## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative debater may not read reasons why affirming is harder without an implication.

#### Violation-

#### Standards:

#### Strat Skew- Absent specification, the 1ar can shift the implication to any theoretical benefit based on structural roles allowing them to win every round or cross apply affirming is harder to essentially any part of the flow to justify their paradigm as reasons why you err aff on any issue and

#### Inf abuse -allows them to justify any practice based on side bias which both justify infinite abuse.

## 2

#### Strikes act as revolutionary behavior that reify systems of domination – a cruel game where the Revolutionary sees itself as mobilized when it is unknowingly restrained into reproducing the system.

**Baudrillard 81** [Jean Baudrillard, sociologist, cultural theorist, and philosopher], Simulacra and Simulation, 1981//pesh-anika-

Today it cannot be achieved since power itself, after knowledge, has taken off, has become ungraspable - has dispossessed itself. In a now uncertain institution, without knowledge content, without a power structure (except for an archaic feudalism that turns a simulacrum of a machine whose destiny escapes it and whose survival is as artificial as that of barracks and theaters), offensive irruption is impossible. Only what precipitates rotting, by accentuating the parodic, simulacral side of dying games of knowledge and power, has meaning. A strike[s] has exactly the opposite effect. It regenerates the ideal of a possible university: the fiction of an ascension on everyone's part to a culture that is unlocatable, and that no longer has meaning. This ideal is substituted for the operation of the university as its critical alternative, as its therapy. This fiction still dreams of a permanency and democracy of knowledge. Besides, everywhere today the Left plays this role: it is the justice of the Left that reinjects an idea of justice, the necessity of logic and social morals into a rotten apparatus that is coming undone, which is losing all conscience of its legitimacy and renounces functioning almost of its own volition. It is the Left that secrets and desperately reproduces power, because it wants power, and therefore the Left believes in it and revives it precisely where the system puts an end to it. The system puts an end one by one to all its axioms, to all its institutions, and realizes one by one all the objectives of the historical and revolutionary Left that sees itself constrained to revive the wheels of capital in order to lay seige to them one day: from private property to the small business, from the army to national grandeur, from puritan morality to petit bourgeois culture, justice at the university - everything that is disappearing, that the system itself, in its atrocity, certainly, but also in its irreversible impulse, has liquidated, must be conserved.

#### The proliferation of signs has left strikes meaningless; strikes are engaging in orchestrated social and political relations that operate for contemporary capitalism, rendering them futile

**Baudrillard 76** [Jean Baudrillard, sociologist, cultural theorist, and philosopher], Symbolic Exchange and Death, 1976//pesh-anika

Within a system of production, strikes were historically justified as organised violence for purposes of snatching a fraction of surplus-value, or else power, from the opposing violence of capital. Today this form of the strike is dead: It is dead because capital is in a position to leave every strike to continue until it rots, precisely because we are no longer in a system of production (maximalisation of surplus-value). Profits be damned so long as the reproduction of the form of social relations is saved! It is dead because such strikes change nothing fundamental: contemporary capital merely redistributes itself, a matter of life or death for it. At best, strikes merely snatch only what, in the end, capital would have conceded anyway. So if relations of production, and with them the class struggle, fall into orchestrated social and political relations, then clearly all that can intervene in this cycle is what escapes the organisation and definition of class as: a representative historical agency; a productive historical agency. Only those who escape the swings and roundabouts of production and representation can disrupt these mechanisms and provoke, from the depths of their blinded state, a return to the 'class struggle', which might indeed mark the end of this struggle as a locus within the 'political'. It is here that the intervention of immigrants in recent strikes 18 takes on meaning.

#### We lose all hope of reality through the excess of unverifiable information caused by the rapid multiplication of signs – removing pieces doesn’t solve.

Gao 16, Liyan Gao. “Ideological cynicism in the modern information age with Sloterdijk and Žižek.”

