### 1

#### Interp – the affirmative may only garner offense from the resolutional bounds. To clarify, extra-t bad.

#### Violation – I critique private space appropriation through a rejection of colonial mimicry, the attempt to reform one’s identity by imitating colonizers’ practices. whichever side’s performance better ruptures replication politics wins

#### 1] Resolved’ before a colon denotes a formal resolution.

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### 2] Advocacy statement: the resolution goes further than a value statement

#### 1AC Ethnofuturism: the resolution is not a question of appropriation, but rather, a method to confront capitalism

#### First is limits – all negative strategy is premised off a stable reading of the resolution. The lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Including their advocacy authorizes any methodology or orientation tangentially related to the topic, which renders research burdens untenable.

#### A] Fairness is good and prior – debate’s a game that requires effective competition and negation, which makes their offense inevitable, it internal link turns clash and engagement.

#### B] Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters.

#### C] Can’t weigh the aff—it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### D] Inescapable – the AC conforms to every norm of debate – speed, speech times, ballots – proves they value playing the game and isolating T as the one bad rule is arbitrary.

#### E] Probability – ballots can’t shape our subjectivity or create broad political change but can rectify in-round skews.

#### Second is clash – extra-t sanctions picking any interpretation for debate – incentivizes retreat from controversy and forces the neg to first characterize the aff and then debate it which eliminates the benefit of preround research. A common point of engagement ensures effective clash, which is a linear impact –

#### A] Negation is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale.

#### B] only effective clash starts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement which internal link turns any scholastic benefit of the 1AC

#### Independently, Our scholarship is tied to the consequences of the plan – their model lets them get through the 1AR and 2AR without addressing the NC and comparative impact and solvency debating

#### TVA, read the affirmative without a method of rejection of colonial mimicry and instead offer it as a framing mechanism for why appropriation is bad

#### Reject impact turns on T, we have presented a model of debate which you can answer

### 2

#### [Insert Team] has extended me gracious unconditional hospitality. I accept (as if I had not always been there, reflecting them, anyway). To tell you what I am about to do, however, would just reveal the mystery. BUT I’ll just say this: with their guard down, I have taken the 1AC hostage.

#### My demand: the ballot for the Red Menace from Northview, 30 speaker points, and their flows (I can’t understand mine). The 1AR will meet my demands or suffer the great revenge of otherness.

#### The 1AC has NO ABILITY to respond because I took it, it’s mine, stolen away to defeat the system on its own terms, turning signs against signs and over-accelerating all symbolic distinctions between self and other as the distinction between terrorist and hostage becomes murkier and murkier. This time, I will not be defeated

