### **1**

#### **Interpretation: The affirmative must only defend the hypothetical implementation of the Uncondo Right to Strike.**

#### **Violation: 1. Cross-ex 2. Their advocacy states the aff as a general principle which is not the same as a policy action because we don’t get to use comparative worlds 3. AT BEST is extra-t because they also “adopt a deterritorialized form of possession and a nomadic property model to create a commons, where Daoist models of creativity and ownership can thrive.” which is outside the scope of the resolution. Hold them to the text of the 1ac since anything else allows them to shift our of our offense in the 1ar.**

#### **Standards:**

#### **Ground- we don’t get to read CPs or even DAs because those all are predicated upon the aff being a policy and they can spike out of links by saying we must prove the aff as a general principle is bad in a normative sense, kills fairness because none of my arguments stick and education because they can skirt questions of topic literature.**

#### **Burden of Rejoinder- the burden of the neg is to prove that the aff is a bad idea but we can’t do this when they’re a general principle because we become constrained to solely normative indicts and can’t test the aff from multiple angles. Kills neg flex and our ability to engage.**

#### **Engagement—they transform debate into a monologue where we can’t read CPs which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny.**

#### **TVA: Literally just defend the aff as a policy plan.**

#### **Vote neg – they’ve destroyed the round from the beginning and topicality’s key to set the correct model of debate which means it comes first.**

#### **Voter:**

#### **Evaluate T through competing interps—it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable**

#### **Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim**

#### **Drop the debater to deter future abuse**

#### **Fairness is an impact and comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.**

#### **Education is an impact – it’s the only reason schools fund debate**

#### **No RVIs—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad. 2] incentivizes baiting theory**

### **2-Dean K**

#### **Delueze’s understanding of capitalism is outdated and ensures a weakening of anti-capitalist movement structures.**

**Scapira & Dean 12** (Michael Schapira and Jodi Dean. 11-14-2012, "Jodi Dean," interview with Jodi Dean. Full Stop. https://www.full-stop.net/2012/11/14/interviews/michael-schapira/jodi-dean/) azi

Michael Schapira: We’re speaking on Election Day, concluding what you called on your blog a “bloated, hell storm of an election.” During the Republican primary and running through the general election you would hear people from the Right accuse Obama of being a Communist, Marxist, or Socialist, and pushing his ideological agenda on the American people. The Left would disavow these charges, saying how he is not any of these. Do you see anything revealed in the Right’s continued willingness to use the word Communist, verses the Left’s hesitation to claim any relationship to this word?

Jodi Dean: In short, the Left has been cowardly. The Left has let itself be completely defeated and beaten by not holding on to its own best achievements. It pushes away from these ideas and doctrines that have given it strength for 150 years – Socialism, Communism, Marxism, letting some of the facts of history incapacitate it.

The Right on the other hand takes its defeats and uses them to strengthen itself. It assumes that the Left does the same, but we just hide the fact that we are Marxists. It uses this to bring folks out by saying “you’re a Marxist,” knowing that the Left will retreat from it. On that one scale you see the difference in how the Right learns from and embraces its failures and the Left wallows in them in this pathetic way.

Additionally the Right knows that words matter, knows that there is a strength there, and I think the Left is sometimes afraid of strength, or afraid of what happens when the people have power.

But that’s also changing. We seem to be in a process where the Left is waking up. It’s been a long time since there has been a vocal Communist, Marxist, or Socialist Left. There have been individuals who have been Leftist obviously, but one significant change is that the Foucauldian/Deleuzian position doesn’t have legs anymore. People are tired of that. It doesn’t seem to address the primary problems facing the world.

Michael Schapira: This seems to relate to what you write in the book about the party. You write that “the power of the return of communism stands or falls on its capacity to inspire large-scale organized collective struggle toward a goal,” and to this end you are against calls to work exclusively outside of a party structure. Slavoj Zizek has been pointing to Syriza in Greece as an example of what this might look like (a coalition of the radical Left). Do you think Syriza is a good example of a renewed embrace of the party structure on the Left?

My discussion of the party in the book is really abstract, and for a couple of reasons. First, I want to encourage Leftists who have been influenced by Deleuze, Hart and Negri, identity politics, and all this swarmy stuff to think more seriously about tighter organizational structures. So that’s the first addressee, this general Left feeling of dispersion as a good thing. I want the Left to think, no, maybe it’s not a good thing, and maybe we need to think in terms of tighter structures like the party.

The next part is to think that maybe one way to do this and make it more attractive is to rethink what it is that a party does, what’s the point of a party. A typical critique of the Leninist party is that “oh it knows everything and tries to put itself at the vanguard of a linear theory of history, that it’s the one group that knows the truth.” Well, that’s actually historically wrong, it’s a parody and a ridiculous way to think about the party. So what I try and do in the book is to use [Georg] Lukács to think about the party as this overlap of two lacks. There is a kind of non-knowledge on the part of the party, and a non-knowledge on the part of the people. But these are held together in the commitment to a collective process, a collective moving forward. So it’s an effort to just try and rethink how one might even imagine a party.

To me that’s the theoretical part that matters. If we begin to ask whether it is necessarily a revolutionary party, or a reformist party, these questions are coming too quickly when in fact what we need to do is think about how we even understand organization.

