#### Plan: The US should ban private appropriation of space

### The Advantage is US/Russia Relations

#### Currently, the US maintains good relations with Russia’s space program-that’s dependent on no space race

Gadd 9/30—Adam Gadd; “The US Cooperates With Russia in Space. Why Not China?”; September 30 2021; The Diplomat; <https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/the-us-cooperates-with-russia-in-space-why-not-china/>; (AG DebateDrills)

It seems that the narrative of China’s rise has not stayed on Earth. Hence, U.S. cooperation with China is arguably held back by fears that China’s space advances will seriously threaten U.S. leadership and prestige in space. While the U.S. role as the senior partner in its cooperation with Russia has never been in doubt, a Chinese space program growing stronger by the day could leave the United States the junior partner in the event of future Sino-U.S. cooperation. These fears, however, are more the product of hyperbole than of fact. While NASA currently plans for the United States to return to the moon in the coming years, China is still in the process of constructing its space station and only plans to undertake human missions to the moon in the 2030s, in a program that also includes Russia. The exact time frame for this program and what it entails, however, are unclear, as the Russian version of the agreement is more ambitious than the Chinese. The Chinese-Russian lunar program does illustrate, however, that the picture of a rapidly advancing Chinese space program poised to surpass that of the United States is dubious at best. Russia-U.S. cooperation in space shows that the China exclusion policy is motivated less by the security risks of opening up to China, and more by the U.S. fear of losing its leadership position. It also illustrates the loss of potential that the policy has meant for both sides. By drawing on each other’s strengths, the U.S. and Russian space programs have both benefited. While the United States has consistently taken the lead on both spending and scientific research in space, its cooperation with Russia has been a significant enabling factor. It was only through this partnership that the United States could continue its manned spaceflight program after it decommissioned its Space Shuttle in 2011. For Russia, the partnership might well have helped save a space industry faced with possible demise in the 1990s. More generally, the effects of international cooperation in space have not been confined to scientific research. Disaster management in particular has proved fruitful ground for international cooperation in space. Initiatives such as the International Charter: Space and Major Disasters showcase how space-based technology can have concrete effects on the ground across the world. Similarly, cooperation between other space agencies, such as the European Space Agency, and China has been successful in the field of earth observation. The lesson here, and from decades of Russo-U.S. cooperation, is that cooperation in specific fields can be conducted in spite of tense bilateral relations. The alternative to this can be seen in the Space Race that preceded the era of cooperation. The room for countries and organizations outside Russia and the United States to actively participate in, and reap the benefits of, space exploration and space-based technology simply did not exist in the confrontational Space Race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Bilateral competition for supremacy in space will only exclude possible partners and prevent the productive use of resources in these expensive endeavors. Instead of modeling the future on Cold War competition, recent decades have showcased more positive developments. They also point to the conclusion that competition with China in space will be detrimental not only for China and the United States, but also for the rest of the world.

#### The Space Act signaling American private appropriation of outer space is a core issue that tanks our relations—the plan creates a uniform understanding that resolves tensions

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U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (“Space Act”): The Dawn of the Second Space Age Until recently, it did not matter that the OST was unclear, and the Moon Treaty failed to garner support. Space exploration remained the province of state actors like NASA because the sheer expense of rocketry and other technologies remained beyond the reach of private corporations and investors throughout the twentieth century.61 However, over the last two decades the industry has changed rapidly. In the United States alone, several of the most innovative companies have invested in space exploration technology.62 As the research accelerates, costs have decreased, and the potential for profits is tremendous – in 2018 the space economy was $360 billion.63 By 2040, its estimated worth is anywhere between $1.1 trillion and $1.7 trillion.64 However, investors demand certainty, and the uncertainty surrounding OST interpretation was reason to pause.65 After all, no investor or company wanted to pour millions, or even billions, into a company designed to mine liquid ice on the Moon only to discover that this violated international law and that the United States had decided to stop licensing such ventures. Just as President Eisenhower feared, the military-industrial complex, augmented by private industry, lobbied Congress heavily to reduce regulatory hurdles and legal uncertainty in space investment.66 In 2015, their efforts bore fruit when Congress passed the Space Act, which President Obama signed into law.67 Chapter 513 of Subtitle V – “Space Resource Commercial Exploration and Utilization” – was the shift that enabled the American private space industry to flourish. This affirmed that American citizens could own and sell any “space resources” that were obtained through “commercial recovery.”68 In one stroke, Congress guaranteed property rights to American citizens and companies on a “first come, first served basis.”69 Moreover, American courts would not permit foreign lawsuits accusing entrepreneurs and businesses of violating the OST.70 The law also required the executive branch to “discourage government barriers” to development and for regulation to “facilitate commercial utilization” in space.71 Finally, it required the President to promote the interest of the American space industry.72 Ever wary of the ambiguities of the OST, and likely out of concern that the Space Act might violate the treaty, the law included a disclaimer that it was the sense of Congress that nothing in the Space Act asserted American sovereignty over any celestial body.73 This disclaimer should be read as opinio juris of American interpretation of the OST. In 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union shared a concern that other nations would challenge their technological preeminence in space.74 In 2015, this proved no different, except, this time, the United States was alone in its preeminence. Russia, in fact, strongly objected and claimed that the Space Act violated international law.75 Russia submitted an objection to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”), claiming the Space Act demonstrated “tot al disrespect for international law order [sic].”76 Russia went on to declare that this law manifested a “doctrine of domination in outer space.”77 Nonetheless, a careful reading of Russia’s complaint to COPUOS elucidates that Russia never actually asserted that the United States violated the OST.78 To be sure, Russia came as close as possible to this, but never outright said it.79 Indeed, the Russians lag behind in investment in outer space and technology and fear American exploitation of space’s vast resources in space without their participation.80 American private investment has accelerated this gap with NASA paying companies like SpaceX $55 million per seat to ferry astronauts to the ISS instead paying the Russians more than $90 million to do the same.81 In fact, in its objection to the Space Act, Russia stated that the United States “could propose discussing the possibility to reach uniform understanding of the status of resources and set forth the structure of the doctrine that would include safety and security aspects.”82 It seems Russia is pining for its prior role of crafting space law with the United States. This also suggests that if Russia had the same capabilities as the United States, its policy would likely be comparable.83

