## 1

#### A. Interpretation: If the affirmative differs from the conventional Truth Testing model, they must explicitly specify a comprehensive role of the ballot in the form of a text in the 1AC where they clarify how offense links back to the role of the ballot, such as whether post-fiat offense or pre-fiat offense matters and what constitutes that offense with implications on how to weigh

#### Multiple ways the AC violates:

#### C. Standards:

#### Engagement –

#### If I don’t know how the role of the ballot functions, its impossible for me to engage the aff, since knowing what counts as offense for me is a prerequisite to being able to make meaningful arguments that clash with yours. Knowing what a legitimate advocacy is ensures that I read something that is relevant to your method, and knowing how to weigh gives us a standard for what is relevant, This is true of role of the ballots since there is no norm on what "performative engagement" is in the same way there is for what counts as util offense. Few impacts:

#### a) Education – when two ships pass in the night we don’t learn anything, education is derived from analyzing and comparing each other’s arguments. This also guts novice inclusion because now they can never learn arguments in round.

#### b) Link turns your role of the ballot – your impacts are premised on actually having a debate and engaging with issues of oppression. Almost impossible to engage roles of the ballot are uniquely bad since no one will take seriously a position that can’t be clashed with, so you harm any progress your position can create.

#### c) Strategy Skew – You make formulating a strategy impossible since I don’t know what links to your evaluative mechanism. My interp means we know what a legitimate neg advocacy is, otherwise you can make up reasons mine doesn’t link to the role of the ballot in the next speech, and by specing a weighing mechanism I can know to make the most relevant arguments so you can’t arbitrarily preclude them in the next speech.

#### Framing: You can’t use your ROB to exclude my shell. My shell allows you to read your role of the ballot, it just functionally constrains how you can do that. Additionally, as long as I win comparative offense to my interp it precludes on a methodological level -my method is your ROTB with specification, your is just the ROTB, so if the former is better it’s a reason to vote for me even if method debates in general preclude theory. Also, if they go for the Aff first that proves the abuse of my shell since they should have specified in the AC.

#### Voters: Fairness/Edu/DTD/CI/No RVI

## 2

#### The ROB is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution.

#### 1. Fiat is illusory: Nothing leaves this round other than the result on the ballot which means even if there is a higher purpose, it doesn’t change anything and you should just write whatever is important on the ballot and vote for me. Answering this triggers constitutivism since the win is necessary for your scholarship which means rules inside of the game matter. 2. Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate. 3. Inclusion: a) other ROBs open the door for personal lives of debaters to factor into decisions and compare who is more oppressed which causes violence in a space where some people go to escape. b) Anything can function under truth testing insofar as it proves the resolution either true or false. Specific role of the ballots exclude all offense besides those that follow from their framework which shuts out people without the technical skill or resources to prep for it. 4. Constitutivism: the ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic and five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true b) the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolutional focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity. It’s a jurisdictional issue since it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game.

## 3

#### Ethical disagreement is inevitable-

#### A] Relativity problem- I can never witness the world from anyone else’s perspective which means our understanding of the world will inevitably be different and require distinct ethical obligations to account for our unique social location

#### B] Empirics- Best studies prove ethical differences are inevitable

Polzler and Wright 19[Thomas Pölzler and Jennifer Cole Wright- “Empirical research on folk moral objectivism” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686698/> NCBI. Published July 5th 2019] UT AI

Examining these studies' results more closely, however, makes it less clear whether this interpretation is appropriate (Pölzler, 2018b). Take again Goodwin and Darley's study. In this study, almost 30% of subjects' responses to the disagreement measure and almost 50% of their responses to the truth‐aptness measure fell on the option that the researchers took to be indicative of subjectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, pp. 1347, 1351). Moreover, while some moral statements were dominantly classified as objective (e.g., the above statement about robbery), many others were dominantly classified as nonobjective (e.g., the stem cell research statement). This suggests that subjects in Goodwin and Darley's study may have actually favored what Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (2013) called “metaethical pluralism,” i.e., they sometimes sided with objectivism and other times with nonobjectivism. More recent studies have by and large confirmed this hypothesis of folk metaethical pluralism. Wright et al. (2013) and Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (2014), for example, replicated Goodwin and Darley's results, using the exact same measures, but letting subjects classify the presented statements as moral and nonmoral themselves. Objectivity ratings for statements that were dominantly self‐classified as moral varied between as little as 5% and as much as 85%. Research based on different measures yielded high proportions of intrapersonal variation as well (e.g., Beebe, 2014; Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Wright, 2018; Zijlstra, forthcoming‐a).2

#### Resolving such differences requires a fair, non-arbitrary method that isn’t biased in its ability to make normative judgements. Thus, the standard is consistency with the public will. Only aggregating ethical viewpoints into an omni-perspective presents us with the fairest way to determine how to make ethical action. Any other ethical calculus is arbitrary and non-objective in its approach to conflict.