#### **Delueze’s approach to capital creates revolutionary ambivalence, hierarchy and subjective paralysis that sabotages an effective challenge to capital.**

**Nail 13** (Thomas Nail, post-doctoral lecturer in European Philopsphy. 2013. “Deleuze, Occupy and the Actuality of Revolution.” Theory & Event , Volume: 16 Issue 1. <https://www.academia.edu/2973497/Deleuze_Occupy_and_the_Actuality_of_Revolution>) azi

(1) Political Ambivalence

“Affirming Difference in the state of permanent revolution [affirmer la Différence dans l’état de révolution permanente],” as Deleuze says in Difference and Repetition (75/53),8 may escape the previous problems of vanguardism and the party-state, but it also poses a new danger: that **the “pure affirmation of Difference” will be ultimately ambivalent**. Revolution may provide a new non-representational space of liberty, or it may provide a ruptured “open” domain for a new discourse of rights and military occupation by the state, or it may **merely reproduce a complicity** with the processes of capitalist deterritorialization necessary for new capitalist reterritorializations. Slavoj Žižek, in particular, frequently attributes this capitalist ambivalence to Deleuze and Guattari’s politics (2004, 184). But to say, with Alain Badiou, that affirming the potentiality for transformation as such is to affirm a “purely ideological radicality” that “**inevitably changes over into its opposite**: once the mass festivals of democracy and discourse are over, things make place for the modernist restoration of order among workers and bosses,” would be to overstate the problem (Badiou and Balmès 1976, 83).

Rather, it would be much more appropriate to say, with Paolo Virno, that “[t]he multitude is a form of being that can give birth to one thing but also to the other: ambivalence” (Virno 2003, 131). Accordingly, the affirmation of this ambivalence as a political commitment, and the “politico-ontological optimism and unapologetic vitalism” it assumes in Hardt, Negri, and Deleuze’s work, according to Bruno Bosteels, remains **radically insufficient** (2004, 95). While the **purely creative power** of the multitude may be the condition for global liberation from Empire, it is also the productive condition for Empire as well. With **no clear political consistency to organize** or motivate any particular political transformation “vitalist optimism” is politically ambivalent, speculative, and spontaneous. Showing the nonfoundational or ungrounded nature of politics provides no more of a contribution for organized politics than does the creative potentiality of desire. “A subject’s intervention,” Bosteels suggests, “cannot consist merely in showing or recognizing the traumatic impossibility, void, or antagonism around which the situation as a whole is structured” (2004, 104). Rather, following Badiou, **a “political organization is necessary** in order for the intervention, as wager, to make a process out of the trajectory that goes from an interruption to a fidelity. In this sense, organization is nothing but the consistency of politics” (Badiou 1985, 12). And in so far as Deleuze and Guattari, and those inspired by their work, do not offer developed concepts of political consistency and organization that would bring differential multiplicities into specific political interventions and distributions, **they remain**, at most, **ambivalent toward revolutionary politics.**

(2) Virtual Hierarchy

In addition to this first danger of revolutionary ambivalence, Deleuze’s concept of revolution, according to Badiou and Hallward, risks a second danger; namely, that of **creating a political hierarchy of virtual potential**. Badiou argues at length in The Clamor of Being that,

… contrary to all egalitarian or “communitarian” norms, Deleuze’s conception of thought is profoundly aristocratic. Thought only exists in a hierarchized space. This is because, for individuals to attain the point where they are seized by their preindividual determination and, thus, by the power of the One-All—of which they are, at the start, only meager local configurations—they have to go beyond their limits and endure the transfixion and disintegration of their actuality by infinite virtuality, which is actuality’s veritable being. And individuals are not equally capable of this. Admittedly, Being is itself neutral, equal, outside all evaluation … But ‘things reside unequally in this equal being’ (Deleuze 1994, 60/37). And, as a result, it is essential to think according to ‘a hierarchy which considers things and beings from the point of view of power’ (Deleuze 1994, 60/37; Badiou 1999, 12–13).

The political thrust of this argument is that, if we understand revolutionary change as the pure potential for change as such, and not actual change for or against certain forms, then, contrary to any kind of egalitarianism, there will instead be **a hierarchy of actual political beings** that more or less participate in this degree of pure potential transformation. The more actual political beings renounce their specific and local determinations and affirm their participation in the larger processes of difference-in-itself, the more powerful they become. Thus, if the point of examining any local political intervention is in every case to show to what degree it renounces its concrete determinations and might “become other than it is” (as a virtuality or potentiality), there is, according to Badiou, **a risk of “asceticism” and hierarchy** in such a relationship of potential (Badiou 1999, 13).

Similarly, Peter Hallward has argued that Deleuze’s political philosophy is “indifferent to the politics of this world” (2006, 162). Hallward claims that “once a social field is defined less by its conflicts and contradictions than by the lines of flight running through it” any distinctive space for political action can only be subsumed within the more general dynamics of creation, life, and potential transformation (2006, 62n16). And since these dynamics are “themselves antidialectical if not anti-relational, there can be **little room in Deleuze’s philosophy for relations of conflict** and solidarity” (2006, 162). If each concrete, localized, actual political being is important only in so far as it realizes a degree of pure potentiality of a virtual event, “and every mortal event in a single Event” (Deleuze 1990, 178/152), then the processional “telos” of absolute political deterritorialization is completely indifferent to the actual politics of this world (2006, 97). By valorizing this pure potentiality for transformation as such against all actual political determinations, Hallward argues, Deleuze is guilty of **affirming an impossible utopianism**. “By posing the question of politics in the starkly dualistic terms of war machine or state,” Hallward argues, “by posing it, in the end, in the apocalyptic terms of a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth—the political aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy amounts to **little more than utopian distraction**” (2006, 162).

(3) Subjective Paralysis

The differential reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of revolution may be able to avoid the problem of representational subjectivity—that it can reject or affirm particular desires but never change the nature of the “self that desires”—but it does so only at the risk of diffusing the self into an endless multiplicity of impersonal drives: a self in perpetual transformation. This leads to the third danger, that of subjective paralysis. Firstly, to read Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of revolutionary subjectivity as the “simple fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality” (Agamben 1993, 43), or as Paul Patton calls it, one’s “critical freedom” (“the freedom to transgress the limits of what one is presently capable of being or doing, rather than just the freedom to be or do those things” (2000, 85) suggests **an ambivalence of action.** What are the conditions and factors by which one might decide to take an action or not? Emancipation and enslavement in this sense are merely just different things to be done.

