### 1

#### Anti-apartheid and human rights activist Desmond Tutu once said that “if you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor.” It is for this reason, that I negate the resolution resolved: In a democracy, the free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy

#### For some definitions,

#### Advocacy means to be biased for a specific viewpoint.

Cambridge Dictionary No Date [Cambridge Dictionary, No Date, "advocacy," https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/advocacy]/Kankee

public support for an idea, plan, or way of doing something:

#### Objectivity in journalism is non-subjective reporting.

Rogers 19 [Tony Rogers, December 04, 2019, Objectivity and Fairness in Journalism, <https://www.thoughtco.com/objectivity-and-fairness-2073726>, Tony Rogers has an M.S. in Journalism from Columbia University and has worked for the Associated Press and the New York Daily News. He has written and taught journalism for over 25 years.]

Objectivity means that when covering hard news, reporters don’t convey their own feelings, biases or prejudices in their stories. They do this by writing stories using neutral language and by avoiding characterizing people or institutions either positively or negatively.

#### I value morality due to the word ought in the resolution

#### The Value criterion is maximizing expected well being

#### Prefer this for 2 reasons

#### Actor Spec- governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs

#### Pre-req – Death destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### That means if I prove that a world where the free press prioritizes objectivity over advocacy is net better than a world that doesn’t, you should vote aff in todays debate.

### 2

#### Desire for “Objectivity” and its impartiality results in a false balance in the name of media neutrality that results in the denial of the existence of climate change

Brüggemann and Engesser 17 [Michael Brüggemann, educator at the University of Hamburg, and Sven Engesser, educator at the Technical University of Dresden, 2017, “Beyond false balance: How interpretive journalism shapes media coverage of climate change,” Research Gate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312015168\_Beyond\_false\_balance\_How\_interpretive\_journalism\_shapes\_media\_coverage\_of\_climate\_change]/Kankee

