### 1NC – Private

#### 1] Interp – Private Entities are completely separate from Government Affiliations – this excludes Private-Public Partnerships.

#### PPPs retains governmental ownership.

Robbins-Gioia ND [Robbins-Gioia, LLC (RG became a portfolio company of Acorn Growth Companies. Acorn Growth Companies is a middle market private equity firm focused exclusively on Aerospace, Defense and Intelligence. Acorn invests solely in operating companies that strive to enhance global mobility and protect national interests. Acorn has a formidable reputation in the industry and is recognized for its deep understanding of the aerospace & defense markets, with proprietary access to the best companies within these sectors. With operational expertise and its ability to lead and manage investments through variable economic and industry cycles, Acorn works in tandem with management to build its portfolio companies into significant market leaders). “Common Misconceptions of Public-Private Partnerships”. No Date. Accessed 4/16/2022. <https://www.teamrg.com/blog/common-misconceptions-of-public-private-partnerships-hint-its-not-a-machiavellian-plot-to-subvert-government> //Xu]

Through a PPP model, the government agency retains ownership over the public facility or system while the private entity invests its own capital to design and develop the facility to deliver the highest quality of service for the cost.

#### Private entities are not government affiliated.

UpCounsel ND [“Private Entity: Everything You Need to Know”. UpCounsel (interactive online service that makes it faster and easier for businesses to find and hire legal help). No Date. Accessed 12/17/21. <https://www.upcounsel.com/private-entity> //Xu]

A private entity can be a partnership, corporation, individual, nonprofit organization, company, or any other organized group that is not government-affiliated. Indian tribes and foreign public entities are not considered private entities.

#### By refers to the actor DOING the action – the act of appropriation MUST be owned and done by private entities.

Cambridge Dictionary No Date "By" <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/by?q=by>+ //Elmer

used to show the [person](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/person) or thing that does something:

The [motorcycle](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/motorcycle) was [driven](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/driven) by a [tiny](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/tiny) [bald](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/bald) man.

We were [amazed](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/amazed) by what she told us.

I'm [reading](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/reading) some [short](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/short) [stories](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/story) (written) by Chekhov.

The [book](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/book) was [translated](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/translate) by a well-known [author](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/author).

I [felt](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/felt) [frightened](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/frightened) by the [anger](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/anger) in his [voice](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/voice).

#### 2] Violation – The Appropriation done in China is done w/ Public Partnerships OR by the Government.

#### China’s "private" sector companies aren't private.

Olson 20 [Stephen Olson, research fellow at the Hinrich Foundation. "Are Private Chinese Companies Really Private?" The Diplomat, 9-30-2020, accessed 1-14-2022, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/are-private-chinese-companies-really-private/] Recut Durham SA

Such is the case with China’s “Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era,” recently released by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (and further elaborated on by President Xi Jinping himself). This document tells us in no uncertain terms that Chinese private companies will be increasingly called upon to conduct their operations in tight coordination with governmental policy objectives and ideologies. The rest of the world should take note.

A Different Vision of “Private” Business

The 5,000 word “opinion” aims to ratchet-up the role and influence of the CCP within the private sector in order “to better focus the wisdom and strength of the private businesspeople on the goal and mission to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The objective is to establish a “united front” between business and government and facilitate the “enhancement of the party’s leadership over the private economy.” According to the plan, “private economic figures are to be more closely united around the party,” thereby achieving “a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee on political stand, political direction, political principles, and political roads.

#### 3] Standards:

#### a] Limits – Allowing Country/Entity Affs that work with or are done by the Government explodes a Predictable Topic – China/Russia/Iran/Algeria/South Africa/Brazil/UK plus a host of Entity Affs like Boeing/Lockheed that contract all become Topical. Each Country Aff requires specific Neg Research or else U/Q thumps Appropriation Good making Neg Research Burden impossible under their model.

#### b] Extra-Topicality – Allowing Aff’s to affects Government-owned/operated Space Appropriation gives them access to extra impacts and advantages that they can leverage proven by their [Internal Links] and we can’t turn it since it wasn’t grounded in the resolution.

#### c] Neg Ground – Giving them Gov Appropriation Bad allows them to artificially fiat pass U/Q concerns by removing core Neg Presses on “Private Key” – that’s key to Negative Impact Weighing on a topic where Neg DA/CPs struggle from U/Q, Timeframe, and Link issues – Err Neg on Neg Ground.

### 1NC – Passive Voice

#### Interpretation: Affirmatives must advocate for the resolution through passive voice:

#### Violation: They don’t

**Eurocentre 15** (Eurocentres, Eurocentres is an organization that teaches 30 different languages to differing people, “What’s the Difference Between the Active and Passive Voice?”, <https://www.eurocentres.com/blog/whats-the-difference-between-the-active-and-passive-voice/>, Published 9/24/15, Accessed 2/6/19, Lex RM)

The passive voice is less common. Unlike the active voice, this describes a verb being happened to the subject of the sentence, rather than the subject carrying it out. In this way, the action is said to be “passive”. Let’s take a look at some examples: “The cake was eaten by the girls.” “The fish was caught by the bear.” “The books were collected by him.” You can see that the examples above contain the word “was”. This is because to form the passive voice, you use the verb “to be” with the past participle – so you use “was eaten”, “was caught” and “were collected”. You can also use the word “got” to create the passive voice. For example: “The prisoner got caught by the guards.” You can also highlight who is actually doing the action in a passive voice sentence, by using the word “by”. For example: “The girl was picked up by her mother.” So what’s the difference between the passive and active voice? To take a closer look, let’s review some of the examples from above: In the passive voice you would say” “The prisoner got caught by the guards.” The prisoner is the subject of the sentence here, and the guards are the object. In the active voice, this would be reversed – but the meaning would still be the same: “The guards caught the prisoner.” Can you see the difference? So when would you use each voice? The active voice is the one used most often, in everyday conversation and in most writing. But the passive voice is used when you want to draw attention to the thing the verb is happening to, rather than what is doing it.

#### Prefer–

#### 1] Accessibility- increases access for minority debaters and spills over

**Dillard-Knox 14**, university of Louisville [“Against the grain: The Challenge of Black discourse within inter-collegiate policy debate” https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3166&context=etd]//Mberhe

