## T

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines – they don’t.

#### "Resolved" requires a policy.

Merriam Webster '18 (Merriam Webster; 2018 Edition; Online dictionary and legal resource; Merriam Webster, "resolve," <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve;> RP)  
: a legal or official determination especially: a legislative declaration

#### The WTO refers to a legislative body.

**WTO:** “What is the World Trade Organization” wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/whatis\_e.htm No Date AA

**The** World Trade Organization (**WTO**) **is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations.** At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business.

#### Vote neg for predictable limits—post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus every 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny. Three Impacts –

#### First — Deliberation Skills. Topicality facilitates a process of successive debates that develops important skills and fosters appreciation for multiple perspectives. Abandoning the topic forecloses the educational benefits of debate.

Lundberg 10 — Christian O. Lundberg, Associate Professor of Rhetoric in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, holds a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, 2010 (“The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum: Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina,” *Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century*, Edited by Allan D. Louden, Published by the International Debate Education Association, ISBN 9781617700293, p. 299)

In response to the first critique, which ultimately reduces to the claims that debate overdetermines democratic deliberation and that it inculcates an unhealthy antagonism, a number of scholars have extended the old maxim that dissent is critical to democracy in arguing that debate is a critical tool for civic deliberation (Brookfield and Preskill 1999; Levinson 2003). Gill Nichols (2000, 132) argues that a commitment to debate and dissent as a core component of democracy is especially critical in the face of the complexity of modern governance, rapid technological change, and an increasing need to deal with the nexus of science and public policy. The benefits of in-class debate espoused by Stephen Brookfield, Meira Levinson, and Nichols stem from the idea that debate inculcates skills for creative and open-minded discussion of disputes in the context of democratic deliberation: on their collective accounting, debate does not close down discussion by reducing issues to a simple pro/con binary, nor does it promote antagonism at the expense of cooperative discussion. Rather, properly cultivated, debate is a tool for managing democratic conflicts that foregrounds significant points of dispute, and then invites interlocutors to think about them together creatively in the context of successive strategic iterations, [end page 304] moments of evaluation, and reiterations of arguments in the context of a structured public discussion.

Goodwin’s study of in-class debate practice confirms these intuitions. Goodwin’s study revealed that debate produces an intense personal connection to class materials while simultaneously making students more open to differing viewpoints. Goodwin’s conclusion is worth quoting at length here:

Traditional teaching techniques like textbooks, lectures, and tests with right answers insulate students from the open questions and competing answers that so often drive our own interest in our subjects. Debates do not, and in fact invite students to consider a range of alternative views on a subject, encountering the course content broadly, deeply and personally. Students’ comments about the value of disagreement also offer an interesting perspective on the nature of the thinking skills we want to foster. The previous research . . . largely focused on the way debate can help students better master the principles of correct reasoning. Although some students did echo this finding, many more emphasized the importance of debate in helping them to recognize and deal with a diversity of viewpoints. (Goodwin 2003, 158)

The results of this research create significant questions about the conclusion that debate engenders reductive thinking and an antagonism that is unhealthy to democracy. In terms of the criticism that debate is reductive, the implication of Goodwin’s study is that debate creates a broader appreciation for multiple perspectives on an issue than the predominant forms of classroom instruction. This conclusion is especially powerful when one considers debate as more than a discrete singular performance, but as a whole process of inventing, discussing, employing, and reformulating arguments in the context of an audience of comparatively objective evaluators. In the process of researching, strategizing, debating, reframing stances, and switching sides on a question, students are provided with both a framework for thinking about a problem and creative solutions to it from a number of angles. Thus, while from a very narrow perspective one might claim debate practices reduce all questions to a “pro” and a “con,” the cumulative effects of the pedagogical process of preparing for, performing, and evaluating a debate provide the widest possible exposure to the varied positions that a student might take on an issue. Perhaps more significantly, in-class debate provides a competitive incentive for finding as many innovative and unique approaches to a problem as possible, and for translating them into publically useful positions.

#### Second — Policy Engagement:

#### Debates about government policies are productive and important. Abandoning the state as an agent of change prevents meaningful progress toward equality.

**This teaches a State-inclusive civic engagement that spills to many issues. State bad offense is inevitable and only we solve it**

**Liu ’12** Et al – Eric Liu is the founder of Citizen University. He served as a White House policy adviser for the Clinton Administration and is a member of the commissioned National Task Force on Civic Learning and Democratic Engagement. This Task Force’s report was called “A Crucible Moment – a Call to Action” and was submitted to Eduardo Ochoa – Assistant Secretary for US Department of Education Postsecondary Education; The National Task Force recommendations were the byproduct of a series of five National Roundtables was held between December 2010 and March 2011 involving 134 people representing 61 community colleges, four-year colleges, and universities; 26 civic organizations; 9 private and government funding agencies; 15 higher education associations; and 12 disciplinary societies. Participants in these National Roundtables helped assess the strengths and limitations of current efforts to engage college students in civic learning and made invaluable contributions to the arguments and recommendations presented in A Crucible Moment. Task Force Members include Eric Liu, founder of The Guiding Lights Network; Gale Muller, Vice Chairman of Worldwide Research and Development for Gallup, where he has overseen research on the voices of citizens in more than 130 countries; Eboo Patel, Founder and Executive Director of Interfaith Youth Core (IFYC) and author of the award-winning book Acts of Faith: The Story of an American Muslim, the Struggle for the Soul of a Generation; Kathleen Maas Weigert, Carolyn Farrell, BVM, Professor of Women and Leadership, and Assistant to the Provost for Social Justice Initiatives at Loyola University Chicago; Sylvia Hurtado, Professor and Director of the Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA, where she researches student educational outcomes, campus climates, and diversity in higher education. A National Call to Action – A Crucible Moment: College Learning and Democracy’s Future. Washington, DC: Association of American Colleges and Universities. Available via: www.aacu.org/civic\_learning/crucible/documents/crucible\_508f.pdf‎