22 1. Introduction 23 While scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change has been growing in recent 24 decades (Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Oreskes, 2004), public opinion has also become 25 increasingly uncertain about the urgency of climate change as a problem (Patt and Weber, 2014; 26 Ratter et al., 2012). Citizens of the biggest carbon emitters of the world (the United States and China) 27 are even less concerned about climate change than people from other countries (PEW, 2015). 28 Outright denial of climate change persists among salient minorities in the United States, United 29 Kingdom, and Australia, and in small niche publics in other countries (Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; 30 European Commission, 2014; Leiserowitz et al., 2013, 2013; Whitmarsh, 2011). One reason for this 31 entrenched denialism in public opinion may be the way the media portray the scientific consensus on 32 climate change as represented by the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 33 (IPCC). By providing a forum for contrarian views, the media “perpetuate the myth of a lack of 34 international scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change—and thereby succeed in 35 maintaining public confusion” (Antilla, 2005: 350). Various studies have shown the detrimental 36 effects of ‘balanced’ media coverage that depict climate change as an open debate between 37 ‘skeptics’ and ‘warners’ (with regards to public debates about vaccines, see: Dixon and Clarke, 2013; 38 Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Thus, the study of media content and its influencing factors is not only 39 relevant for scholars of journalism, but also for everyone seeking to understand how societies 40 struggle to deal with the challenge of climate change. 41 Our study tackles this challenge by analyzing how the IPCC stance on climate change and its 42 challengers are covered in different journalistic media. We seek to explain different patterns of 43 media content by taking into account the influence of different editorial and national contexts. The 44 study contributes to our understanding of how and why contrarian views remain salient in media 45 debates. It is based on a content analysis of articles (N = 936) published in four different types of 46 leading news outlets (left-leaning, right-leaning, regional, online) in five countries (Germany, India, 47 Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States), and is complemented by a survey of the authors of 48 these articles. We argue that a common explanation for the presence of climate change denial in 49 media coverage – adherence to the journalistic norm of balance (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004) – can no 50 longer be regarded as the most powerful driver of climate coverage. Instead we find a transnational 51 pattern of interpretive journalism that puts the denial of anthropogenic climate change into context. 52 2. Analytical framework and state of research: journalists’ role in the climate debate 53 To assess how journalists report on climate change and how they deal with its denial, it is 54 first necessary to describe what we call the climate change frame or IPCC view, as well as the 55 contrarian voices in public debates. The climate change frame or consensus as presented in IPCC 56 reports and in scientific journals may be summarized in four statements (Brüggemann and Engesser, 57 2014; Shehata and Hopmann, 2012): (1) Global warming represents an extraordinary rise in average 58 global temperatures since the industrial revolution. (2) It is mainly caused by human-induced 59 emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. (3) It creates problems for both ecosystems and 60 humanity. (4) Emissions need to be reduced to avoid future damage. These statements allow us to 61 identify four types of contrarianism or challenges to the climate change frame; they focus on 62 doubting: the trend (climate change), the attribution (anthropogenic), the impact (risks, severe 63 problems), and the treatment (reducing emissions) (see Rahmstorf (2004) for the first three types of 64 contrarianism). This framework does not capture all variants of contrarian claims (Capstick and 65 Pidgeon, 2014); it focuses on the challenges that attack the core of the consensus among the world’s 66 leading climate scientists.67 We call actors who challenge the climate change frame in public debates ‘contrarians’ rather 68 than ‘skeptics’ or ‘deniers,’ following a suggestion by McCright (2007) and O’Neill and Boykoff (2010). 69 There are few climate scientists among the contrarians; the group is comprised of people from 70 different backgrounds, many of whom are closely connected to professional lobbyists and the ‘denial 71 machine’ (Dunlap and McCright, 2011) – i.e., their professional activities are part of a strategy to 72 prevent pro-active climate policy-making (Boussalis and Coan, 2016). Contrarians as visible speakers 73 in public debates need to be distinguished from both individual citizens who may have doubts about 74 climate change and from actors who challenge more specific claims in the climate debate that are 75 not part of the basic consensus outlined above. 76 The journalistic practices of (1) giving disproportionate voice to contrarians and (2) 77 challenging the climate change consensus will be the focus of our study. The two practices are 78 interrelated but do not necessarily go together as the empirical analysis will show. First, we will 79 briefly sketch a conceptual framework of important factors that shape media content. Three levels of 80 influence can be distinguished: individual (journalist), organizational (newsroom), and external (e.g. 81 social institutions and culture) (cf. Shoemaker and Reese, 2014). In different contexts, the 82 ‘discretionary power’ (Semetko et al., 1991) of individual journalists varies: They are provided with 83 more or less leverage to set the frames of their coverage (Brüggemann, 2014). On all three levels of 84 influence, two main forces leave their imprint on media coverage: ideological biases and structural 85 media logics (Schulz, 2011: 68). Biases are preferences or inclinations to treat a topic in a certain way 86 (Lee and Grimmer, 2008) that stem from individual journalists, editors, external actors, and the wider 87 cultural context. ‘Media logic(s)’ include the professional norms and routines of journalists and 88 newsrooms, which Altheide (2004, p. 294) defines as “assumptions and processes for constructing 89 messages within a particular medium.” The most powerful media logics are news factors such as 90 novelty, elite actors, or proximity: editors look for these attributes when deciding which stories to 91 run, and journalists emphasize them in their coverage (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). 92 Past studies have found evidence that the power of bias and media logics at different levels 93 of influence explains the role of contrarians in climate coverage. Depending on ideological bias, 94 climate change is depicted as more or less uncertain, and climate policy is described as more or less 95 costly, depending on the policies of the respective national government (Grundmann, 2007). Below 96 the national level that introduces this kind of political/cultural bias, newsroom policies affect climate 97 coverage; right-leaning media are more likely to cite contrarian views (Carvalho, 2007; Feldman et 98 al., 2015; Feldman et al., 2011). There is also evidence that the ideological stance of the individual 99 author matters: right-wing columnists in the United States cultivate hard-core denialism of climate 100 change in their columns (Elsasser and Dunlap, 2013). Hence, different interpretations of climate 101 change, which are often strongly related to political ideology, influence the coverage of this issue. 102 Explanations drawing on media logics – particularly the professional norms of journalism – 103 are strongly connected to the work of Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) who emphasize the professional 104 norm of balance as an important influencing factor: "[...] journalists present competing points of 105 views on a scientific question as though they had equal scientific weight, when actually they do not’’ 106 (127). The norm of balance is part of the broader concept of objectivity (Westerstahl, 1983), which 107 calls on journalists to provide a ‘neutral’ account by giving equal voice to both sides in a conflict 108 (Hopmann et al., 2012). Journalists follow this practice as it allows them to demonstrate their 109 professional objectivity and to fend off accusations of one-sided coverage (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 110 1972). Balance also serves as a "surrogate for validity checks" (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992: 129) if 111 journalists lack the time or expertise to assess the validity of conflicting statements from different 112 sources. Earlier research on environmental and science journalists in the United States cited evidence 113 of their lack of knowledge about what climate experts consider to be basic common in climate 114 research (Wilson, 2000). The norm of balance is particularly powerful in cases of contested 115 knowledge claims and a lack of expertise among the journalists who cover the respective issue. 