## 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not specify a type of appropriation or private entity

#### ‘The’ indicates that appropriation is generic – no spec is allowed

Merriam Webster’s 19 Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

#### Entities is a generic bare plural

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 August 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a definite singular since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with bare singulars (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to this topic – a] entities is a bare plural bc it has no determiner b] The sentence “The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust” does not imply “the appropriation of outer space by private and public entities is unjust”

#### Violation: they spec China

#### Standards

#### 1] Limits – they can spec infinite different types of appropriation like space mining, satellite orbit types, colonization, etc. This takes out functional limits – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of entities, governments, and appropriation.

#### 2] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### Drop the debater –anything else is self-serving since they have created irreversible harm by arbitrarily limiting arguments I could read in the 1N

#### Use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter

#### No RVIs –a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

## 2

#### [China] should:

#### establish a national space policy declaring disputes over international space law and policy should be resolved via compulsory and binding arbitration through the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).

#### submit [private appropriation of space] for binding arbitration through the PCA pursuant to the Optional Rules for the Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities.

#### not shirk full compliance with the tribunal’s rulings on matters relating to outer space activities.

#### The PCA should rule appropriation of space in violation of the Outer Space Treaty

#### That establishes compulsory jurisdiction over the plan via the PCA, using the new Optional Space Rules—this is especially beneficial when relating to private agents.

**Kilgore 18** – Experienced international law & dispute mediation attorney, writing for the trade publication of the Federal BarSusan Cone Kilgore, Attorney advising clients on international law issues & dispute mediation with the Leeser Law Firm PLLC, Former adjunct professor of law with the University of Houston Law Center, over 30 years of legal experience, primarily in various federal government positions including trying numerous federal cases and serving as Assistant United States Attorney for the Western District of Texas, former General Counsel for a telecommunications provider, former FBA vice president for the Fourth Circuit, Arbitration Rules for Disputes Arising from Outer Space Activity, The Federal Lawyer - Federal Bar Association, March 2018, <http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2018/March/Features/Arbitration-Rules-for-Disputes-Arising-from-Outer-Space-Activity.aspx?FT=.pdf> recut 2-15-2022 amrita

The Optional Rules state that the secretary general of the PCA has the authority to “govern” PCA arbitrations.19 Jurisdiction is established by Article 1, paragraph 1: Where **parties have agreed that disputes between them** … whether contractual or not, shall be referred to arbitration under [these rules]…. The characterization of the dispute as relating to outer space is not necessary for jurisdiction where parties have agreed to settle a specific dispute under these rules.20 This is a broad statement of jurisdiction—as it should be—for a voluntary resolution process. The advisory group considered a subject matter jurisdiction test, but because the advisory group wanted to serve the greater intent to use arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism, they did not included any test or limitation.21 The **rules allow the parties to determine whether to apply the rules**, whether to modify the rules, and do not require the dispute to be characterized as relating to outer space. Jurisdiction is further expanded in Article 3, paragraph 1: The party or parties initiating recourse to arbitration … shall communicate to … the International Bureau a notice of arbitration. And Article 3, paragraph 3(d): The notice of arbitration shall include … identification of any rule, decision, agreement, contract, convention, treaty, constituent instrument of an organization or agency, or relationship out of, or in relation to which, the dispute arises.22 This **language is more expansive than the UNCITRAL** rules.23 The Optional Rules, by these provisions, recognize and **account for** the **various constituents—from states to private actors**—**and the various sources of law that affect space activities**.24

#### Solves and establishes effective PCA arbitration for space—they’ll agree with the plan, which solves the aff, but allow the effectiveness of PCA arbitration to be established for outer space.

**Goh 7** – Associate Prof of Law-Nat’l U of SingaporeDr. Gérardine Meishan Goh, Adjunct Associate Professor, Faculty of Law- National University of Singapore, *Dispute Settlement in International Space Law: A Multi-Door Courthouse for Outer Space*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, book accessible at <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/11860/Thesis.pdf?sequence=10> recut 12-15-2022 amrita

