## 1

#### CP: Space appropriation by private entities is unjust except for private entities registered within The Republic of India.

#### Private appropriation for Indian private entities is key for investor confidence.

This card is so good #amritaisthebest

**Sen 20** [Nilanjan Sen, who is an experienced lawyer, specialising in International Law and Arbitration, 07-26-2020,Business Insider,https://www.businessinsider.in/science/space/news/the-fault-in-our-stars-indias-bid-at-privatizing-space/articleshow/77182064.cms, 12-7-2021 amrita]

With the creation of the Indian National Committee for Space Research (now ISRO) in 1962, India has been an active patron to mankind’s space efforts. From Aryabhata to Chandrayaan-2, India has launched 113 satellites, including the first privately built and funded satellite ExceedSat-1 which was launched from USA, as a part of Elon Musk’s Space X project Falcon-9. Up **until 2016, India’**s space activities **have been the exclusive domain of the State, however, the launch of the IRNSS-1H** in 2017 was the herald of a new era in India’s Space endeavours. The IRNSS-1H **marked the** beginning of **privatisation in this area** by being the first Indian satellite, to be designed in collaboration with the private parties. In the following year, the ExseedSat-1 was to become the first privately funded and built satellite launched in collaboration with the private Space X project. Interestingly, **up until now**, all **missions have been conducted for** purposes of research, reconnaissance as well as for augmenting communication systems since there wa**s a substantial State monopoly**. With the recent announcement ofthe creation of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre or IN-SPACeby the Government of India as part of its atma nirbhar Bharat scheme, which aims at providing a “level playing field” and a supportive regulatory regime to allow Indian private enterprises to grow and carve their own niche in the so-called “fast-growing global space sector”**, India has** in fact **shown an inclination to capitalise** on the US strategy of opening up the avidly touted space “sector” to private participation. While the initiative **sounds exhilarating** and will definitely go a long way in defining India’s image as an emerging global technology powerhouse**, it is** extremely **difficult to fathom why private players, would** be willing to readily come forward and **invest billions,** by confining their activities for research purposes alone, **without any expectation of commercial gains** or simply, return on their investment. This is so because, matters concerning space and space exploration are subject of a special branch of customary international law, that are mainly centred around five treaties and eleven agreements. The most significant of these is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies or the Outer Space Treaty (OST) which India ratified in 1967, and which specifically lays down under Article I that outer space and space exploration including that on the moon and other celestial bodies, are to be carried out solely for, and in the interest of all countries, and that they are the province of all mankind. **Article II restricts** claims of sovereignty and national **appropriation** by any means whatsoever, Article VI **places international responsibility on all activities carried on by** governmental or by **non-governmental entities**, as well as mandates authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party. While there is considerable debate surrounding the applicability of the OST especially Article VI to private parties, since the US Supreme Court ‘s ruling in Medellin v Texas (2008) which held that Article VI is not self-executing in nature, regard must be had to the fact that these are domestic Court rulings and the fact that Space law is part of Customary International law which is affirmed by decades of State practise, cannot be denied, and neither can the fact that it is settled principle of international law that a State cannot, under the excuse of changes in domestic law, including subsequent Court rulings, renege from treaty obligations once ratified. In effect, the OST places strict checks upon the objectives behind exploring this uncharted territory by State and Non-State actors, far less allowing the possibility of even claiming rights of any kind. Moreover, it is no secret that **private corporations operate predominantly with** the object of individual gains **and** unless driven by the zeal to serve mankind and share profits with all countries, **chances are** that the **investments** made by private parties **will have little** to nil **returns,** far less any substantive protection**.**

#### Investor confidence is necessary for strong Indian private space-tech—that spills over, boosts Indian military heg, and turns case.

**Prasad 16** [Narayan Prasad has a Master of Space & Telecommunications Law, May 2016, National Academy of Legal Studies and Research University of Law Hyderabad, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305402089\_A\_POLICY\_REVIEW\_TOWARDS\_THE\_DEVELOPMENT\_OF\_A\_SPACE\_INDUSTRY\_ECOSYSTEM\_IN\_INDIA/link/578dbd2908ae5c86c9a65d05/download, 12-8-2021 amrita]

