### cp- UBI

#### A just government should implement a universal basic income.

**UBI solves for power imbalances between the workers and employers**

**Pettit 7** Philip Pettit (Laurence S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University). “A Republican Right to Basic Income?” Basic Income Studies. Vol 2, Issue 2. December 2007. https://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/2008/A%20Republican%20Right%20to%20Basic%20Income.pdf

The argument is straightforward. Others will control me, if only in the merely invigilatory fashion, only to the extent that the division of powers between us means that they can interfere with me at will – that is, without prevention – and at tolerable cost, i.e. with a degree of impunity. If I am not assured a basic income, there will be many areas where the wealthier could interfere with me at tolerable cost, without their being confronted by legal prevention of that interference. Suppose there are just a few employers and many available employees, and that times are hard. In those conditions I and those who like me will not be able to command a decent wage: a wage that will enable us to function properly in society. And in those conditions it will be equally true that we would be defenseless against our employers’ petty abuse or their power to arbitrarily dismiss us. Other protections, such as those that strong trade unions might provide, are possible against such alien control. But the most effective of all protections, and one that should complement other measures available, would be one’s ability to leave employment and fall back on a basic wage available unconditionally from the state. Next suppose that you live in conditions where you, and perhaps your children, depend financially on your husband. In such conditions he is likely to control you, even though he never resorts to violence or other abuse. He may let you act as you please within certain limits, while being disposed to stop you – at the limit, by leaving you – if you breach those limits. You would live under your husband’s control, almost certainly straining to keep within his restrictions, unless there is an effective, financially viable alternative such as that which a basic income would provide. Other protections may be available here as in the first case – for example, he may be legally required to provide maintenance should you separate – but these are unlikely to be equally effective and in any case they will be powerfully supplemented by a basic income. Such examples show it to be entirely plausible that promoting the resilient, republican possession of basic liberties argues for establishing a legal right to a basic income. Such a right would mean that people had adequate income for functioning properly in society. And that income would mean that people would not have to beg the favour of the powerful, or even of the counter-clerk.

### da - trade

#### Trade is stable and growing---governments are avoiding protectionism, the key threat

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Global supply chains have weathered the pandemic intact, and the deep recession has not unleashed a wave of protectionism. That is good for global trade, and probably for foreign direct investment, too, and suggests that predictions of globalization’s demise were premature.

Trade is recovering robustly alongside the upticks in growth in major economies. This good news deserves more attention. Less than 12 months ago, many observers were predicting an end to globalization. The pandemic disrupted supply chains, and governments, suddenly confronted with the resulting vulnerabilities and dependencies, encouraged “reshoring” production of critical goods.

Today, the outlook is much brighter. There is little indication of a sustained movement away from global supply chains. And many governments have realized that trade is more of an opportunity than a threat to national sovereignty. As a result, the World Trade Organization expects the volume of global trade to increase by 8% in 2021, more than offsetting last year’s 5.3% decline.

True, foreign direct investment (FDI) still lags, having plummeted 42% in 2020. Europe actually recorded a negative flow. But the pandemic’s differential impact on trade and investment is not surprising. Transporting goods around the world requires little physical human interaction. Giant cranes, often remotely operated, load and unload containers, and supertankers pump oil ashore.

In contrast, acquiring a firm or establishing a new production facility in another country requires travel to meet potential partners, and in many cases close contact with foreign governments to obtain permits. Pandemic-induced border closures and travel restrictions obviously made this much more difficult.

But FDI is notoriously volatile, often plunging one year and recovering the next, so it could still bounce back strongly in 2021. In fact, the OECD has already detected signs of a recovery.

Moreover, global supply chains have proved to be less vulnerable than many had feared. The notion of a “supply chain” conjures up an image of a fragile arrangement, with each enterprise depending on inputs from the adjacent link. And a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

The global trading system’s vulnerability to choke points seemed to be driven home in March, when a single large freighter blocked the Suez Canal, after sandstorms restricted visibility and transformed the huge stack of containers on board into sails. But this incident, which was resolved relatively quickly, is not representative of how global trade works.

It is more accurate to talk of interrelated networks of suppliers than supply chains. Most enterprises have more than one supplier of key components, and multinational companies with operations in many countries source supplies from many other countries. The pandemic has reinforced multi-sourcing, rather than triggering a retrenchment from the division of labor.

