### 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2021/2022 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation: A screenshot of a computer Description automatically generated

#### 1] Evidence Ethics --- disclosure deters mis-cutting, power-tagging, abuse of brackets and ellipses, and plagiarism. Independent reason to vote you down because it promotes better norms about academic engagement---debate is an academic environment and must ensure that we become fair scholars.

#### 2] Revolutionary testing - their affirmative is an echo chamber absent the ability to test it from multiple angles which replicates the issue of status quo solvency because not everyone key to change starts from the position of understanding that their aff grants to their method. Black peop around the country rely on interconnected networks like disclosure to share methods and liberation tactics which makes our method key to your solvency.

#### 3] White Flooding DA – if only non-black debaters disclosed then the wiki would be full of super white arguments. Turns new black debaters away from the community.

#### 4] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs who can’t bypass paywalled articles.

### 2

#### Our Interpretation is the affirmative should instrumentally defend the resolution – hold the line, clearly not topical, anything new is either extra-T since it includes the non-topical parts of the Aff or effects-T since it’s a future result of the advocacy which both link to our offense.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Free Press are institutional media.

Cambridge Dictionary No Date "Free Press" <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free-press> //Elmer

If a country has a free press, its newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations are able to express any opinions they want, even if these criticize the government and other organizations: How can there be democratic elections without a free press?

#### First - Fairness – radically re-contextualizing the resolution lets them defend any method tangentially related to the topic exploding Limits, erases neg ground via perms and renders research burdens untenable by eviscerating predictable limits. Procedural questions come first – debate is a game and it makes no sense to skew a competitive activity as it requires effective negation which incentivizes argument refinement, but skewed burdens deck pedagogical engagement.

#### Second - Clash – picking any grounds for debate precludes the only common point of engagement, which obviates preround research and incentivizes retreat from controversy by eliminating any effective clash. Only the process of negation distinguishes debate and discussion by necessitating iterative testing and effective engagement, but an absence of constant refinement dooms revolutionary potential.

#### Third - Movement Lawyering Skills – contingent, focused debates around locus points of difference are key to develop activists skills for political justice.

Archer 18, Deborah N. "Political Lawyering for the 21st Century." Denv. L. Rev. 96 (2018): 399. (Associate Professor of Clinical Law at NYU School of Law)//Elmer

Political justice lawyers must be able to break apart a systemic problem into manageable components. The complexity of social problems, can cause law students, and even experienced political lawyers, to become overwhelmed. In describing his work challenging United States military and economic interventions abroad, civil rights advocate and law professor Jules Lobel wrote of this process: “Our foreign-policy litigation became a sort of Sisyphean quest as we maneuvered through a hazy maze cluttered with gates. Each gate we unlocked led to yet another that blocked our path, with the elusive goal of judicial relief always shrouded in the twilight mist of the never-ending maze.”144 Pulling apart a larger, systemic problem into its smaller components can help elucidate options for advocacy. An instructive example is the use of excessive force by police officers against people of color. Every week seems to bring a new video featuring graphic police violence against Black men and women. Law students are frequently outraged by these incidents. But the sheer frequency of these videos and lack of repercussions for perpetrators overwhelm those students just as often. What can be done about a problem so big and so pervasive? To move toward justice, advocates must be able to break apart the forces that came together to lead to that moment: intentional discrimination, implicit bias, ineffective training, racial segregation, lack of economic opportunity, the over-policing of minority communities, and the failure to invest in non-criminal justice interventions that adequately respond to homelessness, mental illness, and drug addiction. None of these component problems are easily addressed, but breaking them apart is more manageable—and more realistic—than acting as though there is a single lever that will solve the problem. After identifying the component problems, advocates can select one and repeat the process of breaking down that problem until they get to a point of entry for their advocacy. 2. Identifying Advocacy Alternatives As discussed earlier, political justice lawyering embraces litigation, community organizing, interdisciplinary collaboration, legislative reform, public education, direct action, and other forms of advocacy to achieve social change. After parsing the underlying issues, lawyers need to identify what a lawyer can and should do on behalf of impacted communities and individuals, and this includes determining the most effective advocacy approach. Advocates must also strategize about what can be achieved in the short term versus the long term. The fight for justice is a marathon, not a sprint. Many law students experience frustration with advocacy because they expect immediate justice now. They have read the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, but forget that the decision was the result of a decades-long advocacy strategy.145 Indeed, the decision itself was no magic wand, as the country continues to work to give full effect to the decision 70 years hence. Advocates cannot only fight for change they will see in their lifetime, they must also fight for the future.146 Change did not happen over night in Brown and lasting change cannot happen over night today. Small victories can be building blocks for systemic reform, and advocates must learn to see the benefit of short-term responsiveness as a component of long-term advocacy. Many lawyers subscribe to the American culture of success, with its uncompromising focus on immediate accomplishments and victories.147 However, those interested in social justice must adjust their expectations. Many pivotal civil rights victories were made possible by the seemingly hopeless cases that were brought, and lost, before them.148 In the fight for justice, “success inheres in the creation of a tradition, of a commitment to struggle, of a narrative of resistance that can inspire others similarly to resist.”149 Again, Professor Lobel’s words are instructive: “the current commitment of civil rights groups, women’s groups, and gay and lesbian groups to a legal discourse to legal activism to protect their rights stems in part from the willingness of activists in political and social movements in the nineteenth century to fight for rights, even when they realized the courts would be unsympathetic.”150 Professor Lobel also wrote about Helmuth James Von Moltke, who served as legal advisor to the German Armed Services until he was executed in 1945 by Nazis: “In battle after losing legal battle to protect the rights of Poles, to save Jews, and to oppose German troops’ war crimes, he made it clear that he struggled not just to win in the moment but to build a future.”151 3. Creating a Hierarchy of Values Advocates challenging complex social justice problems can find it difficult to identify the correct solution when one of their social justice values is in conflict with another. A simple example: a social justice lawyer’s demands for swift justice for the victim of police brutality may conflict with the lawyer’s belief in the officer’s fundamental right to due process and a fair trial. While social justice lawyers regularly face these dilemmas, law students are not often forced to struggle through them to resolution in real world scenarios—