**A Crucible Moment** likewise **calls for transformations necessary** for this generation. A daunting one is **to eliminate** persistent **inequalities, especially** **those in the United States** **determined by income and race**, in order to secure the country’s economic and civic future. **But the academy must also be a vehicle for tackling other pressing issues**—growing **global** economic **inequalities,** climate change and **environmental degradation**, lack of access to quality **health care**, economic **volatility, and more**. **To do that requires expanding students’ capacities to be civic problem-solvers** using all their powers of intellect and inventiveness. Sixty-five years after the Truman Commission, the nation faces a different national and global dynamic than in the aftermath of World War II. A Crucible Moment casts its National Call to Action in the context of five trends that shape this historic juncture. Increase in Democratic nations: In 1950, just over 25 percent of countries in the world could be characterized as electoral democracies (Diamond 2011). In 2010, 59 percent of countries could be characterized in this way (Puddington 2011). Moreover, “in 1975 the number of countries that were ‘not free’ exceeded those that were ‘free’ by 50 percent, [but] by 2007 twice as many countries were ‘free’ as were ‘not free’ (Goldstone 2010, 1). According to an official statement released by the Arab Network for the Study of Democracy, the Arab Spring of 2011 brought people in seven countries to the streets united by three notions: freedom, dignity, and justice (Lee 2011). These shifts offer significant opportunities for revitalizing all democracies, both old and new, as modern democracies learn collectively how to recalibrate democratic processes to meet the new demands of a globalized age. Intensified Global Competition: After World War II, the United States competed only with the Soviet Union for global domination as other nations were busy either putting their devastated economies back in order or developing them. Today, powerful new economies exist on every continent. The European Union is challenging US economic domination, and there is a decided tilt toward the Asian markets of China, India, and Japan. In this globalized world, the budgets of many multinational companies are larger than those of many countries, and they are not bound in their practices by any one nation. Dangerous Economic Inequalities: While the United States had been moving toward a diamond-shaped economy with a larger middle class, recent years have seen an increased gulf between rich and poor across US households. Economist Edward N. Wolff notes, for example, that between 2007 and mid 2009 there was “a fairly steep rise in wealth inequality [where] the share of the top 1 percent advanced from 34.6 to 37.1 percent, that of the top 5 percent from 61.8 to 65 percent, and that of the top quintile from 85 to 87.7 percent, while that of second quintile fell from 10.9 to 10 percent, that of the middle quintile from 4 to 3.1 percent, and that of the bottom two quintiles from 0.2 to -0.8 percent” (Wolff 2010, 33). In sum, as of 2009, nearly 90 percent of wealth was concentrated among the top 20 percent of US households, while just over 10 percent of wealth was spread across the remaining 80 percent. One result of this hyper-consolidation of wealth is that for the first time in US history, the younger generation is not on a trajectory to achieve their parents’ economic level. These same economic inequalities are even more dramatic in a global context. According to former UN Humanitarian Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland. “The richest individuals are richer than several of the poorest nations combined—a few billionaires are richer than the poorest two billion people” ( http://ucatlas. ucsc.edu/income.php). Economist Branko Milanovic (2000) has found that the ratio of the average income of the top 5 percent of the world’s population to the bottom 5 percent increased from 78 to 1 in 1988 to 114 to 1 in 1993. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, a whole region has been left behind: it will account for almost one-third of world poverty in 2015, up from one-fifth in 1990 (United Nations Development Programme 2007). Demographic Diversity: The United States is “the most religiously diverse nation on earth” (Eck 2002, 4), and is more racially diverse than ever. By 2045 communities of color will constitute at least 50 percent nationwide (Roberts 2008), as is already the case in some states. Immigrants now make up 12.5 percent of the US population (Gryn and Larsen 2010). Intensified immigration and refugee populations swirling around the entire globe have resulted in similarly dramatic demographic shifts on almost every continent. Having the capacity to draw on core democratic processes to negotiate the increased diversity will secure a stable future. technological Advances: In 1945, televisions were a rarity and many sections of the country were just getting telephone lines and electricity. The impact of computers and information technology today is reminiscent of the transformation wrought by the Industrial Age: all facets of everyday livingare affected, from communication to health care, from industry to energy, and from educational pedagogies to democratic practices. The Internet— particularly the development of social media to organize groups of people around commonly shared values—influences democratic engagement and activism, as dramatically illustrated by the 2011 Arab Spring and the 2008 US presidential election. While the historical dynamics that shaped the Truman Commission’s findings may differ from today’s political and social environment, a number of stubborn problems that existed then continue to erode the foundation of our democracy. The most pressing of these are unequal access to college and economic lethargy. Although access has increased dramatically, unequal access continues to plague democracy’s ability to thrive. Students are underprepared for college because of what writer and educator Jonathan Kozol (1991) refers to as “the savage inequalities” of the nation’s K–12 system. The poorer the young person, the less likely he or she will go to college. Yet SAT scores, which directly correlate with income, continue to determine many students’ qualifications to attend college. Failure to graduate from high school shuts off college as an option for nearly 30 percent of our nation’s young people; researchers James Heckman and Paul LaFontaine (2007) note that high school graduation rates have leveled or declined over four decades, and the “majority/minority graduation rate differentials are substantial and have not converged over the past 35 years.” In a new foreword to The Drama of Diversity and Democracy: Higher Education and American Commitments, Ramón A. Gutiérrez illustrates Latinos’ attrition along the educational pipeline in the United States. While they are the fastest growing racial minority, surpassing the percentage of African Americans, education is not providing a democratic pathway to economic independence or social mobility. Drawing on research by Armida Ornelas and Daniel Solórzano, Gutiérrez explains that “of every one hundred Latinos who enroll in elementary school, fifty-three will drop out,” and of the forty-seven who graduate from high school, “only twenty-six will pursue some form of postsecondary education” and “only eight will graduate with baccalaureate degrees” (Gutiérrez 2011, xvi). In the face of troubling discrepancies among racial and socioeconomic groups, there is some good news in the longer term regarding the nation’s increasing college graduation rates. In 1940, only 24 percent of the population 25 years and older had completed high school, and just under 5 percent held a bachelor’s degree (Bauman and Graf 2003). Seventy years later, those numbers have progressed dramatically. “Of the 3.2 million youth age 16 to 24 who graduated from high school between January and October 2010, about 2.2 million (68.1 percent) were enrolled in college in October 2010” (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). Overall college graduation rates have also improved: the Digest of Education Statistics 2010, for example, reports that for those seeking the bachelor’s degree, the rate of graduation within four years has reached 36.4 percent. Within six years, it jumps to 57.2 percent. For those seeking an associate’s degree, the graduation rate within six years is 27.5 percent (Snyder and Dillow 2011). According to the 2011 Education at a Glance report completed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the labor force in the United States is among the world’s top five most highly educated. However, OECD’s report explains, “The US is the only country where attainment levels among those just entering the labor market (25–34 year-olds) do not exceed those about to leave the labor market (55–64 yearolds).” As a result, “among 25–34 year-olds, the US ranks 15th among 34 OECD countries in tertiary attainment” (OECD 2011, 2). In other words, the educational attainment level in the United States has remained relatively flat while other countries have rapidly increased and surpassed us. An attainment rate that qualified the United States to be near the top of the world several decades ago is not a guarantee of retaining world leadership educationally. Neither graduation rates nor attainment rates that were sufficient in the past are satisfactory today, when two-thirds of future jobs will require some type of postsecondary credential. There is a strong link between educational level and preparedness for a newly demanding workplace, just as there is a strong link between educational level and other civic indicators, including voting. A high-quality education, workforce preparation, and civic engagement are inextricably linked. A college education—who has access to it, and who completes the degree—affects personal ambitions, the economy, and civic participation. After World War II, the United States invested in higher education as a vehicle to jump-start economic expansion. The community college sector in particular was dramatically expanded to provide people with new access to college and new technical skills. In today’s economy, higher education is once again viewed as a way graduates can achieve greater economic mobility and our lethargic economy can be stimulated. In 1947, with the world in shambles, new structures, alliances, and programs were created in an attempt to avert future catastrophic wars, to reconstruct multiple economies, and to establish common principles of justice and equality. As the Truman Commission demonstrates, political and educational leaders agreed that higher education was needed to educate students for international understanding and cooperation to secure a sustainable future. Although today’s world is more globally integrated financially, culturally, and demographically, it is also fraught with civil and regional wars, clashing values, and environmental challenges wrought by rapacious consumption and carelessness. Citizens who have never examined any of these issues will be left vulnerable in the face of their long-term consequences. How to achieve sustainability—understood in its broadest definition as including strong communities, economic viability, and a healthy planet—is the democratic conundrum of the day. If it is not solved, everyone’s future well-being will be in jeopardy. Meanwhile, students’ economic options are heavily influenced by two long-term trends: the requirement of a college credential for the twenty-firstcentury employment market, and the inadequacy of federal and state funds that could make higher education more widely available. After World War II, the majority of jobs in the United States did not require a college degree, yet many—especially in unionized fields—offered a middle-class living wage and benefits. Today, a college degree is the credential that a high school diploma once was. According to a 2010 report, Projections of Jobs and Education Requirements through 2018, of the 46.8 million new and replacement job openings in 2018, 34 percent will require a bachelor’s degree or better, while 30 percent will require at least some college or a two-year associate’s degree. (Carnevale, Smith, and Strohl 2010, 110). As the report’s authors describe this societal sea change, “…postsecondary education or training has become the threshold requirement for access to middle-class status and earnings in good times and bad. It is no longer the preferred pathway to middle-class jobs—it is, increasingly, the only pathway” (110). This higher educational bar is imposed as colleges and universities continue to cope with the effects of the recession and budget deficits at both state and federal levels. Higher education is often the vehicle that states use to balance their budgets. The sector does well in good times and is hit harder in lean ones. According to a 2011 report issued by the National Conference of