## **A2 US-China DA**

#### **Plan boosts US heg.**

**Borjas 21** – Andres Borjas is a Staff Writer at The Tufts Daily. Andres is a senior studying international relations and can be reached at [andres.borjas@tufts.edu](mailto:andres.borjas@tufts.edu); “In response to crises, the US has chosen to weaponize its vaccine policy as a diplomatic tool”; April 7, 2021; <https://tuftsdaily.com/opinion/2021/04/07/in-response-to-crises-the-us-has-chosen-to-weaponize-its-vaccine-policy-as-a-diplomatic-tool/> // advay

**Possessing one of the largest stockpiles of COVID-19 vaccines, the United States holds special weight when it comes to distributing the vaccines worldwide, and the concept of “vaccine diplomacy” is becoming an evermore important buzzword for American foreign policy. Policymakers, however, increasingly view the United States’ COVID-19 response as a weaponized diplomatic tool**. This perception works to no one’s benefit and more fundamentally exposes a half-heartedness and fragility to U.S. foreign policy that does not bode well for the return of American global leadership in the near future. **At the core of this weaponized model of vaccine diplomacy lies the national anxieties that made up the core of “America first” and that now pervade vaccine policy**, shaping the issue into a matter of national security and foreign policy. **This need to “securitize” vaccines is driven by the now all-too-common feelings of individual, social and national insecurity that the pandemic has highlighted and exacerbated across the country**. The botched initial response to the pandemic left the United States as the most COVID-19-ridden country on the face of the earth. **By summer, polls began showing a growing loss in social trust and national pride. The national unease brought a moment of renewal for anti-vaxxers and other conspiracy theorists who shouted through their keyboards about “plandemics,” cabals and Bill Gates to a receptive audience facing a shattered world.** **These factors all aided in catalyzing the political violence that transpired during the Capitol insurrection on Jan. 6,** an event that has been considered the first American self-coup. **China, meanwhile, leveraged the opportunities arising from America’s internal upheaval by challenging the United States militarily in the South China Sea and assuming a leading role in supplying the world with vaccines and desperately needed medical equipment.** Needless to say, **many saw 2020 as the poignant end of American primacy. For an America scarred internally and scorned internationally, the vaccine was a path toward renewed security and power**. **After our annus horribilis, the world has seen the fragility of American cohesion and has questioned the country’s claims to hegemony**. Back to normal as fast as possible, as such, is not as much the preference of a rich country that can afford it, but rather a necessity for its survival. **This is the rationale that attempts to justify the fact that for every one American there are about four vaccine doses reserved**. Meanwhile, **in the whole of Africa, that number barely reaches 0.2 doses per person**. In all, only 10 countries have administered about three-fourths of all vaccine doses. For the United States, this hoarding is symptomatic of a desperation to prevent the next wave of social unrest **— one jab at a time, all the while disregarding the Global South’s struggles, where many countries may not receive enough supply to vaccinate the majority of their populations until several years down the line. Even while some semblance of self-denial has found its way into U.S. foreign policy**, the thinness of promises made is hard to miss. Biden’s donation of more than 2.5 million AstraZeneca doses to Mexico, while amounting to the largest vaccine transfer from one country to another, seems meaningless when considering America’s 300 million strong AstraZeneca stockpile might simply end up unused. **In other less publicized instances, the vaccine paranoia has been more clear**. In February, the United States backed other rich nations in opposing a waiver to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which would allow for widespread production of COVID-19 vaccines and other treatments without infringing on international property **rights. This arrangement benefits Moderna and Pfizer the most, the country’s vaccine champions, who are now the face of American power, centrality and indispensability in the same vein that other powerful entities, like Google, Amazon and Facebook, have been for decades**. **The vaccine is also key to recouping power vis-a-vis China. President Biden took the opportunity this March during the first summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the joint project of Australia, India, Japan and the United States to contain China, to announce the bloc’s vaccination initiative**. Not surprisingly, **great power competition infuses the core of this joint project**, as the Quad members aim to provide their vaccines to Southeast Asia as a means of keeping China’s out. **The U.S. posture is a shrewd reminder that in international politics, altruism will almost always come second**. Even while Americans have often played the role of the good Samaritan worldwide, especially in the realm of global health, right now, we are a country backed into a corner, looking to claw our way back. Internally, even as the choice to not widely share the vaccine incurs heavy costs — the loss of countless lives around the world and billions of dollars in trade — large stocks and lofty promises are upheld as a matter of national security. **Externally, vaccines offer an avenue to regain the world’s adoration, thus transforming into a central component of a foreign policy seeking to protect American hegemony. Until the United States feels safe, the rest of the world will not be.**

#### **US heg needed prevent US-China war is through strong US heg- multipolarity is bad and Forsyth 19** [Jim Forsyth currently serves as dean of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD from the University of Denver, Josef Korbel School of International Studies. He has written and published extensively on great power war, intervention, and nuclear issues. “Through the Glass—Darker”, Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 4 (WINTER 2019), pp. 18-36, JSTOR]//recut SLC PK