#### TVA – Affirm that News Media cannot conduct Conservative Advocacy and must be Objective to overcorrect for Racist Modelling – solves Social Justice/aligns Journalism w/ Black Movements.

#### The TVA is terminal defense – proves compatibility of our Models AND Solvency Deficits proves ground for engagement.

#### SSD solves – it preaches self-reflexive ideologies that are key to check back dogmatism – arbitrarily bracketing off topics of discussion creates a groupthink mentality that dooms Social Movements.

#### No RVIs or impact turns, we’ve presented a model of debate and if you have a net better one, we shouldn’t lose for it, instead we should continue substantive engagement.

### 3

#### Technocratic Neoliberalism reifies the sign economy in debate their fantasy of evacuating whiteness reinvests into antiblackness and communicative structures of speed elitism.

**Hoofd 10**

(Ingrid M. Hoofd is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, "The Accelerated University: Activist-Academic Alliances and the Simulation of Thought." Ephemera: Theory and politics in organisation, Vol. 10, No.1 (September 2010), http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/accelerated-university-activist-academic-alliances-and-simulation-thought) //KB+TR Collab

Cries announcing the **demise** of the university abound, in particular in Europe and North America. Those who utter these cries often do this in an admirable attempt to **renew** the original mandate of the university, namely the fostering of **truth**, **justice** and **democratic debate**. Giving up on the now largely neoliberal and managerial university system that plagues Europe and the United States, some such critics try to mobilise a renewal of this mandate **outside academia’s institutional walls** with people and groups who represent an alternative to neoliberal globalisation. Much of this mobilisation is in turn done through technologies and discourses of mobility and tele-communication. Examples here are the European anti-Bologna ‘new university’ projects like Edu-Factory, the various autonomous virtual universities, and the intellectual collaboration with local and international activists and non-Western academics. I am referring here in particular to the promising formation of various extra-academic ‘activist-research’ networks and conferences over the last years, like Facoltà di Fuga (Faculty of Escape), Mobilized Investigation, Rete Ricercatori Precari (Network of Precarious Researchers), Investigacció (Research), Universidad Nómada (Nomadic University), and Glocal Research Space. Characteristically, these projects organise events that try to set up dialogues between non-Western and anti-neoliberal activists and academics, and carve out spaces for offline and web-based discussion and participation. Initiators and participants of these projects often conceptualise their positions as relating closely to **alter-globalist activism** – positions which hence are **hoped** to effectively **subvert neo-liberalism** as well as the **elitist-**managerial **university** space and its problematic method of scientific objectification for capitalist innovation.