#### Prefer

#### 1] Constutivism- A democracy intrinsicially requires a majority of its citizens to consider a policy legitimate. This makes our framework most actor-specific and contextual.

#### 2] Regress- Polls prevents infinite regress of asking why and how a moral action or evaluation is attributable to the agent, as (1) agents consent to policy so the regress terminates in internal motivation or (2) defines the duties and boundaries of state policy which contextualizes how certain actions are attributable to governments.

#### Now Negate-

#### 1] Polls decisively negate

Hicks 5/14 [Cynthia Hicks (Director of Public Affairs at PhRMA focusing on polling and opinion research that supports advocacy communications and strategy). “New polling shows Americans are sounding the alarm on the TRIPS IP waiver”. Phrma. May 14, 2021. Accessed 8/27/21. <https://catalyst.phrma.org/new-polling-shows-americans-are-sounding-the-alarm-on-the-trips-ip-waiver> //Xu]

Last week, the Biden administration announced support for a waiver of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which could lead to the removal of intellectual property protections for manufacturers of COVID-19 vaccines and treatments – a move some have suggested will speed global access in countries devastated by recent surges. However, once you peel back the layers of the TRIPS waiver and understand the risks to health and safety, recent data shows that Americans want a better way. In fact, a recent Hill-HarrisX poll found that a majority of Americans – 57% – oppose the waiver. Recent polling conducted by Morning Consult on behalf of PhRMA echoed these strong concerns around the dangerous consequences of waiving intellectual property – including risks to public safety and vaccine manufacturing – and explored alternatives that could better expand global access to life-saving vaccines and treatments. Below are three notable findings: 1. While Americans want to expand global access to vaccines, they would prefer to build on successful U.S. manufacturing rather than waive patents. Americans support expanding vaccine access globally. In fact, 70% of registered voters believe it is a “top priority” to ensure COVID-19 vaccines become widely available for all countries, including 82% of Democrats and 56% of Republicans. However, they would prefer to build on existing U.S. manufacturing efforts rather than undermine patents through the TRIPS waiver. When asked to choose between the two, a strong majority – 56% – prefers that we “build upon successful U.S. manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines to increase global supply, donate excess doses and increase licensing agreements with foreign manufacturers to increase supply.” Conversely, only 23% of voters support waiving intellectual property rights of U.S. manufacturers as the means to that end. 2. Americans are concerned that the TRIPS waiver could risk patient safety, sow public confusion, and cede America’s global innovation leadership to China. Americans worry that waiving intellectual property introduces unnecessary and dangerous risks to safety and vaccine manufacturing. The top concerns – expressed by more than six in ten voters – include the following: 3. Americans want strong intellectual property and more collaboration to expand global access. Americans across party lines support intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines. In fact, three-quarters (75%) believe that the U.S. needs strong intellectual property protections to encourage innovation. In looking to solutions, 4-in-5 voters (80%) say that vaccine manufacturers working together to help get vaccines to poorer countries is important. This collaboration was the top-ranked alternative to the TRIPS waiver for supporters of both parties: 84% support among Democrats and 74% support among Republicans. Voters also strongly support the following approaches to help increase global COVID-19 vaccine and treatment access: Increasing production targets from manufacturers (73%); U.S. vaccine developers partnering directly with manufacturers in poorer countries (71%); Providing financial support and in-kind donations to local organizations in poorer countries (69%); Increasing American vaccine exports (69%); and Making new commitments to the global vaccine equity initiative COVAX (68%). Americans want a better way toward COVID-19 vaccine and treatment equity than what the TRIPS waiver would offer: one that involves protecting strong intellectual property, building on the United States’ innovation and manufacturing leadership to date, increasing collaboration, and addressing the true impediments to access, such as infrastructure, last-mile distribution and trade barriers.