116 Finally, conflicts create news value and thus stories that grasp audience attention. The presence of 117 contrarians in media coverage may therefore be explained by either bias (ideological fit) as outlined 118 above or as part of journalistic norms (objectivity/balance) and routines (news values). Yet applying 119 the norm of balance amplifies the views of contrarians (which may attract audience attention) and 120 distorts coverage of the issue. By quoting contrarian voices out of context, journalists give them 121 legitimacy and ‘media standing’ that might also translate into political power (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 122 1993). 123 Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) examined the coverage of climate change in US newspapers from 124 1988 to 2002, and found that half of the articles presented a balanced account of the issue; slightly 125 more than half of the television newscasts analyzed during that time did so (Boykoff, 2008). A 126 replication of the study found the share of balanced coverage reduced from more than a third of all 127 articles in 2003 to about three percent in 2006 in US newspapers (Boykoff, 2007). Thus, balanced 128 reporting may be retreating, but contrarians have not necessarily vanished from the media. Painter 129 and Gavin (2016) find that the British press quoted contrarians in every fifth article during the years 130 2007 to 2011. Schmid-Petri et al. (2015) find that almost a third of articles in the US press contain 131 contrarian voices. Have journalists therefore moved on to a one-sided promotion of denial of climate 132 change, which would be proof of ideological bias, rather than adhere to professional logics such as 133 the norm of balanced coverage? 134 A recent survey of journalists covering climate change in different countries found that most 135 of them strongly agreed with the climate change consensus (Brüggemann and Engesser, 2014). 136 Therefore, it seems that they quote contrarians despite being aware that their claims defy the 137 findings of climate science. A much earlier US study identified a journalistic tendency to amplify 138 outlier views and give ‘mavericks’ a forum: Dearing (1995) analyzed US newspaper coverage of three 139 maverick science stories (e.g., propagating an alternative theory on the cause of AIDS). Our study 140 follows his model of analyzing the content of coverage and then conducting a survey of the authors 141 of the articles. Dearing found that the surveyed journalists were aware that the ‘maverick scientists’ 142 did not represent credible science, yet the articles’ neutral coverage of their views gave the 143 mavericks credibility. Dearing explained this with news values such as conflict that attract larger 144 audiences as well as a general sympathy for mavericks in US public culture, which values 145 individualism expressed through outlier views (also see Gans (1979)). 146 Another trend in journalism should be considered for making sense of the finding that 147 balanced coverage may be gone, but not so, the quoting of contrarian voices. Studies find a trend 148 towards interpretive reporting among online science journalists (Fahy and Nisbet, 2011) and in 149 political journalism in different Western countries (Esser and Umbricht, 2014). Hiles and Hinnant 150 (2014) found a radically redefined understanding of objectivity among experienced climate 151 journalists that goes beyond ‘balanced coverage.’ They found that while these specialist journalists 152 still attempted to refrain from letting their biases influence their coverage, they followed “weight-of153 evidence reporting” (Dunwoody, 2005) in which stories reflect scientific consensus and are “written 154 with authority” (Hiles and Hinnant, 2014: 15), thereby distinguishing between views that represent 155 valid, peer-reviewed science and those that represent outliers with no backing from scientific 156 evidence or peers (Boykoff, 2011). Another qualitative interview study with science journalists in the 157 United States confirms this trend: journalists claim that they want to go “beyond balance” and even 158 ignore contrarian voices (Gibson et al., 2016). 159 Yet, whether these approaches are put into practice has not been comprehensively 160 investigated with regards to different media types in different cultural contexts. Most studies focus 161 on the US and British contexts or on the coverage of upmarket newspapers (Schäfer and Schlichting, 162 2014). Grundmann and Scott (2014) also include France and Germany from 2000 to 2010 and a great 163 number of newspapers using corpus linguistic methods. Their study shows that, overall, contrarians 164 are much less prominent in media discourses than speakers who support the climate change 165 consensus. They also show that countries consistently diverge on the salience of contrarians, with a 166 much stronger entrenchment of contrarian voices in the United States. This is in line with findings 167 from Painter and Ashe (2012), who also included quality papers from Brazil, China, France, and India 168 in their analysis. They compared the coverage in 2007 and 2009/2010 during the UN Climate summit 169 in Copenhagen and, at the same time, ‘Climategate’ (the pseudo scandal constructed around 170 personal e-mails between climate researchers that were published by contrarian bloggers in order to 171 discredit climate research, Holliman (2011)). Overall, these findings show that there is no linear 172 decline in contrarianism in the news, but rather that specific events (or staged pseudo events like 173 Climategate) provide ‘media opportunity structures’ (Adam et al., 2003) for contrarians to become 174 salient voices in media coverage. This explains why Shehata and Hopmann (2012), who focused on 175 media coverage between 1997 and 2007, did not find contrarians in the news. They studied UN 176 climate conferences, where contrarians have not managed to play a significant political role. This was 177 radically different in the context of the Climategate campaign: the content analysis of Painter and 178 Ashe (2012) found that contrarian views occurred in every third article in the United States, followed 179 by the United Kingdom, while contrarians played only a negligible role in all other countries. 180 Painter and Ashe also found that roughly the same number of articles raised doubts about 181 climate change in right-leaning and left-leaning papers. The only difference was that right-leaning 182 papers hosted contrarianism in their commentary pages, while these sources were quoted in the left183 leaning newspapers. This confirms the influence of editorial bias on climate coverage: in right-leaning 184 papers, it is part of the editorial opinion; in left-leaning papers, contrarianism is raised by external 185 voices. Thus, past research has identified the salience of contrarianism and the evaluation of 186 contrarians as an important case for studying the influence of both ideological biases (along the left187 right spectrum) and journalistic norms (e.g., balance, news values). While the studies mentioned 188 above have pushed the research in this area ahead, there are three main gaps in the literature. 189 The first concerns the role of contrarianism in post-Climategate coverage, after 2010. 190 Climategate was an extraordinary moment of success of political spin, but it remains to be seen 191 whether climate change denial retained a voice in transnational journalism afterwards. Grundmann 192 and Stock (2014) extended their analysis to 2010 and show that after the peak of attention to 193 contrarians, the levels declined, but remained somewhat higher than during earlier times. In Britain, 194 the level of contrarianism in media coverage remained high in 2011 (Painter and Gavin, 2016). 195 Second, Painter and Ashe’s finding that contrarians were equally prominent in right- and left196 leaning papers raises the question whether (and how) these quotes were evaluated in the coverage. 197 For example, it is not clear whether contrarians were mentioned in the context of how they continue 198 to make unsubstantiated claims with no backing in climate science, whether they were balanced with 199 other voices (as originally posited in the Boykoff and Boykoff study from 2004), or whether 200 unbalanced contrarianism is occurring (as Painter and Gavin (2016) show for parts of the right201 leaning press in Britain). In this regard, the study by Grundmann and Stock (2012) provides a first 202 hint, as the term Climategate in their co-location analysis linked with the terms ‘stolen’ and ‘hacked’ 203 in the US media, while the British media preferred ‘leaked,’ which indicates that journalists in 204 different countries framed Climategate quite differently. This shows that analysis of the frequency of 205 reporting contrarian viewpoints needs to also include whether and how they were evaluated in the 206 articles. 207 Third, it is unclear whether the quoting of contrarians is motivated by media logic through 208 adherence to journalistic norms (such as balance or news values) or by ideological biases (such as 209 genuine questioning of the validity of climate science). This can best be explored by connecting 210 content analysis data with survey data (following the model introduced in Dearing (1995)).