In this paper, I will explain how such announcements of **the university’s demise**, the conceptualisation of its current situation as **one of crisis**, as well as the mobilisation of **the true academic mandate** today which often segues into a **nostalgia for the original university** of independent thought, truth and justice, are themselves paradoxically **complicit in the techno-acceleration that** precisely **grounds and reproduces neo-liberalism.** This is because the playing out of such nostalgia typically runs through the problematic invocation of **the humanist opposition between doing and thinking.** This causes the terms and their mode of production to become increasingly intertwined under contemporary conditions of capitalist simulation in which ‘thinking’ is more and more done in service of an economist form of ‘doing’. The aforementioned commendable projects thus paradoxically appear foremost as symptoms of acceleration.

Moreover, I will argue that this acceleration increasingly renders certain groups and individuals as **targets of techno-academic scrutiny and violence.** This increasing objectification that runs through the contemporary prostheses of the humanist subject hence spells disaster for non-technogenic forms of **gendered**, **raced** and **classed otherness.** I therefore suggest that this disastrous state of affairs is precisely carried out by the humanist promise of transcendence, democracy and justice that currently speeds up institutions like the university, and vice versa. Following this line of thought through, I claim that technological acceleration then surprisingly also harbours the promise of the coming of **a radical alternative** to neo-liberalism, and that it is precisely through the eschatological performance of this promise – arguably a repetition of the Christian belief in the apocalypse – that these activist-research projects and their neo-liberal mode of production may fruitfully **become the future objects of their own critique.** In short then, this paper attempts to affirm and displace the projects’ call for reinstating the original ‘true’ or transcending the current ‘spoilt’ university, in the hope of gesturing towards yet another alterity, through its own accelerated argument.

I argue that the complicity of projects like Edu-Factory and Facoltà di Fuga in technological acceleration should primarily be understood in terms of what I in my work call **speed-elitism** (Hoofd, 2009: 201). I extrapolate the idea of speed-elitism largely from the work of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neoliberal capitalism. In turn, I will argue that these activist-academic projects exacerbate speed-elitism by connecting the latter to Jacques Derrida’s ideas on technology and thought, as well as the late Bill Readings’ and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s critiques of the contemporary university. In ‘Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed’, Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of communication and the logic of speed. They connect the logic of speed specifically to a certain militarisation of society under neoliberalism. In line with Virilio’s Speed and Politics, they argue that the areas of war, communication and trade are today intimately connected through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that ‘**circulation** has become **an essential process** of capitalism, **an end in itself**’ (Armitage and Graham, 2001: 118) and that therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied up in this logic.

Neoliberal capitalism is hence a system in which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of thought and linguistic difference – are formally subsumed under this system by being **circulated** as capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology’, Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated in favour of what I designate as the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, instantaneity, liberation, transformation, multiplicity and border crossing. **Speed-elitism**, I therefore argue, **replaces Eurocentrism** today as the primary nexus around which global and local disparities are organised, even though it largely builds on the formalisation of Eurocentric conceptual differences like doing versus thinking, and East versus West.

Under speed-elitism, the utopian emphasis on the transparent mediation through technologies of instantaneity gives rise to the *fantasy* of the networked spaces ‘outside’ the traditional academic borders as radical spaces, as well as the desire for a productive dialogue or alliance between activism and academia. This would mean that activism and academia have become *relative* others under globalisation, in which the (non-Western or anti-capitalist) activist figures as some kind of *hallucination* of radical otherness for the Western intellectual. This technological hallucination serves an increasingly aggressive neo-colonial and patriarchal economic state of exploitation, despite – or perhaps rather *because of* – such technologies of travel and communication having come to figure as tools for liberation and transformation.