As the article argued in 2007, “technological shifts have continuously altered the methods of war,” but in the end, “political arrangements matter, and the deterrent effect of any weapon should be evaluated within the context of the structure of the international system.”20 This claim is as true now as it was then. Indeed, **one might conclude that structure matters even more now than it did 10 years ago, given the shift to multipolarity.21 Under “lopsided**” **multipolarity—where the United States outweighs both China and Russia militarily—it will maintain power advantages on some fronts, but at smaller margins than it did during the unipolar moment when it reigned supreme**. **Power diffusion, and related great power competition concerns, will be governed by the continued growth of Asian economic and military clout predominantly from China and India and the relative decline of Western economic influence**.22 As China continues to translate economic gains into military modernization, the US will “focus mainly on countering China.”23 **Avoiding the perils of security competition will require that the US be more cautious about exercising its power abroad**.24 Yet exercising diplomacy and restraint could prove to be challenging. **Even scholars who adopt a more circumspect view of emerging multipolarity, and the implications of growing military-technological parity, acknowledge its underlying risks.** Barry Posen, who questions the assumption that multipolarity is inherently unstable, nonetheless acknowledges that growing parity will only “mute” great power competition**. The diffusion of power will not eradicate “great power adventures.”**25 **China’s rise is apt to entail alliance reconfigurations and temptations to employ conventional military power**.26 In fact, just as the original article predicted, **the United States and India, Russia and China, and France and Germany have taken steps toward tightening their security relationships.** China’s progress toward narrowing its power gap with the US has already met with a return to US defense budget growth and the establishment of new US defense cooperation commitments—notably with India. In parallel, China and Russia have grown closer, with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meeting three times in 2018 and China sending a “strong supporting contingent” to Russia’s Vostok-2018 military exercises.27 **Given the complexities and uncertainties of multipolarity, the US arsenal of advanced conventional weapons** (and those of other great powers) may not only **prove ill suited to deterring great power war but also provide occasion for its inadvertent onset. The stealth, speed, and lethality of advanced conventional technologies—allowing for quick and decisive US victories** in the Persian Gulf (1991), Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001)—have **proven increasingly enticing to other great powers. Russia and China drew similar lessons from these conflicts, each embarking on military modernization** programs geared toward antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) and grey zone strategies.28 Advanced conventional weapons already undergird Russia’s and China’s respective salami-slicing campaigns in Eastern Europe and the South China Sea. **Russia began modernizing its military following its 2008 war with Georgia, enhancing its ground force readiness and updating its integrated air defense system**. The improvements have allowed for significant defensive and force-projection gains (against border states).29 Though Russia has since dialed back modernization efforts in the wake of its economic downturn, **China continues to seek avenues for undermining the United States’ conventional weapons edge**. **The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still trails the United States in the areas of innovation and operational proficiency.** **Its modernization achievements, though—especially the development of intermediate-range missiles that threaten US forward bases and carrier strike groups—have substantially augmented China’s “advantage** of proximity in most plausible conflict scenarios.”30 **As great power rivals continue to chip away at the United States’ once considerable smart-weapons advantage, national security experts are reevaluating the viability of deterrence**. On this front, the diffusion of capabilities, as well as the expansion of competition to the space and cyber domains, do more than complicate appraisals of the balance of power; they threaten to upend the foundations of deterrence.31 The arrival of dualcapable hypersonic weapons (and delivery systems)—currently being designed and tested by the US, China, and Russia—will arguably risk jeopardizing strategic stability. Their ultrahigh velocity could reduce warning time to the extent that “a response would be required on first signal of attack”; likewise, their deployment in ready-to-launch mode could trigger preemptive strikes, as others might perceive it as a sign of impending attack.32 Further, cyber weapons’ potential for disabling an opponent’s “early warning and command systems” may diminish the expected costs of first strike under crisis conditions.33 Autonomous weapons also have the potential to fundamentally alter the psychological underpinnings of strategy And, as Kenneth Payne notes, there is no “a priori reason” to expect that substituting artificial intelligence (AI) for human intelligence—that rapid, accurate, and unbiased information processing and responses—“will necessarily be safer.” Because AI limits the risks of using force, it could make conflict more acceptable to risk-averse states; because its speed and precision favor the offense, it could prove more conducive to aggression than deterrence; and because it shapes a host of processes and technologies rather than a single weapon or system, its effects on strategy (and the challenges of its regulation) could prove counter to deterrence.34 As noted in the original article, nuclear weapons helped sustain the “cold peace” during the Cold War—not because of their awesome destructive power but because that awesome destructive power helped buttress bipolarity.35 The simplicity of bipolarity and superpower balancing, in turn, limited “the dangers of miscalculation and overreaction.”36 **Multipolarity, though, makes for complexity; additional great power players provide additional opportunities for miscalculation and overreaction**. **Given these conditions and the perceived “usability” of advanced conventional weapons relative to nuclear weapons, it seems likely that they will fall short of yielding “the kinds of political structures necessary to enhance deterrenc**e.”37 To counter Posen, the diffusion of advanced conventional technology may well have cheapened the near-term costs and risks of going to war, and particularly engaging in hybrid warfare. Even if the US manages to avoid a direct confrontation with Russia or China, it seems increasingly plausible that it could be dragged into a conflict involving one or more of their allies.

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#### **Alt fails—only the government can restructure the economy fast enough**

Roosevelt Institute 19 “Decarbonizing the US Economy: Pathways Toward a Green New Deal SAMPLE POLICY: ELIMINATING FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES” Policy Brief, 2019 RE

The climate crisis is here. According to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, limiting climate change to 1.5°C—and avoiding some of its most harmful impacts—would require a 45 percent cut in humancaused CO2 emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by mid-century. We argue that decarbonizing at this rapid pace is not only possible, but that it will improve our economic outlook, create jobs, and promote equity. Such an endeavor, however, necessitates immediate action and a broad range of policy tools. In Decarbonizing the US Economy: Pathways Toward a Green New Deal, we outline the three pillars of such an approach: 1) carbon pricing that promotes an equitable transition while meeting our emissions goals; 2) comprehensive regulations to redirect private spending and to ensure climate targets are met; and 3) large-scale public investments. Solving these sizable problems will require a sizable actor: government. To change the everyday decisions of businesses, individuals, and communities, and to provide a true alternative to the dirty “business-as-usual” economy, we must put a price on carbon and deploy direct environmental regulation. Though necessary, regulations and carbon pricing alone will be insufficient to meet the scale of the challenge and to address the dislocation associated with decarbonization. Carbon pricing and regulation may reduce fossil fuel extraction, for example, but they won’t ensure that workers in carbon-intensive industries find quality jobs; they may reduce transportation-related emissions, but they won’t offset increased driving costs or expand access to alternative modes of transit. Fortunately, the choice between decarbonization and meeting other social needs is a false one. A rapid transition to a carbon-neutral economy will raise living standards for the majority of Americans. We must rewrite the rules of our economy to promote a rapid and equitable transition, with an increase in public investment at the core of such an undertaking. To transform our economy on the scale that a Green New Deal would require, we need a large degree of coordination—coordination that can and must be directed by the government. While the economics of decarbonization are often misunderstood as a problem of scarcity, in which doing more to avert climate change means doing less to meet other social needs, we argue that a more robust public sector to facilitate this transition is both affordable and attainable. In Decarbonizing the US Economy, we outline a set of policy proposals that demonstrate how we can decarbonize the economy in ways that promote growth and ensure equitable outcomes. These sample policies show that decarbonizing the US economy can create quality jobs, reduce inequality, and tackle the existential threat of climate change. Here, we explore one of these policies: eliminating fossil fuel subsidies.

#### **Neoliberalism is inevitable --- crises cause elites to double down on austerity measures and structural adjustment that hasten privatization --- 2008 proves**

**Peck and Theodore, 19**

Jamie Peck is Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography at the University of British Columbia, Canada. He is the Managing Editor of Environment and Planning A and the convenor of the Summer Institute in Economic Geography. Nik Theodore is a Professor, Urban Planning and Policy, Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs and Research, CUPPA. “Still Neoliberalism?” The South Atlantic Quarterly, 118, April 2019

Neoliberal, Neoliberalism, Neoliberalization: What’s in a Name?