As India ramps up its space defence capabilities, **lack of a mature space industrial base will** potentially **hurt** its ambitions**.** **India** counts among the top nations in the world in terms of government space investment 4 , but **is far behind** when it comes to **creating successful private industry** that is globally reputed. India’s space budget has increased in size (Figure 2) and is one of the largest space budgets in the world; however, the lack of an active space industry at turnkey level might have an immense opportunity cost for India in manufacturing satellites and launch vehicles to service the global market.5 This in effect is also due to absence of a single Indian company among the top space companies in the world (which in itself is an alarming statistic) that needs to be addressed urgently through policy push under the several grand schemes announced by the current government, such as ‘Make in India’ and ‘Digital India’. Most of **the apprehensions** for private investment in space industry **come from** the **requirements** of high capital investment, **and** the long gestation periods of space projects to get substantial Return on Investment (RoI) for the investors. These trends have been put aside by a new breed of space companies calling themselves ‘NewSpace’, which thrive on new business models of low cost access to space by capitalising on the advancements made in recent years in small satellite technology, consumer electronics, and computing power. Tiny modular satellites called ‘CubeSats’, weighing 1-4 kgs and costing under $100,000 have revolutionised the way space products and services are delivered to end users. The movement began in Europe and US simultaneously as a by-product of university and space agency collaborated research, but it was the US which took the lead in successfully commercialising these technologies developed in laboratories. Figure 3 shows the forecast of nano satellites weighing between 1-50 kg, which are scheduled to be launched during 2014-16 globally.6The high number arises from the fact that such nano satellites have short development timelines, and provide the necessary agility for satellite operators to develop large constellations that can cater to a larger customer base with high service quality. These NewSpace companies have ushered in widespread changes in the traditional satellite manufacturing and launch services industry, with companies like RocketLabs and Firefly Systems building new launchers cheaply using innovative techniques like additive manufacturing, to reduce the cost to orbit for these satellites. The impact of these companies has been felt within the space industry, as practices from these ‘NewSpace’companies have been adopted to keep the costs low and have a factory type approach in building systems in order to cater to the increasing demand. The NewSpace revolution has now led to companies such as Google, Virgin, and Qualcomm investing in small satellite-based communication technologies. India, however, has remained shielded from the rapid changes that have happened in the global space industry over the past decade. **ISRO** has been **slow to respond on** both **commercial** and academic **fronts,** with only a handful of university-level small satellite missions being launched during the same period, none of which could transform into a full-fledged commercial opportunity for the people involved in these projects. Lack of clarity on space policy in India is to blame, and partly the lack of willingness of DoS to take up additional responsibility of creating an ecosystem that disrupts their own traditional one, without any visible incentives. In the following sections, the need and motivation to develop a strong private industry ecosystem is detailed with necessary arguments. 1.2 Motivations to Develop a Private Industry Ecosystem in India Presently, **India has inherent advantages** over other countries **due** the availability of **skilled workforce**, a stable and business friendly **government,** positive investor climate and low cost of operations**.** Because India was an early mover in space technology, it is **poised to become a major space power albeit** slight policy push towards **greater commercialisation** of the industry. Table 1 shows the PESTLE analysis of India, in lieu of the motivation to develop a strong private space industry. The PESTLE analysis shows high suitability for services-based business models to operate out of India. The government’s encouragement for private space industry within the country to develop capacity and capability in pursuing space activities should thereby be directed to both the spectrums across the industry value chain. A focused space policy mandate can have multiple direct and fringe benefits to the government, especially in the defence sector which has been the current government’s area of interest through its ‘Make in India’ initiative. Some of the direct and indirect benefits of space technology include: Civilian and Commercial **Space industry has the potential to emerge as the third** technological **success** front following the successes of the Information Technology (IT) and Biotechnology in the country. Space **has an important role in** the overall **economic development** of the country **and** in the success of the government initiatives such as Digital India and Make in India. The development of the private space industry shall **aid in rural connectivity, e-governance and** setting up of **manufacturing facilities** base for products of high technology in India, creating headways in the overall emergence of the country at the world stage. The success of the space industry will enhance capacities within the country and complement the government-driven programme, which has been historically proven in advanced space faring countries such as the US. Capacity building in the private industry at a turnkey level for both upstream and downstream shall assist theeconomic development of the country by keeping up to the pace of requirement of the marketplace (e.g. Direct-to-Home TV, Broadband Internet), while reducing the inherent dependence on foreign assets. For example, as per a recent Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report, only one among the seven DTH providers is leasing transponder from the INSAT system**. The** primary **reason for this disparity is** the **slow pace** at which **ISRO has added** satellite transponders **to the commercial market.** The net effect is that the DTH providers are incurring higher transponder costs on foreign satellites when INSAT could have been an equally reliable, and more cost efficient, alternative. Space has its bearings over the imagination of youth and a strong emerging local industry can revolutionise the mindset of the national talent pool and can potentially aid in reversal of brain drain from the country. Public outreach, awareness, and STEM education are some of the intangible impact that investment in space technology produces. The capacity built up within the industry shall foster Business-to-Business (B2B) collaborations within the country and with enterprises across the globe and create also a strong focus on Business-to-Customer (B2C) applications which moves from the traditional Government-to-Government (G2G) flow of development of capacity and application of technology. The B2B, B2C ecosystem in the space industry has immense potential of tapping the much successful IT infrastructure of the country and extending the IT knowledge base to core software based applications of spacebased information such as Geographical Information Systems (GIS).It shall create an environment of technological innovation which when supported and encouraged can sustain to create a secondary source of development of high-tech hardware, software and applications for the government. An ecosystem of technological innovation in space technology has the potential of creating the next generation Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) in India which shall 17 leverage the frugal nature of engineering and can create products and services independently for local and global requirements. Military **In the development of space technology with several dual use capabilities, there exists a case for the building up a sustained indigenous industry ecosystem that shall support the safety and security apparatus of the country**. These range **from development of capabilities in upstream** such as satellite, launch vehicle development **to** creating specific downstream applicationssuch as Automatic Identification of Ships (AIS), Electronic Intelligence (ELINIT), Communication Intelligence (COMMINT) and other Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4I2SR) applications. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is **the ability to view, understand and predict the physical location of natural and man-made objects orbiting the Earth. SSA is a prominent concern for both military and commercial systems, mainly because of the increasing military reliance on space assets**. The debris created by the anti-satellite testing by China in 2007 and the Kosmos-Iridium collision in 2009 has raised additional concerns about the safety of space assets. India currently relies on NASA’s data, and will operationalise its own system of Multi Object Tracking Radar (MOTR) by 2017.7 Meanwhile in the US, commercial operators have established the Space Data Association (SDA) for providing satellite operators reliable and efficient data for increased safety of satellite operations; this is in addition to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) own surveillance network. **The changing space security environment and the rising international concerns over the rapid growth of military assets in space makes space security one of the most important issues to address.** The need to have a space security policy is being 7 increasingly debated in India **and** the IDSA Task force in 2009 produced a report which attempted to conceptualise such a policy. However, there is reluctance to talk about use of space for national security needs including its military applications. Though efforts are being made to synchronize the activities of ISRO which is responsible for India’s civilian space programme and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) which works on the use of space for national security needs, **the lack of a strong private industry that can meet heightened needs for such sophisticated missions hampers the progress in this direction,** apart from the bureaucratic delay that is normally associated when two high security government agencies interact. Capacity building within the space industry shall not only drive commercial applications, but shall aid the government in situations of emergencies (e.g. natural disasters, intelligence gathering for fighting against terrorism) and can eventually develop into a foundation that could potentially contribute as a part of a strong foreign policy drive. Studying the impact of space technology on civilian life is a complicated task, especially when it comes to quantifying the tangible and intangible impact. **The spill-over of space technology is in sectors as varied as defence, agriculture and education.** There exist many ways to show the impact of investment in space technology; some of them illustrated above. **Thus, the technological and knowledge backbone for space technology creates opportunities in the marketplace to create and explore commercial applications on a global scale, which** traditionally might not be the fundamental focus a governmental space agency, as well as **create multiple intangible impacts** across various sectors such as defence, education, agriculture, energy, transportation and environment**.** India has made substantial investment in its government space programme over the years, but it is **a sustained policy push towards investments in the private space industry ecosystem that will create commercial space applications**, complementing the societal benefits motivation currently being pursued by the government.

