### Contractarianism NC

#### Moral internalism is true:

#### [1] Disagreement – Externalist theories fail to explain why some agents have the differing motivation for actions – internalism solves by showing how agents’ motivations are dictated by internal desires. Markovitz

[Markovits 14, Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. https://philpapers.org/rec/ROCJMM Oxford University Press, 2014.//Scopa] SHS ZS

Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. **We should not assume** that **some of us have** special **epistemic access to what matters**, **especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment**. **It’s better to start from the assumption**, as internalism does, **that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit** – **and correct this assumption** only **by appealing to standards that are** as **uncontroversial** as possible. **According to externalism** about reasons, **what matters normatively** – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – **does not depend in** any fundamental way on **what** in fact **matters to us** – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. **Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters**, **and some** of us **are “wrongly” motivated**. **But externalists** can **offer no explanation for this supposed difference** in how well we respond to reasons – **no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones** – **that doesn’t** itself **appeal to the views about what matters** that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) **A comparison to the epistemic case** helps **bring out what is unsatisfactory** in the externalist position. **We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than** to **others** **despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right** in their beliefs about a certain topic. **Chicken-sexing is a popular example** of this among philosophers. **We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens.** But in the case of chicken-sexing, **we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right**. **Externalism seems to tell[s] us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others**, but **without providing the independent means of determining** which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).

#### [2] Regress – a priori knowledge is merely an acceptance of an individual’s conception of rationality. Macintyre 81.

[Macintyre 81, Alasdair Macintyre, https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268035044/after-virtue/ After Virtue, 1981] SHS ZS

The most influential account of moral reasoning that emerged in response to this critique of emotivism was one according to which an agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but on this view [**S]ince every chain of reasoning must be finite**, such **a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given.** ‘Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effect of observing those principles. **If** [I] **the enquirer still goes on ask ing** ‘But why should I live like that?’ then **there is no further answer to give** him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, [we have already] said everything that could be included in the further answer.’ (Hare 1952, p. 69). **The terminus of justification is thus always**, on this view, a not further to be justified choice, **a choice unguided by criteria.** **Each individual implicitly or explicitly has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice.** The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and for that will its principles have and can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them.

#### [3] Empirically proven – the competition between competing externalists modes of ethics has been going for centuries. Leiter

[Leiter, Brian. “Moral Psychology with Nietzsche.” Oxford University Press. Published 2019] SHS ZS

With respect to very particularized moral disagreements — e.g., about questions of economic or social policy — which often trade on obvious factual ignorance or disagreement about complicated empirical questions, this seems a plausible retort. But **for over two hundred years**, **Kantians and utilitarians have** [developed] **been developing** increasingly systematic **versions of their respective positions**. The Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy has an even longer history. **Utilitarians** [They] **have become** particularly **adept at explaining how they can accommodate** [**others**] Kantian and Aristotelian intuitions about particular cases and issues, **though** in ways that are usually found to be systematically unpersuasive to the competing traditions and which, in any case, **do nothing to dissolve the disagreement** about the underlying moral criteria and categories. Philosophers in each tradition increasingly talk only to each other, without even trying to convince those in the other traditions. And **while there may well be ‘progress’ within traditions** — e.g., most utilitarians regard Mill as an improvement on Bentham—**there does not appear to be any progress** [towards] **in moral theory**, in the sense of a consensus that particular fundamental theories of right action and the good life are deemed better than their predecessors. What we find now are simply the competing traditions — Kantian, Humean, Millian, Aristotelian, Thomist, perhaps now even Nietzschean — who often view their competitors as unintelligible or morally obtuse, but don’t have any actual arguments against the foundational principles of their competitors. **There is**, in short, **no sign** — I can think of none — **that we are heading towards any epistemic rapprochement** between these competing moral traditions. Are we really to believe that hyper-rational and reflective moral philosophers, whose lives, in most cases, are devoted to systematic reflection on philosophical questions, many of whom (historically) were independently wealthy (or indifferent to material success) and so immune to crass considerations of livelihood and material self-interest, and most of whom, in the modern era, spend professional careers refining their positions, and have been doing so as a professional class in university settings for well over a century — are we really supposed to believe that they have reached no substantial agreement on any foundational moral principle because of ignorance, irrationality, or partiality

#### [4] Motivation – A. Externalist ethics collapse to internalism because agents will only follow external demands if they are consistent with their internal account of the good. For instance, citizens only follow the law insofar as its consistent with their internal beliefs, even when external value structures are being placed upon them. B. Empirics – there is no factual account of the good since each agent has unique motivation and there is no way to combine these beliefs into a unified ethic.