That neoliberalism remains a circulating if contestable term, after decades of fitful and fickle usage, might be considered an achievement of sorts. Repeatedly **disowned**, **denigrated**, and **dismissed**, it nevertheless **refuses to go away**— at least circumstantial evidence, perhaps, that there is indeed “some there there.” This is not the place to revisit the extended genealogy of this troubled signifier and its contested historical geography (see Peck 2010; Cahill et al. 2018), except to observe that its turbulent fortunes, perhaps especially in the period since the Wall Street crash of 2008, have been revealing, while at the same time adding new layers of mystification and puzzlement to what has been a never-less-than-checkered history. What was to be a particularly heavyhanded reboot of this history began in the thick of that last crisis, a little over a decade ago. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Wall Street crash was at the time widely interpreted as both a **comprehensive repudiation** and a system failure of neoliberalism by key figures on the left, from Eric Hobsbawm to Naomi Klein, who read the moment as terminal for the rolling project of financial deregulation and for the small-state consensus more generally, a view that was echoed by center-left economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and, although not in so many words, by the likes of Paul Krugman. Rather more surprisingly, there were also some mainstream politicians on the right and left flanks of the center ground, from France’s Nicolas Sarkozy to Australia’s Kevin Rudd, who in this uniquely disorientating context were moved to utter the hitherto unspeakable term, albeit only to declare its graceless exit (see Erlanger 2008; Rudd 2009). A common refrain across much of the commentary at the time, when real economies around the world and the credibility of those charged with their stewardship were both in freefall, was that the much-maligned state would be (had to be) making a comeback—in its own way echoing the arch-neoliberal conceits of governmental withdrawal and free-market governance, as if the state had ever really gone away. Projects of neoliberalization, it has been fairly clear all along to those willing to see, have never been synonymous with a simple diminution, or withdrawal, of the state, but instead have been variously concerned with its capture and reuse, albeit in the context of a generalized assault on social-welfarist or leftarm functions, coupled with an expansion of right-arm roles and capacities in areas like policing and surveillance, incarceration and social control, and the military. Nevertheless, this kind of state project was widely believed to have met its end a decade ago in the Wall Street meltdown.

What followed certainly **did not align with the script** of a terminal, **once-and-for-all collapse of neoliberalism** represented (again, somewhat misleadingly) as a bracketable “era” of free-market governance. As if to affirm Thatcher’s premature dismissal that there was “no alternative” to market rule, what followed in the wake of the financial crisis was, far from a retreat of neoliberalism, more like **an audacious exercise in doubling down**. Longterm **austerity** measures were (re)imposed in nations rich and poor, including those countries once regarded as the tutelary “heartlands” of the project, and its proving grounds, the United States and the United Kingdom. A new generation of **structural adjustment** programs targeted not only populations across the global South but also Greece, Detroit, and elsewhere. There were sustained, if scattergun, assaults on many of the old targets—public services, public budgets, and public servants; social movements and labor unions; social security, socialized healthcare, and public-education systems; and undeserving classes, the poor, and racialized others. And all the while, **financial and corporate elites got away with slaps on the wrist,** if that, only to be compensated in due course with yet more deregulation and further rounds of tax cuts. This **unapologetic mutation** of late neoliberalism, **back** as it were **from its own grave**, may have been shorn of anything approaching credible claims to moral leadership and intellectual authority, but in this reconstituted form it would present a yet more brutal face in its dogged defenses of political power and institutional dominance, soon to be coupled with brazen reassertions of the manifestly dubious case for corporate liberty, financial freedom, and social-state retrenchment.

#### **“No alternative” is the reigning ideology – solution was austerity measures, taax cuts, structural adjsmtnet across the global South, challenges to public service provision/social security/healthcare, and financial elites got bailed out/deregulated**

#### **Changes come and go – Dodd Frank and liquidity shock requirements got repealed – Syrizas in Greece still got austerity medicine and then wrecked in 2019 election by conservatives**

#### **They’re a link to the status quo etc**

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#### **Capitalism is self-correcting– war and environmental destruction are not profitable and innovation solves their impacts**

**Kaletsky ’11** (Anatole, editor-at-large of *The Times* of London, where he writes weekly columns on economics, politics, and international relationsand on the governing board of the New York-based Institute for New Economic Theory (INET), a nonprofit created after the 2007-2009 crisis to promote and finance academic research in economics, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis, p. 19-21)

Democratic **capitalism is a system built for survival. It has adapted successfully to shocks of every kind, to upheavals in technology and economics, to political revolutions and world wars. Capitalism** has been able to do this because, unlike communism or socialism or feudalism, it **has an inner dynamic akin to a living thing. It can adapt and refine itself in response to the changing environment.** And it will evolve into a new species of the same capitalist genus if that is what it takes to survive. In the panic of 2008—09, many politicians, businesses, and pundits forgot about the astonishing adaptability of the capitalist system. Predictions of global collapse were based on static views of the world that extrapolated a few months of admittedly terrifying financial chaos into the indefinite future. **The self-correcting mechanisms that market economies and democratic societies have evolved over several centuries were either forgotten or assumed defunct.** The language of biology has been applied to politics and economics, but rarely to the way they interact. **Democratic capitalism’s equivalent of the biological survival instinct is a built-in capacity for solving social problems and meeting material needs. This capacity stems from the principle of competition, which drives both democratic politics and capitalist markets. Because market forces generally reward the creation of wealth rather than its destruction, they direct the independent efforts and ambitions of millions of individuals toward satisfying material demands, even if these demands sometimes create unwelcome by-products.** Because voters generally reward politicians for making their lives better and safer, rather than worse and more dangerous, **democratic competition directs political institutions toward solving rather than aggravating society’s problems**, even if these solutions sometimes create new problems of their own**. Political competition is slower and less decisive than market competition, so its self-stabilizing qualities play out over decades or even generations, not months or years.** But regardless of the difference in timescale, **capitalism** and democracy have one crucial feature in common: Both are mechanisms that **encourage individuals to channel their creativity, efforts, and competitive spirit into finding solutions for material and social problems.** And in the long run, these mechanisms work very well. If we consider democratic capitalism as a successful problem-solving machine, the implications of this view are very relevant to the 2007-09 economic crisis, but diametrically opposed to the conventional wisdom that prevailed in its aftermath. Governments all over the world were ridiculed for trying to resolve a crisis caused by too much borrowing by borrowing even more. Alan Greenspan was accused of trying to delay an inevitable "day of reckoning” by creating ever-bigger financial bubbles. Regulators were attacked for letting half-dead, “zombie” banks stagger on instead of putting them to death. But these charges missed the point of what the democratic capitalist system is designed to achieve. In a capitalist democracy whose raison d’etre is to devise new solutions to long-standing social and material demands, a problem postponed is effectively a problem solved. To be more exact, a problem whose solution can be deferred long enough is a problem that is likely to be solved in ways that are hardly imaginable today. **Once the self-healing nature of the capitalist system is recognized,** the charge of “passing on our problems to our grand-children”—whether made about budget deficits by conservatives or about global warming by liberals—becomes morally unconvincing. Our grand-children will almost certainly be much richer than we are and will have more powerful technologies at their disposal. It is far from obvious, therefore, why we should make economic sacrifices on their behalf. Sounder morality, as well as economics, than the Victorians ever imagined is in the wistful refrain of the proverbially optimistic Mr. Micawber: "Something will turn up."

