### Setcol

#### Western philosophy is colonialist -- its presuppositions of objectivity and rationality which devalues indigenous knowledge while justifying imperialism.

**Gutierrez et. al 19** [Daniel Orr de Gutierrez - Tsi Tsalagi, Born and raised in Oklahoma (Ponca City and Norman), B.A. in Native Education from Swarthmore College, M.A. in Teaching from the University of San Francisco, Edwin Mayorga - an Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Studies and the Program in Latin American and Latino Studies at Swarthmore College, Lekey Leidecker - A youth educator in New York City, activist, and writer, Daniel Orr de Gutierrez, “Burn it Down: The Incommensurability of the University and Decolonization” , Iowa state university digital press & School of education, Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis, 2019, Vol. 8, No. 1, 87-106]

Birthed through and for the colonial state, modern philosophy does not coincidentally bear colonialist ideology, although we would not attempt a full accounting of that here. Rather, because knowledge production and regulation are the defining functions of the university, we analyze the epistemology of modern philosophy. In doing so, we find that modern epistemology not only justifies and authorizes colonial violence, but, in itself, demands epistemic violence. Operating upon these principles, the essential function of the modern university has become a colonization of knowledge: knowledge is processed to conform to colonial ideology and agendas, and, in turn, disseminated in order to assimilate the populace. To conceal the inherent violence of that mission today, the university employs a strategic negligence that reaffirms its own indispensability. Two epistemological assumptions narrate modern philosophy: (1) there are certain aspects of reality which are ubiquitously and invariably true, (2) observation and logical reasoning are the only means of accessing that absolute truth. From these two basic assumptions however, issue a number of derivative beliefs linking knowledge production to power. The first of these corollaries is the privileging of objectivity, assessing knowledge against the perceived contamination of subjective experience, by which modern scholars limit the scope of legitimate knowledges to those consistent with their own principles and tradition. In so doing, Western thinkers not only affirm the superiority of their knowledge systems but also claim for themselves the exclusive authority to define knowledge (Smith, 2012). Moreover, the assumption that absolute truth is ascertainable practically and ethically implies a responsibility to do so, creating an obligation for humanity to thoroughly investigate their reality. Given the exclusive authority of modern Western scholars to lead that investigation, instrumental reasoning insinuates, and hubris abets, that all reality need come under Western dominion. On the one hand, this epistemology leaves no room for enchantment, sacrificing the private and sacred for the pursuit of knowledge3 (Grande, 2015). On the other hand, it justifies imperialist ideation and, in fact, makes scientific investigation dependent upon the subjugation of non-Western peoples and lands. In order to understand reality, modern philosophy thus engenders material and symbolic violences against reality. But, more immediately, modern scientific investigation and knowledge production, in themselves, constitute epistemic violence. Modern philosophy is confronted by the same conflict as is any intellectual paradigm: incorporating and rectifying new knowledges with the old. In its pursuit of absolute truth, however, modern philosophy cannot engage in dialogic relations, but is confined to the dialectic, and, operating upon the presumed objective superiority of its own knowledge traditions, must contort new knowledge so that it takes on a form comprehensible within its own ideological framework.

#### Settler workers are still settlers – the 1ac grounds their politics in a defense of indigenous dispossession and necessitates settler expansion.

Englert 20 Sai Englert (lecturer @ Universiteit Leiden), 2020, “Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession,” Antipode, Vol. 0, No. 0, doi:10.1111/anti.12659

The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession.3 In fact, more often than not, settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars, boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources. For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty. In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. (2012:83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society ... In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies. If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession. This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.5 This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot. Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon (2001) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards. Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine.

#### Philosophy So White – phil debate lacks objective means of resolution which uniquely exacerbates gendered and racial biases – empirics prove.

**Cherry and Schwitzgebel 16** [Myisha Cherry is a doctoral student in philosophy at the University of Illinois at Chicago and host of the UnMute podcast. Eric Schwitzgebel is a professor of philosophy at UC Riverside and author of "Perplexities of Consciousness." “Like the Oscars, #PhilosophySoWhite” LA Times, March 4, 2016 https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0306-schwitzgebel-cherry-philosophy-so-white-20160306-story.html]

