most interesting but flies in the face of every commonly held opinion. Everywhere socialization is measured by the exposure to media messages. Whoever is underexposed to the media is desocialized or virtually asocial. Everywhere information is thought to produce an accelerated circulation of meaning, a plus value of meaning homologous to the economic one that results from the accelerated rotation of capital. Information is thought to create communication, and even if the waste is enormous, a general consensus would have it that nevertheless, as a whole, there be an excess of meaning, which is redistributed in all the interstices of the social just as consensus would have it that material production, despite its dysfunctions and irrationalities, opens onto an excess of wealth and social purpose. We are all complicitous in this myth. It is the alpha and omega of our modernity, without which the credibility of our social organization would collapse. Well, the fact is that it is collapsing, and for this very reason: because where we think that information produces meaning, the opposite occurs. **Information devours its own content. It devours communication and the social**. And for two reasons. 1. Rather than creating communication, it exhausts itself in the act of staging communication. Rather than producing meaning, it exhausts itself in the staging of meaning. A gigantic process of simulation that is very familiar. The nondirective interview, speech, listeners who call in, participation at every level, **blackmail through speech: "You are concerned, you are the event**, etc." More and more information is invaded by this kind of phantom content, this homeopathic grafting, this awakening dream of communication. A circular arrangement through which one stages the desire of the audience, the antitheater of communication, which, as one knows, is never anything but the recycling in the negative of the traditional institution, the integrated circuit of the negative. Immense energies are deployed to hold this simulacrum at bay, to avoid the brutal desimulation that would confront us in the face of the obvious reality of a radical loss of meaning. It is useless to ask if it is the loss of communication that produces this escalation in the simulacrum, or whether it is the simulacrum that is there first for dissuasive ends, to short-circuit in advance any possibility of communication (precession of the model that calls an end to the real). Useless to ask which is the first term, there is none, it is a circular process that of simulation, that of the hyperreal. The hyperreality of communication and of meaning. More real than the real, that is how the real is abolished. Thus not only communication but the social functions in a closed circuit, as a lure to which the force of myth is attached. Belief, faith in information attach themselves to this tautological proof that the system gives of itself by doubling the signs of an unlocatable reality. But one can believe that this belief is as ambiguous as that which was attached to myths in ancient societies. One both believes and doesn't. One does not ask oneself, "I know very well, but still." A sort of inverse simulation in the masses, in each one of us, corresponds to this simulation of meaning and of communication in which this system encloses us. To this tautology of the system the masses respond with ambivalence, to deterrence they respond with disaffection, or with an always enigmatic belief. Myth exists, but one must guard against thinking that people believe in it: this is the trap of critical thinking that can only be exercised if it presupposes the naivete and stupidity of the masses. 2. Behind this exacerbated mise-en-scène of communication, the mass media, the pressure of information pursues an irresistible destructuration of the social. Thus information dissolves meaning and dissolves the social, in a sort of nebulous state dedicated not to a surplus of innovation, but, on the contrary, to total entropy.\*1 Thus the media are producers not of socialization, but of exactly the opposite, of the implosion of the social in the masses. And this is only the macroscopic extension of the implosion of meaning at the microscopic level of the sign. This implosion should be analyzed according to McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, the consequences of which have yet to be exhausted. That means that all contents of meaning are absorbed in the only dominant form of the medium. Only the medium can make an event whatever the contents, whether they are conformist or subversive. A serious problem for all counterinformation, pirate radios, antimedia, etc. But there is something even more serious, which McLuhan himself did not see. Because beyond this neutralization of all content, one could still expect to manipulate the medium in its form and to transform the real by using the impact of the medium as form. If all the content is wiped out, there is perhaps still a subversive, revolutionary use value of the medium as such. That is and this is where McLuhan's formula leads, pushed to its limit there is not only an implosion of the message in the medium, there is, in the same movement, the implosion of the medium itself in the real, the implosion of the medium and of the real in a sort of hyperreal nebula, in which even the definition and distinct action of the medium can no longer be determined. Even the "traditional" status of the media themselves, characteristic of modernity, is put in question. McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, which is the key formula of the era of simulation (the medium is the message the sender is the receiver the circularity of all poles the end of panoptic and perspectival space such is the alpha and omega of our modernity), this very formula must be imagined at its limit where, after all the contents and messages have been volatilized in the medium, it is the medium itself that is volatilized as such. Fundamentally, it is still the message that lends credibility to the medium, that gives the medium its determined, distinct status as the intermediary of communication. Without a message, the medium also falls into the indefinite state characteristic of all our great systems of judgment and value. A single model, whose efficacy is immediate, simultaneously generates the message, the medium, and the "real." Finally, the medium is the message not only signifies the end of the message, but also the end of the medium. There are no more media in the literal sense of the word (I'm speaking particularly of electronic mass media) that is, of a mediating power between one reality and another, between one state of the real and another. Neither in content, nor in form. Strictly, this is what implosion signifies. The absorption of one pole into another, the short-circuiting between poles of every differential system of meaning, the erasure of distinct terms and oppositions, including that of the