#### A private space race with Russia pushes them towards alliance with China and also creates a technocracy that undermines US interests. Space is key as the next frontier of commercial and military success

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The Artemis Accords are a culmination of American space policy to enable commercialization of outer space. However, they pose a variety of problems. To start, any future agreements under the accords may violate international law – both the OST and the VCLT. While the Trump Administration appears willing to ignore this issue, violating international law is a dangerous precedent and should be avoided.118 Further, the dual nature of all space technology means that any commercial activity in space that the Artemis Accords enable could readily be converted for belligerent purposes.119 This would both violate international law and threaten national security. Despite these inherent dangers, the Trump Administration has maintained a bellicose rhetoric on its space policy.120 Although American technology and investments surpass those of Russia and China, such rhetoric serves to inflame[s] already tense relations. Russia and China are each pursuing their own space programs which threaten national security interests, but the United States has engaged neither in Artemis Accords diplomacy.121 A. Violations of International Law? At best, future Artemis Accords agreements exist in a gray area of international law. After all, the Moon Treaty failed to update and clarify the gaps in the OST on space exploration and resource exploitation by non-state actors. The Space Act and the Artemis Accords together represent American state practice and opinio juris as to the meaning of the OST. At worst, the Trump Administration would be blatantly and knowingly violat[e]ing international law, in particular the ban on national appropriation. Certainly, the Artemis Accords signal a willingness to push international law to the limit, if not to step over the line. In addition to potentially violating the OST, the Artemis Accords may also violate the VCLT. Though the United States has not ratified the VCLT, the “treaty on treaties” is customary international law and thus binding on all states. Article 41 of the VCLT permits two or more parties to a treaty to make bilateral, inter-se agreements or to modify a treaty among themselves.122 Yet, if these side deals are “incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole” then the VCLT forbids them.123 NASA made clear that bilateral Artemis Accords agreements with other nations will be “grounded in the Outer Space Treaty” and that resource utilization will be conducted under the “auspices of the Outer Space Treaty.”124 Therefore, the United States appears ready to create bilateral, inter-se agreements every time it signs an Artemis Accords agreement. Because Article II of the OST clearly bans national appropriation, licensing non-state actors to create mining colonies on the Moon in safety zones verges on appropriation, especially when coupled with Article VI’s responsibility clause based on national activity.125 Overall, the Administration advances on very uneven legal footing, which is further compounded by the fact that space technologies are inherently dual purpose. B. Dual Purpose Any technology – from rocketry, to satellites, to mining equipment – introduced into space is inherently dual purpose. That is, it may readily be converted to military uses. The OST makes clear that nuclear weapons are prohibited in space. It also completely demilitarizes the Moon, under Article IV.126 However, military personal may participate in scientific research or other peaceful purposes – i.e., commercial ones.127 Hence, from a national security standpoint it would be legal for other rival nations, namely Russia and China, to create lunar bases or asteroid mines. But should conflict arise, such technology and infrastructure could readily be turned hostile and harnessed against American infrastructure in space. This is troubling because for a country like China there is no obvious distinction between public and private industry.128 And from China’s perspective, NASA is still teaming up with SpaceX in public-private partnerships and the DoD has many of similar agreements as well. In fact, in its 2020 Defense Space Strategy, the DoD proclaimed its eagerness to “[l]everage commercial technological advancements and acquisition processes.”129 An incident with Russia highlights the dangers of dual-purpose space technologies. On November 26, 2019, Russia launched what appeared to be a single satellite.130 Eleven days later the single satellite “birthed” a second.131 In mid-January the pair floated near KH-11, a multi-billion- dollar U.S. military reconnaissance satellite. The United States complained to Moscow, which moved the satellites away from KH-11. However, on July 15, 2020, the “birthed” satellite launched a missile into outer space. This is the first time the United States has alleged a space-based anti-satellite missile test.132 Although Russia claimed that the satellites are peaceful, it proved that even a so-called peaceful satellite could be secretly armed with military capabilities. Ironically, in a speech that same day to his counterparts in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, Dmitry