The Enforcement of the Rule of Law in Outer Space International law may be **flawed** and deficient in some aspects, but it is **more often observed than violated**. This is **certainly** the case as well with international **space** law. Further, it is submitted that a **permanent, compulsory dispute settlement mechanism** will make a **substantial contribution** to the **development of the corpus juris gentium**. As such it will **improve** international space law and **enhance the role** of dispute settlement in space activities.156 **In resolving disputes** **within the legal framework**, the dispute settlement mechanism will **interpret the law through its application**. Each dispute settled is a step in the evolution of international space law.157 Probably the **most important reason** for the establishment of a sectorialized dispute settlement mechanism for space disputes that is permanent and compulsory is for the **enforcement of the rule of law** in outer space. This mechanism would **provide a viable alternative to** any **extra-legal** and illegal methods of redress or conflict resolution. This mechanism would perform three tasks in this regard: 1. Establish international space law as a special sector of international law through the declaration of the law; 2. **Increase the political attractiveness** of **accepting international legal norms in space** activities with a **built-in system for reform and review**; and 3. Maintain outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes by **ensuring that conflicts are settled peacefully rather than through the use** or threat of the use **of force**. This section will deal with these three factors in sequence. One of the most important reasons for establishing a permanent, compulsory dispute settlement mechanism is that it allows for the development of international space law as a specialized branch of international law. This dispute settlement mechanism will allow for the declaration of the law through its application. **As more disputes arising from space** activities are **settled through legal means**, this **allows the corpus** of international space law to be gradually **built up**. The **declaration of the law** is **essential** for its **progressive evolution**, in particular in **young fields** such as international space law. The formulation of the law in this regard **allows for its growth and enforcement** in **practical matters**. The second factor is that a compulsory, permanent dispute settlement mechanism will increase the political appeal of accepting international legal rules governing space activities. The existence of a dispute settlement mechanism implies a **solid framework** **within which** the **law can be reviewed and reformulated as necessary**. This allows the law to **progressively develop** **together** with **changes in social** and **technological innovations**. With a **built-in system** for such review and changes, **actors will** likely **be more disposed to accept international space law as the governing framework for space activities**. This furthers the cause of the **enforcement** of the rule of law in outer space activities. The **most urgent and important reason** for the adoption of a permanent, compulsory dispute settlement mechanism to ensure the enforcement of the rule of law is that it **maintains** outer **space for exclusively peaceful purposes.** Such a dispute settlement mechanism ensures that disputes are settled peacefully within the legal framework, rather than through the use or threat of use of force. This is a crucial argument as to the reason for the establishment of such a mechanism. The international legal order is **essential** to the **maintenance of international peace and security**. Explicitly or implicitly, international law establishes and **enforces the general jus cogens principles** that **all disputes should be settled peacefully**.158 This **crystallizes each actor’s interest** in the **maintenance of international order**, and international peace and security. Dispute settlement **within the** international **legal framework** also **more expressly establishes norms, procedures and institutions** that **facilitate conflict avoidance and dispute settlement**. In the latter case especially, **international law provides** relevant regulations and legal norms that **influence actors’ perceptions of legitimacy**. This guides their efforts in reaching settlement of any potential dispute. Further, to the extent that relevant legal obligations are clear, actors are less likely to pursue a course of action that might give rise to disputes. Should any such disputes nonetheless arise, parties will be able to settle them more straightforwardly based on clear relevant laws. Even if parties elect to settle disputes through non-legal, non-binding forms of dispute settlement, such as negotiation, they typically bargain in the shadow of the law. The rule of law in the international order also provides a framework by which actors can commit themselves to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. It also allows them to institute detailed dispute settlement methodologies. This allows the enforcement of the rule of law through the compromise on reaching a legal settlement. The maintenance of international peace and security in outer space is at a particularly crucial juncture. The **legal regime** that **governs military, commercial and scientific activities** in outer space **presently** lacks coherence. It is **increasingly insufficient** to **deal with** the **challenges raised by the disparate actors involved** in space activities. **Without a concentrated endeavor to establish a workable dispute settlement mechanism** and a **comprehensive legal order for outer space**, there is a **real possibility that the lacuna will be filled with military competition instead**. This will doubtless have **immense destabilizing consequences** for international peace and security. To **avoid a military** confrontation or an actual **conflict in outer space**, actors on the international plane **must be subject to the rule of law**. In this regard, the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism would be in the interests of the global military, commercial, political and scientific constituencies. The dispute settlement mechanism will **ensure that the future of space activities** will be **presided over by the long-term interests of law rather than the short-term interests of the balance of power**. The predominant concern would be to manage space activities while highlighting the crucial role of international space law in the preservation of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes. The dispute settlement mechanism **showcases the benefits of multilateral cooperation