#### Indian space military heg checks and limits Chinese heg in the Indo-Pacific.

**Bommakanti 7-15-20**[Kartik Bommakanti is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. Kartik specialises in space military issues and his research is primarily centred on the Indo-Pacific region. He also works on emerging technologies as well as nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional coercion, particularly in the context of the Indian subcontinent and the role of great powers in the subcontinent’s strategic dynamics. He has published in peer reviewed journals., The enduring significance of space weapons for India, 7-15-2020,ORF,https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-enduring-significance-of-space-weapons-for-india/, 12-8-2021 amrita]

Regardless of the Americans protestations about the Russian test**, there are important underlying implications for India particularly in the context of Chinas’ growing space and counterspace capabilities as well as the repercussions that are likely to ensue if New Delhi were to pursue a weak response to Chinese space military power.** India will need a whole set of additional KEW tests. This author made the case for sea-launched and air launched KEWs in an extensive analysis. However, it was focused mostly on earth to space KEW systems and Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). Confining India to the acquisition of KEWS and Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) or cyber and electronic weapons can be expanded to include co-orbital KEWs. The Russian test also illustrates why co-orbital KEWs are also critical. Investment in additional KEW capabilities assumes considerable importance especially for India because of the long-term defence related challenges presented by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). **The ongoing boundary crisis should only lend greater urgency to India’s space weapons programme, simply because space assets in India’s inventory are vital to the prosecution of a potential military campaign whether on land, sea or air against the People’s Republic China (PRC).** The PRC is known to have developed the accoutrements necessary to conduct co-orbital test. For instance, in 2008 the Chinese BX-1 microsatellite while orbiting in close proximity to its mother satellite, executed a maneuver within 45 kilometers of the International Space Station (ISS). While BX-1 did not definitively establish a PRC co-orbital ASAT capability, it did indicate the PRC’s latent capability to conduct co-orbital kinetic tests and mount attacks against a potential adversary’ space assets. India must avoid what one leading Indian space analyst prior to India’s March 2019 KEW test observed: “To date, India’s interests in space have been restricted to using space assets for reconnaissance, navigation and communication. However, China’s ASAT test could influence India’s policies in the field of counter-space capabilities. To address the concerns raised at the regional and global level about this Chinese bravado, the best option for India could be to follow the disarmament and arms control route.” The statement is a non-sequitur, **while India has conducted only but one direct ascent KEW test, it has not matched China** in developing and executing non-destructive earth to space KEW tests, let alone fully match Chinese KEW, DEW, electronic and cyber weapon capabilities to target space assets. **Pursuing the arms control and disarmament route by India will be premature** in response to the PRC’s extensive development of space **and** counterspace capabilities**.** Reinforcing this point is that the PRC’s current and evolving space weapons programme deserve a sustained response. Bringing closure to the development of space and counterspace capabilities **would imply surrender that is completely unwarranted in light of Beijing’s recent and ongoing aggressiveness,** which India is evidently bearing the brunt. Very likely Beijing will be emboldened even more in deducing that India’s skittish response to its space weapons programme should be treated as weakness **and India subjected to further aggression, not just terrestrially, but equally in space.** The External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated there is an imperative for India and China to achieve some “equilibrium”, although he never fully elaborated what exactly it would look like. However, if equilibrium or more precisely a stable balance of power is to be achieved in the Indo-Pacific, military power is crucial. **Space military power has grown in importance** from reconnaissance, navigation and communications to space weapons **and will be crucial to generating an equilibrium.** Ignoring the eventual deployment of weapons in space would be foolhardy for a state such as India when pitted against the PRC**. Consequently, space military power is a key constituent element in India’s capacity to contribute to the Asian balance of power**. Thus, **investing in a direct ascent and co-orbital KEWs as well as DEWS and cyber and electronic weapons geared for destroying or disabling spacecraft is crucial**. If India were to deprive itself of offensive space weapons to take Chinese or other enemy spacecraft, New Delhi would be putting itself at a considerable disadvantage by leaving it at the mercy of a wide variety of Chinese counterspace capabilities and measures against its Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Communications (COMMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites. Indeed, it is perplexing to see arguments that call for India to restrain itself, strive for disarmament and arms control when China makes no significant effort to do so beyond rhetorical commitments. The Russian co-orbital test has underlined the importance of space borne weapons despite entreaties for the non-weaponisation of space. The Modi government must see the emerging space military competition as an opportunity to bolster India’s counterspace capabilities. **It will help cement India as a major space military power and prevent Chinese hegemony over the Indo-Pacific.** Chinese hegemony on the other hand will become a certainty, if New Delhi lapses into self-doubt and remains unduly restrained in the testing, integration and deployment of space weapons.

#### China heg is revisionist and offensive-- in the Indo-Pacific that causes draw-in.

**Brands 19** [Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Zack Cooper is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, an associate at Armitage International, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, "After the Responsible Stakeholder, What? Debating America’s China Strategy." Texas National Security Review. Volume 2, Issue 2. February 2019k <https://tnsr.org/2019/02/after-the-responsible-stakeholder-what-debating-americas-china-strategy-2/> 12-10-2021 amrita]

The responsible-stakeholder paradigm offered a coherent “theory of victory”: It identified a desired outcome and employed all elements of American power to bring about that outcome. Over time, the strategy produced greater Sino-American cooperation on a range of issues, from counter-piracy to climate change. **It is increasingly clear, however, that the responsible-stakeholder strategy failed. Two of its core assumptions now appear misplaced: the idea that China’s intentions would become more benign over time, and the belief that Washington had the power to keep Chinese ambitions in check until that shift occurred.** What happened instead was that, as China rose, the Chinese Communist Party became more willing to use its newfound power in coercive and disruptive ways.3 Confounding Western hopes that China would liberalize, **the Chinese Communist Party embraced more repressive policies**, especially after Xi Jinping became general secretary in 2012. **Meanwhile, Beijing sought to control the Indo-Pacific region by** coercing its neighbors, undermining U.S. alliances, practicing mercantilist policies, steadily **increasing its presence** and influence in the South China Sea**, and modernizing its military. In the Indo-Pacific and beyond, moreover, China has engaged in a range of behaviors that challenge American interests: supporting authoritarian regimes, engaging in widespread corruption, pursuing predatory trade practices and major geo-economic projects meant to project Chinese influence further afield,** seeking to stifle international criticism of its human rights abuses, practicing massive intellectual property theft, and striving for technological dominance in critical emerging fields such as artificial intelligence.Recently, China’s confidence has been on display, with Xi stating in 2018 that “no one is in a position to dictate to the Chinese people,” after declaring in 2017 that China is ready to “take center stage in the world.”4 Rather than becoming a responsible stakeholder in a U.S.-led system, **China appears increasingly determined to compete with Washington for primacy in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.** These more assertive policies have been made possible by China’s surprisingly rapid growth**.** Between 1990 and 2016, China’s constant-dollar gross domestic product increased roughly twelve-fold and its military spending grew tenfold.5 The People’s Liberation Army rapidly developed the tools — anti-ship missiles, quiet submarines, advanced fighter aircraft, and integrated air defenses — needed to contest American supremacy in the Western Pacific and give China greater ability to shape events in its region and beyond. Surging national wealth also led to an explosion of Chinese trade, lending, and investment abroad, which enabled far more ambitious geo-economic statecraft**.** All told, **this expansion of Chinese national power is unprecedented in modern history.** It has dramatically narrowed the gap between China and the United States and made it far more difficult for Washington to shape Beijing’s behavior. No strategy can survive the invalidation of its central premises: By the end of the Obama presidency, the responsible-stakeholder concept was living on borrowed time. The Trump administration drove the final stake through the concept in its 2017 National Security Strategy. The document slammed Beijing for attempting to “shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests” and declared the failure of China’s “integration into the post-war international order.”6 In particular, **China’s behavior increasingly threatens three enduring U.S. interests. First, the United States seeks to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region** and to deter a military conflict — over Taiwan, Korea, or maritime Asia — that could undermine the regional order and cost American or allied lives. Second, **U.S. leaders have an interest in ensuring an open international economy conducive to American prosperity and competitiveness.** Third, **the United States seeks to preserve an international environment in which democracy, human rights, and the rule of law can** flourish, and it seeks to **strengthen** — where possible — the prevalence of those practices abroad. As Chinese power has grown and Chinese behavior has become more assertive, U.S. policymakers have come to see all three of these interests as being imperiled.

