# **1NC**

### **1NC—T No Gov**

#### **Interpretation – The affirmative cannot defend governmental action.**

#### **Private entity is non-governmental**

**Cornell** (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def\_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term\_occur=999&term\_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501)

**private entity (A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof. (B) Inclusion The term “private entity” includes a State, tribal, or local government performing utility services, such as electric, natural gas, or water services. (C) Exclusion The term “private entity” does not include a foreign power as defined in section 1801 of title 50.**

#### **Private entities are majority owned and managed by nonstate actors**

**Warners 20** (Bill, JD Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School) "Patents 254 Miles up: Jurisdictional Issues Onboard the International Space Station." UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2020, p. 365-380. HeinOnline. EE

To satisfy these three necessary requirements for a new patent regime, the ISS IGA must add an additional clause ("Clause 7") in Article 21 specifically establishing a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. First, Clause 7 would define **the term "private entity" as an individual, organization, or business which is primarily privately owned and/or managed by nonstate affiliates**. Specifically defining the term "private entity" prevents confusion as to what entities qualify under the agreement and the difference between "public" and "private."99 This definition would also support the connection of Clause 1 in Article 21 to "Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization." 100 A succinct definition also alleviates international concerns that the changes to the ISS IGA pushes out Partner State influence. 101 Some in the international community may still point out that Clause 7 still pushes towards a trend of outer space privatization. However, this argument fails to consider that private entities in outer space have operated in space almost as comprehensively as national organizations. 102

#### **Violation: They defend Chinese governmental action.**

#### **Standards:**

#### **1] Vote neg for predictable limits. Their aff justifies ignoring words in the resolution which destroys any predictable basis of neg prep. There’s no non-arbitrary way to choose which words aren’t changeable under their interp. This leads to debates where we’re forced to go for generics which destroys education.**

#### **2] Clash: they destroy clash by attaching and adding anything they want to the resolution – this allows them to unlink from ks and das that were prepped for the actual res and prevents any engagement.**

#### **2] TVA solves: Defend no governmental action**

#### **Fairness is a voter – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and answers to it rely on the judge evaluating the argument fairly**

#### **No RVIs: a. Chills theory – If people know they might lose for reading theory, it will disincentivize them. b. You don’t get to win by being fair. c. Theory Baiting – good theory debaters will bait people into reading theory against certain cases. T link turns 1AR theory – proves the aff forced me to be abusive**

#### **Use competing interpretations: a. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom with testing the limit of it b. Judge intervention shouldn’t be allowed bc it produces bias c. Uniquely, use competing interps on T – you can’t be reasonably topical**

#### **Drop the debater: for being abusive – we can’t restart the round from the 1AC and I’m skewed for the rest of the debate.**

### **1NC -DA OFF**

#### **Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.**

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

**In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule,** suggesting that **democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent**. In fact, **many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements**—**large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator**—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its **aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.**

**China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to**[**innovate**](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china)**.** **It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration.** Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But **much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries.** This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. **But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals.** That’s why **ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.**

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed **95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens.** Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. **Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive,** although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### **Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180. [Their own link author agrees]**

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few **private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while**: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That **all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged.** In 2014, a year **after** **Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China,** the **Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation,** as it had already **begun doing with AI and solar power**. It **issued a policy directive called**[**Document 60**](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml)**that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.**

“**Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace**, it was **critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector**,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “**He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”**

As a result, there are **now 78 commercial space companies operating in China,** according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than **half have been founded since 201**4, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, **Galactic Energy**, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company **i-Space**, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does **LinkSpace** (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

**Spacety**, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, **China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US**: using **government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot** **up**. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. **The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018**—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but **nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago**. At least **42 companies had no known government funding.**

And much of the **government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one**. “[These **companies**] are **drawing high-tech development to these local communities,**” says Hines. “And in return, **they’re given more autonomy by the local government.”** While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also **one advantage specific to China: manufacturing.** “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s **China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.”** Zheng believes the **country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.**

Making friends

The **most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration**—particularly to **attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government.** (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“**China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own**,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And **by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do** (such as constraints on talking with the media). **Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale**: you’re **taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.**

Although **China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry,** the **nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about**. While Chinese companies may look **private on paper**, they must **still submit to government guidance and control**, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The **distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy**, especially if the **government is a frequent customer**. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s **not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army**, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### **Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners**

**Weiss 19** Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

**Public support**—or the appearance of it—**matters to many autocracies.** As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, **modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”**6 **Mao** Zedong **told** his **comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”**7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular **ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office.** Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, **even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.**9 A **history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest.** The **weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty** at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 **galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials** and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These **precedents** have **made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion.** As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that **public opinion and regime safety are inseparable**.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### **Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots**

**Norris 17**, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### **US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction**