Yes, governments almost everywhere have interfered with trade during the pandemic to address acute shortages of key products, such as personal protective equipment in 2020 and COVID-19 vaccines during the first few months of 2021. But both of these products, while vital in the context of the pandemic, play only a marginal role in the wider economy. The rich countries could vaccinate the entire world for less than a dollar a week from each citizen.

The main danger is that governments, fearing similar dependence on foreign suppliers for many other key products, introduce protectionist measures. Prompted by the EU’s concern that such dependence could leave the bloc vulnerable to political pressures from hostile governments, the European Commission has recently completed a fascinating study of strategic dependencies and capacities.

#### Unions cause protectionism – that slows growth and causes tariffs

Epstein 16 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Rise of American Protectionism." https://www.hoover.org/research/rise-american-protectionism]

This point explains why the American labor movement has historically opposed free trade. The essence of unionism is, and always will be, the acquisition of monopoly power. There is no way for a union to obtain that monopoly power in the marketplace. It can only secure it through legislation. The first step in that process was the exemption of unions from the antitrust laws under Section 6 of the Clayton Act of 1914. The second major step was the legitimation of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which gave the union the exclusive bargaining rights against the firm once it was successful in a union election. These major statutory benefits strengthened private sector unions and imposed inefficiencies on unionized firms. This, in turn, opened the field for new firms, like the Japanese automobile companies, to organize outside the union envelope. In response, labor’s strategy went one step further. It pushed hard on trade and tariff barriers to keep out foreign imports, and exerted political influence to encourage local zoning boards to exclude new businesses that do not use union labor. Add to these issues the aggressive rise of minimum wage laws and other mandates like Obamacare and family leave statutes, and you construct a regulatory fortress that defeats the corrective forces of free trade and renders the nation less economically resilient and productive than before.

It is easy to say that people are “screwed” by free trade if you only look at the stories of those individuals who lose their jobs. It is much more difficult to make that case after taking into account the simple but powerful truth that overall levels of profitability and wealth increase under free trade. The short-term relief that targeted groups get from protectionist measures mask the larger inefficiencies that slow down the rate of growth. Despite what the Democrats think, transfer programs are no substitute for growth. Indeed, the imposition of new taxes without return benefits on the firms taxed only depresses the rate of return on investment further, which will necessarily compound the problem.

#### New trade conflicts cause global war and undermine cooperation on collective action problems

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Four structural forces will shape the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the “non-westernization of IR”3); and secular economic stagnation, a product of longer term global decline in birth rates combined with aging populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. Environmental events, global health challenges, internal political developments, policy mistakes, technology breakthroughs or failures, will intersect with structure to define our future. But these four structural forces will impact the way states behave, in the capacity of great powers to manage their differences, and to act collectively to settle, rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade.

Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity (inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president. 7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9

But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10

Secular Stagnation

This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations, accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call “secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains:

…rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result.

Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth…

This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible.

…in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development.

Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates.

Illiberal Globalization

Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically pro- Trump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them.

What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18

As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end.

Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods:

We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20

The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the pre- World War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present:

Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago.

…In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports.

…The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable.

…the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry.

Furthermore, powerful structural forces are working against liberal hegemony and in favor of offshore balancing. China’s rise and the partial revival of Russian power are forcing the United States to pay closer attention to balance-of-power politics, especially in Asia. The intractable problems of the Middle East will make future presidents reluctant to squander more blood and treasure there especially in chasing the siren song of democracy promotion. Pressure on the defense budget is unlikely to diminish, especially once the costs of climate change begin to bite, and because trillions of dollars' worth of domestic needs cry out for attention.

For these reasons, the foreign policy elite will eventually rediscover the grand strategy that helped build and sustain American power over most of the nations history. The precise path remains uncertain, and it will probably take longer to get there than it should. But the destination is clear. 5\*'

### da – military

#### The right to strike undermines militaries.

LYNNETTE PETA TERRIE HEINECKEN 97 [“THE SOLDIER AS EMPLOYEE: THE COMPATIBILITY OF LABOUR RIGHTS WITH MILITARY SERVICE” Dissertation presented to the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities in fulfilment for the degree of Masters in Social Science, Department of Sociology, University of Cape Town. 1997]

Given the structure and function of the armed forces, the transition to a pluralist approach to labour relations which implies the support for principles of freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike, is fraught with difficulties. As a function of a union is to present an interest group (the bargaining unit) in competition with the established authority (management), it poses a problem to military leadership which requires cohesion amongst all levels within the armed forces. Union membership also entails intent to challenge the decisions of management and to challenge the authority of management to make those decisions (Hallenbeck, 1977:239). Yet, one of the fundamental requirements of the military profession is the need for discipline, unquestioning obedience and the acceptance of authority.