#### That goes nuclear-- extinction :/

**Hayes 18** [Peter John Hayes is the Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, a non-governmental policy-oriented research and advocacy group. He graduated from the University of Melbourne with a degree in History, and from University of California, Berkeley with a Ph.D. in energy and resources. #gobears, Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony, November 8, 2018. [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525 recut 12-10-2021](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525%20recut%2012-10-2021) amrita]

During a post-hegemonic era, long-standing **nuclear alliances are** likely to be **replaced by** ad hoc nuclear **coalitions**, aligning and realigning around different congeries of threat and even actual nuclear wars, **with** much **higher levels of** uncertainty and **unpredictability** than was the case in the nuclear hegemonic system. There are a number of ways that this dynamic could play out during the interregnum, and these dynamics are likely to be inconsistent and contradictory. In some instances, the sheer momentum of past policy combined with bureaucratic inertia and the potency of political, military service and corporate interests, may ensure that residual aspects of the formerly hegemonic postures are adhered to even as formal nuclear alliances rupture. Even as they reach for the old anchors, these **states may be forced to adjust** and retrench **strategically, or start** to take their own nuclear risks by **making** increasingly explicit **nuclear threats** and deployments **against nuclear-armed adversaries** – as Japan has begun to do with reference to its “technological deterrent” since about 2012.9 This period could last for many years until and **when** nuclear **war breaks out** and leads to a post-nuclear war disorder; or **a** new, post-hegemonic strategic **framework is established** to manage and/or abolish nuclear threat. Under full-blown American nuclear hegemony, fewer states had nuclear weapons, the major nuclear weapons states entered into legally binding restraints on force levels and they learned from nuclear near-misses to promulgate rules of the road and tacit understandings. The lines drawn during full-blown collisions involving nuclear weapons were stark and concentrated the minds of leaders greatly. In a nuclear duel, it was clear that only one of two sides could fire first; the only question was which one. **Now, with nine** nuclear weapons **states, and conflicts** conceivably **involving** three, four or **more of them**, no matter how much leaders concentrate, **it will not be evident** who is aiming at who, **who may fire** first, and during a volley, who fired first and even who hit whom. In a highly proliferated world, **nuclear-armed states** may **feel driven to obtain larger** nuclear **forces** able **to deter multiple adversaries** at the same time, sufficient to conduct not only a few nuclear attacks but **configured to fight more than one** protracted **nuclear war at a time, especially in** nuclear **states torn apart by civil war** and post-nuclear attack reconstruction. The first time nuclear weapons are used since 1945 will be shocking, the second time, less so, the third time, the new normal.

## Case

### Framework

#### The standard should be maximizing expected well being.

**pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

**Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.  
Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]  
These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

**Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one.   
Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.], Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.  Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. [http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf)Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the   possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential   catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**.  **This implies that the expected value of   reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the   value of a million human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10  54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10  52  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even   more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a   technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected   value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth   a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an   expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct   benefit of saving 1 billion lives.**  And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1  billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost   certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action

### C1

#### Capitalism turns structural violence --- maintaining growth minimizes the chances of violent impacts happening to the impoverished and marginalized

Pinker 18 (Stephen, professor of psychology at Harvard, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, EM) \*\*Modified for gendered language

