# **Queerness**

### **Frwk- t shell**

#### **My interpretation is that the resolution should only define the division of affirmative and negative ground and be the only thing we can garner offense from. It was *negotiated* and *announced in advance*, providing both sides with a reasonable opportunity to prepare to engage one another’s arguments.**

#### **This does *not* require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, a call to tell you not to speak about your identity, or an assumption about the role of the judge —the *topic* is a limit on CONTENT to determine the debate’s subject matter.**

#### **Violation: They say in cx that they dont defend the rez**

#### **Vote neg**

#### **1] Predictable limits – absent topical constraints affirmative there is no stasis point for neg preparation which means we can’t predictably research your affirmative since there are thousands of literatures bases you could choose to base your affirmative on. That outweighs – a) you can dedicate 4 years to learning one literature base creating a structural skew to debaters who switch topics every 2 months and b) you can cherry pick advocacies like “racism is bad” which makes contesting the aff psychologically violent and they can always revise their aff to de-link from the few generics that are responsive.**

#### **2] Clash – the topic delineates aff and neg ground on an issue that allows in depth engagement while their model creates one-sided monologues. Their model forecloses the ability of intricate debate and advocacy refinement by forcing us into stale generics, since we can’t predictably research the 1ac. These positions don’t test the aff in rigorous ways since they are generic and supposed to apply to every affirmative. That turns the aff – absent rigorous testing of the aff echo chambers that operate within existing structural privilege without self-questioning and refinement of strategies.**

#### **C] TVA – defend the unconditional right to strike for queer workers.**

#### **In round competitive equity first:**

#### **[1] Evaluation – their arguments only seem true because they have an advantage – equity is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who’s better under the aff method since if one debater had 10 minutes to speak and the other had 1 it alters the ability to judge the truth value of the aff which means no cross apps and you should presume their arguments are false since I wasn’t adequately prepared to contest them so they don’t get to weigh the case if we couldn’t engage it to start with since I couldn’t disprove it.**

#### **[2] Ballot proximity – the ballot can’t solve their offense or actualize their method since the arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, but the judge can determine the direction of good norms and equitable practices so a risk our interp is good means negate**

#### **[3] exclusion’s inevitable since you have the ability to exclude my offense with your ROB which means I shouldn’t be punished for excluding the way you presented your advocacy.**

#### **[4] Quality of discussion – even if it’s true that the scholarship they introduce is valuable, if I can’t answer the aff then there’s no point to reading the position. Debate’s unique value is that it forces engagement and contestation of issues – but this is impossible if I don’t even know what to prepare for which also turns the tangible benefit of their method**

**[5] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game proven by wins, losses and speaker points which proves its inescapable b)**

#### **Drop the debater – Changing your advocacy kills NC strat because the 1ac advocacy is the only stasis point for NC offense, anything else moots all clash and fairness.**

#### 

#### **New 2nr answers to AC preemts- otherwise they just preload the aff with 6 minutes and don’t debate substance, cross apps sre impossible to see and shifty**

#### **No impact turns or rivis - A] Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T. B] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position.**

#### **CI- intervention, collapses, yours vs best, race to bottom**

#### 

### **Overview to the case**

1. **Framing**

#### **(They only said ROB) the ROB is to the better debater**

#### **Fairness – arbitrary frameworks moot the 1nc –**

#### **Education- Discussing the literal policy of the res is best for education, o/w since we only have two months for this topic and by debating random Fwks we lose a debate we could have used to learn and educate ourselves about the current topic**

#### **3. There is no a-priori role of the ballot. Debate is**

#### **merely a tool which can lead to a whole bunch of**

#### **outcomes - anything other than voting for who**

#### **did the better debating leads to tunnel vision**

On their underview

1] no warrant. Critiquing epistemology of resolution is fine but Arguments only function under the current topic. So we need to comprehend the topic first before other arguments like theory.

The ballot asks you to vote for who did the better debating but if the aff is not topical, then they are not actually affirming, then you cant vote for them or their theory

2] T is not “policing people”- 1] applies to everyone 2] bidirectional so its most fair 3] anything else says some people should get more rights then others

[1] Arguments in round don’t have an effect on structural equity only procedural equity. Therefore the burden is on the Affirmative to establish that on the basis of of the perceived violation their advocacy is the only way to remedy PROCEDURAL equity. These can’t be inherently bad as the debater has debated or will debate the opposite side an equal number of times.