State Legislatures, total state support for higher education institutions fell by 1.5 percent in FY 2009. Without federal funding from the American Reinvestment and Renewal Act (ARRA), this decline would have been 3.4 percent. In 2010, twenty-three states decreased state support of public higher education institutions, even after receiving ARRA funds. Eight of these states reported drops in higher education funding exceeding 5 percent (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011). These compounding factors produce our crucible moment today. **The country,** the economy, **and** the **world demand a different kind of expertise** than was required of graduates after World War II. **The** **kind of** **graduates we need at this moment in history** need to possess a strong propensity for wading into an intensely interdependent, pluralist world. They **need to be** agile, creative **problem solvers** who draw their knowledge from multiple perspectives both domestic and global, who approach the world with empathy, and who are ready to act with others to improve the quality of life for all. Another name for these graduates is democratic citizens. In the face of the constellation of forces described in the previous chapter, this crucible moment in US history might look daunting. Certain lessons from the Truman Commission, however, should spur people to action, not paralysis. Despite the ravages of World War II and the resultant worldwide economic devastation, the Commission was ambitious in its scope, calling for bold leadership and investment of public funds and reaffirming the public mission of higher education as a reservoir for progress for the nation and the world. That same visionary leadership is necessary today. The Truman Commission also imagined long-term, systemic change— within both higher education and the nation at large—as an answer to the dire challenges of the day. In a revolutionary stand, the Commission named racial segregation, inequality of any kind, and intolerance as impediments to economic advancement and affronts to democratic values. This twentyfirst-century juncture likewise demands deep structural reforms in higher education and the broader society. As Charles Quigley’s (2011) epigraph to this report states, “Each generation must work…to narrow the gap between the ideals of this nation and the reality of the daily lives of its people.” Today, colleges and universities must once again serve as “the carrier[s] of democratic values, ideals, and process,” but for a new age confronting new challenges (President’s Commission on Higher Education 1947a). **Putting civic learning at the core rather than the periphery** of primary, secondary, and postsecondary education **can have far-reaching positive consequences** for the country and the economy. It can be a powerful counterforce to the civic deficit and a means of replenishing civic capital. That restored capital, in turn, can function as a self-renewing resource for strengthening democracy and re-establishing vitality, opportunity, and development broadly across the socioeconomic spectrum and even beyond national borders. As Martin Luther King Jr. (2011) accurately noted, we are all “tied in a single garment of destiny.” If indeed we seek a democratic society in which the public welfare matters as much as the individual’s welfare, and in which global welfare matters along with national welfare, then education must play its influential part to bring such a society into being. As Ira Harkavy (2011) asserts in the epigraph to this chapter, that will require a commitment to “develop and maintain the particular type of education system conducive to it.” A Crucible Moment posits that the nature of that particular type of education must be determined at the local institutional level in order to construct civic-minded colleges and universities. In Chapter I we argued that such campuses are distinguished by a civic ethos governing campus life; civic literacy as a goal for every graduate; civic inquiry integrated within majors, general education, and technical training; and informed civic action in concert with others as lifelong practice. If Chapter I established the urgency of reinvesting in education for democracy and civic responsibility and Chapter II demonstrated that ambitious action was possible in the face of earlier difficult historical eras, **this chapter comprises a National Call to Action: recommendations that can begin to erase the current civic learning shortfall.** **These recommendations are meant to** shift and **enhance** the national dialogue about **civic** learning and democratic **engagement and to mobilize constituents** to take action. **Everyone has a role and everyone must act**, with participation and deliberation across differences as vibrant democracies require. We invite each constituent group to use this report and its National Call to Action as a guideline to chart a course of action—tailoring, for example, the strategies and tasks to be accomplished, the entities responsible for each effort, the partners to be engaged, the timeline for action, and other particulars—that would most effectively respond in the exigencies of this crucible moment. **We encourage readers to expand** and refine **this report’s recommendations and make them locally relevant** by institution, region, issue, and demographics. In Appendix A, we provide a mechanism for doing so in the form of tools to help each participating entity develop its own Civic Investment Plan. **Readers are encouraged to work** collectively **within self-designated spheres to develop a plan for** exactly **what they can** and will **do to make civic** learning and democratic **engagement a meaningful** national **priority.** As described in the opening pages of this report, **the** National **Call to Action is the product of a broad coalition** of people. The idea for bringing such a group together began with the US Department of Education, which commissioned the report, funded it, and nurtured it. From the beginning, the department acknowledged the widespread civic engagement movement that has been working for decades both on and off campus. The design for the project deliberately drew from that expertise and charged leaders in civic renewal efforts to envision the next frontiers of civic learning and democratic engagement in higher education. Assuming that the best solutions would be generated by people responsible for moving from a set of recommendations to purposeful action, the department charged the National Task Force on Civic Learning and Democratic Engagement with making recommendations—to the government and to higher education—that were informed by the expertise and experience of the leaders and essential partners of the civic renewal movement already underway. A staunch partner in promoting civic learning and democratic engagement throughout the process, the department nonetheless made clear that A Crucible Moment was to be the Task Force’s report not the department’s, prepared in dialogue with a very broad community of advisers. Those advisers who were participants in five different national roundtables, and whose names are listed in Appendix C are civic practitioners, scholars, and administrators. They generated what became an evolving set of specific recommendations included in this chapter. The National Task Force continued to refine the recommendations in subsequent drafts. **There was consensus** among participants **that a successful Call to Action would require** multiple leaders **collaborating** from varying constituencies both within and beyond higher education and **within** and beyond **government agencies**. **The** broad swath of **recommendations that emerged reflects that consensus**. K–12 education is the cornerstone for both functioning democracies and college readiness. As Ira Harkavy (2011) said in his address at the international conference “Reimagining Democratic Societies,” “no effective democratic schooling system, no democratic society. **Higher education has the potential to powerfully contribute to** the democratic **transformation of** schools, communities, and **societies.”** Despite all the investment in improving the level of schooling in the United States, particularly over the past quarter century, **far too little attention has been paid to education for democracy** in public schools. In their foreword to the report Guardian of Democracy: The Civic Mission of Schools, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and former Congressman Lee Hamilton note, “**Knowledge of our system of governance** and our rights and responsibilities as citizens **is not passed along through the gene pool**. **Each generation** of Americans **must be taught** these basics” (2011, 5). The arguments for the civic purpose of K–12 education and the arguments for the civic mission of higher education are similar. **Education for democratic engagement is** even **more urgent than it has ever been,** **given** America’s current diverse populace and **global interdependencies**. Revealingly, the definition of civic learning put forth in Guardian of Democracy encompasses a continuum across educational levels—in both pedagogy and curricula—that is consistent with an enlarged definition of civic literacies cited in Chapter I of this report, the framework for twenty-first-century civic learning provided in figure 1, and the examples of campus practices featured in Chapter V. Research in 2009 about civic learning in K–12 by Judith Torney-Purta and Britt S. Wilkenfeld echoes findings in higher education. Torney-Purta and Wilkenfeld suggest, for example, that the educational outcomes proceeding from well-constructed civics curricula overlap with the knowledge and skills needed in the workplace. Similarly, their research finds that engaged pedagogies in K–12 that accelerate empowered, student-centered learning also enhance both constructive civic/political participation skills and parallel skills of collaboration, so valuable in the workplace. Finally, they find that classrooms that are civically oriented across multiple kinds of subjects also contribute to students’ motivation to do well and, therefore, to the likelihood that students will stay in school. The Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools therefore argues there should be three C’s driving reform in K–12 education: college, career, and citizenship (see www.civicmissionofschools.org). Unfortunately, the current public discourse—driven by multiple public, business, and governmental sectors—focuses disproportionately on the first two. The 2011 Educational Testing Services report The Mission of High School voices this concern in a chapter called “A Narrowing of Purpose and Curriculum?” Diane Ravitch is quoted about the grievous consequences to democracy’s health of not setting high expectations across an array of subjects in schools but instead focusing on only a few subjects that are narrowly judged in high stakes testing: “A society that turns its back on the teaching of history encourages mass amnesia, leaving the public ignorant of the important events and ideas of the human past and eroding the civic intelligence needed for the future. **A** democratic **society that fails to teach the younger generation** the **principles of self-government puts these principles at risk**” (Barton and Coley 2011, 25–26). The omission of civic goals for education occurs even in the face of evidence that civic engagement contributes to academic success. As reported by the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), “Longitudinal studies show that young people who serve their community and join civic associations succeed in school and in life better than their peers who do not engage” (Levine 2011, 15). Parallel findings across K–12 and postsecondary education suggest that (1) comprehensive civic goals need to be included in standards to be assessed at state and national levels; (2) civic development for teachers in schools needs to be supported; and (3) schools of education need to integrate civic learning and democratic engagement into the curricula that prepare our nation’s teachers. Recognizing the need for a reinvestment in civic learning, thoughtful K–12 **educators** and leaders **have developed a framework that accords with the** vision and **argument of this report** (see particularly the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools 2011a, 2011b, www.civicmissionofschools.org/site/ resources/civiccompetencies.html, and Guardians of Democracy). **The timing is right**, then, **to form** sturdy **bridges to civic** learning and democratic **engagement across student**s’ lifelong **learning trajectories.** Without K–12 education laying the foundations for civic responsibility and developing students’ understandings of democracy’s history and principles, any hopes of raising national civic literacy and civic agency are likely to be undermined, both for college students and, even more so, for high school graduates who may never enroll in college.

