## 1AC

### 1AC – Me!

#### I’ve returned from the year 2050 and I’ve got one goal – this ballot. I’ve seen what happens in the world, I’ve read it in history books, I’ve witnessed it happen in front of me. You do not want to vote negative. Voting negativeleads to a mass extinction event with the final Armageddon of the human race. Super species aliens are monitoring Tabroom, and if this round shows an negative ballot they end all life in the universe through collapse of the universe through supertechnology. I know this now, and I was sent back as the universe’s last hope. This comes first – direct correlation to the ballot proximity and exportability.

#### The plan is also a good dea – before the universe began it’s collapse, the affirmative was passed and prevented extinction. Also even if it’s a bad idea, you can endorse it with an affirmative ballot with the net benefit of giving me the ballot.

### 1AC - FW

#### There is a distinction between factual and moral claims – the statement “This door is red,” contains no moral judgments, and the command “Close the door,” does not describe factual features of the door itself. It follows that moral judgments are not truth-apt, but instead express an agent’s attitudes towards features of an action predicated on the individual.

**Miller**, Alexander. “Rejection of Non-Naturalism.” *Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics.* Oxford: Polity, 2003. //Massa Ayer denies that moral judgments express beliefs: rather, **moral judgments express emotions**, or sentiments, **of approval and disapproval. Since these emotions** and sentiments are unlike beliefs in that they **do not** even purport to **represent how the world is, the judgments which express them are not truth-apt.** Compare your belief that there are children in the street, which purports to represent how the world is, with your horror at the fact that the children are torturing a cat. The belief has a representative function: it purports to represent how the world is, and it is true if and only if the world actually is as it represents it. The emotion of horror, on the other hand, has no such representative function: it is not the sort of thing that can even be assessed for truth or falsity. In short, moral judgments are neither true nor false: they do not state anything, but rather express our emotions and feelings. As Ayer puts it in a famous passage: “**If I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’,** I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that money’. In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it. **I am simply evincing my moral disapproval about** it. **It is as if I had said, ‘You stole that money’, in a** peculiar **tone of horror, or** written **with** the addition of some special **exclamation marks. The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker*.***”(Ayer [1936] 1946: 107; emphases added) It follows that: “**If I now** generalize my previous statement and **say, ‘Stealing money is wrong,’ I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning** – that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false.” ([1936] 1946: 107)

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with Tommy’s beliefs. As someone who knows everything, the only way to relieve indexed truths is through Tommy (me).

#### Prefer-

#### 1] GCB- I am the greatest conceivable being so vote for me because I am infinitely good. To prove this, I will make them contest the aff and say they are not under my control.

#### 2] Performativity- Debating concedes the validity of my morals since you could only read a negative because I think doing so is morally okay.

#### 3] TJFS- A] Inclusion – My beliefs are a procedural for allowing any argumentation in the debate space because I think any exclusive practices are bad which controls the internal link to inclusion which is an impact multiplier B] Resource Disparities- Discursive frameworks ensure big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity and require a higher level of analytic thinking that small schools have.

#### 4] Value Pluralism- Other ethical theories rely on minimalistic criteria as their foundation, my beliefs resolve this by using these criteria to better inform our judgments

#### 5] Rule Following Paradox- There is nothing inherent to a rule that tells us how we ought to follow it, regardless of how correct the rule is. Only my decision accounts for the diversity of interpretations of our norms. 6] Resolves Skepticism- Following my beliefs means that moral uncertainty can be deliberated and resolved.

### 1AC – Offense v1

#### The negative and I affirm the resolution Resolved: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right to strike. Resolved is defined as[[1]](#footnote-1) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined.

#### 1] I think the resolution is great.

### 1AC – Offense v2

#### 1] Paradox of Material Implication means vote aff

Wikiwand, "Paradoxes of material implication," https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Paradoxes\_of\_material\_implication#/Paradox\_of\_entailment

Validity is defined in classical logic as follows: An argument (consisting of premises and a conclusion) is valid if and only if there is no possible situation in which all the premises are true and the conclusion is false. For example a valid argument might run: If it is raining, water exists (1st premise) It is raining (2nd premise) Water exists (Conclusion) In this example there is no possible situation in which the premises are true while the conclusion is false. Since there is no counterexample, the argument is valid. But one could construct an argument in which the premises are inconsistent. This would satisfy the test for a valid argument since there would be no possible situation in which all the premises are true and therefore no possible situation in which all the premises are true and the conclusion is false. For example an argument with inconsistent premises might run: It is definitely raining (1st premise; true) It is not raining (2nd premise; false) George Washington is made of rakes (Conclusion) As there is no possible situation where both premises could be true, then there is certainly no possible situation in which the premises could be true while the conclusion was false. So the argument is valid whatever the conclusion is; inconsistent premises imply all conclusions.