[2] Automatic suppositions of position without violation, don’t help the cause, but rather commodify the position as a tactic, depriving it of value as a symbolic stance.

[3] There is no bright line for Drop the Debater: Puts debaters in a predicament. To argue against the Affirmative even when in support of the cause

[4] Allows the judges to engage in slacktivism politics; the judge leaves the room feeling like they have

[5] Turn: The debater reading the violation does more for the position by conceding the round and engaging in discussion. A sacrifice is only meaningful and generates movement if it is of oneself, not of the opposite body. Sacrificing the negative does nothing for the cause. IT IS EASY to sacrifice your opponent

Hold an in-round discussion about their aff and vote for me. The net benefit is that it would generate even more publicity and solve the problem better. Amanda Liverzani ran a position on feminism in 2004 at Greenhill.

The following is an excerpt of an interview.

Jon Cruz. “Discussing What She Believes In”. 10/4/2004 [http://victorybriefsdaily.com/2004/10/0 ... lieves-in/](http://victorybriefsdaily.com/2004/10/04/discussing-what-she-believes-in/)

[Jon Cruz asked:] JC: **Once you started forfeiting rounds and held discussions instead**, what was the climate? Was it awkward? Or were people receptive? [Liverzani responded:] AL: **I don’t think it could have gone any better.** At Greenhill, I debated ten rounds. At the round robin, I debated three. None of those rounds were as successful in sparking discourse and thought on the subject as my round with Hirsh [Jain]. How so? **Prior to that round everyone had been approaching my case in that adverserial context…not thinking about the actual issues behind it. I can really say that I had an effect on people in that room once they realized how serious I was about the subject**.Hirsh, the judge, and I engaged in a genuine discussion on feminism, rape, sexism in society. **Not only did I get my views out there, but I learned from the two of them as well.**

It garners all educational aspects of both pre-fiat and post-fiat, while she only gains educational benefits from pre-fiat. 2) It doesn’t skew the round one way or another, meaning it is most fair.

**Reject the aff ballot**

**1] Cross Apply limits and testing from T shell as independent reasons to reject the case.**

**Also**

**2] Small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities. their revolution is only accessible within the bubble of circuit debate.**

#### **3] Even if it’s a good model the judge shouldn’t endorse it, results in guilt politics where the judge does nothing but believes they participate, this leads to broader exported violence in everyday life. Paints suffering as vote for us to remedy, assuages the judge of guilt bc of indivual actions when they have in fact done nothing**

#### **4] Paternalism DA-**

#### **4. Competition takes out the aff – the ballot becomes a securitizing object that prevents engagement**

**Ritter 13.** JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterize5d as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

#### **5. No evidence for the power of the ballot – debate specific – negate on presumption.**

**Ritter 13** [Michael, JD UTexas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University. September 2013. “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2Pac’s Changes?” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9896ec\_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf]

Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “**competitive interscholastic debate**” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, **none of the many academics** who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support **the social change fiction**. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, **students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted**.

#### **Their description of overkill as an overarching phenomenon that describes asterisks black queer death as part of the universal. Warren says queerness can negotiate its existence based on whiteness but blackness does not have access to the fluidity of queerness. Warren 15:**

Warren, Calvin, PhD. Assistant Professor of American Studies, American Studies, "Onticide: Afropessimism, Queer Theory, & Ethics". 2015.

We can approach this from a different angle: A person understood as “queer” could purchase a black-object from the auction block like his/her hetero-normative counterpart. In those rare instances where the black-as-object was able to participate in this economy and purchase a black-object as well, the black purchaser could, at any moment, become another commodity—if found without freedom papers or validation from a white guardian—the system of fungible blackness made any black interchangeable and substitutional. This movement between object and subject is not a problem for queer-ness, but is an unresolvable problem for blackness. This is the im-portant difference between the two. Queerness does not inhabit the position of the object—which is the ontology of blackness. Blackness is much more than deviance; it is the object that allows the distinc-tion between deviance and normativity to have any meaning at all. To equate blackness with queerness because of shared discourses of deviance, transgression, and perversity misses the “existential ne-gation” of blackness. While we can talk about the non-normativi-ty of liminal subjects, blackness does not travel within the Symbolic the way queerness does and must be conceptualized with different terms.What, then, is queer about blackness? Nothing. In using the gram-mar of queerness to explicate the structure of blackness, we equate fungability with the repertoire of non-normative sexualities that con-stitute conditions of human suffering. In this sense, we get a nuanced interpretation of Hortense Spillers’s profound suggestion that under captivity “the customary aspects of sexuality, including ‘reproduc-tion,’ ‘motherhood,’ ‘pleasure,’ and ‘desire’ are all thrown into crisis” (221). Blackness does rupture sexuality and gender in that it is (mis)applied. This creates something like personification, but in this case, it is the application of human qualities to a sentient object. Sexuality is dubiously appropriate because it belongs to the human, and the signifier “queerness” cannot sidestep this fact or resolve this problematic—despite its desire to exceed identity, sexual practices, etc. We do not have a proper grammar outside of humanism to describe the domain of “pleasure,” “desire,” “sexuality,” and “gender” for the socially dead object. This is part of the torment and dereliction of blackness; it is placed outside of life and its customary lexis. And this is what it means to inhabit the position of the “unthought” and the incommunicable.