#### **The boom-bust crises of capitalism are essential to innovation – the aff is a specific type of effective neoliberalism**

**Janeway**, board of directors of the U.S. Social Science Research Council and co-founder of the Institute for New Economic Thinking, **2012**

(William, *Doing Capitalism in the Innovation Economy*, pg. 202-206)

Finally, to return to the source of my abiding sensitivity to the emergence of a bubble: radio is a classic example of the Three-Player Game in action. The pioneers of wireless technology on both sides of the Atlantic had found sufficient funding from angel investors. It was the discovery in 1920 of the “killer app” for wireless communications – broadcast entertainment – that triggered speculative interest, a development that was accompanied by the creation of RCA, under the direct sponsorship of the US Navy and War Departments, to pool ownership of the patents held by American Marconi, General Electric, AT&T and Westinghouse. Through early 1925, new companies and new offerings proliferated, some 258 in 1925 alone, the most prominent of which traded on the Curb Exchange. The inevitable collapse took radio stocks, excluding RCA, down by 92 percent from December 1924 to May 1926. Thereafter, RCA’s successful enforcement of its patents limited new entry, but its own soaring stock price, from (split-adjusted) 7 at the bottom of the correction to 103 just before the Crash, induced a second wave of entrants beginning in March 1928.50 Notwithstanding the long hiatus of financial capitalism through the Depression, the Second World War and the immediate postwar period, by 1929 the American public equity markets had already evolved into the engine for turning long-term financing into assets that could be realized through sale on the market at short notice … Thus, through the magic of financial intermediation by investment banks, the productive sector received permanent equity financing while investors believed they had liquid assets.51 **When the post-Second World War golden age of broad-based economic growth unfolded under the new regime of big-state capitalism**, **the equity markets** responded. They **would** be there to **finance commercialization of the digital technologies spawned by the American military in its role as investor in research and lead consumer of digital products**. Speculation and innovation: an explanatory schema This chronicle of the interdependence between **epochal waves of financial speculation** and **the deployment of innovative tech**nological infrastructure whose economic significance reveals itself only over decades invites construction of a systematic, explanatory narrative. I began my own search for such a narrative in 2000, as my generation’s bubble was reaching its apotheosis. I had recognized that the literature on technology and technology-driven industrial development was much farther along than the literature on how that evolution had been financed. In response, I initiated a research project sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and led by two distinguished economic historians, Naomi Lamoreaux and the late Ken Sokoloff, whose output was a range of case studies, published in 2007 as Financing Innovation in the United States, 1870 to the Present.52 In parallel, in 2003 I discovered the work of Carlota Perez and her book Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages.53 In an appropriately recursive movement, that discovery was a function of Amazon’s ability to work out that I would be interested in a book with such a title. Perez applies her schema to five successive technological revolutions, as laid out in Table 9.1. **In each case**, **the technological revolution begins with** an “installation” period that climaxes in **a frenzy of speculation**, which is followed by a crash and an extended turning point, as that which was once **innovative** – even revolutionary – and not amenable to rational calculus **becomes** recognized as **routine**. Finally, the technology’s deployment constitutes the construction of **a previously unimaginable new economy**. Throughout her analysis, Perez distinguishes financial capital, the agent of speculation in Keynes’s formulation, from production capital, which is embedded in Keynes’s “enterprise.” Thus, in her explicitly neo-Schumpeterian characterization of the recurrent waves of creative destruction, Perez too has revitalized the approach to reading the world that I had inherited from my Cambridge mentors, Keynes’s own students. In doing so she has constructed a framework for understanding the necessity of bubbles and the prospective cost of eliminating them from our economic life. The process of moving from technical invention to funded innovation is messy and wasteful; the extreme skew in the returns of venture capital, within individual portfolios and across the multitude of funds and firms, testifies to this. So, too, do the bubbles of speculation in the financial markets that fund the deployment of innovations significant enough to make a broad economic difference, along with the detritus of scams and no-hopers that get swept along with them. Efficiency in the allocation of resources to satisfy current demands at a given moment of time – the hallmark of well-behaved markets in **neoclassical theory** – **hardly captures the process through which conditions of life have been transformed** by Perez’s five great waves over more than 200 years. But can the ability to tolerate such waste be enhanced? Can the costs incurred when the speculative bubble bursts be limited in advance? Certainly, there is no a priori set of economic principles that will yield an efficient outcome. Frank Dobbin observes that Britain, France and the United States all “produced rapid, dependable and cost-effective transport systems in relatively short order,” although in each country the process of planning, funding and regulating the railways was radically different.54 The one common element shared by British speculators, French state planners and the entrepreneurial American sources and seekers of subsidies is that rational calculation of economic returns was not a primary motivator. France from the 1820s with respect to the railways and the United States since the Second World War with respect to digital electronic technology **demonstrate that the state can play a decisively catalytic**, and not merely a constructive, **role**. But to explore the new space for innovative applications thereby created remains the realm of entrepreneurial finance, **the world of bubbles and crashes**.

### 

### **1rst adv is Econ**

### **Vaccines will not cover LMICS until at least 2023—fortunately there is massive room for supply increase**

Nancy S. **Jecker &** Caesar A. **Atuire 21**. \*Department of Bioethics & Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine, \*\*Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, Gauteng, South Africa, “What’s yours is ours: waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines,” Journal of Medical Ethics, July 6, 2021, <https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/early/2021/07/06/medethics-2021-107555.full.pdf>., RJP, DebateDrills.

Since consequentialist justifications treat the value of IP as purely instrumental, they are also vulnerable to counterarguments showing that a sought-after goal is not the sole or most important end. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we submit that the vaccinating the world is an overriding goal. With existing IP protections intact, the world has **fallen well short** of this goal. Current forecasts show that at the current pace, there will **not be enough vaccines to cover the world’s population** until 2023 or 2024.15 IP protections further frustrate the goal of universal access to vaccines by limiting who can manufacturer them. The WHO reports that 80% of global sales for COVID-19 vaccines come from five large multinational corporations.16 Increasing the number of manufacturers globally would not only **increase supply,** but reduce prices, making vaccines more affordable to LMICS **L[ow and] M[iddle] I[ncome] C[ountrie]s. I**t would stabilise supply, minimising disruptions of the kind that occurred when India halted vaccine exports amidst a surge of COVID-19 cases.

It might be objected that waiving IP protections will not increase supply, because it takes years to **establish manufacturing capacity**. However, since the pandemic began, we have learnt it takes less time. Repurposing facilities and vetting them for safety and quality can often happen in 6 or 7months, about half the time previously thought.17 Since COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic humanity faces, expanding manufacturing capacity is also necessary preparation for **future pandemics**. Nkengasong, Director of the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, put the point bluntly, ‘Can a continent of 1.2billion people—projected to be 2.4billion in 30 years, where one in four people in the world will be African—continue to import 99% of its vaccine?’18

#### **Unequal vaccine distribution has massive economic costs even with conservative estimates that don’t account for the Delta variant**

**Çakmakli 21**-- Çakmakli, Cem [Assistant Professor at Koç University. PhD: Pennsylvania State University] et al. The economic case for global vaccinations: An epidemiological model with international production networks. No. w28395. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021. (AG DebateDrills)

**To estimate the costs of inequitable vaccine distribution, we develop a global SIR-multi-sectormacro framework and calibrate it to 65 countries-35 sectors.** We incorporate sectoral heterogeneity in infections together with inter-industry and international trade and production linkages. **Once we account for this economic interdependence of the economies, we reveal the substantial costs, up to 3 percent of advanced countries pre-pandemic GDPs, that will be borne by the vaccinated countries through their trade relationships with unvaccinated countries.**36 Our framework captures the short run. **We find that AEs may bear somewhere from 13 percent to 49 percent of the global losses arising from an inequitable distribution of vaccines in 2021. Globalization might have amplified the effects of the pandemic but it is also imperative for an equitable distribution of the vaccines because this is the only way for open economies with international linkages to have a robust recovery.** There are substantial uncertainties ahead of us regarding the course of vaccine distribution. Our estimates are based on the available information about the pandemic. For example, we did not incorporate the recent developments on the variants into our analysis. **To the extent that these variants threaten the efficacy of the current vaccines, there is even more urgency to make the existing vaccines globally available as soon as possible. Mutations that risk a prolonged pandemic would not only have further health costs but also escalate the economic costs that we estimated in our analysis.**