#### Next, agents justify their actions based on individual moral preferences and deal with ethical dilemmas by prioritizing their own beliefs. Gauthier.

[David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998, ///AHS PB] SHS ZS

Fortunately, I do not have to defend normative foundationalism. One problem with accepting moral justification as part of our ongoing practice is that, as I have suggested, **we no longer accept the world view on which it depends**. But perhaps a more immediately pressing problem is that we have, ready to hand, an alternative mode for justifying our choices and actions. In its more austere and, in my view, more defensible form, this is to show that **choices and actions maximize** **the agent ’s expected utility**, **where utility is a measure of considered preference.** In its less austere version, this is to show that **choices and actions satisfy, not a subjectively defined requirement such as utility, but meet the agent ’ s objective interests.** Since I do not believe that we have objective interests, I shall ignore this latter. But it will not matter. For the idea is clear; **we have a mode of justification that does not require the introduction of moral considerations.** 11 Let me call this alternative nonmoral mode of justification, neutrally, **deliberative justification**. Now moral and deliberative justification are directed at the same objects – **our choices and actions. What if they conflict?** And what do we say to the person who offers a deliberative justification of his choices and actions and refuses to offer any other? We can say, of course, that his behavior lacks moral justification, but this seems to lack any hold, unless he chooses to enter the moral framework. And such entry, he may insist, lacks any deliberative justification, at least for him. **If morality perishes, the justificatory enterprise**, in relation to choice and action, **does not perish with it**. Rather, one mode of justification perishes, a mode that, it may seem, now hangs unsupported. But not only unsupported, for it is difficult to deny that **deliberative justification** is more clearly basic, that it **cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents**, so that if moral justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but opposed by what is rationally more fundamental. **Deliberative justification relates to our deep sense of self**. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, and **provides the basis for rationality**, is the capacity **for semantic representation**. You can, as your dog on the whole cannot, represent a state of affairs to yourself, and consider in particular whether or not it is the case, and whether or not you would want it to be the case. **You can represent to yourself the contents of your beliefs, and your desires or preferences**. But in representing them, you bring them into relation with one another. You represent to yourself that the Blue Jays will win the World Series, and that a National League team will win the World Series, and that the Blue Jays are not a National League team. And in recognizing a conflict among those beliefs, you find  rationality thrust upon you. Note that the first two beliefs could be replaced by preferences, with the same effect. Since in representing our preferences we become aware of conflict among them, the step from representation to choice becomes complicated. **We must, somehow, bring our conflicting desires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And there is only one plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle**. We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfillment. **And in so doing, we show ourselves to be rational agents, engaged in deliberation and deliberative justification**. There is simply nothing else for practical rationality to be. The foundational crisis of morality thus cannot be avoided by pointing to the existence of a practice of justification within the moral framework, and denying that any extramoral foundation is relevant. For an extramoral mode of justification is already present, existing not side by side with moral justification, but in a manner tied to the way in which we unify our beliefs and preferences and so acquire our deep sense of self. **We need not suppose that this deliberative justification is itself to be understood foundationally. All that we need suppose is that moral justification does not plausibly survive conflict with it.**

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with contractarianism. Agents must engage in the project of mutual self-restraint as to not impede upon the moral authority of others. Stanford.

[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Contractarianism.” <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/> Published 18 June 2000] SHS ZS