## Case

#### Your performance is a cooption of indigenous resistance. **Barker 12,**

[Adam J., Jenny Pickerill, Professor of Environmental Geography at University of Sheffield, 2012, Antipode, “Radicalizing Relationships To and Through Shared Geographies: Why Anarchists Need to Understand Indigenous Connections to Land and Place”, Volume 00, No. 0, 14-15]//SS To overcome these barriers, anarchist activists need to alter their basic practices of solidarity and affinity with respect to Indigenous communities. It is often necessary to begin by pursuing deep understandings of place-based relationships, connections to governance and nationhood, as well as impacts of settler colonization on relational networks and implications for decolonization. Olson suggests that, with respect to communities of black Americans, anarchists must focus less on magazines, rallies and social centres, and more on movement building, engaging directly with community members (Olson 2009). With respect to Indigenous communities, anarchists must chart a different course yet again: anarchists must understand that to be truly decolonizing and effective allies to Indigenous peoples, they must step back from attempts to draw Indigenous peoples into movements or insert themselves into Indigenous struggles. First, anarchists must understand Indigenous peoples’ roles in, and connections, to place. Anarchistic spaces such as autonomous zones and social centres can remain tactically important, but anarchists need to spend time with Indigenous peoples in place, learning the “personality” (Deloria and Wildcat 2001) of the place and the ways that Indigenous peoples perceive and interact with the entire dynamic community of place. In this way, anarchists can begin to understand the subtle difference in spatial perception, construction and behaviour that differentiate an autonomous zone from a decolonized space. This might also involve tackling the inherent urban-bias in anarchist organising and venturing into more rural spaces. A decolonized space empowers the complex place-based relational networks rooted in, and connected to, all the elements of place, which can enable decolonized Indigenous identities. If an Indigenous identity emanates from place, and requires therefore the decolonization of place to reach full articulation, then anarchists must seek to connect to Indigenous peoples’ struggles through and in place rather than through community solidarity and affinity-group building. This is the first step to approaching alliances with Indigenous peoples in a respectful way: on their ground and in their time, something that so many activists have failed or been unable to do. Any attempt to connect to Indigenous peoples through place is fraught with challenges. Perhaps the most important of these involves appropriation. Anarchist activist and practicing witch Starhawk has intimate knowledge of the wedges created between Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists amidst accusations of appropriation of cultural traditions by pagans (Starhawk 2002:201–205), and her accounts paint a complex picture. Indigenous communities are often sensitive to appropriation and use of cultural practices by non-Indigenous peoples, and with good reason. Activists attempting to speak for Indigenous peoples or, potentially worse, with Indigenous voice have participated in the disempowerment and marginalization of Indigenous peoples (Haig-Brown 2010), unwittingly furthering the goal of elimination of Indigenous peoples under settler colonization. Activists may feel that accusations of appropriation are too harsh. Indigenous communities have unequivocally demanded that their ways of knowing and being be respected; by attempting to internalize Indigenous ways, anarchists often intend only to show respect for the power and profound utility of those ways. While that perspective is very attractive and by some logics makes sense, the disconnect between anarchist respect for and utilization of Indigenous terms, names, concepts, and protocols, and Indigenous objections on the grounds of appropriation indicate one of the practical effects of misunderstanding Indigenous connections to place. In Indigenous networks of place-based relationships, all of the elements—whether (drawing from Jake Swamp’s opening statement) a blade of grass, a leaf on a tree, a river, or a person—have roles that are only fully revealed in their interactions with each other (through their reciprocity). Anarchists must learn about Indigenous connections to place not to learn specific Indigenous ways, as these connections are not appropriate for all humans. Rather, this learning is necessary to see the dynamics of relationality between Indigenous peoples and their places. What is appropriate behaviour for Indigenous peoples in place is dependent on their roles in the larger relational matrix; it does not necessarily apply to others, regardless of their support for decolonizing efforts. Starhawk illustrates this with a poignant example, noting that a “Hopi clown can ritually mock the ceremony he is part of—but were a stranger to jump in and do the same, it would be a hostile and destructive act” (Starhawk 2002:202). Similar dynamics, while less visible, exist throughout Indigenous practices of relations; imitation should always be approached sceptically. It is only through the observation of how Indigenous peoples relate to place (and why they do so using the methods which they do) that anarchists can come to understand the needs of place. As Indigenous peoples confront colonization and reassert Indigenous ways of knowing and being, their relational networks have become fluid and mutable. As Jake Swamp says, Indigenous peoples are inventing “new ways of looking at things” (Swamp 2010:20) in order to establish new relationships with the changed and/or changing elements of place; the true challenge for anarchists who would be allies is to find their own new way of looking at—and being in—place that compliments but does not replicate what Indigenous peoples are attempting to do. Replication of relations, as with appropriation of voice, is an unwelcome and unneeded imposition.

