### Permissibility and Presumption affirms:

**[A] Logic – Negating an obligation requires proving a prohibition. That is, to negate an action one would have to provide proactive reasoning as to why that action was wrong. In the absence of prohibitions, that affirms.**

**[B] Freezes action – requiring pro-active justification for all our actions would make it impossible to make morally neutral claims like ‘I ought to drink water’ which means we always assume we can take an action absent a proactive reason not to.**

**[C] Constitutiveness – the negative’s only role is to negate the aff. If they haven’t done that through proving a moral obligation against affirming, they have not met their burden which affirms**

**[D] Epistemology – If we presumed neg then nobody would be able to start any strand of reasoning since we would question everything infintely**

**Counter interpretation – “A” refers to a singular – plural constructions necessitate “some” or no article**

**Butte College n.d.** “TIP Sheet – Definite and Indefinite Articles.” http://www.butte.edu/departments/cas/tipsheets/grammar/articles.html

Rule #1 - Specific identity not known: Use the indefinite article a or an only with a singular count noun whose specific identity is not known to the reader. Use a before nouns that begin with a consonant sound, and use an before nouns that begin with a vowel sound.

* Use the article a or an to indicate any non-specified member of a group or category.

I think an animal is in the garage  
That man is a scoundrel.  
We are looking for an apartment.

* Use the article a or an to indicate one in number (as opposed to more than one).

I own a cat and two dogs.

* Use the article a before a consonant sound, and use an before a vowel sound.

a boy, an apple

◊ Sometimes an adjective comes between the article and noun:

an unhappy boy, a red apple

* The plural form of a or an is some. Use some to indicate an unspecified, limited amount (but more than one).

an apple, some apples

Rule #2 - Specific identity known: Use the definite article the with any noun (whether singular or plural, count or noncount) when the specific identity of the noun is known to the reader, as in the following situations:

* Use the article the when a particular noun has already been mentioned previously.

I ate an apple yesterday. The apple was juicy and delicious.

* Use the article the when an adjective, phrase, or clause describing the noun clarifies or restricts its identity.

The boy sitting next to me raised his hand.  
Thank you for the advice you gave me.

* Use the article the when the noun refers to something or someone that is unique.

the theory of relativity  
the 2003 federal budget

Rule #3 - All things or things in general: Use no article with plural count nouns or any noncount nouns used to mean all or in general.

Trees are beautiful in the fall. (All trees are beautiful in the fall.)  
He was asking for advice. (He was asking for advice in general.)  
I do not like coffee. (I do not like all coffee in general.)

#### Standard

#### Depth

#### Education

#### Rvi cuz rtime skew

## New off

#### Interp: neg may not read a consult cp especially without solvency advocate specific to the affirmitive plan

#### Violation: they do

#### Standards:

#### 1} Limits

#### 2} clash

DTD

No rvi cuz time

# Kant stuff

#### Kantian ethics can’t ground normativity.

Enoch ’11: (David Enoch. “Shmagency Revisited.” Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan//FT)

If it can be defended, then, constitutivism promises to yield significant payoffs . But constitutivism seems to be subject to a powerful objection. For agents need not care about their qualifications as agents, or whether some of their bodily movements count as actions. They can, it seems, be perfectly happy being shmagents – non-agent things that lack the thing purportedly constitutive of agency, but that are as similar to agents as is otherwise possible – or perhaps being something else altogether. If so, constitutivism cannot make good on its promises: For when Korsgaard replies to the agent who asks, say, "Why should I care about the hypothetical and categorical imperatives?" with "Well, otherwise you wouldn't even count as an agent, you wouldn't even be in the game of performing actions.", the skeptic can discard this reply with a simple "So-what?". What is it to her, as it were, if she qualifies as an agent or not? She would be analogous not to the chess-player who asks why she should play according to the rules, but to someone who enjoys the aesthetic qualities of (what we call) the chess board and pieces. If we tell this person that he must not move his king to a certain position because it's against the rules, and if he breaks them he won't count as playing chess, he can shrug us off with a simple "So-what?". He doesn’t care whether his manipulation of the chess pieces qualifies as chess-playing. And at this point the objectivity Velleman hopes for also collapses, because the practical reasons whose objectivity Velleman wants to secure will not reach the person who is happy being a shamgent-rather-than-an-agent, or perhaps something else entirely. The general point here is that the status of being constitutive of agency does not suffice for a normatively non-arbitrary status. Of course, if there were some independent reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent), or to perform actions, this objection would go away. But the price would be too high, for such an independent reason – one not accounted for by the constitutivist story, but rather presupposed by it – would make it impossible for constitutivism to be the whole, or the most foundational, account of normativity, or to deliver on its promised payoffs.

#### Double bind – if agency is inescapable and constitutes a minimal threshold for being an agent, that can’t be normative, since you’ll never fail to meet its standards. Yet if agency is escapable and constitutes a higher standard for moral action, it can’t bind action, since you can avoid being an agent and thus avoid moral responsibility.