A brief sketch of the most complete and influential contemporary contractarian theory, David Gauthier’s, is in order. **Gauthier’s project** in Morals By Agreement **is to employ a contractarian approach to grounding morality in rationality** in order **to defeat the moral skeptic.** (However, Anita Superson (2009) points out that Gauthier attempts to answer only the skeptic who asks “why should I be moral?” but leaves both the motive skeptic, who argues that it is enough to act morally but need not be motivated by morality, and the amoralist, who denies that there is any such thing as morality, that is, that there are true moral statements.) **It is** generally **assumed that humans can have no perfect natural harmony of interests** (otherwise morality would be largely superfluous), and that there is much for each individual to gain through cooperation. However, **moral constraint on the pursuit of individual self-interest is required because cooperative activities almost inevitably lead to a prisoner’s dilemma**: a situation in which the best individual outcomes can be had by those who cheat on the agreement while the others keep their part of the bargain. This leads to the socially and individually sub-optimal outcome wherein each can expect to be cheated by the other. But by disposing themselves to act according to the requirements of morality whenever others are also so disposed, they can gain each others’ trust and cooperate successfully. **The contractarian element of the theory comes in the derivation of the moral norms. The compliance problem—the problem of justifying rational compliance with the norms that have been accepted—must drive the justification of the initial situation and the conduct of the contracting situation**. **It is helpful to think of the contract situation as a bargain, in which each party is trying to negotiate the moral rules that will allow them to realize optimal utility**, and this has led philosophers to apply a number of bargaining solutions to the initial contract situation. Gauthier’s solution is the “minimax relative concession” (1986, ch. V). **The idea of minimax relative concession is that each bargainer will be most concerned with the concessions that she makes from her ideal outcome relative to the concessions that others make**. If she sees her concessions as reasonable relative to the others, considering that she wants to ensure as much for herself as she can while securing agreement (and thereby avoiding the zero-point: no share of the cooperative surplus) and subsequent compliance from the others, then she will agree to it. What would then be the reasonable outcome**? The reasonable outcome, according to this view, is the outcome that minimizes the maximum relative concessions of each party to the bargain** (Gauthier 1986, ch. V). Equally important to the solution as the procedure is the starting point from which the parties begin. For some contractarians (like Gauthier) there is no veil of ignorance—each party to the contract is fully informed of their personal attributes and holdings. However, without the veil of ignorance, contractors will be aware of the differences in bargaining power that could potentially affect the outcome of the bargain. **It is important, then, that the initial position must have been arrived at non-coercively if compliance to the agreement is to be secured.** A form of the “Lockean proviso” (modeled after Locke’s description of the initial situation of his social contract): that one cannot have bettered himself by worsening others, may turn out to be beneficial in cases without a veil of ignorance. In sum, **the moral norms that rational contractors will adopt** (and comply with) **are those norms that would be reached by the contractors beginning from a position each has attained through her own actions which have not worsened anyone else,** and adopting as their principle for agreement the rule of minimax relative concession (Gauthier 1986, ch. VII). On one line of thought, contractarianism produces liberal individuals who seem well suited to join the kind of society that Rawls envisioned (Gauthier 1986, ch. XI). On another line, the Hobbesian contractarian argument leads towards the sparse government of libertarianism (Narveson 1988). The controversy here turns on the primary motivation for individuals to make agreements and cooperate. As we said before, there are two such motivations for the Hobbesian contractarian: fear of the depredations of others and benefits from cooperation with others. Libertarianism results when the first of these is primary, whereas when the second is primary, the kind of reciprocity and supportive government that will be discussed in the final section becomes possible.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Actor specificity – states are not moral entities but derive authority from the contracts that allows them to constrain action. This outweighs on empiricism; states aren’t bound by moral obligations, but they are by their contracts to other entities.

#### [2] Collapses – Contracts takes into account all other ethical theories and allows agents to engage under the index of their own good so long as they don’t violate the constraints of their other. The NC functions as a meta constraint – meaning indicts don’t take it out but they rather prove the truth of a theory under a particular index.

#### [3] Culpability – Only contracts ensure agents are held to their agreements since there is a verifiable basis for judging their actions as wrong as well as a pre-established punishment for breaking it.

#### Negate: Governments providing the right to strike negates already signed contracts between workers and employers by providing immunities to workers that mean employers can’t enforce terms of contract.

## 2

#### The global economy is recovering and is set to accelerate this year, but any shocks can devastate growth

**World Bank 21 -** [The World Bank is an international financial institution that provides loans and grants to the governments of low- and middle-income countries for the purpose of pursuing capital projects.] "The Global Economy: on Track for Strong but Uneven Growth as COVID-19 Still Weighs" 06/08/2021 <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/06/08/the-global-economy-on-track-for-strong-but-uneven-growth-as-covid-19-still-weighs> VS

**A year and a half since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy is poised to stage its most robust post-recession recovery in 80 years in 2021. But the rebound is expected to be uneven across countries, as major economies look set to register strong growth even as many developing economies lag. Global growth is expected to accelerate to 5.6% this year, largely on the strength in major economies such as the United States and China. And while growth for almost every region of the world has been revised upward for 2021, many continue to grapple with COVID-19 and what is likely to be its long shadow. Despite this year’s pickup, the level of global GDP in 2021 is expected to be 3.2% below pre-pandemic projections, and per capita GDP among many emerging market and developing economies is anticipated to remain below pre-COVID-19 peaks for an extended period. As the pandemic continues to flare, it will shape the path of global economic activity. The United States and China are each expected to contribute about one quarter of global growth in 2021.** The U.S. economy has been bolstered by massive fiscal support, vaccination is expected to become widespread by mid-2021, and growth is expected to reach 6.8% this year, the fastest pace since 1984. China’s economy – which did not contract last year – is expected to grow a solid 8.5% and moderate as the country’s focus shifts to reducing financial stability risks.