Secondly, without a pre-given unity of subjectivity, how do agents qua multiplicities deliberate between and distinguish (in themselves) different political decisions? Without the representational screen of reason, or the stateguaranteed grounds of political discourse, what might something like a dispute or agreement look like? If “becoming other is not a capacity liberated individuals possess to constitute themselves as autonomous singularities,” but “what defines ‘autonomy’ itself” (2006, 146), as Simon Tormey argues, then the political danger, according to Hallward, is that **the subject is simply replaced** by the larger impersonal process of transformation as such: “pure autonomy.” The radical affirmation of the ambivalent and unlocalizable processes of subjective potentiality (qua pure multiplicities) seems then to have nothing to contribute to an analysis of the basic function of participatory democracy and collective decision-making, which remains at the core of many of today’s radical political struggles (See Starr, Martinez-Torres, and Rosset 2011). Insofar as a theory of subjectivity is defined only by its potential for transformation, it is stuck in a kind of paralysis of **endless** potential change **no less disempowering than subjective stasis.** Or, as Hallward frames this criticism, Deleuze “abandons the decisive subject in favor of our more immediate subjection to the imperative of creative life or thought” (2006, 163).

These criticisms articulate three dangers to be avoided, both in reading Deleuze and Guattari as well as in the practical philosophy of revolution.

#### **The alternative is embracing party politics. This means building a radical coalition that unifies all marginalized by different forms of oppression to challenge capitalism and imperialism. Black Panther Party proves concrete action outside of the state is possible and successful.**

[Curry Stephenson **Malott**. “In Defense of Communism Against Critical Pedagogy, Capitalism, and Trump.” Critical Education 8, no. 1 (20**17**).] WWEY

