# 1NC

## 1---T

T Private

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of space by private entities is unjust.

#### China’s "private" sector companies aren't private.

Olson 20 [Stephen Olson, research fellow at the Hinrich Foundation. "Are Private Chinese Companies Really Private?" The Diplomat, 9-30-2020, accessed 1-14-2022, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/are-private-chinese-companies-really-private/] Recut Durham SA

Such is the case with China’s “Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era,” recently released by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (and further elaborated on by President Xi Jinping himself). This document tells us in no uncertain terms that Chinese private companies will be increasingly called upon to conduct their operations in tight coordination with governmental policy objectives and ideologies. The rest of the world should take note.

A Different Vision of “Private” Business

The 5,000 word “opinion” aims to ratchet-up the role and influence of the CCP within the private sector in order “to better focus the wisdom and strength of the private businesspeople on the goal and mission to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The objective is to establish a “united front” between business and government and facilitate the “enhancement of the party’s leadership over the private economy.” According to the plan, “private economic figures are to be more closely united around the party,” thereby achieving “a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee on political stand, political direction, political principles, and political roads.

#### Negate –

#### Limits – They skirt the core controversy of the topic which is national vs private space activities---kills stasis point and pre-round prep and means we lose access to generics that rely on the motives of private companies differing from national interest proven by the fact that their advantage is functionally China space good/bad. Justifies the NASA Aff, ISS aff, ESA Aff, US Aff, literally any other country, or combo of countries making it impossible to negate.

#### T is DTD and No RVIs – The whole aff violates and its their burden to be topical---must proactively prove the aff is good since the entire debate follows it. Means T comes first---our abuse was because of theirs.

#### Use Competing Interps – Anything else lets the judge intervene and pick whatever definition is best under their own bs meter leading to a proliferation of abuse.

## 2---CP

CIL CP

#### The United Nations organs and specialized agencies ought to request a prior and binding advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether [aff plan text] under Customary International Law. [Aff Actor] ought to [aff plan text] if and only if the International Court of Justice rules it violates the no-harm principle.

#### It competes – the affirmative must be immediate and certain---anything else destroys neg ground and makes the aff conditional. [Insert thing here if it makes sense]

#### Solves the aff and the no-harm principle---ICJ say yes.

Koplow 09, [David Koplow, (Professor of Law at Georgetown, JD from Yale), Asat-isfaction: Customary international law and the regulation of anti-satellite weapons. Michigan Journal of International Law, 30(4), 1187-1272] Recut Sachin

