### The Advantage is African Instability

#### Vaccines will not cover LMICs until at least 2023 or 2024—fortunately there is massive room for supply increase

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Since consequentialist justifications treat the value of IP as purely instrumental, they are also vulnerable to counterarguments showing that a sought-after goal is not the sole or most important end. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we submit that the vaccinating the world is an overriding goal. With existing IP protections intact, the world has **fallen well short** of this goal. Current forecasts show that at the current pace, there will **not be enough vaccines to cover the world’s population** until 2023 or 2024.15 IP protections further frustrate the goal of universal access to vaccines by limiting who can manufacturer them. The WHO reports that 80% of global sales for COVID-19 vaccines come from five large multinational corporations.16 Increasing the number of manufacturers globally would not only **increase supply,** but reduce prices, making vaccines more affordable to L[ow and] M[iddle] I[ncome] C[ountrie]s. It would stabilise supply, minimising disruptions of the kind that occurred when India halted vaccine exports amidst a surge of COVID-19 cases.

It might be objected that waiving IP protections will not increase supply, because it takes years to **establish manufacturing capacity**. However, since the pandemic began, we have learnt it takes less time. Repurposing facilities and vetting them for safety and quality can often happen in 6 or 7months, about half the time previously thought.17 Since COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic humanity faces, expanding manufacturing capacity is also necessary preparation for **future pandemics**. Nkengasong, Director of the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, put the point bluntly, ‘Can a continent of 1.2billion people—projected to be 2.4billion in 30 years, where one in four people in the world will be African—continue to import 99% of its vaccine?’18

A prolonged economic contraction due to the pandemic in Africa pushes millions more into poverty and also forever ends projects key to future economic progress

Lakemann and Tafese 20-- Lakemann, Tabea, Jann Lay, and Tevin Tafese. "Africa after the covid-19 lockdowns: economic impacts and prospects." (2020): 14.

The most recent economic data suggests that economic activity declined dramatically during the lockdowns. The very sharp decline in South Africa is particularly worrying, as it is likely to affect neighboring economies as well. At the same time, some countries in West and East Africa are already showing signs of recovery that may take place more quickly than anticipated. Looking solely at African aggregate growth performance and aggregate poverty will be misleading. Short-term impacts, especially on urban poverty, have likely been severe: The evidence is clear that informal workers across the continent have suffered drastic income losses during the lockdowns, as few have been shielded by social protection or other policies. It remains to be seen how quickly they can recover from the shock, but there is some empirical silver lining here as well. As elsewhere in the world, industries have been affected heterogeneously by the pandemic and the associated restrictions. This also holds for the external sector. Trade has declined dramatically, but our analysis reveals important differences between export products. Oil exporters have been adversely affected by the oil price slump and impacts on products traded in GVCs have been diverse, ranging from strong declines in textiles and apparel to increases in some food products. Food imports have hardly been affected, as global food supply chains have, overall, proven relatively resilient thus far. Finally, FDI is likely to drop substantially in 2020. Although there is again sectoral variation, this drop will not spare investments considered key for an acceleration of Africa’s economic development and the creation of productive employment. The drop in FDI demonstrates the uncertainty that looms over the hope for quick recovery. Huge setbacks to economic progress and poverty reduction in Africa can only be avoided with a quick recovery. A prolonged economic recession would not only cause poverty to rise further, but the medium- to long-term costs of the shock could be exacerbated by political turmoil or even increased conflict.

#### These direct impacts combine with indirect effects on the job market to create a vicious cycle where productivity loss increases political instability, deteriorating economic conditions and foreign confidence further, fostering even more turmoil

Carmody 20-- Carmody, Pádraig. "Meta-trends in global value chains and development: interacting impacts with COVID-19 in Africa." Transnational Corporations Journal 27.2 (2020).