#### Causes war – two internal links:

#### A] Shifts in the balance of power lead to war – consensus of the lit

Kroenig and Gopalaswamy 18 [Matthew Kroenig is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. His most recent book is The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy. Bharath Gopalaswamy is the director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. He holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin. "Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 12, 2018 https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/]

Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory [which] identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage.

#### B] Military weakness leads to opportunistic invasions.

Michael Edward Brown 96 [Michael E. Brown is an American academic. He formerly served as Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs of the George Washington University, where he currently serves as Professor of International Affairs, Political Science, and Gender Studies. The international dimensions of internal conflict. No. 10. Mit Press, 1996. Pg. 598-599. Google Books.]

OPPORTUNISTIC INVASIONS. Fifth and last, neighboring states take advantage of the momentary weakness caused by internal turmoil to launch an invasion of a rival. Internal conflicts create windows of opportunity for neighboring states, which they often exploit. The difference between an "opportunistic intervention" and an "opportunistic invasion" is mainly a matter of degree and form: in the former, neighboring states support rebel forces and engage in proxy wars while trying to maintain an innocent public facade; in the latter, they launch full-scale military assaults using their own forces and make a less credible pretense about their intentions. Examples of opportunistic inter-state invasions include the Syrian invasion of Jordan during the latter's civil war in 1970. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 had defensive and protective elements, but was also driven by opportunistic calculations. [and] The Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Shah, also fits into this category.

#### Its an existential risk.

Schmidt and Juijn 21 [Andreas T. Schmidt, Faculty of Philosophy, Centre for PPE, University of Groningen; Daan Juijn, CE Delft, Delft, the Netherlands “Economic inequality and the long-term future” Global Priorities Institute | May 2021 https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Inequality-and-the-Long-Term-Future\_Andreas-Schmidt-and-Daan-Juijn-reupload.pdf]

So, good social and institutional conditions could help reduce existential risk. Consider next how, conversely, bad conditions might increase existential risk. A key driver of existential risk is conflict, both between and within nation-states (or what (Ord 2020, 175–79) calls a ‘risk factor’). Conflicts and arms races raise human-induced existential risks such as nuclear war, the outbreak of a bioengineered virus or the launch of misaligned artificial intelligence. Note that an existential catastrophe could be set in motion either purposefully or accidentally. Both are more likely during conflict. Nuclear warheads, cyberweapons, and bioweapons could all be used purposefully to attack enemy states, leading to potential global escalation. But as past nuclear incidents and close calls during the Cold War show, arms races also increase the probability of accidental catastrophes (Schlosser 2013).

#### 2] War destroys civilization and causes massive structural violence and oppression

**Barry Levy and Victor Sidel, professors of medicine, in War and Public Health, 2007:** /Barry Levy and Victor Sidel 2007 (Adjunct proft @ Tufts and prof of social medicine at the Albert Einstein Medical College) “Preface” War and Public Health Edited by Barry Levy and Victor Sidel pg. ix/

War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases combined. It destroys families, communities, and sometimes whole cultures. It directs scarce resources away from protection and promotion of health, medical care, and other human services. It destroys the infrastructure that supports health. It limits human rights and contributes to social injustice. It leads many people to think that violence is the only way to resolve conflicts—a mindset that contributes to domestic violence, street crime, and other kinds of violence. And it contributes to the destruction of the environment and overuse of nonrenewable resources. In sum, war threatens much of the fabric of our civilization.