Žižek compares the reporting of the Gulf War with that of the Bosnian War. In the former, the employment of ‘evil versus good’ framing was used to demonise Saddam Hussein and to justify the war. In the latter, journalists focused on the complexities of the issue including the long history of conflict in the region.30 Though this approach informs people of more facts, it clouds the brute reality that ethnic cleansing and genocide was rife during the war. By painting the Bosnian War as too complex for both citizens and politicians of the West to understand, people were absolved from the responsibility of intervening in the crisis. Cynicism is this aporia raised to the level of a psychological barrier: new media can present world problems as too complicated, too extensive, too global, beyond the control and understanding of any one individual, and thus, as problems we cannot hope to intervene in or politically organise to oppose. Merely being more knowledgeable about the complexity of the problems in our society does not dispel ideology nor is it necessarily empowering. When we feel overwhelmed and disempowered to change the current situation and condition, we learn to adapt and accept them. Subsequently, numbness and apathy comes from paradoxically caring. THE SEDUCTION OF CYNICISM The feeling of being overwhelmed and disempowered makes people susceptible to embracing what Jodi Dean calls the victimhood position. This position addresses the sense of being overwhelmed by providing a means of understanding oneself within the chaos of over-information, and the feeling of disempowerment by instilling a moral high ground, albeit a false one. When one is overwhelmed by the various unethical practises of the world one feels unable, or incapable, to intervene in a meaningful way. The victimhood position assumes an identity of hopelessness, which validates our feelings of powerlessness. Hence instead of taking the more difficult but ultimately rewarding path of politics, the cynic embraces their hopelessness. 31 In the 2000 U.S. Presidential election the Democrat candidate Al Gore controversially lost to Republican George Bush, despite winning the popular vote. For Dean, the victimhood position is evident in the Democrat’s failure to contest the results. While prominent leftist commentators argued the Republicans ‘stole’ the election, thus presenting themselves as victims, Dean argues the Democrats gave up and forfeited the election cynically because they were convinced of America’s conservatism and their own powerlessness: [The Left was] convinced that the country was republican, conservative, capitalist, Christian fundamentalist, and evangelical. It’s almost as if we believed in their strength and unity, their power and influence, more than they did themselves. So we submitted to what we loudly lamented as our own worst nightmare.32 When the Left argued Bush won the election because America was becoming increasingly more conservative, they absolved themselves of the responsibility for their own inaction while maintaining their moral superiority. This event shows the temptation of the victimhood position for the modern cynic: they cannot be accused of being naïve, nor can they be reproached for any political failures.33 Dean points towards the Black Power movement, the Sisterhood movement, and the Queer movement as examples of political struggles that have refuted the victimhood position. 