## 1

#### The Standard is Maximizing Expected Wellbeing

#### [1] Extinction first –

#### A] Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible

#### B] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### C] Moral obligation – allowing people to die is unethical and should be prevented because it creates ethics towards other people

#### D] Objectivity – body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### [2] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework –

#### Threats to bodily security precl1ude the ability for moral actors to act upon other theories since they are in a constant crisis that inhibits the moral conditions other theories presuppose.

#### [3] Pain provides an objective reason for why oppression is bad.

**Gray 09** [Gray, James W. "An Argument for Moral Realism." Ethical Realism. N.p., 07 Oct. 2009. Web. 04 Sept. 2015. <https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2009/10/07/an-argument-for-moral-realism/>. MA in philosophy from San Jose State University (2008)]

**If we have evidence** that **anything** in particular **has intrinsic value**, then we also have evidence that **moral realism is true**. Our experiences of pleasure and pain are probably the most powerful evidence of intrinsic value because such experiences are tied to our belief that they have intrinsic value. My argument that pain has intrinsic disvalue is basically the following: We experience that pain is bad. We experience that pain is important. The disvalue of pain is irreducible. The disvalue of pain is real. If pain is bad in the sense of being important, irreducible, and real, then pain has intrinsic disvalue. Therefore, pain has intrinsic disvalue. I am not certain that the premises are true, but I currently find good reasons for accepting them. Therefore, we have reason for accepting the conclusion. The conclusion could be read saying, “We have reason to believe that pain has intrinsic disvalue.” If we accept that **pain has intrinsic disvalue**, then we will simultaneously accept moral realism.1 In order to examine the plausibility of my argument, I will examine each of the premises: We experience that pain is bad. We know pain is bad **because of our experience** of it. If someone described their pain as extremely wonderful, we would doubt they are feeling pain. Either the person is lying or doesn’t know what the word “pain” means. When a child decides not to touch fire because it causes pain, we understand the justification. **It would be strange to ask** the child, “So what? **What’s wrong with pain**?” We experience that pain is important. If pain is important in the relevant sense, then it can provide us reason to do something without merely helping us fulfill our desires. In other words, we must accept the following: The badness of pain isn’t just an instrumental value. The badness of **pain is a final end**. Pain’s badness isn’t an instrumental value – Pain’s disvalue is not an instrumental disvalue because pain can be quite useful to us. **Pain** can tell us when we are unhealthy or injured. We evolved pain because **i**t’**s** **essential** **to** our **survival**. Pain’s bad for a different kind of reason. Pain’s disvalue is found in our negative experience, and this is why pain is a candidate for having an intrinsic disvalue. Whenever someone claims that something has intrinsic value, we need to make sure that it’s not just good because it’s instrumentally valuable. If it’s merely useful at bringing about something else, then it’s not good in and of itself (as intrinsic values are). Pain is perhaps the perfect example of something that is useful but bad. If usefulness was the only kind of value, then pain would actually be good because it helps us in many ways. Pain’s badness isn’t just our dislike of pain – We dislike **pain** because it **feels bad**.2 If pain didn’t feel bad, then we wouldn’t have such a strong desire to avoid intense pain. Pain means “feels bad” and it **is manifested in various experiences**, such as touching fire. **We have to know the meaning of “bad”** in order to understand pain at all. **We attain an understanding of “bad” just by feeling pain**. If pain was only bad because we dislike it, then we couldn’t say that “pain really