In the stacked layer graph in figure 8-5, the thickness of the bottom slab represents the number of people living in extreme poverty, the thickness of the top slab represents the number not living in poverty, and the height of the stack represents the population of the world. It shows that the number of poor people declined just as the number of all people exploded, from 3.7 billion in 1970 to 7.3 billion in 2015. (Max Roser points out that if news outlets truly reported the changing state of the world, they could have run the headline NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN EXTREME POVERTY FELL BY 137,000 SINCE YESTERDAY every day for the last twenty-five years.) We live in a world not just with a smaller proportion of extremely poor people but with a smaller number of them, and with 6.6 billion people who are not extremely poor. Figure 8-5: Extreme poverty (number), 1820–2015 Sources: Our World in Data, Roser & Ortiz-Ospina 2017, based on data from Bourguignon & Morrison 2002 (1820–1992) and the World Bank 2016g (1981–2015). Most surprises in history are unpleasant surprises, but this news came as a pleasant shock even to the optimists. In 2000 the United Nations laid out eight Millennium Development Goals, their starting lines backdated to 1990.25 At the time, cynical observers of that underperforming organization dismissed the targets as aspirational boilerplate. Cut the global poverty rate in half, lifting a billion people out of poverty, in twenty-five years? Yeah, yeah. But the world reached the goal five years ahead of schedule. Development experts are still rubbing their eyes. Deaton writes, “This is perhaps the most important fact about wellbeing in the world since World War II.”26 The economist Robert Lucas (like Deaton, a Nobel laureate) said, “The consequences for human welfare involved [in understanding rapid economic development] are simply staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.”27 Let’s not stop thinking about tomorrow. Though it’s always dangerous to extrapolate a historical curve, what happens when we try? If we align a ruler with the World Bank data in figure 8-4, we find that it crosses the x-axis (indicating a poverty rate of 0) in 2026. The UN gave itself a cushion in its 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (the successor to its Millennium Development Goals) and set a target of “ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere” by 2030.28 Ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere! May I live to see the day. (Not even Jesus was that optimistic: he told a supplicant, “The poor you will always have with you.”) Of course that day is a ways off. Hundreds of millions of people remain in extreme poverty, and getting to zero will require a greater effort than just extrapolating along a ruler. Though the numbers are dwindling in countries like India and Indonesia, they are increasing in the poorest of the poor countries, like Congo, Haiti, and Sudan, and the last pockets of poverty will be the hardest to eliminate.29 Also, as we approach the goal we should move the goalposts, since not-so-extreme poverty is still poverty. In introducing the concept of progress I warned against confusing hard-won headway with a process that magically takes place by itself. The point of calling attention to progress is not self-congratulation but identifying the causes so we can do more of what works. And since we know that something has worked, it’s unnecessary to keep depicting the developing world as a basket case to shake people out of their apathy—with the danger that they will think that additional support would just be throwing money down a rat hole.30 So what is the world doing right? As with most forms of progress, a lot of good things happen at once and reinforce one another, so it’s hard to identify a first domino. Cynical explanations, such as that the enrichment is a one-time dividend of a surge in the price of oil and other commodities, or that the statistics are inflated by the rise of populous China, have been examined and dismissed. Radelet and other development experts point to five causes.31 “In 1976,” Radelet writes, “Mao single-handedly and dramatically changed the direction of global poverty with one simple act: he died.”32 Though China’s rise is not exclusively responsible for the Great Convergence, the country’s sheer bulk is bound to move the totals around, and the explanations for its progress apply elsewhere. The death of Mao Zedong is emblematic of three of the major causes of the Great Convergence. The first is the decline of communism (together with intrusive socialism). For reasons we have seen, market economies can generate wealth prodigiously while totalitarian planned economies impose scarcity, stagnation, and often famine. Market economies, in addition to reaping the benefits of specialization and providing incentives for people to produce things that other people want, solve the problem of coordinating the efforts of hundreds of millions of people by using prices to propagate information about need and availability far and wide, a computational problem that no planner is brilliant enough to solve from a central bureau.33 A shift from collectivization, centralized control, government monopolies, and suffocating permit bureaucracies (what in India was called “the license raj”) to open economies took place on a number of fronts beginning in the 1980s. They included Deng Xiaoping’s embrace of capitalism in China, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its domination of Eastern Europe, and the liberalization of the economies of India, Brazil, Vietnam, and other countries. Though intellectuals are apt to do a spit take when they read a defense of capitalism, its economic benefits are so obvious that they don’t need to be shown with numbers. They can literally be seen from space. A satellite photograph of Korea showing the capitalist South aglow in light and the Communist North a pit of darkness vividly illustrates the contrast in the wealth-generating capability between the two economic systems, holding geography, history, and culture constant. Other matched pairs with an experimental group and a control group lead to the same conclusion: West and East Germany when they were divided by the Iron Curtain; Botswana versus Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe; Chile versus Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro—the latter a once-wealthy, oil-rich country now suffering from widespread hunger and a critical shortage of medical care.34 It’s important to add that the market economies which blossomed in the more fortunate parts of the developing world were not the laissez-faire anarchies of right-wing fantasies and left-wing nightmares. To varying degrees, their governments invested in education, public health, infrastructure, and agricultural and job training, together with social insurance and poverty-reduction programs.35 Radelet’s second explanation of the Great Convergence is leadership. Mao imposed more than communism on China. He was a mercurial megalomaniac who foisted crackbrained schemes on the country, such as the Great Leap Forward (with its gargantuan communes, useless backyard smelters, and screwball agronomic practices) and the Cultural Revolution (which turned the younger generation into gangs of thugs who terrorized teachers, managers, and descendants of “rich peasants”).36 During the decades of stagnation from the 1970s to the early 1990s, many other developing countries were commandeered by psychopathic strongmen with ideological, religious, tribal, paranoid, or self-aggrandizing agendas rather than a mandate to enhance the well-being of their citizens. Depending on their sympathy or antipathy for communism, they were propped up by the Soviet Union or the United States under the principle “He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”37 The 1990s and 2000s saw a spread of democracy (chapter 14) and the rise of levelheaded, humanistic leaders—not just national statesmen like Nelson Mandela, Corazon Aquino, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf but local religious and civil-society leaders acting to improve the lives of their compatriots.38 A third cause was the end of the Cold War. It not only pulled the rug out from under a number of tinpot dictators but snuffed out many of the civil wars that had racked developing countries since they attained independence in the 1960s. Civil war is both a humanitarian disaster and an economic one, as facilities are destroyed, resources are diverted, children are kept out of school, and managers and workers are pulled away from work or killed. The economist Paul Collier, who calls war “development in reverse,” has estimated that a typical civil war costs a country $50 billion.39 A fourth cause is globalization, in particular the explosion in trade made possible by container ships and jet airplanes and by the liberalization of tariffs and other barriers to investment and trade. Classical economics and common sense agree that a larger trading network should make everyone, on average, better off. As countries specialize in different goods and services, they can produce them more efficiently, and it doesn’t cost them much more to offer their wares to billions of people than to thousands. At the same time buyers, shopping for the best price in a global bazaar, can get more of what they want. (Common sense is less likely to appreciate a corollary called comparative advantage, which predicts that, on average, everyone is better off when each country sells the goods and services that it can produce most efficiently even if the buyers could produce them still more efficiently themselves.) Notwithstanding the horror that the word elicits in many parts of the political spectrum, globalization, development analysts agree, has been a bonanza for the poor. Deaton notes, “Some argue that globalization is a neoliberal conspiracy designed to enrich a very few at the expense of many. If so, that conspiracy was a disastrous failure—or at least, it helped more than a billion people as an unintended consequence. If only unintended consequences always worked so favorably.”40 To be sure, the industrialization of the developing world, like the Industrial Revolution two centuries before it, has produced working conditions that are harsh by the standards of modern rich countries and have elicited bitter condemnation. The Romantic movement in the 19th century was partly a reaction to the “dark satanic mills” (as William Blake called them), and since that time a loathing of industry has been a sacred value of C. P. Snow’s Second Culture of literary intellectuals.41 Nothing in