## T

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines– they don’t.

#### "Resolved" requires a policy.

Merriam Webster '18 (Merriam Webster; 2018 Edition; Online dictionary and legal resource; Merriam Webster, "resolve," <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve;> RP)  
: a legal or official determination especially: a legislative declaration

#### The WTO refers to a legislative body.

**WTO:** “What is the World Trade Organization” wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/whatis\_e.htm No Date AA

**The** World Trade Organization (**WTO**) **is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations.** At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business.

#### Vote neg for predictable limits—post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus every 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny. Three Impacts –

#### First — Deliberation Skills. Topicality facilitates a process of successive debates that develops important skills and fosters appreciation for multiple perspectives. Abandoning the topic forecloses the educational benefits of debate.

Lundberg 10 — Christian O. Lundberg, Associate Professor of Rhetoric in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, holds a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, 2010 (“The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina,” *Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century*, Edited by Allan D. Louden, Published by the International Debate Education Association, ISBN 9781617700293, p. 299)

In response to the first critique, which ultimately reduces to the claims that debate overdetermines democratic deliberation and that it inculcates an unhealthy antagonism, a number of scholars have extended the old maxim that dissent is critical to democracy in arguing that debate is a critical tool for civic deliberation (Brookfield and Preskill 1999; Levinson 2003). Gill Nichols (2000, 132) argues that a commitment to debate and dissent as a core component of democracy is especially critical in the face of the complexity of modern governance, rapid technological change, and an increasing need to deal with the nexus of science and public policy. The benefits of in-class debate espoused by Stephen Brookfield, Meira Levinson, and Nichols stem from the idea that debate inculcates skills for creative and open-minded discussion of disputes in the context of democratic deliberation: on their collective accounting, debate does not close down discussion by reducing issues to a simple pro/con binary, nor does it promote antagonism at the expense of cooperative discussion. Rather, properly cultivated, debate is a tool for managing democratic conflicts that foregrounds significant points of dispute, and then invites interlocutors to think about them together creatively in the context of successive strategic iterations, [end page 304] moments of evaluation, and reiterations of arguments in the context of a structured public discussion.

Goodwin’s study of in-class debate practice confirms these intuitions. Goodwin’s study revealed that debate produces an intense personal connection to class materials while simultaneously making students more open to differing viewpoints. Goodwin’s conclusion is worth quoting at length here:

Traditional teaching techniques like textbooks, lectures, and tests with right answers insulate students from the open questions and competing answers that so often drive our own interest in our subjects. Debates do not, and in fact invite students to consider a range of alternative views on a subject, encountering the course content broadly, deeply and personally. Students’ comments about the value of disagreement also offer an interesting perspective on the nature of the thinking skills we want to foster. The previous research . . . largely focused on the way debate can help students better master the principles of correct reasoning. Although some students did echo this finding, many more emphasized the importance of debate in helping them to recognize and deal with a diversity of viewpoints. (Goodwin 2003, 158)

The results of this research create significant questions about the conclusion that debate engenders reductive thinking and an antagonism that is unhealthy to democracy. In terms of the criticism that debate is reductive, the implication of Goodwin’s study is that debate creates a broader appreciation for multiple perspectives on an issue than the predominant forms of classroom instruction. This conclusion is especially powerful when one considers debate as more than a discrete singular performance, but as a whole process of inventing, discussing, employing, and reformulating arguments in the context of an audience of comparatively objective evaluators. In the process of researching, strategizing, debating, reframing stances, and switching sides on a question, students are provided with both a framework for thinking about a problem and creative solutions to it from a number of angles. Thus, while from a very narrow perspective one might claim debate practices reduce all questions to a “pro” and a “con,” the cumulative effects of the pedagogical process of preparing for, performing, and evaluating a debate provide the widest possible exposure to the varied positions that a student might take on an issue. Perhaps more significantly, in-class debate provides a competitive incentive for finding as many innovative and unique approaches to a problem as possible, and for translating them into publically useful positions.

#### Second — Policy Engagement:

#### Debates about government policies are productive and important. Abandoning the state as an agent of change prevents meaningful progress toward equality. Patriarchy thrives in an environment of anti-statism.

Harrington 92 — Mona Harrington, lawyer and political scientist, 1992 (“What Exactly Is Wrong with the Liberal State as an Agent of Change?,” *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, Edited By V. Spike Peterson, Published by Lynne Rienner, ISBN 1555872980, p. 65-66)

The title of this chapter is a question that needs much more careful exploration by feminists than we have given it so far. In fact, I raise the question in a somewhat belligerent tone because I am inclined to think that the liberal state is a suitable, even elegant, agent to advance a feminist agenda in both domestic and international relations. Yet most of my feminist colleagues who are probing the gendered nature of the state vastly mistrust the liberal tradition and seek to formulate a politics that will displace it. My aim here is to join some of their arguments before a consensus forms that liberalism is beyond the pale of seriously critical feminist analysis. But let me hasten to say, before irreversible misunderstanding sets in, that what I am contesting is the meaning, the content that antiliberals generally assign to liberalism. The object of most of their criticism is actually one variant of the liberal tradition, and I think it is crucially important that we recognize another, more morally spacious, set of liberal ideas and that we help to develop its deeper promise.