#### Third — Constructive Constraints. Absolute affirmative flexibility leaves the negative without meaningful ground to advance well-developed counter-arguments. Establishing boundaries is important because they spur imagination and innovation, improving the quality of debates.

#### TVA solves – read the racial cap aff on this topic, or any type of k lit – this topic is super good for kritik literature on the aff – it talks about the racialized impact of COVID, and how vaccines check back for that.

#### SSD solves– their ability to read this affirmative on the negative solves all their offense so vote negative to combat dogmatism.

#### Theres another tva – the pandemics plan and use HIV examples – people say its been a genocide

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify, and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater - dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense.

#### No RVI’s – it’s illogical to say the game is bad and then decide to play it.

### Invisibility k

#### The 1AC proliferating their survival strategies in debate only serves to disempower those strategies and reveal it to the state which causes external crackdowns

**Ruzicka 16** (Michal Ruzicka; Forschungszentrum Menschenrechte, Universität Wien, Hörlgasse; 2016; “*Unveiling what should remain hidden: ethics and politics of researching marginal people*;” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie volume 41, 147–164)

A gradual turning point in my research came after I realized that our relationship based on mutual trust became deeper, allowing Koloman to openly discuss with me the details of his and his family’s social and economic life. From one point, Koloman had no trouble providing me with details about his past (how he got to prison etc.) and present experience, especially with regard to how he managed his family’s finances; by that time, he had already lost eligibility to receive State unemployment benefits. I acquired a new perspective on how people like Koloman do things in order to manage their lives on a day-to-day basis, especially by utilizing marginal economic resources available to them either directly on the street or via social networks, mostly in the context of the underground economy. Koloman often openly explained to me how things work on the street, how one has to behave in order to utilize the most viable resources. Along with strategies to make the “right impression” in the eyes of the State – a police officer or a social worker most commonly in this case – I learned about the tactical role which certain strategies (which would be seen by the dominant society as false promises, overt lies, theft, threat or even open violence) played in managing the insecure, rare and constantly fleeting resources in the shadow areas of the underground economy. Koloman never got involved in organized crime, preserving his pride as a lone wolf who is really good in what he does: exploiting economic resources, often at the expense of other actors in the social game. I came to feel that I started to better understand Koloman’s own perspective on the world which led me, among other things, to stop perceiving his actions as resulting from his cultural membership, but rather as his own practical strategies and tactics that he himself had learned to utilize in order to be successful in the street economy. Based on my extensive experience with Koloman’s family, I realized that there is a certain “core” of informal practices and tactics that not only give a new meaning to what Koloman did on an everyday basis, but that would give me a new understanding of what it is like to live on the margins. New data and new forms of understanding motivated me to reconsider the complex relationship that existed between my method and data, and between ethical and political considerations. For instance, I was struggling between my ethnographic curiosity (“wow – amazing data!”) and my own ethical beliefs (“I just cannot publish this data”). My biggest fear was to unwittingly become an informant to the disciplining State apparatus, providing an informational base that could potentially be used against the interests of my informants. Besides that, I was personally reluctant to being over-involved in the underground economy. I understood that there was a multiplicity of perspectives and ethical considerations that perhaps should be taken into account if I decided to continue my research: 1. Koloman’s own moral convictions of what is right and wrong. 2. My own moral convictions of what is right and wrong. 3. The wider society’s moral convictions of what is right and wrong, together with hegemonic stereotypes used to justify Roma marginalization. 4. The scientific community demanding research results to be reported, allowing data to be available for peer review. At first, I did not find the fact that these perspectives exist in mutual conflict to be problematic. Only later did I realize that I have a problem: what to do with the data that at the same time served to “explain” a social phenomenon, yet their nature was that they must remain hidden to the observer, especially to the agents of the State. The problem was that, in a sense, I also was the State’s agent: a professional scientist paid by the State to provide and publish “data” on what it means to live on the margins as a poor Roma under post-socialismFootnote1. Not only my research, but also my data turned political. I knew that the data – if disclosed openly – could serve as a fuel for the anti-Roma discourse by conforming the general stereotype of Gypsies as “smart liars”, “cunning pretenders” or “thieves”. I became obsessed with imaginary scenarios of how my data could possibly be politically used against those who have trusted me most, my informants. How to say enough without saying too much? The tension between the scientific imperative to “do research and present your results” and the ethical imperative “never cause harm to your informants” was clearly not easily resolved at this point. As I was thinking my way through the plethora of moral dilemmas and ethical considerations stemming from recent developments in my research, I came to realize that my research was not only about the relationship between my informants and myself. Rather, other powerful actors were to be included into how I perceived the issue: the dominant society (with its pre-constructed notions and stereotypes about the Roma) as well as the State with its primary agenda to preserve the social and political status quo by means of disciplining those who are perceived as a threat to the symbolic order of the dominant society (Sibley 1995). This consideration eventually led me to integrate the relationship between the marginal (marginalized Roma in my case) and the central (the State and its institutions) into my research on conditions that make the enduring Roma marginality possible.

#### The alternative is to embrace *Invisibility* as a tactical choice to prevent discursive cooption by *hegemonic forces*—like debate.

**Ruzicka 16** (Michal Ruzicka; Forschungszentrum Menschenrechte, Universität Wien, Hörlgasse; 2016; “*Unveiling what should remain hidden: ethics and politics of researching marginal people*;” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie volume 41, 147–164)//Garfield-Ben