Academic philosophy in the United States has a diversity problem. No other discipline of comparable size in the humanities is as gender-skewed as philosophy. Women still receive only about 28% of philosophy PhDs in the United States, and are still only about 20% of full professors of philosophy — numbers that have hardly budged since the 1990s. And among U.S. citizens and permanent residents receiving philosophy PhDs in this country, 86% are non-Hispanic white. The only comparably-sized disciplines that are more white are the ones that explicitly focus on the European tradition, such as English literature. Black people are especially difficult to find in academic philosophy. Black people or African Americans constitute 13% of the U.S. population, 7% of PhD recipients across all fields, 2% of PhD recipients in philosophy, and less than 0.5% of authors in the most prominent philosophy journals. One of the main causes of homogeneity in philosophy, we believe, is subjectivity and bias in the evaluation of philosophical quality. What makes some works of philosophy good and others meh? It's not straightforward. In biology, you synthesize the protein or you don't. In math, you prove the long-standing conjecture. It's not always entirely clear in these fields what separates the good from the meh, but there are substantial external standards and constraints. Philosophy, in contrast, is partly about challenging existing standards.

We admire philosophers whose central arguments are nearly impossible to understand, or who speak in paradoxes, who accept seemingly bizarre views, or who display dazzling skill with formal logical structures of no practical significance. Kant and Hegel are better loved than understood. It's almost aesthetic, the assessment of philosophical quality. And like aesthetic judgments, it's shaped by a huge range of factors — how well the view fits with your hopes and preconceptions, whether it's argued with confidence and flair, how clever or wise the author seems, how much other people admire the author. Whether a work is even read as a work of philosophy — rather than literature, religion, or journalism — depends partly on the author's social position and whether its topic and writing style fit disciplinary expectations. Potentially interesting work is disqualified, on unclear grounds, before the question of “good or meh” even arises. Similarly unclear are our grounds for assessing campus speakers and students in the classroom. Whom do you perk up and listen to? Whom do you credit with brilliance and insight? In philosophy, the line between the foolish and the unconventional-but-clever is hard to locate. To a substantial extent, what we assess is whether the person who is expressing the ideas in question sounds smart. If you're going to convince someone to take your perplexing, paradoxical ideas seriously, or if you're going to convince them that your impenetrable prose is worth the struggle, you had better first convince them that you're wicked smart. Being good at seeming smart is perhaps the central disciplinary skill for philosophers. This might explain why no academic discipline is more obsessed with the intelligence of its practitioners than philosophy. The philosopher Sarah-Jane Leslie and her colleagues recently asked faculty, graduate students and postdoctoral fellows from around the country to what extent they thought their discipline required a special aptitude “that just can't be taught.” Philosophers agreed with such statements more than scholars in any other subject area. Unfortunately, seeming smart is not a level playing field. In our culture, white men, especially white men from privileged backgrounds, have a large advantage in displaying the superficial features that attract high expectations. Social psychologists have demonstrated that identical resumes are rated more highly when the applicant is white or male than when the applicant is black or female. Emails from prospective graduate students are more likely to receive a reply if sent by someone with a stereotypically white male name than if sent by a woman or ethnic minority. Interviewers tend to credit black and dark-skinned Latino subjects with less intelligence, even when the interview answers are the same. In a recent study of biology students, anthropology doctoral candidate Daniel Z. Grunspan and colleagues found that male students were perceived by their peers as having a better understanding of the classroom material than their female classmates, even when controlling for grades and outspokenness in class. It's not that white men are innately better philosophers than women and people of color. It's that white men have better command of the cultural apparatus of seeming smart. As undergraduates, they enter the classroom with more self-confidence. They see faces like their own in front of the classroom and hear voices like their own coming from professors' mouths. In the philosophy classroom, they see almost exclusively white men as examples of great philosophers. They think “that's me” and they step into it. Those around them, their professors and fellow students, see them and think that person sounds smart — and these students are then further encouraged. When women and people of color do advance professionally, their colleagues may still not perceive them as sounding especially smart — a problem that's compounded if they decide not to confine themselves to traditional academic approaches. For example, if they choose to write for a popular rather than an academic audience or if they engage with thinkers outside of the mainstream canon. It's a double whammy. Before one writes or opens one's mouth, cultural biases favor white men over others. After the words come out, cultural biases favor a certain style. The next time you're tempted to dismiss a piece of writing—not just a work of philosophy, but any work that requires subjective evaluation — consider that your judgment likely reflects a range of influences that are difficult to see, many of them probably unlovely, culturally specific, and unrelated to intrinsic value.