#### **Economic loss and slow supply recovery causes inflation deanchoring and econ collapse in advanced economies as well as extreme poverty in EMDEs**

**World Bank 6-21** – World Bank Prospects Group; June 2021 Global Economic Prospects; <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35647/9781464816659.pdf> (AG DebateDrills)

**Since May 2020, however, inflation has gradually picked up.** **By April 2021, inflation had risen above pre-pandemic levels, in both advanced economies and EMDEs**. The inflation pickup was broad-based and present in about four-fifths of countries, although the change in inflation varied widely, especially in EMDEs. The 2020 global recession featured the most muted inflation decline and fastest subsequent inflation upturn of the five global recession episodes of the past 50 years (box 4.1). While this behavior partly reflects lower levels of inflation at the beginning of 2020, purchasing managers report growing pressures on input as well as output prices in 2021 (figure 4.1). **Looking ahead, as the global economy gradually reopens, monetary and fiscal policies continue to be accommodative to support the global recovery, and pent-up demand may be about to be unleashed in advanced economies.1 For major advanced economies, some have raised concerns that this confluence of factors may generate significant inflationary pressures** (Blanchard and Pisani-Ferry 2020; Goodhart and Pradhan 2020; Landau 2021). Others, in contrast, see little reason for concern, at least for many advanced economies, because of the temporary nature of price pressures over the short-term as well as wellanchored inflation expectations and structural factors still depressing inflation (Ball et al. 2021; Gopinath 2021). If growing inflationary pressures cause financial market participants to become concerned about persistently higher inflation in advanced economies, they may reassess prospects for continued accommodative monetary policies by major central banks. **This could trigger a significant rise in risk premia and borrowing costs. EMDEs are particularly vulnerable to such financial market disruptions because of their record high debt and a lagging economic recovery from the pandemic (chapter 1). In the event of financial market stress, sharp exchange rate depreciations and capital outflows may force them to abruptly tighten policies in a manner that could throttle their recoveries. Even in the absence of dislocating financial market stress, EMDES E[merging] M[arket] D[eveloping] E[conomie]s may face rising inflation as global price pressures feed into domestic inflation through input prices and exchange rate movements**. A temporary increase in inflation may not warrant a monetary policy response. Again, if rapidly rising price pressures risk de-anchoring inflation expectations, EMDE central banks may be forced to tighten monetary policy before the recovery is fully entrenched. **Persistently higher inflation would erode discretionary incomes of the poorest households and may tip some back into poverty** (Ha, Kose, and Ohnsorge 2019). **This is a particularly serious risk for LMICS low-income countries** (LICs; box 4.2). **Since food accounts for a substantial share of consumption in these countries, recent increase in food prices have led to higher inflation and compounded the challenges confronting the poor during the pandemic.**

#### **Economic Collapse goes Nuclear.**

**Tønnesson 15**, Stein. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review 18.3 (2015): 297-311. (the Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway)

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, **decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations**. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. **Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly**, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The **greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy** alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

**Adv 2 – WTO Legitimacy**

**WTO credibility is fragile right now– Baschuk 21**

Bryce Baschuk, “WTO Chief Pursues a ‘Hectic’ Agenda to Fix World Trade’s Referee”, April 27 2021

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-27/wto-chief-pursues-a-hectic-agenda-to-fix-world-trade-s-referee>

**The head of the WTO world Trade Organization raised an alarm about the credibility of the multilateral trading system, urging leaders to act fast to bolster the global economy with steps like fairer vaccine distribution and cooperate to resolve longer-term problems like overfishing.**

**During her first two months, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala has met with trade ministers around the globe to communicate a message that the WTO is important, it needs to be reformed and it needs to deliver results.**

So far, she says the reception from world leaders has been positive, but quickly translating that goodwill into substantive outcomes during a global pandemic is just as daunting as she anticipated.

“The word I would use to describe it is absolutely hectic,” Okonjo-Iweala said in a phone interview on Tuesday when asked about her first few months in the job. “The challenges we thought were there are there and getting an agreement is not as easy because of longstanding ways of negotiating business positions.”

Countries need to move past the notion that one country’s gain in international commerce is another’s loss, she said.

“We need to break out of the zero-sum deadlock,” Okonjo-Iweala said. “We need to remind the countries and members that the WTO is here to deliver for people. We can’t take 20 years to negotiate something.”

Okonjo-Iweala said her top priority is to use trade to alleviate the pandemic and said her recent meeting with trade ministers and vaccine manufacturers provided a positive step in the right direction.

More **Pragmatism**

“That meeting yielded quite a lot,” she said. “I see more pragmatism on both sides.”

**An important component of the WTO’s trade and health agenda is a proposal from India and South Africa that seeks to temporarily waive enforcement of the WTO’s rules governing IP intellectual property for vaccines and other essential medical products.**

As of this week there are fresh signals that the Biden administration, which currently opposes a waiver to the WTO agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, wants vaccine manufacturers like [Pfizer Inc.](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/PFE:US) and [AstraZeneca Plc](https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AZN:LN) to help ramp up U.S. pandemic assistance to the rest of the world.

“There is movement,” Okonjo-Iweala said. “Are we there yet? No, but there is a little bit of change in the air among members. I think hopefully we will be able to come to some sort of a framework for the WTO ministers to bless.”

“We don’t have time,” she added. “People are dying.”

Okonjo-Iweala said this month’s vaccine meeting also revealed areas where the developing world can increase its capacity to produce more doses rather than waiting for rich countries to send them their excess supplies.

She said **various emerging markets such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Senegal, Indonesia and Egypt already have some capacity to begin producing vaccines for people living in developing economies.**

**A TRIPPS waiver is necessary to maintain WTO credibility – Meyer 21**

Meyer, David, “The WTO’s survival hinges on the COVID-19 vaccine patent debate, waiver advocates warn”, June 18, 2021

<https://fortune.com/2021/06/18/wto-covid-vaccines-patents-waiver-south-africa-trips/>

**The World Trade Organization knows all about crises. Former U.S. President Donald Trump threw a wrench into its core function of resolving trade disputes—a blocker that President Joe Biden has not yet removed—and there is widespread dissatisfaction over the fairness of the global trade rulebook.** The 164-country organization, under the fresh leadership of Nigeria's [Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala](https://fortune.com/2021/04/01/wto-chief-covid-vaccine-manufacturers-poor-countries/), has a lot to fix.