34 These movements are premised on agency, strength, and selfdetermination.35 Though there are of course marginalised sectors of society who are victims of oppression, however, recognising and acknowledging this is different from assuming victimhood as a mode of being or an emblem of one’s identity. A sense of empowerment is necessary for people to overcome their oppressive conditions, something they cannot achieve if they mobilise around victimhood as something essential to their experiences. Dean’s notion of victimhood is indebted to Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment. The link between Sloterdijk’s notion of cynicism and ressentiment is analysed by Robert Halsall through Sloterdijk’s Contempt for the Masses: Essay on the Culture Wars in Modern Society. Halsall distinguishes resentment from ressentiment by arguing that while resentment can motivate political action through revenge, ressentiment is a generalised feeling that seeks symbolic revenge rather than political outcomes: First, whereas resentment is specific in targeting its blame, the feeling of ressentiment is generalized: it seeks to identify someone or something, a target, however imprecise, responsible for the feelings of contempt which the mass subject feels. Second, whereas resentment can be channelled into overturning the political circumstances responsible for the state of affairs, ressentiment finds no specific political or other outlet, and is thus converted into a general feeling of contempt for all ‘higher’ things, a desire for symbolic revenge.36 Rage and Time is a later work of Sloterdijk where he discusses Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment in relation to rage. As Nietzsche situates the origin of ressentiment in Christian (slave) morality, Sloterdijk considers ressentiment as the deference of rage where the afterlife will rectify any injustices. This typifies modernity’s approach to overcoming and suppressing rage, which Sloterdijk contrasts with the Ancient Greek thymotic (of pride and spirit) approach of harnessing rage.37 While Sloterdijk departed from his critical theory heritage when criticising communism as a form of ressentiment (which brought him criticism from old supporters including Žižek), nonetheless one can draw the connection between cynicism’s ability to suppress rage instead of utilising it towards political action. Sara Ahmed similarly argues that the fetishisation of the wound is a form of Nietzsche’s ressentiment. Transforming the wound into an identity involves substituting politics (an action) for revenge (a reaction):38 I agree with the transformation of the wound into an identity is problematic. One of the reasons that it is problematic is precisely because of its fetishism: the transformation of the wound into an identity cuts the wound off from a history of ‘getting hurt’ or injured. It turns the wound into something that simply ‘is’ rather than has happened in time and space. The fetishisation of the wound as a sign of identity is crucial to ‘testimonial culture’, in which narratives of pain and injury have proliferated.39 When one is bombarded and overwhelmed with the different problems of the world, victimhood is a comforting and affirming position. However as Ahmed puts it, the position ultimately increases the pain and injury it aims to address, and it enables us to “deal with it” without affecting any real change. Sharon Stanley places cynicism as the successor of the enlightenment: it has taken the lessons of challenging traditions and religions to their logical conclusions but without rebuilding a better alternative world.40 Kant wrote in What is the Enlightenment? that enlightenment involved not only possessing knowledge but also acting upon the knowledge: he concluded “The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere Aude! [Dare to be wise!] Have courage to use your understanding!”41 My research argues that cynicism is precisely the immature, selfdeceptive attitude of the coward, scared by past failures. The path to escaping the selfdepiction of cynicism is to move away from informational, sound-bite new media and promote the expansion of discursive and visionary forms of knowledge.