medium and of the real thus the impossibility of any mediation, of any dialectical intervention between the two or from one to the other. Circularity of all media effects. Hence the impossibility of meaning in the literal sense of a unilateral vector that goes from one pole to another. One must envisage this critical but original situation at its very limit: it is the only one left us. It is useless to dream of revolution through content, useless to dream of a revelation through form, because the medium and the real are now in a single nebula whose truth is indecipherable. The fact of this implosion of contents, of the absorption of meaning, of the evanescence of the medium itself, of the reabsorption of every dialectic of communication in a total circularity of the model, of the implosion of the social in the masses, may seem catastrophic and desperate. But this is only the case in light of the idealism that dominates our whole view of information. We all live by a passionate idealism of meaning and of communication, by an idealism of communication through meaning, and, from this perspective, it is truly the catastrophe of meaning that lies in wait for us. But one must realize that "catastrophe" has this "catastrophic" meaning of end and annihilation only in relation to a linear vision of accumulation, of productive finality, imposed on us by the system. Etymologically, the term itself only signifies the curvature, the winding down to the bottom of a cycle that leads to what one could call the "horizon of the event," to an impassable horizon of meaning: beyond that nothing takes place that has meaning for us but it suffices to get out of this ultimatum of meaning in order for the catastrophe itself to no longer seem like a final and nihilistic day of reckoning, such as it functions in our contemporary imaginary. Beyond meaning, there is the fascination that results from the neutralization and the implosion of meaning. Beyond the horizon of the social, there are the masses, which result from the neutralization and the implosion of the social. What is essential today is to evaluate this double challenge the challenge of the masses to meaning and their silence (which is not at all a passive resistance) the challenge to meaning that comes from the media and its fascination. All the marginal, alternative efforts to revive meaning are secondary in relation to that challenge. Evidently, there is a paradox in this inextricable conjunction of the masses and the media: do the media neutralize meaning and produce unformed [informe] or informed [informée] masses, or is it the masses who victoriously resist the media by directing or absorbing all the messages that the media produce without responding to them? Sometime ago, in "Requiem for the Media," I analyzed and condemned the media as the institution of an irreversible model of communication without a response. But today? This absence of a response can no longer be understood at all as a strategy of power, but as a counterstrategy of the masses themselves when they encounter power. What then? Are the mass media on the side of power in the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the liquidation of meaning, in the violence perpetrated on meaning, and in fascination? Is it the media that induce fascination in the masses, or is it the masses who direct the media into the spectacle? Mogadishu-Stammheim: the media make themselves into the vehicle of the moral condemnation of terrorism and of the exploitation of fear for political ends, but simultaneously, in the most complete ambiguity, they propagate the brutal charm of the terrorist act, they are themselves terrorists, insofar as they themselves march to the tune of seduction (cf. Umberto Eco on this eternal moral dilemma: how can one not speak of terrorism, how can one find a good use of the media there is none). The media carry meaning and countermeaning, they manipulate in all directions at once, nothing can control this process, they are the vehicle for the simulation internal to the system and the simulation that destroys the system, according to an absolutely Mobian and circular logic and it is exactly like this. There is no alternative to this, no logical resolution. Only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution. With one caution. We are face to face with this system in a double situation and insoluble double bind exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world. Children are simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free and conscious, and to constitute themselves as submissive, inert, obedient, conforming objects. The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand he responds with a double strategy. To the demand of being an object, he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to subjecthood. To the demand of being a subject he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, an object's resistance, that is to say, exactly the opposite: childishness, hyperconformism, total dependence, passivity, idiocy. Neither strategy has more objective value than the other. The subject-resistance is today unilaterally valorized and viewed as positive just as in the political sphere only the practices of freedom, emancipation, expression, and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable and subversive. But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning precisely the practices of the masses that we bury under the derisory terms of alienation and passivity. The liberating practices respond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects, but they do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves, expressing ourselves at whatever cost, of voting, producing, deciding, speaking, participating, playing the game a form of blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, even more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood. But this strategy is more reflective of the earlier phase of the system, and even if we are still confronted with it, **it is no longer the strategic terrain: the current argument of the system is to maximize speech**, the maximum production of meaning. **Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning** and of the spoken word or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non-reception. It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it. This strategy (if one can still speak of strategy) prevails today, because it was ushered in by that phase of the system which prevails. To choose the wrong strategy is a serious matter. All the movements that only play on liberation, emancipation, on the resurrection of a subject of history, of the group, of the word based on "**consciousness raising**," indeed a "raising of the unconscious" of subjects and of the masses, do not see that they are going in the direction of the system, whose imperative today is precisely the overproduction and regeneration of meaning and of speech.