#### Ivory tower da—criticism from afar makes themselves feel good but kills any chance for indigenous sovereignty.

**Snelgrove et. al 14,** [Corey Snelgrove, University of British Columbia, Rita Kaur Dhamoon, University of Victoria, Jeff Corntassel, University of Victoria, “Unsettling settler colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous nations,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society , Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014, <https://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/21166>]Decontextualized conceptions of settler colonial studies, ‘settler’, and solidarity risk further eschewing Indigenous peoples and thereby reifying the stolen land each of the above is founded upon. Perhaps, most centrally, this is done through de-centering Indigenous peoples own articulations of Indigenous-settler relations, their governance, legal, and diplomatic orders, and the transformative visions entailed within Indigenous political thought. Such de-centering has the potential to present settler colonialism as complete or transhistorical, as inevitable, rather than conditioned and contingent. This failure to attend to the conditions and contingency of settler colonialism can also be traced to the marginalization of how colonization actually proceeds across time and space. That is, as entangled with other relations of domination, and not only through structures, but also practices that serve as, what Paige Raibmon (2008) refers to, “microtechniques of dispossession.” Those who critique settler colonialism through transhistorical representations are then able to feel good and satisfied about their criticisms, despite their ahistoricism and decontextualization, and thus their own role in actually sustaining colonial power by failing to attend to its conditions and contingency.

#### Viewing settler colonialism as structural prevents incremental action which dooms the aff to passivity – this excuses settlerism rather than confronting it and causes fatalism.

Macoun & Strakosch 13, [Elizabeth Strakosch is Lecturer in Public Policy and Politics at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, Alissa Macoun is a professor at the school of political science and international studies at the University of Queensland, 2013, “The Ethical Demands of Settler Colonial Theory,” accessed 7/8/18, [https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63908/1/63908.pdf]//SS](https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63908/1/63908.pdf%5d//SS)Firstly, by disturbing settler colonialism’s narratives of progress, SCT attributes a peculiar suspended temporality to the settler project. This can portray settler colonialism as an inevitable structure likely to exist across time – the fact that the past persists in the present implies that this past will also persist in the future. Foundational scholar Patrick Wolfe has been labelled ‘very much a structuralist stuck in a poststructuralist world’.63 As we have outlined, this structuralism is particularly useful in identifying the operation of political hierarchies. However, it can also excuse us from human political action in the present by presenting this action as futile or already determined.**64 The role of political activists is to wait for the structurally determined future, and at most to prepare others for its arrival.** The particular challenge of SCT’s analysis is that it does not give an account of such a transformed future, or of the conditions for settler colonialism’s demise. This can lead to a theoretical and political impasse and result in a kind of colonial fatalism. Such fatalism can be deployed to imply a moral equivalence between different forms of settler political interaction with Indigenous people, and, at its worst, to deny the legitimacy of Indigenous resistances. Structuralist narratives are able to posit radical change, but only if this change is built into the structures they describe – for example because these structures are subject to internal contradictions or are inherently unstable. Settler colonial structures, however, appear as highly stable and ‘relatively impervious to regime change’.65 Therefore, at the same moment settler scholars finally see the depth and reach of settler colonialism in the present they feel unable to find ‘postsettler colonial passages’.66 This tendency is reinforced by SCT’s capacity to identify significant commonalities in the objectives of conservative and progressive policy approaches, as discussed above. It shows that traditional ‘decolonizing’ pathways such as treaty making, reconciliation and formal apologies may also serve colonial ends by absorbing and extinguishing Aboriginal political difference without disturbing the foundational structures of settler dominance. As Australian anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose notes, this makes it ‘difficult to offer a critique of the colonizing features without calling into question the whole decolonizing project’.67 If every settler action is framed as always already colonizing, then individuals are excused from anti‐colonial action in the present and Indigenous people are destined to be victims of an unstoppable colonizing state.68 As bell hooks argues in relation to US race relations, this is useful to those in a position of dominance: ‘so many White people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. **No responsibility need be taken for not changing something if it is perceived as immutable**.’69 Is it possible that settlers are particularly attracted to SCT precisely because it gives us a sense of being intellectually committed to the end of colonialism while simultaneously unable to act against our own privilege? As a recent article concluded about the prospects for decolonization: I can only assess this with a degree of gloom. I am yet to be convinced that we can prevent indigenous disadvantage remaining structurally embedded in society and through the state even after any kind of ‘transition’ or ‘transformation’. At the same time, I fear decolonization. I am myself a settler, like several of my ancestors before me, and I have nowhere else to belong.70 SCT’s structuralism may serve these conflicted interests, in allowing us to feel we have done all we can while facing the ‘reality’ of an inevitable settler colonial future.