Rogozin, head of Russia’s space program, called for a “space free of weapons of any type, to keep it fit for long-term and sustainable use as it is today.”133 It requires little imagination to envision a Chinese or Russian base on the Moon doubling as a commercial mining post and as a secret military garrison. After all, when the Soviets feared American ICBM superiority and a first-strike capability in the early 1960s they chose to place missiles in Cuba.134 Nowadays, a similar dynamic exists, with the US enjoying a comparable advantage. C. Bellicose American Rhetoric The Trump Administration has provided mixed signals to rivals about American intentions in outer space. In 2017, Vice President Mike Pence declared that “America must be as dominant in the heavens as it is on Earth.”135 Citing the fear that Sputnik instilled in Americans, Pence later warned that Russia and China were racing to pass the United States in space technology, especially with respect to the military.136 In its 2020 Defense Space Strategy, the DoD pronounced, “China and Russia present the greatest strategic threat due to their development, testing, and deployment of counterspace capabilities and their associated military doctrine for employment in conflict extending to space.”137 More modestly, however, Stephen Kitay, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, made clear that the United States is still superior in space capabilities; however, the gap is rapidly diminishing.138 Still, this rhetoric is somewhat misleading. American public investment in space dwarfs Russian and Chinese investments combined: in 2018, the United States invested $41 billion whereas China invested $5.8 billion, and Russia invested $4.2 billion.139 Moreover, this spending does not account for private investment in space. Unfortunately, this author has been unable to procure aggregate data on total U.S. private investment. However, for reference, Jeff Bezos has claimed he invests $1 billion each year of Amazon stock to finance Blue Origins.140 Elon Musk spent $100 million to found SpaceX in 2002.141 In 2019, the company raised $1.33 billion in three rounds of funding.142 Additionally, SpaceX has estimated its broadband satellite project, Starlink, will cost at least $10 billion to build and deploy.143 Finally, Bryce Technology reported that start up space ventures raised $5.7 billion in funding in 2019.144 Whatever the total number is, it is quite large and likely in the tens of billions a year. Russia and China simply do not have the same level of private investment. This is not to say that the Administration is wrong for taking foreign threats in outer space seriously. It should, precisely because the Russians and Chinese take these threats seriously. The United States should not, however, start a space race when it is already light years ahead of its rivals, as this would repeat the mistake of the first space race – permitting private industry, which Eisenhower warned against, to dictate American policy and thereby create a technocracy.145 Naturally, this talk of competition begs the question, what do the Russians and Chinese actually want in outer space? D. Engagement with Russia and China? i. Russia Russia has strongly rejected the Artemis Accords as a violation of international law.146 After the United States excluded Russia from the Artemis Accords, Dmitry Rogozin, Chief of Roscosmos, fumed, “The principle of invasion is the same, whether it be the Moon or Iraq. The creation of a ‘coalition of the willing’ is initiated. Only Iraq or Afghanistan will come out of this.”147 More recently, he called the Artemis Accords a “political project,” and compared it to NATO.148 When asked if Russia would partner with NASA on Artemis, Rogozin answered, “Frankly speaking, we are not interested in participating in such a project.”149 Ominously, Rogozin signaled a Russian shift towards partnering with the Chinese, “We respect their results…[China] is definitely our partner.”150 In a sign of how quickly this partnership is forming, just a few weeks later, Rogozin announced that he and the Director of the China National Space Administration, Zhang Kejian, had agreed to “probably” build a lunar research base together.151 On March 9, 2021, Russia and China signed an agreement to build this base together.152 This partnership is dripping with irony. Recall that, in 2016, Russia issued a complaint about the Space Act before COPUOS.153 But that complaint walked a fine line and never directly claimed that American resource exploitation in space violated the OST.154 Indeed, the Russians appeared more interested in signaling to the United States their interest in “discussing the possibility to reach uniform understanding of the status of resources and set forth the structure of the doctrine that would include safety and security aspects.”155 As discussed, the Russians care less about complying with international law than being able to shape it to suit their own interests. Though they may lack the level of investment and advanced technologies of the United States, they appear willing to join the Chinese who have a long-term plan to achieve space supremacy. Of course, the creation of Russo-Chinese partnership and system in space to challenge the Artemis Accords would render Rogozin’s fear of NATO a self-fulfilling prophecy.

