## 1

#### Interpretation: If the affirmative differs from the conventional Truth Testing model, they must explicitly specify a comprehensive role of the ballot in the form of a text in the 1AC where they clarify how offense links back to the role of the ballot, such as whether post-fiat offense or pre-fiat offense matters and what constitutes that offense with implications on how to weigh

#### Multiple ways the AC violates:

#### C. Standards:

#### Engagement –

#### If I don't know how the role of the ballot functions, its impossible for me to engage the aff, since knowing what counts as offense for me is a prerequisite to being able to make meaningful arguments that clash with yours. Knowing what a legitimate advocacy is ensures that I read something that is relevant to your method, and knowing how to weigh gives us a standard for what is relevant, This is true of role of the ballots since there is no norm on what "performative engagement" is in the same way there is for what counts as util offense. Few impacts:

#### a) Education – when two ships pass in the night we don't learn anything, education is derived from analyzing and comparing each other's arguments. This also guts novice inclusion because now they can never learn arguments in round.

#### b) Link turns your role of the ballot – your impacts are premised on actually having a debate and engaging with issues of oppression. Almost impossible to engage roles of the ballot are uniquely bad since no one will take seriously a position that can't be clashed with, so you harm any progress your position can create.

#### c) Strategy Skew – You make formulating a strategy impossible since I don't know what links to your evaluative mechanism. My interp means we know what a legitimate neg advocacy is, otherwise you can make up reasons mine doesn't link to the role of the ballot in the next speech, and by specing a weighing mechanism I can know to make the most relevant arguments so you can't arbitrarily preclude them in the next speech.

#### Framing: You can't use your ROB to exclude my shell. My shell allows you to read your role of the ballot, it just functionally constrains how you can do that. Additionally, as long as I win comparative offense to my interp it precludes on a methodological level -my method is your ROTB with specification, your is just the ROTB, so if the former is better it's a reason to vote for me even if method debates in general preclude theory. Also, if they go for the Aff first that proves the abuse of my shell since they should have specified in the AC.

#### Voters: Fairness/Edu/DTD/CI/No RVI

## 2

#### Interp – aff debaters must not read both a role of the ballot and a role of the judge absent specifying which comes first.

#### Violation: they don’t specify

#### Standards:

#### [1] clash

#### a- infin delink -

#### b- dk how to weigh

#### [2] shiftiness

## 3

### Framework

#### The starting point of morality is practical reason.

#### 1] Bindingness: A theory is only binding when you can answer the question “why should I do this?” and not continue to ask “why”. Only practical reason provides a deductive foundation for ethics since the question “why should I be rational” already concedes the authoritative power of agency since your agency is at work. Bindingness ow its meta-ethical, so it determines what counts as a warrant for a standard, so absent grounding in some metaethical framework, their arguments aren’t relevant normative considerations

#### 2] Action theory: only evaluating action through reason solves since reason is key to evaluate intent, otherwise we could infinitely divide actions. For example: If I was brewing tea, I could break up that one big action into multiple small actions. Only our intention, to brew tea unifies these actions if we were never able to unify action, we could never classify certain actions as moral or immoral since those actions would be infinitely divisible.

#### 3] Empirical uncertainty – Evil demon deceiving us or inability to know others’ experience make empiricism/induction an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### And, reason must be universal –

#### [A] a reason for one agent is a reason for another agent. I can’t say 2+2=4 is true for me but not for you – that’s incoherent.

#### [B] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative’s system of equal and outer freedom. Prefer:

#### [1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify the neg arguments/standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: [A] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. [C] Aggregation Fails – suffering is not additive can’t compare between one migraine and 10 headaches [D] Predictions are impossible because anything could lead to a butterfly effect of unexpected consequences i.e. sneezing becoming a tornado and killing thousands [E] To account for all foreseen impacts would prevent action because individuals would become morally culpable for all actions and states of affairs not just those that factor into the will [F] Since it requires evaluating end-states we can’t know whether the action was good until after it was taken which means the judge cannot determine whether the aff is good

#### [3] Resource disparities- Our framework ensures big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity - their model crowds out small schools because they have to prep for every unique advantage under each aff, every counterplan, and every disad with carded responses to each of them

#### [4] The Categorical Imperative unites the abstract with the concrete—this is key to challenging oppression.

Farr 2, Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an **embodied**, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is not allowed to exclude others as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclus[ive]ion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

### Offense

#### 1] Private entities utilize their own property and resources to fund and conduct space exploration which means – Prohibition of it is a violation of a). Their ability to use their own property(like their rocketships or fuel) to set their ends in space and b). Their freedom to explore unknown horizons such as space.