So the discourses of techno-progress, making connections, heightened mobility and crossing borders in activist-academic alliances often go hand in hand with the (implicit) celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication between allied groups. Such **discourses** however **suppress** the **violent colonial, capitalist and patriarchal history** of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness of any such alliance. More severely, they **foster an oppressive** sort of **imaginary ‘collective’ or ‘unity of struggles’ through the myth of ‘truly’ allowing for radical difference and multiplicity within that space** – a form of **techno-inclusiveness that** in turn **excludes** a variety of **non-technogenic groups and slower classes**. That these highly mediated spaces of thought and knowledge production are exclusivist is also shown by Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades’ study of the transformation of higher education in ‘The Academic Capitalist Knowledge/Learning Regime’. Slaughter and Rhoades argue that new technologies allow the neo-liberal university to precisely cross the borders of universities and external for-profit and non-profit agencies in the name of development, production and efficacy, resulting in ‘new circuits of knowledge’. These ‘opportunity structures’ (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004: 306) that the neoliberal economy creates, I in turn argue, become precisely those spaces of imagination that come to signify as well as being resultant of the university’s humanist promise of reaching-out to alterity. This paradoxically also **leads to** what Slaughter and Rhoades accurately identify as a ‘**restratification among and within** **colleges** and **universities’** (2004: 307).

*Thought* is then increasingly exercised in, and made possible through, spaces that are just as much spaces of acceleration and militarisation. The increasing complicity of the humanities in the applied sciences within the contemporary university, and hence the integration of critical thinking and neo-liberalist acceleration, is also a major theme running through Jacques Derrida’s *Eyes of the University*. Derrida there suggests that neo-liberalisation entails a militarisation of the university, claiming that ‘never before has so-called basic research been so deeply committed to ends that are at the same time military ends’ (Derrida, 2004: 143). The intricate relation between the military (‘missiles’) and the imperatives of the humanities (‘missives’) also pervades Derrida’s ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, in which he argues that the increasing urgency with which intellectuals feel compelled to address disenfranchisement and crisis **paradoxically** leads to a differential acceleration of such oppression through technologies of instantaneous action. But the relationship between new technologies and the subject’s *perception* of and subsequent desire for the incorporation of otherness that speed-elitism engenders, is best illustrated through Derrida’s *Archive Fever* and *Monolingualism of the Other*. Derrida’s concerns here are not so much directly with the contemporary university, but rather with the link between how thought is situated in technologies of communication (like language) and the emergence of authority as well as (academic and activist) empowerment.

#### Hartman’s archival work on slavery is rooted in a melancholic relationship to history. That locks the archive out of history evading transparency. The fantasy of an intimate relationship to the past and a pre-given fixity of ontological damnation makes their impacts structurally inevitable

Best 15

(Stephen Best, associate professor of English at UC Berkeley, PhD from the University of Pennsylvania, November 2015, “Come and Gone,” *small axe: a caribbean journal of criticism* Volume 19 Number 3, modified) gz

Huey Copeland asserts, in his magnificent new book *Bound to Appear: Art, Slavery, and the Site of Blackness in Multicultural America*, that the high-water mark of this complex visuality occurred during the black renaissance of the 1980s—a period of frenetic artistic activity, centered in New York and identified by many (Copeland included) with the publication of Toni Morrison's *Beloved* in 1987; a moment, as well, in which artists such as Ligon, Renée Green, Lorna Simpson, and Fred Wilson, the subjects of *Bound to Appear*, initially made their mark. Copeland reasons that the novel came to influence contemporary art practice on account of two factors. First, the novel's formal experiments into trauma and collective memory made it “a central touchstone for subsequent revisitations of slavery.”4 Second, the novel (or, to be more accurate, Morrison) completely redefined the politics of racial representation, broadly expanding the repertoire of responses to slavery by predicating the aesthetic ones on slavery's absence from the representational field.5 Morrison, rarely outmaneuvered when it comes to offering a critical context for her work, provided the following framing for the novel and its moment of production: “There is no place you or I can go, to think about or not think about, to summon the presences of, or recollect the absences of slaves … . There is no suitable memorial or plaque or wreath or wall or park or skyscraper lobby … . And because such a place doesn't exist (that I know of), the book had to” (3).6

The projects Copeland discusses, all installation works, “resonate with Morrison's invocation of slavery,” and each in its way extends Morrison's logic of presence and absence to “summon up the ghosts of the past” (9). Before I turn to discuss how contemporary art summons this past, it would help to place *Bound to Appear* in a critical context.