#### The plan also institutionalizes a policy against traditional strengthening of alliances and US military power, which strikes at the root cause for any Russo-China alliance

Crawford 21-- Crawford, Timothy W. professor of political science, boston college; "How to Distance Russia from China." The Washington Quarterly 44.3 (2021): 175-194. (AG DebateDrills)

But the last five years have proven that the most important cause of Russia’s and China’s moves toward military alignment is the spread of the US alliance system around their borders, especially Russia’s. (This is not the same thing as saying that US preponderance and pursuit of primacy drives them together, because a large and ever-growing alliance system is not necessary for the United States to preserve its relative power position and could, on net, weaken it.) The alliance system’s role as a general source of their convergence is easy to discern: the network of US military ties expanded in a big way after the Cold War, well before Russia and China began serious moves toward alliance, and it continues to sweep forward in US efforts to groom new allies and strategic partners around Eurasia. Given this expansion, it would be strange if Russia and China did not increasingly align. Eventually, the basic dynamic of an alliance “spiral” goes to work, with one alliance’s growth feeding fears that prompt another’s.[9](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)9 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984), 462, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010183>.View all notes The Trump administration’s distinctive approach helped get a firmer grasp on the cause of alignment But it is possible to get a firmer grasp on the matter now, thanks to the Trump administration’s distinctive approach to competing with Russia and China. When Trump took office in 2017, the White House dialed down ideological and institutional competition. He praised the governing prowess of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, winked at their success in entrenching personal rule, and routinely flattered other authoritarian “strongmen.”[10](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)10 David Shepardson, “Trump Praises Chinese President Extending Tenure for Life,” Reuters, March 3, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-china/trump-praises-chinese-president-extending-tenure-for-life-idUSKCN1GG015>; Domenico Montanaro, “6 Strongmen Trump Has Praised,” NPR, May 2, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/2017/05/02/526520042/6-strongmen-trumps-praised-and-the-conflicts-it-presents>.View all notes He ignored the human rights agenda. It is hard to imagine a more decisive reversal of the “color revolution” cheerleading of previous administrations. Trump also often disparaged the competency and reliability of allied liberal democratic governments while cultivating deeper strategic ties with authoritarian regimes. At the level of the liberal rules-based order, the Trump administration, with its “America First” formula, targeted multilateral enterprises—like the Trans Pacific Partnership, the WTO, the Paris Accords, and the JCPOA—that expressed US leadership in global trade, climate, and non-proliferation agendas.[11](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)11 Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership (Public Affairs, 2018).View all notes It largely neglected the United Nations, where Russia and China—with permanently institutionalized peer status at the apex of the organization—gained practical influence as a result. In sum, many of the conditions thought to drive Russia and China convergence were sharply weakened by the White House in those years. But with military alignments, it was rather different. There, the Trump administration continued military counters to Russian and Chinese activism. The president’s rhetorical slams on NATO free-riders notwithstanding, Washington bolstered the alliance—especially the eastern flank—in significant ways. It turned the 2014 European Reassurance Initiative into the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to accentuate its anti-Russia focus and multiplied the DoD budget for EDI activities.[12](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)12 Congressional Research Service, “The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview,” updated June 16, 2020, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10946/5>View all notes It pressured NATO allies into higher levels of defense spending and approved NATO membership for Montenegro and North Macedonia. It ratcheted up US troop rotations in Poland, the Baltics, and Romania; programs to prepare longer-term basing arrangements in such countries; and naval activities in the Black Sea region. It adopted a more confrontational approach to security assistance for Ukraine and Georgia. In Asia, meanwhile, it revived efforts to consolidate an anti-China front with Japan, Australia, and India, via the “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). It launched the 2019 “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to restore US primacy in the region by building up its own forces and investing in old allies and new strategic partners to lean against China’s growing power and influence. It forged new agreements to deepen strategic partnership with India, courted Vietnam, boosted arms sales to Taiwan, and encouraged important increases in Japanese defense spending. And to complete the picture, the Trump administration—along with allied governments—sought to promote stronger strategic linkages between the NATO and Indo-Pacific alignment networks.[13](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)13 Shannon Tiezzi, “NATO Huddles with Asia-Pacific Democracies to Talk China, The Diplomat, December 3, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/nato-huddles-with-asia-pacific-democracies-to-talk-china/>.View all notes All of this activity culminated in a rapid magnification of military alignments against Russia and China. It is not surprising, then, that some of Russia’s and China’s most eye-catching moves toward military partnership occurred in the last few years, including step-level changes in the pattern and qualities of military technology transfers, collaboration and planning, and joint training exercises and maneuvers.