#### Their use of settler colonial theory is merely an attempt to evade settler guilt and results in the re-inscription of settler academics’ power.

Macoun & Strakosch 13, [Elizabeth Strakosch is Lecturer in Public Policy and Politics at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, Alissa Macoun is a professor at the school of political science and international studies at the University of Queensland, 2013, “The Ethical Demands of Settler Colonial Theory,” accessed 7/8/18, <https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63908/1/63908.pdf>] For many decades, postcolonial theory has shaped global scholarship of colonialism, and this has tended to obscure the ongoing hierarchies of settler states.1 However, building on the theoretical contributions of Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini, increasing numbers of scholars are beginning to think about settler colonialism as a specific political formation. Importantly, this work draws a distinction between settler states and formally decolonized societies, and acknowledges that postcolonial does not ‘mean the same thing as post‐settler colonial’.2 While this movement may be animated by and in sympathy with major developments in critical Indigenous theory and global Indigenous activism,3 settler colonial theory (SCT) remains a largely White attempt to think through contemporary colonial relationships. Like us, most settlers who use the theoretical framework are concerned to disturb rather than re‐enact colonial hierarchies, and seek to contribute to Indigenous political struggles. However, Indigenous scholars have not always embraced the theory and it has been met with scepticism by some engaged in challenging colonialism.4 This article seeks to make explicit SCT’s current location as a primarily settler framework, and to explore its strengths and limitations in this context. While we do not suggest that SCT can only ever be used by settlers, we frame our discussion in relation to the current political and theoretical dynamics of its use. In the Australian context, SCT is an appealing interpretive framework for academics seeking to understand the state’s increasingly coercive approach to Indigenous people. It has had a particularly significant presence in Australian academic debates over the Commonwealth government’s Northern Territory (NT) Emergency Response (widely known as ‘the intervention’). Adopted with bipartisan support in 2007 following allegations of widespread abuse of children in remote Aboriginal communities, the intervention involves the imposition of controversial and coercive measures such as racially based welfare quarantining, alcohol and pornography bans, and the imposition of compulsory leases over Aboriginal land. The policy essentially understands Aboriginal communities as ‘insufficiently colonised zones’,5 and its introduction required the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. This pathologizing of Aboriginal communities links Aboriginality to child abuse, prescribes additional interaction with the state and mainstream economy, and establishes a political debate about the nature and future of Aboriginality in which Indigenous perspectives are problematized.6 Given the policy’s articulation through language of ‘stabilizing’ and ‘normalizing’ Aboriginal communities,7 as well as obvious resonances with previous policies of segregation and assimilation, it is not surprising that a range of scholars have found settler colonialism to be a compelling framework for analysis.8 The intervention has also sparked debate about the role of non‐Indigenous academics, and the ethical and political implications of contributions by ‘outsiders’ to questions concerning the experiences and futures of Aboriginal people.9 In this paper, we draw on recent Australian academic debates surrounding the NT intervention to assess the contributions of SCT and to investigate some of the ethical and political implications of its use.   We contend that SCT makes major contributions to current mainstream scholarship, but that its analytic and explanatory power also presents a range of political and ethical risks. Exposing colonization as ‘a structure not an event’10 confronts settlers with an account of contemporary colonialism that is difficult to avoid, exposing underlying similarities between conservative and progressive approaches to contemporary Indigenous policy and revealing intimate connections between settler emotions, practices, knowledges and institutions. However, emphasizing continuities in colonial relationships between the past and the present can tend to construct existing political relationships as inevitable and unchanging. When deployed with a neutral descriptive authority, SCT can also re‐inscribe settler academics’ political authority and re‐enact the foundational settler fantasy that we constitute, comprehend and control the whole political space of our relationships with Indigenous people. In order to counter this potential, we suggest that while settler ways of thinking structure and dominate much of our contemporary reality, they are not equivalent to it. SCT makes visible our own frames of reference, thus revealing possibilities and political visions that lie outside them. From this standpoint, the fact that settler colonialism struggles to narrate its own ending does not mean that it cannot end. Ultimately, we contend that this approach has the potential to facilitate new conversations and relationships with Indigenous people but, in order to unlock this transformative potential, settler scholars must remain attentive to our own positions within colonial relationships.