Snow’s essay enraged his assailant F. R. Leavis as much as this passage: It is all very well for us, sitting pretty, to think that material standards of living don’t matter all that much. It is all very well for one, as a personal choice, to reject industrialization—do a modern Walden if you like, and if you go without much food, see most of your children die in infancy, despise the comforts of literacy, accept twenty years off your own life, then I respect you for the strength of your aesthetic revulsion. But I don’t respect you in the slightest if, even passively, you try to impose the same choice on others who are not free to choose. In fact, we know what their choice would be. For, with singular unanimity, in any country where they have had the chance, the poor have walked off the land into the factories as fast as the factories could take them.42 As we have seen, Snow was accurate in his claims about advances in life and health, and he was also right that the appropriate standard in considering the plight of the poor in industrializing countries is the set of alternatives available to them where and when they live. Snow’s argument is being echoed fifty years later by development experts such as Radelet, who observes that “while working on the factory floor is often referred to as sweatshop labor, it is often better than the grand[parent] of all sweatshops: working in the fields as an agricultural day laborer.” When I lived in Indonesia in the early 1990s, I arrived with a somewhat romanticized view of the beauty of people working in rice paddies, together with reservations about the rapidly growing factory jobs. The longer I was there, the more I recognized how incredibly difficult it is to work in the rice fields. It’s a backbreaking grind, with people eking out the barest of livings by bending over for hours in the hot sun to terrace the fields, plant the seeds, pull the weeds, transplant the seedlings, chase the pests, and harvest the grain. Standing in the pools of water brings leeches and the constant risk of malaria, encephalitis, and other diseases. And, of course, it is hot, all the time. So, it was not too much of a surprise that when factory jobs opened offering wages of $2 a day, hundreds of people lined up just to get a shot at applying.43 The benefits of industrial employment can go beyond material living standards. For the women who get these jobs, it can be a liberation. In her article “The Feminist Side of Sweatshops,” Chelsea Follett (the managing editor of HumanProgress) recounts that factory work in the 19th century offered women an escape from the traditional gender roles of farm and village life, and so was held by some men at the time “sufficient to damn to infamy the most worthy and virtuous girl.” The girls themselves did not always see it that way. A textile mill worker in Lowell, Massachusetts, wrote in 1840: We are collected . . . to get money, as much of it and as fast as we can. . . . Strange would it be, if in money-loving New England, one of the most lucrative female employments should be rejected because it is toilsome, or because some people are prejudiced against it. Yankee girls have too much independence for that.44 Here again, experiences during the Industrial Revolution prefigure those in the developing world today. Kavita Ramdas, the head of the Global Fund for Women, said in 2001 that in an Indian village “all there is for a woman is to obey her husband and relatives, pound millet, and sing. If she moves to town, she can get a job, start a business, and get education for her children.”45 An analysis in Bangladesh confirmed that the women who worked in the garment industry (as my grandparents did in 1930s Canada) enjoyed rising wages, later marriage, and fewer and better-educated children.46 Over the course of a generation, slums, barrios, and favelas can morph into suburbs, and the working class can become middle class.47 To appreciate the long-term benefits of industrialization one does not have to accept its cruelties. One can imagine an alternative history of the Industrial Revolution in which modern sensibilities applied earlier and the factories operated without children and with better working conditions for the adults. Today there are doubtless factories in the developing world that could offer as many jobs and still turn a profit while treating their workers more humanely. Pressure from trade negotiators and consumer protests has measurably improved working conditions in many places, and it is a natural progression as countries get richer and more integrated into the global community (as we will see in chapters 12 and 17 when we look at the history of working conditions in our own society).48 Progress consists not in accepting every change as part of an indivisible package—as if we had to make a yes-or-no decision on whether the Industrial Revolution, or globalization, is a good thing or bad thing, exactly as each has unfolded in every detail. Progress consists of unbundling the features of a social process as much as we can to maximize the human benefits while minimizing the harms. The last, and in many analyses the most important, contributor to the Great Convergence is science and technology.49 Life is getting cheaper, in a good way. Thanks to advances in know-how, an hour of labor can buy more food, health, education, clothing, building materials, and small necessities and luxuries than it used to. Not only can people eat cheaper food and take cheaper medicines, but children can wear cheap plastic sandals instead of going barefoot, and adults can hang out together getting their hair done or watching a soccer game using cheap solar panels and appliances. As for good advice on health, farming, and business: it’s better than cheap; it’s free. Today about half the adults in the world own a smartphone, and there are as many subscriptions as people. In parts of the world without roads, landlines, postal service, newspapers, or banks, mobile phones are more than a way to share gossip and cat photos; they are a major generator of wealth. They allow people to transfer money, order supplies, track the weather and markets, find day labor, get advice on health and farming practices, even obtain a primary education.50 An analysis by the economist Robert Jensen subtitled “The Micro and Mackerel Economics of Information” showed how South Indian small fishermen increased their income and lowered the local price of fish by using their mobile phones at sea to find the market which offered the best price that day, sparing them from having to unload their perishable catch on fish-glutted towns while other towns went fishless.51 In this way mobile phones are allowing hundreds of millions of small farmers and fishers to become the omniscient rational actors in the ideal frictionless markets of economics textbooks. According to one estimate, every cell phone adds $3,000 to the annual GDP of a developing country.52 The beneficent power of knowledge has rewritten the rules of global development. Development experts differ on the wisdom of foreign aid. Some argue that it does more harm than good by enriching corrupt governments and competing with local commerce.53 Others cite recent numbers which suggest that intelligently allocated aid has in fact done tremendous good.54 But while they disagree on the effects of donated food and dollars, all agree that donated technology—medicines, electronics, crop varieties, and best practices in agriculture, business, and public health—has been an unalloyed boon. (As Jefferson noted, he who receives an idea from me receives instruction without lessening mine.) And for all the emphasis I’ve placed on GDP per capita, the value of knowledge has made that measure less relevant to what we really care about, quality of life. If I had squeezed a line for Africa into the lower right corner of figure 8-3, it would look unimpressive: the line would curve upward, to be sure, but without the exponential blastoff of the lines for Europe and Asia. Charles Kenny emphasizes that the actual progress of Africa belies the shallow slope, because health, longevity, and education are so much more affordable than they used to be. Though in general people in richer countries live longer (a relationship called the Preston curve, after the economist who discovered it), the whole curve is being pushed upward, as everyone is living longer regardless of income.55 In the richest country two centuries ago (the Netherlands), life expectancy was just forty, and in no country was it above forty-five. Today, life expectancy in the poorest country in the world (the Central African Republic) is fifty-four, and in no country is it below forty-five.56 Though it’s easy to sneer at national income as a shallow and materialistic measure, it correlates with every indicator of human flourishing, as we will repeatedly see in the chapters to come. Most obviously, GDP per capita correlates with longevity, health, and nutrition.57 Less obviously, it correlates with higher ethical values like peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance.58 Richer countries, on average, fight fewer wars with each other (chapter 11), are less likely to be riven by civil wars (chapter 11), are more likely to become and stay democratic (chapter 14), and have greater respect for human rights (chapter 14—on average, that is; Arab oil states are rich but repressive). The citizens of richer countries have greater respect for “emancipative” or liberal values such as women’s equality, free speech, gay rights, participatory democracy, and protection of the environment (chapters 10 and 15). Not surprisingly, as countries get richer they get happier (chapter 18); more surprisingly, as countries get richer they get smarter (chapter 16).59 In explaining this Somalia-to-Sweden continuum, with poor violent repressive unhappy countries at one end and rich peaceful liberal happy ones at the other, correlation is not causation, and other factors like education, geography, history, and culture may play roles.60 But when the quants try to tease them apart, they find that economic development does seem to be a major mover of human welfare.61 In an old academic joke, a dean is presiding over a faculty meeting when a genie appears and offers him one of three wishes—money, fame, or wisdom. The dean replies, “That’s easy. I’m a scholar. I’ve devoted my life to understanding. Of course I’ll take wisdom.” The genie waves his hand and vanishes in a puff of smoke. The smoke clears to reveal the dean with his head in his hands, lost in thought. A minute elapses. Ten minutes. Fifteen. Finally a professor calls out, “Well? Well?” The dean mutters, “I should have taken the money.”