#### 

#### Strikes deck economy– multiple warrants

#### 1] Stop investment

**Tenza 20 -** Tenza, Mlungisi. . [Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal] “The Effects of Violent Strikes on the Economy of a Developing Country: A Case of South Africa.” Obiter, Nelson Mandela University, 2020, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&amp;pid=S1682-58532020000300004VS

These strikes are not only violent but take long to resolve. **Generally, a lengthy strike has a negative effect on employment, reduces business confidence and increases the risk of economic stagflation.** **In addition, such strikes have a major setback on the growth of the economy and investment opportunities. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth.** At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty.

**One of the measures that may boost the country's economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as investors would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment may not materialise if the labour environment is not fertile for such investments as a result of, for example, unstable labour relations. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment.**

#### 2] Strikes negatively impact labor and confidence, causing major economic losses

**Tenza 20 -** Tenza, Mlungisi. . [Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal] “The Effects of Violent Strikes on the Economy of a Developing Country: A Case of South Africa.” Obiter, Nelson Mandela University, 2020, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&amp;pid=S1682-58532020000300004. VS

When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of violent strikes that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have shattered-down the aspirations of a better South Africa. **South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which cost the country about R6.1 billion according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers' downed tools for better wages.** Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that "the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession".7 **This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people.** Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers' stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These strikes are not only violent but take long to resolve. **Generally, a lengthy strike has a negative effect on employment, reduces business confidence and increases the risk of economic stagflation.** **In addition, such strikes have a major setback on the growth of the economy and investment opportunities. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth.** At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty.

#### 3] Even just the right to strike causes to these impacts– the right to strike is accompanied with increased strikes, many of them being violent, devastating key industries and the economy

**Tenza 20 -** Tenza, Mlungisi. . [Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal] “The Effects of Violent Strikes on the Economy of a Developing Country: A Case of South Africa.” Obiter, Nelson Mandela University, 2020, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&amp;pid=S1682-58532020000300004. VS

Economic growth is one of the most important pillars of a state. Most developing states put in place measures that enhance or speed-up the economic growth of their countries. It is believed that if the economy of a country is stable, the lives of the people improve with available resources being shared among the country's inhabitants or citizens. **However, it becomes difficult when the growth of the economy is hampered by the exercise of one or more of the constitutionally entrenched rights such as the right to strike.1 Strikes** in South Africa are becoming more common, and this **affects businesses, employees and their families, and eventually, the economy. It becomes more dangerous for the economy and society at large if strikes are accompanied by violence causing damage to property and injury to people.** The duration of strikes poses a problem for the economy of a developing country like South Africa. South Africa is rich in mineral resources, the world's largest producer of platinum and chrome, the second-largest producer of zirconium and the third-largest exporter of coal. It also has the largest economy in Africa, both in terms of industrial capacity and gross domestic product (GDP).2 **However, these economic advantages have been affected by protracted and violent strikes.3 For example, in the platinum industries, labour stoppages since 2012 have cost the sector approximately R18 billion lost in revenue and 900 000 oz in lost output. The five-month-long strike in early 2014 at Impala Platinum Mine amounted to a loss of about R400 million a day in revenue.4** The question that this article attempts to address is how violent strikes and their duration affect the growth of the economy in a developing country like South Africa. It also addresses the question of whether there is a need to change the policies regulating industrial action in South Africa to make them more favourable to economic growth.

#### 4] Strikes decrease productivity, create investment risk, weaken capital, and market volatility– causes econ collapse

**Wisniewski et al 19 -** Wisniewski, T. P., Lambe, B. J., & Dias, A. (2019). The Influence of General Strikes against Government on Stock Market Behavior. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. doi:10.1111/sjpe.12224 VS