#### Advocacy Journalism is key to Solve Climate Change:

#### 1] Motivates organization to reduce emissions at the local level

Petersen et al. 19 [Alexander Michael Petersen, Associate Professor at UC Merced, Emmanuel M. Vincent, Research Scientist with a PhD at the University Pierre et Marie Curie and a post-doctoral fellowship at MIT, and Anthony LeRoy Westerling, professor at UC Merced with a PhD from UC San Diego, 2019, “Discrepancy in scientific authority and media visibility of climate change scientists and contrarians,” Nature Communications, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-09959-4]/Kankee

We juxtapose 386 prominent contrarians with 386 expert scientists by tracking their digital footprints across ∼200,000 research publications and ∼100,000 English-language digital and print media articles on climate change. Projecting these individuals across the same backdrop facilitates quantifying disparities in media visibility and scientific authority, and identifying organization patterns within their association networks. Here we show via direct comparison that contrarians are featured in 49% more media articles than scientists. Yet when comparing visibility in mainstream media sources only, we observe just a 1% excess visibility, which objectively demonstrates the crowding out of professional mainstream sources by the proliferation of new media sources, many of which contribute to the production and consumption of climate change disinformation at scale. These results demonstrate why climate scientists should increasingly exert their authority in scientific and public discourse, and why professional journalists and editors should adjust the disproportionate attention given to contrarians. Introduction Since the early 2000s there has been little disagreement among scientific experts over the fundamental evidence supporting the existence, origin, and societal significance of anthropogenic climate change (CC)1,2,3,4. Yet, while an anthropogenic cause is supported by an overwhelming majority of climate change scientists (CCS)5, climate change contrarians (CCC) have successfully organized a strong voice within politics and science communication in the United States6,7. Historians of science have detailed the political origins of the CCC movement, documenting how its strategic efforts succeeded in distorting the science-based narrative on multiple fronts, e.g., by promoting the idea that there is a lack of scientific consensus concerning anthropogenic CC6,8,9,10,11,12, despite the fact that objective research has found little evidence for such a claim. One study comparing consensus scientists with unconvinced scientists found that the 2–3% of researchers unconvinced by evidence for anthropogenic CC were not only small in group size but also had substantially lower levels of authority in the CC literature10. Another study surveying ∼3000 earth scientists found the highest levels of CC consensus to be among the most expert climatologists5. Public confusion over science affects various other domains13, in addition to CC communication14, and requires a better understanding of the human, social, and technological factors that facilitate widespread disinformation efforts15,16,17,18. One salient human factor that contributes to the public’s susceptibility to information manipulation is cognitive bias. A particularly relevant example is motivated reasoning—the tendency for individuals to bias their judgements according to personal- and group-level values, even when faced with documented facts19,20,21. Another class of factors are prominent external influences, owing to elite political cues22, ideological biases23,24, cultural worldviews25, and even personal weather experiences26,27. Not least among these external factors is the news media15, which has a longstanding and dominant role empowering cultural politics28. A third decisive technological factor is the paradigm of new media and the nearly boundless scalability of content distribution across the internet. Even in the case where individuals have complete control in choosing their sources of information, they are nevertheless susceptible to significant disparities in content production in addition to being susceptible to media coverage that is disproportionate to the authority and number of scientists holding the consensus viewpoint. Recent research highlights the ramifications of this problem, finding that the acceptance of CC increases (respectively decreases) with consumption of media content that acknowledges (respectively dismisses) CC realities, other factors being equal24. Susceptibility to information manipulation may continue to be a serious problem until society fully adapts to managing the sheer range and volume of new media sources. As such, addressing the opportunities and threats facing CC communication requires an integrated understanding of these human, social, and technological factors. Accordingly, the literature on CC communication is multi-disciplinary. Research efforts draw on a wide range of methods that typically target a single entry point—such as applying content and meta-analysis methods to select collections of scientific publications2,3,10,29, news media articles7,8,9,12,28,30,31,32,33,34, or surveys4,22,23 or by developing behavioral experiments and survey instruments5,11,19,24,25,35. For example, applying in-depth content analysis to select media article sets, researchers identified common factors among skeptical critics, estimated the percentage of CC articles that contain skeptical elements, and developed a typology of CC skeptics30. Building on this framework, another recent study reports that contrarians have strategically shifted away from their external narrative—initially based upon challenging fundamental tenets of CC science (e.g., its anthropogenic origins), thereby positioning themselves as skeptics with legitimate scientific motives for dissent—to instead challenging assessments of CC impacts in an effort to impede the development of proactive regulations33. However, a separate large-scale analysis of internal documents from 19 contrarian organizations shows that the inward contrarian narrative is still rather focused on CC science, with the relative frequency of science-related topics increasing relative to policy-related topics over the period 2009–201334. We complement these extensive efforts by investigating the degree to which socio-technical factors facilitate the visibility and emergence of authority among contrarian claims-makers36. To address this literature gap, we focus our analysis on a group of 386 prominent contrarians, denoted both individually and collectively by CCC. We compare these CCC with 386 prominent scientists active in CC research, denoted hereafter by CCS. These experts in CC science serve as an objective measurement baseline for juxtaposing visibility in the media with authority in the scientific domain. To operationalize this integrative comparison, we collected two large datasets through 2016, comprised of ∼200,000 CC research articles from the Web of Science (WOS) and ∼100,000 English-language CC media articles from the Media Cloud (MC) project37. By focusing on a fixed set of individuals, we leverage large-scale data-driven methods of computational social science38 in an effort to reveal individual-, pair-wise-, and group-level phenomena at the intersection of science and the media. In what follows, we characterize and compare these CC actors at various levels of aggregation: first, by comparing their scientific authority and media visibility at both the individual and group levels; and second, by mapping their associations that are manifest in media co-visibility networks and scientific co-citation networks. Our approach accounts for the variation in visibility across a wide range of sources, from main-stream to non-mainstream sources. By simultaneously accounting for each individual’s scientific authority, our quantitative analysis contributes to the CC communication literature by revealing the degree to which prominent contrarian voices benefit from the scalability of new media, in particular the large number of second-tier news sources and blogs that do not implement rigorous information quality assessment standards. Such disproportionate media visibility of contrarian arguments and actors not only misrepresents the distribution of expert-based beliefs28,36,39, it also manifestly undermines the credible authority of career CCS experts and reinforces the trend of CCC presiding over public scientific discourse40, which all together hinders prospects for rapid public action on CC41. Results