matters.” Instead, the badness of pain would just be a matter of taste. However, we don’t just say pain is bad because we dislike it. We also say pain is bad because of how it feels. Avoiding **pain is a final end** – A final end is a goal people recognize as being **worthy of being sought after for its own sake**. Money is not a final end **because** it is only valuable when used to do something else. Pleasure and pain-avoidance are final ends because they are taken t be worthy of being avoided for their own sake. We know that avoiding pain makes sense even when **it doesn’t lead to anything else** of value, so avoiding pain is a final end.3 If I want to take an aspirin, someone could ask, “Why did you do that?” I could answer, “I have a headache.” This should be the end of the story. We understand that avoiding pain makes sense. It would be absurd for someone to continue to question me and say, “What difference does having a headache make? That’s not a good reason to take an aspirin!”4 Both realists and anti-realists can agree that pain is bad, and they can both agree that pain is a final end. Our desire to avoid pain is non-instrumental and such a desire is experienced as justified. (However, the ant-realist might argue that it is only taken to be justified because of human psychology.) If pain is a final end, then we understand (a) that pain is important and (b) it makes sense to say that we ought to avoid pain. **Pain’s disvalue is irreducible**. **If the badness of pain was reducible to nonmoral properties, then we should be able to describe what** “bad” means **through a non-moral description**. **However**, **we** currently **have no** way of understanding pain’s badness as being something else. We can’t describe pain’s badness in non-moral terms. If someone needs to know what ” bad” means, they need to experience something bad. To say that some moral states are irreducible is just like saying that some mental states are irreducible. Pain itself can’t be described through a non-mental description. If we told people the mental states involved with pain, they would still not know what pain is because they need to know what it feels like. Someone could argue that **“bad” means the same thing as** something like **“pain,”** and then we would find out that the badness of pain could be reduced to something else. However, pain and the badness of pain are conceptually separable. For example, I could find out that something else is bad other than pain. They could then reply that “bad” means the same thing as a disjunction of various other bad things, such as “pain or malicious intent.” But people who disagree about what constitutes what is “bad” aren’t just arguing about the meaning of the word “bad.” They are arguing about what has the property “bad.”5 Additionally, the word “bad” would no longer have any importance. If “bad” just means “pain or malicious intent,” then why care about it? Why ought I refrain from causing pain or having a malicious intent? It could be that we can find out that “bad” and “pain” are identical, but then “bad” might not be entirely reducible to “pain” (or a disjunction of bad things). We might still think that there are two legitimate descriptions at work. The “pain” description and the “bad” description. (Some people think water is H2O through an identity relation similar to this.) This sort of irreducible identity relation require us to deny that pain is “important.” (If the identity theory did require us to deny that pain is “important,” then we would have a good reason to reject such an identity theory.) I have given reason to think the word “bad” is irreducible, but I haven’t proven it. If someone could prove that pain isn’t important, and we can reduce pain to something else, then I will be proven wrong. I just don’t see any reason to agree with that position at this time. I discuss the badness of pain as irreducible in more detail in my essays “Objection to Moral Realism Part 1: Is/Ought Gap” and “Objections to Moral Realism Part 3: Argument from Queerness.” The badness of pain is real. **If the badness of pain is real**, **then everyone’s pain is bad**. Pain isn’t bad just for me, but not for you. It states that **we don’t** all merely **share a subjective preference** in avoiding pain,