*Bound to Appear* can be categorized as the most recent in a long line of investigations into what has come to be called “the afterlife of slavery”—the general preoccupation with establishing the authority of the slave past in contemporary black life—and the first to explore that subject in the field of contemporary art. The projects that fall within this field are too many to mention here, but among them I would include Ian Baucom's *Specters of the Atlantic*, Colin Dayan's *The Law Is a White Dog*, Saidiya Hartman's *Scenes of Subjection* and *Lose Your Mother*, Stephanie Smallwood's *Saltwater Slavery*, and the *Representations* special issue on “redress” edited by Hartman and myself, all work underwritten, to some degree or another, by traumas of slavery and Middle Passage that appear unknowable, irrecoverable, and yet able to account for the *longue durée* of slavery.7 There is much to distinguish these works methodologically, and yet they share an inclination toward the melancholic view that history consists in the taking possession of such grievous experience and archival loss. As I have put it elsewhere, the vanished world of the black Atlantic comes into existence through loss and can only be sustained through more tales of its loss.8 This work, in addition to making an affective claim for continuity, to which a debt to Morrisonian ethics is owed, shares as well a belief in the political ontology of slavery, in the repetition of its structural inequalities in the present, a thesis offered in critical solidarity with Michel Foucault's “historical ontology”—a portmanteau term that sums up his lifelong interest in the conditions and the possibility of certain objects coming into being and sustaining their own unique temporal force, indifferent to historical context, historical period, or even, as in the case of American slavery these scholars would point out, the act of emancipation or the event of civil war.9 Structure and affect frequently affirm the authority of the slave past.

Copeland offers the visual as yet another register for this ontology, underscoring his affinities with this generation of work when he observes, for example, that Ligon's project is to engage “the regimes of viewership that subtend the afterlife of slavery” (149). One in fact picks up deeper soundings of the logic of historical ontology in Copeland's “carceral” vocabulary: “Can blackness ever appear other than through the scrim of its debilitating visual, institutional, discursive, and physical *constraints*,” he asks at one point, “the at once *censoring* and *spectacularizing* frameworks in which black being has been presented for public consumption,” “the *mastering conceit* from which African Americans have *sought refuge*?” (132, 129; italics mine). This is the lingua franca of a dominant strain in contemporary criticism, possessing dual origins in the thinking of Frantz Fanon and Foucault, and one need only take a moment to consider the post-Ferguson discourse of race and policing to be convinced of the validity of the thesis of slavery's visual afterlife.10 It will be my claim (and I will get to it presently) that when we reverse the thesis of slavery's afterlife and reconceptualize it as the basis for a historiography of slavery, we can tend also to hypostatize aspects of the slave past as missing from the visual field and in need of recovery—or, as one would have it, bound to appear. I would contend that this last entailment is not always tenable or justified by the historical record, and would invite us to reconsider this way of predicating loss. First, a bit of a confession.

In my own previous attempt to address the afterlife of slavery, in which my focus was on a problematic of historical injury in the political project of reparations and the political vocabulary of redress, the goal was, as Saidiya Hartman and I would write, “to interrogate rigorously the kinds of political claims that can be mobilized on behalf of the slave (the stateless, the socially dead, and the disposable) in the political present”—those rough cognates of the slave revealing the underlying work of political ontology. We asked, What is the time of slavery? Is it the time of the present? What is the story about the slave that we ought to tell out of the present we ourselves inhabit? In taking up these questions, we were concerned to elaborate neither “what happened then” nor “what is owed because of what happened then,” but rather the particular character of slavery's violence that appears to be ongoing and constitutive of the unfinished project of freedom.11 However, of late I have felt the urge to dissent from my own earlier investments in this historical ontology and to question what might be considered the epistemological “frames” this view of history compels on me, not least a tort historicism that views slavery as a site of wrongful injury—that is, the assumption that our birth into relation (our admittance to the social order) is the result of an injury from which we have yet to recover; that the social is historical in the sense of being structured by a present past of suffering and injury, so that for me to understand myself today I must necessarily believe myself (or, better, my historical proxy) to have been someone else (or potentially someone else) in the past; that the person I was prior to my wounding can in fact be known; and though missing from the field of knowledge, the scholar's recovery of knowledge of those dispossessed by history paves the royal road to a kind of tolerance or repair of damaged life. These sorts of historical and political investments (the acquisitive urges, strong claims-making, perfective activity) are common to agonistic critique, and while I cannot do full justice here to the terms of my dissent from this epistemology, for the moment I would like to observe, in line with the thinking of Stanley Cavell, that the agon of wrestling with the failure, resistance, or impossibility of something that was lost to history making an *appearance* often carries with it fears and desires about social *acknowledgment*. I hold that it does not always serve the project of critique to limn appearance to the social, or to conceptualize the social as ideally structured around a sense of mutual acknowledgment, and that at the very least it ought to concern us that a number of expressions of loss in the history of slavery do not serve that conception. These last exceptions I will take up more extensively in the next section of this essay.