#### **The impact is overkill. Our erasure of black queers separates the redeemable from those that are dead consigned to the unmarked grave of history. This fractures queer organizing and straight turns the case Warren 15:**

Warren, Calvin, PhD. Assistant Professor of American Studies, American Studies, "Onticide: Afropessimism, Queer Theory, & Ethics". 2015.

The attempt to reclaim Shepard, what I am calling “the project of recuperation,” separates the redeemable from the socially dead, the liminal subject from the derelict object, and the suffering subject from the ‘uninjurable.’ Stanley rightly criticizes the “social screen” for its tendency to sanitize suffering and to present mourning as a “spectacle of mocking pain,” but the social screen also reflects the axiological assumptions about the value of beings. The fact that Shepard’s murder captured the screen at all is an indication that his death was registered as a lost life and his murder registered as unethical suf-fering. Where was the national media coverage on Steen Keith Fen-rich? Because Steen could not participate in the synecdochal play between ‘part and whole’ and because his existence (if we can say he ‘existed’ at all) inhabited such a low frequency on the onto-existential horizon, he never died because he was already dead—there was not a “loss” because there was never a possession of life. You cannot kill that which is already dead. Thus, recuperation was not possible on the social screen and the nation could not perform mourning. This is what it means for “the archive of queer death to disappear.” The nation remembers Shepard; his suffering has a grammar and we can articulate this grammar. His death did not, and will not, disappear. Steen’s death, however, was not registered as a death and so never really appeared at all, or more accurately, was always already absent.What we can say, then, is that overkill is the materialization of onticide. It is not a phenomenon that is generalizable, or applies widely to the ‘queer’ population. What is crucial about Stanley’s theory of overkill is that it is a violence that cannot be recuperated into the ex-isting grammar of ethics and justice. It ruptures intelligibility because it is the precondition for the intelligible—it is its necessary kernel of nonsense. It is a violence lacking utility, and unlike Bataille’s theo-ry of expenditure, its recipient lacks a subjectivity to ‘enjoy’ (in the psychoanalytic sense of enjoyment) the symptom of divestiture and transgression. Overkill cuts the “black queer” into an infinite array of ontological fragments. The missing heads, legs, hands, and limbs, ‘unlocatable’ and unrecoverable by police and investigators, mime the ontological itinerancy and unmappability of the “black queer.” This violence serves both as a vicious allegory and instantiation of the onticide structuring New World antagonism.

END OF 1nc

#### **Their explanation for violence is reductive and wrong**

**Pinker 13**

Steven Pinker, Prof of Psychology at Harvard, "The Decline of War and Conceptions of Human Nature", International Studies Review, 2013, 15, pp. 396-419

2. **Human Nature Has Multiple Components**

**People tend to reduce human nature to a single essence** and then debate what that essence consists of. Are we nasty or noble, Hobbesian or Rousseauan, ape or angel? In this way of thinking, if we regularly engage in violence, we must be a violent species; if we are capable of peace we must be pacifistic.

**But the brain is a mind-bogglingly complex organ** with many anatomically and chemically distinguishable circuits. **Most psychologists believe** that **human nature is not just one thing**, but comprises multiple intelligences, modules, faculties, organs, drives, or other subsystems. Some of these subsystems may impel us toward violence, but others inhibit us from violence.