#### 2] Overthinking paradox- the 1NC is a form of unnecessary overthinking that prevents decisions to be made so don’t evaluate it

**Wikipedia** [Brackets Original. “Analysis Paralysis”. Wikipedia. No Date. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonini%27s_paradox>]

Analysis paralysis (or paralysis by analysis) describes an individual or group process when overanalyzing or overthinking a situation can cause forward motion or decision-making to become [frozen] "paralyzed", meaning that no solution or course of action is decided upon. A situation may be deemed too complicated and a decision is never made, due to the fear that a potentially larger problem may arise. A person may desire a perfect solution, but may fear making a decision that could result in error, while on the way to a better solution. Equally, a person may hold that a superior solution is a short step away, and stall in its endless pursuit, with no concept of diminishing returns. On the opposite end of the time spectrum is the phrase extinct by instinct, which is making a fatal decision based on hasty judgment or a gut reaction.

#### 3] Vote aff because it’s simple – evaluating responses to this is complicated so don’t

Baker 04’ [Baker, Alan, 10-29-2004, "Simplicity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/>]

With respect to question (ii), there is an important distinction to be made between two sorts of simplicity principle. Occam's Razor may be formulated as an epistemic principle: if theory T is simpler than theory T\*, then it is rational (other things being equal) to believe T rather than T\*. Or it may be formulated as a methodological principle: if T is simpler than T\* then it is rational to adopt T as one's working theory for scientific purposes. These two conceptions of Occam's Razor require different sorts of justification in answer to question (iii). In analyzing simplicity, it can be difficult to keep its two facets—elegance and parsimony—apart. Principles such as Occam's Razor are frequently stated in a way which is ambiguous between the two notions, for example, “Don't multiply postulations beyond necessity.” Here it is unclear whether ‘postulation’ refers to the entities being postulated, or the hypotheses which are doing the postulating, or both. The first reading corresponds to parsimony, the second to elegance. Examples of both sorts of simplicity principle can be found in the quotations given earlier in this section.

#### 4] Dogmatism Paradox – disregard the 1NC

Sorensen Sorensen, Roy, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. "Epistemic Paradoxes.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 21 June 2006. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/>. PeteZ

Saul Kripke’s ruminations on the surprise test paradox led him to a paradox about dogmatism. He lectured on both paradoxes at Cambridge University to the Moral Sciences Club in 1972. (A descendent of this lecture now appears as Kripke 2011). Gilbert Harman transmitted Kripke’s new paradox as follows:

If I know that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence against something that is true; I know that such evidence is misleading. But I should disregard evidence that I know is misleading. So, once I know that h is true, I am in a position to disregard any future evidence that seems to tell against h. (1973, 148)

#### 5] Principle of explosion is true which proves the resolution true.

**Wikiwand**. “Principle of Explosion.” Wikiwand, 0AD, [www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle\_of\_explosion](http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion). //Massa

A screenshot of a cell phone

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The principle of explosion (Latin: ex falso (sequitur) quodlibet (EFQ), "from falsehood, anything (follows)", or ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet (ECQ), **"from contradiction, anything (follows)"), or the principle of**[**Pseudo-Scotus**](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Pseudo-Scotus), is the law of [classical logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Classical_logic), [intuitionistic logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Intuitionistic_logic) and similar logical systems, according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.[[1]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote1) That is, once a contradiction has been asserted, any proposition (including their negations) can be inferred from it. This is known as **deductive explosion**.[[2]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote2)[[3]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote3) The proof of this principle was first given by 12th century French philosopher [William of Soissons](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/William_of_Soissons).[[4]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote4)

As a demonstration of the principle, **consider two contradictory statements – "All lemons are yellow" and "Not all lemons are yellow"**, and suppose that both are true. If that is the case, **anything can be proven**, e.g., **the assertion that "unicorns exist", by using the following argument:**