I mention Cavell because no one has been more committed than him to exploring how the problem of appearance gets infused with the need for acknowledgment, and I have often found his queries into the psychological dimensions of skepticism supremely helpful in my efforts to think critically about the habit of positing a return to appearance from archival oblivion as a salve for damaged life. Rei Terada summarizes Cavell's project on “the skeptic” (described by Terada as one “who seems to care inordinately about appearance and reality”):

Interpreting the mutually irritable conversation between the skeptic and ~~her or his—almost always, his~~ [their]—interlocutors, Cavell explains that the skeptic is perceived as wanting something fundamentally unreasonable, something more than conditions on our planet can provide. Cavell interprets the skeptic's language as a request for social acknowledgment in the guise of a failed epistemic statement. In his account, skeptical scruples about appearance and reality transmit fears and desires about interpersonal understanding: “*acceptance* in relation to objects” corresponds to “*acknowledgment* in relation to others.”12

Both Terada and Cavell mean by “acceptance” that moment when the skeptic no longer disputes the givens of the phenomenal world, a moment that, forever foreclosed from arrival on account of ~~his~~ [their] dissatisfaction, nevertheless carries both ~~his~~ [their] hope and ~~his~~ [their] fear of acknowledgment in the final instance, of the end to ~~his~~ [their] “antagonism toward a world that prevents ~~[him]~~ [them] from joining ~~[his]~~ [their] own being.”13 My concern is not to burrow deeper into the problem of appearance as it has been formulated within this precise strain of philosophical skepticism. Rather, taking Cavell's correlation between appearance and acknowledgment as axiomatic, that is, assuming that he never means their relation to be causal and instead sees them as specifying two poles of a philosophical entailment, I would like to propose that the correlation has something to teach us about a concern with appearance that persists in work on race and slavery.

I pointed earlier to a general interest in the traumas of slavery and Middle Passage during what might be called the Morrisonian moment, and I would add that specific traumas have figured most prominently in this period—the Margaret Garner infanticide in which she killed her children rather than see them returned to slavery, or, as well, the massacre aboard the slave ship *Zong* in which Captain Luke Collingwood ordered that 132 slaves be thrown overboard in the attempt to collect on the voyage's insurance contract. When one gets right down to it, scholars of slavery have been drawn not simply to death as such but to lives made visible only at the point of their erasure and obliteration. As a consequence, they have had to split their concerns, evenly, as if in an inverse mirror, between the deconstructively elusive and the historically grounded: on the one hand, finding themselves keen to discuss lives that are “spectral,” in the sense that Jacques Derrida gives us to understand that word, that is, departing at the moment of their apparition;14 on the other, finding it hard to resist the allure of the encounter with power, with “lowly lives reduced to ashes in the few sentences that struck them down.”15

All those lives destined to pass beneath any discourse and disappear without ever having been told were able to leave traces—brief, incisive, often enigmatic—only at the point of their instantaneous contact with power … .

Lives that are as though they hadn't been, that survive only from the clash with a power that wished only to annihilate them or at least to obliterate them … . They are no longer anything but that which was meant to crush them—neither more nor less.16

A broadly shared enthrallment with the “touch of the real,” a desire to be drawn into the vortex of lives lost in the very moment when they are found, a desire to bear witness to violent extermination in the hope that such witnessing may occasion compassionate resuscitation: such propensities have kept critics returning to the scene of the crime, and a crime most often imagined as the archive itself, whether ship's logs, planter's journals, or coerced confessions. This is neither a problem nor a surprise; but the practice of structuring slave historiography around an archive understood as the scene of a crime allows for the emergence, as Mark Seltzer has observed, of centripetal social bonds (my use of the term *vortex* was no accident), ones “formed at the scene of the crime or at the impact point of a collective disaster, one at which witnessing is mutually witnessed and so forms a momentary social encounter and joint world.”17 Witnessing promises mutuality, and that mutuality, in turn, a kind of intimate acknowledgment. But as I have written elsewhere, even Morrison in her more recent (post-*Beloved*) novels has abandoned this project, turning her attention away from solidarity and mutual acknowledgment and toward the conditions of abandonment as such, as this last registers in the past's recalcitrance and moments when it fails to speak to us or mirror our concerns. Thus even Morrison has found reason to accent the centrifugal energies in historical moments, as I phrased it, “not when things come together but when things fall apart.”18