VI. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ASATs We turn next to a much younger'" area of specialized CIL, one that may also extend restrictions on ASAT operations in surprising ways. International environmental law attempts to rein in national behaviors that pollute, damage, or jeopardize the natural environment in significant measure, even when no particular State is individually aggrieved. As with LOAC, skeptics may doubt the efficacy or even the existence of international environmental law, but, again as with LOAC, the reality is now abundantly clear: hundreds of treaties, UNGA resolutions, and declarations of other noteworthy international bodies attest to the ambition, competence, and accomplishment of the international environmental movement.'99 A prominent early example of this emergent international environmental law is the pathbreaking 1972 Stockholm Declaration, crafted at the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, through which all leading States confirmed that protection of the environment is a major issue affecting everyone's well-being and "is the urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments. 2° Principle 21 of the Declaration affirms that States have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 2° ' Identical language was featured two decades later in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in its Principle 2.202 The UNGA has repeatedly confirmed and elaborated those assertions, urging all governments to pursue and effectuate the Stockholm and Rio pronouncements, 23 emphasizing the special responsibility to protect the environment in times of armed conflict,2 and stressing that all States should "ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the natural systems located within other States or in the areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction., 025 The UNGA has also flatly asserted that "destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing international law."2 0 6 International agreements bespeak a set of similar commitments. The 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity echoes the States' responsibility "to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."2 7 The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change carries forward parallel language, noting that the statement is "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law."200 The Restatement confirms that the core of the Stockholm and Rio propositions has advanced far beyond the status of mere aspiration, and has achieved the widespread, longstanding acceptance, pursuant to a sense of legal obligation, to have risen to the status of binding CIL. Section 601 asserts state obligations with respect to the common environment: A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control ... are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.2 0 The ICJ, too, has had the occasion to recognize the binding quality of this feature of customary international environmental law. In the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the court affirmed that "[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment."20 A year later, the ICJ repeated that conclusion in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia).2' A few vocabulary points about the language of these documents must be noted. First, in these instruments, the reference to "areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" was principally intended to refer to the high seas, Antarctica, and other sectors of the terrestrial "global commons" that no country could or did claim as part of its sovereign territory. But the concept certainly embraces outer space as well, particularly given the OST's explicit stricture that no country may subject space, the moon, or other celestial bodies to claims of national sovereignty. 212 Second, the language of these prescient instruments contemplates not just "pollution" as ordinarily understood, but more generic "damage" or "injury" to the environment, which would surely include activities that degrade or despoil outer space by so littering it with hazardous, long-lasting ASAT debris that vast regions are rendered unfit for transit or use. In fact, the near-permanent character of high-altitude space debris far eclipses what would ordinarily be contemplated as serious harm to the oceans or Antarctica, such as via unregulated runoff, tanker collisions, or even dumping of hazardous materials. In the same vein, where documents refer to "significant" injury to the international environment, that threshold would, unhappily, be easily met by the sorts of ASAT generated space debris under consideration here. This is not a case of merely de minimis harms.213 Next, the rhetoric makes clear that this sort of injury to the global commons is an issue of universal concern, properly raised even by States that are not individually damaged by the offending acts, and even by States that currently do not undertake or even contemplate space activities that would exploit the resources-everyone has a legitimate, permanent interest in the preservation of that delicate environment.! 4 Finally, to address a point that has surfaced in virulent form in a very different context, these documents speak of activities undertaken "within the jurisdiction and control" of a State. The "action" in contemplation here-the exoatmospheric collision or detonation of a killer satellite unquestionably occurs outside any State's territory. But the clear import of the law would have to reach the "action" that drove that destruction, that is, a government's decision to test or use its ASAT in a debris creating mode, and that decision-making action would ordinarily be undertaken in the national capital, certainly within its jurisdiction and control.2 5 These crucial environmental protection norms would certainly apply to a State's ASAT testing activities during peacetime (thereby neatly complementing the LOAC rules identified in Part V, which by their terms apply only during wartime). But to what extent are environmental protection standards also effective during combat, to help regulate ASAT uses .? 2 16 There is often substantial uncertainty regarding the applicability of ordinary international law during wartime; both treaties and CIL rules have to be parsed with care to determine whether the parties may have intended to suspend or terminate the obligations when conflict arises. Much of environmental law, in particular, is probably designed to be applicable only during peacetime; obviously, combat can be thoroughly devastating for the environment, and many standard rules of protection would be simply held in abeyance until the fighting subsides."7 But some CIL rules are deliberately designed to be applicable even (or especially) during hostilities, and these postulates provide something of a bridge between Part V and Part VI of this Article. Unfortunately, this area of law is one characterized by persistent absence of consensus, especially regarding the position of the United States, and it is difficult to state with certainty the content of any CIL rules on States' obligations regarding environmental protection during combat.28 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) asserts, in its authoritative tome on Customary International Humanitarian Law, several propositions that would explicitly incorporate environmental concerns into the traditional LOAC standards of discrimination, proportionality, and necessity. For example: Rule 43: The general principles on the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural environment: A. No part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it is a military objective. B. Destruction of any part of the natural environment is prohibited, unless required by imperative military necessity. C. Launching an attack against a military objective which may be expected to cause incidental damage to the environment which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited. Rule 44: Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the protection and preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of military operations, all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific certainty as to the effects on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the conflict from taking such precautions. Rule 45: The use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon.219 If these postulates genuinely constitute universal CIL, they would impose on military forces a duty of care in any wartime ASAT operations that would be entirely consistent with their more general LOAC obligations. Specifically, a State contemplating an ASAT attack would be enjoined: " to attack only legitimate military objectives (and the natural environment-including outer space-does not count as a military objective); " to calculate the proportionality assessment weighing unintended damage to civilian and neutral persons and assets versus the military value expected from the attack (and harm to the natural environment-including outer space-must be factored into the mathematics); and " to undertake only those strikes that are militarily necessary. In most respects, these specific obligations dovetail with those described in Part V, and the United States generally accepts these postulates of the international environmental law of armed conflict. In some specific areas, however, the United States has taken a different view, rejecting the ICRC's contention that CIL has already fully evolved on these points. 22 0 The most salient illustration of the difference concerns the ICRC's contention that CIL categorically bars any warfighting action that would inflict "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment." In contrast, the United States asserts that even such catastrophic actions might be justifiable as "proportionate" if sufficient military gain could be garnered thereby. The United States views the ICRC Rule 45 obligations as being grounded exclusively in treaty law, not CIL, and the relevant treaty (the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions) is an instrument that the United States has not joined, and is therefore not bound to implement.2 2 ' There may be a soupgon of difference between the ICRC view and the U.S. view, but both would provide substantial protection to the international environment as such, as well as to transiting satellites, and both would affirm that harm to outer space itself must be taken into account in assessing the discrimination, proportionality and necessity of an attack 22 As a practical matter, the separation between the two perspectives is small for our purposes; via either route, CIL standards inveigh against debris-creating ASATs, during either wartime or peacetime.2 ' As the ICJ stated in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion: The Court does not consider that the [environmental protection] treaties in question could have intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its right of self-defense under international law because of its obligations to protect the environment. Nonetheless, States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality. 224