## 2

#### Consumer Confidence soars, while the economy thrives. There are 5 Warrants.

Ziemer 21 Ziemer Colin, 5-7-2021, "What Is Going On? (Published 2020)," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/business/dealbook/stock-market-record-high.html//SA

The S&P 500 is 0.1 percent higher than it was six months ago, setting a record at the close of trading yesterday. That doesn’t seem so momentous — until you consider what happened in between: The blue-chip index shed a third of its value in the early stages of the pandemic and then roared back, soaring more than 50 percent from its low in late March.

Chart, line chart

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What gives? A new market record may seem strange when set against the human and economic devastation of the pandemic. (Or as one analyst put it: “This market is nuts.”). As Andrew explains in a guest appearance in The Morning, our sister newsletter, there are five major considerations that investors are making to justify the rally:

1️⃣ Looking past bad news today and anticipating better conditions 12 to 18 months from now

2️⃣ The continued good fortunes of a few big tech companies

3️⃣ An almighty market pop that would arise from news of a vaccine breakthrough

4️⃣ An accommodating Fed printing money and keeping rates low

5️⃣ The hope that Congress overcomes its divisions and pumps the economy with more stimulus

Can it last? “Markets often operate as something of an experiment in mass psychology,” The Times’s Matt Phillips writes. So what could dampen the mood? • The market is very top-heavy, with just five companies — Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft — accounting for more than a fifth of the S&P 500’s market value. Those tech giants have gained around 40 percent so far this year, while the 495 other stocks in the index have collectively lost a few percentage points. • Another potentially ominous sign comes from company insiders, who have been selling their holdings in greater numbers. The data platform AlphaSense sifted through regulatory filings for DealBook and found that disclosures of executive stock sales so far this month have already surpassed last month’s total, and are on track to beat the record set in February, when the market set its previous high. Here’s what is happening In case there was any doubt, Joe Biden has been confirmed as the Democratic presidential nominee. He was formally nominated by the party last night at the party’s national convention. Also onscreen: Former President Bill Clinton and Jill Biden rejected President Trump’s handling of the pandemic, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez highlighted progressive priorities in her cameo appearance, and other Democrats focused on improving health care. Tonight’s agenda includes Senator Elizabeth Warren (more on her below), former President Barack Obama and Senator Kamala Harris, Mr. Biden’s running mate. Cost-cutting measures at the Postal Service were put on hold. Postmaster General Louis DeJoy announced that operational changes, which drew criticism for causing mail delays and for potentially affecting voting by mail, would now take place after the November elections. A Senate panel found extensive links between the 2016 Trump campaign and Russia. The Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee released a nearly 1,000-page report concluding that some Trump advisers maintained extensive contacts with Russian intelligence officials who sought to disrupt the 2016 election.

#### Strikes destroy consumer confidence in business

Tenza 20 Mlungisi Tenza, Obiter vol.41 n.3 Port Elizabeth 2020, LLB LLM LLD Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal, "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa," No Publication, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=S1682-58532020000300004

The relationship between the business of the employer and its customers is based on loyalty and confidence. The employer is expected to keep this relationship going by supplying goods or deliver services to clients when needed. It is expected that this would take place without disturbance. However, during strikes or conduct in furtherance of a strike, this relationship gets affected since the level of production or service delivery is reduced or does not take place. It is well known that the continued existence of a business relies on customers' satisfaction with services or goods provided. A business that does not have customers can hardly survive as they are the backbone of the business. If a strike is violent and takes long to resolve, this may chase away customers or clients as the possibility of not getting what they want is high if less or no production takes place. The possibility that customers could shift loyalty to other businesses doing the same business as the employer is high. The end result is that a prolonged strike has the potential of chasing away customers or clients as they may not want to associate themselves with a business environment that poses a risk to their lives. In addition, customers may want to share solidarity with employees and refuse to associate with a business whose employees are on strike. To stop this from taking place, the employer and the union need to speed up the process of resolving their dispute through a non-violent mechanism such as a collective bargaining process.

#### Business confidence is key to ensuring continued growth

Macquarie Financial Group, 5-25-2016, "5 factors that impact business and consumer confidence," No Publication, <https://www.macquarie.com.au/advisers/business-consumer-confidence-australia.html>//SA