The indirect impacts have, potentially, even wider effects. First amongst these is a “negative multiplier”. Dramatic reductions in the formal economy will have substantial knock-on effects on the informal sector, with potentially massive implications for poverty and unemployment. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa forecasts that up to half of all formal sector jobs in Africa could be lost as a result of the pandemic, whereas McKinsey predicts 18 million formal and 100 million informal jobs could be at risk (Thomas, 2020). While the urban informal economy may be locked in an exploitative relationship with the formal one (Santos, 1979), it is nonetheless largely dependent on it for its survival. Reductions in remittances from urban areas or from relatives living overseas may affect rural areas particularly badly. In rural Western Kenya average income declines of 25 per cent were recorded from early April to the end of May 2020 as lockdown measures were introduced and then eased (Miguel, 2020)3 . Flows of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to decline by 23.1 per cent in 2020 (World Bank cited in African Business, 2020). As formal sector jobs are lost, less income circulates through the economy and tax revenues are reduced. This may also have potentially severe political economy effects as “productive” social contracts (Nugent, 2019) may be further undermined, where they exist, as informalization deepens and proliferates, driving marginal productivity even further down. This may, in turn, exacerbate problems of governance and corruption in certain countries, with myriad, but generally negative economic consequences; again potentially compromising the ability to attract inward inflows of productive FDI. Reduced tax revenues may also mean reductions in infrastructural investment and social expenditure, increased indebtedness, or most likely, both – again reducing economic growth – with the potential to generate a vicious circle. While there have been some initiatives to try to limit the impact of increased indebtedness, such as a debt moratorium by the Group of 20 (G20) for low income countries until the end of the year, the head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has argued that many countries will need debt restructuring, rather than just a freeze (Reuters, 2020). As economic conditions deteriorate in many African countries they will find it increasingly difficult to source finance from international capital markets, which may reorient to service developed countries seeking to finance their budget deficits. Consequently, many have already been forced to ask the IMF for emergency assistance. However, the strict conditions attached to IMF loans have generally not been conducive, or have been actively detrimental, to development efforts on the continent (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Dozens of countries on the continent are now under, or requesting, IMF financial assistance, even if that organization has also offered some debt relief (Mizner, 2020)4 . The (enforced) return or reinforcement of economic orthodoxy on the continent will reduce policy space for developmental states, such as Ethiopia, to emerge in the future (Carmody, Kragelund and Riboredo, 2020).

#### African instability results in global draw-in as natural resource wealth and weak governance make Africa a prime target for proxy wars

Yeisley 11, Mark O. "Bipolarity, proxy wars, and the rise of China." Strategic Studies Quarterly 5.4 (2011): 75-91. (assistant professor of international relations at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies)//Elmer

Of primary interest is open access to Africa’s significant deposits of oil and other energy resources. For example, China has 4,000 military personnel in Sudan to protect its interests in energy and mineral investments there; it also owns 40 percent of the Greater Nile Oil Production Company.54 Estimates indicate that within the next few decades China will obtain 40 percent of its oil and gas supplies from Africa.55 Trade and investment in Africa have also been on the rise; trade has grown more than 10 percent annually in the past decade. Between 2002 and 2004, African exports to China doubled, ranking it third behind the United States and France in trade with the continent. Chinese investment is also growing; more than 700 Chinese business operations across Africa total over $1 billion. Aid and direct economic assistance are increasing as well, and China has forgiven the debt of some 31 African nations.56 Africa is thus a vital foreign interest for the Chinese and must be for the United States; access to its mineral and petroleum wealth is crucial to the survival of each.57 Although the US and Chinese economies are tightly interconnected, the nonrenewable nature of these assets means competition will remain a zero-sum game. Nearly all African states have been independent entities for less than 50 years; consolidating robust domestic state institutions and stable governments remains problematic.58 Studies have shown that weak governments are often prime targets for civil conflicts that prove costly to control.59 Many African nations possess both strategic resources and weak regimes, making them vulnerable to internal conflict and thus valuable candidates for assistance from China or the United States to help settle their domestic grievances. With access to African resources of vital strategic interest to each side, competition could likely occur by proxy via diplomatic, economic, or military assistance to one (or both) of the parties involved. Realist claims that focusing on third-world issues is misplaced are thus fallacious; war in a future US-China bipolar system remains as costly as it was during the Cold War. Because of the fragile nature of many African regimes, domestic grievances are more prone to result in conflict; US and Chinese strategic interests will dictate an intrusive foreign policy to be both prudent and vital. US-Sino proxy conflicts over control of African resources will likely become necessary if these great powers are to sustain their national security postures, especially in terms of strategic defense.60

#### US-China conventional war goes nuclear.

[Caitlin **Talmadge** (10-15-20**18**), PhD in Political Science from MIT, BA in Government from Harvard, Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option]//recut](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option%5d//recut) CHS PK

**As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States.** Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but **the prospect of a military confrontation**—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation **going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.**

Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This **assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation.** Since the end of the Cold War, **the United States’ signature approach to war has been** simple: **punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.**

**China**, by contrast, **not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other**. This means that **a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal**. Faced with such a threat, **Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.**

**A**s **U.S. and Chinese** leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a **conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation**. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms**, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating**. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on **both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war**. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place.