I will review the antiliberal arguments in some detail and answer them presently. First, I want to suggest why the whole argument is important.

The crux of feminist challenge to the liberal state is essentially an antistate analysis with demonstrations that liberalism, while promising to divest the state of its destructive features, does not do so. In this analysis, states are inherently oppressive and exploitative organizations of power. They are run by hierarchies in control of deadly force deployed to protect the privileges of elites, which are, for the most part, capital-controlling, white, and male. In short, feminist antiliberal, antistate analysis is similar to already established Marxist criticism of the state but with added attention to gender. States are not only instruments of class interest but also of patriarchy. They perpetuate not only class conflict and violence but also gender conflict and violence. And liberal systems that supposedly democratize power and wealth simply mask the underlying fact of elite rule. Where can this analysis lead but to a call for deconstructing the present sovereign state system? [end page 65]

At this juncture in history—I am writing in the winter of 1990-91 with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe decommunized, the Cold War over— other calls for deconstructing nation-states are also in the air. Internationalists see the first opportunity since the mid-1940s to put a functioning system of international organization in place, starting with a revived United Nations and extending, in some versions, to complex networks of denationalized, depoliticized regimes rationally and efficiently organizing the world's business.

In other words, the state as a dealer in power, a wielder of weapons, an inherently violent institution, is the object of suspicion and resistance by both antiliberal feminists and liberal internationalists. And, especially now, when the international system is undergoing immense change, pressures for denationalizing change—certainly discourse arguing for it—will be persistent.

In the face of such pressures, I believe that feminist critics of the present state system should beware. The very fact that the state creates, condenses, and focuses political power may make it the best friend, not the enemy, of feminists—because the availability of real political power is essential to real democratic control. Not sufficient, I know, but essential.

My basic premise is that political power can significantly disrupt patriarchal and class (which is to say, economic) power. It holds the potential, at least, for disrupting the patriarchal/economic oppression of those in the lower reaches of class, sex, and race hierarchies. It is indisputable that, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it has been the political power of states that has confronted the massive economic power privately constructed out of industrial processes and has imposed obligations on employers for the welfare of workers as well as providing additional social supports for the population at large. And the political tempering of economic power has been the most responsive to broad public needs in liberal democracies, where governments must respond roughly to the interests of voters.

Of course, this is not the whole story. The nation-states of this period have also perpetrated horrors of torture and war, have aided the development of elite-controlled industrial wealth, and have not sufficiently responded to the human needs of their less powerful constituents. But I believe it is better to try to restrain the horrors and abuses than to give up on the limits that state organized political power can bring to bear on the forms of class-based, race-based, sex-based power that constitute the greatest sources of oppression we are likely to face.

#### Third — Constructive Constraints. Absolute affirmative flexibility leaves the negative without meaningful ground to advance well-developed counter-arguments. Establishing boundaries is important because they spur imagination and innovation, improving the quality of debates.

#### TVA solves – read the racial cap aff on this topic, or any type of k lit – this topic is super good for kritik literature on the aff – it talks about the racialized impact of COVID, and how vaccines check back for that.

#### SSD solves– their ability to read this affirmative on the negative solves all their offense so vote negative to combat dogmatism.

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify, and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater - dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense.

#### No RVI’s – it’s illogical because your expected to be topical/fair.

### setcol

#### The affirmative’s positing of slavery as the contradiction through which humanism affirms itself collapse indigeneity into slavery and turns settler colonialism into the very ground by which their analytic gains force

Byrd 11 (Jodi, Professor of English at the University of Illinois, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critique of Colonialism*)

But what seems to me to be further disavowed, even in Lowe’s important figuration of the history of labor in “the intimacies of four continents,” is the settler colonialism that such labor underwrites. Asia, Africa, and Europe all meet in the Americas to labor over the dialectics of free and unfree, but what of the Americas themselves and the prior peoples upon whom that labor took place? Lowe includes “native peoples” in her figurations as an addendum when she writes that she hopes “to evoke the political economic logics through which men and women from Africa and Asia were forcibly transported to the Americas, who with native, mixed, and creole peoples constituted slave societies, the profits of which gave rise to bourgeois republican states in Europe and North America.”23 By positioning the conditions of slavery and indentureship in the Americas as coeval contradictions through which Western freedom affirms and resolves itself, and then by collapsing the indigenous Americas into slavery, the fourth continent of settler colonialism through which such intimacy is made to labor is not just forgotten or elided; it becomes the very ground through which the other three continents struggle intimately for freedom, justice, and equality. Within Lowe’s formulation, the native peoples of the Americas are collapsed into slavery; their only role within the disavowed intimacies of racialization is either one equivalent to that of African slaves or their ability to die so imported labor can make use of their lands. Thus, within the “intimacies of four continents,” indigenous peoples in the new world cannot, in this system, give rise to any historical agency or status within the “economy of affirmation and forgetting,” because they are the transit through which the dialectic of subject and object occurs.