within a legal regime** as the **best path towards the protection of various interests** in space. This ensures that no single power dominates the space industry, and threatens the freedom of access to space by other actors. The dispute settlement mechanism will **ensure that any power-play will be restrained by recourse to legal rules**. Any interests in outer space would then be pursued **solely** in the context of an **evolved, expressed legal framework** on the **basis** of **mutual benefit** and **reciprocity**. The **dearth** of a proper dispute settlement mechanism in international space law could lead to two potentially **disastrous scenarios**. The first is military dominance by a space-faring power, and the second is a fragmented unilateral interpretation of the law by various parties. The first scenario envisages the unilateral imposition of one party’s perspectives through power politics and military dominance. This was the model of the initial two decades of space exploration, where the two superpowers of the United States and the former Soviet Union, the only space-faring States at the time, held sway over the development of international space law through their actions. **Without** a proper dispute settlement mechanism to **articulate the framework** of international space law, there is a **clear and present danger** of a **powerful party taking advantage** of the immensely unbalanced distribution of power and influence in the space field. This party could then enforce its own hegemonic order that promotes only its own interests and defends only its own actions. This will inevitably lead to a monopoly on the use and exploration of outer space, and the denial of access to space to other parties. It is clear that such a scenario will not take any heed of international treaties and international law. In fact, any existing restraint imposed by the law would likely be swept away as an undesirable restriction on that party’s assertion of power and sovereignty in outer space.159 The second scenario envisages the continuation of the status quo ante, without the development of any mechanism for the settlement of disputes. The existing practice of laboring under disparate elucidations of ostensibly mutual but imprecisely specified principles is the norm. Parties pay lip-service to whatever current regulations there are, and seek to modify the legal framework incrementally whenever possible. International space law would be shaped by unilateral interpretations of general principles and self-determining policies. Any normcreation would proceed in an ad hoc, piecemeal fashion. Neither one of the scenarios is sustainable for the further progressive evolution of international space law. They encompass two miasmas for the development of international law: the threat of the use of force, as well as the fragmentation of the international legal system. It is submitted that a more detailed normative system may **provide the solution needed**. An established dispute settlement mechanism would ensure that commercial, political, security and scientific interests in outer space are protected. This mechanism would accentuate pan-party cooperation, with widespread involvement by all stakeholders in decision-making and norm-creation regarding space activities. The establishment of a sectorialized dispute settlement mechanism that is compulsory and permanent would enforce the rule of law also in other beneficial ways. It would reduce the resort to unjustified countermeasures on the part of allegedly injured parties. The establishment of such a dispute settlement mechanism would, by the fairest means possible, restrict the facult´e of parties to resort to illegal countermeasures. Also, an effective dispute settlement mechanism would reduce friction between stakeholders, and bring about a more balanced and equitable allocation of benefits and settlement of disputes. This would work to prevent against any unjustified countermeasures and counterreprisals and the intensification of unilateral measures that would serve only to **ignite further friction** between the parties. The result on the whole would be based on the rule of law and would thus likely be more just than those attained by resort to unilateral coercion. The upshot is that such a **dispute settlement mechanism** is that it **reduces the need for actors to rely exclusively upon their own ability** to resort to effective unilateral reaction, which in space activities is likely to prove costly and uncertain to produce the desired results. Parties would have the opportunity to **better defend themselves before an effective dispute settlement mechanism** **rather than being coerced to accept** the **unilateral determinations** of a potentially more powerful opponent. Considering the **high degree of economic risk** and **technical interdependence** of **parties in space** activities, this would be a **great motivating factor for actors to accept the enforcement of the rule of law** in outer space activities through the establishment of such a dispute settlement mechanism.160 Thus, a generally established dispute settlement mechanism in space law matters would not only **benefit the international community by reducing tension** between the various actors, but is also a **requisite condition for augmenting the dependability and efficacy of this new field of international law**. **Improved confidence in the system of international regulation of space** activities would moreover **boost the readiness of actors to extend space law regulation to specific fields not yet included**. There is now a substantial body of positive international space law comprising substantive law regarding the rights and obligations of actors in space activities. However, there needs to be a **framework of procedural rules for the implementation** and **enforcement** of these rules of substantive law in **cases of dispute**. This **procedural framework for dispute settlement** is **still missing in international space law today**. This lacuna gives **great reason for concern** today as to the **actual usefulness** of space law. **Presently**, the **practical application** of space activities confronts the international legal framework with a **great risk of potential disputes**. These arise **both in the application** of international space law principles, as well as in the disparate fields of applied space activities. The commercialization of outer space, the potential benefits to be derived there from, and the proliferation of activities in outer space has increased the urgency for the establishment of a proper dispute settlement mechanism. This urgent need if ignored would lead only to the detriment of the efficacy, relevance and evolution of the framework of international space law.