**However, one crisis is more pressing than the others: the battle over COVID-19 vaccines, and whether the protection of their patents and other intellectual property should be temporarily lifted to boost production and end the pandemic sooner rather than later.**

**According to some of those pushing for** [**the waiver**](https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669R1.pdf&Open=True)**—which was originally proposed last year by India and South Africa—the WTO's future rests on what happens next.**

"The credibility of the WTO will depend on its ability to find a meaningful outcome on this issue that truly ramps-up and diversifies production," says Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, South Africa's ambassador to the WTO.

"Final nail in the coffin"

The Geneva-based WTO isn't an organization with power, as such—it's a framework within which countries make big decisions about trade, generally by consensus. It's supposed to be the forum where disputes get settled, because all its members have signed up to the same rules. And one of its most important rulebooks is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, which sprang to life alongside the WTO in 1995.

The WTO's founding agreement [allows for rules to be waived](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/wto_agree_art9_jur.pdf) in exceptional circumstances, and indeed this has happened before: its members [agreed in 2003](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm) to waive TRIPS obligations that were blocking the importation of cheap, generic drugs into developing countries that lack manufacturing capacity. (That waiver was effectively [made permanent](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/trip_23jan17_e.htm) in 2017.)

Consensus is the key here.

**Although the failure to reach consensus on a waiver could be overcome with a 75% supermajority vote by the WTO's membership, this would be an unprecedented and seismic event.** In the case of the COVID-19 vaccine IP waiver, it would mean standing up to the European Union, and Germany in particular, as well as countries such as Canada and the U.K.—[the U.S. recently flipped](https://fortune.com/2021/05/06/covid-vaccine-patent-waiver-protections-rights-waiver-biden-next/) from opposing the idea of a waiver to supporting it, [as did France](https://fortune.com/2021/06/10/covid-vaccine-patent-waiver-european-parliament-commission-wto/).

It's a dispute between countries, but the result will be on the WTO as a whole, say waiver advocates.

"If, in the face of one of humanity's greatest challenges in a century, the WTO functionally becomes an obstacle as in contrast to part of the solution, I think it could be the final nail in the coffin" for the organization, says Lori Wallach, the founder of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, a U.S. campaigning group that focuses on the WTO and trade agreements.

**"If the TRIPS waiver is successful, and people see the WTO as being part of the solution—saving lives and livelihoods—it could create goodwill and momentum to address what are still daunting structural problems."**

Those problems are legion.

Reform needs

Top of the list is the WTO's Appellate Body, which hears appeals in members' trade disputes. It's a pivotal part of the international trade system, but Trump—incensed at decisions taken against the U.S. —[blocked appointments](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-idUSKCN1LC19O) to its seven-strong panel as judges retired. The body became completely paralyzed at the end of 2019, when two judges' terms ended and the panel no longer had the three-judge quorum it needs to rule on appeals.

Anyone who hoped the advent of the Biden administration would change matters was disappointed earlier this year when the U.S. rejected a European proposal to fill the vacancies. "The United States continues to have systemic concerns with the appellate body," it [said](https://www.gtreview.com/news/americas/slim-chances-for-the-wto-appellate-body-despite-the-us-return-to-multilateralism/). "As members know, the United States has raised and explained its systemic concerns for more than 16 years and across multiple U.S. administrations."

At her confirmation hearing in February, current U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai reiterated those concerns—she said the appellate body had "overstepped its authority and erred in interpreting WTO agreements in a number of cases, to the detriment of the United States and other WTO members," and accused it of dragging its heels in settling disputes.

"Reforms are needed to ensure that the underlying causes of such problems do not resurface," Tai said.

"While the U.S. [has] been engaging [with the WTO] it hasn't indicated it would move quickly on allowing appointments to the Appellate Body," says Bryan Mercurio, an economic-law professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, who [opposes the vaccine waiver](https://fortune.com/2021/05/06/covid-vaccine-patent-waiver-protections-rights-waiver-biden-next/). "This is not a good sign. In terms of WTO governance, it's a much more important step than supporting negotiations on an [intellectual property] waiver."

It's not just the U.S. that wants to see reform at the WTO. In a [major policy document](https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/february/tradoc_159439.pdf) published in February, the EU said negotiations had failed to modernize the organization's rules, the dispute-resolution system was broken, the monitoring of countries' trade policies was ineffective, and—crucially—"the trade relationship between the U.S. and China, two of the three largest WTO members, is currently largely managed outside WTO disciplines."

China is one of the key problems here. It became a WTO member in 2001 but, although this entailed significant liberalization of the Chinese economy, it did not become a full market economy. As the European Commission put it in February: "The level at which China has opened its markets does not correspond to its weight in the global economy, and the state continues to exert a decisive influence on China's economic environment with consequent competitive distortions that cannot be sufficiently addressed by current WTO rules."

"China is operating from what it sees as a position of strength, so it will not be bullied into agreeing to changes which it sees as not in its interests," says Mercurio.

China is at loggerheads with the U.S., the EU and others over numerous trade-related issues. Its rivals don't like its policy of demanding that Chinese citizens' data is stored on Chinese soil, nor do they approve of how foreign investors often have to partner with Chinese firms to access the country's market, in a way that leads to the transfer of technological knowhow. They also oppose China's industrial subsidies.

Mercurio thinks China may agree to reforms on some of these issues, particularly regarding subsidies, but "only if it is offered something in return."

All these problems won't go away if the WTO manages to come up with a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies, Wallach concedes. "But," she adds, "the will and the good faith to tackle these challenges is increased enormously if the WTO has the experience of being part of the solution, not just an obstacle."

Wallach points to [a statement](https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Sectoral-Ministerial-Meetings/Trade/2021_MRT) released earlier this month by Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade ministers, which called for urgent discussions on the waiver. "**The WTO must demonstrate that global trade rules can help address the human catastrophe of the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitate the recovery," the statement read in its section about WTO reform.**

**WTO is necessary for good US-China relations, which solves a bunch of existential threats – Shaffer 21**

Shaffer, Gregory, “The US must engage with China — even when countering China”, June 21, 2021

<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/559049-the-us-must-engage-with-china-even-when-countering-china>

A policy statement heard around the world is that U.S. engagement with China “[has come to an end](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-26/biden-s-asia-czar-says-era-of-engagement-with-xi-s-china-is-over).” It suggests that the Biden administration is taking a hawkish approach toward China. That stance seemed clear as the U.S. worked the [G7 and NATO communiqués](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique/) to confront China with an “[alliance of democracies](https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/initiatives/the-copenhagen-democracy-summit/the-summit-2021/).”

Yet, peeling the layers, one comes to the necessity for a much more complex U.S. approach to China. Rather than ending engagement, the U.S. should be thinking about engagement’s different dimensions. Indeed, [Kurt Campbell](https://thehill.com/person/kurt-campbell), coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council, who made the remark, implicitly addressed three necessary forms of engagement that have been lacking.

First, even when the United States aims to counter China, engagement remains essential. The U.S. will most effectively counter Chinese actions in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, along the border with India, and against [allies’ economies](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-57004797), if the U.S. works closely with others. The Trump administration was notoriously unreliable and antagonistic towards allies. The United States and its allies will bolster their position in relation to China if they coordinate — an approach underscored at the recent G7 and [NATO](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/14/world/europe/biden-nato-china-russia.html) summits.