**We are at the end of the antiblack capitalism regime sustained by combing the waste of modernity for affective fuel. Their thesis of capital production is wrong – “devalued women’s work” becomes a commodity to be deregulated by semiotic economies and coopted to a surplus of value that is accumulated.**

James 15. Robin James is an Associate Professor of Philosophy @ UNC Charlotte. “Resilience & Melancholy: Pop Music, Feminism, Neoliberalism, Publisher: Zero Books p. 88-92

Resilience must be performed explicitly, legibly, and spectacularly. Overcoming is necessary but insufficient; to count and function as resilience, this overcoming must be accomplished in a visible or otherwise legible and consumable manner. Overcoming is a type of “affective labor” which, as Steven Shaviro puts it, “is productive only to the extent that it is a public performance. It cannot unfold in the hidden depths; it must be visible and audible” (PCA 49n33) In order to tune into feminine resilience and feed it back into its power supply, MRWaSP has to perceive it as such. “Look,! Overcame!” is the resilient subject’s maxim or mantra. Gender and race have always been “visible identities,” to use philosopher Linda Martin Alcoff’s term, identities strongly tied to one’s outward physical appearance. However, gendered/racialized resilience isn’t visible in the same way that conventional gender and racial identities are visible. To clarify these differences, it’s helpful to think of resilience in terms of a “Look, I overcame!” imperative. “Look, I Overcame!” Is easy to juxtapose to Frantz Fanon’s “Look a Negro!”, which is the touch stone for his analysis of gendered racialization in “The Fact of Blackness.” In both cases, looking is a means of crafting race/gender identities and distributing white patriarchal privilege. But, in the same way that resilience discourse “upgrades” traditional methods for crafting identities and distributing privilege, the “looking” in “Look, I Overcame’” is an upgrade on the “looking” in “Look, a Negro” According to Fanon, the exclamation “Look, a Negro!” racializes him as a black man. To be “a Negro” is to be objectified by the white supremacist gaze. This gaze fixes him as an object, rather than an ambiguous transcendence (which is a more nuanced way of describing the existentialist concept of subjectivity). “The black man,” as Fanon argues, “has no ontological resistance for the white man” (BSWM 110) because, as an object and not a mutually-recognized subject, he cannot return the white man’s gaze (“The Look” that is so important to Sartre’s theory of subjectivity in Being & Nothingness). The LIO narrative differs from Fanon’s account in the same way it differs from Iris Young’s account of feminine body comportment: in resilience discourse, objectification isn’t an end but a means, any impediment posed by the damage wrought by the white/male gaze Is a necessary prerequisite for subjectivity, agency, and mutual recognition. In other words, being looked at isn’t an impediment, but a resource. Resilience discourse turns objectification (being looked at) into a means of subjectificatlon (overcoming). It also makes looking even more efficient and profitable than simple objectification could ever be. Recognizing and affirming the affective labor of the resilient performer, the spectator feeds the performer’s individual overcoming Into a second-order therapeutic narrative: our approbation of her overcoming is evidence of our own overcoming of our past prejudices. This spectator wants to be seen by a wider audience as someone who answers the resilient feminine subject’s hail, “Look, I Overcame’. Just as individual feminine subjects use their resilience as proof of their own goodness, MRWaSP uses the resilience of its “good girls” as proof that they’re the “good guys” — that its social and ethical practices are truly just, and that we really mean it this time when we say everyone is equal. For example, the “resilience” of “our” women is often contrasted with the supposed “fragility” of Third-World women of color.

#### Instead Vote Negative to endorse a politics of radical passivity that pushes the system to its collapse -- such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix

Berardi 11

Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108

Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely. The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity

#### The University is a site of social death, the mass grave of Western culture and the aff’s fantasy of radicalizing debate plays into the hands of the system by denying the violence innate to the university system itself—only triggering a symbolic collapse can reverse this metastasis as the aff paves over the conditions of violent colonialism which structure debating in the first place

Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (“The University, Social Death, and the Inside Joke,” <http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620>)

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other.  
Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47]  
Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.  
Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death.