In many ways, then, this book argues for a critical reevaluation of the elaboration of these historical processes of oppression within postcolonial, critical race, queer, and American studies at the beginning of the twenty-first century. By foundationally accepting the general premise that racialization (along with the concomitant interlocking oppressions of class, gender, and sexuality) causes the primary violences of U.S. politics in national and international arenas, multicultural liberalism has aligned itself with settler colonialism despite professing the goal to disrupt and intervene in global forms of dominance through investments in colorblind equality. Simply put, prevailing understandings of race and racialization within U.S. post-colonial, area, and queer studies depend upon an historical aphasia of the conquest of indigenous peoples. Further, these framings have forgotten, as Moreton-Robinson has argued, that “the question of how anyone came to be white or black in the United States is inextricably tied to the dispossession of the original owners and the assumption of white possession.”24 Calls to social justice for U.S. racialized, sexualized, immigrant, and diasporic queer communities that include indigenous peoples, if they are not attuned to the ongoing conditions of settler colonialism of indigenous peoples, risk deeming colonialism in North America resolved, if not redressed, two cents for 100 billion dollars.

#### Positing blackness as absolute ontological dereliction is capitulation to the logic of the white, settler master.

Robinson, 2020 (Rowland – member of the Menominee Nation (Ka͞eyes-Mamāceqtawak) and PhD Candidate in Sociology @ the University of Waterloo, “An Autoethnographic Account of the Imaginarium of Late Capitalist/Colonialist Storytelling”, dissertation, shae)

This is something that I believe is lost in approaches to these issues that increasingly base themselves in a turn to the ontological as a method of investigation and theorization, as I attempted to outline and argue in the previous chapter. These kinds of arguments and analysis, such as those exhibited by at least some of the principal theorists of Afropessimism, namely Frank Wilderson, III (2010) and Jared Sexton (2008), can often begin to drift into the territory of a philosophical transcendental idealism in which the proverbial goalposts for analysis can be continuously moved in order to fit whatever socio-political and philosophical paradigm is being elaborated. It is not to devalue the role and the insights of political ontology in these matters, though as I have already discussed I feel that it is important that we consider strongly the problematizing of the concepts and categories of political ontology (including political ontology itself) put forwards by Maldonado-Torres, Gordon and others. For Maldonado-Torres, his elaboration of the concept of race and racialization as sub-ontological difference converges with Wolfe’s concept of the trace of history, in placing emphasis upon the materiality of the relations from which the ideology of race emerged39. Indeed, the concept of race is ideology par excellence40, though following Weheliye I caution that race is not only ideology, but a racializing assemblage that brings together networks of ideology, bodies, desires, forces, velocities, institutions, interests, intensities towards the differentiation of the biological species of humanity into full humanness, Man, and not-quite-humans and non-humans, and which benefit the former (2014)41. Regardless, what is key is that we unsettle the way which treating race “as ontological is to recapitulate colonizing thought, and to take colonial ideology as truth” (Kauanui 2017:258). Thus, while I find the work of Juárez in elaborating what he calls Redness Studies (2014) to be extremely interesting and valuable, and further have gleaned significant insight from other Indigenous scholars whom I read as being deeply rooted in this kind of ontological turn, I believe that the same problems are present within their work. Thus, I believe that the foundational place of material relationships between peoples and the structures of power that mediate them is occluded in these kinds of political ontological approaches.

#### The alt refuses the aff’s settler colonial investments. The link debate is a process of unsettling hope in the aff that leaves open potential for decolonial politics

Dyer ‘12 (Herbert Dyer Jr. is an African American writer in Chicago with a masters degree from Governors State University in Political & Justice Studies, April 28, “Redemption of the White Liberal”, Dissident Voice, http://dissidentvoice.org/2012/04/redemption-of-the-white-liberal/)