Two implications:

1. Their scholarship is tainted and you should toss it out – don’t let them leverage their framing against the K as that would beg the question
2. The same mechanisms that produce academic inequality reproduce in-round inequality

#### That cannot be delinked from settler institutions – the settler state is driven by the logic of elimination – the primal drive to expansion that materializes native land dispossession, displacement, and genocide.

Rifkin 14 – Associate Professor of English & WGS @ UNC-Greensboro [Mark, ‘Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance,’ pp. 7-10] mp

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness functions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sover- eignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writ- ing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that

settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collectivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix).

**The alternative is unyielding decolonization—reject any and all attempts at reformism and assimilation**

**Walia ‘12** (Harsha, South Asian organizer and writer based in Vancouver Coast Salish Territories, “Moving Beyond a Politics of Solidarity Towards a Practice of Decolonization,” Jan 5, www.peopleofcolororganize.com/analysis/theory/moving-beyond-politics-solidarity-practice-decolonization/) \*\*\*We don’t endorse ableist language.

Decolonization is as much a process as a goal. It requires a profound re-centring of Indigenous worldviews in our movements for political liberation, social transformation, renewed cultural kinships, **and the development of an economic system that serves rather than threatens our collective life on this planet.** As stated by Toronto-based activist Syed Hussan “Decolonization is a dramatic re-imagining of relationships with land, people and the state. Much of this requires study, it requires conversation, it is a practice, **it is an unlearning**.” It is a positive sign that a growing number of social movements are recognizing that Indigenous self- determination must become the foundation for all our broader social-justice mobilizing. Indigenous peoples are the most impacted by the pillage of lands, experience disproportionate poverty and homelessness, are over-represented in statistics of missing and murdered women, and are the primary targets of repressive policing and prosecutions in the criminal injustice system. Rather than being treated as a single issue within a laundry list of demands, Indigenous self-determination is increasingly understood as intertwined with struggles against racism, poverty, police violence, war and occupation, violence against women, and environmental justice. Intersectional approaches can, however, subordinate and compartmentalize Indigenous struggle within the machinery of existing Leftist narratives: anarchists point to the anti-authoritarian tendencies within Indigenous communities, environmentalists highlight the connection to land that Indigenous communities have, anti-racists subsume Indigenous people into the broader discourse about systemic oppression, and women’s organizations point to relentless violence borne by Indigenous women in discussions about patriarchy. We have to be cautious to avoid replicating the state’s assimilationist model of liberal pluralism, whereby Indigenous identities are forced to fit within our existing groups and narratives. The inherent right to traditional lands and to self-determination is expressed collectively and should not be subsumed within the discourse of individual or human rights. Furthermore, it is imperative to understand being Indigenous as not just an identity but a way of life, which is intricately connected to Indigenous people’s relationship to the land and all its inhabitants. Indigenous struggle cannot simply be accommodated within other struggles; it demands solidarity on its own terms.

### FWRK

#### The role of the ballot should be the team who best deconstructs and combats settler colonialism.

#### You should view the 1ac as a research project, in which we test the represenatations of the aff and the epistemology of the aff.

#### Its better for debate – the aff will never actually happen in the real world, and testing the actual education and representations of the 1ac changes our views of the realworld and allows us to get more education.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for who best centers indigenous scholarship and resistance-- Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

Carlson 16 (Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213) // recut SJ DL

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.**42** Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies.I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoplesand take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broade\_r view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

## Case

### Overview

#### We shouldn’t have to concede either

#### This is nonsensical – us answering more offense is better for critical thinking skills and combats dogmatism – you should have to defend your framework and allows us to test the best framework and arguments

#### Their interp kills neg ground – allows the aff to choose every round and incentives the neg to find a random small framework to defend so the aff has no prep for it or you cant read better offense – on an aff baised topic that magnifies the abuse

#### Theres no impact to this don’t give them one

### underview

#### The role of the judge should be that you use comparative worlds

#### [1] Topic lit – this ignores very good policy, soft left, and K aff ground which moots prep and pigeonholes negative ground to bad frameworks. Makes your 1NC easy because you prepped for these case positions only. That outweighs – pre-round abuse controls internal link to in round

#### [2] Advocacy skills – policymakers don’t act off truth statements; instead, they act off what they determine they should do. Roleplay forces us to advocate for actions and actively engage each other’s’ advocacies – key to make effective decisions is the most lasting and important skill gained through debating.