Yet, even in high-conflict situations, diplomacy and bargaining with China also will be important. Trade and technology policies are rife with rivalry and competition. These policies can trigger harmful tit-for-tat escalations if they are not [grounded in agreed rules and understandings](https://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2019/10/announcing-the-us-china-trade-policy-working-group.html). These risks become particularly salient when economic and financial crises strike. **Third-party institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) can help parties manage their conflicts so that they are not mutually destructive. China will be indispensable in any U.S. effort to update and “reform”** [**WTO rules**](https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/233.pdf&Open=True)**.**

**Second, the US United States needs to work with China to effectively address common global, existential challenges. Campbell mentioned three: climate change, global pandemics, and nuclear proliferation**. A signal success of the Obama administration was getting China to make commitments for the first time on emissions, which gave rise to the [Paris Agreement](https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement). The U.S. also worked with China to stem Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons under the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance). It needs to do the same regarding North Korea’s nuclear program.

Even in these areas of mutual concern, competition and rivalry are present. Yet such competition also can lead to mutually beneficial outcomes, such as to provide vaccines globally and to develop green technologies.

Third, Campbell stressed the critical importance of bipartisan engagement within the U.S. As politics in America degrades, the U.S. position against China weakens — and China knows this. The U.S. domestic inability to cooperate bolsters Chinese claims that the U.S. is declining and China is rising because China’s authoritarian model is superior to U.S. democracy. Unfortunately, bipartisan engagement to productively respond to China’s challenge — from the building of infrastructure, the support of science and education, and the defense of democracy — might be the most difficult to achieve. But it is critical.

### **Thus**

#### **Plan: Member nations of the WTO ought to grant a TRIPS waiver for novel pandemics**

### **Solvency**

**-the TRIPS waiver will be triggered by conditions modified from the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology:**

Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology **(APIC 19)**. Center for Disease Control sub-branch.<https://apic.org/monthly_alerts/outbreaks-epidemics-and-pandemics-what-you-need-to-know/> January 2nd,2019

* The geographical area is world wide.
* It rapidly infects people at an elevated stage above epidemic
* is often caused by a new strain that has not circulated among people for a long time. Humans usually have little to no immunity against it. The illness spreads quickly from person-to-person worldwide.
* causes an elevated rate of death compared to a well known counterpart (IE. swine flu vs common flu)
* often creates social disruption, economic loss, and general hardship.

#### **Developing nations benefit from a TRIPS waiver—this is also our solvency advocate**

Nancy S. **Jecker &** Caesar A. **Atuire 21**. \*Department of Bioethics & Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine, \*\*Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, Gauteng, South Africa, “What’s yours is ours: waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines,” Journal of Medical Ethics, July 6, 2021, <https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/early/2021/07/06/medethics-2021-107555.full.pdf>., AG, **DebateDrills.**

This view has come under increasing fire. Two competing positions have emerged. First, **India and South Africa petitioned the WTO for a temporary waiver of IP rights for medical products pertaining to preventing, containing or treating COVID19.2 The wavier would apply to all WTO members and lift restrictions in four TRIPS sections: copyright and related rights, industrial designs, patents and protection of undisclosed information. It would be annually reviewed and last for a set length, determined by the WTO Council. Proponents of the proposal argue that IP protections have ‘hindered urgent scale-up of vaccine production** and that ‘many countries—especially LMICs countries—may face institutional and legal difficulties when using TRIPS flexibilities’.12 To break the divide, WTO Director General, Okonjo-Iweala, proposed ‘a third way’ in which ‘we… license manufacturing to countries so that we can have adequate supplies while still making sure that IP issues are taken care of.’13 **This approach permits companies to retain ownership while licensing other companies to manufacture their vaccines**.

#### **The plan is also a prerequisite to starting the WHO technology transfer hub**

**WHO 4/21—**WHO, 4-21-2021, “Establishment of a COVID-19 mRNA vaccine technology transfer hub to scale up global manufacturing,” <https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/establishment-of-a-covid-19-mrna-vaccine-technology-transfer-hub-to-scale-up-global-manufacturing>. (AG DebateDrills)

WHO and its partners are seeking to expand the capacity of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to produce COVID-19 vaccines and scale up manufacturing to increase global access to these critical tools to bring the pandemic under control.

**WHO will facilitate the establishment of one (or more, as appropriate) technology transfer hub(s) that will use a hub and spoke model (REF) to transfer a comprehensive technology package and provide appropriate training to interested manufacturers in LMICs. This initiative will initially prioritize the mRNA-vaccine technology2 but could expand to other technologies in the future.**

The intention is for these hubs to enable the establishment of production process at an industrial or semi-industrial level permitting training and provision of all necessary standard operating procedures for production and quality control. **It is essential that the technology used is either free of IP intellectual property constraints in LMICs, or that such rights are made available to the technology hub and the future recipients of the technology through non-exclusive licenses to produce, export and distribute the COVID-19 vaccine in LMICs, including through the COVAX facility**. Preference will be given to applicants who have already generated clinical data in humans, as such clinical data will contribute to accelerated approval of the vaccines in LMICs.

It is anticipated that WHO will work with funders and donors to mobilize financial support to establish the hubs and, as they are being established, to support the transfer of technology to selected manufacturers in LMICs, taking into consideration the need to establish permanent vaccine production capacity in regions where this is currently mostly absent. **This broader objective will ensure that all WHO regions will be able to produce vaccines as essential preparedness measures against future infectious threats**

#### **Other countries have capacity to produce millions of doses**

**Meldrum and Cheng 21**-- ANDREW MELDRUM and MARIA CHENG, AP News, “Vaccine technology transfer center to open in South Africa,” 6/21/2021, <https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-south-africa-africa-technology-coronavirus-vaccine-3cbdee395502802b55db2b5c81e6becd>. (AG, DebateDrills)

**Poor countries in Africa and elsewhere are facing dire shortages of COVID-19 jabs despite some countries having the ability to produce vaccines**, lamented Lara Dovifat, a campaign and advocacy adviser for Doctors Without Borders. “The faster companies share the know-how, the faster we can put an end to this pandemic,” she said in a statement. **Numerous factories in Canada, Bangladesh, Denmark and elsewhere have previously called for companies to immediately share their technology, saying their idle production lines could be churning out millions of doses if they weren’t hampered by IP intellectual property and other restrictions**. More than 1 billion coronavirus vaccines have been administered globally, but fewer than 1% have been in poor countries. South Africa accounts for nearly 40% of Africa’s total recorded COVID-19 infections and is currently suffering a rapid surge, but vaccine rollout has been slow, marked by delayed deliveries among other factors. **South Africa currently does not manufacture any COVID-19 vaccines from scratch, but its Aspen Pharmacare assembles the JJ Johnson & Johnson shot by blending large batches of the ingredients sent by J&J and then putting the product in vials and packaging them, a process known as fill and finish.** Earlier this month the company had to discard 2 million doses because they had ingredients produced in the U.S. in a factory under suspect conditions.