### fwrk

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. To clarify hededonistic act utilitarianism

#### 1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 3] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### **4] Extinction first**

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

## Case

### fwrk

#### c/a our warrants on our framework – they all answer this

#### Util is key to correct for the cognitive biases their evidence describes.

Andrew Scott **Conning 15 summarizes** ["Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them" Journal of Moral Education, Volume 44, 2015 - Issue 1, 2015 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057240.2015.1012365]

This is an ambitious book. In 400 pages, Joshua Greene attempts both philosophically and scientifically to demonstrate that utilitarianism is an adequate ‘meta-morality’ for adjudicating among the conflicting moralities of diverse cultural communities. Greene methodically builds his case in several prolonged steps. First, he demonstrates that our brains are wired for dividing people into ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ and that this creates biases in our moral thinking. Next he shows that the moral brain is a dual-process system that can work both at a fast, gut-level mode (which works well for intragroup cooperation but generates ingroup-preferential bias) and at a slow, analytical mode (which can overcome this bias). He argues on the basis of abundant neuroscientific research on ethical reasoning that our fast, instinctive mode is biologically adapted for intragroup, but not intergroup, cooperation. On this basis he concludes that moral intuition is an adequate guide within intracommunal ethical settings resembling those prevalent in our evolutionary past, whereas deliberative moral reasoning is needed for resolving conflicts arising between group moralities, where instinctive thinking hinders us with self-preferential bias. Greene claims that a ‘deep’ version of utilitarianism (‘deep pragmatism’) is better suited than other conceivable moral philosophies to fill the adjudicating role when different communal moralities come into conflict. He supports this claim with the philosophical argument that ‘maximizing happiness’ is a goal that all moralities can accept and with empirical evidence that utilitarian thinking is the ‘native philosophy’ of rational human thought—more rational than the standard rights-oriented alternative (p. 194). To support the latter point, he uses evidence from brain studies to attempt to establish that utilitarian reasoning occurs when people think deliberatively, whereas Kantian rights-based reasoning is associated with the types of automatic, emotion-based judgments people make when they have little opportunity to think. Greene closes by presenting meticulous defenses and applications of his philosophy, which are bound to sharpen people’s views of utilitarianism even if only to hone their critiques of it.

### Definitions

#### As an observation, the affirmative must defend a right to strike without restrictions.

**Vogt et al. 20 explains** [Vogt, Jeffrey, et al. The right to strike in international law. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020.]

Together, the national constitutions, laws and judicial decisions, the aforementioned UN covenants and instruments and opinions of regional human rights tribunals, as well as the voluminous jurisprudence of the ILO, lend further support to the claim of a customary norm. We do not maintain that these and other indications of international consensus on the right to strike create an absolute right under customary international law. Between an unconditional right to strike and an absolute prohibition, the international community has converged on a general principle of the right to strike within reasonable limits. These limits are precisely those which have been articulated by the ILO Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association, which are the competent bodies, per their respective mandates, to set the parameters of the customary law norm on the right to strike. Recall again that Article 9 of Convention 87, concerning the police and the armed forces, is the only article of that Convention that explicitly delegates to national governments the regulation of the scope of the right to freedom of association, and by extension the right to strike. The most recent, thorough examination of the scope of the right to strike and its permissible limits is found in the Committee of Experts' 2012 General Survey As the Committee then explained: Over and above the armed forces and the police, the members of which may be excluded from the scope of the Convention in general, other restrictions on the right to strike may relate to: (i) certain categories of public servants; (ii) essential services in the strict sense of the term; and (iii) situations of acute national or local crisis, although only for a limited period and solely to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the situation. In these cases, compensatory guarantees should be provided for the workers who are thus deprived of the right to strike.

#### Thus, proving that there ought to be limitations on the right to strike as outlined in my Vogt card is sufficient for me to win the round.

#### Any other interpretation is arbitrary – it allows them to spike out of any offense saying that they don’t have to defend it – this kills neg generics and fairness

### Case

#### Vote neg on presumption –recognition solves nothing

Mathilde Dorcadie 18 [Mathilde Dorcadie is editor of the French version of Equal Times. For several years she worked as a correspondent for French-language media in Brazil and the Middle East. As a freelance journalist, she worked for Agence France Presse as well as various television channels, magazines and newspapers. “New Index Shows Rising Influence of Giant Firms in Repressive Labor Policies” Equal Times, JUNE 11, 2018 https://inequality.org/research/big-corporations-growing-role-in-regressive-labor-laws-around-the-world/]

“Workers’ right to strike is recognized in virtually every country in the world. The right is even enshrined in the national constitutions of some 90 countries,” notes ITUC deputy president Karl-Petter Thorwaldsson. And yet, according to the Global Rights Index, violations of the right to strike were recorded in 87 percent of the countries studied in 2017.