#### And kant affirms -

#### The right to strike is consistent with negative rights – otherwise it requires direct government intervention to break the negotiation process

#### Sheppard ’96:

Terry Sheppard, "Liberalism and the Charter: Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike" (1996) 5 Dal J Leg Stud 117. yoaky

The simplest way to differentiate these two concepts of rights and freedoms, which are often taken as synonymous, is to say that a right is a right to something while a freedom is a freedom from something, usually government interference. The question that is raised here is whether striking is a freedom or a right.55 The distinction is important because the liberal will only support the negative conception of non-interference but not the positive right to formulation.56 What are the union members being given when they exercise their right to strike? Some would answer that they are being given higher wages, better benefits or whatever else is sought by striking. If this is the case, then it is untrue that workers have a right to any of these things. The liberal does not allow that anyone has a right to a particular wage for a specific job. Those philosophers who have protested the supply and demand determination of prices and wages have created various schemes for an objective calculation of wages and prices. Marx, for example, believed that each person should be given a wage according to their need. Liberals deny these claims and argue that the only price or wage is what the market will bear. But this is not what unions are asserting when they postulate a right to strike. There is no set wage or benefits package that is morally justifiable outside the turbulent give and take of the free market. In contrast to socialists, liberals do not believe that one end result is any more just than another. As long as the rules of the game are just, the results will be just. This is how liberals justify the often severe inequality present in a liberal society and attack socialists for wanting to change the outcome. The analogy that is often used focuses upon the rules of a game. It would make little sense to criticize the score of a hockey game even if the home team is defeated soundly. As long as all the rules apply equally to both teams, the final score is just. Only if one team were allowed to be offside and the other not would there be cause to question the outcome of the game. It does not matter that one team is better and stronger than the other team. Such is the case with labour negotiations. Liberals cannot complain that a union receives too much in labour negotiations simply because it has the bargaining power to exact a generous contract. Likewise, socialists cannot complain if the union failed to have its demands met. What the unions are really seeking is the right to enter into the labour negotiation process without the fear of the state's coercive powers being used against them. It is a freedom they seek, the same freedom liberals seek for all individuals-the freedom from government interference. The right to strike is only a right in the sense that unions have the right to enter into labour negotiations free from government intervention. In the same sense, freedom of religion is a right to worship free of state involvement. So the right to strike is really the freedom to strike. The argument has been made that if the government is kept out of the labour field by providing unions with a constitutionally protected freedom to strike, the balance of power would be unfairly changed in favour of the unions. Mcintyre]. makes the point when he writes: To intervene in that dynamic [i.e. that of labour negotiations] ... by implying constitutional protection for a right to strike would, in my view, give to one of the contending forces an economic weapon removed from and made immune, subject to s. l, to legislative control which could go far towards freezing the development of labour relations and curtailing the process of evolution necessary to meet the changing circumstances of a modern society in a modern world.57 Mcintyre J. believes that in dismissing the case he is leaving the situation as it was before with the power structure more or less equal. After all, he is not taking the freedom to strike away from unions but merely allowing the legislatures to regulate this freedom as they see fit. Unions can still legally strike in the same manner as they always could. The fact that some unions did strike, and strike successfully, does not mean that unions had the legal freedom to strike. Even after this decision, some unions will still strike. The conclusion that the freedom to strike is not compromised because the government allows some strikes to go on is a non sequitur. A totalitarian regime may allow certain religions to practice but ban all others. Could this regime be said to have freedom of religion? What the Supreme Court did in failing to recognize a constitutional freedom to strike was to allow the government to step into any labour dispute and order the union back to work, which, in effect, enervates the freedom to strike. Mcintyre J. believes that in denying unions the freedom to strike he was remaining impartial in the field of labour relations. In fact, he believes that if unions were granted this freedom, he would be "freezing" the "process of evolution" by giving unions an unfair advantage. In its present form, the labour negotiation process is generally to the advantage of the employer. Obviously, some unions have more bargaining power than others. However, this power rarely exceeds that of their employer. For many reasons, unions are reluctant to launch a strike and once they do strike, there are pressures on a union to settle quickly. First, as Smith pointed out, the effects of a labour dispute are more immediate to the workers than to management: A landowner, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a single workman, could live a year or two upon the stocks which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, a few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long-run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate. [my emphasis]. 58 Even farther removed are the stockholders of those companies that are publicly traded. Secondly, many companies will have a reserve of their product on hand, especially if they have anticipated labour trouble, which will see them through the initial strike period. Workers, on the other hand, may have limited savings but even if they do, they will reluctantly dip into their life savings or their child's college fund, certainly more reluctantly than the company will use up its surplus stock. Also, depending on the provincial legislation and the union contract, it may be possible for the company to bring in replacement workers while the strikers must report for picket duty each day. Where replacement workers cannot be used, some companies can get by for a short time by using management to run the factory. Often, union workers are restricted from finding a temporary job during the strike and even when this is permissible, the hopes of finding an interim position are limited. A strike may involve thousands of workers, each of them feeling the effects of the work stoppage differently. This is why it is very difficult, even in a small union, to maintain cohesion, while the employer can more easily offer a united front. It is difficult to maintain that the Supreme Court's decision is neutral. The government only rarely intervenes on behalf of the unions. None of Canada's major political parties have a great track record on protecting unions.

#### The government only has an obligation to stop violations of freedom so it has no right to intervene in this process. People have every right unless it infringes on other people’s rights.