#### Thus, the alt is to embrace radical nihilism. Capitalism engages in unending reproduction; thus we need to drain of propped up ideals. A society that maintains capitalist production is contingent upon subjects that are forced to labor – so we let the system collapse in on itself.

Baudrillard 4 [Jean; Simulacra and Simulation; Sociologist/Philosopher, cool dude; 1981; University of Michigan Press; LCA-BP][[1]](#footnote-1)

Nihilism no longer wears the dark, Wagnerian, Spenglerian, fuliginous colors of the end of the century. It no longer comes from a Weltanschauung of decadence nor from a metaphysical radicality born of the death of God and of all the consequences that must be taken from this death. Today's nihilism is one of transparency, and it is in some sense more radical, more crucial than in its prior and historical forms, because this transparency, this irresolution is indissolubly that of the system, and that of all the theory that still pretends to analyze it. When God died, there was still Nietzsche to say so - the great nihilist before the Eternal and the cadaver of the Eternal. But before the simulated transparency of all things, before the simulacrum of the materialist or idealist realization of the world in hyperreality (God is not dead, he has become hyper-real), there is no longer a theoretical or critical God to recognize his own. The universe, and all of us, have entered live into simulation, into the malefic, not even malefic, indifferent, sphere of deterrence: in a bizarre fashion, nihilism has been entirely realized no longer through destruction, but through simulation and deterrence. From the active, violent phantasm, from the phantasm of the myth and the stage that it also was, historically, it has passed into the transparent, falsely transparent, operation of things. What then remains of a possible nihilism in theory? What new scene can unfold, where nothing and death could be replayed as a challenge, as a stake? We are in a new, and without a doubt insoluble, position in relation to prior forms of nihilism: Romanticism is its first great manifestation: it, along with the Enlightenment's Revolution, corresponds to the destruction of the order of appearances. Surrealism, dada, the absurd, and political nihilism are the second great manifestation, which corresponds to the destruction of the order of meaning. The first is still an aesthetic form of nihilism (dandyism), the second, a political, historical, and metaphysical form (terrorism). These two forms no longer concern us except in part, or not at all. The nihilism of transparency is no longer either aesthetic or political, no longer borrows from either the extermination of appearances, nor from extinguishing the embers of meaning, nor from the last nuances of an apocalypse. There is no longer an apocalypse (only aleatory terrorism still tries to reflect it, but it is certainly no longer political, and it only has one mode of manifestation left that is at the same time a mode of disappearance: the media - now the media are not a stage where something is played, they are a strip, a track, a perforated map of which we are no longer even spectators: receivers). The apocalypse is finished, today it is the precession of the neutral, of forms of the neutral and of indifference. I will leave it to be considered whether there can be a romanticism, an aesthetic of the neutral therein. I don't think so - all that remains, is the fascination for desertlike and indifferent forms, for the very operation of the system that annihilates us. Now, fascination (in contrast to seduction, which was attached to appearances, and to dialectical reason, which was attached to meaning) is a nihilistic passion par excellence, it is the passion proper to the mode of disappearance. We are fascinated by all forms of disappearance, of our disappearance. Melancholic and fascinated, such is our general situation in an era of involuntary transparency. I am a nihilist. I observe, I accept, I assume the immense process of the destruction of appearances (and of the seduction of appearances) in the service of meaning (representation, history, criticism, etc.) that is the fundamental fact of the nineteenth century. The true revolution of the nineteenth century, of modernity, is the radical destruction of appearances, the disenchantment of the world and its abandonment to the violence of interpretation and of history. I observe, I accept, I assume, I analyze the second revolution, that of the twentieth century, that of postmodernity, which is the immense process of the destruction of meaning, equal to the earlier destruction of appearances. He who strikes with meaning is killed by meaning. The dialectic stage, the critical stage is empty. There is no more stage. There is no therapy of meaning or therapy through meaning: therapy itself is part of the generalized process of indifferentiation. The stage of analysis itself has become uncertain, aleatory: theories float (in fact, nihilism is impossible, because it is still a desperate but determined theory, an imaginary of the end, a weltanschauung of catastrophe).