The foremost reality that white liberals must understand and then deal with is that every square inch of land, every lake, river and stream, every mountain, field, every blade of grass or grain of desert sand that they proudly refer to as the “United States of America” is stolen property – stolen from a people who rarely, if ever, warrant even a back-handed mention in today’s socio-economic and political discourse. This terrible reality lies at the bottom of a continent-wide and unimaginably deep sea of red blood which separates the two blue eastern and western oceans. By now they must be aware of the magnitude and meaning of such an unconscionable atrocity. Hell, at some level they’ve always known; but do they care? White liberals must go further, though. They must understand that the reason Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia, Houston, San Francisco, New Orleans, St. Louis, etc., ad infinitum, sport such high and gleaming alters to capitalism is because the raw materials and laborers used in their construction were ripped from the soil and souls of Black, Brown, Red and Yellow peoples not only here but from throughout the world. The white liberal must understand that those villages, countries, nations and nation-states are labeled and defined by them as “Third World”, “underdeveloped”, “developing” because it was and remains white supremacy and their embrace thereof that put and keep them there. Appalling numbers of white liberals are in deep denial of the unfathomable pain, suffering, and death that the pursuit of white supremacy has wrought. Yes, their denial is appalling but completely understandable. They labor under a grand form of “cognitive dissonance” which exquisitely defines the term. I have wondered often that had I been born “white”, how utterly impossible it would be, must be, to simply look into a mirror knowing how much innocent blood lay behind my reflection, my history. Absolute denial and rejection of that blood, of that reflection and history would be the only means of maintaining even a semblance of sanity. On another level, though, many, perhaps a majority, of white liberals appreciate quite clearly what they have done. Indeed, they celebrate and gleefully swim in that bloody sea of denial, ever thankful for their whiteness and their conscientious and well-meaning liberalism. This set of white liberals eagerly embraces their unearned privileges and power and protect themselves and their whiteness behind world-destroying weapons, multi-million-man armies – or “gated” enclaves. Their fear is understandable as well for they have much to fear, going all the way back to, and starting with, Indian attack and slave revolt. Black folks know very well that all white people are not knowingly white supremacist in their worldview and daily lives. That is, there are now and always have been some “good” white folks – those few who fought and died alongside Blacks at various stages of history against white supremacy. The problem is, however, that the good have never outnumbered the bad. The “good” white people have never constituted the majority of white people. And, somehow it seems that when it comes to Black folks, some sort of “compromise” must always be made in order that white supremacy remains supreme. Finally, what can and must white liberals do to redeem themselves, their people? The time has long passed for any more perfunctory “national discussion of race” between whites and Blacks. There is nothing more to talk about. White people, including white liberals, invented “race”, racism and white supremacy. They must begin the redemption process by disavowing and denouncing the validity, legitimacy of each of these self-serving and pernicious concepts and ideologies. They must first acknowledge, recognize and accept their guilt. Then repent. Repentance can take many forms, but it must be holistic, all encompassing, just as holistic and encompassing as the past 500 years of white supremacy have been. White liberals must teach each other and their children the unvarnished history of this nation-state. They must begin and see through to the end the hard work of dismantling all of the covert and overt institutional structures and scaffolds which have framed and perpetuated a white racial consciousness and its attendant white supremacist practices for the last 25 generations. They must teach themselves and their children that the number one problem in the world has been, is, and remains Europe’s and America’s Original Sin: white supremacy – not global warming nor environmental degradation, not the national debt/deficit, not gay rights, not the energy crisis, and not women’s liberation – but white supremacy. In doing so, they will discover that these other “issues” are but symptoms and byproducts of the most debilitating disease that has afflicted the whole of mankind since those first Europeans began rampaging across the seas circa 1444.

**The central question of this debate is that the exclusion of the indigenous provides the ontological grounding for modern sovereignty - any analysis which fails to foreground these histories is doomed to reproduce the horrors of colonialism**

Also makes an indict of security rhetoric; war allows the sovereign colonizer to continue its violent imposition

**Byrd ‘11**(Jodi, Chickasaaw and Asst. Prof of American Indian Studies and English at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critics of Colonialism*, p. xvii-xxi)

The Transit of Empire begins with a network of conflicting definitions to reflect upon the cultural and political modes of "Indianness" regulated and produced by U.S. settler imperialism née colonialism. Primarily, this book is essayistic, provisional, and some of its readings and conclusions often defy the expected affective common sense of liberal multiculturalism invested in acknowledgements, recognitions, equality, and equivalences. Transit is slightly provocative, an incomplete point of entry, and its provenance might be more suited to diaspora studies and border-crossings than to a notion such as indigeneity that is often taken as rooted and static, located in a discrete place. Steven Salaita's The Holy Land in Transit denotes transit alternately as the function of an alliance between United States and Israeli settler colonialisms that map old world sacred names onto new world sacred sites, a comparative approach to American Indian and Palestinian literatures, and finally a gesture towards the ways in which peoples have been forced to move and relocate.' Gerald Vizenor's work offers another way to frame modes of indigeneity in his concept of transmotion that he defines as a "sense of native motion and an active presence (that) is sui generis sovereignty. Native transmotion is survivance, a reciprocal use of nature, not a monotheistic, territorial sovereignty. Native stories of survivance are the creases of transmotion and sovereignty." Those creases, according to Vizenor, are apprehended in the complementarities of stories, associations, intimacies, and reincarnations that resist absence and possession. 2 The Chickasaws have a migration story that we tell. In search of a new homeland, twin brothers, Chikasah and Chatah, were charged with leading the people as they traveled across the land. Ababinili had given them a sacred pole, the lrohta falaya, that would point the way. After each day of travel, Chikasah would plant the long pole in the earth, and each morning the brothers would rise to find the pole leaning eastward in the directionthey needed to travelled by a white dog and the Milky Way, the brothers and the people traveled for years, always following the direction of the pole. Until one morning. At sunrise, the brothers awoke to find the pole standing almost straight upright. Chatah insisted that the pole confirmed that their travels were done, but Chikasah disagreed and argued that the pole still leaned, that there was still further to go. After continued debate, the question was put to the people-those who agreed with Chatah would stay and make a life there as Choctaws, in the lands that would become central Mississippi and those who sided with Chikasah would travel further east to finally live in what is now northern Mississippi. Chickasaw sovereignty is, according to our national motto, unconquered and unconquerable. It is contrary and stubborn. But the creases of Chickasaw movement demonstrate how sovereignty is found in diplomacy and disagreement, through relation, kinship, and intimacy. And in an act of interpretation. To be in transit is to be active presence in a world of relational move ments and countermovements. To be in transit is to exist relationally, multiply. There is more than one way to frame the concerns of The Transit of Empire and more than one way to enter into the possibilities that transit might allow for comparative studies. On the one hand, I am seeking to join ongoing conversations about sovereignty, power, and indigeneity—and the epistemological debates that each of these terms engender—within and across disparate and at times incommensurable disciplines and geographies. American studies, queer studies, postcolonial studies, American Indian studies, and area studies have all attempted to apprehend injury and redress, melancholy and grief that exist in the distances and sutures of state recognitions and belongings. Those distances and sutures of recognitions and belongings, melancholy and grief, take this book from the worlds of Southeastern Indians to Hawai’i. from the Poston War Relocation Center to Jonestown. Guyana, in order to consider how ideas of “Indianness” have created conditions of possibility for U.S. empire to manifest its intent. As liberal multicultural settler colonialism attempts to flex the exceptions and exclusions that first constituted the United States to now provisionally indude those people othered and abjected from the nation-state's origins, it instead creates a cacophony of moral claims that help to deflect progressive and transformative activism from dismantling the ongoing conditions of colonialism that continue to make the United States a desired state formation within which to be included. **That cacophony of competing struggles** for hegemony within and outside institutions of power, no matter how those struggles might challenge the state through loci of **race, class, gender, and sexuality**, **serves to misdirect and cloud attention** from the underlying structures of settler colonialism that made the United States possible as oppressor in the first place. As a result, the cacophony produced through U.S. colonialism and imperialism domestically and abroad often