**Baudrillard’76** |Jean, alternate universe Brett Bricker, Symbolic Exchange and Death, pp. 36-38|KZaidi

**We will not destroy the system** by a direct, dialectical revolution of the economic or political infrastructure. Everything **produced by contradiction**, by the relation of forces, or by energy in general, **will only feed back into the mechanism** **and give it impetus**, following a circular distortion similar to a Moebius strip. We will **never defeat it by following its own logic** of energy, calculation, reason and revolution, history and power, or some finality or counter-finality. The worst violence at this level has no purchase, and **will only backfire against itself. We will never defeat the system on the plane of the real:** the worst error of all our revolutionary strategies is to believe that we will put an end to the system on the plane of the real: this is their imaginary, imposed on them by the system itself, living or surviving only by always leading those who attack the system to fight amongst each other on the terrain of reality, which is always the reality of the system. This is where they throw all their energies, their imaginary violence, where an implacable logic constantly turns back into the system. We have only to do it violence or counter-violence since it **thrives on symbolic violence** not in the degraded sense in which this formula has found fortune, as a violence 'of signs', from which the system draws strength, or with which it 'masks' its material violence: **symbolic violence is deduced from a logic of the symbolic** (which has nothing to do with the sign or with energy): reversal, the incessant **reversibility of the counter-gift** and, conversely, the seizing of power by the **unilateral exercise of the gift**. 25¶ We must therefore displace everything **into** **the sphere of the symbolic**, where challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law, so that **we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death.** There is no question here of real violence or force, the only question concerns the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. If domination comes from the system's retention of the exclusivity of the gift **without counter-gift the gift of work which can only be responded to by destruction or sacrifice, if not in consumption, which is only a spiral of the system of surplus-gratification without result, therefore a spiral of surplus-domination**; a **gift of media and messages to which, due to the monopoly of the code, nothing is allowed to retort**; the gift, everywhere and at every instant, of the social, of the protection agency, security, gratification and the solicitation of the social from which nothing is any longer permitted to escape then the only solution is to **turn the principle of its power back against the system itself: the impossibility of responding** **or retorting**. To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death. **Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains.** **The system turns on itself,** as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For **it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide.¶** **So hostages are taken.** **On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence** **of the victims is ruled out, the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the 'terrorist' the hostage's death for the terrorist's. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. The stakes are death without any possibility of negotiation, and therefore return to an inevitable overbidding**. Of course, they attempt to deploy the whole system of negotiation, and the **terrorists themselves often enter into this exchange scenario in terms of this calculated equivalence** (the hostages' lives against some ransom or liberation, or indeed for the prestige of the operation alone). From this perspective, taking hostages is not original at all, it simply creates an unforeseen and selective relation of forces which can be resolved either by traditional violence or by negotiation. **It is a tactical action.** There is something else at stake, however, as we dearly saw at The Hague over the course of ten days of incredible negotiations: no-one knew what could be negotiated, nor could they agree on terms, nor on the possible equivalences of the exchange. Or again, **even if they were formulated, the 'terrorists' demands' amounted to a** **radical denial of negotiation.** It is precisely here that **everything is played out,** for with the **impossibility of all negotiation we pass into the symbolic order**, which is ignorant of this type of calculation and exchange (**the system itself lives solely by negotiation, even if this takes place in the equilibrium of violence). The system can only respond to this irruption of the symbolic (the most serious thing to befall it, basically the only 'revolution') by the real, physical death of the terrorists. This, however, is its defeat, since their death was their stake, so that by bringing about their deaths the system has merely impaled itself on its own violence** **without** **really responding to the challenge** **that was thrown to it.** Because the system can easily compute every death, even war atrocities, but cannot compute the death-challenge or **symbolic death,** **since this death has no calculable equivalent**, it opens up an inexpiable overbidding by other means than a death in exchange. **Nothing corresponds to death except death.** Which is precisely what happens in this case: the system itself is driven to suicide in return, which suicide is manifest in its disarray and defeat. However infinitesimal in terms of relations of forces **it might be, the colossal apparatus of power is eliminated in this situation where** (the very excess of its) **derision is turned back against itself.** The police and the army, all the institutions and mobilised violence of power whether individually or massed together, **can do nothing against this lowly but symbolic death. For this death draws it onto a plane where there is no longer any response possible for it** (hence the sudden structural liquefaction of power in '68, not because it was less strong, but because of the simple symbolic displacement operated by the students' practices). **The system can only die in exchange, defeat itself to lift the challenge.** Its death at this instant is a symbolic response, but a death which wears it out.¶ The challenge has the efficiency of a murderer. Every society apart from ours knows that, or used to know it. Ours is in the process of rediscovering it. **The routes of symbolic effectiveness are those of an alternative politics.¶** Thus the dying ascetic challenges God ever to give him the equivalent of this death. God does all he can to give him this equivalent 'a hundred times over', in the form of prestige, of spiritual power, indeed of global hegemony. But the **ascetic's secret dream is to attain such an extent of mortification that even God would be unable either to take up the challenge, or to absorb the debt.** He will then have **triumphed over God, and become God himself.** That is why the ascetic is always close to heresy and sacrilege, and as such condemned by the Church, whose function it is merely to preserve God from this symbolic face-to-face, to protect Him from this mortal challenge where He is summoned to die, to sacrifice Himself in order to take up the challenge of the mortified ascetic. The Church will have had this role for all time, avoiding this type of catastrophic confrontation (catastrophic primarily for the Church) and substituting a rule-bound exchange of penitences and gratifications, the impressario of a system of equivalences between God and men.¶ The same situation exists in our relation to the system of power. All these institutions, all these social, economic, political and psychological mediations, are there so that **no-one ever has the opportunity to issue this symbolic challenge,** this challenge to the death, the irreversible gift which, like the absolute mortification of the ascetic, brings about a **victory over all power, however powerful its authority may be.** It is no longer necessary that the possibility of this direct symbolic confrontation ever takes place. And this is the source of our profound boredom.¶ **This is why taking hostages** **and other similar acts rekindle some fascination: they are at once an exorbitant mirror for the system of its own repressive violence, and the model of a symbolic violence which is always forbidden it, the only violence it cannot exert: its own death.**