\*1 Analysis is itself perhaps the decisive element of the immense process of the freezing over of meaning. The surplus of meaning that theories bring, their competition at the level of meaning is completely secondary in relation to their coalition in the glacial and four-tiered operation of dissection and transparency. One must be conscious that, no matter how the analysis proceeds, it proceeds toward the freezing over of meaning, it assists in the precession of simulacra and of indifferent forms. The desert grows. Implosion of meaning in the media. Implosion of the social in the masses. Infinite growth of the masses as a function of the acceleration of the system. Energetic impasse. Point of inertia. A destiny of inertia for a saturated world. The phenomena of inertia are accelerating (if one can say that). The arrested forms proliferate, and growth is immobilized in excrescence. Such is also the secret of the hypertelie, of what goes further than its own end. It would be our own mode of destroying finalities: going further, too far in the same direction - destruction of meaning through simulation, hypersimulation, hypertelie. Denying its own end through hyperfinality (the crustacean, the statues of Easter Island) - is this not also the obscene secret of cancer? Revenge of excrescence on growth, revenge of speed on inertia. The masses themselves are caught up in a gigantic process of inertia through acceleration. They are this excrescent, devouring, process that annihilates all growth and all surplus meaning. They are this circuit short-circuited by a monstrous finality. It is this point of inertia and what happens outside this point of inertia that today is fascinating, enthralling (gone, therefore, the discreet charm of the dialectic). If it is nihilistic to privilege this point of inertia and the analysis of this irreversibility of systems up to the point of no return, then I am a nihilist. If it is nihilistic to be obsessed by the mode of disappearance, and no longer by the mode of production, then I am a nihilist. Disappearance, aphanisis, implosion, Fury of Verschwindens. Transpolitics is the elective sphere of the mode of disappearance (of the real, of meaning, of the stage, of history, of the social, of the individual). To tell the truth, it is no longer so much a question of nihilism: in disappearance, in the desertlike, aleatory, and indifferent form, there is no longer even pathos, the pathetic of nihilism - that mythical energy that is still the force of nihilism, of radicality, mythic denial, dramatic anticipation. It is no longer even disenchantment, with the seductive and nostalgic, itself enchanted, tonality of disenchantment. It is simply disappearance. The trace of this radicality of the mode of disappearance is already found in Adorno and Benjamin, parallel to a nostalgic exercise of the dialectic. Because there is a nostalgia of the dialectic, and without a doubt the most subtle dialectic is nostalgic to begin with. But more deeply, there is in Benjamin and Adorno another tonality, that of a melancholy attached to the system itself, one that is incurable and beyond any dialectic. It is this melancholia of systems that today takes the upper hand through the ironically transparent forms that surround us. It is this melancholia that is becoming our fundamental passion. It is no longer the spleen or the vague yearnings of the fin-de-siecle soul. It is no longer nihilism either, which in some sense aims at normalizing everything through destruction, the passion of resentment (ressentiment).\*2 No, melancholia is the fundamental tonality of functional systems, of current systems of simulation, of programming and information. Melancholia is the inherent quality of the mode of the disappearance of meaning, of the mode of the volatilization of meaning in operational systems. And we are all melancholic. Melancholia is the brutal disaffection that characterizes our saturated systems. Once the hope of balancing good and evil, true and false, indeed of confronting some values of the same order, once the more general hope of a relation of forces and a stake has vanished. Everywhere, always, the system is too strong: hegemonic. Against this hegemony of the system, one can exalt the ruses of desire, practice revolutionary micrology of the quotidian, exalt the molecular drift or even defend cooking. This does not resolve the imperious necessity of checking the system in broad daylight. This, only terrorism can do. It is the trait of reversion that effaces the remainder, just as a single ironic smile effaces a whole discourse, just as a single flash of denial in a slave effaces all the power and pleasure of the master. The more hegemonic the system, the more the imagination is struck by the smallest of its reversals. The challenge, even infinitesimal, is the image of a chain failure. Only this reversibility without a counterpart is an event today, on the nihilistic and disaffected stage of the political. Only it mobilizes the imaginary. If being a nihilist, is carrying, to the unbearable limit of hegemonic systems, this radical trait of derision and of violence, this challenge that the system is summoned to answer through its own death, then I am a terrorist and nihilist in theory as the others are with their weapons. Theoretical violence, not truth, is the only resource left us. But such a sentiment is Utopian. Because it would be beautiful to be a nihilist, if there were still a radicality - as it would be nice to be a terrorist, if death, including that of the terrorist, still had meaning. But it is at this point that things become insoluble. Because to this active nihilism of radicality, the system opposes its own, the nihilism of neutralization. The system is itself also nihilistic, in the sense that it has the power to pour everything, including what denies it, into indifference. In this system, death itself shines by virtue of its absence. (The Bologna train station, the Oktoberfest in Munich: the dead are annulled by indifference, that is where terrorism is the involuntary accomplice of the whole system, not politically, but in the accelerated form of indifference that it contributes to imposing.)