#### 2] Pressures policy makers to pass active legislation to combat warming

Lueddeke 19. Jack Lueddeke. September 16, 2019. Advocacy Journalism & Why the World Needs It. <https://envhumanities.sites.gettysburg.edu/environmental-journalism/week-4/advocacy-journalism-why-the-world-needs-it/?fbclid=IwAR39i1ZxUhnGAGn5gcdZ1pjuI8V5q8P7zbw8RYX1FAkRu671kmA7DpqZE38>

Should journalists write about what they personally believe in or simply report the facts? The answer to that question differs depending on the type of journalism. A journalist reporting on economics should state the facts so people can make informed decisions. A journalist working the green beat should include personal feelings to advocate for the planet. Advocacy journalism is a type of journalism that has an intent, or objective. The writer wants their readers to support what they’re reading about. In today’s world of a failing environment any and everyone should be concerned with the going ons of the world. Because a reporter writes about an environmental issue and urges readers to take action does not mean that it isn’t good journalism. Environmental journalism is reporting on environmental problems that need to be solved for the sake of life on Earth. Marianne Lavelle’s story How Big Oil Blocked the Nation’s Greenest Governor on Climate Change is an example of how advocacy journalism is still good journalism. She writes about how Washington State governor Jay Inslee was trying to pass environmental legislation that would cut carbon emissions and his interaction with BP Oil. She is fair in her reporting, going as far as linking the actual emails between the governor’s office and BP in her story. Going through the SIFT acronym it is clear to see that Lavelle’s story, while being advocacy journalism, is not “fake news.” In reading Covering the Environment: How Journalists Work the Green Beat, Bob Wyss discusses advocacy journalism and what it is. Wyss writes that “sound practice demands a clear distinction between news reports and opinions,” he does not say that advocacy is a bad thing for journalism (Wyss 2018, 213). One of the people he uses as an example is Michael Frome, who for years as “urged journalists to be environmental advocates.” (Wyss 2018, 216) Frome believes in advocacy journalism in behalf of the environment and adhering to the basic tenets of good journalism, he also draws a distinction between bias and advocacy, and concludes that bias “is inescapable.” (Wyss 2018, 216) In fact, the Oxford Research Encyclopedias, say that “Promoters of advocacy also argue that having a situated viewpoint is more transparent,” which would almost eliminate any concerns of bias by outright telling the readers that there is a purpose behind the story. There is no reason to believe that advocacy journalism is bad journalism, especially in environmental journalism. When humans have increased the rate of climate change so drastically and there is a need to slow that change, advocating for the environment is crucial. Lavelle advocates for the support of climate change policies through good journalism so people will stand up and join the fight to save the Earth.

#### Warming causes Extinction

Kareiva 18, Peter, and Valerie Carranza. "Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back." Futures 102 (2018): 39-50. (Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA)//Re-cut by Elmer

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (**climate change**, global **freshwater** cycle, **and** ocean **acidification**) do **pose existential risks**. This is **because of** intrinsic **positive feedback loops**, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all **directly connected to** the provision of **food and water**, and **shortages** of food and water can **create conflict** and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. **Ample clean water** is not a luxury—it **is essential for human survival**. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes **Humans** are remarkably ingenious, and **have adapted** to crises **throughout** their **history**. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). **However**, the many **stories** **of** human ingenuity **successfully** **addressing** **existential risks** such as global famine or extreme air pollution **represent** environmental c**hallenges that are** largely **linear**, have immediate consequences, **and operate without positive feedbacks**. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, **the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops**. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that **very warming can cause more CO2 release** which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that **forest fires will become more frequent** and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This **catastrophic fire** embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that **could catch humanity off-guard and produce a** true **apocalyptic event.** Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that **runaway climate change,** and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks **portends** even greater **existential risks**. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

### 3

#### Advocacy Journalism is the only way to make social movements effective.

Opara ’20 (Ndidi Opara; Based in Eastside Seattle, Ndidi Opara (she/her) is a community organizer, journalist, and researcher. Her published work spans from research on the American Color-line in Rap Advocacy in the Journal of Student Research to op-ed's on educational inequality through being journalism fellow with StudentVoice. Her political beliefs are radically left, economically anti-capitalist and socially a radical progressive abolitionist; published 2020; "The Importance of journalistic advocacy"; https://www.yipinstitute.com/articles/the-importance-of-journalistic-advocacy; accessed 2-24-2022; Elkins AM)