#### Strikes fail due to cost.

Marianne Garneau 19 [Marianne Garneau is a labor educator and organizer with the historic IWW, Industrial Workers of the World. She’s the publisher of the website Organizing.Work. “WHY DON’T STRIKES ACHIEVE MORE?” Organizing.Work, May 1, 2019 https://organizing.work/2019/05/why-dont-strikes-achieve-more/]

There are a number of factors that contain how effective strikes can be, and impel unions to settle them. For one thing, they are expensive. If a union is providing even minimal strike pay, it needs a war chest of millions of dollars to be able to support even a few hundred workers. Strikes drain union coffers, and they take a financial, physical, and emotional toll on workers as well, who aren’t usually earning as much in strike pay as they would on the job, while getting yelled at or hit by cars or freezing on the picket line. Quite often, strikes don’t succeed in completely shutting down a business, not least because employers can legally hire scabs. The product may suffer, and employers may take a hit, but they can hobble along (while draining the union’s bank account). (A note on the alleged $100 million loss suffered by Stop & Shop during the recent strike, which leftists also celebrated: that figure was put out by the employer, and is more than double an estimate put forward by an industry analyst. We should always remain skeptical about boss communications. In this case, they may be crying poverty to get workers to sign the proposed collective agreement.) Sometimes strikes end because of government intervention, as when workers are legislated back to work, or fired en masse. Less dramatically, the government can intervene to bring about some kind of settlement in the form of binding arbitration. Sometimes employers even goad unions into striking, knowing what a heavy toll strikes take. If an employer knows they can weather a strike much better than the union, they are perfectly incentivized to provoke one and starve the union out.

#### Workers do have bargaining power through the freedom to quit.

Julian Adorney 15 [Julian Adorney is a Young Voices Advocate and senior SEO analyst for Colorado SEO Pros. His writing has appeared in a number of outlets, including The Federalist, Fox Nation, The Hill, and the Mises Institute. “Employment Is Nothing Like Slavery” Mises.org 10/21/2015 https://mises.org/library/employment-nothing-slavery]

The comparison ignores the power of employees. They can leave a company whenever they want, and wielding that power can leave their former employers in a bind. In a small company or a busy firm, an employee who quits can leave the company without the manpower to meet its obligations. If an accountant suddenly quits H&R Block during tax season, he'll leave their franchise struggling to make up lost ground. Even in a big firm like Amazon, employees who leave suddenly cost their bosses money. According to the liberal-leaning Center for American Progress, the turnover costs for employees earning under $50,000 per year averages 20 percent of that employee's annual salary. These costs incentivize employers to retain staff, and grants bargaining power to employees.

#### All the benefits from strikes are swamped by inflation.

Stephen Moore 21 [co-founded and served as president of the Club for Growth from 1999 to 2004. Moore is a former member of the Wall Street Journal editorial board. He worked at the Heritage Foundation during the period from 1983 to 1987 and again since 2014. “Stephen Moore: Will all of America go on strike?” Post-Gazette, October 27, 2021 https://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2021/10/27/Stephen-Moore-Will-all-of-America-go-on-strike/stories/202110270040]

Here’s the vicious cycle we could be looking at in due time. Inflation means higher prices at the stores, which means workers want higher pay, which means companies have higher costs, which means the firms have to raise their prices further. And the process repeats. Six percent inflation could snowball into 8% to 10% inflation by the end of the year. Yikes. History proves that mismanagement of the money supply and a dollar that loses value causes convulsions in the labor market. E.J. Antoni, an economist at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, recently ran the numbers. Annual inflation spiked to 7.9% for 1951, and a record 470 strikes occurred the following year. In the late 1960s, inflation rose to 5.4%, and the number of strikes rose above 400 in a single year. But as price volatility moderated starting in the Ronald Reagan years, so did strikes. A stable dollar that was “as good as gold” retained its value and allowed labor and management to reach mutually agreeable contracts on wage increases. From 1947 to 1982, a period of many strikes, inflation rose and fell wildly, with the annual rate changing as much as 8.7 percentage points in a single year and having a 14.5 percentage point range from -1% to 13.5%. Suddenly, it feels as though we are in a “Back to the Future” sequel with Michael J. Fox. Rising prices and a slowdown in the economy — the worst of all worlds. I predict that there will be many more strikes in the months ahead. Unions will flex their muscles in part because they have Joe Biden in the White House, who genuflects in front of the union bosses who spent hundreds of millions of dollars on his campaign. President Ronald Reagan famously fired illegally striking air traffic controllers in 1981. Does anyone believe Mr. Biden would ever have the backbone to do that? Bottlenecks now squeeze a supply chain that was once the hallmark of American economic efficiency at every turn. It’s getting worse, and the unions and their rank-and-file workers paying higher bills aren’t happy. Nor should they be. History shows that strikes are a form of mutually assured destruction. Both sides generally lose in the long term from work stoppages — and so does America.