#### Embracing globalism is good and alt exacerbates climate change significantly—also poverty, violence, and exploitation date back much further than capitalism

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(Rasmus, “The Environmental Risks of Incomplete Globalisation,” Globalizations, August)

While neither xenophobia nor militarism is by any means new in history, what is striking is the **lack of enthusiasm** among contemporary elites and leading academics for accelerating globalisation processes or actively planning for a future of shared prosperity. As climate change has emerged as the defining political issue of our time, the rise of the poor is increasingly treated as a problem rather than a transformative opportunity (Myers & Kent, 2003). What is worse, **cultural perfectionist ideas** about the perceived superficiality of “mass consumption” have been allowed to **blend with protectionist fears of foreign competition** into a **silent acceptance of chronic poverty** abroad, preferably **under the guise of “sustainable livelihoods”** powered by small-scale renewable energy, as a tolerable price for avoiding a climate emergency. According to Paul and Anne Ehrlich, avoiding a collapse of global civilisation will require “widely based cultural change” and dramatic reductions of both “population size and overconsumption” (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013:5). For those subscribing to such views, a delayed or incomplete globalisation is seen as a blessing of sorts as it takes away some of the urgency of climate mitigation.

The primary aim of this paper is to show that, far from offering a path to long-term climate stability, such a development may lead policy-makers to **grossly underestimate** the true scope of the climate/energy challenge (Arto et al., 2016) and pursue policies that continue to lock in non-scalable forms of low-carbon technologies. More generally, beyond the formidable human cost of maintaining a divided world, the possibility of incomplete globalisation is likely to make the transition to a “Good Anthropocene” (Ellis, 2014) more difficult, reduce overall resilience, and **divert resources** away from important social and environmental ends.

The paper is structured so that it proceeds from a general critique of traditional environmental ideas of intentional localisation through a more specific discussion on the effects of “climate nationalism” towards a normative argument in favour of deliberately, i.e. by political and democratic means, accelerating the transition to a fully integrated high-energy planet as a way of reducing global environmental risks. **None of this comes from facile cornucopian optimism** or any attempt to downplay the existential challenges that humanity is currently facing with regard to the natural environment. It is rather the very urgency of those risks that makes it important to **contest existing discourses** on the relationship between globalisation and the environment, both those discourses that reflect **Malthusian beliefs** (Christoff & Eckersley, 2013) and those who deny the very reality of global environmental problems such as climate change.

The transition fallacies of localism

One long-running theme in the literature on sustainability **has been the virtues of localism and decentralisation** (Dobson, 2007:95; Goodin, 1992:147). Local economies are thought to be (a) intrinsically more sustainable, (b) better equipped to cope with resources scarcities, and (c) less vulnerable to environmentally catastrophes. As a consequence, the “Transition Town” movement and others have come to see intentional localisation as an appropriate response to climate change and other Anthropocene risks (Barry & Quilley, 2009; North, 2010). While such arguments obviously form part of a much broader discussion on political economy and the future of capitalism, there are many reasons to be **sceptical of this localist discourse**.

Starting with the first claim and assuming a basic natural resource point of view, it is clear that different geographical locations have different endowments of everything from soil types to moisture variability. This naturally invites specialisation and **intensification** of production. If each locale were to produce the full range of goods necessary even for meeting **basic human needs**, then **efficiency would be much lower** and **land use much higher** than today. Inefficient modes of production would thus not only require higher inputs of labour, energy, and raw materials but also **leave less room for nature** (Desrochers & Shimizu, 2012). As agricultural production would be pushed into landscapes of increasingly lower productivity (e.g. poorer soils, less favourable climatic conditions, and steeper slopes) the result would be **lower yields yet again**. In a field such as metallurgy, even the most rudimentary processes require inputs that are geographically dispersed. To unthink trade is therefore essentially to unthink modern civilisation. While this may in fact be the explicit goal of some of the most radical voices (Zerzan, 2008) there is very little recognition in localist literature for how much of human welfare that actually depends on economies of scale, specialisation, and exchange. Yet, it simply suffice to consider how little most individuals in advanced economies know of farming, forestry or mining to realise what an enormous loss in productivity and knowledge that would follow if these tasks were to be more broadly shared within local communities. Similarly, the ecological toll that would follow if billions of people would go out in nature in search for food and fuel is clearly **unfathomable**. It is thus not surprising that most advocates of localism **fall short of endorsing autarky** or complete self-reliance. However by romanticising the local and discriminating in favour of it (Woodin & Lucas, 2004:30) these scholars show little appreciation for the enormous gains in welfare, not to mention the formidable progress in science and technology, which have been made possible over the last centuries precisely thanks to specialisation and the integration of markets.