#### [3] Truth Testing Collapses—we know a statement is true because it creates a better world

#### [4] Resolvability and destroys topic lit

**Mangus** (Michael, “the value-comparison paradigm: a turn away from truth-testing,”)

irresolvable debates. instead of reaching a sortof strategically-skewed synthesis, these two forces instead create debates that leave judges dumbfounded. the affirmative will drop an overview that “proves” the resolution contradictory while the negative will drop a spike that “proves” the resolution tautological. if the judge is lucky, one of these arguments will somehow respond to or undermine the other and a decision can be rendered with some degree of fairness. oftentimes, however, there is no comparison between the arguments and no obvious interaction between them. even in the first case, this is not the pinnacle of substantive debate. in the latter case, it is a direct invitation for judge intervention. this is not isolated to the lower brackets of tournaments either – many high-powered prelims and elimination rounds feature these strategies.

#### [5] Prefer comparative worlds

* 1. **Truth testing devolves – we still have to compare the worlds of truth and falsity**
  2. **Substantive debate – authors write about the topic from a comparative worlds lens – means our model is more educational because it’s the only one that promotes topic discussion– education is good – it’s the only portable impact from debate, we care about what we learn not if we were fair**
  3. **Ground – our model encourages argument innovation and more possibilities for arguments – lets the neg read CPs, Ks, Das which you wouldn’t get under TT**

#### Yes new 2nr theory, paradigm issues or weighing

#### The neg reading pure offense in the 1nc is good – it forces more critical thinking from the aff and allows for more in depth debates

#### The 2ar checks any abuse – it is reciprocal you literally get to weigh in the 2ar – and we should be able to check infinite 1ar abuse

### Fwrk

#### 1. Tailoring objection: maxims can be arbitrarily narrow like "only Aerin Engelstad can steal" which avoids a contradiction and means their framework condemns nothing

#### 2. The inescapability of reason just means we need to provide justifications which we do, doesn’t mean Kantian practical reason

#### 3. Their framework can't avoid regress because we can ask "why must reason be universalizable"

#### 4. There's no way to verify which maxim is derived from any given action so we can't use their framework

#### 5. No uncertainty – we already know that oppression is wrong and you should drop them if they disagree because that makes the debate space exclusionary

#### 6. Not performative: it doesn't need to be a right to freedom just that freedom is sometimes good

#### 7.

#### Intention-focus fails:

#### Non-verifiable: you have no way to ascertain the intention of another agent

#### Doesn’t prescribe action – any action can be taken with any intent, I can give to charity because I want to look good

#### The resolution asks what states ought to do and states lack intent because they’re not one unified agent

#### Intent-focus is oppressive – two links:

#### 1.

#### 2

On Farr:

1. Empirically disproven by Kant’s oppressive views on race, women, and queer people
2. Doesn’t solve because of moral hypocrisy, people can deploy Kant in service of oppression and disregard it when convenient
3. If we win that Kant fails to condemn material violence then this is irrelevant because even if Kant were 100% adhered to it still wouldn’t solve, their own framing says we can’t look to consequences or the real world

On ideal theory:

1. Ideal theory fails because of implicit bias, their arguments are only theoretical but impossible in practice because of the limits of human cognition
2. At best Shelby proves that we need ideal theory at some point but it’s not necessary to take the first step to rectify existing injustices
3. Ideal theory can be used to rationalize any end they want, doesn’t solve oppression because the ideal theory they choose can still allow oppression
4. Universalizability fails because everyone will want their own perspective to be universalized so it collapses

On calc indicts:

1. Nonunique defense, still a risk of offense

**The conflict between non ideal theory – one that accounts for the realities and material conditions of the world – and ideal theory, an abstract ethical approach - Prefer Non-ideal theory. Ideal theory glosses over issues of structural domination – that reifies oppressive power structures. Mills 05:**

Charles W. Mills, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology, 2005