#### Strike funds aren’t enough for workers

Hamilton Nolan 21 [HAMILTON NOLAN is a labor reporter for In These Times. He has spent the past decade writing about labor and politics for Gawker, Splinter, The Guardian, and elsewhere. “We Need a Big National Strike Fund” In These Times, JULY 27, 2021 https://inthesetimes.com/article/national-strike-fund-frito-lay-miners-nurses-labor-unions]

The pandemic was a galvanizing event for the half or so of the working population who saw, in a very tangible way, that their lives are considered disposable. Right now, we can look across the country and see some of the upswells of worker anger that have burst forth into strikes: the nurses in Massachusetts, the miners in Alabama, the Spectrum workers in New York whose endless battle drags grimly on. These high profile strikes, to a large extent, define union power in the public mind. Winning them is important not just for the workers on the picket line, but for the entire labor movement. And, when strikes are very hard, their biggest vulnerability is the simple reality that workers on the picket line are not getting paid — the brutal economic calculus that ultimately defines how long and hard people can fight before they need to settle. Individual unions do have strike funds, but these are meager — often, union members can expect to get a few hundred bucks from a strike fund in the time they might have gotten a few thousand from work. Strike funds [and] will always pay less than wages. (A little math can help demonstrate why: In Alabama, for example, 1,100 miners have been on strike for four months. If the United Mine Workers paid each of them even a thousand dollars a week, they would have already spent more than $50 million. To guarantee that rate of compensation for every strike would rapidly bankrupt most unions, and would create an incentive for unions to push hard against big strikes by members.) But the strength of the labor movement is about thinking collectively in the largest possible sense. If we want to encourage more big, high profile strikes that can carry on long enough to secure major gains, we have to have a big, national strike fund.

#### Alternatives to striking

Hästbacka and Falk 21 [Rasmus Hästbacka and Kristian Falk of the Swedish syndicalist union SAC (Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation, or Central Organization of the Workers of Sweden) “LET’S FIND ALTERNATIVES TO STRIKING” Organizing.Work November 8, 2021 https://organizing.work/2021/11/lets-find-alternatives-to-striking/]