In her discussion of the International Section of the Black Panther Party Kathleen Cleaver (1998), echoing Harry Haywood, notes that the Party understood that, “Black self-determination was not feasible under American imperialist domination” (p. 212). Cleaver (1998) notes that while the BPP’s membership was exclusively Black, their message and practice was geared more toward the communist ethic of power to the people and the unification of all anti-imperialist movements and workers’ states rather than on the more isolationist practice of Black nationalism and Black Power. Regarding the revolution in Algeria, which the CIA was concerned would pave the way for rise to power of communists through the National Liberation Front (NLF) (Blum, 2004), Cleaver (1998) notes that, “the Panthers admired the Algerian revolution and considered its victory a powerful example of the ability of oppressed people to attain power over their destiny” (p. 213). Black Panther Party members would be represented at the Organization of African Unity conferences hosted in Algeria and had visited and established relationships with workers’ statesas Cuba and the DPRK. The BPP therefore struggled to extend the communist movement in the U.S. which was difficult given the limitations of the CP-USA and the SWP as demonstrated by Marcy (1976). Huey P. Newton was not only the BPP’s co-founder, but he was also its revolutionary theoretician, and, as such, was continuously engaged in the process of developing the Party’s tendency, the influences of which were wide-ranging, including Marxist-Leninism. Newton (1995) would eventually come to adopt what is obviously Lenin’s (1917/2015) framework outlined in The State and Revolution. For example, Newton (1995), in a creative twist on Lenin, would argue that U.S. imperialism had negated the conditions for states to exist such as economic and territorial sovereignty. Newton (1995) therefore argued that the world consisted not of states or nations, but of imperialists, on one hand, and dominated or colonized oppressed communities on the other. From this point of view Cuba, China, the Soviet Union, and the DPRK were examples of liberated communities. Oppressed communities within the U.S. such as the Black community, from this perspective, should follow the example of liberated communities adopting their revolutionary goals adapted for the American context. The Panthers therefore argued for a unified struggle of all oppressed communities the world over aimed at destroying imperialism and the capitalist system in general and replacing it with communism. Under communism, in accordance with Lenin’s model, Newton was adamant that oppressed communities would retain their right to self-determination, realized under the protection of democratic centralism dedicated to fighting the counterrevolutionaries of the capitalist class. Newton also understood that racism and all manner of bigotry would also have to be eradicated through education in order for the proletarian state to be able to wither away and for communism to be able to flourish freely. The BPP’s first campaign was the establishment of a regularized armed patrol targeting the state’s Oakland Police Department due to their history of terrorizing and murdering members of the Black community, the vast majority of which represented some of the highest concentrations of unskilled, super-exploited workers. The BPP understood that the role of the police was to employ deadly force to create an intimidation-based consent to extreme exploitation. Huey Newton, who has been described as a youth of rare brilliance, at the height of his popularity, commanded the respect and commitment of the African American community across the country, leading to the establishment of BPP chapters from coast to coast. A fundamental component of why Newton was so dangerous in the eyes of the U.S. bourgeoisie was because he understood that the global proletariat was a great chain, and each conglomeration of workers around the world can be thought of as links in the great chain. What happens to workers in England affects workers and the price of their labor in the U.S. Lenin applied this insight to unions and the role of the strike. When one shop strikes and wins victories, they affect the average price of labor within the whole branch of industry, and can also inspire workers in the same region to take similar actions, thereby affecting other branches of industry. Newton, familiar with the work and tradition of Harry Haywood, employed this concept in the U.S. to understand how racism was used to push down the price of labor amongst Black and Brown workers, and in turn, their communities, and because all workers are links in the same chain, the overall price of labor within the whole country is suppressed. From this view it makes little sense to hold on to colonial structures and pressure more privileged white workers to paternalistically support more oppressed and exploited workers as a moral act because it is far more revolutionary for more privileged workers and less privileged workers to dissolve their class differences through revolutionary struggle as comrades. This requires an engagement with racial differences within the labor market rather than pretending they do not exist. The anti-communism of the American Left is so deep-seated that it is uncommon in retrospective discussions of the BPP to acknowledge that they were a Party in the communist sense that stood in solidarity with workers’ states. For example, as a political prisoner in the U.S., BPP leader George Jackson found inspiration in the political writings of imprisoned Palestinians in Israel (Pierce, 2015). The BPP not only was a descendant of Malcolm X, but they were also following in the communist footsteps of Harry Haywood, adopting much of his analysis and practice. They regularly sent delegations to workers’ states, and routinely distributed Maoist literature at their rallies. Perhaps the internal contradictions of the BPP were too great to overcome, as some commentators suggest. However great their errors were, however, the evidence seems to suggest that the FBI’s COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Programs) operations played the most decisive role in the destruction and elimination of the BPP. The same can be said of the SWP and the CP-USA who had been subjected to COINTELPRO operations since the 1940s (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1990). The goal of COINTELPRO was to disrupt, discredit, and neutralize communism and the political Left in general. Churchill and Vander Wall (1990) describe this war as secret because it was. The FBI, for example, would employ agent provocateurs who would infiltrate the ranks of the BPP in order to foment internal dissent within the organization as well as provide authorities with critical intelligence that could be used against the radicals. For example, the FBI would employ convicts as undercover agents to infiltrate groups like the BPP. William O’Neal was such a character who joined the BPP as an undercover FBI agent. O’Neal would eventually work his way up the ranks of the BPP and become Fred Hampton’s personal security guard. Hampton was of interest to the FBI because he was the Chairman of the Chicago chapter of the BPP and a dynamic, influential revolutionary leader who had made great strides in fostering working class solidarity across racial lines. O’Neal seems to have drugged Hampton and provided the FBI and Chicago PD with a floor plan of Hampton’s apartment making it much easier to execute his assassination, which was carried out in1969 on December 4that approximately 4:30 AM (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1990). Among the tactics employed by COINTELPRO operatives to neutralize the BPP nationwide included eavesdropping, sending bogus mail, “black propaganda” operations, disinformation or “gray propaganda,” harassment arrests, infiltrators and agent provocateurs, “pseudo gangs,” bad-jacketing, fabrication of evidence, and assassinations (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1990). While most of these tactics require explanations and examples to develop a full understanding, suffice it to say that the FBI’s efforts to destroy the communist movement within America’s Black working class was only limited by the creative deviancy of COINTELPRO agents. At the first Black Radical Tradition conference at Temple University in early January 2016, Mumia Abu-Jamal, phoning in from prison to deliver a keynote presentation, argued that the FBI’s secret war to exterminate and neutralize the BPP was designed to not only obliterate them, but to replace them. That is, the goal was to remove the Black community’s organic leadership and replace it with a puppet leadership no different than the way the imperialist U.S. military has instituted regime changes across the globe, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan and as is the current goal for Syria. The Black bourgeois leadership class that has emerged in the U.S. might be understood as serving this purpose. Globally, the Soviet Union, and the communist movement more generally, have suffered the same fate at the hands of the imperialist counterrevolutionaries. Whether operating within the U.S. through federal and state police agencies or outside the U.S. through the military and the CIA the physical bourgeois assault on the communist horizon has been fundamental. This imperialist thread is also another link in the chain of the global class war. The coalescing of the revolutionary center of gravity with that of the economic center will be the great turning point in...history. The first truly revolutionary outburst on the social soil of the American continent will light the flames of a new revolutionary conflagration which is sure to envelop the entire globe. It will graphically demonstrate how "East meets west” not by the construction of new and more tortuous artificial, boundaries, but by the revolutionary destruction of all of them. It will be the supreme and ultimate alliance of the great truly progressive classes of the East and West in a final effort to accomplish their own dissolution. This in turn will terminate the first great cycle of man’s development from sub-man—man—to Communist Man, and set him on the path to new and higher syntheses.(Marcy, 1950, p. 41)What Marcy describes here began to take place in 1966 with the birth of the Black Panther Party. Rather than realizing its global revolutionary vision, its leaders were murdered, imprisoned and demonized. Despite this and other setbacks, the ultimate unification of the world’s proletarian masses, united around a shared vision of communism, remains the unrealized potential of the present, capitalist moment. However, even though it is changing, the communist vision is still stigmatized as incomplete, outdated, or hopelessly Eurocentric. That is, this communist coming-to-be should not be interpreted as the violent imposition of a European conception of being forced onto non-European and indigenous subjectivities. Rather, communism offers a global economic structure where indigenous subjectivities can be reformulated after centuries of physical, biological and cultural genocide. The communist traditions ‘conception of Oppressed Nations offers a more complete picture of how the sovereignty of the world’s indigenous peoples would be an integral component of a socialist future. Marx’s notion of each according to her ability and each according to her need offers a more philosophical approach to understanding the inclusiveness of a communist ethic. Marcy’s work is crucial because he is absolutely clear that the threat of US imperialism situated in a world forever at war, makes all states dedicate such a large portion of their national productive capacity on the military to render serious efforts for socialist planning nearly impossible. For this reason, Marcy (1950) argues that the center of global capitalist economic power, which is the U.S., must develop into the center of global revolutionary gravity. Marcy therefore suggests that only through the defeat of U.S. imperialism can the unification of the global proletarian class camp be realized. This, perhaps, remains true today. Each day then, Lenin (1917/2015) grows more relevant and more urgent. Ironically enough there is a strong tendency within the U.S. Left, and the educational Left in particular, that argues that the actual communists, communists in China, the former Soviet Union, and the DPRK, are not the real communists, but state capitalists betraying the spirit and intent of Marx. The arrogance of such positions is absurd, even taking into consideration the imperfections of real existing communism. Given the anti-communist nature of U.S. society, I believe that other potential communists, people like myself who had been involved in Marxism and/or critical pedagogy for decades, might struggle with the necessary solidarity with the aforementioned communist states. This is important because members of communist parties cannot pick and choose which aspects of the Party’s platform to support and defend. Party members, correctly in my view, must support and defend the entireplatform. To clarify whata communist Party program entails I will briefly turn to the PSL as an example. The purpose here is not to provide a complete overview, but to spark the reader’s interest.