### **The plan sets a precedent to seamlessly shift to a direct support model during pandemics--that solves future pandemics but avoids the innovation DA.**

Brink **Lindsey 21**. Vice President, Niskanen Center; Writes for Brookings, “Why Intellectual Property and Pandemics Don’t Mix,” Brookings, June 3, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/06/03/why-intellectual-property-and-pandemics-dont-mix/>, RJP, **DebateDrills**.

**PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES AND DIRECT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT**

For pandemics and other public health emergencies, patents’ mix of costs and benefits is **misaligned** with what is needed for an effective policy response. The basic patent bargain, even when well struck, is to pay for more innovation down the road with **slower diffusion of innovation today**. In the **context of a pandemic**, that bargain is a bad one and should be rejected entirely. Here the imperative is to **accelerate** the diffusion of vaccines and other treatments, not slow it down. Giving drug companies the power to hold things up by blocking competitors and raising prices pushes in the completely wrong direction.

What approach to encouraging innovation should we take instead? How do we incentivize drug makers to undertake the hefty R&D costs to develop new vaccines without giving them exclusive rights over their production and sale? The most effective approach during a public health crisis is **direct government support**: public funding of R&D, advance purchase commitments by the government to buy large numbers of doses at set prices, and other, related payouts. And when we pay drug makers, we should not hesitate to pay generously, even extravagantly: we want to offer drug companies big profits so that they prioritize this work above everything else, and so that they are ready and eager to come to the rescue again the next time there’s a crisis.It was direct support via **Operation Warp Speed** that made possible the astonishingly rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines and then facilitated a relatively rapid rollout of vaccine distribution (relative, that is, to most of the rest of the world). And it’s worth noting that a major reason for the faster rollout here and in the United Kingdom compared to the European Union was the latter’s [misguided penny-pinching](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/opinion/europe-vaccines-commission.html?smid=tw-share). The EU bargained hard with firms to keep vaccine prices low, and as a result their citizens ended up in the back of the queue as various supply line kinks were being ironed out. This is particularly ironic since the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine was developed in Germany. As this fact underscores, the chief advantage of direct support isn’t to “get tough” with drug firms and keep a lid on their profits. Instead, it is to accelerate the end of the public health emergency by making sure drug makers profit handsomely from doing the right thing.Patent law and direct support should be seen **not as either-or alternatives but as complements** that apply different incentives to different circumstances and time horizons. Patent law provides a decentralized system for encouraging innovation. The government doesn’t presume to tell the industry which new drugs are needed; it simply incentivizes the development of whatever new drugs that pharmaceutical firms can come up with by offering them a temporary monopoly. It is important to note that patent law’s incentives offer no commercial guarantees. Yes, you can block other competitors for a number of years, but that still doesn’t ensure enough consumer demand for the new product to make it profitable. **DIRECT SUPPORT MAKES PATENTS REDUNDANT** The situation is different in a pandemic. Here the government knows exactly what it wants to incentivize: the creation of vaccines to prevent the spread of a specific virus and other drugs to treat that virus. Under these circumstances, the decentralized approach isn’t good enough. There is no time to sit back and let drug makers **take the initiative** on their own timeline. Instead, the government needs to be more involved to incentivize specific innovations now. As recompense for letting it call the shots (pardon the pun), the government sweetens the deal for drug companies by insulating them from commercial risk. If pharmaceutical firms develop effective vaccines and therapies, the government will buy large, predetermined quantities at prices set high enough to guarantee a healthy return. For the pharmaceutical industry, it is useful to conceive of patent law as the default regime for innovation promotion. It improves pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to develop new drugs while leaving them free to decide which new drugs to pursue – and also leaving them to bear all commercial risk. In a pandemic or other emergency, however, it is appropriate to **shift to the direct support regime**, in which the government focuses efforts on one disease. In this regime, it is important to note, the government provides qualitatively superior incentives to those offered under patent law. Not only does it offer public funding to cover the up-front costs of drug development, but it also provides advance purchase commitments that guarantee a healthy return. It should therefore be clear that the pharmaceutical industry has **no legitimate basis for objecting to a TRIPS waiver**. Since, because of the public health crisis, drug makers now qualify for the superior benefits of direct government support, they no longer need the default benefits of patent support. Arguments that a TRIPS waiver would deprive drug makers of the incentives they need to keep developing new drugs, when they are presently receiving the most favorable incentives available, can be **dismissed as the worst sort of special pleading.** That said, it is a serious mistake to try to cast the current crisis as a morality play in which drug makers wear the black hats and the choice at hand is between private profits and public health. We would have no chance of beating this virus without the formidable organizational capabilities of the pharmaceutical industry, and providing the appropriate incentives is essential to ensure that the industry plays its necessary and vital role. It is misguided to lament that private companies are profiting in the current crisis: those profits are a drop in the bucket compared to the staggering cost of this pandemic in lives and economic damage. What matters isn’t the existence or size of the profits, but how they are earned. We have good reason to want drug makers to profit from vaccinating the world: the comparative price is minuscule, and the incentive effects are a vital safeguard of public health in the event of future crises. What we want to avoid at all costs is putting drug makers in the position where drug companies can profit from standing in the way of rapid global vaccination. That is why intellectual property rights need to be taken out of the equation. Vaccinating the world in any kind of reasonable time frame will require large-scale technology transfer to drug firms in other countries and rapid expansion of their production capacity. And looking beyond the current pandemic to the longer term, we need [ample, redundant global vaccine production capacity](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22397914/vaccine-mrna-adenovirus-manufacturing-process-investment) that is widely distributed around the planet. To achieve these goals as rapidly as possible will require the active cooperation of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, which is why the direct support model now needs to be extended. What is needed now is an Operation Warp Speed for the world, in which we make it worth current vaccine producers’ while to share their know-how broadly and ramp up global capacity. Here again, we must recognize that the choice isn’t between people on the one hand and profits on the other. Rather, the key to good pandemic response policy is ensuring that **incentives are structured** so that drug company profit-seeking and global public health are well aligned. That means opting out of the default, decentralized patent bargain in favor of generous but well-focused direct government support.

## **Framing**

#### **Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valueable and disvalueable – everything else regresses. Evolutionary knowledge is reliable – broad consensus and robust neuroscience prove.**

**Blum et al. 18**

Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/>, R.S.

**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even **produce the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### **Thus, the standard is maximizing expected well-being or act hedonistic util. Prefer additionally –**

#### **1] Outweighs – A] Predictability – most authors assume util when discussing the cost/benefit tradeoffs of policy B] topic ed – other frameworks don’t engage with key questions of implemented policy impacts – that’s key, b/c we only have 2 months for this topic. C] TJFs first because they assume the framework being good for debate**

#### **2] Death is bad and outweighs – a) agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b) it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life c) the loss of all future generations would be trillions of lives o/w on magnitude**

#### **3] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.**

### **Underview**

**Underview**

**[1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, no rvis and the highest layer of the round – 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs or 2NR theory and paradigm issues– 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.**

**[2] Assume I-meets to spec shells since bidirectional shells and infinite regress prove abuse is inescapable**

**[3] Give me new 2AR weighing and arguments - I only know what arguments I have to weigh against in the 2NR, but they know in the 1AR.**