[14](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)14 For details see Kofman, “The Emperor’s League”; Weitz, Expanding China-Russia Defense Partnership.View all notes The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s annual worldwide threat assessments provide a useful barometer of the progression. The 2016, 2017, and 2018 reports discussed at length the challenges posed by Russia and China in their respective regions and at the level of global influence, but they did not raise alarms about their military cooperation.[15](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)15 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong. (February 9, 2016) (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence), <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf>; Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (May 11, 2017) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI> Unclassified SFR - Final.pdf; Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (February 13, 2018) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf>.View all notes The 2019 report, however, placed special emphasis on this cooperation and warned that the two powers had become more aligned than they had been at any time since the early Cold War.[16](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)16 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (January 29, 2019) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence), <https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf>.View all notes The 2021 report treats deep military cooperation between the two as a given.[17](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)17 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 9, 2021), 6, 9. <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.View all notes When other ideological and institutional factors thought to encourage Russia-China convergence were most muted, their military partnership advanced rather significantly. What were not muted at that time—indeed were intensified—were US efforts to strengthen and enlarge military alignments against them both. Many obscure, if not altogether ignore, this driver. The latter approach appeared in former Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ September 2018 assertion: “I see little in the long term that aligns Russia and China.”[18](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)18 Quoted in Alexander Gabuev, “Why Russia and China are Strengthening Security Ties,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2018, 1, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-09-24/why-russia-and-china-are-strengthening-security-ties>.View all notes Ironically, he was then leading the long-term project of expanding US military presence in Eastern Europe and the rollout of a new Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at extending and deepening military partnerships in South and East Asia. A similar kind of omission appears in more serious analyses calling for the United States to ratchet up military and economic pressure on Russia that do not note that such actions will drive Russia deeper into alignment with China much less consider the costs for US grand strategy of such consequences.[19](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)19 Michael McFaul, “How to Contain Putin’s Russia: A Strategy for Countering a Rising Revisionist Power,” Foreign Affairs, January 19, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2021-01-19/how-contain-putins-russia>; Daniel Fried and Alexander Vershbow, “How the West Should Deal with Russia,” Atlantic Council/Eurasia Center, November 23, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russia-in-the-world/>; Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How a Confident US Should Deal with Russia,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 4 (July/August 2020), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2020-06-09/pinning-down-putin>.View all notes Even when one recognizes that US military policies stimulate Russia-China convergence, it is easy to minimize or obscure the implications of that mechanism.[20](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)20 For example, see Stokes and Smith, “Facing Down the Sino-Russian Entente,” 140; Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, Navigating the Deepening Russia-China Partnership, 4.View all notes So it is with the claim that the two regimes’ authoritarianism and revisionist hostility to the US-led liberal order makes their alignment natural and inevitable.[21](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)21 Haas, “Ideological Polarity and Balancing in Great Power Politics,” 750–52.View all notes Presuming these to be primary drivers of their convergence makes the growing US alliance system seem epiphenomenal and implies that their alignment trajectory cannot be changed by any restraint in America’s. National security strategist Matthew Kroenig goes further, suggesting that closer Russia-China military ties would not be so bad for American security because the authoritarian defect that unites them also makes them poor cooperators “unlikely to form an enduring and coordinated alliance that will pose a major threat to the United States.”[22](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970903?casa_token=ujiE1wzexN4AAAAA:-lrqqcqr1jVqUz_4q9uc4ulCMHvQuV1qZ9ooPTvm-7JsXMWZcdEq0pSPFlYMHCIRStlbbuXTuSDN)22 Matthew Kroenig, “The United States Should Not Align with Russia Against China,” Foreign Policy, May 13, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/united-states-should-not-align-russia-against-china-geopolitical-rivalry-authoritarian-partnership/>. The implications of the mainspring are also obscured in the new mantra that the American alliance system is a powerful source of “leverage” against the Russia-China combination.23 There is an obvious truth in this, if we think of leverage like investors do, as borrowed power. But the image skips over the way that the creeping expansion of the alliance system—especially toward Russia’s border—can backfire and drain leverage by weakening the unity within NATO that helps deter Russia and by strengthening the Russia-China alignment that makes it harder to deter China.

