## 1AC – Framing

#### Ethics must begin A priori:

#### 1. Is/Ought gap – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory.

#### 2. Empirical Uncertainty – Evil demon deceiving us or inability to know others’ experience make empiricism/induction an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### 3. Circular – Our judgements are authoritative and can’t only apply to ourselves, I can’t say 2+2=4 is true for me but not for you – that’s incoherent.

#### That requires practical reason as the basis for ethics:

#### 1. Inescapability – Every agent intrinsically values practical reason when they go about setting and pursuing an end under a moral theory, as it presupposes that the end they are committing is an intrinsic good. That necessitates practical reason as a necessary means to follow through on any given end.

#### 2. Enterprise – Any moral rule faces the problem of regress – I can keep asking “why should I follow this.” Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason to do in the first place which concedes its authority.

#### 3. Action theory – only evaluating action through reason solves since reason is key to evaluate intent, otherwise we could infinitely divide actions. For example: If I was brewing tea, I could break up that one big action into multiple small actions. Only our intention, to brew tea unifies these actions if we were never able to unify action, we could never classify certain actions as moral or immoral since those actions would be infinitely divisible.

#### 4. All arguments by definition appeal to reason – otherwise you are conceding they have no warrant to structure them and are by definition baseless. Thus reason is an epistemic constraint on evaluating neg arguments.

#### Since we value our ends, to ensure them, we must universalize them:

#### 1] Reason – A priori principles like reason definitionally apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience therefore ethics is universal.

#### 2] Principle of equality – There is nothing apriori distinct between agents thus our obligations should be equal, which means even if we aren’t bound to the categorical imperative, universality is still a side constraint on other frameworks.

#### 3] Maxim Willing – Any non-universal norm is contradictory as it justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Performativity — freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### 2. Resource disparity – a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A Kantian debate can easily be won without any prep since only analytical arguments are required which o/w accessibility.

#### 3. Other frameworks collapse – theories prescribe necessary actions based on objectively good ends, but those ends require something unconditionally good to serve as a condition of their goodness. Inclinations are insufficient because they are liable to change, whereas the rational nature of humanity is unconditionally valuable. Thus, obligations sourced in extrinsically good objects presuppose the goodness of a rational will to confer value upon them.

#### 4. Consequences Fail – [A] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. [C] Aggregation Fails – suffering is not additive can’t compare between one migraine and 10 headaches [D] Predictions are impossible because anything could lead to a butterfly effect of unexpected consequences i.e. sneezing becoming a tornado and killing thousands

## 1AC – Contention

#### 1] Out of the possibility of extraterrestrial reasoners, we have an obligation to respect their habitats and not interfere through exploration.

Brian Patrick Green 2014, Santa Clara University, "Ethical Approaches to Astrobiology and Space Exploration: Comparing Kant, Mill, and Aristotle," Scholar Commons, <https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/markkula/5/> //Dulles VN

But to assume that Kant has not considered these questions is an enormous mistake. In 1755, quite early in his career, Kant published the book Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, where he described the solar nebular hypothesis (now the accepted theory for how the solar system formed).4 More than that, Kant not only allowed that extraterrestrial intelligences might exist, he believed that if they did not yet exist, that someday they would,5 and that some of these ETIs would be inferior and some superior to humans in intelligence.6 One might wonder if the young Kant’s belief in ETIs continued into his older years, when he was writing on ethics. There is good evidence that it does. Writing his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 30 years after his work on the nebular hypothesis, Kant is explicit – he is not just discussing humans, but “all rational beings.” 7 So with respect deontology and extraterrestrial intelligent life, Case 1) on the chart, Kant would extend the same full dignity and respect to ETIs which humans owe to each other, in accord with his categorical imperative, which requires the universalizability of moral norms8 and treating all rational beings as ends in themselves.9 For deontology and non-intelligent life, Case 2), Kant argues that animals, as non-rational beings, are of only relative worth. They are not as ends in themselves, not persons, but things.10 If humans discovered non-intelligent life on other worlds (most likely microbes, but if larger then we would have to carefully evaluate what it means to be intelligent, and make sure the discovered life does not qualify), according to Kant, we could do with it as we pleased. While some contemporary moral philosophers have tried to reinterpret or rehabilitate Kant on animals, these works are developments of Kant’s philosophy; they are not his philosophy itself.11 So while Kantianism might be modifiable into a system which is more friendly towards the rest of the living world, without these modifications it is not. For non-life and Kantian deontology, Case 3), there is likewise a simple answer: nonliving things are just things. Non-living things are not a moral concern, they are merely instrumental, and as such intelligent creatures can treat these things as they wish. However, there is an odd exception to this conclusion which is worth mentioning (and which I note with a star in the table). Kant believed that if other planets were not yet inhabited, they someday would be. If this is the case, then what of planets currently without intelligent life but which may someday have it? Ought we to anticipate these intelligent creatures and therefore respect them proactively by respecting their prospective goods? Kant does not say (perhaps because he was not interested in speculating or because humans were, in his time, far from being in a position to affect the futures of these planets). However, given the importance of rational beings in Kant’s system (rationality, teleology, and morality are the purpose of universe) the answer is possibly, or even probably, yes.