In 1933, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt pointedly noted that "confidence... thrives on honesty, on honour, on the sacredness of obligations, on faithful protection and on unselfish performance. Without them it cannot live". And over 80 years later these words still resonate with political, policy and business leaders as they grapple with increasingly fickle cycles of consumer and business confidence. To be fair, global policymakers are currently confronting a perplexing set of factors in the aftermath of the financial crisis and major central banks' deployment of unconventional monetary policy via unprecedented asset purchase programs and negative interest rates. Arguably, the crisis of 2008-09 and its legacy continue to cast some doubt on the effectiveness and accountability of policymaking institutions in the major developed economies. Confidence levels in the major developed economies have also been influenced by concerns about the socioeconomic consequences of the unrelenting pressure for ‘structural change’ in an increasingly competitive global economic system. At the household/consumer level, a key concern has been persistently high levels of unemployment faced in some regions and subdued income growth in developed economies, while for businesses, sluggish demand and highly competitive operating conditions continue to influence perceptions of resilience and confidence. Consequently, as the global economy moves into the second half of 2016 it is important to understand the causes and consequences of shifts in consumer and business confidence and the possible implications for the business cycle and macroeconomic policy settings. Confidence may be a case of shifting sands With policymakers in the major economies working hard to restore and maintain confidence levels and shifts in sentiment indicators playing a key role in risk assessments of investors, it is worthwhile to consider the various influences on this qualitative economic measure. Our analysis of the various indicators of consumer and business confidence that are regularly published highlight several common factors that have the potential to cause marked shifts in sentiment; including: Changes in interest rates and/or exchange rates, particularly if they are rapid, large and unexpected Swings in the business cycle and associated movements in employment/unemployment levels and business investment intentions Shifts in the relative prices of nondiscretionary goods and services, notably petrol, healthcare, education and utilities prices Large external economic and/or financial shocks, such as the financial crisis of 2008/09 and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2010/11 Announced policy shifts in the stance of government fiscal policy, including large structural spending cuts or increases/decreases in taxation rates. Interestingly, it is widely accepted by economists that the financial economy operating via interest rates and exchange rates acts as a buffer for the real economy in terms of external shocks, but this effect can often be magnified due to the out-sized impact on consumer and business confidence. For example, Australia was not directly affected by either the financial crisis or the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis, but on both occasions a considerable upsurge in general anxiety and slumping confidence were recorded. Australian households and businesses reported concerns about the economy's vulnerability in the face of unprecedented upheaval in global financial markets. Not surprisingly, in some quarters concerns continue to be expressed that small open economies such as Australia and New Zealand often experience disproportionate reactions to economic and financial disturbances that emanate from much larger and more complex economies, including the US, the Eurozone, Japan, and China. To be sure, we are not suggesting that economic policymakers should maintain inappropriate macro policy settings in order to buoy consumer and business confidence. Rather, the announcement and implementation of shifts in key macro policy needs to be sensitive to the psychological impact on households and firms in the real economy. It is the need to manage psychology that has led the major central banks to bolster their policy 'forward guidance' activities, as they fine-tune strategies to eventually end a period of extraordinary monetary policy accommodation. It's not all in the mind as sentiment shapes activity Although it is often said that 'confidence can turn on a dime', this should not be taken as diminishing the role of sentiment in shaping economic activity and in turn the path of business cycles. The power of confidence was patently demonstrated in late 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent slump in global consumer and business sentiment. This was accompanied by an unprecedented collapse in global trade volumes, industrial production, investment and importantly risk-taking. It is estimated that in the major developed economies, including Australia and New Zealand, consumer spending contributes up to two thirds of aggregate demand, based on income levels or changes, buying and spending trends, and underlying economic conditions. If we consider credit and liquidity to be the life-blood of the economic system, then it is reasonable to regard confidence as the oxygen that sustains the system. So heightened economic anxiety and languishing confidence will have manifest impacts on the health and wellbeing of the economy, often determining whether or not it can reach and sustain its long term potential rates of growth. Recent experience indicates that there are several important consequences of low and declining levels of confidence, including: unusually high household and business savings rates, including the hoarding of capital by financial and nonfinancial firms subdued nominal income growth and tepid private sector credit growth widespread household deleveraging declining business investment spending and weak employment growth dominance of short-term thinking and absence of longer-term strategic activity risk of a decline in the economy’s structural growth rate and associated deterioration in productivity growth. Therefore, economies facing 'crises of confidence' may find if this prevails it will undermine productive capacity and prove to be 'growth limiting'. In this event, it could lead to deterioration in living standards as the base of economic activity gradually contracts and the willingness and capacity to engage in risk-taking is curtailed. Looking forward, the continuing desynchronised global business cycle and the likelihood that macroeconomic policy shifts will also vary over the next 12 months suggest that global consumer and business confidence will remain fickle. For policymakers this suggests that communication and announcement effects will continue to be crucial in managing confidence effects in economies. In contrast, investors and firms need to remain vigilant for unexpected shifts in confidence and/or the development of unsettling negative feedback loops.

#### Crashes lead to a great depression.

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Why will the downturn that you see be so harsh?

The only reason the 2008 downturn didn’t turn into a depression was that they turned on the monetary spigots so hard and blew us out of it, which kept the bubble going. They kept printing money and put it off. Now we’ve got a bigger bubble. This downturn is going to be the Great Depression that the deep recession of 2008 was.

How long do you think the depression will last?

If the economy finally falls apart after this much stimulus, economists will flip from being endlessly bullish to endlessly bearish. They’ll say, “Now we’re in a decade-long-plus depression, like the 1930s.” But I’ll say, “Nope, this thing will be hell: It’s going to do its work very fast. By 2024, it will be over.” By 2023 or 2024, we’re going to be coming out of it into what I call the next Spring Boom.

Right now, you favor investing in Treasury bonds. What’s your strategy?