**Ndidi Opara, a community organizer and journalist, notes in October 2020 that:**

Journalistic advocacy, journalism that takes a politically or socially charged view, is another way journalism is a powerful political tool. Advocacy journalism **rejects** the prominent ideal of **objectivity** in journalism in favor of **opinionated rhetoric** to **push a social agenda**. Political organizations may use advocacy journalism to write letters to the editors of local publications to **persuade** and **mobilize** people who read those publications. People also use journalism to write op-ed pieces that focus on **combining personal stories with facts** to push a political agenda. Advocacy journalism can **seriously impact legislation**, primarily through **lobbying local officials** and **garnering local support** for an issue or initiative. As more people are becoming politically involved, more advocates and organizers are turning to journalistic advocacy as a form of advocacy. In short: **more advocates are becoming journalists**. Right-wing journalists like Dennis Campbell argue that this journalism represents a complete disregard for truth post-Watergate. The right views this advocacy as propaganda, while the left views it as the advantageous merge between advocacy groups and media organizations. Mathew Ingram for the Columbia Journalism Review cites the ACLU revealing Amazon’s recent implementation of facial recognition software as an example of the way that advocacy groups have used — and continue to use — journalism to their advantage. People's views on advocacy journalism differ on whether it represents positive or negative deviance from the traditional values of journalism. The right may view the departure from traditional, objective journalism as a sign that journalism is becoming propaganda. The left may view the turn towards opinionated journalism as a new opportunity for advocacy and reform. On the same political thread, op-eds — commentary rather than strictly fact-based reporting — have become a vessel for bridging the personal to politics. Op-eds have **given a voice** to the **social issues** that our nation is currently facing and have done this **in a way that fact-based reporting cannot**. This personal element to politics is a **new way** that journalism can portray **traditional journalistic ideals** like **integrity**, **public trust**, and **accountability**, but at the expense of objectivity. Advocacy journalism must ask itself where facts and opinions meet. It must ask itself what kinds of opinions can be supported with facts, and what a fact means if it is put in an objective light. In turn, Americans must be more critical of the journalism they consume. Advocacy journalism presents a greater debate about the ethics of journalism. Is it good practice to publish stories with the expectation that readers will do the extra analysis of thinking critically about what they read? Can you expect the average reader to do their own fact-checking or understand what is objective and what is not? These are questions that journalistic advocates and journalists generally must consider as journalism continues to change and grow.

#### That’s uniquely key for poverty reduction—movements educate the public and pressure the government to pass reforms.

Bebbington ’06 (Anthony Bebbington; University of Manchester - Institute for Development Policy and Management; published 8-1-2006; "Social Movements and the Politicization of Chronic Poverty Policy"; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1753621; accessed 2-24-2022; Elkins AM)

**Anthony Bebbington, a professor at the University of Manchester, explains that:**

This article argues that chronic poverty is a socio-political relationship rather than a condition of assetless-ness. Social movements are therefore of **acute importance**, because they are vehicles through which these **socio-political relationships** are argued over in society and potentially **changed**. Movements rarely work directly on poverty, nor do they emerge simply because poverty exists, rather: “they emerge to challenge existing social and political economic arrangements, one of whose effects is to produce and sustain poverty. Their terrain of action is therefore political: challenging ideas, assumptions, dominant practices and stereotypes […] Perhaps the **most important role** of social movements in addressing chronic poverty is that of **destabilizing dominant**, **taken-for-granted ideas** about poverty and the reasons why it is so chronic.‟ (p. 813) There has been a tendency to assume that the ways in which social movements will affect poverty pass through the state (e.g. by **placing pressure** on governments to **adopt new poverty reduction policies** etc). But much of the literature on social movements suggests their prime importance is rather to change the ways in which society understands poverty in the first place. Four pathways through which movements can affect poverty can be identified in the literature: 1. Through challenges to the institutions that underlie the political economy of chronic poverty: Many social movements have emerged to challenge processes of exploitation and dispossession. In Latin America, communities have mobilized around issues of trade liberalization (because of the perceived adverse effect on livelihoods). Other mobilizations have occurred around natural resource extraction – for example, Bolivia‟s “water wars‟, and local mobilizations of communities affected by mining in Bolivia and Peru. Whilst chronic poverty per se does not lead to the emergence of these movements, they often emerge within environments characterized by chronic poverty. “Typically these movements argue that such forms of extraction and resource governance do little to reduce poverty. Some argue that they actually deepen poverty through resource dispossession and the environmental and social damage visited on the resources of poor people living in the vicinity of these activities‟ (p. 10). Other movements emerge as **responses to social structures and institutions** that serve to **exclude groups** from **certain domains of political and economic life**. This particularly includes identity-based, gender, place, ethnic and racial movements which seek to challenge the "terms of recognition‟ of disadvantaged groups. In Latin America, such movements have played an **important role** in **creating new public spaces** in which novel debates on development and democracy have occurred. For example, People‟s assemblies in Ecuador have helped change the terms of national and local debates on development, as well the terms on which indigenous groups are recognized. 2. Through their roles in reworking the cultural politics of poverty: One of the most important effects of social movements is to **challenge ideologies** surrounding poverty debates; by using knowledge to **affect social processes**, and **challenging dominant ideas** about the nature and acceptability of poverty. For example, in Ecuador, Bolivia and Guatemala, increased indigenous people‟s organizations have helped make the **multiple links** between ethnicity and poverty **visible** and **debated** in ways that **were not the case twenty years ago**. (pp. 806-807) 3. Through direct effects on the assets of the poor: Movements rarely emerge in order to have a direct impact on the assets of the poor, but they have been important in enhancing access to land, shelter and water. Mobilizations for land typically emerge in contexts of skewed land distributions and tied labour arrangements linked to these distributions. The Landless People‟s Movement in Brazil is a prominent example. MST has changed the meanings of land and landlessness in, and beyond, Brazil, and has benefited both the chronically poor and middle-sized farmers, as well as landless rural workers. 4. Through their engagements with the state: Movements are continually troubled by debates on whether and how to engage the state, often culminating in internal arguments and divisions. Relationships vary on a continuum, from collaboration to adversarial relationships, and the success of the strategies employed by movements will vary according to context. Conciliatory approaches have been effective for the Slum Dwellers movement in India, mining companies in Peru and Ecuador have arguable only really shifted their approaches to mineral development and community relations in response to direct action. Some commentators argue the act of negotiation with the state can make movements less responsive to grassroots demands and can demobilize them. However, several factors can weaken social movements and therefore their potential to influence the dynamics of chronic poverty. These include problems of internal representation and democracy (including how far they can represent the poorest), the difficulty of sustaining coherence and convergence among actors, and tensions within movements.