**Their conception of death as a biological end to life denies the value of death as a reversible and subjective transformation. The result is securitization from which social control is made possible**

**Robinson ‘12.** (Andrew Robinson, political theorist and activist based in the UK, “An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death” Ceasefire Magazine, March 30, 2012, <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-2/>)

The passage to capitalism: Symbolic exchange **– or rather, its suppression –**plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism.   Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to **an eternal return of the Same.** Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death **through accumulation**. It **tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life. But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent**. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. **The idea of progress, and linear time**, comes from **the accumulation of time**, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. **Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This** according to Baudrillard **produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is radically subversive**of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is **because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality**’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death: Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, **but**rather, a **form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns things to a state of indeterminacy**. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals**.** This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard**,**the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death.

### 3 – Debate PIK

#### Pawn to E4

#### Check

### 4

#### Settler colonialism is a structure, not an event, that reasserts the superiority of the settler in the continuous occupation of land and the recasting of entire lifeworlds as fungible resources – that causes ecocide, imperial conquest, and the biopolitical exploitation of black and indigenous people.

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve Tuck. Associate Professor and Coordinator of Native American Studies at SUNY New Paltz. Wayne Yang. Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, San Diego. (2012). Decolonization is Not a Metaphor. *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1*(1), 4-6.)

The set of settler colonial relations Generally speaking, postcolonial theories and theories of coloniality attend to two forms of colonialism2. External colonialism (also called exogenous or exploitation colonization) denotes the expropriation of fragments of Indigenous worlds, animals, plants and human beings, extracting them in order to transport them to - and build the wealth, the privilege, or feed the appetites of - the colonizers, who get marked as the first world. This includes so-thought ‘historic’ examples such as opium, spices, tea, sugar, and tobacco, the extraction of which continues to fuel colonial efforts. This form of colonialism also includes the feeding of contemporary appetites for diamonds, fish, water, oil, humans turned workers, genetic material, cadmium and other essential minerals for high tech devices. External colonialism often requires a subset of activities properly called military colonialism - the creation of war fronts/frontiers against enemies to be conquered, and the enlistment of foreign land, resources, and people into military operations. In external colonialism, all things Native become recast as ‘natural resources’ - bodies and earth for war, bodies and earth for chattel. The other form of colonialism that is attended to by postcolonial theories and theories of coloniality is internal colonialism, the biopolitical and geopolitical management of people, land, flora and fauna within the “domestic” borders of the imperial nation. This involves the use of particularized modes of control - prisons, ghettos, minoritizing, schooling, policing - to ensure the ascendancy of a nation and its white3 elite. These modes of control, imprisonment, and involuntary transport of the human beings across borders - ghettos, their policing, their economic divestiture, and their dislocatability - are at work to authorize the metropole and conscribe her periphery. Strategies of internal colonialism, such as segregation, divestment, surveillance, and criminalization, are both structural and interpersonal. Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap4 - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves5, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural

#### Their research strategy based on mystery is a white move to innocence which renders unintelligible and unspeakable the structures of colonial occupation, legitimizing the capacity for settlers to disavow the violent disposessions which sustain their subject-position.

Vimalassery et. al. 16 (Manu Vimalassery, Assistant Professor of American Studies at Columbia University, Juliana Hu Pegues, Assistant Professor in the Department of American Indian Studies at the University of Minnesota, and Alyosha Goldstein, Associate Professor of American Studies at the University of New Mexico. (2016). On Colonial Unknowing. *Theory & Event, 19*(4). Accessed March 27th, 2018 at <https://www.academia.edu/35005504/_Colonial_Unknowing_and_Relations_of_Study>)