Man, what’s better than sleeping with 30-year Treasury bonds — the safest investment in the reserve currency of a country that’s in big trouble — but not as much as Europe and Japan are in and nowhere near as much as China is in. We’re in the best house in a bad neighborhood.

What will happen to the 30-year Treasury bond during the massive crash you foresee?

It’s going to fall to half a percent and maybe zero. It will expand your money 30%, 40%, 50%, while stocks are crashing 70%, 80%, 90%. Real estate will go down 30%, 40%, 50%. Commodities are already down 50% and are going down another 30% or 40%. Everything is going to default. Cash will preserve your money. The 30-year Treasury will magnify your money.

So, do you think 50% of an investment portfolio should be in Treasurys?

If you’re willing to take more risk, you’ll have one bucket in long-term U.S. Treasury bonds and maybe in a few other good governments, like Sweden or Australia. Triple-A corporates could go in there too. Then you’ll have another bucket — of short stocks, not leveraged.

Stocks are very volatile on the way down. You can also be in REITs that are in very solid areas, like multi-family housing in affordable cities and medical facilities because those will hold up the best.

There’s a discernable euphoria now among investors. But John Templeton, the renowned investor and fund manager, famously said that “bull markets die on euphoria.” Do you agree with that?

Yes. And Jeremy Grantham [GMO co-founder] said [on Jan. 5] this level of euphoria means you’re within months — not years — of a major bubble peak. You’re at the end.

Wil cryptocurrency be part of that huge crash?

Yes. I think Bitcoin is the big thing long term and that crypto and blockchain is a big trend. It’s like the internet of finance — money and assets — instead of information. So it’s a big deal — but in its early stages.

Bitcoin is going to go to 58 [thousand], 60, 80 — and then end up back at 3,000 to 4,000. I would buy it long term, a couple of years from now. I wouldn’t touch it between now and then.

What are your expectations for the economy once the pandemic substantially fades?

Some industries are never going to come back. We’re not back to where we were before COVID — by GDP or any other major indicator. Everybody is acting like “When we get over COVID, we’ll be back better than ever.” The stock market is already anticipating that. But it’s wrong.

The only reason people are spending is because the government handed businesses and consumers tons of money. But it will get to a point where it’s not going to matter how much money is printed — and then you’ll have an avalanche. A huge collapse is coming.

What specifically will cause it?

There’s is no way you can [keep] having fake earnings, fake GDP, fake interest rates and super-high valuations. Financial assets have to come down to reality.

What are the implications?

Loans will fail by the boatload. Then money disappears. That causes bank and business failures. We have to get all the financial leverage, financial assets and debt out of our economy.

#### Economic Depression cascades – Extinction

Mathew Maavak, 4-16-2021, "Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems? – Analysis," Dr. Mathew Maavak is a regular commentator on geostrategic issues, an external researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University in Vilnius, Lithuania, PHD in Risk Foresight from Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Eurasia Review, <https://www.eurasiareview.com/16042021-horizon-2030-will-emerging-risks-unravel-our-global-systems-analysis/>

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid-2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity.

[graph omitted]