Now what distinguishes ideal theory is not merely the use of ideals, since obviously nonideal theory can and will use ideals also (certainly it will appeal to the moral ideals, if it may be more dubious about the value of invoking idealized human capacities). What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual. As O’Neill emphasizes, this is not a necessary corollary of the operation of abstrac- tion itself, since one can have abstractions of the ideal-as-descriptive-model type that abstract without idealizing. But ideal theory either tacitly represents the actual as a simple deviation from the ideal, not worth theorizing in its own right, or claims that starting from the ideal is at least the best way of realizing it. Ideal theory as an approach will then utilize as its basic apparatus some or all of the following concepts and assumptions (there is necessarily a certain overlap in the list, since they all intersect with one another):¶ • An idealized social ontology. Moral theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will pro- foundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds.¶ • Idealized capacities. The human agents as visualized in the theory will also often have completely unrealistic capacities attributed to them—unrealistic even for the privileged minority, let alone those subordinated in different ways, who would not have had an equal opportunity for their natural capacities to develop, and who would in fact typically be disabled in crucial respects.¶ • Silence on oppression. Almost by definition, it follows from the focus of ideal theory that little or nothing will be said on actual historic oppression and its legacy in the present, or current ongoing oppression, though these may be gestured at in a vague or promissory way (as something to be dealt with later). Correspondingly, the ways in which systematic oppression is likely to shape the¶ Charles W. Mills 169¶ basic social institutions (as well as the humans in those institutions) will not be part of the theory’s concern, and this will manifest itself in the absence of ideal-as-descriptive-model concepts that would provide the necessary macro- and micro-mapping of that oppression, and that are requisite for understanding its reproductive dynamic.¶

**Inclusion is an epistemological prerequisite – oppression is the biggest impact—can’t form moral theories until all those affected are included by it**

### Case proper

#### Vote neg on presumption – mere recognition solves nothing

Mathilde Dorcadie 18 [Mathilde Dorcadie is editor of the French version of Equal Times. For several years she worked as a correspondent for French-language media in Brazil and the Middle East. As a freelance journalist, she worked for Agence France Presse as well as various television channels, magazines and newspapers. “New Index Shows Rising Influence of Giant Firms in Repressive Labor Policies” Equal Times, JUNE 11, 2018 https://inequality.org/research/big-corporations-growing-role-in-regressive-labor-laws-around-the-world/]

“Workers’ right to strike is recognized in virtually every country in the world. The right is even enshrined in the national constitutions of some 90 countries,” notes ITUC deputy president Karl-Petter Thorwaldsson. And yet, according to the Global Rights Index, violations of the right to strike were recorded in 87 percent of the countries studied in 2017.

#### Their gourevitch evidence is ABOUT CLASS OPPRESSION – I want to make it perfectly clear that it makes no claims about the increase in movements rather makes the claim that you can do more strikes ig and that can fight some forms of domination – don’t let them claim it’s a link turn

#### Moreover – gourevitch doesn’t even say that it can destroy capitalism – only says that it can give workers more power in capitalism

#### 1] Domination is irrelevant under Kantian freedom which only protects rights not interests – specifically true in the context of employers