Human violence springs from at least four kinds of motives, each involving different neurobiological systems:

Exploitation: Violence used as the means to an end; that is, damaging a human who happens to be an obstacle on the path to something the actor wants. Examples include plunder, rape, conquest, the displacement or genocide of native peoples, and the murder or imprisonment of political or economic rivals.

Dominance: The urge among individuals to ascend the pecking order and become the alpha male, and the corresponding urge among groups for tribal, ethnic, racial, national, or religious supremacy.

Revenge: The conviction that someone who has committed a moral infraction deserves to be punished.

Ideology: Shared belief systems, spread virally or by indoctrination or force, which hold out the prospect of a utopia. Examples include nationalism, Fascism, Nazism, communism, and militant religions. Since a utopia is a world that will be infinitely good forever, one is permitted to perpetrate unlimited amounts of force against those who stand in its way, as in the saying, “You can’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs.”

Pushing against these nasty impulses are some of our kinder, gentler faculties:

Self-control: Circuitry in the frontal lobes of the brain that can anticipate the long-term consequence of actions and inhibit them accordingly.

Empathy: The ability to feel someone else’s pain.

The moral sense: A system of norms and taboos centered on intuitions of fairness to individuals, loyalty to a community, deference to legitimate authority, and the safeguarding of purity and sanctity. The moral sense can motivate the imposition of standards of fairness and can render certain courses of harmful action unthinkable. (Unfortunately, it can also be a cause of violence, because it can rationalize militant ideologies based on tribalism, puritanism, and authoritarianism.)

Reason: Cognitive processes that allow us to engage in objective, detached analysis. Whether people actually commit acts of violence, then, depends on the interplay among these faculties; the mere existence of human nature does not doom our species to a constant rate of violence.

The decision to wage war, in particular, may be triggered by any combination of the violence-inducing motives. If the decision is not overturned by any of the motives that inhibit violence, the decision-maker must then mobilize an aggressive coalition by whipping up the aggressive motives in his compatriots, while disabling the peaceable motives. **The actual outbreak of war thus depends on many psychological processes lining up in the right way and escaping the restraining influence of other psychological processes**, which are distributed in social networks connecting many other individuals. There is no reason to expect that the relative strengths of these competing influences should remain constant over the course of human history.

3. Facultative Components of Human Nature

Many components of human nature are facultative (environmentally sensitive), not hydraulic (homeostatic). The intuition that a respite from war could not possibly be real often rests on a mental model in which the drive toward violence is conceived of as a hydraulic force. At best, it can be diverted or channeled, but it cannot be bottled up indefinitely. **The hydraulic model of human motivation is deeply embedded in the way we think about violence. It was given a scientific imprimatur by psychoanalysis**, ethology, and behaviorism (in the guise of drive reduction), and it fits with the cybernetic notion of homeostasis, in which a feedback loop maintains a system in a steady state by counteracting any imbalance. It also fits with our subjective experience: no one can go indefinitely without food, water, or sleep, and it is a challenge to do without sex or to hold in a mounting urge to yawn, sneeze, scratch an itch, or expel various substances from the body.

But, **it is a big mistake to think** that all **human responses are homeostatic**. Many are opportunistic, reactive, or facultative: they are elicited by combinations of environmental triggers and cognitive and emotional states. Consider evolutionarily prepared fears such as those of heights, snakes, confinement, deep water, or spiders. Even if one were born with an innate phobia of snakes, as long as one never encountered a snake one could live one’s entire life without experiencing that fear. Other examples include the tendency to shiver, fall head over heels in love, or experience sexual jealousy.

The **motives that lead to violence**, too, **need not be homeostatic**. There is no reason to believe that the urge to hurt someone gradually builds up and periodically needs to be discharged. Violence carries significant risks of injury or death when the target defends himself, when he or his relatives wreak revenge, or when he is tempted into attacking preemptively. The theory of natural selection predicts that adaptations evolve when their expected costs exceed their expected benefits. **We should not expect a hydraulic urge to violence to evolve, but rather one that is sensitive to circumstances**. These may include predation and exploitation, when an opportunity to exploit a victim at low risk presents itself; dominance, when one’s masculinity is suddenly impugned in front of an important audience; vengeance, to punish (and thus ultimately deter) insults or injuries; rampage, when a longstanding menace is suddenly exposed in a window of vulnerability. If the circumstances never materialize—say, if one lives an orderly, bourgeois life, free from grave threats or insults—any tendency to react with violence could lie as dormant as a fear of poisonous snakes. The same sensitivity to environmental contingencies could, if circumstances line up, prevent political leaders from experiencing any urge to mobilize their countries for war.