#### The no-harm principle is key to overall ILaw, co-op, and warming.

Mayer 16, [Benoit Mayer, (Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong), The relevance of the no-harm principle to climate change law and politics, Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law, <https://www.elgaronline.com/view/journals/apjel/19-1/apjel.2016.01.04.xml>] Recut Sachin

Climate change is the most important case of anthropogenic cross-boundary environmental harm, but 25 years of international negotiations on climate change have given little consideration to the no-harm principle. Yet, the responsibility of states for causing harm to the environment of other states is not a negotiable concept: it is an indispensable corollary of the structures of today's international legal order. States cannot be equal and sovereign, yet knowingly cause harms to others’ environment – harms that could go all the way to denying the very existence of some low-lying small island developing states. Admittedly, powerful states can oppose the application of the no-harm principle, but they cannot ignore the cost of this denial of justice: the erosion of the trust that populations and states’ leaders have progressively placed in international law as an instrument for the construction of a better world rather than a tool of domination. This loss of trust, in turn, hinders international cooperation on climate change: why would a population commit to costly climate change mitigation policies if it is unsure whether other states will implement similar policies, and whether, consequently, they could draw significant benefits from climate change mitigation? Why should a nation not attempt to free-ride on the efforts made by other nations if it does not believe that justice should guide international relations? Successful international cooperation against climate change requires more international socialization, not less, and trust requires actions that are broadly consistent with principles largely considered as just. The no-harm principle is one of these principles, and arguably the most relevant one to the overall architecture of international responses to climate change. Legal scholars have a role to play in affirming the relevance of international law's principles in response to climate change, thus preparing arguments for successful international negotiations. The greatest impediment to the political acceptability of the no-harm principle relates to a misunderstanding relating to the consequences of the no-harm principle, in particular regarding the ambit of remedial obligations. International jurisdictions are unlikely to be permitted to take substantive decisions in the matter. Therefore, international law scholars need to define more nuanced, more realistic, hence more relevant understandings of the responsibilities of states whose failure to regulate domestic activities has had a dangerous impact on our climate system. International law should not be construed in rigid ways that suggest unrealistic obligations: an obligation to make full reparation, in particular, is a dangerous chimera in the context of climate change. The responsibility of states for excessive greenhouse gas emissions needs to be conceived in ways that advance a transition towards more sustainable societies conducive to international peace and security, not in favour of a revanchist utilization of international law. The no-harm principle is relevant, but it needs to be adapted, taking the specific challenges arising from climate change into account, in order to pursue, through international cooperation, the objective of solving the international problems of our time.