**Kulacki 20** [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

## **Case**

### **1NC---AT: Sino-Russian Alliance**

#### **No war – it’s hype and systems are redundant**

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In the last two years, we’ve seen rising **hysteria** over a future **war in space**. **Fanning the flames** are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also **breathless coverage** from a cooperative and **credulous press**. This reporting doesn’t only **muddy public debate** over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently **slim possibility** of **war in space** more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called **Sharknado in Space** – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some **fact checkers**. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, **no country** in the world has yet **weaponized space**. Contrary to CNN, **stock** market **transactions** are **not** timed nor synchronized through **GPS**, but a **closed system**. Cruise **missiles** can find their targets even **without GPS**, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and **IMUs don’t rely** on **sat**ellite **data**. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the **U**nited **S**tates is **not unable** to **protect** its **sat**ellite**s**, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy **sat**ellite**s**, have **capabilities to maneuver**. Many are **hardened** against **e**lectro-**m**agnetic **p**ulse, sport **“shutters”** to protect optical “eyes” from solar **flares and lasers**, and use radio **frequency hop**ping to **resist jamming**.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. **No** potential **adversary** has such capabilities, nor will they **ever** likely do so. There is just **too much redundancy** in the system.

#### **China-Russian alliances don’t last- “US causes them to draw together” narrative is wrong**

**Carafano 19** (Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges., <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/why-the-china-russia-alliance-wont-last>, August 7th, 2019, “Why the China-Russian Alliance won’t last”)//AK

So, now everybody wants to be Bismarck. They see themselves shaping history by artfully moving big pieces on the geostrategic chessboard. And one gambit they just can’t resist is moving to snip the growing bonds of Sino-Russian cooperation. My advice to them: Just stop. Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown. Indeed, there is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both countries heat rash. Siren’s Cat Call Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente) and then focus on beating back against China. This is an idea that should be dumped into the dustbin before it has any history. Yes, China and Russia are going to work together to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it serves their interests. They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick up the baton for them. What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why would Russia or China ever consider giving up these practices? **Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest.** Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return? What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer is not near enough to justify any of these concessions. On the other hand, what leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action. A central element of both their strategies is that they want to win against the United States “without fighting.” Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But, neither of them will be volunteering to go first anytime soon. Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated. Peace through strength really works. If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing. We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original. The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military expansionism and more. All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns. There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch, their global goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate interests will grate on the relationship. For example, China is meddling more in Central Asia and the Arctic—spaces where Russia was dominant. Moscow has to ask itself: Why is Beijing elbowing in? There is an argument that rather than looking for a strategic partnership, China is just biding its time till Russia implodes, and Beijing steps in and sweeps up the choice pieces. And, as much as Putin likes to tweak Trump about Moscow’s ties with Beijing, it is becoming more apparent to Washington that Russia is ever more the junior partner. Can Putin really continue to play Robin to a Chinese Batman? As for China, they have to ask: What does Robin really bring to the dynamic-duo? Play the Long Great Power Game The world doesn’t require a twenty-first century Bismarck. The United States will do better simply by continuing its strategy of pushing back on Russia and China, while letting them know there’s an off-ramp waiting for them if—and only if—they respect U.S. interests. Sure, this makes double duty for Washington. The United States has to mitigate Moscow’s efforts to destabilize Europe, even as it pushes for a free and open Indo-Pacific. But these tasks are not beyond our capabilities—and for us the pain is worth the gain. Rather than try to pry Putin and Xi Jinping apart, Trump should continue to squeeze them from both sides. The natural friction in the Russian and Chinese relationship will prevent them from effectively ganging up on the United States. And it wouldn’t hurt if the United States should find subtle ways to remind them that they would be foolish to trust each other too much. The primary interest of both Putin and Xi is to assure the survival of their regimes. The American squeeze play will leave them with little choice but to accept the fact that America is strong, it’s here to stay, and their regimes have to live with it. This is the only kind of global balancing that will bring about stable relationships in the long-term.

#### **Relations aren’t useful militarily- kills the militarization internal link**

**Cheng 21** (December 21, 2021, “China and Russia likely won’t support each other militarily analysts say”, Evelyn Cheng is CNBC.com’s Beijing correspondent, covering China’s economy and financial markets.<https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/17/china-and-russia-likely-wont-support-each-other-militarily-analysts.html>)//AK