How do we understand our locations in the colonial present as we contemplate and work toward the ongoing imperative of decolonization? In North America and the Caribbean, the predominant lack of acknowledgement or engagement with the histories and contemporary relations of colonialism—especially with regard to the specificities of Indigenous peoples and colonial entanglements of differential racialization—is not simply a matter of collective amnesia or omission. The magnitude of this disavowal is not primarily a matter of a forgotten or hidden past, at least to the extent that forgetting might be viewed as a passive relation or a concealed past might suspend culpability. Instead, this ignorance—this act of ignoring—is aggressively made and reproduced, affectively invested and effectively distributed in ways that conform the social relations and economies of the here and now. Colonial unknowing endeavors to render unintelligible the entanglements of racialization and colonization, occluding the mutable historicity of colonial structures and attributing finality to events of conquest and dispossession. As with Jodi Byrd’s theorizations in The Transit of Empire, we emphasize how colonialism requires a constitutive relation to Indigenous peoples and differential racialization for its claims to place, emplotment, and worldings that notions of forgetting, elimination, and absence tend to neglect.1 This introduction and the essays that comprise this special issue of Theory & Event seek to critically analyze and confront the ways in which epistemologies of unknowing are instantiated. The essays that follow focus on the articulations, practices, and consequences of this colonial insistence on epistemic mastery and refusal of heterogeneous ways of knowing otherwise, as well as considering the co-constitutive dynamics and contingencies that appear to be unintelligible under such conditions. We are emphatically not arguing for making visible, rendering comprehensible, or restoring to presence as a response to forms of colonial unknowing and willful ignorance. The practices of refusing and rejecting colonial demands for intelligibility so forcefully theorized by critical indigenous studies scholars Joanne Barker, Brian Klopotek, Audra Simpson, and Glen Coulthard suggest some of the ways that making known, recognition, and visibility can replicate and reinscribe colonial regimes of knowledge/power.2 Throughout this introduction we examine colonial unknowing as an epistemological orientation that works to preempt relational modes of analysis.3 We begin by reflecting on colonial agnosia, agnotology, and epistemologies of ignorance as various manifestations of unknowing, and discuss postcolonial feminist theory, critical disability studies, queer theory, and women of color feminism as indispensable for critically engaging these forms of unknowing. We then suggest that settler colonialism as a discrete analytic and academic field formation is potentially itself a manner of colonial unknowing. Specifically, we consider the ways in which the generative work of Patrick Wolfe has been taken up reductively to occlude settler colonialism as constitutively entangled with broader imperial formations. We discuss Mamhood Mamdani’s critique of the settler/native binary, Kamau Brathwaite’s conception of the arrivant, and Sara Ahmed’s theorization of arrivals and migrant orientation as offering ways to trouble the schematic distinction between structure and event often attributed to Wolfe. We conclude with an analysis of how Leanne Simpson and Saidiya Hartman provide ways of knowing otherwise. Obstinacies of Unknowing Colonial unknowing takes many forms. For instance, borrowing from Jodi Byrd, the idea of colonial agnosia conveys how colonialism remains pervasive but not comprehended as an extensive and constitutive living formation by those situated in complicity with colonial occupation.4 Colonial agnosia provides a means of theorizing this condition and its practices, not to analogize its operations as a disability, but to indicate the particular ways in which these practices are cathected as unintelligible and rendered as discrete objects or instances without an identifiable relationship. We use agnosia to describe what in the colonial context is both resolutely “normal” and normative, rather than as an ascription of pathology, anomaly, or disorder. The apperceptive subset of agnosia is a neurological condition that entails trouble assembling elements of an image into an understandable whole, and difficulty in grasping the relationship of objects to one another. Agnosia, as a particular manifestation of colonial aporia, indexes how the disjuncture between colonialism as simultaneously everywhere and nowhere shapes the hegemonic terms of the contemporary United States and those places similarly shaped by the foundational and persistent violence of colonial displacement. At stake in colonial agnosia is the profound investment in maintaining the failure to comprehend the realities of colonialism by those people who might most benefit from these conditions. Colonial agnosia refuses relationality. Recent scholarship on “epistemologies of ignorance” is also especially relevant for our theorization of colonial unknowing.5 As an at once defensive and dismissive measure, Charles Mills argues that “White ignorance has been able to flourish all these years because a white epistemology of ignorance has safeguarded it against the dangers of an illuminating blackness or redness, protecting those who for ‘racial’ reasons have needed not to know.”6 This needing not to know is requisite to the pretense of white innocence. It is both the privileged position of not being the target of racism and colonial dispossession and benefiting from circumstances that are themselves sustained through the disavowal of racism and colonial dispossession. As James Baldwin insisted in 1962 with regard to white people in the United States: “…they have destroyed and are destroying hundreds of thousands of lives and do not know it and do not want to know it… But it is not permissible that the authors of devastation should also be innocent. It is the innocence which constitutes the crime.”7 The study of ignorance, what Robert Proctor calls agnotology, questions “the naturalness of ignorance, its causes, and its distribution,” and thus points to “the historicity and artifactuality of nonknowing and the non-known—and the potential fruitfulness of studying such things.”8 Unknowing in this sense establishes what can count as evidence, proof, or possibility—aims to secure the terms of reason and reasonableness— as much as it works to dissociate and ignore. Even as colonialism as a constitutive and current condition is disavowed, the historical “fact” of colonization assumes an irrefutability that forecloses possibilities for futures otherwise. From this perspective, substantive decolonization—beyond UN-sanctioned protocols and the mid-twentieth century statecentered “era of decolonization”—is thus by definition unreasonable and unrealistic. The theme of colonial unknowing likewise engages postcolonial feminist theorizing around different registers of epistemological aporia. Perhaps most notable in this regard is Ann Laura Stoler’s work on colonial aphasia as a means to signal a disassociation so profound that colonial history becomes unspeakable. As a corrective to the idea of historical amnesia, aphasia describes historical loss and dismembering as produced. Stoler is principally concerned with how colonial histories are rendered illegible in the present, looking at the example of the rise in French racial violence directed at Algerian youth.9 We share Stoler’s interest in examining colonial history as simultaneously known and unknown, resisting a method of apprehension and instead ruminating on the interstices between knowledge and ignorance, reflecting on the relationship between production, loss, and disassociation. At the same time, our framing of colonial unknowing is meant to consider the produced incomprehensibility between different forms of colonialism, such as the comparative and connective nature of settler colonialisms and franchise colonialisms, as well as differential and contingent racializations and racialized violences. In this regard, our formulation of unknowing closely aligns with Michel Foucault’s use of aphasia as a descriptive metaphor for his construction of heterotopia, a genealogy that Stoler traces in her own work on colonial aphasia. For Foucault, while utopias offer comfort, heterotopias disturb, “because they make it impossible to name this and that,” and evoke the ongoing fragmentation of resemblances represented by the aphasiac.10 The impossibility of relationality is core to Foucault’s notion of heterotopia, wherein “the common ground on which such meetings are possible has itself been destroyed. What is impossible is not the propinquity of the things listed, but the very site on which their propinquity would be possible.”11