Historically, the topics that have been selected have been constructed utilizing the active voice as opposed to a passive voice. An active voice example would be, ―Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase statutory and/or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States.‖ A passive voice example would be, ―Resolved: The war powers authority of the President of the United States should be substantially restricted.‖ The active voice topics require debaters to defend that the United States Federal Government ―do something‖ in a more limited capacity, whereas a passive voice topic could allow debaters the opportunity to defend a variety of interpretations of ―something being done‖ by or to the United States Federal Government. The active voice topic always gives the agency to act to the United States Government. For students that see themselves as having the possibility to access these positions of power, acquiring these skills become empowering. However, many marginalized students come to Debate from communities that have historically been excluded from these positions of power. Having a passive topic that removes the agency from the United States Federal Government and allows debaters the flexibility to choose who has agency thus becomes more empowering to this population of students. These students would then be more motivated to participate in the process of debate through which they can acquire a variety of skill sets from politician to community activist. Secondly, the literature base used to construct the topic has failed to include perspectives found within the race literature, such as the legal and political scholarship of Derrick Bell (1992), Cornel West (1994), and bell hooks (1995). Very little, if any, attention has been given to Critical Race Theory or Critical Legal Studies within the chosen controversy areas, such as Immigration and Supreme Court Cases. Even when topic papers are submitted that do include this literature, they are rarely, if ever selected in the voting process. This is important to the conversation of debating the topic in that the topic paper sets the definitional guidelines of what is considered topical. If the topic paper is limited to the language and perspective of the dominant, then so too will the debates be limited to the language and perspective of the dominant. Thus, it could be argued that the topic does not account for the discourse strategies of marginalized populations and could be an additional source of exclusion from Debate. The important role that Debate has played throughout history in training students to become the nation‘s most prominent leaders and active citizens requires special attention to how these students are trained. Debate is the training ground for the future movers and shakers of society. Therefore, Debate educators have a responsibility to ensure that the ways in which these students think about the policy making process is inclusive of a diversity of values, perspectives, and cultures. Altering the perspectives of debaters during their intercollegiate debate careers could have positive long term effects on the ways they choose to interact with diverse members of the larger society. Debate is no longer an activity mostly comprised of wealthy, white males. Within the last decade and a half, Debate has had an increase in demographically diverse populations. Thus, it is necessary that Debate has a process for valuing the voices of all of its students. Just like the interracial debates of the early twentieth century provided Blacks with a platform to disprove stereotypes about Black intellectual inferiority, Debate continues to provide a stage for Black students‘ voices. However, these students must not be forced to assimilate into the traditional norms of Debate to be considered valuable members of the Debate community. In order for Debate to continue to be relevant well into the future, there has to be a transformation in the culture of the community. This culture must transition away from a community that holds onto stagnate notions of universalism to one that embraces notions of difference. This process began in 2000 when Dr. Ede Warner, then Director of Debate at the University of Louisville, had a vision to bring Debate to Black students. Successfully recruiting a new cohort of Black students in Debate, Warner found that these students were frustrated with being forced to assimilate into the traditional norms of the activity in order to be successful. Warner and his students were not only successful in challenging traditional norms and procedures but they were also innovative in the successful creation of alternative methods that are most representative of the lives that they experience. The success of this new model of Debate has led to increased tensions and hostilities throughout Debate in what is now called the clash of civilizations. An examination of the clash of civilizations debates is not only necessary for the recruitment and retention of the Black student population but Debate at large. This new model of debate, alternative debate, has been instrumental in the recruitment of other diverse groups, such as: Latinos, Native Americans, disabled populations, and LGBT students. Additionally, the inclusion of different values and perspectives adds another level of training for the future movers and shakers of society. If debaters are trained to make policy for diverse populations, then understanding the difference in cultures, values and perspectives of these groups is an invaluable experience. Ultimately, these standpoints are necessary for the growth and development of every member of the Debate community. Unfortunately, the backlash to alternative debate has overshadowed the 73 benefits of including alternative debate for much of the community. Therefore, research on the clash of civilization debates is an essential and timely endeavor. The speech community model of analysis has been a productive model for examining the ways in which the prioritizing of traditional debate norms and procedures has served to exclude Black discourse, values, and perspectives. While it is not always an intentional act of exclusion, the effects can often be just as injurious. The debate about Debate, that has been ongoing within Intercollegiate Policy Debate, has provided an excellent opportunity to examine how the exclusion of different discourse strategies can ultimately lead to the exclusion of an entire culture, their values, and their experiences. With the recent growth of the Black student population in Debate, the community has been introduced to new methods of debate. As a result of the increased use of alternative methods, the discussions regarding the community‘s best practices have become a site of contention for many of its members. The hostility surrounding the debate about Debate is at an all-time high and the community is split along the lines of stylistic choice. Additionally, this split has also segregated the community along lines of race. The effects of this conflict have left these Black students stigmatized and constantly fighting to be recognized as valuable members of the Debate community. In this regard, the Debate community has failed to become the open and inclusive community that it prides itself on being. Not only are these Black debaters negatively affected, but the entire community risks losing the potential benefits that come from the inclusion of alternative perspectives. 74 This research isolates specific norms within traditional debate. Specifically, the research targets the use of the flow, speed, and line by line refutation. To be clear, it is not the norms in and of themselves but the ways in which these practices have been used at the exclusion of alternative methods of debate for Black students. Traditional debate practices have often been defended, by coaches and debaters alike, as the best method to train debaters in the process of policy making. However, most of the rationale for this defense depends upon a universal understanding of the purpose of Debate. There are various factors that determine why each student chooses to participate in the activity and what he/she chooses to get out of the activity. The ontological positioning of traditional debate practices as ―the best‖ inhibits debate traditionalists from understanding the epistemological challenges that these alternative debaters are issuing.

### 1NC – Black Buddhism

#### The demand for durable fiat is a form of white delusion that represents an active misapprehension of reality

**McRae ’19** [Emily; May 13; Associate Professor of Buddhism at the University of New Mexico; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 1,” p. 44-45]

I offer this story not only as an example of everyday white delusion, but also to set the tone of this chapter: From both the Buddhist and critical race theoretical perspectives that I draw on here, ignorance (delusion) is not someone else’s problem. There is a moral, and epistemic imperative to confront our own ignorance, to dismantle the false beliefs and misunderstandings that inform our everyday sense of reality. In this chapter, I use the Buddhist concept of avidyā (ignorance, confusion, delusion) to analyze the causes, mechanisms, and possible correctives for white delusion. In Buddhist contexts, avidyā refers not only to a lack of knowledge but also (and primarily) to an active misapprehension of reality, a warped projection onto reality that reinforces our own dysfunction and vice. Ignorance is rarely innocent; it is not an isolated phenomenon of just-not-happening-to-know-something. It is maintained and reinforced through personal and social habits, including practices of personal and collective false projection, strategic ignoring, and convenient “forgetting.” This view of avidyā has striking similarities to philosophical analyses of white ignorance, such as Charles Mills’s, which understand white ignorance not in terms of a passive lack of knowledge but as an active refusal by whites to confront basic facts about our social world.

I argue that Buddhist analyses of avidyā may help us understand the mechanisms of white ignorance and the practices for deconstructing it. On the Buddhist view, the mechanisms for maintaining avidyā include obsession with self and clinging to fixed narratives about the self (in the case of white delusion, “I’m not racist” or “I’ve earned and deserve everything I have”) and the refusal to take seriously cause and effect (such as a failure to historicize racism, the failure to understand broad, systemic effects of racism, and the inability to apply abstract knowledge of racism to specific cases). In my own case of white delusion, I was guilty of both kinds of mistakes: I was clinging to a narrative that obscured reality—that it was only women who bore the burden of managing physical appearance in our society—and I failed to apply my knowledge of how racism works in the abstract to the specifics of my partner’s life.  
Buddhist conceptions of ignorance or delusion may also help to locate possible correctives for white ignorance. Because avidyā is not simply a lack of knowledge, it cannot be completely remedied by exposure to facts and analyses of those facts. To be receptive to such knowledge in the first place, to remember and apply it, we must overcome our own dysfunctional emotional patterns that sustain our confusion. So, on a Buddhist ethical view, white people cannot combat white ignorance simply with knowledge about racism (which is already widely available) but rather white people need to do the personal and emotional work of deconstructing our own whiteness, as it arises in our own lives, to uproot our white ignorance. This is uncomfortable and ugly (but necessary) work that will require white people to correct for major moral blind spots by developing the moral skill of equanimity (or “tarrying,” as George Yancy has argued).3

#### International relations is complicit in an anti-black rationalism that pathologizes the lived realities of black folx as an insufficient critical prospective

**Gordon and Harper-Shipman ’20** [Lewis and T.D.; 2020; Professor of Philosophy at UCONN-Storr; Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at Davidson College; *The Routledge Handbook to Rethinking Ethics in International Relations*, “Race and Ethics in International Relations,” p. 75-77]

Through a systematic positing of rationalism and parsimonious models, conventional IR elides the possibility of including the lived realities of black, brown, and red peoples in the Global South as valid forms of evidence and critical perspectives. To the extent that these voices can be quantified in an undifferentiated manner, they do not figure legitimately into the existing disciplinary paradigm. Without intentionally incorporating race into the framework, scholars are unable to explain phenomena such as the Global North’s continued imperial domination through globalization or the racialized political economy of contemporary forms of slavery such as sex-traffcking and forced domestic servitude in the United States (Crawford 2002; Georgis and Lugosi 2014; J.A. Gordon 2019). Alternative methodologies that may allow for a more ethical incorporation of race into IR include the world-travelling goal of achieving ‘a space of mutual understanding using the tool of empathy, which is the ability to enter the spirit of a different experience and find it in an echo of some part of oneself’ (Sylvester 2017, 182; see also Anzaldúa 1987; Sylvester 1995).There isalso poise, an epistemological framework for offering a critique of and reconstructing IR in a fashion that is void of colonial, capitalist-patriarchy (see Agathangelou and Ling 2004). Grovogui (2001) proposes reverse ethnography as a methodology available to the formerly colonized for assessing the colonizers’ ontological dispositions for what they are and not what the colonizers say they are. Exposing the limitations in this line of thinking in IR knowledge production demonstrates the provincial nature of the predominantly white approach to International Relations, which contradicts the current positivist paradigm. that calls for universal theorizing. Finally, though not exclusively, ethics demands connectedness and its concomitant obligation to others. This involves being in-relation-with-others instead of being separate. Models of IR premised on purity would require the elimination of relations with others (read as forms of contamination), whereas those premised on being-in-relations leads to a form of structural, ongoing mixture and transformation, which Jane Anna Gordon (2014) describes as ‘creolizing theory’. As the white supremacist origins of IR oppose such a model, overcoming that history requires acknowledging a different model of coexistence on our planet.