#### Effective ILaw prevents extinction---puts a cap on conflict---turns case.

Pickering 14, [Heath Pickering, (MA, International Relations, Melbourne School of Government), 2/4/14, “Why Do States Mostly Obey International Law?,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/04/why-do-states-mostly-obey-international-law/>] Recut Sachin

All states in the contemporary world, including great powers, are compelled to justify their behaviour according to legal rules and accepted norms. This essay will analyse the extent to which states comply and the reasons for their compliance. Essentially, the extent to which states follow their international obligations has developed over the past 400 years. From a historical perspective, international obligations and accepted norms were founded following two key developments in European history. In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War by acknowledging the sovereign authority of various European princes.[1] This event marked the advent of traditional international law, based on principles of territoriality and state autonomy. Then in 1945, again following major wars initiated in Europe, states began to integrate on a global scale.[2] The UN Charter became the international framework for which norms of sovereignty and non-intervention were enshrined. Now, as a result of modern technology, communication, transport, and more, the evolving process of Globalisation, “The internationalization of the world”,[3] has provided an opportunity for international law and accepted norms to reach every corner of the globe. However, the development of international law and accepted norms has not compelled states to comply all the time. Instead, the trend over the past 400 years has shown that states have been mostly compelled to justify their behavior according to legal rules and accepted norms. The emphasis on mostly should be stressed. Even though the UN Charter does not permit violating sovereignty through the use of aggression, the extent to which states follow their international obligations varies. Louis Henkin’s book, How Nations Behave, articulates the extent of compliance.[4] He said, “Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time”.[5] As such, the trend in contemporary international relations is that war remains possible, but it is much less acceptable now than it was a century or even half a century ago.[6] The benefit of the trend is that almost full compliance is said to lead states into a pattern of obedience and predictable behaviour.[7] Therefore, conflict only arises when countries fail to comply. States attempt to manage the friction with ongoing compliance through the principle of pacta sunt servanda – the adherence to agreements.[8] Over time, such agreements to norms and treaties have diminished sovereignty, increased international institutions, given rise to non-state actors, and rapidly developed the contemporary customary and treaty based rules system.[9] The evolution of the dispute-settlement procedures of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the establishment of numerous global treaties illustrate states agreeing voluntarily to give up a portion of their sovereignty.

#### Even a tiny bit of multilat outweighs every other impact.

Brimmer 14, Esther Brimmer 14 [Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the United States Department of State from April 2009 to June 2013, “Smart Power” and Multilateral Diplomacy, June, <http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Smarter%20Power/Chapter%204%20brimmer.pdf>]