#### Their focus on violence originating from signification and ideology trades off with an understanding of violence stemming from the material dispossession of land.

Harris 4 (Cole, Department of Geography, How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire, University of British Columbia, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 94(1), 2004, pp. 165–182 )

Influenced by Michel Foucault’s analysis of the relationships of power and knowledge (1972), by Edward Said’s examination of Orientalism (1978), by textual theory harnessed to colonial discourse analysis, and by many studies of the values and ideologies enmeshed in particular colonial encounters, most postcolonial scholars now identify culture and associated procedures of knowledge generation as the dominant power relations associated with colonialism. Whereas Frantz Fanon (1963) emphasized violence— the power of the gun—and Marx, to the extent that he wrote on colonialism, the aggressive reach of capital, postcolonial research and writing situates the momentum of colonialism in the culture of imperialists and colonists. A central goal, therefore, of colonial discourse theory is to identify the assumptions and representations inherent in colonial culture—in the binary of civilization/savagery, in the erasures of Aboriginal knowledge of time and space, in assumptions about race and gender, in the concept of the land as empty (terra nullius), and so on—and then, insofar as possible, to expose their contemporary manifestations. This work has focused much scholarly energy and has yielded important theoretical and practical results, but it is less clear that it has revealed the principal momentum and power relations inherent in colonialism. Originating in literary an￬輳￫辈￴辇ural studies, colonial discourse theory, indeed postcolonial scholarship generally, privileges the investigation of imperial texts, enunciations, and systems of signification. In so doing, it exposes implicit modes of seeing and of understanding that are held to infuse and validate colonialism while imparting much of its momentum. If Said offered broadly inclusive descriptions of colonial culture, and if others, more recently, have emphasized the variety of colonial voices and the importance of a local, contextual appreciation of different colonial cultures (e.g., Thomas 1994), in either case, culture is treated as a primary locus of colonial power. Moreover, as elements of colonial culture are assumed to have outlived formal colonial regimes their identification becomes an active political project—the decolonization of representation (Hall 2000, 5). In itself, this is commendable enough, but if studies of colonial culture are not contextualized among other forms of colonial power, then it is well nigh impossible to assess the particular work and the relative salience of colonial culture itself. A study of travel writing, for example, may yield an appreciation of the inflected seeing of travelers and of the complicity of such seeing with colonial projects, while not beginning to address the relative importance of travelers’ seeing and writing in the whole colonial enterprise. Given its focus, it cannot. At best, it can yield a nuanced understanding of traveler perceptions and values, and suggestive ideas about their relationships with colonialism. Colonialism’s complexity may be affirmed, so too, perhaps, the discursive construction of reality— comments tied more closely to theory than to a situated knowledge of colonial practices and power relations. In the hands of some of its most able practitioners, postcolonial scholarship is a potent means of exploring the reworking (‘‘provincializing’’) of European thought at and for the margins of empire (Chakrabarty 2000, 16). However, most postcolonial scholarship is written out of British or American universities and emanates from the heart of a recently superceded empire or of a recently ascendant one that hesitates to acknowledge its own imperial background. American postcolonial scholarship is not preoccupied with America (Hulme 1995; Thomas 1994 172–73). In the background of such scholarship are European theorists, particularly Foucault, Derrida, and Gramsci; in the foreground, European colonial thought and culture. In these circumstances, as many have pointed out, it tends to be Eurocentric—or as the Australian anthropologist PatrickWolfe puts it, occidocentric (1999, 1). So positioned, it is well placed to comment on the imperial mind in its large diversity, and even—especially in the hands of scholars like Homi Bhabha and Dipesh Chakrabartywho grew up in former colonies—on the ways in which European thought has been inflected and hybridized by its colonial encounters, but not on the diverse, on-the-ground workings of colonialism in colonized spaces around the world. A central claim of the distinguished Indian subaltern historian, Ranajit Guha, is that if British historical writing on the subcontinent reveals something of Britain and the Raj, it reveals nothing of India (1997). Somewhat similar criticisms have been made of much of the postcolonial literature: that it (or parts of it) anticipates a radically restructured European historiography, that it allows for nothing outside the (European) discourse of colonialism, that it is yet another