#### A strong Sino-Russian alliance sets the stage for Chinese adventurism and the impact of transition wars

Crawford 2-- Crawford, Timothy W. professor of political science, boston college; "How to Distance Russia from China." The Washington Quarterly 44.3 (2021): 175-194. (AG DebateDrills)

But more than these material aids to China’s military strength, Russia’s alignment with China increases the likelihood of Chinese adventurism. It is not only that political crises or military confrontations between the United States and Russia in Eastern Europe will invite China to “exploit US preoccupation” by applying pressure on points of conflict in Asia26—even absent such European crises, closer Russian partnership with China can embolden Beijing because the increased potential of Russian involvement in a US-China clash significantly boosts the risks and complications of a US response.27 And the plausible prospect that such risks and complications would inhibit, delay, or weaken US reaction will enlarge China’s perceived freedom of maneuver. The closer their military ties, and the more complex and engrained the channels of strategic cooperation, the larger the “halo” of political expectations of support will become, particularly if the two cross the formal alliance threshold.28 This potential points to an important benefit of doing things now to weaken Russia-China alignment. If expectations of direct support from Russia (or a diversionary reaction by it), will make China’s leaders willing to run greater risks of conflict with the United States, reducing or complicating such expectations should, by the same token, make it easier for the United States to deter China. The pay-off, then, could be very large, even if it only comes in the invisible currency of bad things that don’t happen. Because it is hard to quantify how these risks aggravate the military power problem, it is tempting to dismiss them. But anyone who worries, for example, that China’s newly minted “strategic partnership” with Iran will embolden Tehran to step up its regional or nuclear ambitions surely intuits the logic.29 This issue of expectations is skirted by those who argue that because Russia cannot be flipped into an ally against China, there can be no significant payoff from weakening its ties with China, or that even if it could be flipped there is little to gain because Russia cannot help in any serious way to balance against China.30 Both arguments incorrectly suggest that a wedge strategy must lead an adversary to switch sides to be successsful and, more practically, they ignore the strategic value to the United States of less dramatic changes in Russia’s alignment. Depriving China of a close Russian ally may cause it to avoid a war that it would be willing to risk if it were more confident of Russian support, whether it was actually forthcoming or not, or to pursue more limited aims if it does use force. There are two other cardinal virtues of trying to weaken, rather than reverse, Russia’s alignment: it is easier and less costly to do.

#### More broadly, every shift towards multipolarity weakens deterrence, making worldwide conflicts more likely and increasing the likelihood of any conflict going nuclear

**Forsyth 19** [Jim Forsyth currently serves as dean of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD from the University of Denver, Josef Korbel School of International Studies. He has written and published extensively on great power war, intervention, and nuclear issues. “Through the Glass—Darker”, Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 4 (WINTER 2019), pp. 18-36, JSTOR]//recut CHS PK