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

Environmental

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

Geopolitical

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction- adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced. Geopolitics will still be dictated by major powers. However, how will the vast majority of nations fare during this VUCA decade? Many “emerging nations” have produced neither the intelligentsia nor industries required to be future-resilient. Raw materials and cheap labour cannot sustain anaemic societies in a volatile world. Advances in material sciences and robotic automation as well as technological “ephemeralization” (Fuller, 1938; Heylighen, 2002) may shift manufacturing back to the Developed World. In an attempt to mask the looming redundancy of these nations, untold billions have been wasted on vanity studies, conferences and technological initiatives drawn up by an army of neoliberal experts and native proxies. Risks were rarely part of the planning calculus. National and regional blueprints ranging from Malaysia’s Vision 2020, Saudi Vision 2030, ASEAN 2025 to Africa 2030, amongst others, will fail just as their innumerable precursors did. The author defines a redundant nation as one which persistently lacks a comprehensive brain bank and an adaptive governance structure in order to be future-resilient. Redundant nations are preludes to failed states. They will lack native ideations and coherent policies that are critically needed in a VUCA decade. While policies intended to “promote growth in developing countries” had traditionally acted “as agents for conflict prevention” (Humphreys, 2003), the trade-off was often bureaucratic overgrowth, corruption, ethnoreligious discrimination and resource wastages. Attempts to re-use these nations as geopolitical proxies a la the Cold War may prove too costly for potential sponsors. The Fat Leonard scandal (Whitlock, 2016) in Southeast Asia – which entrapped senior US naval officers in a web of sleaze – may be a harbinger of similar breaches on friendly territory, particularly as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) challenges US geopolitical hegemony worldwide. The BRI however snakes through many potentially- redundant nations and may expose China to a “death by a thousand cuts” via geo-economic extortion. Beijing’s recent attempts to portray itself as a humanitarian superpower has somewhat backfired after numerous defects were discovered in its “medical aid” exports (Kern, 2020). Ultimately, one should not underestimate the possibility, however remote, of national boundaries being redrawn before the Great Reset period is over. The global map was different only 100 years back. The once-mighty Soviet Union no longer exists while its former nemesis, the United States, faces social clefts of ominous proportions. Alarming parallels are now being drawn between the inauguration of President Abraham Lincoln on March 4, 1861 – which led to the US civil war – and the swearing in of Joe Biden as 46th President of United States on January 20, 2021 (Waxman, 2021). How will a weakened United States affect NATO and the larger Western-led global alliance?

Societal

The WEF (2017) had pencilled “global social instability” as the biggest threat facing our collective future. A similar outcome was gamed out in a 2007 study by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre at the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (DCDC, 2007). According to Peter Turchin (2016), a professor of Evolutionary Biology at the University of Connecticut, the United States may experience “a period of heightened social and political instability during the 2020s” – marked by governmental dysfunction, societal gridlock and rampant political polarization. To blame this phenomenon on the presidency of Donald J. Trump is to wilfully ignore the gradual build-up of various fissiparous forces over decades. The social media plays a force multiplier role here. While risks metastasize at the bedrock levels of society, policymakers are constantly distracted from the task of governance by a daily barrage of recriminations, fake news and social media agitprops. As a result, long- term policy imperatives are routinely sacrificed for immediate political gains. The importunate presidential impeachment sagas and electoral fraud accusations in the United States are reflective of wider social fissures, state fragilities and policy paralyses worldwide. There is nothing new in this panem et circenses (bread and circuses) phenomenon. Juvenal had noted a similar trend during Rome’s imperial decline circa 100 A.D. Recently, despite clear signals that the world was facing an economic catastrophe, the United Nations seemed more focused on the discovery of gender bias in virtual assistant software like Siri and Alexa (UNESCO, 2019). How will this revelation benefit the bottom 99% of humanity in dire economic conditions; one where the victims will be preponderantly women and children? Just like in Imperial Rome, bread and circuses are symptomatic of an economic system that relentlessly benefits the elite. The mountain is ignored and the molehill is prioritized through controlled public narratives. The issue of “stolen childhoods”, for example, is now couched in terms of climate change rather than on sexual exploitation. Few take note that nearly “100,000 children – girls and boys – are bought and sold for sex in the U.S. every year, with as many as 300,000 children in danger of being trafficked each year.” Child rape, as John Whitehead (2020) further notes, has become “Big Business in America.” Not surprisingly, human trafficking has emerged as a $150 billion global industry (Niethammer, 2020). Such shocking human rights failures do not figure prominently in the calculus of various “social justice” movements. The Top 1% needs their “useful idiots” – a phrase misattributed to Lenin – to generate a constant supply of distractions. Activist-billionaire George Soros, for example, is pumping $1 billion into a global university network to “fight climate change” and “dictators” which curiously include elected leaders such as former US President Donald J. Trump and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. These “academically excellent but politically endangered scholars” (Open Society, 2020), as Soros calls them, may turn out to be the very disruptors who will “undermine scientific progress” in the West – just as Turchin (2016) predicted in his seminal study. Soros’ pledge was coincidentally made when COVID- 19 began to decimate the global economy and healthcare systems. Elite philanthropy is now an avenue for global subversion. An assortment of scholars, government officials and NGOs are already channelling the agendas of their well-pocketed patrons, backed by Big Tech’s control of the mainstream and social media (Maavak, 2020c). Their narratives are reminiscent of giddy sophistries which fuelled a variety of communist and anarchist movements during the build-up to WWII.Under these circumstances, some nations may eventually seal their borders and initiate authoritarian measures in order to maintain internal stability. This is no longer an unthinkable proposition as dissatisfaction with democracy has peaked worldwide (Foa et al, 2020). Measures perfected by COVID-19 lockdowns may have inadvertently served as a test run in this regard.