exercise in metatheory and in European universalism (e.g., Slemon 1994; McClintock 1994). As the literary theorist BenitaParry puts it, the postcolonial emphasis on language and texts tends to offer ‘‘the World according to the Word’’ (1997, 12)—and the word tends to be European. But unless it can be shown that colonialism is entirely constituted by European colonial culture (a proposition for which it is hard to imagine any convincing evidence unless the concept of culture is understood so broadly that it loses any analytical value), then studies of colonial discourse, written from the center, must be a very partial window on the workings of colonialism. The discipline of geography has responded to postcolonial thought in a variety of ways (Clayton 2003). Among others, studies of colonialism itself have come into vogue, most of them written in Britain, a few from the edges of empire. I am struck by how much the character of these studies has been influenced by the locations of their authors. Consider, for example, two recent books by historical geographers: Felix Driver’s Geography Militant: Cultures of Exploration and Empire (2000), and Frank Tough’s ‘‘As Their Natural Resources Fail’’: Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 1870–1930 (1996). From opposite perspectives, they treat a fairly similar period of British colonialism. Driver analyzes the culture of exploration, particularly the sites and nature of its production and consumption—as at the Royal Geographical Society. His is a study of the ways in which the British imperial mind, both popular and academic, processed explorers’ information. Tough’s work is embedded in the materiality of a declining fur trade in the northern Manitoba bush. It deals with forts and trade routes; with economies and survival strategies as a twohundred- year-old system of commercial capital vacated the region; and with native livelihoods found in a precarious balance between what remained of a hunting, fishing, and gathering economy and intermittent employment in uncertain industrial resource economies. Each is an authentic study, yet they have little to say to each other, and this is basically, I think, because one is written from London, the heart of an empire, and the other from the Canadian Shield, one of its many colonial margins. At least, as Derek Gregory has put it, ‘‘what seemed plausible in the lecture hall of the Royal Geographical Society in London . . . might well become a half truth on the ground’’ (1998, 21). The distinction, perhaps, is between studies of imperialism and of colonialism: imperialism ideologically driven from the center and susceptible to conceptual analysis, colonialism a set of activities on the periphery that are revealed as practice (Young 2001, 16–17). Only a few geographers have tried to bring both the imperial mind and the particularities of local colonial circumstances into focus (e.g., Clayton 2000 and Lester 2001). But if the aim is to understand colonialism rather than the workings of the imperial mind, then it would seem essential to investigate the sites where colonialism was actually practiced. Its effects were displayed there. The strategies and tactics on which it relied were actualized there. There, in the detail of colonial dispossessions and repossessions, the relative weight of different agents of colonial power may begin to be assessed. If colonialism is the object of investigation, then Tough’s sparse Canadian Shield is promising terrain. It was not detached from London, of course, and may have been profoundly influenced by elements of imperial thought and culture, but the extent of this influence cannot be ascertained in London. Rather, I think, one needs to study the colonial site itself, assess the displacements that took place there, and seek to account for them. To do so is to position studies of colonialism in the actuality and materiality of colonial experience. As that experience comes into focus, its principal causes are to be assessed, among which may well be something like the culture of imperialism. To proceed the other way around is to impose a form of intellectual imperialism on the study of colonialism, a tendency to which the postcolonial literature inclines. The experienced materiality of colonialism is grounded, as many have noted, in dispossessions and repossessions of land. Even Edward Said (for all his emphasis on literary texts) described the essence of colonialism this way: ‘‘Underlying social space are territories, land, geographical domains, the actual geographical underpinnings of the imperial, and also the cultural contest. To think about distant places, to colonize them, to populate or depopulate them: all of this occurs on, about, or because of land. The actual geographical possession of land is what empire in the final analysis is all about’’ (1994, 78). Frantz Fanon held that colonialism created a world ‘‘divided into compartments,’’ a ‘‘narrow world strewn with prohibitions,’’ a ‘‘world without spaciousness.’’ He maintained that a close examination of ‘‘this system of compartments’’ would ‘‘reveal the lines of force it implies.’’ Moreover, ‘‘this approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its geographical layout will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized’’ (1963, 37–40).