Over the subsequent decade, the variable definitions of Smart Power have evolved to reflect a rapidly changing foreign affairs landscape – a landscape shaped increasingly by transnational issues and what can only be described as truly global challenges. Nations of the world must now calibrate their foreign policy investments to try to leverage new opportunities while protecting their interests from emerging vulnerabilities. Smart Power is no longer an alternative path; it is a four-lane imperative. ¶ The world in 2014 is fundamentally different from previous periods, growing vastly more interconnected, interdependent, networked, and complex. National economies are in many cases inextricably intertwined, with cross-border imports and exports increasing nearly tenfold over the past forty years, and more than doubling over just the past decade. At the same time, we are all connected – and connected immediately – to news and events that in past generations would have been restricted to their local vicinities.¶ Consider, for example, the 2011 tsunami that devastated parts of Japan. Not only did we know in real time of the earthquake that triggered the tsunami, we had live coverage of some of the tsunami’s most devastating impacts and then round-the-clock coverage of the Fukushima nuclear power plant crisis. Communications technology brings such events to us without delay and in high definition. This communications revolution, headlined by the explosion of social media, carries with it the almost unlimited potential to inform and educate. It also provides people and communities with new ability to influence and advance their causes – both benevolent and otherwise, as the dramatic events of recent years in North Africa and the Middle East have made clear. ¶ At the same time, global power is more diffuse today than in centuries. Although predictions of the nation-state’s demise have gone unrealized, non-state actors – including NGOs, corporations, and international organizations - are more influential today than perhaps at any point in human history. The same might be said for transnational criminal networks and other harmful actors. Concurrently, we are witnessing the rise of new centers of influence – the so-called “emerging” nations – that are seeking and gaining positions of global leadership. These emerging powers bring unique histories and new perspectives to the discussion of current challenges and the future of global governance. Several of these countries are democracies and share many of the core values of the United States; others have sharply different political systems and perspectives. All are gauging how to be more active in the global arena. ¶ It is this new, more diffused global system that must now find means of addressing today’s pressing global challenges – challenges that in many cases demand Smart Power ingenuity. From terrorism to nuclear proliferation, climate change to pandemic disease, transnational crime to cyber attacks, violations of fundamental human rights to natural disasters, today’s most urgent security challenges pay no heed to state borders. ¶ So, just as global power is more diffuse, so too are the opposing threats and challenges, and it is in this new reality that the United States must define and employ its Smart Power resources. That reality demands a definition that must now far exceed the origin parameters of hard and soft. Many of these challenges would be unresponsive to traditional Hard tools (coercion, economic sanctions, military force), while the application of Soft tools (norm advancement, cultural influence, public diplomacy) in customary channels is likely to provide unsatisfactory impact. ¶ Ultimately, the other component necessary in today’s Smart Power alchemy is robust, focused, and sustained international cooperation. In effect, in an increasing number of instances, Smart Power must now feature shared power, and in that context foreign policy choices must follow two related but distinct axes. ¶ First, those policy choices must strengthen a state’s overall stature and influence (rather than diminish it), leaving the state undertaking the action in a position of equal or greater global standing. This is easier said than done. The proliferation in challenges facing all states has created a need for multiple, simultaneous diplomatic transactions among a broadening cast of actors. Given the nature of today’s threats facing states both large and small, those transactions have never been more frequent and at times overlapping – a reality that requires new agility and synchronization within foreign policy hierarchies. States that are less capable of responding to this new reality may experience diminished political capital and international standing by acting on contemporary threats in isolation or without a full appreciation of the reigning international sentiment. Many observers have highlighted U.S. decision-making in advance of the 2003 Iraq invasion as indicative of just this phenomenon. ¶ Alternatively, states applying a new Smart Power approach to their foreign policy recognize the overlapping need to maintain global standing and stature while seeking resolution of individual policy challenges. We see considerable effort on the part of emerging powers to find just that balance, and I would argue that the United States has also made great strides in that regard since 2009. ¶ Second, Smart Power policy choices must contribute to the strength and resilience of the international system. As noted above, the globalization of contemporary challenges and security threats has augmented the need for effective cooperation among states and other international actors, and placed even greater demands on the global network of international institutions, conferences, frameworks, and groupings in which these challenges are more and more frequently addressed. Given this heightened need for structures to facilitate international collaboration, states are more rarely undertaking foreign policy courses of action that entirely lack a multilateral component, or that feature no interaction with or demands upon the international architecture. As recent American history shows, even states with unilateral tendencies have found themselves returning to the multilateral fold to address aspects of a threat or challenge that simply cannot be addressed effectively alone.

#### Condo Good---proving a CP is bad doesn’t prove the plan is good, a logical policy maker can always choose not to act. Logic outweighs – it’s the basis of all rational arguments.

#### PICs are good---Its NDCA nats. TOC is in 2 weeks. You should be prepared to debate counterplans that test implementation of the aff. Uniquely key on a topic with no action or actor---we have no way of knowing what random things people will extrapolate. PICs are key to neg strat since they get plan choice and infinite prep and allows us to focus in on key issues.

