# 1AC

### 1AC – Framework

#### Theories cannot be static because we are constantly learning. Historical moral progress proves we shift our norms but only adaptable theories can withstand the test of time.

#### Thus, the meta ethic is constructivism. Prefer –

#### 1] Temporality – It is impossible to construct perfect theories because they’re debunked by the future when we realize it doesn’t perfectly fit our way of life

#### 2] Epistemology – Formulating correct theories requires an understanding of the mind which means the construction of knowledge over time is valuable.

#### 3] Subject Formation – experiences shape identity because we construct our thoughts based on how we feel.

University at Buffalo Center for Educational Innovation **(U@Buffalo CEI)**. (**2020**, December 08). Constructivism. Retrieved April 14, 2021, from http://www.buffalo.edu/ubcei/enhance/learning/constructivism.html

**Constructivism** is the theory that **says learners construct knowledge rather than** just **passively take in information.** **As people experience the world and reflect** upon those experiences, **they build their own representations and incorporate new information into their pre-existing knowledge (schemas).**

Related to this are the processes of assimilation and accommodation.

* **Assimilation** refers to the process of taking new information and fitting it into an existing schema.
* **Accommodation** refers to using newly acquired information to revise and redevelop an existing schema.

**For example, if I believe** that **friends are always nice, and meet a** new **person who is** always **nice to me I may call this person a friend, assimilating them into my schema.** **Perhaps, however, I meet a different person who sometimes pushes me to try harder and is not always nice.** **I may decide to change my schema to accommodate** this person by deciding a friend doesn’t always need to be nice if they have my best interests in mind. **Further, this may make me reconsider whether the first person still fits into my friend schema.**

Consequences of constructivist theory are that:

* Students learn best when engaged in learning experiences rather passively receiving information.
* Learning is inherently a social process because it is embedded within a social context as students and teachers work together to build knowledge.
* Because knowledge cannot be directly imparted to students, the goal of teaching is to provide experiences that facilitate the construction of knowledge.

This last point is worth repeating. A traditional approach to teaching focuses on delivering information to students, yet constructivism argues that you cannot directly impart this information. Only an experience can facilitate students to construct their own knowledge. Therefore, the goal of teaching is to design these experiences.

#### Prefer additionally-

#### 1] Paradox of Material Implication means vote aff

Wikiwand, "Paradoxes of material implication," https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Paradoxes\_of\_material\_implication#/Paradox\_of\_entailment

Validity is defined in classical logic as follows: An argument (consisting of premises and a conclusion) is valid if and only if there is no possible situation in which all the premises are true and the conclusion is false. For example a valid argument might run: If it is raining, water exists (1st premise) It is raining (2nd premise) Water exists (Conclusion) In this example there is no possible situation in which the premises are true while the conclusion is false. Since there is no counterexample, the argument is valid. But one could construct an argument in which the premises are inconsistent. This would satisfy the test for a valid argument since there would be no possible situation in which all the premises are true and therefore no possible situation in which all the premises are true and the conclusion is false. For example an argument with inconsistent premises might run: It is definitely raining (1st premise; true) It is not raining (2nd premise; false) George Washington is made of rakes (Conclusion) As there is no possible situation where both premises could be true, then there is certainly no possible situation in which the premises could be true while the conclusion was false. So the argument is valid whatever the conclusion is; inconsistent premises imply all conclusions.

#### 2] Overthinking paradox- the 1NC is a form of unnecessary overthinking that prevents decisions to be made so don’t evaluate it

**Wikipedia** [Wikiwand, "Analysis paralysis," https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Analysis\_paralysis]

Analysis paralysis (or paralysis by analysis) describes an individual or group process when overanalyzing or overthinking a situation can cause forward motion or decision-making to become [frozen] "paralyzed", meaning that no solution or course of action is decided upon. A situation may be deemed too complicated and a decision is never made, due to the fear that a potentially larger problem may arise. A person may desire a perfect solution, but may fear making a decision that could result in error, while on the way to a better solution. Equally, a person may hold that a superior solution is a short step away, and stall in its endless pursuit, with no concept of diminishing returns. On the opposite end of the time spectrum is the phrase extinct by instinct, which is making a fatal decision based on hasty judgment or a gut reaction.