## Solvency

#### Plan: Member nations of the WTO ought to grant a TRIPS waiver for COVID vaccines

#### India and South Africa have signaled ability to increase vaccine production after a TRIPS waiver—this is also our solvency advocate

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This view has come under increasing fire. Two competing positions have emerged. First, India and South Africa petitioned the WTO for a temporary waiver of IP rights for medical products pertaining to preventing, containing or treating COVID19.2 The wavier would apply to all WTO members and lift restrictions in four TRIPS sections: copyright and related rights, industrial designs, patents and protection of undisclosed information. It would be annually reviewed and last for a set length, determined by the WTO Council. Proponents of the proposal argue that IP protections have ‘hindered urgent scale-up of vaccine production’ and that ‘many countries—especially LMICs countries—may face institutional and legal difficulties when using TRIPS flexibilities’.12 To break the divide, WTO Director General, Okonjo-Iweala, proposed ‘a third way’ in which ‘we… license manufacturing to countries so that we can have adequate supplies while still making sure that IP issues are taken care of.’13 This approach permits companies to retain ownership while licensing other companies to manufacture their vaccines.

#### The plan is also a prerequisite to starting the WHO technology transfer hub

WHO 4/21—WHO, 4-21-2021, “Establishment of a COVID-19 mRNA vaccine technology transfer hub to scale up global manufacturing,” <https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/establishment-of-a-covid-19-mrna-vaccine-technology-transfer-hub-to-scale-up-global-manufacturing>. (AG DebateDrills)

WHO and its partners are seeking to expand the capacity of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to produce COVID-19 vaccines and scale up manufacturing to increase global access to these critical tools to bring the pandemic under control.

WHO will facilitate the establishment of one (or more, as appropriate) technology transfer hub(s) that will use a hub and spoke model (REF) to transfer a comprehensive technology package and provide appropriate training to interested manufacturers in LMICs. This initiative will initially prioritize the mRNA-vaccine technology2 but could expand to other technologies in the future.

The intention is for these hubs to enable the establishment of production process at an industrial or semi-industrial level permitting training and provision of all necessary standard operating procedures for production and quality control. It is essential that the technology used is either free of intellectual property constraints in LMICs, or that such rights are made available to the technology hub and the future recipients of the technology through non-exclusive licenses to produce, export and distribute the COVID-19 vaccine in LMICs, including through the COVAX facility. Preference will be given to applicants who have already generated clinical data in humans, as such clinical data will contribute to accelerated approval of the vaccines in LMICs.

It is anticipated that WHO will work with funders and donors to mobilize financial support to establish the hubs and, as they are being established, to support the transfer of technology to selected manufacturers in LMICs, taking into consideration the need to establish permanent vaccine production capacity in regions where this is currently mostly absent. This broader objective will ensure that all WHO regions will be able to produce vaccines as essential preparedness measures against future infectious threats.

#### Plan also solves for future pandemics by creating precedent for a new IP regime that seamlessly shifts to a direct support model only during pandemics, which allows pharma companies to profit and innovate while speeding up the process---that solves but avoids the innovation DA.

Brink **Lindsey 21**. Vice President, Niskanen Center; Writes for Brookings, “Why Intellectual Property and Pandemics Don’t Mix,” Brookings, June 3, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/06/03/why-intellectual-property-and-pandemics-dont-mix/>, RJP, **DebateDrills**.

PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES AND DIRECT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

For pandemics and other public health emergencies, patents’ mix of costs and benefits is **misaligned** with what is needed for an effective policy response. The basic patent bargain, even when well struck, is to pay for more innovation down the road with **slower diffusion of innovation today**. In the **context of a pandemic**, that bargain is a bad one and should be rejected entirely. Here the imperative is to **accelerate** the diffusion of vaccines and other treatments, not slow it down. Giving drug companies the power to hold things up by blocking competitors and raising prices pushes in the completely wrong direction.

What approach to encouraging innovation should we take instead? How do we incentivize drug makers to undertake the hefty R&D costs to develop new vaccines without giving them exclusive rights over their production and sale? The most effective approach during a public health crisis is **direct government support**: public funding of R&D, advance purchase commitments by the government to buy large numbers of doses at set prices, and other, related payouts. And when we pay drug makers, we should not hesitate to pay generously, even extravagantly: we want to offer drug companies big profits so that they prioritize this work above everything else, and so that they are ready and eager to come to the rescue again the next time there’s a crisis.