Marginal people navigate their everyday lives on the fringes of the dominant socio-economic system, often having to deal with the stigma attached to their social (and/or ethnic) status. Being deprived of full access to resources which are otherwise accessible to members of the society at large, lacking skills and knowledge to be perceived by the distributors of social recognition, as well as having limited access to social services, marginal people have to rely on irregular, precarious and often unpredictable sources of income. The economic strategies of marginal people can be seen as “open” in the sense that these people must be ready to make use of such opportunities and resources (both material, social and informational) as soon as they emerge (Day et al. 1999). Life on the margins consists mainly of waiting and waiting again for the right opportunity. Koloman’s life may appear to the outside observer as slow, if not ‘boring’ (it is he himself who describes his life as boring). In fact, ‘not much has happened, you know’ is the most common answer I received at any time when asking what has changed since our last encounter. Such a statement reflects the nature of things most of the time: ‘nothing has happened’ in the sense that no big changes have occurred in Koloman’s family’s life. Often, however, I was quite surprised to find rather dramatic changes taking place rather suddenly: Koloman finding a new apartment to rent for his family, or his unexpectedly leaving the city for an expedient job that ‘you know, just suddenly appeared’ … To put it in another words: in his life, Koloman usually waits. Unhappy with his and his family’s current living situation, Koloman waits for an opportunity: an opportunity that is unpredictable, since it often pops up suddenly, unannounced and unanticipated. In this sense, Koloman relies not on the limited amount of recognized forms of capital (money, education or skills utilizable in the labor market), but rather on resources embedded in social capital that he is not aware of yet: a friend offering a part-time job at a construction site, an acquaintance suggesting a risky but relatively profitable ‘deal’, or another random resource which could be utilized to make Koloman’s family’s life more bearable. Koloman’s case corroborates the observation that life on the margins operates by means of “isolated actions, blow by blow …,” leading marginal people to “vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers” (de Certeau 1984, p. 37). After I turned my attention to how Koloman manages the unpredictable resources and opportunities, I realized the importance of “impression management” for his relative success not only in the underground economy. I have no objective way to assess Koloman’s craft to induce the right impression in the right people, yet this skill has astonished me so many times: making a great impression in the eyes of the landowner, his children’s schoolteacher, the social worker responsible for assessing the needs of his mother-in-law, the judge in his eldest son’s court case … and the list could go on. Not only Koloman, but also other Roma families living on the margins whom I have come to know, often unemployed and thus depending on irregular and unpredictable sources of income, are forced to rely on irregular sources of income: from actively searching for materials to be collected, recycled (and/or repaired) and then sold, to exchanging services for cash (mostly by providing cheap unskilled labor, or more informal services), to passively waiting for the “right moment” to utilize their personal skills to effectively act and then disappear without being noticed. The craft of impression management and the art of becoming “invisible” come hand in hand. These forms of economic strategies remain relatively under-researched, perhaps due to the fact that they have been morally condemned by both the dominant society and the State apparatus (along with those researchers who, fearing that their research could contribute to their informants’ bad reputation, simply “ignore” such practices). This includes such arts and crafts as “impression management” in the presence of utilizable resources, beggary, or even thievery (Horváthová 1964, p. 330; Sutherland 1975, p. 28). Having their lives relatively determined by their disadvantaged position with regard to social and economic resources embedded within the dominant social and economic system, marginal people are nevertheless still a part of it and are never completely “excluded”. Stigmatized by both their ethnicity and economic strategies, these people never find themselves completely “outside” the socio-economic system. Living on the margins of a system means not to live outside of it, but on its fringes – in the shadow area where formal social control is relatively weaker. Limited access to the recognized forms of capital does not rule out having access to irregular and “morally questionable” resources (i. e. those which are “morally questionable” from the perspective of the members of the dominant society). The relational perspective on the State and its marginals (i. e. the mutual relationship between the center and its periphery) allows us to recognize that marginal people are never totally “excluded”; their life is possible only by means of utilizing marginal and often stigmatized (but never fully “excluded”) resources. In other words, marginal people can be fully understood only once we recognize how they are actually embedded within the dominant system, albeit marginally. That is exactly why the Roma “cannot be understood in isolation from the wider society of which they have always formed a part” (Bloch 1997, p. xiv). People without a fixed and secure position in society, such as the Roma, “maintain their autonomy by adapting to the dominant culture” in the sense that they “have successfully stayed apart from the larger society because that society provides their economic base” (Sibley 1981, p. 14; see also Sway 1984). In other words, there is a “paradox of Gypsy ethnicity” to be explained: “how Gypsies keep themselves distinct while appearing to assimilate” (Silverman 1988, p. 273; see also Okely [1983] 1992). Marginal people who are economically dependent on the dominant society which at the same time excludes them must make sure to give the “right impression” in the eyes of the beholder. Koloman is very keen on how he and his actions appear to the people “who have power” (by “people in power”, he means State agents such as policemen, social workers and other state bureaucrats, teachers, landlords, doctors and – perhaps – also ethnographers). Koloman recognizes that his family depends to a certain degree on the impression they produce in these agents. People who are almost constantly subjected to the controlling and disciplining gaze of the State are simply forced to develop methods of “impression management” (Gmelch 1986, p. 313–314; Silverman 1982; for an analytic frame of studying strategies of impression management, see Goffman 1969), enabling themselves always to wear the proper “mask” when on “stage” (Goffman 1959). People selling “street newspapers” develop techniques to make themselves more visible without “annoying” the by-walkers too much, so do beggars who have mastered techniques to arouse compassion in bystanders. Koloman also has particular strategies and techniques that “work” in the sense that they deliver positive results: making the right impression and thus actualizing potential resources. Making the right impression, or having the process of impression management under control, is a solution to the problem of how to appear in the eyes of the (always possibly exclusionary) beholder. Another solution would be to “become invisible”, i. e. to produce a discontinuity between appearance on the outside, and autonomy and sense of identity on the inside. Because of their marginal status, “the Rom have developed one set of rules for behaviour in obtaining economic and political gain from the gaje and another set of rules for the same behaviour with their own people” (Sutherland 1975, p. 20). Both the gadje and the State (especially when they meet in the figure of the policeman, the teacher, the social worker, the journalist or the landlord) are always potentially threatening forces. In minatorial situations, and in those in which “impression management” is out of the question, marginal people can resort to “becoming invisible” as an ultimate means of deflecting the gaze of the State’s disciplinary agents. With regard to “becoming invisible” as the everyday strategy of marginalized people, a particular case might help to illustrate the main point here. Academic interest has for some time focused on researching Roma migrations, especially those from the East to the countries of Western Europe (Guy 2003; Lee 2000; Matras 2000; Guy et al. 2004). Recent Roma migration has generally been perceived and researched as “a way of solving the economic problems” (Uherek 2004, p. 91), or as a means of escaping socio-economic and political problems, such as discrimination, or as an escape from serious interpersonal conflict (Weinerová 2004, p. 114). Vašečka and Vašečka (2003) mainly regard modern Roma migration as a result of disillusionment and the degradation of the socio-economic status of the “Romani socialist-style middle class” (Vašečka and Vašečka 2003, p. 37), which are again basically economic motives. Prónai in his article on Gypsy migration in Hungary (2004) states that the motivation for migration among the Hungarian Gypsies has been economic, but often with some political considerations as well (Prónai 2004, p. 126). Matras’ conclusions on the overall motives and causes of recent Roma migrations are in accord with those of the above-mentioned authors, as he sees such migrations to be motivated by reasons of economic or personal security (Matras 2000, p. 37–38). Without questioning the importance or validity of such claims, my own ethnographic experience led me to a slightly different conclusion regarding the possible causes of contemporary flows of Roma migration (see Ruzicka 2009). I refused to “fit” my research experience and my data into the pre-established categories of economically and politically motivated migration, as I realized that it is perhaps impossible to generalize Roma migrations under one analytical umbrella (Grill 2011, p. 81). To avoid the pitfall of pre-established categories, I proposed another category: that of “invisible migration.” Current research, I argue, has focused mostly on the “visible” forms of Roma migrations – receiving the highest level of media coverage, they become visible on account of the strongest social and political interest (Clark and Campbell 2000). Not only does such a perspective conform to the image of the overall Gypsy history as a history of “forced migration” – a history of “exodus” (Kendrick 2004; Clébert 1967, p. 46). It also presents Roma migration as being caused by some exogenous forces. In my own ethnographic research, I observed forms of migration that did not fit into the category of labor or political migration, nor was I able to see any exogenous forces that would limit the choices of my informants. Due to the particular political development in former Czechoslovakia, and due to the State’s policy of “liquidation of Gypsy settlements” in the 1960 s and 1970 s, parts of Roma families from the Gypsy settlements in Eastern Slovakia moved to Czech industrial cities to seek better housing and employment opportunities (Jurová 1996). Other parts of these families sometimes refused to be moved, remaining in their settlements. Kin-based social networks, now stretching between the Czech and Slovak states, have often been maintained for decades and presently serve as a kin infrastructure facilitating forms of Roma migration. Applied to migration such kin-based networks have also been used for such “endogenous” reasons as gathering and maintaining resources or identifying suitable spouses (for details, see Ruzicka 2009). Due to the fact that these forms of Roma migration have been going unnoticed by the dominant society (i. e. not arousing anti-Gypsy sentiments, nor stimulating any form of media coverage, not to speak of academic research), I referred to them in terms of “invisible migration.” A further interpretation might be that such “invisibility” has been a conscious strategy of the marginalized people who at once need to gather resources available through their kin networks, while remaining hidden from the gaze of the outsider (Williams 1982). There are forms of migration that go unnoticed by the State and by “outsiders”, i. e. by members of the dominant society (bureaucrats, policemen, ethnographers etc.) who are always seen as possessing the power to endanger one’s security or chances for success. Marginal people navigate their everyday lives with limited resources, constantly being scrutinized and subjected to the omnipresent gaze of the state institutions and members of the dominant societies. Being subjected to various forms of formal and informal social control, these people must maintain the right impression by subjecting themselves to the formal and informal demands, while at the same time keeping distance from them in order to preserve their own identity, sense of self-worth, and cultural autonomy. A certain compromise between submission to those in power and keeping distance from them is thus a crucial determinant of the craft of living on the margins. Marginal people apply contextual tactics rather than explicitly and deliberately planned strategies to navigate their lives through the space of limited resources, constantly being observed by agents of social control. In other words, these tactics are used to “maneuver ’within the enemy’s field of vision’ … and within enemy territory” (de Certeau 1984, p. 36–37). The art of “correct” impression management, along with the craft of going unnoticed, invisible, and remaining hidden, is one of the most important forms of the “art of the weak” (de Certeau 1984, p. 37). The problem arises when these smart tactics, these “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985), seen as the last resort in their own terms, suddenly become transparent, visible and unveiled, exposed to the panoptical eye of the State and its’ servants.