#### 3] Vote aff because it’s simple – evaluating responses to this is complicated so don’t

Baker 04’ [Baker, Alan, 10-29-2004, "Simplicity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/>]

With respect to question (ii), there is an important distinction to be made between two sorts of simplicity principle. Occam's Razor may be formulated as an epistemic principle: if theory T is simpler than theory T\*, then it is rational (other things being equal) to believe T rather than T\*. Or it may be formulated as a methodological principle: if T is simpler than T\* then it is rational to adopt T as one's working theory for scientific purposes. These two conceptions of Occam's Razor require different sorts of justification in answer to question (iii). In analyzing simplicity, it can be difficult to keep its two facets—elegance and parsimony—apart. Principles such as Occam's Razor are frequently stated in a way which is ambiguous between the two notions, for example, “Don't multiply postulations beyond necessity.” Here it is unclear whether ‘postulation’ refers to the entities being postulated, or the hypotheses which are doing the postulating, or both. The first reading corresponds to parsimony, the second to elegance. Examples of both sorts of simplicity principle can be found in the quotations given earlier in this section.

#### 4] Dogmatism Paradox – disregard the 1NC

Sorensen Sorensen, Roy, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. "Epistemic Paradoxes.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 21 June 2006. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/>. PeteZ

Saul Kripke’s ruminations on the surprise test paradox led him to a paradox about dogmatism. He lectured on both paradoxes at Cambridge University to the Moral Sciences Club in 1972. (A descendent of this lecture now appears as Kripke 2011). Gilbert Harman transmitted Kripke’s new paradox as follows:

If I know that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence against something that is true; I know that such evidence is misleading. But I should disregard evidence that I know is misleading. So, once I know that h is true, I am in a position to disregard any future evidence that seems to tell against h. (1973, 148)

#### 5] Principle of explosion is true which proves the resolution true.

**Wikiwand**. “Principle of Explosion.” Wikiwand, 0AD, [www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle\_of\_explosion](http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion). //Massa

A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generated

The principle of explosion (Latin: ex falso (sequitur) quodlibet (EFQ), "from falsehood, anything (follows)", or ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet (ECQ), **"from contradiction, anything (follows)"), or the principle of**[**Pseudo-Scotus**](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Pseudo-Scotus), is the law of [classical logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Classical_logic), [intuitionistic logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Intuitionistic_logic) and similar logical systems, according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.[[1]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote1) That is, once a contradiction has been asserted, any proposition (including their negations) can be inferred from it. This is known as **deductive explosion**.[[2]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote2)[[3]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote3) The proof of this principle was first given by 12th century French philosopher [William of Soissons](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/William_of_Soissons).[[4]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote4)

As a demonstration of the principle, **consider two contradictory statements – "All lemons are yellow" and "Not all lemons are yellow"**, and suppose that both are true. If that is the case, **anything can be proven**, e.g., **the assertion that "unicorns exist", by using the following argument:**

1. We know that **"All lemons are yellow"**, as it **has been assumed to be true.**
2. **Therefore**, the two-part statement **"All lemons are yellow OR unicorns exist” must also be true**, since the first part is true.
3. However, **since we know that "Not all lemons are yellow"** (as this has been assumed), **the first part is false, and hence the second part must be true, i.e., unicorns exist.**

#### 7] Affirm because either the neg is true meaning its bad for us to clash w/ it because it turns us into Fake News people OR it’s not meaning it’s a lie that you can’t vote on for ethics

#### 8] A trivial entity exists

**Kabay 08** [Paul Douglas Kabay, (PhD thesis, School of Philosophy, Anthropology, and Social Inquiry) "A Defense Of Trivialism" The University Of Melbourne, 2008, https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/35203, DOA:10-25-2017]