It was direct support via **Operation Warp Speed** that made possible the astonishingly rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines and then facilitated a relatively rapid rollout of vaccine distribution (relative, that is, to most of the rest of the world). And it’s worth noting that a major reason for the faster rollout here and in the United Kingdom compared to the European Union was the latter’s [misguided penny-pinching](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/opinion/europe-vaccines-commission.html?smid=tw-share). The EU bargained hard with firms to keep vaccine prices low, and as a result their citizens ended up in the back of the queue as various supply line kinks were being ironed out. This is particularly ironic since the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine was developed in Germany. As this fact underscores, the chief advantage of direct support isn’t to “get tough” with drug firms and keep a lid on their profits. Instead, it is to accelerate the end of the public health emergency by making sure drug makers profit handsomely from doing the right thing.

Patent law and direct support should be seen **not as either-or alternatives but as complements** that apply different incentives to different circumstances and time horizons. Patent law provides a decentralized system for encouraging innovation. The government doesn’t presume to tell the industry which new drugs are needed; it simply incentivizes the development of whatever new drugs that pharmaceutical firms can come up with by offering them a temporary monopoly. It is important to note that patent law’s incentives offer no commercial guarantees. Yes, you can block other competitors for a number of years, but that still doesn’t ensure enough consumer demand for the new product to make it profitable.

**DIRECT SUPPORT MAKES PATENTS REDUNDANT**

The situation is different in a pandemic. Here the government knows exactly what it wants to incentivize: the creation of vaccines to prevent the spread of a specific virus and other drugs to treat that virus. Under these circumstances, the decentralized approach isn’t good enough. There is no time to sit back and let drug makers **take the initiative** on their own timeline. Instead, the government needs to be more involved to incentivize specific innovations now. As recompense for letting it call the shots (pardon the pun), the government sweetens the deal for drug companies by insulating them from commercial risk. If pharmaceutical firms develop effective vaccines and therapies, the government will buy large, predetermined quantities at prices set high enough to guarantee a healthy return.

For the pharmaceutical industry, it is useful to conceive of patent law as the default regime for innovation promotion. It improves pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to develop new drugs while leaving them free to decide which new drugs to pursue – and also leaving them to bear all commercial risk. In a pandemic or other emergency, however, it is appropriate to **shift to the direct support regime**, in which the government focuses efforts on one disease. In this regime, it is important to note, the government provides qualitatively superior incentives to those offered under patent law. Not only does it offer public funding to cover the up-front costs of drug development, but it also provides advance purchase commitments that guarantee a healthy return.

It should therefore be clear that the pharmaceutical industry has **no legitimate basis for objecting to a TRIPS waiver**. Since, because of the public health crisis, drug makers now qualify for the superior benefits of direct government support, they no longer need the default benefits of patent support. Arguments that a TRIPS waiver would deprive drug makers of the incentives they need to keep developing new drugs, when they are presently receiving the most favorable incentives available, can be **dismissed as the worst sort of special pleading.**

That said, it is a serious mistake to try to cast the current crisis as a morality play in which drug makers wear the black hats and the choice at hand is between private profits and public health. We would have no chance of beating this virus without the formidable organizational capabilities of the pharmaceutical industry, and providing the appropriate incentives is essential to ensure that the industry plays its necessary and vital role. It is misguided to lament that private companies are profiting in the current crisis: those profits are a drop in the bucket compared to the staggering cost of this pandemic in lives and economic damage.

What matters isn’t the existence or size of the profits, but how they are earned. We have good reason to want drug makers to profit from vaccinating the world: the comparative price is minuscule, and the incentive effects are a vital safeguard of public health in the event of future crises. What we want to avoid at all costs is putting drug makers in the position where drug companies can profit from standing in the way of rapid global vaccination. That is why intellectual property rights need to be taken out of the equation.

Vaccinating the world in any kind of reasonable time frame will require large-scale technology transfer to drug firms in other countries and rapid expansion of their production capacity. And looking beyond the current pandemic to the longer term, we need [ample, redundant global vaccine production capacity](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22397914/vaccine-mrna-adenovirus-manufacturing-process-investment) that is widely distributed around the planet. To achieve these goals as rapidly as possible will require the active cooperation of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, which is why the direct support model now needs to be extended. What is needed now is an Operation Warp Speed for the world, in which we make it worth current vaccine producers’ while to share their know-how broadly and ramp up global capacity.

Here again, we must recognize that the choice isn’t between people on the one hand and profits on the other. Rather, the key to good pandemic response policy is ensuring that **incentives are structured** so that drug company profit-seeking and global public health are well aligned. That means opting out of the default, decentralized patent bargain in favor of generous but well-focused direct government support.