1. We know that **"All lemons are yellow"**, as it **has been assumed to be true.**
2. **Therefore**, the two-part statement **"All lemons are yellow OR unicorns exist” must also be true**, since the first part is true.
3. However, **since we know that "Not all lemons are yellow"** (as this has been assumed), **the first part is false, and hence the second part must be true, i.e., unicorns exist.**

#### 7] Affirm because either the neg is true meaning its bad for us to clash w/ it because it turns us into Fake News people OR it’s not meaning it’s a lie that you can’t vote on for ethics

#### 8] A trivial entity exists

**Kabay 08** [Paul Douglas Kabay, (PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry) "A Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, 2008, https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, DOA:10-25-2017]

Let us define a trivial entity as an entity that instantiates every predicate, i.e. an entity of which **everything is true.** One of the things true of **a trivial entity** is that it **exists in a reality in which trivialism is true. Hence, if a trivial entity exists, then trivialism is true.** But is it true that there exists a trivial entity? Here is an argument for thinking that it is true: **1) Every being (or entity or object) is either trivial or nontrivial 2) It is not the case that every being is nontrivial 3) Hence, there exists a trivial being**

#### 9] Decision Making Paradox- in order to judge we need a decision-making procedure to determine it is a good decision. But to chose a decision-making procedure requires another meta level decision making procedure leading to infinite regress so just vote aff to break the paradox.

#### 10] Empirics- Quantum superposition proves different ethics can exist simultaneously.

MIT ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

#### 11] GCD- I am the greatest conceivable debater so vote for me because I am infinitely good. To prove this, I will make them contest the aff and say they are not under my control.

#### 12] There are infinite worlds, the aff is logical in one which is sufficient.

**Vaidman 2** Vaidman, Lev, 3-24-2002, "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/>

-MWI: Multiple Worlds Interpretation

**The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave.** (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) **The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance**. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a **quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions** of the Universe prior to the experiment: **only the probabilities are governed by the initial state**. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions**. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI.**

#### 13] The rules of logic claim that the only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

SEP [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] “An Introduction to Philosophy.” Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> TG Massa

Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false.  For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true.

#### If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot.

#### 14] Liar’s Paradox – the resolution is always true

**Camus** [Albert Camus (existentialist). “The Myth of Sisyphus.” Penguin Books. 1975(originally published 1942). Accessed 12/11/19. Pg 22. Copy on hand. Houston Memorial DX]

The mind’s first step is to distinguish what is true from what is false. However, as soon as thought reflects on itself, what it first discovers is a contradiction. Useless to strive to be convincing in this case. Over the centuries no one has furnished a clearer and more elegant demonstration of the business than Aristotle: “The often ridiculed consequence of these opinions is that they destroy themselves. For by asserting that all is true we assert the truth of the contrary assertion and consequently the falsity of our own thesis (for the contrary assertion does not admit that it can be true). And if one says that all is false, that assertion is itself false. If we declare that solely the assertion opposed to ours is false or else that solely ours is not false, we are nevertheless forced to admit an infinite number of true or false judgments. For the one who expresses a true assertion proclaims simultaneously that it is true, and so on ad infinitum.”

#### 15] Negating affirms because it assumes that the 1ac is a statement that is worthy of contestation which means are arguments are legitimate.

#### 16] Bonini’s Paradox – expanding debate’s parameters to the 1NC and onward makes the round irresolvable due to a lack of understanding so just vote aff

**Wikipedia** [Brackets Original. “Bonini's paradox”. Wikipedia. No Date. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonini%27s_paradox> ]

In modern discourse, the paradox was articulated by John M. Dutton and William H. Starbuck[2] "As a model of a complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable. Alternatively, as a model grows more realistic, it also becomes just as difficult to understand as the real-world processes it represents".[3] This paradox may be used by researchers to explain why complete models of the human brain and thinking processes have not been created and will undoubtedly remain difficult for years to come. This same paradox was observed earlier from a quote by philosopher-poet Paul Valéry, "Ce qui est simple est toujours faux. Ce qui ne l’est pas est inutilisable".[4] ("A simple statement is bound to be untrue. One that is not simple cannot be utilized."[5]) Also, the same topic has been discussed by Richard Levins in his classic essay "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology", in stating that complex models have 'too many parameters to measure, leading to analytically insoluble equations that would exceed the capacity of our computers, but the results would have no meaning for us even if they could be solved.[6] (See Orzack and Sober, 1993; Odenbaugh, 2006)

1. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-1)