The research that has been done to date focused primarily on the incidence of general strikes and the motivations that drive the unions to stage opposition to government plans and reforms (Vandaele, 2011; Gall, 2013; Hamann et al., 2013a). A number of papers considered the determinants of union success, which can be measured according to the concessions granted by the government (Johnson, 2000; Hamann et al., 2013b; Nowak and Gallas, 2014).Implications for policy-makers were further highlighted by Hamann et al. (2013c) who documented the vote share losses of incumbents in the presence of general strikes. This is unsurprising considering the substantial efforts exerted by the unions to engage voters, generate news stories, and expose the alleged incompetency of the government. To counter the resultant electoral losses, a country’s leadership that faces popular protests is more likely to align fiscal policy with the election cycle. More specifically, Klomp and de Haan (2013) showed that affected governments increase their spending and deficits in the pre-election year in order to temporarily stimulate the economy and, as a consequence, boost popular support. While some clarity may have emerged with respect to the outcomes encountered by workers and governments, the literature remains silent with regards to the ramifications faced by employers. It is this void in the body of knowledge that our paper intends to fill. **Even if the general strikes are not strictly directed against companies, their value may be adversely affected for several reasons. First, the unproductive periods impose costs in terms of lower levels of output and profits. Although general strikes are typically short in duration, the large number of employees involved has a bearing on the total number of days not worked (Gall, 2013). Second, such manifestations of popular dissent signal to the market the workforce’s frustration with the government and its policies. In the case where policy-makers are responsive to the demands being made, a general strike may also signal the weakening position of capital providers and other sources of power within the productive process.** Corporations may also be forced into a position of carrying the burden of government concessions and the costs of social pacts that are agreed in the aftermath of a general strike. **Third, in instances where the future response of the government is not known with certainty, additional investment risk is created. Such risk will raise the time-varying discount rates leading to lower stock valuations and increased market volatility. Fourth, conceding to workers’ demands may lead to a deterioration in a government’s financial position, which will exert upward pressure on bond yields and discount rates. This, in turn, would further aggravate the falls in stock prices.** Our findings in this study reflect the abovementioned considerations. Through investigating a large sample spanning an array of countries, we demonstrate a valuation impact that is both statistically and economically significant. Since the magnitude of the fall in stock prices coinciding with the occurrence of a general strike is substantial, investors should pay particular attention to this type of event**. Furthermore, we record significant increases in stock index return volatility and Value-at-Risk1 in the year of the event, which could be indicative of the policy uncertainty that arises alongside mass strike action.** Such findings should be brought into consideration by those on both sides of the divide who are engaged in the collective bargaining process. **Market vulnerability around times of mass strike action could be particularly distressing to shareholders who are not internationally diversified.** The problem is of concern not only to frontline investors but extends to a wider swathe of the population invested in the market through pension funds. It is neither in the interest of trade unions nor governments to adversely affect the value of retirement portfolios. **For this reason, both parties should seek alternative resolutions that do not involve walkouts. This means that in order to avoid costly economic frictions, governments should be wary of situations which may inflame worker indignation.** Similarly, trade unions should consider the full welfare implications for their members before staging a mass protest.

#### Two impacts

#### 1] Econ collapse causes destroys medicine industry

**Frank 18** – Robert A.University of Ottawa. [“Conflict and Disease: A Complex Relationship”, March 2018, [Lex AZ], 10.18192/riss-ijhs.v7i1.1895]

Impact of **Economic** Instability Financial **crises hinder** quality of **life**, **while** promoting **redistribut**ion of **funds away from areas** that are most **beneficial to citizens**. A common feature of economic crises is a rapid **increase in unemployment**, which **often results in** **instability and mass protest** (International Labour Organization, 2013). The uncertainty associated with financial loss is also a significant stressor that **can negatively impact** mental and physical **health**. **Throughout the economic crisis** in Greece, mental illness and suicide rates have increased significantly, while **HIV rates** have also **increased** due to intravenous drug utilization (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). Furthermore, many individuals are thrust into poverty and subsequently face the barriers associated with low socioeconomic status. Despite the **significant impact of** **economic collapse on** societal health, the **quality of healthcare** is often paradoxically sacrificed due to reallocation of limited funds, as **highlighted by** the **funding cuts** **to** mental **health** and drug abuse prevention **programs** in Greece during its economic struggles (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). A **society in economic crisis**, therefore, **faces a conflicting scenario with** increased demand for, but **reduced** supply of, **health services**.