#### Strong arbitration framework solves war and NoKo.

**Sievert & Norris 18** – Professors of International Affairs & Chinese Foreign Policy at the Bush School-Texas A&MRonald Sievert, Associate Professor of the Practice and Director of the Certificate in Advanced International Affairs Program in the Bush School of Government & Public Service at Texas A&M University, and William Norris, associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at the Bush School and former associate focused on US-China escalation risks with the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ed. by Catesby Holmes, Global Affairs Editor—The Conversation, Arbitration as a way out of the North Korean crisis, 2018, https://theconversation.com/arbitration-as-a-way-out-of-the-north-korean-crisis-91899

According to latest polls, a majority of Americans see North Korea as the greatest immediate threat to the U.S. with as many as 73 percent concerned about Kim Jung Un’s use of nuclear weapons. The world lives in fear that **one more provocation** in the form of a North Korean missile or nuclear test could **lead to major war** on the Korean Peninsula. It is true that tensions have **lessened recently** with North and South Korea holding talks and, on March 8, President Trump accepting an invitation to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jung-Un “by May.” **But** past efforts to engage the North have **often** left participants unsatisfied and disappointed. If these talks fail or **lead to frustration**, the **temptation to resort to military force** could **ratchet up quickly**. And if such **direct engagement** efforts **fall short of expectations**, **international arbitration might provide – as it has in the past – an alternative to conflict**.As **scholars who study international law and Asian politics**, our question is: Could **arbitration** help **resolve the present crisis** with **North Korea?** We have been here before In 1904, **war between Russia and the** **U**nited **K**ingdom **appeared imminent** after the Russian Baltic fleet fired on and severely damaged six English fishing boats, killing two fisherman and wounding six others, on Dogger Bank, just a few miles off the coast of England. The British **press** **demanded** that the “wretched Baltic fleet” be **destroyed**, and the Royal Navy **eagerly maneuvered** to do just that. **War was avoided at the last minute** when the **foreign ministers of both countries agreed to arbitration** presided over by commissioners from Britain, Russia, the United States, France and Austria. The result was a four-month interval that **allowed time for tempers to cool** as well as a **complete inquiry** and an analysis of the incident. **Ultimately Russia paid damages** for the incident on Dogger Bank, and **the U.K. and Russian governments were both able to step away from war while saving face** with their public. A positive track record The **United States, too, has been party** to disputes settled by arbitration. The most prominent of these are the “**Alabama claims**” in which the U.S. – after the Civil War – demanded reparations from the U.K. for having supplied and armed Confederate ships such as the CSS Alabama, despite being ostensibly neutral. These “Confederate raiders” had caused millions in damages to American shipping. **Such was the tension** between the two countries that some **American politicians suggested that the U.S. annex Canada**, which was then under British rule. **Instead, diplomacy prevailed** and the U.S. and the U.K. finally **agreed** in 1871 **to an arbitration panel** – composed of Switzerland, Italy, Brazil, U.S. and the U.K. – that awarded US$15 million to Washington and, **critically**, also **set the stage for a lasting peace between the two countries. After this arbitration**, politicians, including Ulysses S. Grant, thought **the world could** be **enter**ing **an “epoch** when a **court recognized by all nations** will **settle international differences**” so as to **avoid major military conflict**. **Indeed, such a court was created** in 1899 at the Convention on Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and **still exists** with the **Permanent Court of Arbitration** in The Hague, which has been **actively involved in settling current disputes** in India, Malta, Italy, Timor, Australia and South Africa. **Given this positive historical track record**, could **arbitration** help **avoid war on the Korean Peninsula** **today?** Why it could work **This is not far-fetched**. It is **impossible to underestimate the enmity between Russia and the U.K. in 1904** or **England and the U.S. in the mid-19th century**, **but arbitration still took place**. **All three** of these countries were also **extremely nationalistic** in an **age of great power expansion**. Their concept of **individual sovereignty** was **not unlike** that which **kept the U.S. in the 20th century from signing on to international conventions** such as the U.N. Law of the Sea [LOST] and the **I**nternational **C**riminal **C**ourt. What it took to get to arbitration, in the case of Dogger Bank, was a third party like France concerned about being dragged into a larger conflict – think China today – and individual government officials who were willing to honestly seek peace. So, assuming that there would be willingness on the American and Korean sides to this, how might it work? How it could work One **advantage** of such a commission is that **it could make** relatively **objective, logical and practical decisions that politicians could never agree to** if they wanted to **keep their popular base** and their **defense establishments** happy.For example, it is likely that President Donald Trump could not, at present, agree to let North Korea keep nuclear weapons. At the same time, despite what Kim Jong Un has told the South Koreans, his generals would probably not be happy with a unilateral promise to cease testing in the Pacific. **Supporting an international arbitration mechanism** would **certainly offer China a tempting opportunity** to **restore its international legal image** following its **rejection** of the 2016 U.N. ruling against it and its claims in the South China Sea. So who would sit on this arbitration panel? We believe it would make sense to decide this on the basis of the U.N. Security Council’s permanent members and the leading countries in the region: China, Russia, France, the U.K. and Japan. The next question is, what would **such an arbitration** court decide? A possible outcome There are many possible scenarios, but we believe the following would be **realistic**, fair and **effective**. Many countries – from France, the U.K and the U.S. to India, Israel and Pakistan – have nuclear weapons. Their primary motive is not aggression but self-preservation. It seems reasonable that this is North Korea’s main motivation too. All nations today are also acutely aware of what happened in Libya to Gaddafi and in Iraq when Saddam did not have weapons to defend against invasion. North Korea, therefore, could make a case to keep its present stock of nuclear weapons. Although South Koreans have reported a willingness on Pyongyang’s part to give them up, this remains one of the most contentious elements of any resolution. North Korea would freeze its intercontinental ballistic missile program (those missiles with minimum range of 3,400 miles or 5,500 km) and promise not to further test nuclear weapons or to fire their missiles toward or over any other nations. China would promise to come to the aid of North Korea if invaded – after all, it has come to its aid before, in 1950, during the Korean War.. But, critically, the Chinese would also promise that if North Korea acted unilaterally or distributed its nuclear weapons to third parties, then China would back the elimination of the present regime. This last promise would be heralded as a serious shift in China’s strategy and would send an unambiguous message to the North Koreans while simultaneously signaling China’s constructive engagement in favor of stability on the Korean Peninsula. The point is that North Korea does not want China as an enemy. China, for its part, is loathe to see a nuclear-armed North Korea. For a number of years, China has felt that it has lost a good deal of influence and control over its North Korean ally. This sort of declaration from China would help restore China’s influence while simultaneously reining in the Kim regime. Protecting the US President Trump’s desire to put America first seeks to avoid getting bogged down in unnecessary foreign entanglements such as a significant war on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the president has an obligation to protect and defend the United States from a potential nuclear threat. Although the **arbitration route** could be vulnerable to domestic political critiques of “outsourcing sovereignty” it might, nonetheless, **offer a way out** of the current menu of unpalatable options. It is certainly **far better** than a **disastrous war**.