Below we provide a selection of alternatives to striking that also help build up the capacity to strike. The alternatives can be categorized into four different types of pressure: moral, psychological, economic, and legal. 1) Moral pressure Applying moral pressure means that workers appeal to the bosses’ will to do the right thing according to their own moral perception, or the will to be perceived as fair in the eyes of the staff. Some examples of this are questioning decisions at staff meetings, conducting surveys among employees and criticizing management’s actions in a union workplace paper. The moral pressure becomes a kind of punishment through shaming of the bosses. Of course, it often happens that bosses do not care that they are perceived as unfair. Some have no shame. Then the moral pressure does not bite, but perhaps psychological pressure will do the trick. 2) Psychological pressure Psychological pressure is about creating inconveniences for shameless bosses, to create a stressful situation for them. One example is to issue union warnings to bosses who have treated colleagues badly. According to Swedish labor law, legally only employers can issue discipline. But that does not prevent the union from giving written warnings to bosses and making that warning visible to all employees. Another example is to strike a wedge between bosses. Employees can try to ally with bosses who are receptive to workers’ demands against negative bosses. The workforce can also visit higher-level executives to persuade them to put pressure on lower-level executives. Another variant of psychological pressure is to distance oneself from management. The bosses are then made to understand that workers do not want to deal with them until they have come to their senses. Some examples are boycotting the company party, arranging Christmas dinners without bosses or skipping a company trip. 3) Economic pressure To exercise economic pressure means that workers reduce the employer’s revenue or drive up the costs, but not only that. It can also mean throwing gravel into management’s machinery. How can this be done? One method is work-to-rule. This means following current rules in the workplace to the letter so that work is delayed. Another method is sometimes called union outsourcing. This means that you pressure an employer by influencing another employer who has some connection to the first employer. An example may be that a labor conflict arises at a cleaning company that is hired by other companies. The management of the cleaning company may be pressured by a union notice to the customer businesses. The most well-known forms of economic pressure are strikes and blockades. While strikes usually mean stopping all work, a blockade means refusing to perform certain parts of the labor process. It is also called partial industrial action in Swedish labor law. Blockades occur in many forms: refusing overtime, refusing certain work tasks or tools, refusing business trips, blocking the transfer of labor power between different workplaces within the same company, refusing to deliver goods to certain companies and blocking the employment of new labor power (in Swedish: nyanställningsblockad). To block the employment of new labor power is an appeal for solidarity directed at jobseekers. They are urged not to accept employment in the workplace until the conflict is resolved. Jobseekers then have a right to neutrality, according to Swedish law, which means that the Public Employment Service must not direct jobseekers to that workplace. A method called the good strike or good blockade has occurred in the service sector. This means that employees provide the user or consumer side with a better or cheaper service at the employer’s expense. This can be done, for example, by employees only performing tasks close to the customer and ignoring other tasks. Struggle through unions is a struggle of producers. It can be combined with consumer actions, provided that producers call for such actions. Consumer boycott is a well-known method, but its opposite is less known. The opposite is called a union label in English. This means that unions certify employers who live up to certain requirements and recommend consumers buy from them. 4) Legal pressure Legal pressure, finally, may become relevant when employers break laws and agreements. According to Swedish labor law, legal pressure is exerted mainly through private enforcement. The union then activates a collective bargaining process about the legal dispute on the basis of the Co-determination Act (in Swedish abbreviated: MBL – Medbestämmandelagen). The union demands that a certain rule be followed under the threat of a lawsuit to the Labour Court. However, it is best if the workforce can retain control of the case in the workplace and combine legal pressure with other types of pressure.

#### The right to strike necessarily causes harm – this means it can’t be unconditional

**Loewy 2000**, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

#### Nurse’s strikes kill patients – this outweighs

**Wright 10** Sarah H. Wright July 2010 "Evidence on the Effects of Nurses' Strikes" <https://www.nber.org/digest/jul10/evidence-effects-nurses-strikes> (Researcher at National Bureau of Economic Research)

U.S. hospitals were excluded from collective bargaining laws for three decades longer than other sectors because of fears that strikes by nurses might imperil patients' health. Today, while unionization has been declining in general, it is growing rapidly in hospitals, with the number of unionized workers rising from 679,000 in 1990 to nearly one million in 2008. In Do Strikes Kill? Evidence from New York State (NBER Working Paper No. 15855), co-authors Jonathan Gruber and Samuel Kleiner carefully examine the effects of nursing strikes on patient care and outcomes. The researchers match data on nurses' strikes in New York State from 1984 to 2004 to data on hospital discharges, including information on treatment intensity, patient mortality, and hospital readmission. They conclude that nurses' strikes were costly to hospital patients: in-hospital mortality increased by 19.4 percent and hospital readmissions increased by 6.5 percent for patients admitted during a strike. Among their sample of 38,228 such patients, an estimated 138 more individuals died than would have without a strike, and 344 more patients were readmitted to the hospital than if there had been no strike. "Hospitals functioning during nurses' strikes do so at a lower quality of patient care," they write. Still, at hospitals experiencing strikes, the measures of treatment intensity -- that is, the length of hospital stay and the number of procedures performed during the patient's stay -- show no significant differences between striking and non-striking periods. Patients appear to receive the same intensity of care during union work stoppages as during normal hospital operations. Thus, the poor outcomes associated with strikes suggest that they might reduce hospital productivity. These poor health outcomes increased for both emergency and non-emergency hospital patients, even as admissions of both groups decreased by about 28 percent at hospitals with strikes. The poor health outcomes were not apparent either before or after the strike in the striking hospitals, suggesting that they are attributable to the strike itself. And, the poor health outcomes do not appear to do be due to different types of patients being admitted during strike periods, because patients admitted during a strike are very similar to those admitted during other periods. Hiring replacement workers apparently does not help: hospitals that hired replacement workers performed no better during strikes than those that did not hire substitute employees. In each case, patients with conditions that required intensive nursing were more likely to fare worse in the presence of nurses' strikes.

#### They say theres a difficult issue defining – but we can, i.e being specific

#### Life comes before freedom – takes away their freedom