coerces struggles for social justice for queers, racial minorities, and immigrants into complicity with settler colonialism. This book, on the other hand, is also interested in the quandaries poststructuralism has left us: the traces of indigenous savagery and "Indianness" that stand a priori prior to theorizations of origin, history, freedom, constraint, and difference.' These traces of "Indianness" are vitally important to understanding how power and domination have been articulated and practiced by empire, and yet because they are traces, they have often remained deactivated as a point of critical inquiry as theory has transited across disciplines and schools. Indianness can be felt and intuited as a presence, and yet apprehending it as a process is difficult, if not impossible, precisely because Indianness has served as the field through which structures have always already been produced. Within the matrix of critical theory, lndianness moves not through absence but through reiteration, through meme, as theories circulate and fracture, quote and build. The prior ontological concerns that interpellate Indianness and savagery as ethnographic evidence and example, lamentable and tragic loss, are deferred through repetitions. How we have come to know intimacy, kinship, and identity within an empire born out of settler colonialism is predicated upon discourses of indigenous displacements that remain within the present everydayness of settler colonialism, even if its constellations have been naturalized by hegemony and even as its oppressive logics are expanded to contain more and more historical experiences. I hope to show through the juridical, cultural, and literary readings within this book that indigenous critical theory provides alternatives to the entanglements of race and colonialism, intimacy and relationship that continue to preoccupy poststructuralist and postcolonial studies. The stakes could not be greater, given that currently U.S. empire has manifested its face to the world as a war machine that strips life even as it demands racialized and gendered normativities. The post-9/11 national rhetorics of grief, homeland, pain, terrorism, and security have given rise to what Judith Butler describes as a process through which the Other becomes unreal. “The derealization of the ‘Other’” Butler writes, “means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. The infinite paranoia that imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy, regardless of whether or not there are established grounds to suspect the continuing operation of terror cells with violent aims.”4 But this process of derealization that Butler marks in the post-9/11 grief that swept the United States, one could argue, has been functioning in Atlantic and Pacific "New Worlds" since 1492. As Geonpul scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues, discourses of security are "deployed in response to a perceived threat of invasion and dispossession from Indigenous people; and in the process, paranoid patriarchal white sovereignty manages its anxiety over dispossession and threat through a “pathological relationship to indigenous sovereignty.” In the United States, **the Indian is the original enemy combatant who cannot be grieved**. Within dominant discourses of postracial identity that depend on the derealization of the Other, desires for amnesty and security from the contradictory and violent occupations of colonialist wars exist in a world where, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out, "metropolitan multiculturalism-the latter phase of dominant postcolonialism-precomprehends U.S. manifest destiny as transformed asylum for the rest of the world."6 As a result, the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself. The Transit of Empire, then, might best be understood as a series of preliminary reflections on how ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself as settler imperialism at this crucial moment in history when everything appears to be headed towards collapse.

### Case

The aff forges a relationship of cruel optimism with the ballot — a hopeful attachment to the logic of a problematic system of economic exchange that kills the potential for successful change.

**Berlant 06**

Lauren Berlant, Professor of Literature at the University of Chicago, “Cruel Optimism”, Duke University Press, 1 December 2006, accessed: 29 November 2019, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/differences/article-abstract/17/3/20/97656/Cruel-Optimism?redirectedFrom=fulltext>, R.S.

**When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea—whatever. To phrase “the object of desire” as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what is incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality, but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent’s typical misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form (see Ghent). “Cruel optimism” names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility. What is cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject’s desire to temporize an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about the cluster of desires and affects we manage to keep magnetized to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad. But some scenes of optimism are crueler than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalizing or animating potency of an object/scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, patriotism, a career, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one’s attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition. To understand cruel optimism as an aesthetic of attachment requires embarking on an analysis of the modes of rhetorical indirection that manage the strange activity of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson’s work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of phantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because the dynamics of this scene are something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I will describe the shape of my transference with her thought.**

#### Framing – ROB and ROJ is to evaluate the material conditions produced by the aff versus the advocacy of the neg –

#### A] materialism -- abjection is about how material conditions structure every portion of someone's existence, which is key to unraveling the lived realities that people experience to combat structures of oppression

#### B] ground -- able to weigh offense versus each other more effectively – anything else is uncomparable and makes debates over the best liberation politics impossible

#### C] solves offense from their fw bc they can say abjection outweighs; they just have to prove the 1ac materially reduces the impacts of antiblackness rather than making abstracted claims as feel-good politics.