#### If you can do the aff, just not in debate it’s a reason to vote neg

### Case

#### Theres a huge double bind – either the state and politics are infinitely bad and you shouldn’t read this in debate where it will be coopted or the state and politics can be good and learning about them is good which means that you vote on the TVA and SSD on T

#### Vote negative on presumption their strategy of interrogation does nothing to change debate or the world. When you have done your aff multiple times what has been the impact. There is no ballot key warrant so you can vote neg while agreeing with the 1AC.

#### Hold them up to solving the large impacts presented.

#### Ballot isn’t key -- there is no reason by the judge ballot solves the impacts of the 1AC. You can vote negative while agreeing with the substance of the 1AC.

#### Pacification – impossible to know when they have finished their method – encourages affs to forward un-nuanced descriptions of the squo which is actively worse.

#### There are 2 types of politics—saying all of it is bad ignores empirical examples which prove radical black political organizing is effective when it targets governments pragmatically – HIV also proves

Spence, Poli Sci Prof @ John Hopkins, 15 (Lester, Knocking the Hustle: Against the Neoliberal Turn in Black Politics, pp. 140-147)

All four examples have a few things in common. First all occurred at a moment where all seemed lost. While I wouldn’t go as far as to suggest that these events suggest that neoliberalism is “naturally” contested—just as there is no “good teaching gene” there is no “contest neoliberalism gene”—I would say that while the neoliberal turn has signifcantly altered our ability to argue for public goods, it hasn’t killed that ability. It still exists. It exists in institutions we have written of thinking they are no longer relevant—like teachers unions. It exists in populations we’ve written of because we believe they are incapable of radical political action— black youth. It exists in cities that we don’t think of as having a long history of radical political struggle —like Jackson, Mississippi. Second all three recognized the fundamental role politics played in their struggles. The black youth organizers recognized that they had to pressure Maryland state legislators to kill the prison. The black radicals in the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement made electing Chokwe Lumumba a component of their organizing. The CTU chose to take the city head on and to hold a series of town hall meetings designed to inform people of the ways political officials, philanthropists, and corporations are working together to neoliberalize and kill public education. The #blacklivesmatter movement recognized that politics was at the center of their struggle in Ferguson, Baltimore, and elsewhere. All campaigns used moral language in making their arguments. In Jackson they argued that the current way power was allocated in Jackson was immoral because it largely concentrated all of the benefits into a few (predominantly white) hands. In Baltimore they argued that putting $104 million to the goal of incarcerating youth was immoral given the lack of money being spent on youth in other areas, and later that Freddie Gray’s (and before him Tyrone West’s) murder was immoral. In Chicago they argued that closing 50 schools was immoral because it severely impacted the ability of poor black parents and black students to get the same degree of learning their white counterparts had. However, they didn’t rely on those arguments. They understood that seizing power (rather than speaking truth to it), that proposing new alternatives, would at some level have to involve political struggle. Morality wasn’t enough. Even if we had a common defnition of morality, a Christian-infuenced morality for example, that sense of morality could still be interpreted in diferent ways based on material interest. Relying on morality can make it hard to move against the wealthy charter school proponent who sincerely believes that privatizing public schools represent the best hope for increasing positive outcomes among black children. Relying on morality can make it very difficult to argue against the political bureaucrat who says — as they did in the case of Baltimore —that the conditions of youth currently held in adult prisons is so bad that the moral choice would be to give them their own facility where they won’t have to face the risks associated with being housed with adults. In deciding how we go about making our arguments and how we go about choosing our strategies and tactics we should act morally—I do believe our politics have to be rooted in a certain sense of ethics. We should never, however, ignore the fundamental role politics plays and should play in our struggle. Not only did they focus on politics, they all relied on political organizing. Organizing that included long discussions about political issues that mattered, but also parties and other events designed to get people working with each other and trusting one another. In general, people do not come to a common understanding of the structural dynamics of the problem they face, and to a common understanding of what the solution should be, through being exposed to a charismatic speaker, or through “loving black people”, without having the space to talk about the issues in depth over a long period of time. The CTU organized for several years to be able to get a 90% vote. The infrastructure black youth in Baltimore relied upon was by definition designed to inculcate critical thinking skills as well as a sense of the way racism worked at structuring black life chances. The Malcolm X Grassroots Movement worked for years to build the critical capacity required to elect Chokwe, first to the City Council, then Mayor, and to put the political platform into action. There is no way to get around the fact that the type of work we have to do to rebuild a sense of the public interest is going to take a long time and has to start by building connections between people who may not think of themselves as political, who may not think of the various issues they struggle with as being the product of the neoliberal turn, who may not know what neoliberalism is. What I am referring to here is not the same as getting people to attend a rally or a march. I’m referring to political organizing— building the capacity of people to govern and make important political decisions for themselves —not political “mobilizing”. Mobilizing people for a protest act of one kind or another may get people out to engage in a specific act, but unless combined with organizing work, will not cause those people to organize for themselves. Tird in each case they were not only reactive, they were not only being critical of the turn and its efects, they proposed a positive alternative. Protest is not enough. Just as the neoliberal turn did not simply occur when the welfare state was removed, rather it occurred when the welfare state was removed and then replaced with a new program, we will not be able to build a sustainable constituency for a new world without articulating as clearly as possible what that new world will look like, what type of policies would result, what the benefits of those policies would be. Fourth while each of these instances represent responses against the neoliberal turn broadly considered, they each began locally. Te Malcolm X Grassroots Movement has several chapters throughout the country and has already held one conference (planned before Lumumba’s untimely passing) about the Jackson model (which itself is partially based on ideas developed in Spain) and how to export it to other cities. Te movement against the proposed youth jail in Baltimore relied in part on data accumulated by the ACLU on the schoolto-prison pipeline. And as I noted above the Chicago Teachers Union have begun organizing events all across the country to get people to understand how the privatization movement in education afects them. And each of the #blacklivesmatter campaigns began with a specifc local act of police brutality and used that act to organize locally. With this said though each case represents a local struggle people could experience directly. Mark Purcell (2006) argues that academics and activists alike run the risk of falling into the “local trap” by arguing that there is something inherently better and anti-neoliberal about organizing locally. I agree with him a little. Te Civil Rights Movement represented in large part a fght against white supremacy as embedded in local and state politics —the local was not the site of empowerment but rather the site of profound disempowerment for black people throughout the North and the South. However at the same time I argue that sustainable organizing is more likely to occur in response to a local issue (a local school closing, a rise in foreclosures in a local