#### The world fundamentally rests on the logic of (in)difference, in which origins are simultaneously unlocatable and everywhere all at once. The proliferation of communication under late stage capitalism washes up and crashes on the rocks of truth and falsity, eroding meaning at its shores. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best ruptures hyperreality.

**Baudrillard 1** [Jean Baudrillard, sociologist, philosopher and cultural theorist, true sweetheart, “Fatal Strategies”; LCA-BP] \*edited for lang

More generally, **visible things** do not terminate in obscurity and in silence; they **vanish** into what is more visible than the visible: obscenity. An example of this ex-centricity of things, of this drift into excrescence, is the irruption of randomness, indeterminacy, and relativity within our system. **The reaction to this new state of things has** not **been** a resigned abandonment of traditional values, but rather a ~~crazy~~ overdetermination, **an exacerbation, of these values of reference, function, finality, and causality**. Perhaps nature is, in fact, horrified by the void, for it is in the void, and in order to avoid it, that plethoric, hypertrophic, and saturated systems emerge. **Some-thing redundant always settles in the place** where there is no longer any-thing. Determinacy does not withdraw to the benefit of indeterminacy, but **to the benefit of a hyperdeterminacy**: the redundancy of determinacy in a void. Finality does not disappear in favor of the aleatory, but rather in favor of hyperfinality, of a hyperfunctionality: more functional than the functional, more final than the final - the hypertelic (hypertélie). Having been plunged into an in-ordinate uncertainty by randomness, we have responded by an excess of causality and teleology. Hypertelic growth is not an accident in the evolution of certain species, it is the challenge of telos as a response to increasing indeterminacy. In a system where things are increasingly left to chance, telos turns into delirium, and develops entities that know all too well how to exceed their own ends, to the point of invading the entire system. This is true of the behavior of the cancerous cell (hypervitality in a single direction), of the hyperspecialization of objects and people, of the operationalism of the smallest detail, and of the hypersignification of the slightest sign: the leitmotiv of our daily lives. But this is also the chancroid secret of every obese and cancerous system: **those of communication, of information**, of production, of destruction - **each having long since exceeded the limits of functionality,** and use value, in order to enter the phantasmic escalation of finalities. The ~~hysteria~~ of causality, the inverse of the ~~hysteria~~ of finalities, which corresponds to the simultaneous effacement of origins and causes, is **the obsessive search for origins, for responsibility, for reference**; an attempt to extinguish phenomena in infinitesimal causes. But it is also the genesis and genetics complex, which on various accounts are represented by psychoanalytic palingenesis (the whole psyche hypostatized in prime infancy, every sign a symptom); and biogenetics (all probabilities saturated by the fatal ordering of molecules); and the hypertrophying of historical research, the delirium of explaining everything, of ascribing everything, of referencing everything ... All this becomes a fantastic burden - references living one off the other and at the other's expense. Here again we have an excrescent interpretive system developing without any relation to its objective. All of this is a consequence of a forward flight in the face of the haemorrhaging of objective causes. Inertial phenomena are accelerating. Arrested forms proliferate, and growth is immobilized in excrescence. This is the form of the hypertelic, that which goes beyond its own ends: the crustacean that strays far from the ocean unable to return (to what secret end?); or the increasing gigantism of Easter Island statues. Tentacular, protuberant, excrescent, hypertelic: this is the inertial destiny of a saturated world. The denial of its own end in hyperfinality; is this not also the mechanism of cancer? The revenge of growth in excrescence. The revenge and summons of speed in inertia. The masses are also caught in this gigantic process of inertia by acceleration. The masses are this excrescent process, which precipitates all growth towards ruin. **It is the circuit that is shortcircuited by a monstrous finality**. Exxon: the American government requests a complete report on the multinational's activities throughout the world. The result is twelve 1,000 page volumes, whose reading alone, not to mention the analysis, would exceed a few years work. Where is the information? Should we initiate an information dietetics? Should we thin out the obese, the obese systems, and create institutions to uninform? The incredible destructive stockpiling of strategic weapons is only equaled by the worldwide demographic overgrowth. As paradoxical as it may seem, both are of the same nature and correspond to the same logic of excrescence and inertia. A triumphant anomaly: no principle of justice or of proportion can temper either one; they incite one another. And worse, there isn't even so much as Promethean defiance here, no excessive passion or pride. It appears simply that the species has crossed a particular mysterious point, where it has become impossible to turn back, to decelerate, or to slow down.

## Case

#### A country wouldn’t be perceived legitimate when they have many strikes. China would have to put time and effort into stopping these strikes, making it more vulnerable to attacks.

#### Strikes fail and spark backlash – leads to fragmentation. No uniform inyterst

#### Increased strikes sabotage the economy – they cause major disruptions and lower income for workers.

Grabianowski 6 [Ed; Author and freelance writer. He’s worked as a contributing writer for io9, HowStuffWorks, and Sweethome. His fiction has appeared in Black Static, Fear Project, and other publications and anthologies, including Fear After Fear; “How Strikes Work,” HSW; 3/24/06; https://money.howstuffworks.com/strike.htm]//SJWen

Labor strikes can cause major disruptions to industry, commerce and the lives of many people who aren't even connected to the strike itself. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association strike in 1981 resulted in the firing of thousands of air traffic controllers, and the New York City transit strike in late 2005 affected millions of people. The history of strikes and labor unions is a key chapter in the story of the Industrial Revolution.

While the reasons behind strikes can be complex, they all boil down to two key elements: money and power. In this article, we'll find out how labor strikes have affected the balance of power between corporations and workers, what laws regulate strikes and learn about some important strikes in history.