## 3

#### Interp: debaters cant say 1ar theory good, dtd, and no rvi

#### Violation: they do

#### (Extempt)

# Case

## Presumption/Permissibility

#### Presumption and Permissibility Negates – 1 Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation  which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – a) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and b) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text. 2 Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### 3 Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 4 Negating is harder – A] Aff gets first and last speech which control the direction of the debate B] Affirmatives can strategically uplayer in the 1ar giving them a 7-6 time skew advantage, splitting the 2nr C] They get infinite prep time

## Kant

### Schmagency

#### The constituvist can’t ground normativity.

Enoch ’11: (David Enoch. “Shmagency Revisited.” Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan//FT)

If it can be defended, then, constitutivism promises to yield significant payoffs . But constitutivism seems to be subject to a powerful objection. For agents need not care about their qualifications as agents, or whether some of their bodily movements count as actions. They can, it seems, be perfectly happy being shmagents – non-agent things that lack the thing purportedly constitutive of agency, but that are as similar to agents as is otherwise possible – or perhaps being something else altogether. If so, constitutivism cannot make good on its promises: For when Korsgaard replies to the agent who asks, say, "Why should I care about the hypothetical and categorical imperatives?" with "Well, otherwise you wouldn't even count as an agent, you wouldn't even be in the game of performing actions.", the skeptic can discard this reply with a simple "So-what?". What is it to her, as it were, if she qualifies as an agent or not? She would be analogous not to the chess-player who asks why she should play according to the rules, but to someone who enjoys the aesthetic qualities of (what we call) the chess board and pieces. If we tell this person that he must not move his king to a certain position because it's against the rules, and if he breaks them he won't count as playing chess, he can shrug us off with a simple "So-what?". He doesn’t care whether his manipulation of the chess pieces qualifies as chess-playing. And at this point the objectivity Velleman hopes for also collapses, because the practical reasons whose objectivity Velleman wants to secure will not reach the person who is happy being a shamgent-rather-than-an-agent, or perhaps something else entirely. The general point here is that the status of being constitutive of agency does not suffice for a normatively non-arbitrary status. Of course, if there were some independent reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent), or to perform actions, this objection would go away. But the price would be too high, for such an independent reason – one not accounted for by the constitutivist story, but rather presupposed by it – would make it impossible for constitutivism to be the whole, or the most foundational, account of normativity, or to deliver on its promised payoffs.

#### Double bind – if agency is inescapable and constitutes a minimal threshold for being an agent, that can’t be normative, since you’ll never fail to meet its standards. Yet if agency is escapable and constitutes a higher standard for moral action, it can’t bind action, since you can avoid being an agent and thus avoid moral responsibility.

### Practical reasoning

#### 1. No justification for why using reason to unify action requires practical reason to be the normative source of morality – it can just be the way we perceive the world.

#### 2. The fact that actions can be divided infinitely doesn’t prove we should – we can just conclude that something is an action when it’s practical to do

## Kant votes neg

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen)

\*Edited for ablest language\*

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### Their own definition proves! (read green)

**Cambridge** [Striking.. . “strike”. n.d. Cambridge English Dictionary. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/strike. Accessed 10-28-2021]

#### to [refuse](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/refuse) to [continue](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/continue) [working](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/working) because of an [argument](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/argument) with an [employer](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/employer). about [working](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/working) [conditions](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/conditions), [pay](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/pay) [levels](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/level), or [job](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/job) [cuts](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/cut)

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

#### 3] The aff homogenizes all strikes as an unconditional right which is unethical.

Loewy 2K, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.)

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

#### 4] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits.

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>]

While strikes and protests build solidarity among their supporters, they are susceptible to collective action problems. This is because **the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits**. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be enjoyed by both strikers and non-strikers. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of free-riding problems, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.