Let us define a trivial entity as an entity that instantiates every predicate, i.e. an entity of which **everything is true.** One of the things true of **a trivial entity** is that it **exists in a reality in which trivialism is true. Hence, if a trivial entity exists, then trivialism is true.** But is it true that there exists a trivial entity? Here is an argument for thinking that it is true: **1) Every being (or entity or object) is either trivial or nontrivial 2) It is not the case that every being is nontrivial 3) Hence, there exists a trivial being**

#### 9] Decision Making Paradox- in order to judge we need a decision-making procedure to determine it is a good decision. But to chose a decision-making procedure requires another meta level decision making procedure leading to infinite regress so just vote aff to break the paradox.

#### 10] Empirics- Quantum superposition proves different ethics can exist simultaneously.

MIT ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

#### 11] GCD- I am the greatest conceivable debater so vote for me because I am infinitely good. To prove this, I will make them contest the aff and say they are not under my control.

#### 12] There are infinite worlds, the aff is logical in one which is sufficient.

**Vaidman 2** Vaidman, Lev, 3-24-2002, "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/>

-MWI: Multiple Worlds Interpretation

**The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave.** (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) **The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance**. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a **quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions** of the Universe prior to the experiment: **only the probabilities are governed by the initial state**. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions**. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI.**

#### 13] The rules of logic claim that the only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

SEP [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] “An Introduction to Philosophy.” Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> TG Massa

Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false.  For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true.

#### If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot.

#### 15] Negating affirms because it assumes that the 1ac is a statement that is worthy of contestation which means are arguments are legitimate.

#### 16] Bonini’s Paradox – expanding debate’s parameters to the 1NC and onward makes the round irresolvable due to a lack of understanding so just vote aff

**Wikipedia** [Brackets Original. “Bonini's paradox”. Wikipedia. No Date. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonini%27s_paradox> ]

In modern discourse, the paradox was articulated by John M. Dutton and William H. Starbuck[2] "As a model of a complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable. Alternatively, as a model grows more realistic, it also becomes just as difficult to understand as the real-world processes it represents".[3] This paradox may be used by researchers to explain why complete models of the human brain and thinking processes have not been created and will undoubtedly remain difficult for years to come. This same paradox was observed earlier from a quote by philosopher-poet Paul Valéry, "Ce qui est simple est toujours faux. Ce qui ne l’est pas est inutilisable".[4] ("A simple statement is bound to be untrue. One that is not simple cannot be utilized."[5]) Also, the same topic has been discussed by Richard Levins in his classic essay "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology", in stating that complex models have 'too many parameters to measure, leading to analytically insoluble equations that would exceed the capacity of our computers, but the results would have no meaning for us even if they could be solved.[6] (See Orzack and Sober, 1993; Odenbaugh, 2006)

#### **Only an agnostic deliberation model accepts ongoing confrontation as legitimate rather than oppositional.** Thus, the standard is consistency with democratic agonism.

#### Additionally prefer

#### 1] TJFS- A] Inclusion – Pragmatism is a procedural for allowing any argumentation in the debate space which controls the internal link to inclusion which is an impact multiplier B] Resource Disparities- Discursive frameworks ensure big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity and require a higher level of analytic thinking that small schools have.

#### 2] Value – procedural decisions have infinite value because they allow agents to take steps to reduce harms under any index. To shut down an avenue for pragmatic discourse necessitates foreclosing all possible decisions in that situation except a static theory we can’t change. Kills the net most value – alternative theories with massive impacts can’t be considered.