## 3---DA

BizCon DA

#### Changes in appropriation scare investors and research---spills over to broader space.

Freeland 05, [Steven Freeland, 2005, (BCom, LLB, LLM, University of New South Wales; Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Western Sydney, Australia; and a member of the Paris-based International Institute of Space Law), “Up, Up and … Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its Impact on the International Law of Outer Space.”, Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 6: No. 1, Article 4. 2005. JDN, <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1269&context=cjil//> Accessed: 02-22-22] Recut Sachin

V. THE NEED FOR CELESTIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS? ¶ The fundamental principle of "non-appropriation" upon which the international law of outer space is based stems from the desire of the international community to ensure that outer space remains an area beyond the jurisdiction of any state(s). Similar ideals emerge from UNCLOS (in relation to the High Seas) as well as the Antarctic Treaty, 42 although in the case of the latter treaty, it was finalised after a number of claims of sovereignty had already been made by various States and therefore was structured to "postpone" rather than prejudice or renounce those previously asserted claims.43 In the case of outer space, its exploitation and use is expressed in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty to be "the province of all mankind," a term whose meaning is not entirely clear but has been interpreted by most commentators as evincing the desire to ensure that any State is free to engage in space activities without reference to any sovereign claims of other States. This freedom is reinforced by other parts of the same Article and is repeated in the Moon Agreement (which also applies to "other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the earth")." Even though both the scope for space activities and the number of private participants have expanded significantly since these treaties were finalised, it has still been suggested that the nonappropriation principle constitutes "an absolute barrier in the realization of every kind of space activity., 4 ' The amount of capital expenditure required to research, scope, trial, and implement a new space activity is significant. To bring this activity to the point where it can represent a viable "stand alone" commercial venture takes many years and almost limitless funding. From the perspective of a private enterprise contemplating such an activity, it would quite obviously be an important element in its decision to devote resources to this activity that it is able to secure the highest degree of legal rights in order to protect its investment. Security of patent and other intellectual property rights, for example, are vital prerequisites for private enterprise research activity on the ISS, and these rights are specifically addressed by the ISS Agreement between the partners to the project and were applicable to the experiments undertaken by Mark Shuttleworth when he was onboard the ISS.46

#### Unpredictable shifts ruin Confidence---prevents growth and recovery.

Sarah Chaney Cambon 21, Reporter on The Wall Street Journal's Economics Team, BA in Business Journalism from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, “Capital-Spending Surge Further Lifts Economic Recovery”, Wall Street Journal, 6/27/2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/capital-spending-surge-further-lifts-economic-recovery-11624798800

Business investment is emerging as a powerful source of U.S. economic growth that will likely help sustain the recovery.

Companies are ramping up orders for computers, machinery and software as they grow more confident in the outlook.

Nonresidential fixed investment, a proxy for business spending, rose at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 11.7% in the first quarter, led by growth in software and tech-equipment spending, according to the Commerce Department. Business investment also logged double-digit gains in the third and fourth quarters last year after falling during pandemic-related shutdowns. It is now higher than its pre-pandemic peak.

Orders for nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft, another measure for business investment, are near the highest levels for records tracing back to the 1990s, separate Commerce Department figures show.

“Business investment has really been an important engine powering the U.S. economic recovery,” said Robert Rosener, senior U.S. economist at Morgan Stanley. “In our outlook for the economy, it’s certainly one of the bright spots.”

Consumer spending, which accounts for about two-thirds of economic output, is driving the early stages of the recovery. Americans, flush with savings and government stimulus checks, are spending more on goods and services, which they shunned for much of the pandemic.

Robust capital investment will be key to ensuring that the recovery maintains strength after the spending boost from fiscal stimulus and business reopenings eventually fades, according to some economists.

Rising business investment helps fuel economic output. It also lifts worker productivity, or output per hour. That metric grew at a sluggish pace throughout the last economic expansion but is now showing signs of resurgence.