#### Extinction

**Diamond 17** Larry Diamond, Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. “There Is a Peaceful Way Out of the North Korea Crisis.” The Atlantic. April 26, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/

The drama that is playing out now over North Korea’s nuclear and missile program—accentuated Tuesday by that regime’s large-scale artillery drill—**represents one of the most dangerous challenges for U.S. national security since the end of the Cold War**. It is a crisis that has been building for a long time, as North Korea has broken through the nuclear barrier and possesses fissile material sufficient for 20 to 25 nuclear weapons, by one estimate. After many failed attempts, through pressure and negotiations, to bring an end to North Korea’s nuclear program, three new elements have heightened the urgency of the situation. First, North Korea is racing to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the continental United States. In his annual New Years address in January, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un [declared](http://www.ncnk.org/resources/news-items/kim-jong-uns-speeches-and-public-statements-1/kim-jong-uns-2017-new-years-address) his country to be “in the final stage of preparation for the test launch” of such a missile. Moreover, experts warn, North Korea could at some point in the next few year years make the terrifying technological leap to a hydrogen bomb, which could be **up to 1,000 times more destructive** than the nuclear weapons that now comprise the North Korean arsenal. Currently there are only two adversarial powers capable of hitting the U.S. with such awesome destructive power, Russia and China. That a regime so **murderous, megalomaniacal, and unpredictable** as North Korea’s—**the last truly totalitarian regime on earth**, holding more than 100,000 of its own people in political concentration camps—could have the potential to inflict such destruction on the United States should be considered unacceptable. The second relatively new element is North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong Un. Although he has been North Korea’s absolute and “supreme” leader for more than five years, the world is still learning the full measure of his ambition, paranoia, and recklessness. This is a man who has not hesitated to murder even family members, including allegedly his half-brother, to consolidate absolute control. In pushing an ambitious program of nuclear testing and missile development, he also appears more inclined to take risks to expand his power and eliminate imagined threats than his father, Kim Jong Il. Even the faint glimmers of a possible loosening of absolute political control by North Korea’s communist party, the Worker’s Party of Korea, have been suffocated under Kim Jong Un. The third element is the tough-talking new American president, Donald Trump. While the new American administration has declared the end of “[strategic patience](http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/rex-tillerson-declares-end-to-strategic-patience-with-iran-slams-nuclear-deal/article/2620719)” and vowed that the North Korean missile threat “[will be taken care of,](http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/donald-trump-north-korea-strike)” Trump is pursuing a more “transactional” approach to engaging China in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. Thus, North Korea is reported to have figured prominently in the first head-to-head meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the president’s Mar-a-Lago estate recently. **It is difficult to exaggerate the stakes here**. A preemptive strike on North Korea’s military facilities would have nothing like the limited scope of containment or punishment conveyed by the recent American cruise missile strike on Syria. To accomplish anything meaningful, an American strike on North Korea would have to be on a scale many, many times larger. Even then, it would likely fail to eliminate all of Kim’s short-range missiles (many of which are mobile) or his nuclear weapons (which are surely hidden). And so it could bring on the [worst of all scenarios](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea/523080/), a furious military response from North Korea with its nuclear arsenal still intact, putting millions of lives in South Korea and potentially Japan as well at imminent risk. It is no wonder, then, that the Trump administration **has rather quickly discovered the virtues of a diplomatic track**. Yet the six-party talks, launched in 2003 among Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, the U.S., and North Korea to find a diplomatic formula to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, have been suspended since 2009. While efforts to resume those talks have been surrounded by mutual threats and false starts, North Korea has raced ahead to build an ever more menacing nuclear weapons program, which is now bringing the region to a crisis potentially more serious than anything since the end of the Korean War. As the old saying goes, however, in crisis there is both danger and opportunity. In his summit with the Chinese leader, President Trump clearly became aware of the complexity of the situation as seen by the Chinese regime: North Korea is not a mere client state of China, and a Chinese attempt to use its economic leverage (such as cutting off essential food and oil supplies) to pressure the Kim dictatorship could bring unpredictable consequences, including, the Chinese fear, a collapse of the North Korean regime that would send millions of North Korean refugees streaming across the border into China. Yet the Chinese leadership is clearly deeply frustrated