#### 3] Value Pluralism- Other ethical theories rely on minimalistic criteria as their foundation, our framework resolves this by using these criteria to better inform our judgments LaFollete 2K "Pragmatic Ethics" [Hugh LaFollette](http://www.hughlafollette.com/index.htm) In [Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory](http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/b-guide.htm) 2000. Hugh LaFollette is Marie E. and Leslie Cole Professor in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. He is editor-in-chief of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

Employs criteria, but is not criterial The previous discussions enable us to say more precisely why pragmatists reject a criterial view of morality. Pragmatism's core contention that practiceis primary in philosophy rulesoutthe hope of logically prior criteria. Any meaningful criteria evolve from our attempt to live morally – in deciding what is the best action in the circumstances. Criteriaare not discovered by pure reason, and they arenotfixed. As ends of action, they are always revisable. Asweobtainnewevidenceabout ourselves and our world, and as our worlds changes, wefindthat whatwasappropriatefor the old environment maynotbeconduciveto survival in thenew one. A style of teaching that might have been ideal for one kind institution (a progressive liberal arts college) at one time (the 60s) may be wholly ineffective in another institution (a regional state university) at another time (the 80s). But that is exactly what we would expect of an evolutionary ethic. Neither could criteria be complete. Themoralworldiscomplexandchangeable**.** No set of criteriacouldgiveusunivocalanswersabouthowwe should behave in all circumstances**.** If we cannot develop an algorithm for winning at chess, where there are only eighteen first moves, there is no way to develop an algorithm for living, which has a finitely large number of "first moves." Moreover, while the chess environment (the rules) stays constant, our natural and moral environments do not. We must adapt or fail. While there is always one end of chess -- the game ends when one player wins – the ends of life change as we grow, and asour environmentschange. Finally, we cannot resolve practical moral questions simply by applying criteria. We do not make personal or profession decisions by applying fixed, complete criteria. Why should we assume we should make moral decisions that way? Appropriates insights from other ethical theories Nonetheless, there is a perfectly good sense in which a pragmatic ethic employs what we might call criteria, but their nature and role dramatically differ from that in a criterial morality (Dewey 1985/1932) . Pragmaticcriteriaare not external rules we apply, but aretoolsweuseinmakinginformedjudgements. They embody learning from previous action, they express our tentative efforts to isolate morally relevant features of those actions. These emergentcriteriacanbecomeintegratedinto our habits**,** thereby informingthe waysthat wereactto, think about, and imagine ourworldsand our relations to others. This explains why pragmatists think other theories can provide guidance on how to live morally. Standard moral theories err not because they offer silly moral advice, but because they misunderstand that advice. Othermoral theoriescan help us isolate(and habitually focus on) morallyrelevantfeaturesof action. And pragmatists take help wherever they can get it. Utilitarianism does not provide an algorithm for deciding how to act, but it shapes habits to help us "naturally" attend to the ways that our actions impact others. Deontology does not provide a list of general rules to follow, but it sensitizes us to ways our actions might promote or undermine respect for others. Contractarianism does not resolve all moral issues, but it sensitizes us to the need for broad consensus. That is why it is mistaken to suppose that the pragmatist makes specific moral judgements oblivious to rules, principles, virtues, and the collective wisdom of human experience. The pragmatist absorbs these insights into her habits, and thereby shapes how she habitually responds, and how she habitually deliberates when deliberation is required. This also explains why criterial moralities tend to be minimalistic. They specify minimal sets of rules to follow in order to be moral. Pragmatism, on the other hand, like virtue theories, is more concerned to emphasize exemplary behavior – to use morally relevant features of action to determine the best way to behave, not the minimally tolerable way.

#### 4] Rule Following Paradox- There is nothing inherent to a rule that tells us how we ought to follow it, regardless of how correct the rule is. Only deliberation accounts for the diversity of interpretations of our norms.

#### **5]** Resolves Skepticism- a) Discussion between many bodies means that moral uncertainty can be deliberated and resolved. b) Truth only makes sense in groups of people so only they can prescribe action

### 1AC – Offense

#### The negative and I Affirm the Whole Resolution – Resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### Resolved is defined as[[1]](#footnote-1) firm in purpose or intent; determined and I’m determined.

#### 1] Objectivity in the press is consistent with the pragmatic theory of truth via rigorous inquiry and pluralist decision-making.