The recovery in business investment is shaping up to be much stronger than in the years following the 2007-09 recession. “The events especially in late ’08, early ’09 put a lot of businesses really close to the edge,” said Phil Suttle, founder of Suttle Economics. “I think a lot of them said, ‘We’ve just got to be really cautious for a long while.’”

Businesses appear to be less risk-averse now, he said.

After the financial crisis, businesses grew by adding workers, rather than investing in capital. Hiring was more attractive than capital spending because labor was abundant and relatively cheap. Now the supply of workers is tight. Companies are raising pay to lure employees. As a result, many firms have more incentive to grow by investing in capital.

Economists at Morgan Stanley predict that U.S. capital spending will rise to 116% of prerecession levels after three years. By comparison, investment took 10 years to reach those levels once the 2007-09 recession hit.

Company executives are increasingly confident in the economy’s trajectory. The Business Roundtable’s economic-outlook index—a composite of large companies’ plans for hiring and spending, as well as sales projections—increased by nine points in the second quarter to 116, just below 2018’s record high, according to a survey conducted between May 25 and June 9. In the second quarter, the share of companies planning to boost capital investment increased to 59% from 57% in the first.

“We’re seeing really strong reopening demand, and a lot of times capital investment follows that,” said Joe Song, senior U.S. economist at BofA Securities.

Mr. Song added that less uncertainty regarding trade tensions between the U.S. and China should further underpin business confidence and investment. “At the very least, businesses will understand the strategy that the Biden administration is trying to follow and will be able to plan around that,” he said.

#### Decline cascades---nuclear war.

Maavak 21, [Dr. Mathew Mavaak, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8]

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

INTRODUCTION

The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA).

But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998).

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020).

An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity.

COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach.

METHODOLOGY

An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

• Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012);

• Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and

• Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources.

ECONOMY

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

## 4---K

Moen Bad K

#### Their scholarship is hateful and a reason to lose the round—their author endorsed pedophilia and actively advocated for pedophilic content.

Moen 15 [Moen, O. M. (Professor of Ethics at Oslo Metropolitan University). “The ethics of pedophilia”. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 9(1), 111-124. 2015-05-09. Accessed 2/2/2022. <https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/1718> //CHO]

If my arguments in this article are sound, then being a pedophile—in the sense of having a sexual preference for children—is neither moral nor immoral. Engagement in adult-child sex is immoralbecause it exposes children to a significant risk of serious harm, butit is perhaps not always blameworthy to the extent that we intuitively assume. Finally, the enjoyment of fictional stories and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content is, in and of itself, morally acceptable. If these conclusions are correct, what practical implications follow? A central implication is that in dealing with pedophilia, our aim should not be to find outlets for our disgust and outrage, but rather, to minimize what is the real problem: harm to children. On the least revisionist side, the aim of reducing harm provides us with a good justification for upholding current bans on adult-child sex and child pornography. There are, however, also a number of more revisionist implications. One revisionist implication is that we should stop the outright condemnation of pedophiles. Condemning pedophiles for being pedophiles is unjust, and non-offending pedophiles, rather than deserving condemnation for their pedophilia, deserve praise for their admirablewillpower.4 Possibly, today’s condemnation also prevents pedophiles from telling health professionals about their attraction to children, and insofar as detection and counseling can help prevent abuse, this is very unfortunate. To prevent harm to future children, we would also be well advised to start teaching high school students not just what to do in case they are victims of sexual abuse (which, thankfully, we have started telling them over the last few decades), but also what to do in case they themselves are pedophiles. A certain percentage of high school students either are or will become pedophiles, and currently they are not given any advice on how to handle their sexuality. The production, distribution, and enjoyment of texts and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content should almost certainly be made legal. Until or unless it can be shown that such texts and graphics lead to more adult-child sex, the justification for today’s widespread ban is weak.

#### Drop the debater—academic spaces have way too many sympathizers who ignore violence against children, and every act must be challenged in the most unflinching terms because anything else reinforces the epistemic bias in favor of rationalizing disgusting behavior.