Conclusion

Race conjoined with ethics in IR thus raises normative, disciplinary, and methodological challenges to the field. The first raises the obligation of overcoming the normative project of global white supremacy through acknowledging that history and addressing how its continuation is often preserved through ongoing practices of denial. It also demands addressing how dominant global policies and the arguments that support them also facilitate disempowerment, dehumanization, and violence in the Global South and its manifestations in the Global North. This leads to disciplinary and methodological concerns that break down a neat divide between epistemological and normative practices. As the constructivist approaches tend to lead also to normative constructivism, the challenge of race and ethics in IR becomes also the imaginative act of theorizing different kinds of power relations and modes of coexistence with fidelity to extant global challenges on the organization of human and other planetary forms of life.

#### Unethical delusions are an existential threat.

**Loy ’18** [David; April 21st; Former professor of Ethics, Religion, and Society at Xavier University; Mountain Cloud, “Are Humans Special? Part 3 by David Loy,” <https://www.mountaincloud.org/are-humans-special-part-3-by-david-loy-2/>]

If we are special because of our potential, we must choose. We are free to derive the meaning of our lives from delusions about who we are — from dysfunctional stories about what the world is and how we fit into it—or we can derive that meaning from insight into our nonduality with the rest of the world. In either case, there are consequences.

The problem with basing one’s life on delusions is that the consequences are unlikely to be good. As well as producing poetry and cathedrals, our creativity has recently found expression in world wars, genocides, and weapons of mass destruction, to mention a few disagreeable examples. We are in the early stages of an ecological crisis that threatens the natural and cultural legacy of future generations, including a mass extinction event that may lead to the disappearance of half the earth’s plant and animal species within a century, according to E. O. Wilson—an extinction event that may include ourselves.

What needs to be done so that our extraordinary co-creative powers will promote collective well-being (collective in this case referring to all the ecosystems of the biosphere)?

From a Buddhist perspective our unethical tendencies ultimately derive from a misapprehension: the delusion of a self that is separate from others, a big mistake for a species whose well-being is not separate from the well-being of other species. Insofar as we are ignorant of our true nature, individual and collective self-preoccupation naturally motivates us to be selfish. Without the compassion that arises when we feel empathy — not only with other humans, but with the whole of the biosphere — it is likely that civilization as we know it will not survive many more generations.

In either case, we seem fated to be special. If we continue to devastate the rest of the biosphere, we are arguably the worst species on earth: a cancer of the biosphere. If, however, humanity can wake up to become its collective bodhisattva —undertaking the long-term task of repairing the rupture between us and Mother Earth — perhaps we as a species will fulfill the unique potential of precious human life.

#### The alternative is Black Buddhist meditation.

**Vesely-Flad ’19** [Rima; May 13; Ph.D. Director of Peace and Justice Studies at Warren Wilson College; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 5,” p. 85-86]

Lovingkindness practices toward the self, alongside personal interpretations of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Noble Path, guide many Black Buddhist practitioners who have suffered generational trauma and racist degradation in our contemporary moment. Valerie Mason-John, also known as Vimalasara, an African-Canadian teacher in the Nichiren tradition, speaks of the importance of the Four Noble Truths for people of African descent in particular. The First Noble Truth is that suffering is a universal experience. Mason-John states, “We of African descent know what suffering is. It’s in our DNA.”20 The Second Noble Truth states that suffering is a result of ignorant craving. For many Black Buddhists, the interpretations of the causes of suffering are greatly expanded into teachings of white myopia, the desire to exist in delusion, and the collective ego of the dominant white culture. The Third Noble Truth is that there is a path to end suffering. The very promise of liberation is enticing for people of African descent. The Fourth Noble Truth describes the path of liberation, known as the Noble Eightfold Path. In this path, “Right Concentration,” which leads to settling the mind, is a particularly compelling practice.

Manuel writes in The Way of Tenderness:

Only in the deep silence of meditation did I begin to disbelieve that I was born only to suffer. Eventually after many years of sitting meditation, I recognized the root of my self-hatred, both external and internal, as a personal and collective denial or denigration of the body I inhabited.

Her reflections are echoed by Owens’s reflections on silence: “silence became the medium in which I was reborn into a sense of happiness and contentment. But overall, it ushered me into a period of thriving and flourishing in my life.”22 In meditation, practitioners cultivate their ability to confront the suffering wrought by their mental constructs rather than avoid pain. They seek to heal the damage wrought by racism and to rearticulate profound teachings that are rooted in concentration practices. In-depth interviews with Black Buddhist teachers and practitioners illuminate a progression in the process of acknowledging one’s racial identity and embracing teachings of non-self. The progression begins with claiming and rearticulating Blackness as part of the social self, and in so doing, embracing African ancestry. For many, the next step is entering into an experience of silence that facilitates a recognition of the truth of non-self. Finally, Black Buddhist teachers and long-term practitioners integrate embodiment with the psychologically liberating practice of silence. The ten Black Buddhist teachers and long-term practitioners interviewed for this chapter emphasized four primary themes in their articulation of embodiment and Anatta: (1) Being visible in social spaces; (2) Claiming African ancestral lineages; (3) Embracing the two truths of relative and absolute existence; and (4) Liberating the self and the community.

#### Interp: affirmatives must defend their epistemic project prior to weighing the plan.

#### Debates about the “fiated consequences of the plan” promote ethical failure.

**Locke ’19** [Jessica; May 13; Associate Professor of Buddhism at Loyola University of Maryland; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 9,” p. 161-175]

In Buddhist ethics and whiteness studies, we can find rich discussions of the problems and possibilities that stem from the perceptual habits that ground our ways of having a world. While the content of these traditions, on the face of it at least, appears to deal with radically different problems, they both point to the depth of the ethical ramifications of our phenomenological rapport with the world. The entire Buddhist path is predicated upon human beings’ ability to work to transform our phenomenological orientation in order to extirpate ourselves from the fundamental ignorance that causes our suffering and our ethical failures. Anti-racism likewise hinges upon not only the possibility but the necessity of working to revise racialized perceptual habits and thereby challenge the racist valuations that arise within and because of white supremacy.

In what follows, I use moral phenomenology as the unifying concept through which to read Buddhist ethics and whiteness alongside one another. My aim is to draw forth the structural similarities between the Buddhist account of releasing oneself from the self-cherishing attitude and the antiracist task of challenging racialized perceptual habits. The latter task is especially urgent for white people, for whom whiteness is often difficult to single out as a subjective structure of experience. Whereas people of color are much more aware of white privilege, racism, and the way norms of whiteness function as a standard of value in American culture, white people more often lack perceptual attunement to our own privilege, to racialized dynamics in society, and indeed to our own racialized styles of thinking and perceiving. For this reason, much (but not all) of my analysis of whiteness as a moral-phenomenological problem will problematize it within white peoples’ experience.