#### 2] Acquisition of property can never be unjust – to create rights violations, there must already be an owner of the property being violated, but that presupposes its appropriation by another entity.

Feser, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

## Case

### OV

#### Reject 1AR Theory and IVIs They have 7-6 time skew They have two speeches on theory and I have one which is def irreciporcal Its not inf abuse because I only have 7 mins If you don’t buy that, DTA - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it. No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A~ the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B~ introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

### Cards

#### [1] Their call for resistance within a pedagogical structure is problematic – the teacher-student relation fixes positions of knowledge instead of critiquing them. This also means the student doesn’t learn when they can merely look towards the all-knowing teacher.

Jay 87**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

“Many who try to make sense of Lacan's published seminars conclude that these pedagogical performances are indeed the work of an imposter, some Wizard of Id feigning knowledge behind an array of obscure musings and baffling flights of fancy. This author, we suspect, doesn't know what he's talking about. It would be ludicrous, it seems, to suggest that Lacan's work could be of any use in devising a philosophy or praxis of teaching, presuming that pedagogy requires, first of all, an instructor certain of his subject. This requirement evidences what **Lacan calls the demand for the "subject who is supposed to know"** (sujet sup- pose savoir), a demand every teacher has felt in the classroom (a space, in fact, constituted by this demand). It is **the most exacting** and **intractable imposition that teaching and its institutions put upon an instructor, and the one which** must be analyzed and resisted if education is to be something more than socialization or consumption. This demand is the essence of the "transference" that **structures the classroom experience**, in whichthe teacher is called to assume the authorized position of the subject who is supposed to know**,** thusrelieving the student of any responsibility for theproduction or effects ofknowledge**.** In her outstanding account of the pedagogical implications of recent work in psycho- analysis and feminism, Constance Penley observes that "the student, like the child with the parent, is almost clairvoyant when it comes to understanding the desire of the Other and how best narcissistically to mirror what the Other desires" (133). Since the structure of the pedagogical performance is its own primary lesson, more readily and more permanently learned than any subject- matter, this transference effectively **stymies critical thinking by inculcating a relationship of identification instead of analysis. It fixes the positions of knowledge rather than questioning their assumptions or displacing their privileges.**” (785)

#### [2] TURN- their use of educational spaces as a sites of empowerment places the judge into the role of the authoritarian adjudicator who molds students in accordance to a particular political end. Their dogmatic assessment of who is/isn’t allowed to evaluate their argumentation is uniquely flawed in debate.

**Rickert 1[[2]](#footnote-2)**

“An example ofthe connection between violence and pedagogy is implicit inthe notion ofbeing "schooled" **as it has been conceptualized by Giroux** and Peter Mclaren. They explain, "Fundamental to the principles that inform critical pedagogy is **the conviction that schooling for self- and social empowerment is ethically prior** to questions of epistemology or to a mastery of technical or social skills that are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace" (153-54). A **presumption here is** that **it is the** teacherwhoknows (best),and this orientation **gives the concept of schooling a particular bite:** though it presents itself as oppositional to the state and the dominant forms of pedagogy that serve the state and its capitalist interests, **it** neverthelessreinscribes an authoritarian model that is congruent withany number of oedipalizing pedagogies that "school" the student in proper behavior**.** As Diane Davis notes, radical, feminist, and liberatory **pedagogies "**oftencamouflage pedagogical violence in their move from one mode of 'normalization' to another" and "function within a disciplinary matrix of power, a covert carceral system, that aims to create useful subjects for particular

### Counter method

#### Counter Method: Join ur local MIMW group that funds $$ to locating missing women as a form of resisting race based cap

### Counter method

#### Counter method: join. W.in debate

#### Accessibility

#### Coalition building

1. [“The Subject of Pedagogy: Lessons in Psychoanalysis and Politics”, Gregory S. Jay, College English, Vol. 49, No. 7, Psychoanalysis and Pedagogy II (Nov., 1987), pp. 785-800 National Council of Teachers of English] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Rickert, Thomas. ""Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World." JacOnline Journal [↑](#footnote-ref-2)