### Framework

#### The standard is maximizing expected well being.

**1] pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

2. Governments are limited by scarce resources which means they inevitably have to make tradeoff decisions about who to serve. Taking someone's land thru eminent domain hurts them but its net better for society to build public infrastructure on that land which proves they can aggregate and use util.

### Underview

#### 1. Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, either disclose open source or disclose all taglines, full citations, and the first and last three words of the pieces of evidence read in their cases on the NDCA wiki at least one hour before the round

#### Violation: My opponent doesn’t have a wiki, screenshot proves

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

#### Net Benefits:

**a] Research** – disclosure increases research and gets rid of anti-educational arguments because debaters are forced to prepare cases knowing that people will have answers AND people get the opportunity to research answers to disclosed cases.

**Nails 13** - (Jacob [I am a policy debater at Georgia State University. I debated LD for 4 years for Starr's Mill High School (GA) and graduated in 2012.] "A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure)" http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/)

I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that **the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides.** First, **disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of.** Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. **The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory,** the increased quality of information **[this] could trade off with quantity**. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. **Empirically**, however**, the opposite has been true.** In fact, a second advantage of **disclosure is that it motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it.** Likewise, **debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and adovcacies employed by other debaters.** The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago. Lastly, and to my mind most significantly, **disclosure weeds out anti-educational arguments. I have in mind the sort of theory spikes and underdeveloped analytics whose strategic value comes only from the fact that the time to think of and enunciate responses to them takes longer than the time spent making the arguments themselves. If [theory spikes] these arguments were made on a level playing field where each side had equal time to craft answers, they would seldom win rounds, which is a testimony to the real world applicability (or lack thereof) of such strategies.** A model in which arguments have to withstand close scrutiny to win rounds creates incentive to find the best arguments on the topic rather than the shadiest. Having transitioned from LD to policy where disclosure is more universal, I can say that **debates are more substantive, developed, and responsive when both sides know what they’re getting into prior to the round**. The educational benefits of disclosure alone aren’t likely to convince the fairness-outweighs-education crowd, but I’ve learned over the course of many theory debates that most of that crowd has a very warped and confusing conception of fairness. **Debaters who produce better research are more deserving of a win. Debaters who can make smart arguments and defend them from criticism should win out over debaters who hide behind obfuscation.** That so many rounds these days are resolved on frivolous theory and dropped, single-sentence blips suggests that wins are not going to the “better debaters” in any meaningful sense of the term. The structure of LD in the status quo doesn’t incentivize better debating.

**b] Clash** – Disclosure is the best method for increasing clash in debates because it allows debaters to substantively engage positions rather than relying on sketchy tricks to avoid the discussion. It also allows for more specific clash because debaters can see specific arguments disclosed instead of trying to link generic arguments in.

#### C] Reciprocity- Most everyone discloses in national circuit tournaments, if you’re able to benefit from others doing so to learn what positions are being read and prepare against opponents pre-round, not doing the same in return is unfair.

Education is a voter and comes first- there’s no professional debate league, debate is important for us to gain skills for the real word

Fairness is a voter- debate is a competitive activity

Use competing interps as **reasonability is arbitrary and forces judges to make a unilateral decision that has been empirically shown to reject almost all theory shells to the point where most consider it a NIB.**

#### **Drop the debater-** Deterrence: losing the theory debate shouldn’t reset the debate to ground zero, this encourages debaters to try to get away with abuse. Also, you can’t drop the argument on disclosure, there’s no way to rectify the situation and anything they propose is arbitrary and self-serving.

#### No RVIs- it’s illogical to vote for them because they are fair

2. Disclosure comes first, it is pre-round and any abuse that happens afterwards can be attributed at least partially to lack of disclosure. Also, outweighs on scope, it empirically effects every round as everyone discloses because of fear of disclosure theory.

3. Timeframe comes first

A] we shouldn’t care as much about future lives, they haven’t been born yet and if we did, we’d have to spend every moment reproducing

B] Extinction is not infinite, otherwise me dying would similarly be infinite because I can have kids who have kids.

#### 4] The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement

#### a] Anything else moots 6 minutes of the ac – necessary to clash because restarting the debate means less ground for the aff and less time to develop arguments

#### b] Truth is a necessary part of any statement since any statement fundamentally asserts that some property is true. This means all arguments can be included under truth-testing which is key to education since exclusion precludes us from learning about a position.

#### C] Debate doesn’t affect subject formation- I can read cap good in one round and a cap K the next because of strategical incentives, indicting the assumptions of the aff makes no sense.