My approach to these moral phenomenologies is not just descriptive. Ultimately, reading these moral phenomenologies alongside one another helps draw into focus the available trajectories for working on the structure of conscious experience to change ourselves at the dispositional level. The aspiration to cultivate ethical subjectivity and transform consciousness in this way is bold; it asks much more of us than subscription to moral norms. Instead, it makes experience itself an ethical project. While the task of transforming our way of having a world sounds impossibly vast or possibly even naïve, both Buddhist ethics and anti-racism demonstrate how indispensable this form of ethical self-cultivation is to our flourishing.

Moral phenomenology addresses the ethical salience of experience itself. The qualities of my experience—the valuations that I bring to the objects of my experience and my affective responses to those things—comprise the scene in which my moral life unfolds. I am disposed to the world—pushed and pulled by certain ideas, objects, people, and courses of action—because of the meanings that supervene on all of these things. These meanings guide my navigation of the world; they comprise the frames of reference within which I think, feel, and act. The values and significances that populate my world come to me with a “wake of historicity,” as Merleau-Ponty would say; they are invested in the objects of experience by way of perceptual habits that sediment over time through repeated engagement and practice. This kind of habituation finds myriad instantiations in our perception. One would not have to search too long to find two Americans who perceive a semi-automatic weapon according to vastly different perceptual habits: such a weapon is either revolting—a grotesque, infuriating symbol of the NRA’s cold-blooded grasp on American policy and public safety—or it is evocative of American independence, self-determination and freedom from the always-lurking threat of tyranny or threat of the “Other.”

While the significance of our world seems seamless and totalized, in fact the specificity of its meaning for us is underwritten by the subjective styles by which we experience it. Our perceptual habits draw forth the meaningful particularities of our world. In this sense, we see ourselves reflected within the world that we help to constitute; the significances that stand out to us as meaningful are not objective facts of our world per se but rather are given to us through the subjective structures that we provide for having a world at all. Nonetheless, the subjective contribution we make toward its appearance for us is hidden behind its seamlessness and totalized quality. We do not see our perceptual habits but rather we see and experience through our perceptual habits, and our ethical lives—every choice we make and even how the terms of our choices appear to us as such—are grounded first and foremost in perception.

What moral phenomenology highlights for us, therefore, is that how we comport ourselves in the world is profoundly conditioned by the habitual, phenomenological structures that run much deeper than our explicit intellectual commitments. Our ethical flourishing and the fullness of our character are not matters of subscribing to a “correct” view at an intellectual level, and we cannot eschew ethical infelicities simply by intellectually assenting to a philosophical or a political tenet. The real ethical work that moral phenomenology suggests lies in addressing the contradiction between our reflective, consciously avowed values and our pre-reflective, unconscious feelings and responses that comprise the conditions under which we gear into our ethical lives.

UNDOING THE HABIT OF SELF-CHERISHING: MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST ETHICS

In the traditional Buddhist iconographic representation of the human condition known as the Wheel of Life, the cyclic suffering of our existence turns on the “hub” of the so-called three poisons—the afflictions of passion, aggression, and ignorance, represented by a rooster, a snake, and a pig, respectively. In many renderings, the rooster and the snake are depicted emerging from the mouth of the pig, symbolizing how passion and aggression are in fact products of our fundamental ignorance (Sanskrit: avīdya). This ignorance names our fundamental, primal misapprehension of the way things truly are—interdependent and impermanent.2 We hypostasize the content of our experience and our own atomic, individualized selfhood, projecting upon them a permanence and a substantial reality that they in fact lack. Then, based upon that misapprehension, we perceive and experience the world through a structure of subject-object duality.

Clinging to the self and phenomena as permanent entities skews our experience. Everything that we perceive is understood relative to the reified self as either worthy of desire and pursuit (passion, the rooster) or revulsion and avoidance (aggression, the snake). This is a mediated world “full of symbolic representations,” as twentieth-century Tibetan teacher Traleg Kyabgon puts it.3 By clinging to the self and to the meanings and values that we project onto the content of our world as intrinsically existent, we establish a highly polarized, ego-centered frame of reference that serves as the map with which we navigate our world.

We interrogate the world through a perceptual habit of this clinging to “permanent essences,” and this imputation of intrinsic reality of a self and a world produces an ethical orientation that is an expression of confusion. By postulating a substantial self dialectically opposed to a solid world “outside,” populated by essential objects to which we are either attached or from which we are repulsed, we engage in an exhausting, never-ending drama of fighting to defend or fortify ourselves. As Traleg Kyabgon puts it, “We do objectify things in the sense of seeing everything in a dualistic fashion—subject and object, perceiver and perceived—but we also fail to objectify things, and so end up seeing it all too personally.”4 In postulating a fixed, objective world, we effectively give ourselves a profoundly subjective world with ourselves placed at the center of it.

This dualistic way of taking up the world is the origin of suffering, the central problem addressed by Buddhist ethics.5 Fundamentally, the Buddhist ethical approach to ending suffering and promoting human flourishing problematizes the conventional phenomenological orientation that is the cause of our suffering. It calls us to transform that orientation in the interest of ethical self-transformation. Following Jay Garfield,6 I read this ethics as a moral phenomenology;7 it calls for a process of ethical self-cultivation that moves the practitioner from a state of deluded egocentrism toward a liberated state of non-clinging, allowing her to become fully open to and skillful in the task of benefiting sentient beings. When we posit the “I” as our own mobile center of the universe, we automatically develop the instinct to protect and privilege its interests, producing an orientation classically termed “self-cherishing.” The twentieth-century Tibetan scholar Geshe Lhundub Sopa is unsparing in his emphatic warnings about the perils of self-cherishing, which he refers to as “the real enemy” and as a “demonic attitude” through which both “you and others will be harmed by your egocentric behavior.”8 Self-cherishing harms us because it reinscribes the reification of self and other, thus entrenching us ever more deeply in ignorance and prompting us toward exclusive selfconcern and indifference to the interests of others.

Self-cherishing is therefore an ethical problem with epistemological roots, and Buddhist ethics addresses it by asking us to unweave the habits of perception that polarize our experience. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, this takes the form of cultivating bodhicitta, the “awakening mind” (Tibetan: byang chub kyi sems). Bodhicitta names the realization of the selflessness of one’s own identity and the emptiness of all phenomena, together with the compassionate intention to become enlightened in order to benefit sentient beings. Altogether, this marks a total dissolution of the self-other binary that motivates self-cherishing. Of course, this binary is already refuted by Buddhist metaphysics; philosophically speaking, this is the “View” to which all Mahāyāna practitioners subscribe. Simply subscribing to this view does not quite suffice as a method for extirpating ourselves from ignorance, however. The view of emptiness and the ethical comportment that pairs with it have to be integrated at a deep, intrapersonal level, and that requires an ongoing practice of working with phenomenological habits.

The Tibetan Buddhist Mind Training (Tibetan: blo sbyong) tradition is dedicated to the project of cultivating bodhicitta. The Wheel-Weapon Mind Training, a text attributed to the eleventh-century Indian sage Dharmarakṣita, is an especially provocative example of this moral-phenomenological training.9 One of its most prominent tropes is the repeated listing of various types of suffering, such as social alienation, mental anguish, sickness, failure (both worldly and spiritual), destitution, unwieldy mental states, and the list goes on, and then pairing them with a meditation upon the sort of ego-clinging that is its cause. For example, one such verse reads: “When there is disagreement as soon as my companions gather, it is the weapon of my own evil deeds turned upon me for peddling my discontent and evil disposition everywhere. From now on without any ulterior motive, I shall behave well toward all.”10 The primary exercise here is a reorientation of the practitioner’s understanding of her own suffering. Rather than seeing it from the standpoint of being victimized by something “out there,” again and again the practitioner locates the cause of suffering in herself, in her own ego-clinging mind, and commits herself to reversing this tendency by doing the opposite of the habitual behavior that led to the suffering in the first place.