Chinese President Xi Jinping met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin virtually for the second time this year on Wednesday. The meeting came just days after the U.S. and the other Group of 7 major economies condemned Russia’s military build-up and “aggressive rhetoric towards Ukraine.” Beijing likely wants to ensure that if it were to take military action against Taiwan, “the Russians wouldn’t do anything,” said Angela Stent, a professor at Georgetown University. “I think both sides recognize, Putin knows, that if he invaded Ukraine, China [isn’t] going to send military help.” Russia lays out demands as it masses troops on the Ukraine border BEIJING — International pressure may have pushed China and Russia closer together, but not enough for the two countries to send military support to each other, U.S.-based analysts said. Chinese President Xi Jinping met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin virtually for the second time this year on Wednesday. It came just days after the U.S. and the other Group of 7 major economies condemned Russia’s military build-up and “aggressive rhetoric towards Ukraine.” “Beijing and Moscow are forging closer ties because both governments view deeper bilateral cooperation as beneficial to their respective national interests, and not primarily because of an ideological affinity between Xi and Putin,” said Neil Thomas, analyst for China and northeast Asia at consulting firm Eurasia Group. Russia-China relations not an alliance between both countries, says think tank China and Russia would rather “divide Washington’s political attention between strategic hotspots in Europe and the Indo-Pacific,” he said in an email. It’s not clear what Beijing’s position on Ukraine is, but China has come under similar international scrutiny over human rights issues, and territorial claims on the democratically self-ruled island of Taiwan. Neither of them specifically endorsed the position of the other with regard to their points of sensitivity, so I think they both want to preserve some sort of flexibility. This year, while Moscow has sent troops to the border with Ukraine, Beijing has increased military activity near Taiwan. U.S. President Joe Biden recently made confusing statements on whether Washington would defend Taiwan upon attack. Beijing likely wants to ensure that if it were to take military action against Taiwan, “the Russians wouldn’t do anything,” said Angela Stent, professor emerita and director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University. “I think both sides recognize, Putin knows, that if he invaded Ukraine, China [isn’t] going to send military help,” she said on CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia” on Thursday. “But they’ll remain completely neutral and that allows them to do whatever they want in what they consider to be their sphere of influence.” China is cautious on Russia-Ukraine tensions: Professor Official reports from both Beijing and Moscow portrayed the two leaders’ virtual meeting Wednesday as a yet another friendly conversation that strengthened the countries’ relationship. Analysts highlighted the rare and more personal use of “you” in Xi’s address of Putin, as released by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, “neither of them specifically endorsed the position of the other with regard to their points of sensitivity, so I think they both want to preserve some sort of flexibility,” William Courtney, adjunct senior fellow at the Rand Corp. said on CNBC’s “Capital Connection” on Thursday. He is a former U.S. ambassador to Georgia and Kazakhstan. In the video call, Xi said he looked forward to meeting the Russian leader in person at the Olympics in Beijing in February. The Chinese leader also “reaffirmed China’s commitment to firmly support Russia in maintaining long-term stability,” according to a release from China’s foreign ministry. Russia talks up China’s goodwill Moscow struck an even more optimistic tone. In the video call, Putin said Russia’s relations with China were at their best level ever, according to statements from both countries. A Kremlin aide also claimed to reporters after the meeting that Xi said the bilateral relationship was stronger and more effective than that of allies, although the two sides do not have such a formal alliance. “President Xi stressed that he understands Russian concerns and fully supports our initiative to develop appropriate security guarantees for Russia,” said Yury Ushakov, Russian presidential aide on foreign policy. Russia-China relations not an alliance between both countries, says think tank Putin has said Washington should not allow Ukraine to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in return for assurances that Russia would not invade. But Biden told Putin in a virtual meeting last week that Washington would not accept such a demand. An attack on one member of NATO — a powerful military alliance — is considered an attack on all member countries. Ukraine has wanted to join NATO since 2002, but Russia has objected on grounds that such a move would be a direct threat to its borders. China’s diplomatic self-interest Releases from China’s foreign ministry did not describe the relationship with Russia as a kind of alliance. The two countries are major trading partners, with China buying significant amounts of energy products from Russia. “China does not want a formal military alliance with Russia, because it wants to avoid direct involvement in the messy international politics of Moscow’s destabilizing moves in Eastern Europe, and has an ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ that opposes military conflict and emphasizes the importance of dialogue,” Eurasia Group’s Thomas said. “Russia is very much the junior partner in the bilateral relationship,” Thomas said. “And Moscow’s ambition in Ukraine [is] not nearly important enough to Beijing for it to abandon its longstanding opposition to formal alliances in international affairs.” While looking out for its own interests, Beijing claims a core principle of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” is “building a community with a shared future for mankind with a view to defending world peace and promoting common development.” Earlier this week, China’s foreign ministry said Xi sent a message of condolence to Biden over the deaths and other destruction from strong tornadoes in the U.S.

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### **Zero risk of escalation from ASATs**

**Pavur and Martinovic 19** [James Pavur and Ivan Martinovic, May 2019, "The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space," ResearchGate, 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334422193\_The\_Cyber-ASAT\_On\_the\_Impact\_of\_Cyber\_Weapons\_in\_Outer\_Space accessed 12/10/21](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334422193_The_Cyber-ASAT_On_the_Impact_of_Cyber_Weapons_in_Outer_Space%20accessed%2012/10/21)]Adam

A. Limited Accessibility

**Space is difficult.** Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and **only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities**. Moreover, a **launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability**. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420].