#### **The role of the ballot is consistency with the politics of comradery. This results in a clean break in capitalism that allows us to reimagine political work and transcend capital’s limitations on what is possible and feasible. Absent this framing, all movements and coalitions inevitably collapse under the strain of competing interests and the lack of connection.**

Jodi **Dean 19** () “Comrade - An Essay on Political Belonging” Verso, 10-01-2019, http://library.lol/main/429C9EC2E2F0AA8DCC33FE2CC178B11D. Accessed 6-27-2021, WWEY

The comrade relation remakes the place from which one sees, what it is possible to see, and what possibilities can appear. It enables the revaluation of work and time, what one does, and for whom one does it. Is one’s work done for the people or for the bosses? Is it voluntary or done because one has to work? Does one work for personal provisions or for a collective good? We should recall Marx’s lyrical description of communism in which work becomes “life’s prime want.” We get a glimpse of that in comradeship: one wants to do political work. You don’t want to let down your comrades; you see the value of your work through their eyes, your new collective eyes. Work, determined not by markets but by shared commitments, becomes fulfilling. French communist philosopher and militant Bernard Aspe discusses the problem of contemporary capitalism as a loss of “common time”; that is, the loss of an experience of time generated and enjoyed through our collective being-together.10 From holidays, to meals, to breaks, whatever common time we have is synchronized and enclosed in forms for capitalist appropriation. Communicative capitalism’s apps and trackers amplify this process such that the time of consumption can be measured in much the same way that Taylorism measured the time of production: How long did a viewer spend on a particular web page? Did a person watch a whole ad or click off of it after five seconds? In contrast, the common action that is the actuality of communist movement induces a collective change in capacities. Breaking from capitalism’s 24-7 injunctions to produce and consume for the bosses and owners, the discipline of common struggle expands possibilities for action and intensifies the sense of its necessity. The comrade is a figure for the relation through which this transformation of work and time occurs. How do we imagine political work? Under conditions where political change seems completely out of reach, we might imagine political work asself-transformation. At the very least, we can work on ourselves. In the intensely mediated networks of communicative capitalism, we might see our social media engagements as a kind of activism where Twitter and Facebook function as important sites of struggle. Perhaps we understand writing as important political work and hammer out opinion pieces, letters to the editors, and manifestoes. When we imagine political work, we often take electoral politics as our frame of reference, focusing on voting, lawn signs, bumper stickers, and campaign buttons. Or we think of activists as those who arrange phone banks, canvass door-to-door, and set up rallies. In yet another political imaginary, we might envision political work as study, whether done alone or with others. We might imagine political work as cultural production, the building of new communities, spaces, and ways of seeing. Our imaginary might have a militant, or even militarist, inflection: political work is carried out through marches, occupations, strikes, and blockades; through civil disobedience, direct action, and covert operations. Even with the recognition of the wide array of political activities, the ways people use them to respond to specific situations and capacities, and how they combine to enhance each other, we might still imagine radical political work as punching a Nazi in the face. Throughout these various actions and activities, how are the relations among those fighting on the same side imagined? How do the activists and organizers, militants and revolutionaries relate to one another? During the weeks and months when the Occupy movement was at its peak, relations with others were often infused with a joyous sense of being together, with an enthusiasm for the collective co-creation of new patterns of action and ways of living.11 But the feeling didn’t last. The pressures of organizing diverse people and politics under conditions of police repression and real material need wore down even the most committed activists. Since then, on social media and across the broader left, relations among the politically engaged have again become tense and conflicted, often along lines of race and gender. Dispersed and disorganized, we’re uncertain of whom to trust and what to expect. We encounter contradictory injunctions to self-care and call out. Suspicion undermines support. Exhaustion displaces enthusiasm. Attention to comradeship, to the ways that shared expectations make political work not just possible but also gratifying, may help redirect our energies back to our common struggle. As former CPUSA member David Ross explained to Gornick:

### **Case**


On case


Cutting cards in the middle of a paragraph is a voting issue. Strawmanning DA- taken out of context which turns any education offence cuz we can't understand Daosim if its taken out of context. Literally cheating and a D rule for the judge- incentives and justifies debaters to cut evidence to say things it doesn’t say. It’s about the norms you set. Even if it was a mistake, you should still lose. No exceptions, Baseball players can hollow out their bat to make the ball go further, but even if they didnt know it and picked up the wrong bat, you lose anyway.

Here’s the paper:

Bruncevic 15 evidence

<https://www.academia.edu/18563828/We_need_to_talk_about_the_cultural_commons_Some_musings_on_rhizomatic_jurisprudence_and_access_to_art>





#### **Framing issue – they don’t get a permutation:**

(a) it’s incoherent – the NC indicts their methodology of capitalism and ceding the political and the alt is a complete rejection of it, you can’t both categorically reject and uphold cap simultaneously, thus any attempted perms would be intrinsic (b) it’s a methods debate – you should hold them to the method they defended in the 1AC by itself since anything else justifies and endorses severance which endorses bad scholarship as it should be a debate of my method versus yours, and (c) perms justify infinite affs (

#### **Recognition by the state is good — rights re-define citizenship. State involvement is inevitable because autonomous movements can never be secret.**

**King 16** — Natasha King, professor at the University of Nottingham, former caseworker with the British Refugee Council, 2016 (“Acts of Citizenship,” *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance,* published by Zed Books Ltd, Available Online At <https://books.google.com/books/about/No_Borders.html?id=EetiDgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q=acts%20of%20citizenship&f=false>, Accessed 9-11-2018, pp. 39-42)

But to what extent are these experiments in autonomy ever entirely autonomous? In response to Richard Day’s book on the newest social movements, Richard Thompson argues that it’s unrealistic to talk about creating wholly autonomous social structures because ‘[t]he second they’re consequential is the second **they’ll be noticed [by the state].** At that point, it becomes **impossible** to break the cycle of antagonism by will alone. They will come after us’ (Thompson n.d., emphasis added). In other words, experiments in autonomy are rarely (if ever) entirely free from a relation to the state, or from state antagonism, and we are rarely able to ignore that antagonism. We may antagonize the state, but **we are forced also to respond to the state**, as a form of self-defence. This has happened time and time again, from the steady illegalization of squatting in Europe, and the tightening of laws around private property, to the infiltration by the CIA of the Black Panther movement, to the struggle between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state. We see this in the struggle for the freedom of movement when, continuing with the examples above, the EU employs Frontex special missions on the Turkish/Greek borders, or when the living spaces of people without papers are raided or destroyed.