#### **It’s impossible to generalize specific hypotheses into deterministic theories of the self**

**Richards**, M.D., is a psychoanalyst and former editor of The American Psychoanalyst and Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, **‘15**

(Arnold, “Psychoanalysis in Crisis: The Danger of Ideology,” Psychoanalytic Review 102.3, June, 389-405)

My own belief is that one definition of science is the repeated formulation of new hypotheses in search of better explanations of observed data. It doesn't matter whether the particulars of any specific hypothesis eventually prove right or wrong. This searching quality is important to psychoanalysis, and as I will show, we do ourselves no favors when we suppress it.

Psychoanalysis is also a science in the pride it takes in its predictive power. Its primary postulate is the **principle of psychic determinism**, which is used both to explain the past and predict the future. (I am reminded of the patient who told Selma Freiberg that she was good at “backwards future talking.”) On the other hand, many have asserted that psychoanalytic evidence “**can be so manipulated as to escape refutation no matter what facts are adduced.**” (Nagel 1959, cited in Slochower 1964, p. 165) Harry Slochower in his study of psychoanalysis as science and art makes the interesting point that Freud himself considered this a **serious lack**, at least when applied to other people's convictions. Since religious doctrines can be neither proven nor refuted, Freud said in The Future of an Illusion, that **their "reality value" cannot be judged**. (Freud, The Future of an Illusion, Anchor Books, New York, 1964.)

So while we can respect Freud's scientific sensitivity and aspirations, we must also acknowledge that psychoanalysis is in some ways undeniably unlike other sciences, including even the other human sciences. Its subject is the intangible unconscious, and its tool is the relationship between two human beings. Each analyst/analysand pair is unique, making it **very difficult to generalize from the interaction between the observer and the observed**. **Replication is not possible**, and validation is possible only in limited ways -- for instance, tape recorded sessions—and on different terms. Furthermore, psychoanalysis **looks not at static states**, but at **complex processes determined by multiple variables.** Under those circumstances, **immaculate perception is impossible**, and so is immaculate conception. Objectivity in psychoanalysis is **always tempered by subjectivity,** and the knower always influences the known. **Affect is at play as much as reason**. **Exact science is neutral. Psychoanalysis is not.**

We can finesse some other aspects of the debate by recognizing that **psychoanalysis is not a monolith**, and it's good to remind ourselves of this occasionally, too. Psychoanalysis is at once a theory of development, a theory of psychopathology, a theory of how the mind works, and a theory of therapeutic process and cure. Each of these theories is based on different assumptions and offers different propositions with **different degrees of validity**, and **different levels of abstraction** (cf. Waelder).

#### **Death drive thesis outdated**

**Smith**, Director of the Critical Transdisciplinary Research Program and Editor at Heathwood Institute and Press, **‘3/22/17**

(Robert C., “An Alternative Conception of Social Pathology,” in *Society and Social Pathology*, palgrave, pg. 74-75, \*language modified)

Aside from the question of social pathology, at the heart of this book is also the issue of subject development. This involves questions of how a human being develops—or how a child changes during the course of his/ her growth (Litowitz 1999)—and how social conditions, positive or negative, affect that development. “Every psychoanalytic theory from Freud’s earliest models to the latest post-Freudian versions” **attempt to capture a theory of development** in some way (Litowitz 1999). Freud’s theories claim to describe universal developmental stages, which do not depend upon specific environmental responses, cultural or social or otherwise (Litowitz 1999). Thus significant emphasis is **placed on biology** in the development of the psyche (Moritsugu et al. 2016).

Outside of certain movements within CT and more traditional pockets of psychoanalysis, Freud’s instinct theory and biological model is generally **considered highly questionable** (Benja eld 2010; Benjamin 1988; Black and Mitchell 2016; Blum and Hoffman 2016; Gomez 1997; Buirski and Kottler 2007; Rogers 1951, 1959; Schneider et al. 2001; Shane et al. 1997; Simanowitz and Pearce 2003). In fact, Freud’s theories in general are being increasingly challenged, or shown as **not possible to prove** (Dvorsky 2013). Many have either already discarded his theories as postulation without scientic validation or have used them as guidance knowing they are awed or incredibly abstract. As Axel Honneth put it:

Only dogmatism can today still ~~blind one to~~[conceal] the fact that a string of premises of Freudian theory have [...] **become highly questionable.** Developments in **infant research**, in **developmental psychology** generally, but also in **evolutionary biology**, have cast doubt on central and basic assumptions of the psychoanalytic view of young children. (Honneth 2009, p. 126)

Even contemporary theories of the unconscious, which many have labelled one of Freud’s greatest accomplishments, are continuously seeking to establish differentiation from Freudian theory (Romand 2012), rooting their concepts in Gustav Fechner’s earlier hypotheses. Additionally, while efforts at reforming classical Freudian theory have been attempted by the likes of Jacques Lacan and his contemporary followers, which is a popular movement in psychoanalysis today, particularly or primarily in theory and through the work of Slavoj Žižek, this too can be argued for different reasons to be deeply inadequate when weighed against more **up-to-date cross-disciplinary research programme** (Smith 2013).

Indeed, from a wide survey of literature, and from a discussion with different **clinical practitioners and psychotherapists**, it is clear that Fromm’s challenging Freudian **instinct theory** is, in present times, a less than controversial course of critique. This lends to the belief that when reading Freud today, as Fisher and Greenberg (1996) argue, what is required is a significant amount of nuance. His theory should be evaluated, they claim, in terms of specific hypotheses rather than as a whole (Fisher and Greenberg 1996; also cited in McLeod 2013). One reason for this, quite simply, has to do with the many “unresolved contradictions in Freud’s writings”, including what has been summarized as an unevenly developed system of ideas that are not integrated into a logical, systematic whole (Boag 2014).

#### **Can’t wish away the existing terrain, but single issue focus spills over and is distinct from the ideologies that determine its use**

#### **The perm solves - strategically utilizes the potential of futurity**

**Daniel 12**

Drew Daniel is an assistant professor in the Department of English at Johns Hopkins University, Criticism, August 16, 2012, "Trading Futures: Queer Theory's Anti-antirelational Turn", Volume 52, Issue 2, http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=15865&context=criticism

Over the course of Cruising Utopia, Muñoz’s response to the provocation of edelman’s No Future alternates between sincere admiration, begrudging concession, and impassioned rebuttal. however heartfelt, Muñoz’s grumpy observation that babystrollers constitute annoying urban obstacles of straight privilege seems less conciliatory than satirical of edelman’s denunciation of the stubbornly exclusive politics of reproductive futurism. But his chapter “Cruising the Toilet: leroi Jones/amiri Baraka, radical Black Traditions, and Queer Futurity**” launches a more serious objection to the seductive weightlessness of edelman’s vision** of “queerness as a singular abstraction that can be subtracted and isolated from a larger cultural matrix” (94). Citing the structural disparity in acts of violence that threaten youth of color, and lgBT youth of color in particular, **Muñoz denies that all children qua children are equally subject to regimes of protection and status, thus disrupting the conceptual stability of “the child” upon which edelman’s account arguably relies.** For Muñoz, the consequence of edelman’s leveling down of difference **on behalf of immaculate abstractions** (the child-as-such, the queer-as-such) **is a corresponding loss of precisely the temporal dimension through which their political expression and transformation might be realized:**

Theories of queer temporality that fail to factor in the relational relevance of race or class merely reproduce a crypto-universal white gay subject that is weirdly atemporal—which is to say a subject whose time is a restricted and restricting hollowed-out present free of the need for imagining a futurity that exists beyond the self or the here and now. (94)

In the wake of the tragic murders of queer youth of color that Muñoz recounts as evidence of a childhood-which-is-not-one, the point hits home. and yet, from a purely theoretical perspective, one rather doubts that edelman would dispute the core of Muñoz’s claim; indeed, the repetitions of the death drive are nothing if not constitutively defined by just such a “weird atemporality,” and so the allegation that should be damning seems simply apt.