Although **launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations**. **Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage.** **Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints.** Even then, **the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation.** Since the earliest days of the space race, **dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23].**

B. Attributable Norms

There also exists a **long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space.** The effectiveness of this regime, centred around **the Outer Space Treaty (OST),** is **highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings** [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, **this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit.**

Over these six decades, **norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization.** This **de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization.** Although **states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27**]. **Even** the **most notable incidents**, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, **were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons** [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that **states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly.**

One further factor supporting this norms regime is the **high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons.** For **kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible.** The **literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation.** This **imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing,** particularly during peacetime.

C. Environmental Interdependence

A **third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs**. **China’s** **2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history**, as the targeted satellite **dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles** [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often **threaten the attacker’s own space assets** [22, p. 420]. This is **compounded by Kessler syndrome**, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the **cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space** [29, pp. 295– 296]. **Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities** will **likely also operate satellites** of its own, and **they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat**. Space **debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.**

#### **China’s unique hegemonic system far exceeds its alternatives – its intentions are massively misunderstood**

**Gokhale 21**[Indian diplomat and the 32nd Foreign Secretary of India. Gokhale previously served as the Ambassador of India to China, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “China’s vision of hegemony: the view from India”, Feb 1, 2021, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-vision-of-hegemony-the-view-from-india/>] DD MN

When **the Chinese** say that they **will not exercise** hegemony, they presumably mean not the **American kind [of hegemony].** **They are not seeking to assume the role of a paramount state that uses its power and influence to impose rules and order on an otherwise anarchic world.** Pax Britannica is not for them either. **They have shown no appetite to directly control large tracts outside the homeland or to carry the flag, as David Livingstone did, for ‘Christianity, commerce and civilization’.**

**Exercising the sort of hegemony that the Soviet Union did is entirely ruled out.** **The lessons of Soviet failure due to overreach in the export of communism globally are compulsory reading for all members of the Chinese Communist Party.**

What **China seeks** is **the pursuit of national self-interest through persistent and consistent actions to become the dominant state in the Indo-Pacific.** The shape of possible Chinese hegemony may be uniquely Chinese in character—a kind of Chinese hegemony with socialist characteristics. Covid-19 has made this more, rather than less, likely for three reasons.

First, the fundamental shift in the world’s centre of gravity from the Atlantic–Mediterranean region to the Indo-Pacific region has occurred faster than the West had planned for. China is the central actor in this drama, but ASEAN, India and others have also hastened the process.

Second, expectations from a decade ago that the balance of power between China and the United States would likely remain decisively in America’s favour at least for the first half of this century are being proved wrong.

China has not only demonstrated the determination to challenge American power in the Indo-Pacific, but it is building the capacity to neutralise America’s naval superiority in the Western Pacific. It is unlikely that China can, any longer, be confined within the first and second island chains in the Pacific.

Third, it is building a parallel universe in trade, technology and finance that will selectively reduce its vulnerabilities to American hegemony. China’s international behaviour in the year of Covid-19 gives legitimate cause for concern to the peripheral and proximate states of the Indo-Pacific.

China speaks of the ‘community of the shared future for mankind’, and ‘win–win cooperation’; it plays balance-of-power politics and acts in ways that take advantage of others in adversity. China’s aim is to establish its supremacy in areas of productive technology, trade networks and financing options in ways that shut out competition. The Belt and Road Initiative is creating a Sino-centric system of specifications, standards, norms and regulations that will favour China’s technology and services to the exclusion of others.

Those who worry that the primary problem with the BRI is the potentially high level of indebtedness that vulnerable Indo-Pacific economies may face are missing the larger point. Beijing doesn’t aim to impoverish its potential clients, but to ensure that their national systems are fully oriented towards the consumption of Chinese technology and services and are in sync with China’s strategic interests and policies.

Digital dependencies are integral to this objective. Huawei, 5G and fibre-optic networks are some of the ways that China is rewiring the region to its long-term benefit.

**In the Chinese version of hegemony, so long as its industry and services enjoy supremacy in the Indo-Pacific and thus ensure the prosperity and wellbeing of the Chinese people, China is content to provide the public goods and financing for the region’s benefit as a sugar-coated pill.**

**The other facet of China’s potential hegemony** **is** the idea **that** it is the region’s responsibility to accept and respect what **China** calls its **‘core’ concerns and interests**. These **are flexible and change according to the situation**, but are always non-negotiable. What is ‘core’ will always be defined by China. **The definition has expanded beyond issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity to cover economic, social and cultural issues**, and even the persona of the Chinese leader. Those who don’t fall in line are apt to be taught a ‘lesson’.