Whether people have been forced to, or they have seen it as the best strategy, **the history of struggles for liberation has been one that included demands on the state**. Often this has taken the form of engagement in a politics of rights and/or recognition. From the movement of the Sans Papiers in France, to ‘a Day without Migrants’ in the USA; from campaigns that fight against the detention and deportation of people without papers, to struggles against police violence, resistance through forms of visible collective action have been central to struggles against the border. In most cases **such struggles have made demands on the state**, **particularly through seeking recognition as a group,** and through making claims to rights. But to what extent are demands for rights and/or recognition part of a no borders politics?

Demands for rights and recognition have played a big part in the struggle for the freedom of movement. Yet there has been a long history of criticism over the politics of citizenship. Rights claims, for example, have been seen as essentially reinforcing the role of the state as the benefactor and grantor of rights, and reinforcing the notion that rights represent entitlements applicable to those who fit certain descriptions of being a human (cf. Arendt 1973 [1951]; Barbagallo and Beuret 2008; Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; Elam 1994). From this perspective, demands for rights and representation amount to disputes over the allocation of equality and therefore can only ever achieve a redistribution of that equality, rather than undermining the idea that equality is somehow qualified in the first place. As Imogen Tyler says, ‘[c]itizenship is a famously exclusionary concept, and its exclusionary force is there by design. The exclusions of citizenship are immanent to its logic, and not at all accidental. Citizenship is meant to produce successful and unsuccessful subjects. Citizenship, in other words, is “designed to fail”’ (Tyler, quoted in Nyers 2015: 31).

Similar variations of this critique have appeared in the autonomy of migration debate. Representation can also be thought of as a bordering technology that seeks to pacify and discipline expressions of autonomy (or attempts at escape) (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). In other words, the politics of citizenship is problematic because it only ever brings people into the state. ‘Of course migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights’ (ibid.: 219).

I have a lot of sympathy with these arguments, and because of them am extremely suspicious of a politics of citizenship. **But when it comes to actual practices of struggle against the border, a resolute stand against such strategies seems naïve**, **and insulting to those who have taken part.** Migrant-led struggles have often been claims for rights, and ultimately **I don’t want to dismiss such practices because they are philosophically problematic**. In fact, sometimes to appeal to rights or recognition is the only available strategy in situations of extreme vulnerability, where people’s options are highly limited. Recognizing that we are in relations of power right now means also recognizing that **our situation is imperfect and that we have to struggle in our (imperfect) reality**. Youssef, a long-time activist for the freedom of movement in Greece, himself of North African descent, talked about the need for pragmatism in tactics; that sometimes we must engage with the state in order to bring about greater freedoms now. ‘Today, in Creta, in Chania, they will catch five people. How can I take them from the jail? I have something in the police station, OK. I have to talk with them today. OK? But tomorrow I can fuck him. He’s not my friend. He’s not my comrade. OK. We are talking today. Tomorrow we are fucking’ (interview, Youssef). His statement reflects how many practices that refuse the border often come out of necessity. In other words they’re rarely part of some intentional or ‘noble’ act to become a rights-bearer, say, and **more often pragmatic decisions based on the need to alleviate immediate situations of oppression.**

A no borders politics seeks to go beyond claims to representation and rights that ultimately stand to reinforce the state. **But claims to representation and rights can sometimes do this too**. Building on Foucault’s idea that **power can be** both **positive and empowering** or negative and dominating, Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty suggest that fighting oppression involves seeing power in a way that refuses totalizing visions of it and can therefore account for the possibility of resistance, as in creating something new, within existing power relations (Martin and Mohanty 2003: 104). Suggesting that representation only ever brings people into power therefore means rejecting a vast range of moments when the oppressed have voiced their refusal to be reduced to non-beings outside of politics (Sharma 2009: 475). In other words, resistance is not only or always a reaction to the constraining effects of dominating power, but can also express power as something positive and liberating. From the Black Panthers to the Sans Papiers, **demands for representation,** when carried out by minority groups for themselves, **can challenge the role of dominant power over that group and create new, emancipated subjectivities** (Goldberg 1996; Malik 1996). Depending on who it is that acts, then, in some cases demands for recognition/rights can be a radical and transformative political act (Nyers 2015. See also Butler and Spivak 2007; Isin 2008; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). As Nandita Sharma suggests, in response to Papadopoulos et al.’s book Escape Routes, we must recognise that making life and fashioning our subjectivities are intimately intertwined and making ‘new social bodies’ … is not the same as bringing people back into power through identity politics (or identity policing). It is important to recognise that there are significant qualitative differences between subjectivities. There are those that Papadopoulos et al. rightly discuss as bringing us directly back into power – and which account for most of the subjectivities that people hold today (‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘heterosexual’, ‘homosexual’, ‘native’ and so on) – but there are also those that are born of practices of escape. (Sharma 2009: 473, emphasis in original)

#### **K turns the case - ambivalence of becoming can never be revolutionary absent analysis of intermediate political consequences**