#### Vagueness – nowhere in the aff do you define what “transgression” looks like – if you don’t know what the 1AC does after the first speech don’t give leeway to 1AR explanation.

#### Ideology is internal – the aff is talking about ideological positions, for example the fetishization of black people – the desire for others to affirm that is what your cards critique.

#### Cede the Political DA – this form of biopolitical violence was manifested through the state, but refusing the state leaves it under the control of racist white conservatives.

#### They reject the law and EVEN if they don’t not engaging with it is offense --

#### 1-- Radical resistance lawyering created transformative change by using the law to subvert the system which can only happen without a totalizing rejection of the law and the state which requires macropolitical goals to achieve transformative change – lack of specificity are corrosive to political movements

#### 2 -- Empirics go aff

Lester **Spence 15**. Poli Sci Prof @ John Hopkins. 2015. “Knocking the Hustle: Against the Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics.” pp. 140-147.

All four examples have a few things in common. First all occurred at a moment where all seemed lost. While I wouldn’t go as far as to suggest that these events suggest that neoliberalism is “naturally” contested—just as there is no “good teaching gene” there is no “contest neoliberalism gene”—I would say that while the neoliberal turn has signifcantly altered our ability to argue for public goods, it hasn’t killed that ability. It still exists. It exists in institutions we have written of thinking they are no longer relevant—like teachers unions. It exists in populations we’ve written of because we believe they are incapable of radical political action— black youth. It exists in cities that we don’t think of as having a long history of radical political struggle —like Jackson, Mississippi. Second all three recognized the fundamental role politics played in their struggles. The black youth organizers recognized that they had to pressure Maryland state legislators to kill the prison. The black radicals in the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement made electing Chokwe Lumumba a component of their organizing. The CTU chose to take the city head on and to hold a series of town hall meetings designed to inform people of the ways political officials, philanthropists, and corporations are working together to neoliberalize and kill public education. The #blacklivesmatter movement recognized that politics was at the center of their struggle in Ferguson, Baltimore, and elsewhere. All campaigns used moral language in making their arguments. In Jackson they argued that the current way power was allocated in Jackson was immoral because it largely concentrated all of the benefits into a few (predominantly white) hands. In Baltimore they argued that putting $104 million to the goal of incarcerating youth was immoral given the lack of money being spent on youth in other areas, and later that Freddie Gray’s (and before him Tyrone West’s) murder was immoral. In Chicago they argued that closing 50 schools was immoral because it severely impacted the ability of poor black parents and black students to get the same degree of learning their white counterparts had. However, they didn’t rely on those arguments. They understood that seizing power (rather than speaking truth to it), that proposing new alternatives, would at some level have to involve political struggle. Morality wasn’t enough. Even if we had a common defnition of morality, a Christian-infuenced morality for example, that sense of morality could still be interpreted in diferent ways based on material interest. Relying on morality can make it hard to move against the wealthy charter school proponent who sincerely believes that privatizing public schools represent the best hope for increasing positive outcomes among black children. Relying on morality can make it very difficult to argue against the political bureaucrat who says — as they did in the case of Baltimore —that the conditions of youth currently held in adult prisons is so bad that the moral choice would be to give them their own facility where they won’t have to face the risks associated with being housed with adults. In deciding how we go about making our arguments and how we go about choosing our strategies and tactics we should act morally—I do believe our politics have to be rooted in a certain sense of ethics. We should never, however, ignore the fundamental role politics plays and should play in our struggle. Not only did they focus on politics, they all relied on political organizing. Organizing that included long discussions about political issues that mattered, but also parties and other events designed to get people working with each other and trusting one another.

#### 3 -- BLM proves that institutional engagement makes white people less racist, even *assuming* *backlash*.

Gampa 18 (Jeremy Sawyer, Ph.D. Developmental Psychology; M.S. Ed. School Psychology, and Anup Gampa, Ph.D. Candidate At the University of Virginia, “Implicit and Explicit Racial Attitudes Changed During Black Lives Matter,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1– 21)