The text goes on to celebrate the value of suffering and its role in pointing out to us the fact of our self-cherishing. In wonderfully florid language, the text supplicates for the destruction of ego-clinging: “Roar and thunder on the head of the destroyer, false construction! Mortally strike at the heart of the butcher, the enemy, Ego!”12 This move—of turning our attention toward the ego-centricity of our phenomenological orientation to the world— interrupts the conventional attitude of experiencing the world antagonistically, from the “zero point” of our own atomistic selfhood. In his commentary on this text, Geshe Lhundub Sopa summarizes this instruction as follows: “We usually blame countless external causes [for our suffering], but now we should place the blame only on the view of a real personal identity and the self-cherishing attitude. Nobody and nothing else should be blamed.”13 This is not a moralistic instruction toward self-flagellation. It is a method for training the mind away from our habitual responses to suffering. It hinges first and foremost upon the exercise of stepping outside of our ordinary ways of navigating the world and contesting the objectivity of the assumptions and values that supervene on our experience. There is nothing esoteric about this mind training practice; it engages with our most mundane irritations, social obstacles, and personal challenges, explaining them in a way that reveals their potency as nearly endless objects of moral-phenomenological practice, so long as we relate to them skillfully.

At one point, the text acknowledges the profound effects of our habituation in creating the conditions for our suffering: “Habituated to attachment and aversion, I revile everyone opposed to me. Habituated to envy, I slander and deprecate others.”14 The Tibetan verb that is the root of the term “habituated” in this verse is goms, which is also the root of the verbs “meditate” and “cultivate.” Indeed, elsewhere in the text, this verb is used in a highly phenomenological sense to describe the consequences for “cultivating impure vision” and the need to “cultivate only pure vision.”15 The difference between these two uses of the root verb goms involves a subtle but revealing detail of Tibetan grammar. Goms can take a volitional or a non-volitional valence, distinguished by a difference in spelling; to be “habituated” is to dwell within the dualism and afflictive emotions of our confusion non-volitionally, whereas “to cultivate” involves a volitional engagement and intervention upon the structure of our experience. The moral-phenomenological lesson here is that the habitual structures that we dwell within come together through a process of cultivation that is accessible to us if we actively engage with it. Meditation and the moral-phenomenological self-cultivation of Buddhist ethics writ large are volitional acts that can become part of the non-volitional, background structure of our experience. This grammatical quirk in Tibetan points to the link between the “active” and “passive” aspects of our subjectivity that Buddhist moral phenomenology exploits.

Altogether, the Wheel–Weapon is an extended exercise in reframing the significance of suffering, making suffering an instruction that points back at us, at the practitioner, to our own attitudes and ways of experiencing the world. This exercise restructures those habitual patterns that define and condition our suffering and self-cherishing. This practice of mind training is a rigorous method for eradicating the orientation that has proceeded from the reification of self and other and for setting the practitioner aright with a more epistemologically and ethically felicitous orientation. It shows how true ethical flourishing relies upon a process of transforming the practitioner’s way of having a world through a practice of de-habituation from ignorance and toward bodhicitta.

CONTESTING HABITS OF WHITENESS: MORAL PHENOMENOLOGY IN WHITE ANTI-RACISM

bell hooks argues that it is necessary “for concerned folks, for righteous white people, to begin to fully explore the way white supremacy determines howthey see the world, even as their actions are not informed by the type of racial prejudice that promotes overt discrimination and separation.”16 She notes that well-meaning white people face an obstacle in recognizing the elements of our own experience—the ways we perceive and navigate the world, the subtleties of our values and feelings—that are, in fact, rooted in racism and therefore play a collaborative role in white supremacy. Even if white people disavow the harms caused by racism, we often unwittingly re-enact those harms by embodying a stance of white normalcy to which we have become habituated by our culture. This recalls James Baldwin’s assertion that white people are “trapped in a history which they do not understand; and until they understand it, they cannot be released from it.”17 For white people to truly engage with anti-racism means not just addressing overt bigotry or structural racism but what hooks calls the “encompassing and profound reality” of the holistic, world-forming impact of white supremacy, which carries the past into the present at each instant, in our social discourse as well as our subjective experience within which white supremacist values and attitudes supervene, though they may not be obvious as such.

hooks goes on to call for “a paradigm, a practical model for social change that includes an understanding of ways to transform consciousness that are linked to efforts to transform structures.”19 The moral-phenomenological significance of a practical model for transforming consciousness is what I examine in the following section.20 My objective in drawing out this moral phenomenology is to go beyond a diagnosis of whiteness as a totalized phenomenological and social structure and to move toward a more proactive engagement with the possibilities for transforming consciousness on the order of what hooks says is necessary.

Whiteness provides a set of norms, meanings, and values based upon a centering and valuation of whiteness and white people and a decentering and devaluation of blackness and black people. There is nothing essential or ultimately ontologically true about whiteness or white normalcy, but even in its contingency it is a powerfully regulative norm of social discourse and embodied subjectivity. As George Yancy puts it, whiteness is a “relationally lived phenomenon”; it is not a metaphysical reality.21 People of color are marked and “Otherized” by the norms of whiteness; Yancy describes the experience of being black under the white gaze as an invasion, a distortion, and as a rupture of one’s own body schema.22 Conversely, white people experience whiteness as an absence, as being the unraced “norm” against which blackness and all other racial categories are dialectically known, raced, marked, and named. Whiteness remains unmarked, while blackness becomes the object of the white gaze. Black “Otherness” is marked, disciplined, and made to stand out as “abnormal”—outside the norm of whiteness—while whiteness remains “unremarkable.” Yancy illustrates this point by recounting an encounter at an annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, in which a white philosopher admonished Yancy not to use African American vernacular in his writing and remarked that Yancy “[speaks] very well.” The implication was that Yancy was out of turn in using a writing style that did not conform to “standard” American English and that, from the unspoken but centered standpoint of the white philosopher’s authority on language, style and professional mores, Yancy’s blackness marked him as problematic and at the margin of the profession.23 For a white person, the experience of being centered as “the standard” in this way elides the contingency of the highly polarized valuation conferred upon us. As Sara Ahmed puts it, whiteness “becomes the very ‘what’ that coheres a world” but also functions as “a category of experience that disappears as a category through experience.”24 Whiteness orients subjects and dictates how they inhabit and navigate their world, but it does so while disappearing into their implicit, background experience.

In taking the valuations that define our experience of the world as objective and failing to appreciate all the ways in which our subjectivities are constituted in contradistinction to the violently targeted “Other” of blackness, white people are indeed beset by a specific and pernicious form of ignorance. This is the “white ignorance” that Charles Mills defines as “a particularly pervasive—though hardly theorized—form of ignorance.”25 This ignorance yields an inaccurate rendering of the world, because the biases that inhere in white ignorance entail not seeing what is there but instead “seeing” a fictionalized Other. On the other end of this fictionalization is, of course, a person of color who can and does realize that “they are not seen at all.”26 The regulatory work being done by whiteness is thus not equally invisible to everyone; as Ahmed points out, privilege is only invisible to those who have it.27 White ignorance is not simply one standpoint among others; there is a veridical viewpoint that this white ignorance precludes, a knowledge to which those situated outside the “zero point” of white normalcy have access.28 Phenomenologically speaking, the norms and valuations of whiteness become sedimented in perceptual habits as preferences toward whiteness and aversions toward blackness. These perceptual habits are often so seamlessly integrated into the lifeworld of the perceiving subject that he [they] does not even realize they are at play, though for the well-meaning, liberal white person, they undercut his explicitly held beliefs about race.