As the article argued in 2007, “technological shifts have continuously altered the methods of war,” but in the end, “political arrangements matter, and the deterrent effect of any weapon should be evaluated within the context of the structure of the international system.”20 This claim is as true now as it was then. Indeed, one might conclude that structure matters even more now than it did 10 years ago, given the shift to multipolarity.21 Under “lopsided” multipolarity—where the United States outweighs both China and Russia militarily—it will maintain power advantages on some fronts, but at smaller margins than it did during the unipolar moment when it reigned supreme. Power diffusion, and related great power competition concerns, will be governed by the continued growth of Asian economic and military clout predominantly from China and India and the relative decline of Western economic influence.22 As China continues to translate economic gains into military modernization, the US will “focus mainly on countering China.”23 Avoiding the perils of security competition will require that the US be more cautious about exercising its power abroad.24 Yet exercising diplomacy and restraint could prove to be challenging. Even scholars who adopt a more circumspect view of emerging multipolarity, and the implications of growing military-technological parity, acknowledge its underlying risks. Barry Posen, who questions the assumption that multipolarity is inherently unstable, nonetheless acknowledges that growing parity will only “mute” great power competition. The diffusion of power will not eradicate “great power adventures.”25 China’s rise is apt to entail alliance reconfigurations and temptations to employ conventional military power.26 In fact, just as the original article predicted, the United States and India, Russia and China, and France and Germany have taken steps toward tightening their security relationships. China’s progress toward narrowing its power gap with the US has already met with a return to US defense budget growth and the establishment of new US defense cooperation commitments—notably with India. In parallel, China and Russia have grown closer, with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meeting three times in 2018 and China sending a “strong supporting contingent” to Russia’s Vostok-2018 military exercises.27 Given the complexities and uncertainties of multipolarity, the US arsenal of advanced conventional weapons (and those of other great powers) may not only prove ill suited to deterring great power war but also provide occasion for its inadvertent onset. The stealth, speed, and lethality of advanced conventional technologies—allowing for quick and decisive US victories in the Persian Gulf (1991), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001)—have proven increasingly enticing to other great powers. Russia and China drew similar lessons from these conflicts, each embarking on military modernization programs geared toward antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) and grey zone strategies.28 Advanced conventional weapons already undergird Russia’s and China’s respective salami-slicing campaigns in Eastern Europe and the South China Sea. Russia began modernizing its military following its 2008 war with Georgia, enhancing its ground force readiness and updating its integrated air defense system. The improvements have allowed for significant defensive and force-projection gains (against border states).29 Though Russia has since dialed back modernization efforts in the wake of its economic downturn, China continues to seek avenues for undermining the United States’ conventional weapons edge. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still trails the United States in the areas of innovation and operational proficiency. Its modernization achievements, though—especially the development of intermediate-range missiles that threaten US forward bases and carrier strike groups—have substantially augmented China’s “advantage of proximity in most plausible conflict scenarios.”30 As great power rivals continue to chip away at the United States’ once considerable smart-weapons advantage, national security experts are reevaluating the viability of deterrence. On this front, the diffusion of capabilities, as well as the expansion of competition to the space and cyber domains, do more than complicate appraisals of the balance of power; they threaten to upend the foundations of deterrence.31 The arrival of dualcapable hypersonic weapons (and delivery systems)—currently being designed and tested by the US, China, and Russia—will arguably risk jeopardizing strategic stability. Their ultrahigh velocity could reduce warning time to the extent that “a response would be required on first signal of attack”; likewise, their deployment in ready-to-launch mode could trigger preemptive strikes, as others might perceive it as a sign of impending attack.32 Further, cyber weapons’ potential for disabling an opponent’s “early warning and command systems” may diminish the expected costs of first strike under crisis conditions.33 Autonomous weapons also have the potential to fundamentally alter the psychological underpinnings of strategy And, as Kenneth Payne notes, there is no “a priori reason” to expect that substituting artificial intelligence (AI) for human intelligence—that rapid, accurate, and unbiased information processing and responses—“will necessarily be safer.” Because AI limits the risks of using force, it could make conflict more acceptable to risk-averse states; because its speed and precision favor the offense, it could prove more conducive to aggression than deterrence; and because it shapes a host of processes and technologies rather than a single weapon or system, its effects on strategy (and the challenges of its regulation) could prove counter to deterrence.34 As noted in the original article, nuclear weapons helped sustain the “cold peace” during the Cold War—not because of their awesome destructive power but because that awesome destructive power helped buttress bipolarity.35 The simplicity of bipolarity and superpower balancing, in turn, limited “the dangers of miscalculation and overreaction.”36 Multipolarity, though, makes for complexity; additional great power players provide additional opportunities for miscalculation and overreaction. Given these conditions and the perceived “usability” of advanced conventional weapons relative to nuclear weapons, it seems likely that they will fall short of yielding “the kinds of political structures necessary to enhance deterrence.”37 To counter Posen, the diffusion of advanced conventional technology may well have cheapened the near-term costs and risks of going to war, and particularly engaging in hybrid warfare. Even if the US manages to avoid[s] a direct confrontation with Russia or China, it seems increasingly plausible that it could be dragged into a conflict involving one or more of their allies.

#### Extinction – nuclear winter, crude oil amplifies, smoke covers the world

Snyder and Ruyle 17 (Brian F.Snyder and Leslie E. Ruyle, 12-15-2017, [Brian F. Snyder. Department of Environmental Science, Louisiana State University, United States. Leslie E. Ruyle. Center on Conflict and Development, Texas A&M University, United States]"The abolition of war as a goal of environmental policy," No Publication, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969717316431?via%3Dihub)//CHS> PK