#### Settler colonial theory makes settler colonialism structurally inevitable.

**Macoun and Strakosch 13,** [Alissa and Elizabeth, Indigenous Studies Research Network, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia; Institute for Culture and Society, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, Australia, “The ethical demands of settler colonial theory,” Settler Colonial Studies, 3(3-4), pp. 426-443, 2013, <https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63908/>]

Despite these powerful contributions, we also identify some important issues associated with SCT in Australian academic debates about the NT intervention. The first is a direct consequence of one of SCT’s vital contributions, arising from the theory’s present tense iteration of settler colonialism. By emphasizing continuities in colonial relationships between the past and the present, SCT can depict colonization as structurally inevitable, and can be deployed in ways that re‐inscribe settler colonialism. We suggest that SCT’s struggle to narrate its own ending can be countered by approaching the theory as an account of settler desires which makes visible our own frames of reference. This in turn exposes a range of possibilities and political visions outside these frames. Such an approach is significant in countering potentially problematic misuses of SCT that erase its location as a settler discourse. Such erasures problematically empower academics to speak with neutral descriptive authority over both settler and Indigenous realities. Firstly, by disturbing settler colonialism’s narratives of progress, SCT attributes a peculiar suspended temporality to the settler project. This can portray settler colonialism as an inevitable structure likely to exist across time – the fact that the past persists in the present implies that this past will also persist in the future. Foundational scholar Patrick Wolfe has been labelled ‘very much a structuralist stuck in a poststructuralist world’.63 As we have outlined, this structuralism is particularly useful in identifying the operation of political hierarchies. However, it can also excuse us from human political action in the present by presenting this action as futile or already determined.64 The role of political activists is to wait for the structurally determined future, and at most to prepare others for its arrival. The particular challenge of SCT’s analysis is that it does not give an account of such a transformed future, or of the conditions for settler colonialism’s demise. This can lead to a theoretical and political impasse and result in a kind of colonial fatalism. Such fatalism can be deployed to imply a moral equivalence between different forms of settler political interaction with Indigenous people, and, at its worst, to deny the legitimacy of Indigenous resistances. Structuralist narratives are able to posit radical change, but only if this change is built into the structures they describe – for example because these structures are subject to internal contradictions or are inherently unstable. Settler colonial structures, however, appear as highly stable and ‘relatively impervious to regime change’.65 Therefore, at the same moment settler scholars finally see the depth and reach of settler colonialism in the present they feel unable to find ‘postsettler colonial passages’.66

#### Settler colonial studies displace indigenous studies—the affs academic method does nothing to decolonize

**Snelgrove et. al, 2014,** [Corey Snelgrove, University of British Columbia, Rita Kaur Dhamoon, University of Victoria, Jeff Corntassel, University of Victoria, “Unsettling settler colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous nations,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society , Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014, <https://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/21166>]The institutionalization of settler colonial studies (rather than Indigenous studies) is on the one hand a significant shift in the academy. On the other hand, as de Leeuw, Greenwood, and Lindsay (2013) rightly argue, even when (and perhaps because) there are good intentions to decolonize and to “cultivate a culture of ‘doing the right thing,’” there are no “fundamental shifts in power imbalances between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples or the systems within which we operate” (p. 386). Settler colonialism and the study of settler colonialism, in other words, cannot be decolonized because of good intentions. Following this, paradoxically and in deeply troubling ways, settler colonial studies can displace, overshadow, or even mask over Indigenous studies (for example, see Veracini, 2013) and variations within Indigenous studies, especially feminist and queer Indigenous work that is centred on Indigenous resurgence. Indeed the link between Indigenous studies and settler colonial studies is still in process. The synergies between the literature by/on two-spirited Indigenous identities, queer theory, Indigenous studies more broadly, and settler colonial studies are notable in their interwoven conversations across fields of study. But at times, Indigenous peoples and issues are de-centred in settler colonial studies (for example, Rifkin, 2013, p. 323). Furthermore, while Rifkin is right to argue that settler colonial practices and processes operate in everyday ways, are these practices really in the “background” (2013, p. 331), and for whom? Is settler colonialism “largely invisible”, as Barker (2012) claims? Yes, settler colonialism is naturalized, pervasive, and not just state-centred, but for whom is settler colonialism in the background and invisible? These kinds of claims seem to presume white settler subjectivity as the monolithic lens through which to examine settler colonialism and dispossession, both in the context of whites and people of colour, in ways that obscures differentials of power. For Indigenous peoples, settler colonialism may not be the primary lens of living or theorizing, but it is also neither in the background or invisible.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)