Implicit bias is a telling example of how this process of undercutting functions. In the years since the Civil Rights era, the number of white people in the United States who avow racially discriminatory views has declined.29 However, as many social-psychological studies across decades suggest, even well meaning, liberal white people still perceive and respond to people of color in a racist, biased way. While on the whole it has become far more taboo to be explicitly bigoted (notwithstanding the recent resurgence of flagrant white supremacist rhetoric in the era of Donald Trump’s election and presidency), and while more and more white Americans now profess racially egalitarian values, in point of fact, even these white people still instantiate racist views in their lived experience and social comportment. For example, in their study of bias in hiring decisions, Dovidio and Gaertner assigned white people who had claimed not to hold racially discriminatory views the task of rating the resumés of hypothetical job applicants. In cases when the standard for judging qualifications was ambiguous, the study subjects demonstrated a bias in favor of candidates with stereotypically white-sounding names and against candidates with stereotypically black-sounding names.30 That is, “moderate qualifications are responded to as if they were strong qualifications when the candidate is wh ite, but as if they were weak qualifications when the candidate is black.”31 Despite professing liberal, egalitarian ideals, these subjects saw potential job applicants through a gaze that inflected black applicants with disfavor and projected preference for white applicants. The gaze with which these study subjects met their world (and these potential job applicants) constitutes an ethical failure, a mismatch between their explicitly held morals and their actual, practical discourse with the world and with others.

What this shows is that even if white people intellectually assent to antiracist politics, we are still subject to the powerfully influential historicity of white supremacy that shows itself in pervasive, unconscious racist perceptual habits that influence feelings about and behavior toward people of color. Examining an encounter with a white woman in an elevator whose discomfort with being alone with a black man was palpable, Yancy writes that even if she comes to “judge her perception of the Black body as epistemologically false, . . . her racism may still have a hold on her lived body. I walk into the elevator and she feels apprehension.”32 Conceptually agreeing with racial justice does not undo all of the subtleties of the embodied, affective, symbolic, and perceptual facets of racial bias that have sedimented as part of our phenomenological rapport with the world.

Implicit bias is a manifestation of a phenomenological orientation conditioned by the standards of norms of whiteness that distort perception. Through this distortion, what is seen is not the black person but the racism of the white gaze itself. On this point, Yancy writes, “The white gaze defines me, skewing my own way of seeing myself. But the gaze does not ‘see’ me, it ‘sees’ itself.”33 That the white gaze is polarized at all is not obvious to the white person, however. The error and distortion rendered by the white gaze is belied by its totalizing function, and what is given through the white gaze, while clearly both product and reproduction of a cultural patrimony of white supremacy, is experienced as ahistorical and objective. What appears vis-àvis the white gaze arises within the seamless, totalized lived experience of the white subject. Again, we return to bell hooks: “When liberal whites fail to understand how they can and/or do embody white-supremacist values and beliefs even though they may not embrace racism as prejudice or domination . . . , they cannot recognize the ways their actions support and affirm the very structure of racist domination and oppression that they profess to wish to see eradicated.”34 Problematizing racism and white supremacy in the world and in American society does not equate to routing the effects of white supremacy in one’s own thinking, perception, and ways of having a world.

For the white subjects in the implicit bias studies to truly live out their ideals of racial equality, they must not only ascribe to those politics in a nominal fashion but also work to inculcate those valuations at the level of their structures of perception, so that in their everyday discourse, their perceptual practices, and their various forms of bodily comportment they do not reinscribe and re-enact the long history of white supremacy that they claim to disavow. White anti-racism must go beyond offering “corrections” to mistaken views about race and offer practical ways for transforming consciousness. This is why Shannon Sullivan argues that the unconscious habits of white privilege are not simply the result of naïveté that can be cast out by informing a white person of the factual errors embedded in her assumptions about race.35 There is something durably pernicious about the unconscious habits of white privilege such that even well-meaning and well-informed attempts to rout it often miss the mark. Simply acknowledging the fundamental fictitiousness of racial categories or the injustice of white supremacy, for example, is not enough to unfurl the tapestry of racialized habits of perception. Metaphysics and intellectualization are not enough, an insight that is the subtext of hooks’ call for a pedagogy that can transform consciousness to address the “encompassing and profound reality” of white supremacy at the level of how we see and experience the world.

An example of a pedagogy in this vein comes from Patricia Devine and her colleagues at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who developed a multifaceted implicit bias intervention program.36 The program included five types of interventions: stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic imaging, individuation, perspective taking, and increasing opportunities for contact that together produced “encouraging evidence . . . in promoting enduring reductions in implicit bias.”37 Each of these interventions, while mutually reinforcing, takes a distinct approach to undermining negative stereotypes of blackness.38 To delve into but one example, the intervention of counter- stereotypic imaging provides rich fodder for moral-phenomenological analysis. This intervention utilizes the explicit thought process of “mental imagery” to show that implicit stereotyping processes are malleable and indeed more “interdependent” with explicit thought processes than they might otherwise appear.39 Subjects were asked to repeatedly and in detail draw forth “positive exemplars” whose identity or characteristics cut across conventionally negative valuations of blackness. These exemplars could be “abstract, embodying a specific quality (e.g., smart Black people), famous (e.g., Barack Obama), or non-famous (e.g., a personal friend).”40 In subsequent tests of their implicit bias, these subjects showed a diminished proclivity for racial stereotyping, effectively showing that a practice of counter-stereotyping— together with the full complement of other interventions prescribed by the program—can make a racial stereotype less hegemonic in dictating how one thinks about and perceives members of an out-group.

At first blush, this intervention may appear shallow or tokenistic. After all, having the “positive exemplars” of Barack and Michelle Obama in the White House for eight years quite manifestly did not “end” racism in the United States.41 From a moral-phenomenological standpoint, however, actively engaging in a practice of counter-stereotyping goes much deeper than tokenizing or making an empty gesture toward the value of diversity. What makes this intervention more meaningful and fruitful than that is its repeated, sustained practice and its active confrontation with habitual thinking as such. Rather than papering over racialized perceptual habits, it seeks to displace them by developing a rich, detailed competing narrative about blackness. What is underway in a practice of mental imagery such as this is a regime of de-habituation; it uses explicit thought processes to intervene upon implicit values, and its primary tool is affective and aesthetic rather than strictly rational or argumentative. It uses the intimacy of a visualization process to disrupt the totalization of a single, stereotypical perceptual habit over and over again. The stylizing function of the white gaze is confronted by a competing narrative that foregrounds black positivity. This process interrupts the seamless totalization of the white gaze, and, as a result, the valuations of whiteness become less hegemonic.

In similar fashion, other recent social-psychological research has studied the effects of a traditional Buddhist meditation technique known as lovingkindness meditation upon implicit bias with promising results. Loving-kindness meditation can take several forms, but a classic technique is to visualize a specific person and mentally repeat to oneself again and again phrases such as, “May you be at ease and happy.”42 At the University of Sussex, Alexander Stell and Tom Farsides found that practicing loving-kindness meditation toward a member of a racial out-group increased explicit, controlled cognition and decreased automatic, implicit cognition, resulting in a diminution of implicit bias toward the target group, as measured by the Implicit Association Test.43 (In this particular study, the loving-kindness was practiced with a specific black person in mind and resulted in decreased implicit bias toward black people in general.) Put more simply, this evidence suggests that this loving-kindness meditation makes subjects less beholden to their “knee-jerk,” stereotypical responses. Utilizing Buddhist meditative techniques in this specifically anti-racist way highlights the moral-phenomenological ramifications of actively countering stereotypical thinking and habituated responses. On the whole, studies such as these point to the potential of “Buddhistinspired,” contemplative anti-racist pedagogies to help reshape the racialized perceptual habits that cannot be accessed by intellectual learning alone.

Nonetheless, the potential gains of anti-racist pedagogies such as these are still, admittedly, modest, and we should not become too grandiose in our hopes that something like a solitary practice of counter-stereotypic mental imagining can “solve” racism. While this research on implicit bias does indicate the malleability and mutability of our phenomenological structures, it also underscores what an incremental and long-term commitment the revision of these structures will require. Even Devine’s report warns that “effort [is] necessary for implicit bias reduction” and “it is also likely that there is no single ‘magic bullet’ that, by itself, prompts the regulation of implicit bias.”44 The weight of a lifetime’s sedimentation of whiteness is certainly heavy, which is why even those of us who want not to be racist still may find ourselves manifesting racialized perceptual habits in our quotidian discourse.