with North Korea’s erratic and menacing behavior, which increasingly endangers China’s vital interests in regional peace and stability. It is this incipient shift in China’s thinking that presents **the most promising opportunity for a breakthrough on the long-stalled diplomatic front**. Whether through a resumption of the six-party talks or initiation of direct three-party negotiations involving China, the U.S., and North Korea (with the U.S. closely coordinating with Japan and South Korea), a diplomatic breakthrough must be pursued. It is probably not realistic at this point to think that North Korea will give up its current stockpile of nuclear weapons. But at a minimum, resolution of the current crisis requires a version of what my Stanford colleague Siegfried Hecker first proposed—that the Kim regime [commit to “four no’s”](http://thebulletin.org/hecker-assesses-north-korean-hydrogen-bomb-claims9046): no more bombs that would enlarge its current stockpile; no better bombs, and hence an end to nuclear weapons testing; no missile testing or production that would enhance their current range; and no export of bombs or other nuclear weapons or missile technology. These will be hugely difficult goals to achieve through diplomacy. But there are some inducements the United States and its allies could offer the North that might help bring it (reluctantly) to agree. There is also significant leverage that the U.S. and China could jointly bring to bear on Kim Jong Un to raise the costs of his continuing on the current immensely dangerous path. And there are some things that the U.S. could offer China that might help persuade it to assume the risks of pressuring an unstable and unpredictable “ally.” North Korea has depicted its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons as a defensive maneuver to deter an attack on it by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. But the problem is that any new weapon changes the balance of power among adversaries. The greater North Korea’s nuclear weapons capacity, the more emboldened it may be to engage in reckless, bullying behavior in the region. We are now at an existential moment, where North Korea must be confronted with a fundamental choice: Either it will face crippling global economic sanctions (including a Chinese oil embargo) that could trigger the collapse of the regime, or it will negotiate a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons development program. The North’s willingness to give up its weapons program would serve as a prerequisite for talks about new ways to defuse tensions on the Korean peninsula—including a peace treaty that recognizes the North Korean regime, normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea, and flows of investment and trade that would help to modernize the North’s economy. Toward the end of Bill Clinton’s presidency, when he was pursuing a diplomatic approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear threat, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry [found](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/north-korea-nuclear-deal-donald-trump-china-215034) the North Koreans to be seriously interested in the prospect of normalizing relations with the U.S. With respect to economic incentives, more would be possible for North Korea in terms of investment and trade from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to the extent that North Korea takes the reform path that China did in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping. This would mean not only greatly accelerating market-oriented reforms in the North but also closing down the country’s concentration camps and allowing a modicum of political openness as well. America’s goal in this process would not be to bring an end to the North Korean regime, but to bring an end to its failed policies, which propel it toward militarism and aggression to cover up for its manifest developmental failures. What could induce China to take risks for peace? One irony of having elected a U.S. president who repeatedly threatened a trade war with China is that a retreat from those ill-considered warnings now appears as a conciliatory gesture. But there is something more the U.S. can offer. China’s fear of a sudden collapse of the Kim regime is not just about massive refugee flows. It also dreads a “German-style” reunification, in which South Korea would politically absorb the north and China would then confront a newly powerful American ally—hosting nearly 30,000 American troops—right on its border. Because the North Korean regime is not irrational, **it will probably opt for the above deal under Chinese pressure** and American inducements. But should Kim Jong Un balk and his regime then unravel, leading to reunification under a democratic constitution, American troops would no longer be needed to stabilize the Korean peninsula, and they could be withdrawn. Neither should there be a need for the missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD) that is now being deployed in South Korea, over real but misplaced Chinese concerns that the system is aimed partly at them. Agreement to withdraw THAAD and American troops following Korean reunification would be huge elements of strategic reassurance for China. On the flip side, however, the U.S. retains coercive inducements to get China on its side, [namely](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/one-powerful-weapon-to-use-against-north-korea/2017/04/21/ddbb9702-26c2-11e7-bb9d-8cd6118e1409_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4d24efb00424) the option of imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese banks that do business with North Korean front companies.