#### Disease causes extinction

**Millett 17** Piers Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, **disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths**,1 while **smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.**2 **The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population**,3 while **other pandemics**, such as the plague of Justinian, **are thought to have killed 25 million** in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether **a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization**. **A skeptic would have** many good **reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome** rare **genetic resistances, and evade detection**, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While **these arguments** point to a very small risk of human extinction, **they do not rule the possibility out** entirely. Although rare, **there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease**—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There **are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population** without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population). In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But **many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently.** For example, **some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment**, such as rabies or septicemic plague**. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide,** such as the 1918 flu,10 and **seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens,** such as chickenpox and HSV-1**, can successfully reach over 95% of a population**.11,12 **Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility**, virulence, and global reach. **But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits.** Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, **studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified** as well.19-2

#### 2] Econ decline results in nuclear war.

**Tønnesson 15** [Tønnesson is a research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in Norway and the leader of the East Asia Peace program at Uppsala University in Sweden.] “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace.” International Area Studies Review, volume 18, number 3, pgs. 297-311. 2015.

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances **a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers.** At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: **first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict** (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). **The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition** (Solingen, 2015); **second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia** (China, Japan and South Korea) **are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance** (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and **fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations.** International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. **If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.** Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. T**he greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations** (Roach, 2014) **then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.**

## Case

#### The right to strike does nothing to companies who actually exploit workers—they just hire consultants and employ shady tactics

Lafer and Loustaunau 20-- Gordon Lafer [political economist and is a Professor at the University of Oregon] and Lola Loustaunau [assistant research fellow at the Labor Education and Research Center, University of Oregon]; Fear at work: An inside account of how employers threaten, intimidate, and harass workers to stop them from exercising their right to collective bargaining; July 23, 2020; Economic Policy Institute; <https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/>. (AG DebateDrills)

Even when employers obey the law, they rely on a set of tactics that are legal under the NLRA but illegal in elections for Congress, city council, or any other public office. A $340 million industry of “union avoidance” consultants helps employers exploit the weaknesses of federal labor law to deny workers the right to collective bargaining.17 Over the past five years, employers using union avoidance consultants have included FedEx, Bed Bath & Beyond, and LabCorp, among others. Table 1, reproduced from an EPI report published in late 2019, lists just a few of these employers, along with the reported financial investments they made to thwart union organizing during the specified years.18 These firms’ tactics lie at the core of explaining why so few American workers who want a union actually get one, and their success in blocking unionization efforts represents a significant contribution to the country’s ongoing crisis of economic inequality. The lack of a right of free speech enables coercion NLRB elections are fundamentally framed by one-sided control over communication, with no free-speech rights for workers. Under current law, employers may require workers to attend mass anti-union meetings as often as once a day (mandatory meetings at which the employer delivers anti-union messaging are dubbed “captive audience meetings” in labor law). Not only is the union not granted equal time, but pro-union employees may be required to attend on condition that they not ask questions; those who speak up despite this condition can be legally fired on the spot.19 The most recent data show that nearly 90% of employers force employees to attend such anti-union campaign rallies, with the average employer holding 10 such mandatory meetings during the course of an election campaign.20 In addition to group meetings, employers typically have supervisors talk one-on-one with each of their direct subordinates.21 In these conversations, the same person who controls one’s schedule, assigns job duties, approves vacation requests, grants raises, and has the power to terminate employees “at will” conveys how important it is that their underlings oppose unionization. As one longtime consultant explained, a supervisor’s message is especially powerful because “the warnings…come from…the people counted on for that good review and that weekly paycheck.”22 Within this lopsided campaign environment, the employer’s message typically focuses on a few key themes: unions will drive employers out of business, unions only care about extorting dues payments from workers, and unionization is futile because employees can’t make management do something it doesn’t want to do.23 Many of these arguments are highly deceptive or even mutually contradictory. For instance, the dues message stands in direct contradiction to management’s warnings that unions inevitably lead to strikes and unemployment. If a union were primarily interested in extracting dues money from workers, it would never risk a strike or bankruptcy, because no one pays dues when they are on strike or out of work. But in an atmosphere in which pro-union employees have [with] little effective right of reply, these messages may prove extremely powerful.

#### Turn: Today’s strikes rely on public support—legal strikes always incite social tensions among groups of different statuses—only illegal strikes have the potential to be successful and change minds

Reddy 21-- Diana S. Reddy [Diana Reddy is a Doctoral Fellow at the Law, Economics, and Politics Center at UC Berkeley Law]; “There Is No Such Thing as an Illegal Strike”: Reconceptualizing the Strike in Law and Political Economy; Jan 6 2021; Yale Law Journal; <https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy>. (AG DebateDrills)