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However, Pettit’s notion of non-domination does not accurately track the Kantian idea of external freedom or independence. More specifically, the independence protected by people’s external freedom is independence with respect to their sphere of protected rights, not independence from others tout court. To see this, let us look a little closer at the textual evidence that can be brought to bear on this question. The first is Kant’s statement of the innate right of humanity: Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity. (6:237) The second is Kant’s statement that the freedom in which he is interested is external, concerned only with outward actions: The concept of right, insofar as it is related to an obligation corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of right), has to do, first, only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other. (6:230) Stilz and Ripstein read the parenthetical clause in Kant’s statement of the innate right of humanity as identifying the essence of external freedom: independence from the choices of others. This is highly reminiscent of freedom as non-domination in various ways. First, like Kantian external freedom, nondomination is importantly relational. Person B dominates person A if B has the ability to interfere on arbitrary grounds with certain choices A is in a position to make, where B’s interference counts as arbitrary if B’s decision does not track A’s interests and beliefs or is not constrained to do so. 27 Second, non-domination is “external” in just the way Kantian freedom requires: it refers to the absence of the capacity of others to interfere with one’s choices.28 Third, non-domination captures the sense in which Kantian freedom consists in the absence of dependence on the wills of others: B’s capacity of interference makes A’s choices in a very real sense dependent on B’s decisions. And finally, nondomination requires more than the mere absence of actual interference by others. One is still importantly unfree if another has the opportunity to interfere with one’s decision. 29 Kant, of course, did not accept either that freedom would be sufficiently protected if it were enjoyed as a mere matter of contingency: it must be guaranteed. Nevertheless, there are important differences between the two ideas. Non-domination is at the same time too broad and too narrow to correctly identify Kantian external freedom. Non-domination is too broad because it captures situations that are not condemned by external freedom. Independence is an essential element of Kantian external freedom, but it is not equivalent to it. Being externally free is not being completely independent of others. Second, non-domination is too narrow because violations of Kantian freedom need not involve domination. Let us take these in turn. First, Kantian freedom is not independence tout court. It is the freedom that the state is supposed to protect. As we indicated, the protection of this freedom consists in the guarantee that each enjoys a right to the objects or actions he legitimately possesses. The freedom to be protected in the civil condition is something we can enjoy, concerning mine and thine, as a protected sphere of choice relative to our rights (a sphere we are guaranteed to enjoy by the poverty-proviso). Only when an object or an action is thus protected are we entitled to independence from the will of others. There are many situations when we will not be independent of the choices of others but where those choices will not invade our freedom. We are not entitled to live our lives solely on our terms, as if we were islands isolated from society. And we are not entitled, therefore to enlist the state to prevent the choices of others from affecting our lives either. This interpretation of independence as a relative notion is supported by Kant’s text. Kant at no point treats independence tout court as a goal of the state or the public condition. He rarely mentions the idea of independence as such, and in the only extended discussion (of “civil independence”) Kant explicitly denies that the state ought to ensure or promote the independence of all. There, Kant distinguishes between “active” citizens (who are independent), and “passive” citizens (who are not). He writes that “in general, anyone whose preservation in existence (his being fed and protected) depends not on his management of his own business but on arrangements made by another (except the state). All these people lack civil personality” (6:314), and concludes that such persons cannot partake in the public decision-making about how the republic is to be governed. Only those who can offer their goods in the marketplace, or are employed by the state, can (as “active” citizens). Crucially, whatever else one might think of that peculiar passage, Kant at no point suggests that the condition of passive citizenship is in itself wrongful. Instead, he refuses to treat dependent persons as active citizens because he thinks that they cannot make political choices. Passive citizens should not have the vote, not because their condition is incompatible with Kant’s idea of external freedom, but because they are not capable of freely deciding for themselves. For Kant, those who directly depend on others for their income cannot be trusted to choose for themselves; their votes can be controlled too easily by those on whom they depend economically. For this reason, passive citizens are owed, not coercive rectification of their condition or positive assistance by the state, but only that “whatever sort of positive laws the citizens might vote for, these laws must still not be contrary to the natural laws of freedom and of the equality of everyone in the people corresponding to this freedom, namely that anyone can work his way up from this passive condition to an active one.” (6:315, our emphasis) The lesson from this passage is this. In life we suffer many setbacks and disabilities. We may experience material needs, we are at times vulnerable and impotent, and often at the mercy of someone else’s choices. These misfortunes are surely a matter of moral concern: they may inhibit our ability to choose as autonomous creatures and generate in others moral duties of charity. However, they do not, by themselves, qualify as violations of our external freedom. For it is only when others violate our rights

, and thereby violate our independence in the sense relevant here, or when we fall below the threshold of the poverty-proviso, that Kantian freedom is imperiled. Where this is not the case, we should resort to our own reserves of strength and ingenuity (“work our way up”) and sometimes, alas, hope that others will assist us. The difference between freedom-as-non-domination and Kantian external freedom can be illustrated by the following example, offered by Pettit. 30 Consider a wealthy employer who is legally permitted to hire and fire his employees at will. He can interfere with the choices of his employees by removing their current stream of income. The employer does not have to take the interests of his employees into account when deciding to keep them or fire them. The employees have no legal recourse against that decision, nor do they have the bargaining power to force the employer to take their interests into account. Thus, the employer has the arbitrary (in the sense of discretionary) ability to fire them. Pettit may be correct that this employer dominates his employees. However, as long as the firing procedure does not violate the coercion-principle, and as long as the employees remain above the threshold established by the poverty-proviso, the firing would not qualify as a violation of their external freedom. The employer would violate their external freedom only if the labor contracts specified protections against layoffs. By contrast, the employees’ inability to live their lives securely on their own terms does not qualify, in itself, as a violation of their Kantian freedom, even if their limited options involves serious costs to them and their families.

#### 2] This is a consequentialist argument: it depends on recognition of the right to strike having the consequence of altering the power imbalance between worker and employer which is an empirical claim irrelevant under their framing

#### 3] They need to win that the means are legitimate – giving workers the power to murder the boss’ family would alter the power dynamic but would violate rights so it would be illegitimate under Kant – this means the turns are a side-constraint

#### 4] This only justifies striking in certain conditions – if employers were not dominating their employee in any way then a right to strike would be an unnecessary restriction on freedom with no overriding benefits – means that this doesn’t justify an unconditional right