Ward 17 [Stephen J. A. Ward (Distinguished Lecturer in Ethics at the University of British Columbia, Courtesy Professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon, and founding director of the Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin). “ENGAGEMENT AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY”. Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. March 27, 2017. Accessed 2/26/2022. <https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2017/03/27/engagement-and-pragmatic-objectivity/> //Xu]

In the first article in this series, I argued for a radical rethink of ethics to respond properly to the challenge of journalism in a time of Trump. We need to practice democratically engaged journalism, which views journalists as social advocates. But they are advocates of a special kind: objective advocates for plural democracy. Here, I’ll examine the method of objective engagement, what I call pragmatic objectivity. Journalists of this ilk are neither partisans nor neutral reporters of “just the facts.” Objective engagement sounds strange to some ears; it runs against a strong strain of dualistic thinking in journalism ethics: I can be a disinterested journalist or an interest-driven advocate but not both. Facts versus opinion, facts versus values, neutrality versus engagement. These dualisms are the trouble-making heritage of a journalism ethic from a different media era a century ago. Pragmatic objectivity rejects the dualisms, but not objectivity. It redefines it. But how can journalists be engaged and objective? OBJECTIVITY AS TESTING What does it mean to be objective, and why be objective? Since philosophy in antiquity, objectivity has been an ideal of inquiry. Objectivity in this tradition is ontological, i.e., it is knowledge of the world as it exists independent of mind. Objective beliefs map the world. Subjective beliefs fail to map. To be concerned about objectivity is to ask: Which beliefs, reports, and theories are reliable representations of the world? Humans make mistakes. The sources of error are known: our desires, ideologies, prejudices, faulty logic, and interests. How decide which beliefs map the world? There is only one way. We examine how we formed a belief. We evaluate its reasons and its methods. Objectivity becomes epistemological. Objective belief is supported by evidence. Subjective belief lacks support. Objectivity comes down to testing beliefs by the methods and criteria of good inquiry. For example, we test beliefs to see if they follow valid statistical methods. The most familiar modes of testing are the methods of science. But criteria for objective inquiry populate philosophy, logic, critical thinking, social science, law, and journalism. Objectivity is an ideal. Even if never fully realized, it is a target at which to aim. Being objective is not easy. It requires mental discipline and a willingness to critique one’s views. So “Why be objective?” becomes, “Why value well-evidenced belief?” For two reasons. We need objective beliefs to guide actions. And, we need objective methods for adjudication: Teachers need to mark exams objectively; judges need to adjudicate disputes by law and fact. Too much time has been wasted of late on the flabby, unfocused question as to whether objectivity exists, or whether it is valuable. Of course objectivity exists, if we mean there are people capable of reasonably objective judgments. That happens every day. And, it is clear that objective judgment has value in many domains of life. So what is the debate over objectivity in journalism about, anyway? The real issue is what type of objective testing is appropriate for journalism? OLD AND NEW OBJECTIVITY Historically, journalism objectivity has been reductionist. Testing for objectivity is reduced to testing for facts and neutrality. The conception, adopted in the early 1900s for professional newsrooms, is that a report is objective if and only if it neutrally reports only observable facts. The sphere of objective belief is reduced to beliefs derived from the senses. Traditional objectivity is dualistic: it draws a firm line between observation and interpretation of fact, neutral reporting and advocacy. It is exclusive: Reporter’s opinions and interpretations are to be excluded from good reporting. This is the old objectivity. It makes objective engagement ‘sound strange.’ This way of thinking continues to haunt debates, even if people doubt objectivity. Reporters still balk at the suggestion they interpret events. They worry about losing neutrality when covering Trump. Too many commentators reject objectivity because they think of it as strict neutrality, as if there was not some other conception. Pragmatic objectivity is a new objectivity. It is plural and holistic. It evaluates beliefs with a variety of standards. It is inclusive, open to the evaluation of many kinds of writing. It denies dualisms, viewing journalism as both factual and interpretive, an engaged chronicling. For pragmatic objectivity, the sphere of objective belief is larger than the sphere of fact. What we know depends not only on observation but on our perspectives—webs of belief and values. Knowledge is an interpretation, in which fact and theory are entangled. Even what we consider a fact is determined by our webs of belief. Hence, expert analysis of political events and scientific theories of unobservable forces in nature can be objective, even if not reducible to observable fact. They are objective to the extent that they are reliable indicators of the world and guides to action. Journalism stories are web-dependent interpretations. They are not pure observations of fact. Even apparent facts-only reporting, e.g., reporting a news conference, require the journalist to select salient statements, decide on quotations, and make sense of the conference for a public. Salience, choosing content, and creating meaning are interpretive functions. If this view is true, then we need a notion of objectivity that disciplines and tests our interpretive tendencies, rather than tries to eliminate them. We need appropriate standards of evaluation. Pragmatic objectivity provides a list for journalism. They are: Standards of attitude: Journalists should adopt the objective stance, step back from their beliefs, display a passion for truth and give reasons that others could accept. Standards of empirical validity: What is the empirical evidence for the story? Are the facts carefully collected, verified, complete and placed in context? Are counter-facts treated seriously? Standards of clarity, logic, and coherence: Does the story cohere with existing knowledge in the field? Is the interpretation logically consistent? Are the concepts clear? Are fallacious arguments or manipulative techniques used? Standards of diverse and trusted sources: Are important sources taken into account and fairly assessed? Standards of self-consciousness: In constructing a story, are we conscious of the conceptual frame we use to understand the topic? Are there other frames? Standard of open, public scrutiny: Have we subjected our views to the views of others? Are we prepared to alter our views? The standards apply to many forms of journalism from ‘straight’ reporting to editorial commentary and advocacy journalism. It is a flexible, platform-neutral method.