While the precise impacts of a hypothetical nuclear war are difficult to predict, the detonation of the world's nuclear weapons would plausibly kill all or nearly all humans on Earth and initiate a mass extinction event. There are a total of about 9400 nuclear warheads in active service around the world, with approximately 8300 of these weapons in U.S. and Russian arsenals (Kristensen and Norris, 2017a). Because of government secrecy, it is difficult to reliably estimate the total explosive power contained in these warheads, but in most cases, each warhead ranges between 100 and 1200 kt of TNT equivalent (for comparison, the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of approximately 15–20 kt). The combined arsenals of the U.S. and Russia likely have a yield of at least 2–3 billion tons of TNT equivalent (Kristensen and Norris, 2017b,c). 2.1. Nuclear winter In the 1980s climate scientists used simple and early climate models to estimate the effects of large-scale nuclear wars on climate. The estimates they derived were catastrophic. For example, Turco et al. (1983) reported temperature reductions of 43 °C for 4 months in the Northern Hemisphere following nuclear war using the explosive power of 10 billion tons of TNT.1 As the cold war ended, interest in modelling the climate effects of nuclear war declined and some policy-makers considered the threat of nuclear winter to be either disproved or exaggerated (Martin, 1988). Toon et al. (2007) and Robock et al. (2007) reignited interest in the climate effects of nuclear war. Toon et al. (2008) modeled the effects of a medium scale nuclear war with a total explosive yield of 440 million tons of explosive yield (far less than current U.S. and Russian arsenals) and estimated global soot2 emissions of 180 Tg. Using a more conservative estimate of 150 Tg of soot, Toon et al. estimated that this emission would be sufficient to reduce global temperatures by about 8 °C and energy flux by 150 W/m2 ; for comparison, the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere since the industrial revolution have increased energy flux by 3 W/m2 (Butler and Montzka, 2017). Robock et al. (2007) modeled a similar 150 Tg smoke emission and found similar results including temperature reduction of about 8 °C lasting for several years. Low temperatures reduced evapotranspiration and weakened the global hydrological cycle and Hadley cells. As a result, precipitation decreased globally by 45% with especially dramatic decreases in the agricultural areas of the United States. In the Northern Hemisphere, growing seasons would be shortened by about 100 days for about 3 years. This would preclude most food production over most of the world for several years. Mills et al. (2014) conducted a detailed analysis of the effects of a small (1.5 million ton) regional exchange lofting just 5 Tg of soot into the atmosphere. This war would be equivalent to an exchange of 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs between, for example, India, Pakistan, or China. Mills et al. found global temperature decreases of 1.6 °C. To our knowledge, no one has studied the effects of a multi-billion ton nuclear exchange using modern atmospheric models. If, as Toon et al. and Robock et al. suggest, a 440 million ton war results in temperature reductions of 8 °C for a decade and a 100 day reduction in the growing season, it is reasonable to assume that a one to five billion ton war would not be survivable for the majority of people on earth. However, as populations and population centers grow, the effects of nuclear wars on the biosphere will also grow. The consequences of nuclear winter increase as the amount of fuel (buildings, cars, biomass, liquid and solid fuels) added to a targeted area increase. As population centers grow and densify over time, the amount of soot added to the stratosphere as the result of any given nuclear exchange may increase (depending in part on building materials). As a result, the nuclear winter resulting from a 400 million ton yield global war in 2020 may be far more severe than if the same war occurred in 2000. Further, there are reasons to believe that the soot emissions from a hypothetical nuclear exchange are conservative because they focus on urban areas and often do not incorporate non-urban energy infrastructure. For example, if ignited and burned completely, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) alone contains about 14.5 Tg of soot emissions.3 Including all crude held in U.S. commercial facilities, the potential soot emissions increase to 24 Tg. Thus, incorporating crude oil storage in the U.S. alone would increase soot generation estimates by about 16%. Similarly, nuclear war planners would be likely to target coal, oil and gas fields in the U.S., Russia, and their allies. This unaccounted for fuel could increase the total soot contribution to the atmosphere, potentially deepening the resulting nuclear winter. 2.2. Acute effects of particulate matter Studies of nuclear winter typically focus on the effects of smoke lofted into the stratosphere during nuclear firestorms. However, a larger proportion of smoke following nuclear war will be trapped in the troposphere where it would have significantly acute impacts on human and non-human species. Crutzen et al. (1984) calculated that following a major nuclear war (about 5 billion tons of explosives, roughly the combined U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear arms as of 2017) smoke would cover about 30–40% of the earth's surface with airborne smoke concentrations on the order of 5 mg/m3 . While initially this smoke would be composed of very small particles (b0.1 μm), the particles would rapidly coalesce into the 0.1 to 3 μm range, roughly consistent with the wellstudied PM2.5. For comparison, the EPA's National Ambient Air Quality standard for PM2.5 is 0.012 mg/m3 and as of 2017, the highest PM2.5 concentrations in Asia are typically around 0.3 to 1 mg/m3.

### Fw

#### The standard is maximizing expected well being.

**1] pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

**2] Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.  
Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]  
These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

**3] Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one.   
Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.], Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.  Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. [http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf)Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the   possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential   catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**.  **This implies that the expected value of   reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the   value of a million human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10  54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10  52  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even   more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a   technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected   value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth   a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an   expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct   benefit of saving 1 billion lives.**  And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1  billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost  certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

### UV

#### Yes aff RVIs—

#### 1AR Time Skew: a 1 min T shell in the 1N empirically forces a 1 min 1AR response because the 2N has 6 min to collapse to theory. Thus, reading 1 shell, much less multiple effectively makes the 4 min 1AR impossible. Fairness is a theoretical voter because it skews substance-- debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it, unending adherence to truth testing would justify all a prioris or 10 condo PICs.

#### 2AR Time Skew: 2ARs have the burden to fully explain and warrant all arguments—having to do this for a theory shell or two and substance in 3 min makes split 2Ns OP without RVIs.

#### Substance ed: No RVIs makes 1N theory a no loss issue where the 1N knows it will get a good time tradeoff from either spec good or spec bad. That wastes 2 minutes minimum of every debate where both sides are just reading coach-written blocks from years past. Substance ed outweighs baiting on probability—frivolous theory happens every other round, the type of theory that falls into the goldilocks zone between easy win and frivolous where an RVI might actually have a chilling effect is very rare, force them to have examples.

#### RVIs come before theory—otherwise multiple shells creates the exact same abuse where you have to win every layer as aff