Converging evidence from the multiple analyses presented here suggests that pro-White implicit racial bias has decreased concurrent with BLM and its high points of struggle. Although effect sizes across analyses were very small (Sawilowsky, 2009), for the full sample, aggregate implicit attitudes were less pro-White during BLM than pre-BLM and became increasingly less pro-White over time during the BLM period. Furthermore, RDA indicated that these results were not due to an historical trend toward decreasing pro- White bias over the full study span. Rather, before shifting to a decreasing trend during the BLM movement, pro-White implicit bias was actually increasing during the years of the Obama administration prior to BLM. Implicit attitudes were less pro-White during four of the six periods of high BLM struggle in comparison with the preceding 30 days, with two periods showing no change in either direction. In addition to ruling out seasonal effects, the finding that implicit attitudes did not undergo short-term changes for arbitrary selected periods within BLM suggests that attitude changes during high points of BLM struggle were not the result of a general downward trend in pro-White bias during the BLM period. Moreover, participants of all political orientations (from strongly liberal to strongly conservative) displayed reductions in pro-White implicit and explicit bias, with the largest effects for the most liberal participants and the weakest effects for the most conservative participants. In contrast to implicit attitudes, evidence for changes in explicit racial attitudes in the full sample was more mixed. Explicit attitudes were slightly less pro-White during BLM than pre-BLM, but did not become meaningfully less pro- White over time during BLM. Explicit attitudes were less pro-White during two of six periods of high BLM struggle, with other periods showing no change in either direction. These seemingly weaker effects, however, appear to be due to the fact that Whites’ and Blacks’ explicit attitudes changed in opposite directions, obscuring these effects in the full sample. The attitude patterns evident in the full sample, while suggestive, are more accurately characterized as divergent patterns of attitude change among White and Black subgroups. Whites’ implicit attitudes were less pro-White during BLM than pre-BLM, became meaningfully less pro-White across BLM, and were less pro-White during four of six periods of high BLM struggle. In contrast, Blacks’ implicit attitudes showed relatively little difference between the pre-BLM and BLM periods, did not become meaningfully more pro-Black over time during the BLM period, and did not change during any periods of high BLM struggle. Thus, while multiple analyses provide evidence that Whites became less implicitly pro-White in relation to BLM, Blacks’ implicit attitudes did not appear to change. This suggests that the BLM period entailed a greater change in the implicit attitudes of Whites than Blacks. One of several potential explanations for this is that antiracist social movements like BLM may have an effect of moving all racial groups toward more egalitarian racial attitudes.