### 1AC – Advantage

#### Objective Media Coverage is key to combat Vaccine Disinformation BUT Advocacy creates polarization that hardens misinformation.

Sullivan 21 Margaret Sullivan 3-7-2021 "The media plays a crucial role in battling vaccine misinformation. But here’s what not to do." <https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/vaccine-misinformation-media/2021/03/05/fd01a0ba-7dbd-11eb-a976-c028a4215c78_story.html> (Education: Georgetown University; Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism)//Elmer

There are all sorts of ways to counter reluctance to get the coronavirus vaccine. There’s leading by example. There’s guilt. And there’s pure charm. Dolly Parton went the latter route last week as she got her first shot, wearing a sparkly blue cold-shoulder dress for her Instagram PSA and crooning “Vaccine” to the tune of her signature “Jolene.” Anthony S. Fauci made an argument both moral and scientific, reflective of his Jesuit education. “Think about your societal obligation,” he told members of the military, about a third of whom reportedly don’t want the vaccine. He added: “Like it or not, you’re propagating this outbreak.” And Boston Marathon director Dave McGillivray chose to inspire, explaining to the Wall Street Journal how he took the logistics expertise he would have deployed for this year’s canceled race and reapplied it to organizing vaccinations in Massachusetts instead. Despite all this high-level persuasion, a big chunk of Americans — about 3 in 10 — remain hesitant, according to a new Pew Research survey. And like Parton, Fauci and McGillivray, the news media has a role to play — not in outright advocacy, but in relentlessly providing accurate, nuanced information and answering questions straightforwardly. “There is a lot to be said for honestly reporting as much context as possible and knowing the terrain into which your sound bites and headlines will play,” said Emily Bell, director of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University. Although Bell is eager to see more people move past their concerns and get the vaccine, she told me she doesn’t believe in downplaying the numbers on negative reactions to shots: “All you are doing is reinforcing the narrative of the ‘wellness bloggers’ that Big Pharma is hiding something.” And what journalists shouldn’t concentrate on, according to one misinformation expert I talked to, is spending too much energy debunking myths. Some of the most popular myths: That tech mogul Bill Gates is secretly implanting microchips in people’s arms. That the vaccine causes the disease. That there are toxic levels of mercury in the doses. That flu shots protect against covid-19, so the newer vaccine is unnecessary. But even though such notions are incorrect and damagingly so, “the media should not be playing Whack-a-Mole by debunking every obscure rumor,” said Claire Wardle, founder of First Draft, a nonprofit that fights online misinformation. “The more you say some outrageous thing is not true — ‘No, Bill Gates is not microchipping you!’ — the more you give people the key words” that will send them down the social media rabbit hole of misinformation, she told me. “You’re giving it oxygen.” Instead, like Bell, she believes it’s all about relentlessly educating the public by answering reasonable questions with as much expertise as can be mustered. Local reporters — who tend to be relatively well-trusted — are especially important in this effort, providing basic information, and pointing readers or viewers to credible public-health sources. Sadly, there are far fewer of these reporters than when the pandemic began. At their best, local news organizations also provide important watchdog coverage, as the Boston Globe did Friday in an investigative report about Massachusetts Gov. Charlie Baker’s (R) administration disastrously pivoting to privatize vaccine distribution, with