neighborhood, a jail built up the road, a local referendum) that can then be connected to other local issues and made national rather than the other way around. And again the Civil Rights Movement represents the best example of this —people weren’t interested in ending Jim Crow as much as they were interested in desegregating the buses they took to work everyday, desegregating the restaurants they passed on the way to school, desegregating the schools themselves. Fifth they used a variety of black institutions in their struggles. Te Baltimore youth all attended black public schools in Baltimore. Tey used the public schools to garner support for their work and to build relationships with black adults and black children. While a number of Baltimore area churches do promote the prosperity gospel, not all do. A few black churches in Baltimore became critical spaces for organizing against the jail—in fact I ended up fnding out about the movement against the jail in the frst place through hearing a young progressive black nationalist Baltimore pastor speak about the movement. And they used popular culture. Tey used poetry, they used rap and hip-hop, they used parties, understanding that while again the national terrain for hip-hop may move with rather than against the neoliberal turn, they themselves could use it to speak to their local condition. And later they used these same institutions and spaces for their fght against police brutality. Similarly in Jackson the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement did not operate from a clean slate. Tey relied on professors from nearby Jackson State University, they used connections with local churches to gain support for their activities. And the CTU was itself located in one of the most important institutions in black communities, schools. Lastly, they all relied on the fundamental premise that black people had the capacity to be the change they wanted to see in the world. Tey neither believed that black people’s fundamental condition was bruised and broken, nor did they believe that black people because of the contemporary condition didn’t love each other. At the same time though they understood explicitly and implicitly that love was not enough. And while each organization does have a number of leaders they have largely (though not fully) stayed away from the type of prophetic politics that have often created problematic internal hierarchies. Again there are signifcant diferences between these instances. And even though each of these instances were victorious ones that helped to change the terrain of political struggle, there is still much more to be done. In the case of Baltimore they stopped the youth jail but were not able to stop the privatization of Baltimore youth recreation centers, nor have they been able to (as of yet) redirect the $104 million to more progressive ends. Jackson elected Lumumba mayor but after his untimely passing his son ended up coming in second. Chicago teachers made substantial gains as a result of the strike but they were not able to prevent the 50 schools from being closed. Te #blacklivesmatter movement as it stands has not gone without critique. Te most notable one is that even though the project has increased the range of black lives that people are willing to fght for, it still hasn’t gone far enough. Although it’s reasonable to assume, based on the limited data we have, that black boys and young men are victimized by police more than other populations (and to the extent the zero-tolerance technology itself generates broader forms of policing in places like schools), black boys and young men are not the sole target. Black women have been victimized both directly and indirectly by police, as have black transgender populations. These acts have in many instances been as violent as those perpetrated against their male counterparts, and they have been videotaped as well. But they haven’t garnered the same degree of support and/or outrage. Extending the #blacklivesmatter movement to include the lives of black women and transgender populations that are also the victims of police violence would be more than simply a good thing. However there’s a more systemic problem at work. Te idea behind “black lives matters” represents an opportunity to organize around and against a certain type of sufering, a uniquely black sufering, made possible by the neoliberal turn. (It bears repeating, this is not simply the “new Jim Crow” at work. Te odds that someone like me would sufer the type of horrifc death someone like Freddie Gray did is very slim.) However the politics of the #blacklivesmatter movement do not quite match the phrase. Every single time the #blacklivesmatters movement appears it does so in the presence of either a horrifc instance of black death or a startling instance of police brutality. One could argue given this that the real politics of the movement refect the concept that (graphic) black death matters rather than black life. Tis move makes a great deal of sense — one way to think about this move is to think about the way civil rights movement activists used non-violence. Particularly when news cameras were present, non-violent tactics of protest tended to really highlight how violent and terroristic white supremacy in the South and other places was. However, by privileging the graphic black death, the victim shot in his back while running away, the victim who had his back violently broken by police, it ends up ignoring the many forms of non-graphic black death that occurs not because of police violence per se, but because of economic violence. If Freddie Gray weren’t murdered by the police but rather experienced a slow death due to lead poisoning it’s unlikely we’d be talking about him right now. It’d be unlikely that Baltimore would’ve had anything like an uprising. Following up, by privileging black death, graphic black death, we privilege certain types of tactics, strategies, and institutions. We counter the spectacle of the murder with the spectacle of the mass assembly, in the form of the protest march, or the spectacle of the mass disruption, in the form of the highway stoppage, or even in the form of the type of violent actvity the uprising hinted at. Actions in other words that are not only designed to transform the event into a black-and-white catalytic moment where people and the institutions around them feel forced to make a choice for the status quo or against it. And the organizations and institutions we call into being end up being those designed to generate these types of activities and to generate support for these activities (in order to grow the organizations and institutions themselves). As far as solutions go, we also privilege anti-police legislation, and perhaps more broadly, legislation designed to counter the school to prison pipeline. Te political solution for black life matters is to reduce the likelihood of a graphic singular black death— a kid shot on the way to the corner store, a young man shot while holding a BB gun he may have planned on purchasing, a black couple driving a car with a tendency to backfre. Te types of politics that generate change when the deaths come slow, painfully, and in aggregates, or when the issue is an entire legal framework (like the Maryland Law Enforcement Ofcers Bill of Rights) is a diferent politics. It is not solely or primarily a politics of the spectacle. Spectacle can work here in instances. It can be used to mobilize support. It can be used to increase awareness and general participation. And sometimes in combination with other tactics it can be used to disrupt. To generate and prolong crises. Te types of crises that engendered the same type of problems that caused the neoliberal turn. Certainly in the case of Baltimore a range of institutions and elites had no ready-to-roll-out solutions to the issues that the uprising called up. But these aren’t enough. It requires a politics attuned to the type of long term institution building that builds the capacity of individuals to govern and devise alternatives themselves. It also requires a solution set that is more about combating the type of long term institutional violence that doesn’t necessarily have a Trayvon Martin or a Freddie Gray at the center. Te types of violence that, instead might have Freddie Gray at the center, but not at the moment of his murder but at the moment he was found to have lead poisoning. I use these examples in order to argue that we aren’t starting from scratch necessarily— some of the work is already being done on the ground. I use these examples in order to show that we already have the seeds for a new institutional framework that re-roots the economy in politics and in the public interest. To show that we aren’t alone, and that a number of people recognize another way of life is possible. There aren’t as many of us as we’d like, but there are far more of us than we think.