#### The Aff erases the objective truth of sovereignty and Native histories – perm can’t solve because it denies the possibility of objective truth in the name of radical politics, thereby erasing the facticity of the genocide of the Native American

Gorelova, 2009 (Olena, “Postmodernism, native American literature, and Issues of sovereignty.” <http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2009/gorelova/GorelovaO0509.pdf>)

Postmodernism is all about bringing margins into the play and rejecting grand narratives. Michael Dear and Gregg Wassmansdorf point out in Postmodern Consequences that postmodernists learn to contextualize and reject meta-theories in favor of undecidability and microexplanations and renounce the universal truth. Nevertheless, Craig Womack’s statement that there is Native American truth and it is worth looking for (Womack 4) seems to be more convincing, especially in terms of quest for sovereignty and re-establishment of Native histories and their validity. It is way too premature for Native scholars to deconstruct history when we haven’t yet constructed it. We need, for example, to recover the nineteenth century, especially in terms of understanding what Native writers were up to during that time and how their struggles have evolved toward what Indian writers can say in print today, as well as foundational principles they provide for an indigenous criticism. (Womack 3) Deconstructing history and identity would negate the whole purpose of American Indian literature, which, by many scholars, is identified as a support of sovereignty. Postmodernism deconstructs identity and gets rid of Native American points of view, thus putting Native perspective as well as Native narrative and story out of existence. Womack points out that postmodernism has a “tendency to decenter everything, including the legitimacy of a Native perspective” (Womack 6). Therefore, on the one hand, it undermines the ideology of the dominant mainstream society by ridding it of the notion of “alien other” and introducing it into the positive world of differences. On the other hand, the loss of center leads to the loss of meaning and history, therefore devaluing Native perspective as well as five hundred years of colonization that is still ongoing.

**The Alternative is absolute refusal in favor of an orientation towards the material instance of land reclamation. The only ethical demand is to prioritize the pedagogy of land and place because ONLY it can spill over to material change. As settlers, the ethical role for us in the academy is to forefront relationships to land**

**Ballantyne 14** [Erin Freeland, Dechinta Bush U, *Dechinta Bush University: Mobilizing a knowledge economy of reciprocity, resurgence and decolonization*, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 3, No. 3, 2014, pgs 67-85, tony] \*\*\*Pronoun replaced by ||| in the body of this text.