Whether Muñoz’s critique of Edelman constitutes a redirection or a palpable hit will be a function of your theoretical optic and your attraction to the purity of theoretical positions as such. Indeed the contretemps between these books risks collapsing into a parody of their respective guilds: if Jacques lacan is to lee edelman as ernst Bloch is to José Muñoz, then the mischievously absolute theoretical commandments of the former and the stridently lyrical close readings of the latter form a romance of star-crossed methodological commitments, and **the stage is set for a false choice between theories of the subject and theories of the social.** Full disclosure: as a partisan of psychoanalysis, I must demur. given the current superabundance of critical work explicitly formulated as lacanian-hegelian (Žižek, Dolar, Zupancic, Copjec, to name four), **we are surely past the point when the bugbear of an inherent impasse between psychoanalysis and politics is credible**. homing in on race, in the wake of the work of anne Cheng and hortense Spillers (to isolate just two examples from a burgeoning field), **we already know that race does not await complex, politically savvy psychoanalytic readings.** accordingly, the pageant of antirelationality between the psychoanalytic tradition and the Marxist tradition rehearsed by the lingering disjunction between edelman and Muñoz induces a queer feeling curiously at odds with their shared subject of the future itself: déjà vu. Whether we take queer theory to be a Freudor-Marx chessboard or a Freudand-Marx dance floor, from their separate vantage points both Muñoz and edelman are simply too productive of queer theory’s own lived present for a simple choice of critical allegiance between their positions to be sufficient. If neither is complete on their own, the “parallax view” generated by their mutually incongruous evaluations of **the political stakes of futurity might yet produce a future worth sticking around for.**

**Perm - use queer theory to improve politics**

**Power 09**

Nina Power is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Roehampton University, Borderlands, 2009, "Non-Reproductive Futurism", Vol 8, No 2, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol8no2\_2009/power\_futurism.pdf

**Unlike Edelman’s conception of the queer, which is purely negative**, perhaps even individualistic, Rancière explicitly stresses **the role that equality plays in his conception of politics**. In the chapter entitled ‘From Archipolitics to Metapolitics,’ Rancière argues that:

Politics only exists through the bringing off of the equality of anyone and everyone in a vacuous freedom of a part of the community that deregulates any count of parts. The equality that is the nonpolitical condition of politics does not show up here for what it is: it only appears as the figure of wrong. (Rancière, 1999: 61)

The figure of wrong (to be opposed to the ‘right’ of classical political philosophy and jurisprudence) could, however, be understood as ‘queer,’ even in some of Edelman’s own senses: it is unwanted, negative, and not comprehensible from the standpoint of the existing order and the set demarcation of places. As Marx originally put it, the possibility of German emancipation could only arise:

[i]n the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class [Stand] which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general. (Marx, 1974: 256)

This idea of ‘wrong in general’ exceeds the description of civil society with its regulated classes and parts: ‘Wrong’ does not refer to a group of people that have somehow been ill-treated but something structurally in excess of the very identity of groups or classes. As Rancière puts it: ‘Politics ceases ... wherever the whole of the community is reduced to the sum of its parts with nothing left over’ (Rancière, 1999: 123). When Edelman talks about queerness as ‘the site outside the consensus’ (Edelman, 2004: 3) he comes very close to Rancière’s conception of politics as exception. **Except that for Edelman this ‘site’ would somehow be radically opposed to politics as such.** But Rancière’s position is less stark: there are two orders of politics and two orders of rationality. On the one hand, there is the politics that he associates with the ‘police,’ classical political philosophy and consensus, on the other, there is politics as disruption, and disagreement (or dissensus). As Rancière states:

Politics, in its specificity, is rare. It is always local and occasional. Its actual eclipse is perfectly real and no political science exists that could map its future any more than a political ethics that would make its existence the object solely of will. (Rancière, 1999: 139)

Politics for Rancière literally has ‘no future,’ or at least not one that is predictable. As Hallward puts it:

According to Rancière, equality is not the result of a fairer distribution of social functions or places so much as the immediate disruption of any such distribution; it refers not to place but to the placeless or out-of-place, not to class but to the unclassifiable or out-of-class. (Hallward, 2006: 110)

**There are indeed**, as Rancière’s work suggests, **other ways of thinking about a politics that has ‘no future,’ despite Edelman’s insistence that all politics is futural** (‘The Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics’ (Edelman, 2004: 3)). It may be the case that, historically, some ways of thinking about alternative conceptions of politics vis-à-vis the child have been cut off from us: in that sense, then, Edelman’s work can be seen as registering the end of a sequence of political possibilities. His central implication is that politics, in its very nature, is conservative. Edelman argues that politics ‘works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child’ (Edelman, 2004: 3). For him, it is clear that ‘reproductive futurism’ has come to subsume all kinds of politics, both left and right. It places:

an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations. (Edelman, 2004: 2)