#### Objectivity justifies police violence by finding excuses for law enforcement in order to appear balance

Meyer 20 [Will Meyer, writer at Columbia Journalism Review and the New Republic, 2-6-2020, "The Abuses of Objectivity," New Republic, https://newrepublic.com/article/156486/abuses-objectivity]/Kankee

In January 2017, Kellyanne Conway, at that time President Trump’s press secretary, coined the term “alternative facts” on Meet the Press. The term was part of a broader move by President Trump and others on the right to discredit journalists, taunting them as “enemies of people” and purveyors of “fake news.” In this environment, the mainstream press doubled down on its commitments to truth-telling and objectivity. The Washington Post introduced the new slogan, “Democracy Dies in the Darkness.” The New York Times aired a pompous ad during the Oscars titled “The Truth is Hard.” The nonprofit ProPublica used the motto “Defend the Facts” in its fundraising. Newsrooms were defending the twentieth-century ideal of impartial journalism, leaning hard on its norms and brand. What a commitment to objectivity meant, however, was often the appearance of fairness. Neutrality meant showing two sides to every story, even in cases where one side’s arguments were much weaker than the other’s. Over the summer, The New York Times looked into conditions at a Staten Island Amazon warehouse and told the story in a way that was more than generous to management. More recently, the paper was criticized by this magazine for taking its both-sides-style reporting on impeachment so far as to take right-wing conspiracy theories at face value. “Objectivity” also meant veering away from describing figures on the right in unflattering terms—avoiding the words “lies” or “racism”—because those descriptions could be seen as evidence of left-wing bias. Above all, it meant that reporters themselves could not be seen to have any political opinions, because then they would be vulnerable to accusations of impropriety, regardless of the accuracy of what they actually wrote. Just days after the new president was sworn in, NPR’s senior vice president of News, Michael Oreskes, defended his organization’s choice not to call the president elect’s fabrications “lies.” On that same day, January 25, 2017, the popular public radio show Marketplace fired an award-winning transgender journalist, Lewis Raven Wallace, after he wrote a blog post questioning journalistic objectivity. In a follow-up post describing the firing, Wallace notes that the ethics code he was accused of having violated didn’t contain the words “objectivity” or “neutrality.” The show hadn’t received blowback for this transgression (or any of Wallace’s work), nor had he advocated for any particular political position. He merely offered skepticism about the frame, suggesting that as a trans journalist, he could not be impartial about attacks on his humanity. During his firing, Marketplace Vice President Deborah Clark told Wallace about leaving the anti-apartheid struggle—choosing journalism over activism—as a student: The subtext was that Wallace had to get in line. He didn’t, and paid the price with his job. Wallace follows in a long line of journalists who questioned the sacrosanct wisdom of objectivity. His new book, The View From Somewhere: Undoing the Myth of Journalistic Objectivity, aims to place his own story in the context of a long history of deviants and agitators who resisted the basic premise that media should be neutral. The ideal of neutrality, he shows, has been used both by the center to marginalize radical voices and by the right as a bludgeon to quiet and discredit its critics. Meanwhile, right-wing media organizations do not hold themselves to the same standard—Fox News’s infamous slogan “Fair and Balanced” came at the expense of liberals who took it at face value. One Weekly Standard writer has described the right’s strategy as: “Criticize other people for not being objective. Be as subjective as you want. It’s a great little racket.” As long as the left tries to be fair to the right, but the right does not try to be fair to the left, objectivity will always push discourse to the right. The ideal of objectivity is relatively recent. Before the 1830s, newspapers and pamphlets were mostly produced either by political parties (appealing to men who could vote) or business interests, which created trade journals; and, before advertising took hold, early American newspapers were in some cases subsidized by the government. It was, by most accounts, the advent of the penny press—newspapers with mass appeal—that pioneered the advertising business model and led more directly to the papers we know today. Tracing these changes, journalism scholar David Mindich has identified a shift in the mid-nineteenth century from partisan political writing to the more detached, observational writing that foreshadows modern journalistic conventions. This included formats that separated fact-based writing from editorial essays, and the birth of the professional reporter, who went out to gather the news not as a political participant but as a neutral observer. Between the late 1880s and World War I, the newspaper business was “unsure of its place” and went through many changes to establish the norms newspapers employ now. In was in these years that the first professional journalism schools opened and ethical standards for the profession started to be established. Mindich argues that objectivity, at least as an ideal, began to form in the 1890s, directly alongside the professionalization of the trade, shifting from a “low-class occupation” to a specialized one. By 1924, a book called The Ethics of Journalism by Nelson Antrim Crawford spelled out these standards: a wall between advertising and editorial, a moratorium on bribes, fact-checking and thorough sourcing, and a greater reliance on “experts.” The historical moment in which this occurred was in the wake of World War I, when the nation got a taste of mass propaganda created by the U.S. government to support the war effort. In his book Public Opinion, The New Republic’s founding co-editor Walter Lippman