Thomas **Nail 12**, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at University of Denver, PhD from University of Oregon, "Returning to Revolution: Deleuze, Guattari and Zapatismo," 2012

Revolution, according to Patton, is a groundless, unconditioned, unthinkable (in-itself) difference ‘that is the condition of there being events at all’ (2009: 42). Insofar as actual political struggles exhibit this ‘hermeneutical sublime in the highest degree . . . they realise the potential break with existing frameworks of understanding’ (2009: 43). They constitute a ‘pure exteriority and metamorphosis’ (2000: 114) (absolute deterritorialisation) from the state of affairs and its processes of representation. Rather than presuppose existing political conditions, revolution, or the pure eventness of transformation, change and becoming itself, Patton argues, must be considered as ‘the source or condition of the emergence of the new’ (2009: 50).¶ Similarly, as Dan Smith argues in ‘Deleuze and the Production of the New’, ‘if identity (A is A) were the primary principle, that is, if identities were already pregiven, then there would in principle be no production of the new (no new differences)’ (2008: 151). Thus, Smith continues, ‘for Deleuze, the conditions of the new can be found only in a principle of difference’ (2008: 151), ‘no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them temporarily’ (Deleuze 1994: 56/38). While Patton and Smith accurately develop the important concept of ‘difference-in-itself’ drawn from Deleuze’s earlier works, I believe that this concept not only remains unable to account for a theory of revolutionary intervention and political change but even risks blocking it by affirming the unconditioned ambivalence and non-relational ‘exteriority’ of political action. By valorising revolution as the unconditioned (real) potentiality for ‘change as such’ (liberatory change as well as nonliberatory change) or what Patton calls ‘critical freedom’ (2000: 83), radical politics remains optimistically tied to an ultimately indifferent and ambivalent principle of difference for its own sake: the aleatory temporal constitution no less than the destruction of individuals; or spontaneous insurrection.¶ However, the contemporary return to revolution, I argue, is more than an affirmation that ‘another world is possible’. And insofar as revolution affirms pure eventness ‘as that part of every event that escapes its own actualisation’ exterior to history, it remains ultimately (in its pure form) abstracted from all actual and concrete political relations as well as different **political events in their specificity**. To be clear, this is not the same criticism well refuted by John Protevi in his review of Peter Hallward’s Out of This World (Protevi 2006). It is not the case that the virtual simply remains abstractly above the actual as a spiritual realm. Insofar as revolution is the ‘general transformative movement between actualization and counter-actualization’, it remains **non-related to any determinate quasi-causal political event and its** singular **concrete consequences.** It remains **unable to conceptualise the multiple intermediate stages of any local political intervention. I disagree that concrete revolutionary struggles are radical only insofar as they abandon their actual relations and affirm ‘only’ their capacity to become-other**-as-such in a pure becoming-actual-becoming-virtual.¶ II. A Time for Revolution ¶ THE FUTURE ANTERIOR¶ How then are we to understand political transformation such that a non-representational revolutionary praxis is not merely possible but **actually constructed**? Distinct from the notion that revolutionary intervention is based on opposition and from the notion that it is a form of pure ‘eventness’ that conditions all events as such, in this next section I argue for a third position. In order to understand the contemporary return to revolution we need to analyse four **intermediate and concrete stages** that take place between the processes of representation (developed in Chapter 1) on the one hand, and the so-called pure exteriority of ‘eventness’ or ‘absolute deterritorialisation’ on the other. Between the pre-given facts, subjects and objects of the situation and their history (the past) and the radically unconditioned potentiality for their transformation ‘to come’ (the future), I argue, there are four intermediate **stages of political transformation** distributed by a revolutionary event.

### **Aff Fails**

#### **Movements disad -- people focus on group similarities as the basis for a politics, so flux destroys these coalitions.**