It's difficult to say when the first real labor strike occurred. The word "strike" was first used in the 1700s, and probably comes from to notion of dealing a blow to the employer [ref]. In 1786, a group of printers in Philadelphia requested a raise and the company rejected it. They stopped working in protest and eventually received their raise. Other professionals followed suit in the next few decades. Everyone in a city who practiced the same profession agreed to set prices and wages at the same rate. Members would shun anyone who diverged from the agreement, refusing to work in the same shop and forcing employers to fire them. By the 1800s, formal trade societies and guilds began to emerge.

To have a strike today, you must have a union (though not necessarily an official union) -- an organization of workers that bargain collectively with an employer. Workers form unions because an individual worker is powerless compared to an employer, who can set low wages and long working hours as long as it adheres to labor laws. When workers combine to form a union, they collectively have enough power to negotiate with the employer. The main weapon the union has against the employer is the threat of a strike action.

At its most basic level, a strike occurs when all the workers in the union stop coming to work. With no workers, the business shuts down. The employer stops making money, though it is still spending money on taxes, rent, electricity and maintenance. The longer the strike lasts, the more money the employer loses. Of course, the workers aren't getting paid either, so they're losing money as well. Some unions build up "war chests" -- funds to pay striking workers. But it isn't usually very much, and it's often not enough for a prolonged strike.

Strikes help explain why unions are more powerful than individuals. Imagine if an employer refuses to give a raise to an individual worker. She then decides to stop coming to work in protest. The employer simply fires her for not coming to work. That one worker has no power to influence the employer. However, it can be very costly for an employer to fire every single worker when a union goes on strike (though it has happened).

#### No war from economic collapse – this card answers their internal warrants

**Walt 20** Stephen M. Walt,MAY 13, 2020, "Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?," Foreign Policy, [https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war //](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war%20//) LEX JB

But war could still be much less likely. The **Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen** has [already considered](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace) the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes **COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead**. He argues that **the** current **pandemic is affecting** all the **major powers adversely**, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because **states** often **go to war out of** sense of **overconfidence** (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace. Moreover, by its very nature **war requires** states to **assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic**. For the moment at least, beleaguered **governments** of all types **are focusing on** convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their **power to protect the public from the disease**. Taken together, **these** considerations might **explain why** even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like **Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in**[**winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen**](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/09/coronavirus-pandemic-peace-talks-yemen-houthi-saudi-arabia/). **Now is hardly the time for** Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for **China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs** of doing so **would clearly outweigh the economic benefits**. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that [Trump occasionally hints at](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/05/trump-keeps-talking-about-keeping-middle-east-oil-that-would-be-illegal/)—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but **that scenario is not even remotely possible.** The bottom line: **Economic conditions** (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. **Even if** the **COVID-19** pandemic **has** large, lasting, and **negative effects on the world economy**—as seems quite likely—**it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much**, especially in the short term.

#### Repression of strikes has had no negative effects on the growth of the nation’s economy and if anything has helped control conditions to sustain consistent advancement.

Catherine A. Rein 15, Professor of Law, 1-28-2015 “The Chinese Labor Problem: Cynthia Estlund studies how the Communist government is responding to demands for reform from the world's largest workforce” https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ideas/Cynthia-Estlund-China-Labor-Law

One major difference between the US and China is that China is committed to maintaining its monopolistic, party-controlled union structure, while unions in the US, for all their troubles, are independent of the government. China has been trying to address workers’ grievances. “Clearly in part they’re trying to mollify workers so that they won’t be up in arms, demonstrating and striking,” Estlund explains. “They’re trying to nudge their economy higher up the supply chain, and to build up consumers’ purchasing power. They’re trying to do a lot of things that will make workers better off, but one of the things they’re clearly trying to do is to prevent workers from getting so fed up that they feel like they need to form their own unions.” Workers’ growing bargaining power has led to significant public labor unrest prompting international headlines in recent years—including a string of employee suicides at Foxconn and widespread strikes at Honda factories. Thus far China has defied outside expectations by generating stunning economic growth

1. [Jean; Simulacra and Simulation; French Sociologist/Philosopher; 1981; University of Michigan Press; LCA-BP] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)