Nonetheless, research such as this gives us meaningful insight into the moral-phenomenological project of transforming consciousness in the interest of anti-racism. These findings highlight the revisability of our perceptual processes. The phenomenological structures through which we have a world are indeed historical. These perceptual habits are not primordial, and the fact that they have a history should also draw our attention to their futurity. Specific, targeted interventions such as counter-stereotyping practice show that all experience changes us, and what we choose to bring into our milieu can work either to further entrench or to undermine the totalization of our racial categories. Doing so is not tantamount to disavowing whiteness or casting off white privilege, which is simply not possible to do in a racist society. Rather, it is a way of consciously naming how one’s position is conditioned by whiteness and becoming less embedded in the ignorance that it entails.

THE MORAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL VALUE OF NAMING AND DE-CENTERING OUR ORIENTATION

Reading the moral phenomenologies of Buddhist ethics and white anti-racism alongside one another highlights the value of naming our phenomenological orientation as a phenomenological orientation and then working to displace its centrality in our way of having a world. Naming the self-cherishing attitude as such—as the product of the avoidable ignorance of a reified self-other binary—uproots phenomenological structures and calls into question the objectivity of what is given in experience. The entire 2,500-year history of Buddhist practice hinges upon the human capacity to accomplish this profoundly radical moral-phenomenological shift. Likewise, for white people, the practice of taking stock of and challenging how whiteness inflects our way of having a world is required if we are truly to decenter white supremacy in our own thinking as well as in the broader culture. Refusing to own the specificity of one’s orientation as a white person only reinforces the status of whiteness as the basic standard of “the human” and the “Otherness” of anything defined in contradistinction to whiteness.

Traleg Kyabgon reminds us that “our nature is one of tremendous potentiality, but a potentiality seldom explored. Due to our habits, we have done almost every conceivable thing except take full advantage of our potentiality. In fact, we have achieved the opposite, firmly putting a lid on our potential.”45 Exploring the tremendous potentiality of our subjectivity does not begin and end with embracing an intellectual anti-foundationalist metaphysical point about the fluidity of subjectivity. Such an exploration likely begins with an admission that the terms of our experience are mutable, but the real ethical work lies in taking up a practice of working on those terms in the interest of ethical self-cultivation. We can understand the temporality and historicity of our subjectivity as invitations to their revision, but we also must take responsibility for the hard, incremental work required to accomplish such revision. This recalls the famous line from the twelfth-century Tibetan lama Gampopa, who admonished his students to practice with such urgency “as if a snake had crawled into your lap or your hair had caught fire.”46 Self-cherishing has deep roots, and the opportunity that we have to practice the Buddhist dharma is precious. If nothing else, what Buddhist ethics can help the aspiring white anti-racist appreciate is the need for a long, sustained commitment to this practice. There are no instantaneous “fixes” for moral-phenomenological infelicities; these are structures of our consciousness that have come together over a long history and require dedicated practice in order to challenge.

Those who are pessimistic about the likelihood that white people will engage deeply with their own moral phenomenology cannot be blamed for drawing that conclusion; the phenomenon of white fragility speaks to the unwillingness of many white people to earnestly examine the racist norms that structure our thinking and perception. Not only must a white person be willing to contest their privileged, centered position in the epistemic, social and economic regime of whiteness; they must also submit to the disorientation and dissolution of their self-constitution that accompanies phenomenological self-transformation. Even the most committed white anti-racist must be prepared for the potential uncertainty and groundlessness that come with being de-centered from one’s conventional orientation to the world.

This brings to mind a notable distinction between Buddhist ethics and white anti-racism, which is the motivation to practice. The lodestone and primary driver of Buddhist practice is the painful, lived reality of suffering. We are all ensconced in suffering, and it is up to us and us alone to find a way out of it. This gives us a powerful reason for us to address our ignorance. Many Buddhist texts foreground the painful reality of the human condition in order to encourage the practitioner to exert herself on her path of practice. For example, the popular Tibetan teaching known as the Four Reminders outlines four key points that are meant to help motivate the practitioner: the difficulty of attaining the freedoms and advantages of human life, the reality of death and impermanence, the defects and suffering endemic to our cyclic existence, and the weight of karmic cause and effect. The second of these, the contemplation of death, deliberately evokes fear in order to spur the practitioner to take seriously the opportunity she has to practice. In her book on the Four Reminders, the contemporary Tibetan teacher Jetsun Khandro Rinpoche writes, “Reflecting on the impermanence of all phenomena should give rise to a sense of fear—not a paralyzing fear that keeps us from generating positive tendencies or bringing our potential to fruition, but a genuine sense of urgency in the face of impermanence.”47 Buddhist literature frequently invokes the value of this fear (Sanskrit: saṃvega), which Lajos Brons defines as “a religiously and morally motivating state of shock or agitation.”48 This fear can be highly productive inasmuch as it “produces and deepens insights in the nature of suffering and the brevity and irretrievability of an individual’s life,” which makes suffering intolerable and motivates the practitioner to decrease suffering in oneself and in others.49 All this is to say, Buddhist practitioners are given many opportunities to consider the urgency of the moral-phenomenological task before them. Although this task may be intensely challenging at times, it is framed as the only viable alternative to an endlessly repeating cycle of suffering. Buddhist practitioners are responding to a real and urgent existential problem.

White people likewise need to generate a motivational state similar to the Buddhist use of fear, a “white saṃvega.” The subjects in Dovidio and Gaertner’s study on implicit bias espouse ethical ideals of racial equality but then fail to enact them in their lived, embodied social discourse. Is this not a profound failure to achieve ethical flourishing? What I think this indicates is that altruistic motivation and positive emotions such as compassion—while good and likely necessary—may not on their own prompt the kind of deep self-examination and self-critique required for finding and challenging the parts of our moral subjectivity that go against how we see ourselves or how we wish to be in the world. For those of us who wish not to collaborate with white supremacy, the extent to which any of us are able to remain unaware of or indifferent to the racist patterns and habits that structure our experience of the world should be deeply disturbing, provoking a genuine sense of urgency to unseat the embodied, affective, perceptual habits that are undermining our explicitly held ethical values. In the same way that Khandro Rinpoche qualifies the difference between fear that paralyzes us and fear that motivates us, white people must learn to discern the difference between fearing racism because it is taboo to be racist (and therefore avoiding the topic altogether) and fearing racism because it stands between us and the values by which we wish to be guided in our ethical lives and that we wish to see manifest in our communities and society.50 Cultivating this motivational fear is a moralphenomenological exercise in itself, inasmuch as it reorients the significance of white people’s relative comfort within white supremacy—both material and epistemic—as in fact an obstacle to flourishing.

In sum, these moral phenomenologies of Buddhist ethics and white antiracism offer a vivid, highly relevant illustration of what it means to transform consciousness. The Buddhist project of releasing oneself from self-cherishing can sound archaic, grandiose or simply beyond reach of any normal person in a way that elides the quotidian intimacy of what bodhicitta might mean in our ordinary discourse, while the project of challenging racialized perceptual habits likewise might seem impossibly unrealistic or too personally taxing to attempt. Nonetheless, this comparative moral-phenomenological analysis shows us that by engaging wholeheartedly in practices that uproot our ordinary, habitual orientations, we can exploit the always-unfinished trajectory of our ethical subjectivity.

### 1NC - Kant

#### The meta-ethic is procedural moral realism.

#### This entails that moral facts stem from procedures while substantive realism holds that moral truths exist independently of that in the empirical world. Prefer procedural realism –

#### [1] Collapses – the only way to verify whether something is a moral fact is by using procedures to warrant it.

#### [2] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [3] Is/Ought Gap – we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. It’s impossible to derive an ought statement from descriptive facts about the world, necessitating a priori premises.

#### Practical Reason is that procedure. To ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary. That hijacks their framework since you need reason to evaluate any relevant consequences.