## Case

**The winner of the space development race will determine the world order**

**Gan and Westcott 21** (Nectar Gan is China Reporter for CNN Digital Worldwide based in Hong Kong; Ben Westcott is the Asia-Pacific Affairs Writer for CNN Digital Worldwide in Hong Kong, Cnn, 6-21-2021, "US-China rivalry is extending from Earth into space. That poses a challenge to American dominance," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/21/china/china-us-space-race-mic-intl-hnk/index.html>) //EG

When it comes to the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, the sky is by no means the limit.

**As the two countries jockey for economic, technological, geopolitical and even ideological superiority on Earth, space has become a natural extension -- and crucial frontier -- in their great power competition.**

**And due to the inherent dual-use nature of space technologies, what's at stake extends far beyond mere scientific prestige and global standing. In addition to national defense, so much of our life on Earth -- from digital communications to navigation -- depends on satellites in space.**

Following the demise of the Soviet Union's space program, the US has enjoyed a period of unparalleled leadership in space. But in recent years, US [observers](https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/coping-with-the-challenge-of-chinas-growing-space-power/) and [politicians](https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-nasa-budget-more-moon-less-space-station-1516873423) have warned that **America's dominance could soon be challenged by China's fast-growing space capabilities.**

That concern has only deepened with a series of important and high profile Chinese achievements: In 2019, it became the first country to land on the far side of the moon; last year, it successfully put into orbit its final Beidou satellite, setting the stage to challenge the US Global Positioning System (GPS); and last month, it became the only country after the US to put a functioning rover on Mars.