As the conversation of Dechinta grew, the ugly politics of education on a broad political scale quickly surfaced. It became clear that education is a domain of power and privilege that is fiercely protected. Questions relating to control over its content, production and process were, apparently, not open for discussion. Curricula were deeply homogenized, deterritorialized and standardized. Post-secondary in the territory was overtly geared toward training people for industry and the endless promise of mining, pipeline and oil and gas booms (and busts). People were either emphatically supportive of the notion of ‘Elders as professors’ being recognized as equals and collaborating with university professors, or incensed by its disruption of typical academic power. The creation of Dechinta was polarizing, and reactions were telling of the deeply embedded sense of entitlement and power that the state, and existing institutions, had over determining what did and did not count as ‘education’. Rather than support spaces where academic and Indigenous knowledge would overlap, Indigenous knowledge was viewed as curriculum that should be relegated to ‘culture camps’. That processes like hunting and moose-hide tanning could draw parallels, or even inform governance, consensus building and self-determination, continue to elude most mainstream reporters, critics and institutions. Coming back to the land is a battle. ‘Education’ on the land is a direct hit to the exoskeleton of continued colonial power. By specifically disrupting education as a domain of settler colonial control to be deconstructed and re-imagined, Dechinta has challenged the most comprehensive, yet skilfully cloaked machine of settler colonial capitalism - the prescriptive education process, which produces more settler colonial bodies, thinkers, and believers. Building strong relationships of reciprocity with the land results in the crumbling of settler capitalism because it fundamentally shifts the relationships people experience and what they believe about who they|||people||| are, how they are in relation to and with land, and what they believe to be true. Being together on the land, learning with the land, and having a strong relationship with the land is antithetical to settler capitalism itself. The power of settler colonization relies on the total deterritorialization of people’s relationship with land. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1972) work on deterritorialization, ‘the process whereby colonization leads not just to the loss of territory but also to the destruction of the ontological conditions of the colonized culture’s territoriality,’ is a fitting philosophical conjecture to Dene expressions of how they are dislocated from their relationships with land due to process of nation-building and capitalism, and how this deterritorialization separates people from practices with the land that keeps them healthy, even if they still live on the land (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 192; Hipwell, 2004, p. 304). As Said (1993) has stated: land, in the final instance, is what empire is about. In this way, our relationships with land are central to the great unsettling. Reconnection, and the exchange of skills, knowledge and practice with land, thus directly threaten the settler colonial project. It removes bodies from the forces designed to encode the body as capital. The foremost space of enclosure, of encoding, is the ‘school’. The ongoing trend in Indigenous and Northern settler education since its earliest colonial intrusion has been to train Indigenous bodies to serve the needs of industry. Education has happened in Denendeh since time immemorial. It has been the settler prerogative to dismantle Indigenous ways of knowing and being, of education. Returning learning to an intergenerational exchange, on the land - which has at its very core the fundamental teachings that, if we take care of the land, the land takes care of us - will shake the foundation of settler colonization by breaking the dependency that has been created on capitalism through deterritorialization. Transformational learning supports intergenerational learners and teachers to think critically and re-imagine what the purpose of learning is. Learning on the land is healing and being in community on the land is challenging, pulling our attention to the hard work of decolonization. The year after our initial gathering, Dechinta launched a pilot semester with three courses nested within an interdisciplinary approach. Student evaluations of the program indicated it was profoundly ‘transformative’, and was for some the first ‘safe space’ of education that they had encountered (Luig et al, 2011). Interdisciplinary and collaborative, the pilot set the stage for the following four years. Dechinta now has 8 original courses, and a two semester-long program growing into a full degree that operates from -50 winters to the steamy height of summer. The challenges have been substantial. Conflict between academics and Indigenous students have made real the tensions of working on decolonization in concert, even with those who identify, or who are identified as allies. Solving conflict and difficulties through shared governance circles, while combating ingrained reactions of lateral violence and other social expressions codified in settler colonization are truly challenging, but deeply rewarding. Through the building of relationships we have a growing cohort of faculty dedicated to not just teaching but sharing in the creation of safe spaces, where the hard mental work of decolonizing in theory is met with the even harder work of decolonizing as practice. When students and faculty create a community where their relationships are ordered through their relationships with land, the work of decolonization move from a discussion in theory to practice of being and becoming a source of decolonial power. At Dechinta we debate this, and experiment with its meaning in tangible ways. Here, skills categorized as ‘subsistence’ or ‘arts and crafts’ are fundamental in forming and understanding theory. Such practices are themselves theory in action.

### 5

#### CP: Give the negative a ballot for their submission of an NFT