Joseph Schwartz 8, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 56-61

Butler, Brown, and Connolly reject the essentialism of “narrow” identity politics as an inverted “ressentiment” of the Enlightenment desire for a universal, homogenized identity. They judge identity politics to be a politics of “wounding, resentment, and victimization” that only can yield bad-faith moralization Wendy Brown takes to task identity politics for “essentializing” conceptions of group identity. For example, she critiques the work of Catherine MacKinnon as epitomizing “identity” political theory, accusing MacKinnon of denying women agency by depicting them purely as victims.38 Brown also remains wary of the patriarchal, conformist nature of traditional left conceptions of solidarity and citizenship. Brown’s implicit concept of radical democratic citizenship rests upon the recognition that political identity is continually in flux and is socially constituted through “agonal” political struggle. Brown celebrates an Arendtian conception of a polity in which both shared and particular identities are continually open to reconstruction. In this “left Nietzschean” view of an “everyperson’s” will to power, there can be no cultural certainties or political givens, as such “givens” would repress difference and fluidity.39 But, if the human condition is a world of permanent flux, then we must postulate a human capability of living with constant insecurity, for in this world there can be no stable political institutions or political identities.40 An ability to calculate the probabilities of political actions or public policies would disappear in this world of infinite liminality. By assuming that the pre-eminent democratic value is that of leaving all issues as permanently open to question, post-structuralist “democratic theory” **eschews the theoretical and political struggle over what established institutions** and consensual values **are needed to underpin a democratic society**.¶ Post-structuralist analysis has contributed to a healthy suspicion of narrow and “essentializing” identity politics. But a self-identified feminist, African- American, or lesbian activist is likely to value the shared historical narratives that partly constitute such group identities. Of course, if one is a democrat and a pluralist, one would reject the oppressive homogenization and potentially authoritarian aspects of ethnic or racial chauvinism and of “essentializing” types of identity politics. The democratic political home should be open, fluid, and self-reflective; but if participation is to be open to all, then such a society also needs to reproduce a shared democratic culture and the institutional guarantee of democratic rights. That is, contrary to post-structuralist analysis, not all issues can be open to “agonal struggle” in a democratic society. The traditional radical democratic critique of democratic capitalism remains valid; the equal worth of the individual is devalued by rampant social inequality within and between groups. Thus, a radical democrat, whether post-structuralist or not, must not only be committed to institutional protections of political and civil rights, but also to social rights—the equal access to the basic goods of citizenship (education, **health care**, housing, child care). Of course, the precise nature and extent of these rights will be politically contested and constructed. But a democratic society cannot leave as totally “open” the minimal institutional basis of democracy— a democratic society cannot be agnostic as to the value of freedom of speech, association, and universal suffrage.¶ Social movements fighting for an expansion of civil, political, and social rights, rarely, if ever, rest their arguments on appeals to epistemological truths— whether “foundational” or “anti-foundational.” To remain democratic, their policy goals cannot be so specific that they preclude political argument about both their worth and how best to institutionalize them. If social movements in a 58 democratic society deemed that every policy defeat meant a betrayal of basic democratic principles, there would be no give-and-take or winners and losers within democratic politics. But if a government were to abolish freedom of speech and competitive elections, or deny a social group basic rights, it would be reasonable for an observer to judge that democratic principles had been violated. Democratic political movements and coalitions struggle to construct **shared meanings** about those political, civil, and social rights that should be guaranteed to all citizens—and they often work to expand the types of persons to be recognized as citizens (such as excluded immigrants). **Such arguments are inevitably grounded in normative arguments that go beyond merely asserting the import of “flux,” “difference,”** and “anti-essentialism.” The civil rights movement did not demand equal rights for all solely as an “agonal” assertion of the will of the excluded; they desired to gain for persons of color an established set of civil and political rights that had been granted to some citizens and denied to others. The movement correctly assumed that the exclusion of citizens from full political and civil rights violated the basic norms of a democratic society. Thus, postmodern epistemological commitments to “flux” and “openness” cannotin-and-of-themselvessustain the “fixed” moral positions needed to sustain a radical democracy.¶ Post-structuralist theorists openly proclaim their hostility to all philosophical “meta-narratives.” They reject comprehensive conceptions of how society operates and the type of society that would best instantiate human freedom. But post-structuralists go beyond rejecting “meta-narratives”; they insist that only an “anti-foundational” epistemology can ground a politics of emancipation. For Butler, Brown, and Connolly, not only do “meta-discourses” invariably fail in their efforts to ground moral positions in a theory of human nature or human reason. They also assert that an agonal politics of democratic “we” formation can alone sustain democratic society. This agonal politics, they claim, can only be sustained by a recognition of the inconstant signification of discourse and the ineluctable flux of personal and group identity.41 Rejecting the authoritarian, celebration of the “ubermensch” by Nietzsche, they offer a post-Nietzschean, “amoral” conception of democracy as an open-ended project of defining a self and community that is constantly open to the desires of “others.” These theorists constantly reiterate the definitiveness (dare we say “foundational truth”) of this grounding of democracy, **despite the historical reality that social movements often contest dominant narratives in the name of a stable alternative narrative of a democratic and pluralist community.¶** One might well contend that the post-structuralist political stance is guilty of a new meta-narrative of “bad faith,” that of “anti-foundationalism.” According to this anti-foundational politics, a true democrat must reject any and all a priori truths allegedly grounded upon the nature of human reason or human nature. A committed democrat may well be skeptical of such neo-Kantian or neo-Hegelian conceptions of freedom; but, many committed democrats justify their moral commitments using these philosophical methods. A democrat might also reject (or accept) the arguments of a Jurgen Habermas or Hans Georg Gadamer that the structure of human linguistic communication contains within it the potential for a society based on reasoned argument rather than manipulation and domination. But there are numerous other philosophically “pragmatic” ways to justify democracy, even utilitarian ones. Political democrats may well disagree about the best philosophical defense of democracy. But, invariably, “practicing democrats” will defend the belief (however philosophically “proved” or “justified”) that democratic regimes best fulfill the moral commitment to the equal worth of persons and to the equal potential of human beings to freely develop and pursue their life plans.¶ To contend that only an anti-foundationalist, anti-realist epistemology can sustain democracy is to argue precisely for a foundational metaphysical grounding for the democratic project. It is to contend that one’s epistemology determines one’s politics. Hence, Brown and Butler both spoke at a spring 1998 academic conference at the University of California at Santa Cruz where some attributed “reactionary” and “left cultural conservatism” to belief in “reactionary” “foundationalist humanism.”42 **Post-structuralism cannot escape its own essentialist conception of identity.** For example, Butler contends in Feminist Contentions that democratic feminists must embrace the post-structuralist “nondefinability of woman” as best suited to open democratic constitution of what it is to be a “woman.”43 But this is itself a “closed” position and runs counter to the practices of many democratic feminist activists who have tried to develop a pluralist, yet collective identity around the shared experiences of being a woman in a patriarchal society (of course, realizing that working-class women and women of color experience patriarchy in some ways that are distinct from the patriarchy experienced by middle-class white women).¶ One query that post-structuralist theorists might ask themselves: **has there ever existed a mass social movement that defined its primary “ethical” values as being those of “instability and flux”?** Certainly many sexual politics activists are cognizant of the fluid nature of sexuality and sexual and gender identity. But only a small (disproportionately university educated) segment of the women’s and gay and lesbian movement would subscribe to (or even be aware of) the core principles of post-structuralist “anti-essentialist epistemology.” Nor would they be agnostic as to whether the state should protect their rights to express their sexuality. Post-structuralist theorists cannot avoid justificatory arguments for why some identities should be considered open and democratic and others exclusionary and anti-democratic. That is, how could post-structuralist political theorists argue that Nazi or Klan “ethics” are antithetical to a democratic society—and that a democratic society can rightfully ban certain forms of “agonal” (e.g. harassing forms of behavior against minorities) struggle on the part of such anti-democratic groups.