In recent years, consistent with this vision, there has been a shift in the kinds of strikes [are] workers and their organizations engage in—increasingly public-facing, engaged with the community, and capacious in their concerns.178 They have transcended the ostensible apoliticism of their forebearers in two ways, less voluntaristic and less economistic. They are less voluntaristic in that they seek to engage and mobilize the broader community in support of labor’s goals, and those goals often include community, if not state, action. They are less economistic in that they draw through lines between workplace-based economic issues and other forms of exploitation and subjugation that have been constructed as “political.” These strikes do not necessarily look like what strikes looked like fifty years ago, and they often skirt—or at times, flatly defy—legal rules. Yet, they have often been successful. Since 2012, tens of thousands of workers in the Fight for $15 movement have engaged in discourse-changing, public law-building strikes. They do not shut down production, and their primary targets are not direct employers. For these reasons, they push the boundaries of exiting labor law.179 Still, the risks appear to have been worth it. A 2018 report by the National Employment Law Center found that these strikes had helped twenty-two million low-wage workers win $68 billion in raises, a redistribution of wealth fourteen times greater than the value of the last federal minimum wage increase in 2007.180 They have demonstrated the power of strikes to do more than challenge employer behavior. As Kate Andrias has argued: [T]he Fight for $15 . . . reject[s] the notion that unions’ primary role is to negotiate traditional private collective bargaining agreements, with the state playing a neutral mediating and enforcing role. Instead, the movements are seeking to bargain in the public arena: they are engaging in social bargaining with the state on behalf of all workers.”181 In the so-called “red state” teacher strikes of 2018, more than a hundred thousand educators in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and other states struck to challenge post-Great Recession austerity measures, which they argued hurt teachers and students, alike.182 These strikes were illegal; yet, no penalties were imposed.183 Rather, the strikes grew workers’ unions, won meaningful concessions from state governments, and built public support. As noted above, public-sector work stoppages are easier to conceive of as political, even under existing jurisprudential categories.184 But these strikes were political in the broader sense as well. Educators worked with parents and students to cultivate support, and they explained how their struggles were connected to the needs of those communities.185 Their power was not only in depriving schools of their labor power, but in making normative claims about the value of that labor to the community. Most recently, 2020 saw a flurry of work stoppages in support of the Black Lives Matter movement.186 These ranged from Minneapolis bus drivers’ refusal to transport protesters to jail, to Service Employees International Union’s Strike for Black Lives, to the NBA players’ wildcat strike.187 Some of these protests violated legal restrictions. The NBA players’ strike for instance, was inconsistent with a “no-strike” clause in their collective-bargaining agreement with the NBA.188 And it remains an open question in each case whether workers sought goals that were sufficiently job-related as to constitute protected activity.189 Whatever the conclusion under current law, however, striking workers demonstrated in fact the relationship between their workplaces and broader political concerns. The NBA players’ strike was resolved in part through an agreement that NBA arenas would be used as polling places and sites of civic engagement.190 Workers withheld their labor in order to insist that private capital be used for public, democratic purposes. And in refusing to transport arrested protestors to jail, Minneapolis bus drivers made claims about their vision for public transport. Collectively, all of these strikes have prompted debates within the labor movement about what a strike is, and what its role should be. These strikes are so outside the bounds of institutionalized categories that public data sources do not always reflect them.191 And there is, reportedly, a concern by some union leaders that these strikes do not look like the strikes of the mid-twentieth century. There has been a tendency to dismiss them.192 In response, Bill Fletcher Jr., the AFL-CIO’s first Black Education Director, has argued, “People, who wouldn’t call them strikes, aren’t looking at history.”193 Fletcher, Jr. analogizes these strikes to the tactics of the civil-rights movement. As Catherine Fisk and I recently argued, law has played an undertheorized role in constructing the labor movement and civil-rights movement as separate and apart from each other, by affording First Amendment protections to civil rights groups, who engage in “political” activity, that are denied to labor unions, engaging in “economic” activity.194 Labor unions who have strayed from the lawful parameters of protest have paid for it dearly.195 As such, it is no surprise that some unions are reluctant to embrace a broader vision of what the strike can be. Under current law, worker protest that defies acceptable legal parameters can destroy a union. Recasting the strike—and the work of unions more broadly—as political is risky. Samuel Gompers defended the AFL’s voluntarism and economism not as a matter of ideology but of pragmatism; he insisted that American workers were too divided to unite around any vision other than “more.”196 He did not want labor’s fortunes tied to the vicissitudes of party politics or to a state that he had experienced as protective of existing power structures. Now, perhaps more than ever, it is easy to understand the dangers of the “political” in a divided United States. Through seeking to be apolitical, labor took its work out of the realm of the debatable for decades; for this time, the idea that (some) workers should have (some form of) collective representation in the workplace verged on hegemonic. And yet, labor’s reluctance to engage in the “contest of ideas” has inhibited more than its cultivation of broader allies; it has inhibited its own organizing. If working people have no exposure to alternative visions of political economy or what workplace democracy entails, it is that much harder to convince them to join unions. Similarly, labor’s desire to organize around a decontextualized “economics” has always diminished its power (and moral authority), given that the economy is structured by race, gender, and other status inequalities—and always has been. During the Steel Strike of 1919, the steel companies relied on more than state repression to break the strike. They also exploited unions’ refusal to organize across the color line. Steel companies replaced striking white workers with Black workers.197 Black workers also sought “more.” But given their violent exclusion from many labor unions at the time, many believed they would not achieve it through white-led unions.198