Grant 18 [Alec Grant (Independent Scholar, retired from the Uiversity of Brighton where he was a Reader in Narrative Mental Health). “Sanitizing Academics and Damaged Lives” Mad In The UK, 12 April 2018. https://www.madintheuk.com/2018/12/sanitizing-academics-and-damaged-lives/ // Cho Recut

Academics who sympathize with paedophilia constitute its intellectual public relations arm. Their role is to make child-adult sex presentable, more acceptable to the public, fit for polite society, sugar-coated, glossed with a scholarly veneer, sanitized. Snapshots of sanitizing academic activity from the last 40 years show how this seeps into and contaminates public policy, education and practice in insidious ways. This is done via the workings of power, privilege, perverse cronyism, and, as Pilgrim (2018) argues, as a result of widespread moral stupor and denial. It’s astonishing that this happens in the face of the psychological and development features of complex post-trauma which are often a consequence of child sexual abuse. By pathologizing adult survivors, often with the ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’ (BPD) tag, mainstream psychiatric business-as-usual plays out its role in suppressing the truth about the consequences of paedophilia among adult survivors. Pilgrim (2018) reminds us that care and mutuality are core ethical features of all sexual practices. As someone who was for many years associated with cognitive therapy, I’m interested in ‘cognitive, or thought distortions’, which are used by people in rationalising their behaviour in self-serving ways. We know from Pilgrim and many other writers, researchers and practitioners about the rationalisations of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation. They include: Children are not victims but willing participants; They want it; They enjoy it; It’s about friendship; It’s about love; It helps children develop and mature. According to Pilgrim (2018), the ‘heyday’ period of academic versions of such rationalisations was the 1970s. 1977 was the year of an unsuccessful lobby by French intellectuals to defend intergenerational sex. Included among these were the otherwise well-respected philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Jaques Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. These figures were at the forefront of the use of academic authority to lobby governments to liberalise and decriminalise adult-child sexual contact. In 1978, Foucault took part in a France-Culture broadcast with two other gay theorists, Hocquengham and Danet, to discuss the legal aspects of sex between adults and children. They wanted a repeal of the law preventing this because they took the view that in a liberal (they really meant libertarian) society, sexual preferences generally should not be the business of the law. Foucault, Hocquengham and Danet made the following assertions: that children can, and have the capacity to, consent to such relations without being coerced into doing so; that abuse and post-abuse trauma isn’t real; that the law is part of an oppressive and repressive heteronormative social control discourse which unfairly targets sexual minorities; that children don’t constitute a vulnerable population; that children can and are capable of making the first move in seducing adults (they introduced here the category of ‘the seducing child’); that the laws against sexual relations between children and adults actually function to protect children from their own desires, making them an oppressed and repressed group; that – in the language of the sociologist Stanley Cohen – international public horror about sexual relations between adults and children is a form of moral panic which feeds into constructing the ‘paedophile’ as a folk devil, in turn provoking public vigilantism; that sex between adults and children is actually a trivial matter when compared with ‘real crimes’ such as the murder of old ladies; that many members of the judiciary and other authority figures and groups don’t actually believe paedophilia to be a crime; and that consent should be a private contractual matter between the adult and the child. Fast forward to 1981. The Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) has been active for seven years. This was a pro-paedophile activist group, founded in the UK in 1974 and officially disbanded in 1984. The group, an international organisation of people who traded in obscene material, campaigned for the abolition of the age of consent. Dr Brian Taylor, the research director and member of PIE, and sociology lecturer at the University of Sussex produced the controversial book Perspectives on Paedophilia, which had the aim of enlightening social workers and youth workers about the benefits of paedophilia. Taylor, who identified as gay, advocated ‘guilt-free pederasty’ (sexual relations between two males, one of whom is a minor). He argued that people generally are hostile to paedophilia only because they don’t understand it, and If they did wouldn’t be so against it. So it was simply a matter of clearing up prejudice and ignorance.

#### Reading blum solves!