#### The alternative is hyper conformity—only playing with simulations avoids commodification

Rivera 20-- Rivera, Alex. "Baudrillard and the Viral Violence of Cyber Security." (2020).

If the core of global violence manifests from the accumulation of meaning, the only regress would be to abolish such a pursuit. Yet, our weapons to challenge this immense system of semiotic exchange are extremely limited since external critique, like described above, is increasingly coopted as an information commodity within the system (Pawlett, 2016: 33-34). Even the most radical intellectual theories that appear to be in diametric contradiction with the virtue of such exchange ultimately become tolerated and commodified. One can simply look at the plethora of radical critical literature books for sale on Amazon; purchasing copies of books like The Communist Manifesto “[…] not only provides profits to a tax-dodging mega-corporation, it also demonstrates (or rather, simulates) the openness, tolerance and freedoms of the consumer capitalist system” (Pawlett, 2016: 33-34). Thus, these oppositional challenges to commodification end up lauding the virtuous nature of commodification by proving a tolerance that is so complete that it can literally tolerate advocacies of its demise. Most criticism begins at the wrong place by placing their challenge in the domain of the real. For Baudrillard, an unreal system is incapable of receiving a real death and thus our strategy must be a weaponization of simulations that stage its symbolic downfall. This is why the previously mentioned principal of reversibility is of the utmost importance; even when one injects meaning that is toxic to the system’s vitality, it will be consumed and exchanged like any other piece of information that is offered. Since the power of models that completely envelope reality derives from their excess of information, the ability to know everything in advance, they are vulnerable to paradox and irreconcilable confusion. Over identification with the voracious consumption of information and the overproduction of meaning can therefore reverse its strength against itself, “[…] like a much larger opponent being thrown by the momentum of their own weight in martial arts” (Pawlett, 2016: 33-34). One can imagine, for example, a society taking the messages of Red Bull commercials far too seriously and consuming the beverage to the point of widespread intestinal dysfunction – a self-demonstrating critique of the culture of productivity. As the entire system of symbolic exchange is a mere illusion, even a small act of deceit has the potential to cause its downfall. This is not to say that we should accelerate the proliferation of grotesque images like those of Abu Ghraib, quite the opposite, such a strategy would create obscene violence and fail to stake a true virtual challenge of the system. Rather, we should view those examples as demonstrations that even what initially appears impossible or destabilizing to exchange, will indeed be exchanged. Therefore, Baudrillard’s solution is contained within the science of imaginary solutions coined as Pataphysics; “Pataphysicians fight reality […]” not by confronting it, but by “[…] creating illusion and deceit” (Strehle, 2014). To avoid the trap of succumbing to a will to truth that landed us here in the first place, we must instead be radical enough to subvert reality by playing with simulations. Despite traditional assumptions, the purpose of radical thought should not be to “[…] recognize and analyze reality, instead it must deny and contradict its hegemony. It has to create illusion and establish a power of seduction that makes one lose the path of reality” (Strehle, 2014). This is comparable to a fishing lure, which takes advantage of the hunger and curiosity of fish to lead them astray from their normal food course. Baudrillard’s playful work mimics “[…] a simulacrum in the strongest sense” by denying seemingly obvious premises and writing in a riddle-like prose (Strehle, 2014). Language and signs are useful tools that can lead the subject to read and interrogate the event from a different angle. His propositions thus construct a new reality, and if the grand simulacrum is to oppose his illusion, it would expose its own unreality in the process. Yet critically, he is not concerned with discovering truth or crafting an evidence intensive case to create these illusions. By placing premises that contradict reality, his “[…] theories are like evil ghosts: They haunt reality by staging its excluded other—no matter if this other really exists or if it has to be feigned” (Strehle, 2014). This illusion of language attempts to replace what has been muted from the war by creating a new reality, not simply describing one that is waiting in the world. It replaces the old model with a confused and unreadable one in order to end the violence of predictability.

## Case

#### The aff’s investment in ethnic-racialized identity leads to color-checking and a new standard of “recognizable ethnicity” according to the race war – that turns the whole aff

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Part of what I am talking about here is what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s (2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector. How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. Similarly, as Baratunde Thurston (2011) points out in his recent book, How to be Black, often this kind of black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino, or Asian, etc.). Reflecting on his own sense of his Blackness, he writes, “One of the most consistent themes in my own experience… is this notion of discovering your own Blackness by embracing the new, the different, the uncommon, and, simply, yourself” (p. 218). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. As I argue, these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice. So what am I, in the end? I am whatever you want me to be: oppressor, oppressed, cracker, spic, enemy, friend, White, Black, lover, fighter, masculine, effeminate, strong, weak, dead or alive. Just know that with each turn, each attempt to define me, to mark me, to confine and bind me, you free me. Like the hysteric who produces ever shifting configurations of symptoms in order to throw the obsessive physician off guard (see Gherovici, 2003), I will keep producing knowledge of something else, something other, something that is incalculable and undefinable. Something Real. For you I’ll become a Hispanic hysteric, screeching Foucault (1972) with each symptom, with each episode of acting out, “Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (p. 17). Because in the end this is not really about me, or where I stand on the color line. It is about your illusion about where you stand and where you place yourself in the coordinates of race and ethnicity, of self and other, of Black and White. In that sense I function as your blank screen, receiving your projections and identifications, hopefully returning them to you as knowledge productions that question, destabilize, and decenter your ego, paving the way for the subject that slides in the link between signifier and signified, that does not know if it is caused by the signifier or the signified of race, but is instead, its own cause.