#### The Aff doesn’t solve any of their social justice offense – only our State-based model does.

Tow ‘2

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Thematically, Bellamy & McDonald criticize our model by retailoring our arguments to fit their own paradigmatic preferences, without offering a viable alternative approach. We have not argued that transregionalism is the only basis for identifying or measuring threats confronting individuals that merit an international response. We do argue (p. 179) that more states than not are usually successful in containing and resolving the most fundamental challenges of individual human survival and development. Those that do not meet this standard, instead marginalizing various sectors of their population, usually attract opposition from other states, who then decide whether or not to intervene. Such decisions are (fortunately for international stability) not made solely on the basis of what is deemed to be self-evident moral outrage (as ought to be the case according to our critics). They usually result from potential intervening states weighing a complex matrix of countervailing interests and norms to ensure better decisionmaking in an imperfect world. We argue that, for human security to be truly meaningful, it must be applied judiciously rather than immediately and indiscriminately. State motives and behaviour cannot automatically be condemned from the outset of every crisis or subjected to ‘interrogation’ predicated on the inherent assumption that states are the ‘primary agent’ of human insecurity and are all about undermining human ‘emancipation’ (however that term may be defined). Nor can the mere interrogation of the state by non-state actors lead to ‘alternative strategies’ (unidentified by Bellamy & McDonald) that can be assumed to guarantee that its inhabitants will be free of threat. What strategies? Who will implement them and ensure their preservation, credibility and adaptability? Merely restating the obvious – that humans everywhere desire security – is hardly a blueprint for implementation. This is why non-state actors need to engage with other actors (such as the foreign ministries that our critics dread) whose specialized capacities either exceed those of non-state (or even other state) actors or are more appropriate to the situation at hand. Condemning the state for inadequately addressing sources of insecurity identified by the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR) without providing explicit and testable alternatives gets us nowhere. Interpretations The evident determination of Bellamy & McDonald to press their own normative agenda at the expense of directly addressing our article’s actual content is one of the most disturbing characteristics of their rejoinder. We will focus on five selected points to illustrate this problem. First is their representation of our discussion on state-centrism. We do not assert, as Bellamy & McDonald claim, that the state and international borders should remain the primary focus of human security. We instead observe that any such focus needs to be developed in a more analytically precise way than merely calling for ‘emancipation’ by allowing human security to find a viable niche within the broader security studies field. Indeed, we acknowledge the presence of inadequacies in certain state systems, along with the vulnerabilities of groups of people that result from such inadequacies (p. 178). We envisage international civil society intervening to modify such vulnerabilities when other avenues of rectification have been exhausted. Where we differ markedly from Bellamy & McDonald is in our belief that states cannot all be regarded as inevitable culprits in depriving individuals or other substate actors of their human security. In this sense, states, like various individuals, project different behaviour in different circumstances; at various times, that behaviour may be more or less noble, but it is nonetheless usually accountable to international society at large, of which the state is a primary component. One of human security’s best known advocates, Sverre Lodgaard, director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, has stated as much: State security and human security are interlinked.... On a positive note, state security is a means of providing human security – or so it should be – whereas a high degree of human security may shed legitimacy on governments, regimes and states. On a negative note, outwardly aggressive and inwardly repressive regimes can be major sources of human insecurity.... In other words, to maintain its legitimacy, the state has to comply with an expanding body of international law ... to cover conflicts that are predominantly domestic, on the ground that most of them have some international ramification or other.2

#### The 1AC’s investment in a minoritarian protest within the academic confines of debate is nothing more than the re-instantiation of power. The state, capital, and the academy itself hegemonically invests in the representation of unrest in order to pacify resistance and re-weaponize protest

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The history of the U.S. ethnic and women’s studies protests presents the transition from economic, epistemological, and political stability to the pos­sibility for revolutionary social ruptures and subjectivities. For instance, the San Francisco State student strikes of 1969 advocated a “Third World revolution” that would displace and provide an alternative to racial in­ equality on that campus. That same year, 269 similar protests erupted across the country. 3 At Rutgers, black students took over the main educa­tional building, renaming it “Liberation Hall.” At the University of Texas at Austin, a student organization called Afro Americans for Black Libera­tion “insisted on converting the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to a black studies building and renaming it for Malcolm X.” 4 Inspired by the black power movement, Chicano students would also form “the United Mexican American Students, the Mexican American Student Associa­tion, and MECha, Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán, while oth­ ers in San Antonio founded the Mexican American Youth Organization, MAYO.” 5 Those students would also begin to demand Chicano studies courses and departments. Similarly, in 1969 American Indian activists took over Alcatraz Island and claimed it as Indian territory, with hopes of building a cultural center and museum. 6 And in 1970, the first women’s studies programs would be established at San Diego State University and at SUNY-Buffalo. While the state governments in California and Wisconsin called out the National Guard on students advocating for ethnic studies, systems of power also responded to these protests by attempting to manage that transition, in an attempt to prevent economic, epistemological, and political crises from achieving revolutions that could redistribute social and material relations. Instead, those systems would work to ensure that these crises were recomposed back into state, capital, and academy. Whereas modes of power once disciplined difference in the universalizing names of canon­icity, nationality, or economy, other operations of power were emerging that would discipline through a seemingly alternative regard for difference and through a revision of the canon, national identity, and the market. This theorization of power converges with and diverges from Foucault’s own observations, converging with him through an emphasis on the strate­gic nature of power relations. For instance, recall his argument about power in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, where he argues for power’s “intentional and nonsubjective” nature. 7 According to Foucault, whatever intelligibility power relations may possess, it “is not because they are the effect of another instance that ‘explains’ them, but rather because they are imbued, through and through, with calculation.” 8 Elaborating on the strategic but nonindividualized character of power, Foucault wrote that “there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objec­tives. But this does not mean it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject.” 9 The Reorder of Things builds on this element of Foucault’s theorization by looking at how state, capital, and academy saw minority insurgence as a site of calculation and strategy, how those institutions began to see minority difference and culture as positivities that could be part of their own “series of aims and objectives.” As formations increasingly character­ized by the presence of minority difference, state, capital, and academy— in different but intersecting ways— began to emerge as hegemonic processes that were “especially alert and responsive to the alternatives and opposi­tions which [questioned] or [threatened their] dominance.” 10 Hence, this book looks at the diverse but interlocking ways in which state, capital, and academy produced an adaptive hegemony where minority difference was concerned. In keeping with Foucault, the book eschews an individualized notion of power, preferring instead to regard power as a complex and multisited social formation. Rather than being embodied in an individual or a group, power— Foucault says— is a set of relations in which “the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them.” 11 In this book, the impersonal nature of power is derived from the ways in which hegemonic investments in minority difference and culture are distrib­uted across institutional and subjective terrains during and after the period of social unrest, terrains such as universities and colleges, corporations, social movements, media, and state practices. The book also uses the category “power” in the spirit of Foucault’s own implicit belief that complex situations deserve a name. Even though the name is ill-fitting, it is the “closest [we] can get to it.” 12 Addressing the cat­achresis called power, Foucault says, “power establishes,” “power invests,” “power takes hold.” 13 Furthermore, in his description of biopower, he writes, “Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied to the level of life itself.” 14 For Foucault, power becomes like a character in a story, a code name for the “multiplicity of force relations.” 15 Like Fou­cault, I use power as shorthand for a plurality of relations, arguing that if power is the “name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society,” 16 then power in the age of minority social movements becomes the new name for calculating and arranging minority difference. While The Reorder of Things attempts to rigorously attend to how dominant modes of power in the post– World War II moment utilized minority difference, the book does not reduce the “the political and cul­ ural initiatives” of the social movements— those grand champions of minority culture— to the terms of hegemony. Indeed, as part of its own archival investigation, the book attempts to unearth those elements of the social movements that were antagonistic to the terms of hegemony, giving attention to how university and presidential administrations in the sixties attempted to beguile minorities with promises of excellence and uplift. Thus, as part of its investigation of the changing networks of power, the book analyzes how dominant institutions attempted to reduce the initiatives of oppositional movements to the terms of hegemony. This book diverges from Foucault as it takes racial formations as the genealogy of power’s investment in various forms of minority difference and culture while extending Foucault’s emphasis on the productive— and not simply the repressive— capacities of power. From the social movements of the fifties and sixties until the present day, networks of power have at­ tempted to work through and with minority difference and culture, trying to redirect originally insurgent formations and deliver them to the norma­tive ideals and protocols of state, capital, and academy. In this new strategic situation, hegemonic power denotes the disembodied and abstract promo­tion of minority representation

without fully satisfying the material and social redistribution of minoritized subjects, particularly where people of color are concerned. One of the central claims of this book, then, is that the struggles taking place on college campuses because of the student pro­tests were inspirations for power in that moment, inspiring it to substitute redistribution for representation, indeed encouraging us to forget how rad­ical movements promoted the inseparability of the two.