private entities awarded no-bid contracts “to undertake perhaps one of the state’s most pressing, ambitious initiatives in modern times.” The media’s performance, to date, has been far from perfect. Early on, the overemphasis of allergic reactions — without enough context — set a bad standard. And some experts think the media coverage has been too pessimistic overall. “The public has been offered a lot of misguided fretting over new virus variants, subjected to misleading debates about the inferiority of certain vaccines, and presented with long lists of things vaccinated people still cannot do, while media outlets wonder whether the pandemic will ever end,” sociologist Zeynep Tufekci wrote in the Atlantic. The joy of vax: The people giving the shots are seeing hope, and it’s contagious Still, there’s evidence that some people are changing their minds. The number of those who don’t intend to get the vaccine has come down from about 40 percent a few months ago to about 30 percent now, according to the new Pew numbers. Vaccine coverage still has room for improvement. “What the public needs to hear,” Tufekci wrote, “. . . is that based on existing data, we expect them to work fairly well — but we’ll learn more about precisely how effective they’ll be over time, and that tweaks may make them even better.” Before last year’s election, the reality-based media — to its everlasting credit — got across the idea that election night probably wouldn’t provide the answer to who won the presidency, that it might take weeks to count the vote. The media succeeded by repeating this message over many weeks, basing their accounts on credible experts, and warning about misinformation campaigns. When the pandemic-hampered vote count did indeed take several days, most news consumers were prepared to recognize this as acceptable, and far less likely to buy into the lie that the election had been stolen. Call it a victory, rare enough these days, for good information over bad. Vaccine coverage — with its life-or-death implications — is even more consequential. We need to get it right.

#### Credible News Distribution is key to vaccine adoption – it’s the only way to end Pandemics.

\

#### Pandemics risk extinction - simulations, empirics, and surging connectivity prove.

Kim 21, Kiseong, et al. "Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading." Applied Sciences 11.7 (2021): 2997. (Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; R&D Center)//Re-cut by Elmer

Several epidemics, such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, have threatened human life throughout history; however, it is unclear if humans will remain safe from the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases. Moreover, the transmission characteristics of epidemics remain undiscovered. In this study, we present the results of an epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk. To analyze the time-dependent risk and impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below 100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless, certain diseases can potentially infect all nodes in the human social networks, and these diseases cause a pandemic when the average degree is larger than the threshold value. These results indicated that certain infectious diseases lead to human extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. 1. Introduction The emergence of a pandemic is one of the various scenarios frequently discussed as a human extinction event, and it is listed as one of the global catastrophic risks in studies regarding the future [1,2,3]. In particular, several pandemics, such as the Black Death [4,5], Spanish flu [6], and those caused by smallpox [7], severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [8], and Ebola [9], have affected a large population

1. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved [↑](#footnote-ref-1)