#### Their only justification for Ilaw affirming is an ILO law that talks about freedom of association—that doesn’t mean right to strike much less imply unconditionality

Borman 17-- Borman, David A [Department of Political Science, Philosophy, and Economics, Nipissing University]. "Contractualism and the Right to Strike." Res publica 23.1 (2017): 81-98. (AG DebateDrills)

My purpose in canvassing the ambiguous legal situation regarding strikes in North America is not simply to suggest the potential usefulness of directing greater philosophical attention to the matter. That, too. But I also want to highlight two important facts: first, as I mentioned at the outset, there is no generally agreed upon or recognized right to strike; second, that the prevailing strategy for justifying such a right—coming principally from the ILO—has been to attempt to derive it from the freedom of association—that is, the freedom to form groups and organizations for the pursuit of common, constitutionally protected purposes, which the ILO has tied closely to collective bargaining. Despite the recent legal success in Canada, I do not believe this to be a philosophically promising avenue. First, it has the considerable demerit of misrepresent[s]ing in a basic way the demands of the labour movement, whose struggles historically underlie any such putative right. Although employers decried what were quaintly called worker ‘combinations’, the right to combine is transparently instrumental: it is what the combination would do that was the subject of and motivation for struggle. It is especially important to note in this connection, and against the tendency to assume that the strike must be viewed instrumentally as a tool within collective bargaining (so that the former is subordinate to the latter), that the assertion of the right to strike in protest against unjust conditions historically precedes the advent of collective bargaining; it is the latter that is introduced as an additional tool toward the same end (see Pope 2010; Montgomery 1987, pp. 9–13; and Lambert 2005, p. 4). Secondly, framing labour rights in these terms leads directly to some of the problems confronted by the labour movement today: if my freedom is simply to ‘combine’ or ‘associate’ then, as the U.S. Supreme Court believes (and as the dissenting Justices in Saskatchewan argued), that right may in no way be abrogated by my employer’s decision to replace me; or, at least, it remains very much undecided what sorts of constraints may be legitimately placed on the activities of combinations once combined. There is no clear and direct path from the freedom to associate to the right to strike. Perhaps more troubling still: if I am ‘free to associate,’ I am nevertheless not obliged to do so, and thus do so-called ‘right to work’ advocates lobby against mandatory dues collection. Stipulating compulsory dues payment as a practical solution to the collective action problem generated by free-riders is practically sensible, but ad hoc and philosophically unsatisfying: it seems likely to rely either on controversial views of consent via benefit, or on unattractive utilitarian arguments which essentially concede that the rights of the few are indeed to be sacrificed to those of the many. The general point here, then, is not just that the right to associate—like any other abstract right—has unclear contours which can only be set by their institutionalization; rather, it is that there is simply no intrinsic connection between the freedom to form groups, or even the specific right of workers to organize, and the right to withhold one’s labour and the labour of others in response to unacceptable conditions. No doubt there are ways of framing the right of workers to organize that are more substantive and which would therefore include a greater array of protections, perhaps including the right to strike; but as the situation stands at present, though I disagree with the U.S. Supreme Court Justices, I do not see that it is possible to convict them of simple fallacious reasoning from the premises of associational protections.3 That is reason enough to explore alternative justifications. There are, of course, various options: the complainants in Saskatchewan had also argued that striking was an expressive activity, intended in part to communicate with the employer, other workers, and the public, so that Charter protections for free expression should apply; and there is a long history of arguing that real freedom of contract requires strike protections to balance power, a view that was partly reflected in the U.S. Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) and in the Wagner Act (1935). But the question of historical adequacy mentioned above offers a compelling motive, it seems to me, for pursuing the contractualist route here.