Even if pre-modern human history was essentially defined by poverty, social domination, and violent conflict, **it is still common to blame the prevalence of such ills on modernity.** Yet, as many have rightly pointed out, what is difficult to explain is not underdevelopment but that development was at all possible. According to a progressive reading of history, the key driver behind the great acceleration of the last centuries has been the emergence of broad social investments (Lindert, 2004). While both Marxists and libertarians may think otherwise, equality is crucial for modern capitalism to function as it provides both consumers who can afford the goods of industrialism and producers who can create ever more sophisticated things of value to others. Whatever short-term gains that may be obtained through exploitation or other unequal forms of exchange, they are dwarfed by the long-term gains that come with greater measures of equality as clearly illustrated by the resounding economic success of welfare capitalism over the course of the 20th century (Berman, 2006). The same of course holds true in a globalised economy. Rich countries may benefit in the short run from low consumer prices of imported goods but, for every Bangladesh that becomes a South Korea, the value of rising global demand and new export markets is obviously much greater.

As for the second claim that localism promotes resilience, there is a strong intuitive argument that if consumption and production are taking place in close proximity, supply chain interruptions can be minimised. Yet, considering how deeply integrated global supply chains have already become, **the opposite may in fact be the case**. This is so because either discrimination in favour of local products (1) rem**ains the kind of boutique concern for environmental elites** that it is in the present and then it will not matter much in a situation of global trade disruption or (2) it forms part of a comprehensive protectionist regime and then it may be the very thing that **triggers the disruption of global trade in the first place**. As a consequence, the best way to mitigate situations of resource scarcity is therefore rather to ensure the existence of a robust world trade system (Deudney, 1990:470) since it not only allows communities to offset immediate local shortages but also gives them more time to come up with substitutes through technological innovation (the costs of which presumably can be shared among a large number of consumers worldwide). Moreover, judging from the history of the 20th century, the existence of an open world trade system is in itself crucial for driving overall growth and making eventual economic convergence possible (Williamson, 1996).

Finally, as to the third claim, that decentralised local communities would be better suited to cope with environmental disasters thanks to their **“organic” or “embedded” nature**, **the opposite again seems to be the case**. As the events following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami clearly illustrate, the existence of cosmopolitan norms of solidarity abroad and the possibility to bring in resources from unaffected, far-away lands offered **much better help than any policy of national isolation**. Likewise, after the super typhoon Haiyan hit in 2013, remittances from people working overseas and the help from international NGOs have been essential for the rebuilding of the city of Tacloban in the Philippines. As these and many other similar cases illustrate, accelerated global integration appears **far more appropriate** in any real-world scenario of environmental catastrophe than traditional environmental visions of **self- sufficiency and communitarianism**.

#### Their climate change, exploitation, and collapse inevitable arguments ultimately rely on a false premise of growth requiring more resources—capitalist growth can be and is sustainable, prefer this evidence for its empirics

Smith 21—Noah Smith; former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; <https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/people-are-realizing-that-degrowth>; September 6 2021; (AG DebateDrills)

First, note that the typical argument against degrowth, which [I laid out in a Bloomberg post](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-23/economic-growth-shouldn-t-be-a-death-sentence-for-earth?sref=R8NfLgwS) a while back, is that we don’t need it; we can raise human living standards without exhausting the planet. This argument was capably put forward by Andy McAfee, in his excellent book [More From Less](https://www.amazon.com/More-Less-Surprising-Learned-Resources_and/dp/1982103574), which you should buy and read. Essentially, the idea that economic growth requires growth in resource use is false; rich countries have started to grow while using less and less of the planet’s most important resources. For example, here is U.S. use of fresh water and various metals, as well as trade-adjusted carbon emissions:

[Chart, bar chart

Description automatically generated](https://cdn.substack.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333353cd-c549-4514-88f7-0b9d06348059_820x530.png)

[Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated](https://cdn.substack.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0cb2e493-5be6-4022-a9b5-dcbf5c993cda_803x546.png)

So the idea here is that we don’t need degrowth; instead, we can keep raising everyone’s standard of living without exhausting the planet’s resources. Because growth doesn’t just mean using more and more stuff; instead, it can mean finding more efficient ways to use the stuff we have.

Degrowthers have two counters to this. Their first counter, typically, is to show a graph of resource use for the entire world, and show that it’s correlated with global growth. This is a weak response, for two reasons:

Degrowthers have no idea how to combine various resources into an overall measure of resource use, so they [typically go with gross weight](https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2018/9/14/why-growth-cant-be-green). This is absurd, since some materials are recyclable and others are not — if you “use” a ton of copper you still have the copper, whereas if you “use” a ton of oil, your oil is gone. It’s also absurd because it doesn’t take into account the relative abundance of resources — if you figure out how to substitute 2 tons of sand for 1 ton of oil, you’re getting more efficient, since sand is much more plentiful than oil (and doesn’t pollute as much when you use it). A lot of growth is figuring out how to substitute plentiful resources for rare ones, and simply adding up gross tonnage ignores this.

Past trends are no guarantee of future trends. Until the 70s, for instance, U.S. economic growth was closely correlated with both energy use and carbon emissions; after the 70s, this correlation broke down completely and the lines started moving in opposite directions. Degrowthers present historical curves as if these are laws of nature, but we know that they are not. The trend is your friend only til the bend at the end. And the fact that rich countries have hit an inflection point where economic growth no longer depends on growing resource use is a strong indicator that industrializing countries like China will also hit this point as well. (And no, falling use in rich countries is mostly not due to outsourcing, as the emissions graph above illustrates.)

So this degrowther argument is just wrong. But degrowthers have a second, far better counter to McAfee’s notion that we can have our cake and eat it too: Decoupling isn’t happening fast enough. If we wait for China and India and all the countries of Africa to industrialize in a resource-intensive way like today’s developed countries did, and then to dematerialize their growth like today’s developed countries are doing now, it will be far too late and the planet will suffer ecological catastrophe.

This argument isn’t as strong as it sounds — China and India and the rest will be able to take advantage of the efficiency-inducing technologies created by the developed countries, like solar power (indeed, [they are already doing so](https://www.carbonbrief.org/iea-india-is-on-cusp-of-a-solar-powered-revolution)). And they will be able to embrace “dematerialized” goods and services like social networks and video games (sorry, Xi Jinping) very early in their growth path. So these countries’ resource use trajectories won’t look quite like the U.S.’ or Europe’s.