Thus, because Blacks demonstrated little implicit bias prior to BLM (being close to “no preference”) and Whites exhibited a greater degree of implicit bias, the larger change among Whites may reflect a greater room for bias reduction. In terms of explicit attitudes, Whites and Blacks demonstrated generally opposite directions of change. Whites’ explicit attitudes were less pro-White during BLM than pre- BLM, became meaningfully less pro-White over time during BLM, and were less pro-White during two of six periods of high BLM struggle (other periods showed no change). Conversely, Blacks’ explicit attitudes were less pro-Black during BLM, became meaningfully less pro-Black across BLM, and showed no change during periods of high BLM struggle. At first glance, these appear to be opposing trends in Blacks’ and Whites’ explicit attitudes, but they can also be viewed as a mutual shift toward an egalitarian, no preference position. Such a shift in explicit attitudes could be considered consistent with the movement’s egalitarian emphasis. Though these results were not anticipated, several articles have argued that oppressed groups often express strong explicit ingroup preferences to counteract hostile outgroup attitudes, and these ingroup preferences are likely to weaken if societal attitudes become less hostile (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Livingston, 2002; Westgate et al., 2015). While this is post hoc speculation, one possibility is that decreasing bias on the part of Whites during BLM may have slightly lessened the need for Blacks (oppressed group) to maintain explicitly pro-Black preferences. In summary, while further research on such possibilities is needed, the shifts in attitudes for both Whites and Blacks are consistent with the prospect that social movements may move attitudes closer to an egalitarian position, unless those attitudes are already close to egalitarian to begin with. For Blacks, this means that implicit attitudes (which were initially close to no preference) showed little change during BLM, whereas explicit attitudes (which were solidly pro-Black) showed a much larger shift toward an egalitarian, no preference position. Thus, these results at least raise the possibility that antiracist social movements, rather than inevitably polarizing Whites and Blacks against each other, may instead be capable of moving both groups toward more egalitarian explicit racial attitudes. This study focused on the historically constructed racial groups (Blacks and Whites) that have been and continue to be central to the workings of racism in the United States. However, a secondary analysis for participants of races other than Black and White was conducted as a point of comparison. Results were consistently in the same direction as those for White participants (becoming less pro-White during BLM), but the effects were slightly weaker, falling between those of Whites and Blacks (though generally closer to Whites). This is perhaps understandable given a U.S. context in which races other than Blacks and Whites have often not been accorded status as “races” per se, but are conceptualized more along the lines of geography (e.g., Asian, Middle Eastern) or language (e.g., Hispanic) (Fields, 1990). In other words, with Whites and Blacks anchoring U.S. racial relations, changes in the racial preferences of other racial groups (for Whites relative to Blacks) may tend to fall somewhere in between the divergent patterns of Blacks and Whites. Given that empirical research exploring these relations is in its nascency, such hypotheses about the effects of antiracist movement in relation to the attitudes of various racial groups are certainly speculative. This study offers the first empirical evidence connecting a social movement to concurrent societal-level changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. Although the BLM-related effect sizes found across the present analyses are quite small, such effects across many individuals can represent shifts in attitudes with impacts on discrimination that are societally meaningful (Greenwald et al., 2015). These effects are potentially noteworthy given the tenacious persistence of racism in the United States and the society-wide scope of BLM. Moreover, unlike laboratory interventions, BLM was not designed for the express purpose of targeting implicit attitudes. By comparison, the effectiveness of the Civil Rights movement in radically changing attitudes on desegregation and other racial questions may derive in part from the success of the movement in winning tangible structural reforms in the form of sweeping legal changes (e.g., legal desegregation, voting rights). In contrast, BLM has not succeeded in winning such legal or structural reforms, which may be a factor in the very small size of the effects observed during the BLM period. In addition, the present study opens preliminary investigation into two potentially different types of attitude change that may be associated with social movements. The first type is an ongoing, cumulative influence of movements that may be reflected in gradual, aggregate attitude change over lengthy periods of time. The second type is a relatively concentrated burst of high movement activity that may lead to more rapid, short-term changes in aggregate attitudes. This study presented evidence that potentially supports both forms of attitude change in relation to BLM. While the present study predicted that attitude changes related to concentrated periods of high BLM activity would be precisely contemporaneous with those periods, this does not preclude the possibility of a time lag between intensive movement activity and corresponding attitude changes. Moreover, the time scale for attitude change in relation to a social movement may depend on the type of attitude in question (e.g., sexuality, gender, race) as well as social and historical factors bound up with specific movements within specific societies. It is likely that multiple forms and time scales of attitude change are operating during successful social movements, and this should be explored in future work. A major limitation on the generalizability of this study is that participants were self-selected. Although results are robust after controlling for key demographic changes from pre-BLM to BLM, the possibility that individuals with particular attitudes (e.g., more pro-Black) were more likely to take the IAT during the BLM period and its high points of struggle cannot be ruled out. In addition, many other social and political events were occurring around the time of BLM that could have played a role in the societal attitude shifts reported here, which cannot be ruled out by a correlational study such as the present one. Consequently, changes in racial attitudes that are concurrent with BLM and its high points of struggle cannot be taken as evidence that BLM caused these changes. We have made our data and analyses publicly available so that third variables that may account for these correlations between BLM and racial attitudes can be investigated. Nevertheless, the changes corresponding to the a priori selection of the overall BLM period and specific short-term periods of high BLM struggle—using a chronology of BLM combined with BLM media citation data—adds credibility to the notion that BLM may have contributed to observed attitude changes. In addition, the lack of attitude changes during arbitrarily selected short-term periods during BLM supports the hypothesized BLM-related effects of the prespecified periods of high struggle. Although difficult to achieve, future studies should attempt experimental manipulations of exposure to or participation in social struggle to directly examine these potential causal effects. In addition, direct participation in the BLM movement may have had a stronger impact on attitudes than mere exposure to BLMrelated media coverage, which may be disentangled in future work. Although evidence suggests that Project Implicit participants show similar patterns of bias as those in nationally representative samples (Pinkston, 2015), another constraint on the generalizability of this study is that the sample was not nationally representative. In particular, the sample had proportionally more liberal participants than the national population, a concern because political ideology has the strongest effect on racial attitudes (other than race itself, for which we conducted subgroups analysis). In addition, the gender balance of the sample was particularly more heavily female than the national average. We attempted to address this issue by weighting our sample to be nationally representative on political ideology and gender, and found either no change or an increase in effect size of aggregate attitude changes from pre-BLM to BLM, suggesting that attitude changes during BLM are not attributable to a lack of national representativeness in the sample. Furthermore, participants of all political orientations showed decreased pro-White implicit and explicit bias, supporting the possibility that BLM has had a progressive effect across the political spectrum, with the greatest effects among liberals and the smallest effects among conservatives. The relation between BLM and racial attitudes studied here is potentially generalizable to connections between other biases (e.g., anti-LGBT biases) and the specific social movements fighting those biases (e.g., LGBT rights movement). There is, however, no empirical evidence to support such a hypothesis at present, as no similar studies have been published. Furthermore, generalizability may depend on the strength of a given social movement in relation to countervailing social movements, as well as the degree of legal reforms or structural changes the movement is able to win. In the case of BLM, the finding of decreased pro-White bias across political orientations may indicate that countermovements against BLM during the span of the study were not strong enough to change its overall effect, even among the most conservative participants. In other words, because “All Lives Matter” and “Blue Lives Matter” countermovements have been weaker in the streets as well as less resonant in social media and web trends, it suggests that countermovements might have dampened but not reversed the overall effects of BLM. While potentially surprising, there appears to be precedent for this finding in the efficacy of the American Civil Rights Movement to create widespread changes in societal-level explicit racial attitudes despite violent backlash and countermovements (e.g., Condran, 1979; Taylor et al., 1978). Taken as a whole, the findings here suggest the possibility that antiracist social movements may contribute to societal level changes in implicit and explicit racial attitudes. Viewed through the lens of the APE framework, social movements have the potential to influence implicit and explicit attitudes through a variety of associational and propositional mechanisms, in addition to redefining ingroup identities (e.g., as antiracists of all races), and enhancing feelings of efficacy to collectively ameliorate racism. While very little work to date has addressed social movements in relation to implicit attitudes, Zerhouni, Rougier, and Muller (2016) found that municipal-level implicit attitudes predicted citywide participation in protest activity. This raises the possibility that social movements and aggregate attitude change could be mutually reinforcing. In one such scenario, social struggle may change attitudes, thereby promoting further protest activity, which in turn would further transform attitudes. Envisioned as part of such an ongoing process, the collective organization of social movements presents a potential societal- scale alternative to laboratory-based, individual attitude change interventions. It is our hope that further research exploring the connection between social movements and societal-scale attitude change will help to evaluate these prospects.