lamented the role of naked distortions in shaping public perceptions. Within two years of Lippman’s book’s publication in 1922, rigorous standards began to take form. Some were skeptical—“Show me a man who thinks he’s objective, and I’ll show you a man who’s deceiving himself,” Henry Luce, the founder of Time, said in 1923—but a consensus was hardening. Although Wallace says that objectivity “emerged for many of the right reasons,” he argues that it was just as quickly “weaponized,” as it was ideologically used to police journalism’s bounds. With the rise of objectivity and professional ethics, Wallace writes that the “gates went up,” leaving many outside. The first journalist to be fired for a breach of objectivity (not unlike Wallace) was Morris Watson, a reporter from the Associated Press in 1935. What made him “biased,” according to his bosses, was his effort to organize a union with the Newspaper Guild. He sued, and the newly formed National Labor Relations Board took his case and brought it to the Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor. The AP had not found any actual bias in his reporting, the court found, but was banking on “potential bias” to thwart his organizing. Watson was a victim of what Wallace dubs “journalism’s purity ritual,” which can be described as using objectivity as a pretext to fire someone for their politics. One particularly egregious example Wallace came across was a 1996 headline in The New York Times: “Gay Reporter Wants to Be Activist.” As the paper of record reported: To labor leaders … Sandy Nelson is an unlikely hero—a lesbian, socialist journalist. But to the top editors at The [Tacoma] News Tribune, where Ms. Nelson works, she is a walking conflict of interest whose off-duty activities threaten the credibility of journalism. During the 1980s, Nelson was involved in a local struggle to pass a human rights ordinance that would prohibit job discrimination against gay workers. Although political expression was allowed by her union, Nelson was relegated to the copy desk by her editor, a post from which she filed a lawsuit. Unlike in Watson’s case, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled against her, deciding that journalists were exempt from a state law protecting employees from retaliation for political expression. When Wallace interviewed Nelson for the book, she told him, “They didn’t go after people who were involved with their churches, or people who were in the Boy Scouts. They can be political, can’t they?” She believed her bosses intended to make an example out of her, adding, “During the McCarthy era they went after people in the same way.” The tendency to exclude gay journalists, on the grounds of “objectivity,” from conversations about issues that affected the gay community led to serious problems in media coverage. In 1982, as the AIDS death toll continued to rise to around 400, The New York Times ran only five stories; none were on the front page. For comparison, the paper ran four front page and 50 total articles on the Tylenol scare that year, which killed seven people. Yet executives there refused to allow those close to the crisis to influence the paper’s reporting. Instead, as one critic charged in 1981, “Lesbians and gay men at the Times were allowed little—if any—positive influence over the paper’s coverage of gay people.” As Wallace shows, the Times was criticized repeatedly for its homophobic stories, often qualifying crimes with the word “homosexual” (as in “homosexual murder”), prompting journalists and activists to pressure the paper to stop using the term. The Times never reported on violence against queer people but would go out of its way to say if the perpetrator of a crime was gay. The ideal of objectivity has led to an increase in “both-sidesism”—often elaborate attempts to avoid showing favor to any person in a story. One of the most telling examples of this was The New York Times’s coverage of the killing of Michael Brown by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014. In its coverage, the Times went out of its way to portray “balance.” In a story about Brown’s memorial, the paper remarked that he was “no angel” and went out on a limb to mention that he allegedly stole an iPod when he was in ninth grade, a fact that had nothing to do with his death. The memorial piece concerned itself with trafficking heavy-handed moral obfuscations. At one point, it quoted a violent lyric (“My favorite part is when the bodies hit the ground”) in a rap song Brown had “collaborated on,” as if that could somehow be morally comparable to the police violence that saw his body fall in the same manner. Instead of objectivity or impartiality, The View From Somewhere advocates for a different distinction: between earnestly searching for the truth and peddling distortions and falsehoods. For Wallace, it’s OK for journalists to admit where they are coming from, while still “hanging on to some basic tenets of traditional journalism ethics: verification and fact-checking, editorial independence from political parties and corporations, clarity and transparency about financial and political conflicts of interests, and deep, thorough sourcing.” In Wallace’s paradigm, “curiosity” is the “antidote to misinformation and disinformation.” Wallace calls for more collaborative journalism, like Chicago’s City Bureau or Indigenous Media Rising, where members of communities work with journalists to change what kinds of stories are covered and how. Still, in-depth, curious journalism is difficult and expensive to produce, and many newsrooms are strapped for resources, if they even exist at all. Today, some 1,400 communities have lost papers in the past 15 years (it is within these vacuums that Trump excelled), more papers are owned by indifferent hedge funds, and even civic-minded philanthropy seems to overlook local news. The economic precariousness of the news business remains outside of Wallace’s purview. Democracy has been dying in the darkness for quite some time. What The View From Somewhere makes dazzlingly clear is that saving journalism will mean saving it from a false notion of objectivity.