**Chinese leadership solves extinction.**

Shen **Yamei 18**, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491

**As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution.** A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. **The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced. The US and Europe** that used to dominate the global governance system **have been beset with structural problems**, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. **These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance**. **Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind.** **Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth**. **These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves**, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but **the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas.** With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. **As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions**. **Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in such key areas as global economic governance and climate change**. **Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics**. **The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily**. **All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement.** B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. **Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club**”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For **China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations**, **but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order.** C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, **in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations**. **So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations.** Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. **China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement.** D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. **Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn.** **Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements**, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, **the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”.** II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance **Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way.** A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. **The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community.** B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System**. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced**. **China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO**, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. **Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability.** C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. **Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals.** Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. **On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively.** **With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation**. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. **China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”**. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. **As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.**

#### Attacks don’t escalate

--no retaliation – nukes are categorically different than space bc existential

--space is like cyber – attacks are unfortunate but not worthy of a nuke response

--nuke threats not credible bc nobody thinks space is at that lvl

Lewis, 13 – Senior fellow and Program Director at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies

James A. Lewis, “Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace,” in Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations, September 2013. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a587431.pdf>

Unlike other military technologies, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat. If used, damage and casualties would be massive. In contrast, neither cyberattacks nor ASAT attacks pose the same level of destructiveness; they certainly are not existential threats. If there was some way credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons after a cyberattack, deterrence might be possible. However, a nuclear threat in response to these attacks would not be proportional and the threat to use nuclear weapons is likely to be discounted by opponents. There are powerful norms that constrain the use of these weapons, and therefore, a threat to use nuclear weapons in response to cyberattacks would be dramatic but not credible. Calls for a nuclear response to cyberattacks would be dismissed as frivolous. Threats to use military force to retaliate against an act that would not be considered as justifying the use of force in self-defense under international law or practice will likely be dismissed by opponents as bluster.

#### Space Wars are not that dangerous—they’ll be robotized and end as soon as communication satellites are taken out. Corporations are specifically key to this peaceful outcome

--space wars have no terrorist groups or failed states

--mostly robotized means few lives lost

--brief because destroying communication satellites ends conflict, also incentivizes states to innovate in a way that reduces casualties

Szoic et al 17-- Szocik, Konrad [Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow], Tomasz Wójtowicz [Institute of Security and Civic Education, Pedagogical University in Cracow, Podchorążych 2 Street, 30-084 Kraków, Poland], and Leszek Baran [Chair of Internal Security, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, Poland]. "War or peace? The possible scenarios of colonising Mars." Space Policy 42 (2017): 31-36. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2017.10.002>. (AG DebateDrills)

Contrary to fourth and fifth generation warfare, space wars will be dominated by nation states and international corporations. Elon Musk, Managing Director of SpaceX, a company dealing with the manufacture of jet engines, carrier rockets, and spaceships, claimed that within the nearest 40–100 years over 1 million people might be sent to Mars. He estimated the cost of one person's reaching the Red Planet at USD 200 million [16]. According to the authors of the Mars one initiative, a sum of USD 6 billion will be needed to send the first four astronauts to Mars [6]. The need to secure such exorbitant funds virtually excludes any entities other than states and international corporations (terrorist groups, criminal organisations or failed states) from participating in space wars. It should be expected that the future space wars will entail an advanced process of conflict robotisation and dehumanisation. The prospective Mars colonisation war may proceed by means of robots – unmanned aerial vehicles. Ender's Game, an American science fiction film dating back to 2013, based on a novel by Orson Scott Card pub- lished under the same title, features scenes presenting such kind of a conflict. The film is set in 2070. The main hero, ten-year-old Andrew Wiggin, is elected leader of the invading fleet, intended to destroy the native world of a foreign life form threatening the Earth. Andrew Wiggin, believing that he is taking part in training, leads the invading fleet and defeats the enemy. The invading forces comprise only un- manned space drones controlled from a secure place [11]. The pro- gressing robotisation and dehumanisation of war will also be influenced by the strategic culture of western countries (the United States) whose societies show limited tolerance to human loss during military conflicts. As stressed by Adrian Lewis in his book The American Culture of War, abolishing the obligatory military service was the most significant change introduced in the 20th century to the U.S. war-fighting model. It triggered the professionalization of armed forces, with a mass army being replaced by mobile troops limited in numbers [14]. Along with the robotisation and dehumanisation, the future space wars should also be expected to be brief. Unless the dispute escalating between the global powers evolves into military activities located in the Earth, the conflict may end soon after the communication satellites of one of the parties are destroyed, or its space station is damaged. Considering the above, the technological arms race between the competing States, aimed at designing, as fast as possible, a weapon which will enable defeating the enemy in the first attack, without any possibility of re- taliation, will prove crucial.