#### Moral law must be universal—our judgements can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me – any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends. Reject Extinction outweighs- aggregation is nonsensical since a] it impedes on one persons ends for another and b] assumes everyone values the same thing.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### [2] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### [3] TJFs and they outweigh since it precludes engagement on the framework layer – prefer intent based NON EXTINCTION frameworks for Resource disparities- Our framework ensures big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity - their model crowds out small schools because they have to prep for every unique advantage under each aff, every counterplan, and every disad with carded responses to each of them

#### Offense

#### 1] Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### 2] The right to humanity as our own person necessitates property – infringing on someone else’s body is unethical and not universalizable

**General Law 15** General Law. "Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights |." *https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/*, 30 Oct. 2015, lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/. Accessed 7 Apr. 2022.

Kant’s account of property in the Doctrine of Right features a conceptual progression that starts from the innate right to freedom and culminates in the establishment of property as an institution of positive law.[24](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn24) Kant exhibits the phases of this progression as implicit in the relationship of free persons under the conditions of human existence. Because property is consistent with the freedom of all, it is rightly secured and protected by the law’s coercive powers. This progression has three phases, which Kant presents from a variety of standpoints as befits their structural importance. Sometimes he describes these phases in terms of the categories of modality (the possibility, the actuality, and the necessity of possessing objects).[25](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn25) Sometimes, he refers to them as divisions of justice (*iustitia tutatrix, iustitia commutativa, iustitia distributiva*).[26](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn26) Sometimes he refers to the division of duties that accompanies the divisions of justice.[27](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn27) Sometimes he refers to these phases in terms of form and matter.[28](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn28) Sometimes he calls them different variations of right (what is intrinsically right, what is rightful, what is laid down as right)[29](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn29) or different kinds of laws of justice (*lex iusti, lex iuridica, lex iustitiae*).[30](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn30) However the phases are referred to, the progression through them exhibits a dialectical structure of argument.[31](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn31) In the first phase Kant starts with the universal principle of Right, which mandates the coexistence of one person’s action with another’s freedom under a universal law, and notes the juridical relationship analytically contained within that principle. This juridical relationship does not include property in external things, but it does encompass certain “authorizations” such as equality and non-dependence,[32](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn32) which are normative attributes implicit within the universal principle of Right and therefore ascribable to the parties at this phase. In the second phase he extends this initial argument on the ground that having something external as one’s own, although not analytically contained in the universal principle of Right marks a connection to external things that matches the capacity for choice characteristic of self-determining action. This extension, however, is problematic, because although ownership of external things is now permissible, it is not yet put into effect under conditions consonant with the authorizations articulated in the first phase. The second phase, accordingly, is merely provisional. The problems it raises are resolved at the third phase, where the conditions of acquisition take a form that is fully consistent with what was analytically contained in the universal principle of Right. As Kant puts it with unfortunate opacity when he lists the threefold division of duties, the duties of the third phase “involve the derivation of the [duties of the second phase] from the principle of the [duties of the first phase] by subsumption.”[33](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn33) Although presented in a sequence, these three phases are conceptual, not temporal. Kant is not offering a philosophical reconstruction of the historical evolution of property. Rather, the three phases represent aspects that together are constitutive of property in the juridical relationships of free persons (e.g., that external things can be acquired through acts of will, that property does not require actual possession, that property rights are enforceable, and so on), but presented in an ordering that purports to show property’s normative necessity within a system of rights. The three phases comprise an articulated unity: each phase proceeds with its distinct mode of argumentation (the first is analytic, the second is synthetic, the third works by subsumption), but the account of property stands or falls on the totality of the three phases taken together. Kant himself presents property as absent at the first phase and as problematic at the second. If these phases were considered independently, the argument would not get off the ground or would collapse as soon as it did so. Nor does the third phase stand alone either; its role is to incorporate what is necessary to reconcile the second phase to what is analytically contained in the first one. The result is that the institutions of public law that emerge at the third phase determine and guarantee the property entitlements that are the product of the second phase in a way that expresses the normative significance of the principle of right that initiated the first phase. The first phase features the innate right to freedom. The innate right to freedom consists in the independence of one’s actions from constraint by the actions of another, insofar as such independence is consistent with the freedom of everyone else.[34](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn34) This right stands in an analytic relationship with the universal principle of Right, which requires that one person’s action be able to coexist with the freedom of everyone under a universal law. Formulating freedom as an innate right adds nothing to what the universal principle already contains; it merely isolates a constituent element of, and represents what is already involved in thinking about, that principle. The innate right is “the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.”[35](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn35) This right is innate because every person has it simply by virtue of his or her existence. Similarly, it is original because it arises independently of any act that would establish it. Because my innate right is not mine by virtue of some act of acquisition, it is what is internally mine, in contrast to what is externally mine, which must always be acquired.[36](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn36) What is internally mine is my freedom[37](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn37)—that is, my capacity to act in the execution of the purposes I form as a self-determining being. For human beings the paradigmatic manifestation of what is internally mine is the body, the physical organism through which the person expresses his or her freedom as a self-determining being.[38](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn38) By mandating actions that can coexist with the freedom of all, the universal principle of Right signals its application to the actions of self-determining agents. In the case of human beings, self-determining activity takes place through the body. Because the body is an “inseparable unity of members in a person,”[39](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn39) interference with any part of another’s body is a wrong against that person’s freedom. This right with respect to one’s own body is innate. It arises not through the performance of an act of acquisition (indeed, no such act is conceivable because the body itself is what would have to perform it), but simply by virtue of one’s being born. Thus, the body is the primary locus of what Kant calls the “right of humanity in our own person.”[40](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn40) The occupation by a person’s body of a particular space is an exercise of this right: “All men are originally (i.e., prior to any act of choice that establishes a right) in a possession of land that is in conformity with right, that is, they have a right to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them.”[41](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn41) Given the finitude of the earth’s surface, the occupation of space carries with it the possibility of persons coming into contact with one another.[42](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn42) Such contacts are governed by the universal principle of Right. Because no one can interfere with the body of anyone else, a person who occupies a particular space excludes all other persons from that space. In this phase, where one’s only right is the innate right of humanity in one’s own person, property as the entitlement to something distinct from the person’s body does not exist. Of course, a person may come into physical possession of some external object. I might (to use Kant’s examples)[43](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn43) hold an apple or lie on the earth. But someone who wrested the apple away from me or pushed me off the land on which I was lying would be wronging me with respect to my body, not my property. By disturbing the disposition of my fingers as they grasped the apple or of my physical frame as it rested on the earth, the wrongdoer would be acting inconsistently with my innate right to occupy a particular space, rather than infringing a right that I have in the apple or in the resting place as such. The interference would be with what is internally, not externally, mine. Property goes beyond innate right by treating the person as entitled to an external thing even when it is not in the person’s physical possession. Innate right prohibits another’s interference with an external thing only insofar as such interference would simultaneously be an interference with my body as something internally mine. Property, in contrast, entails treating the thing as externally mine, so that the apple I was holding remains mine even when I set it down, and similarly the land upon which I was lying remains mine even when I have moved elsewhere. Under a property regime anyone who interferes with what is mine wrongs me despite the fact that my body is not immediately affected. The extension of the scope of rights to include what is externally mine is the second phase of Kant’s account of property. Kant introduces what he calls “the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights,” under which “it is possible to have any external object of my choice as mine.”[44](https://lawexplores.com/poverty-and-property-in-kants-system-of-rights/ch08_footnote.html#ch08fn44)

### 1NC – Util K

#### Consequentialism is morally repugnant and is a voting issue

#### 1. It justifies atrocities by allowing us to harm some for the benefit of others

#### 2. It can’t justify intrinsic wrongness – We can’t know whether our action was good until its consequences

#### 3. Anything could be justified if its better than another outcome. Thus, Util would justify the holocaust as long as it’s better than extinction.

#### 4. Everything is subjective so aggregation attempts to homogenize perspectives leaves out others which creates static hierarchies

#### DTD - ~1~ Reversibility: once oppressive rhetoric is used it cannot be taken back

#### ~2~ Norm setting: we are part of a larger debate community with extensive norms – letting bad discourse run rampant kills that

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