#### 2] Private entities are incapable of making omnilateral decisions as privatization entails that they withhold information which limits deliberation over making maxims.

Chiara Cordelli 2016, University of Chicago, Political Science & the College [cordelli@uchicago.edu](mailto:cordelli@uchicago.edu) <https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/What-is-Wrong-With-Privatization_UCB.pdf> //Dulles VN

The intrinsic wrong of privatization, I will suggest, rather consists in the creation of an institutional arrangement that, by its very constitution, denies those who are subject to it equal freedom. I understand freedom as an interpersonal relationship of reciprocal independence. To be free is not to be subordinated to another person’s unilateral will. By building on an analytical reconstruction of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, I will argue that current forms of privatization reproduce (to a different degree) within a civil condition the very same defects that Kant attributes to the state of nature, or to a pre-civil condition, thereby making a rightful condition of reciprocal independence impossible. Importantly, this is so even if private actors are publicly authorized through contract and subject to regulations, and even if they are committed to reason in accordance with the public good. The reason for this, as I will explain, derives from the fact that private agents are constitutionally incapable of acting omnilaterally, even if their actions are omnilaterally authorized by government through some delegation mechanism, e.g. a voluntary contract. Omnilateralness, I will suggest, must be understood as a function of 1) rightful judgment and 2) unity. By rightful judgment I mean the capacity to reason publicly and to make universal rules that are valid for everyone, according to a juridical ideal of right, as necessary to solve the problem of the unilateral imposition of private wills on others. By unity I mean the capacity to make rules and decisions that change the normative situation of others, as a part of a unified system of decision-making. The condition of unity is crucial, as I shall later explain, insofar as there might be multiple interpretations compatible with rightful judgment, which would still problematically leave the definition of people’s rightful entitlements indeterminate. Further, the practical realization of the juridical idea of an omnilateral will, I will contend, requires embeddedness within a shared collective practice of decision-making. In practice, rightful judgment can only obtain when certain shared background frameworks that structure practical reasoning and confer unity to that reasoning are in place. The rules of public administration and the authority structure of bureaucracy should be understood as playing this essential function of giving empirical and practical reality to the omnilateral will, as far as the execution of rules and the concrete definition of entitlements are concerned. Together, these two requirements are necessary, (whether they are also sufficient is a different question), to make an action the omnilateral action of a state, which has the moral power to change the normative situation of citizens, by fixing the content of their rights and duties in accordance with the equal freedom of all. The phenomenon of privatization thus raises the fundamental questions of why we need political institutions to begin with, and what makes an action an action of the state. Insofar as private agents make decisions that fundamentally alter the normative situation (the rights and duties) of citizens, and insofar as, by definition, private agents are not public officials embedded in that shared collective practice, their decisions, even if well intentioned and authorized through contract, cannot count as omnilateral acts of the state. They rather and necessarily remain unilateral acts of men. Hence, I will conclude, for the very same reasons that we have, following Kant, a duty to exit the state of nature so as to solve the twofold problems of the unilateral imposition of will on others and the indeterminacy of rights, we also have a duty to limit privatization and to support, on normative grounds, a case for the re-bureaucratization of certain functions. Therefore, my paper provides foundational reasons to agree with Richard Rorty’s nonfoundational defense of bureaucracy as stated in the opening epigraph, since only agents who are appropriately embedded within a bureaucratic structure, properly understood, are, in many cases, capable of acting omnilaterally. The “bosses” I am here concerned with are not primarily those who 5 can unilaterally impose their will on us in their capacity as private employers, but rather any private actor who acts unilaterally while in the garb of the state.

#### 3] Space Exploration is non universalizable - a). Entails that everyone leaves Earth which means that no one would be around to create the means to leave earth b). Assumes all agents have access to the resources to fund a space trip, and is thus exclusionary.

Benjamin Segobaetso 2018, Project Officer at United Nations Association in Canada “Ethical Implications of the Colonization, Privatization and Commercialization of Outer Space.” https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/38318/1/Benjamin\_Segobaetso\_2018.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2yROoOf\_np9HL97WmBB-xDUGSZnQrRPbvs2Gmo6V5NlyEFBoSLWxQFuV0 //Dulles VN

It can be argued through Kantian ethics that our record here on Earth paints a picture of neoliberal and capitalist policies with tendencies to favour the highest bidder at the exclusion of the under privileged and puts profit first at the expense of the environment. For Kantians, there are two questions that we must ask ourselves whenever we decide to act: (i) Can I rationally will that everyone act as I propose to act? If the answer is no, then we must not perform the action. (ii) Does my action respect the goals of human beings? Again, if the answer is no, then we must not perform the action. Kantian ethicists would argue that extending to space neoliberal and capitalist policies is immoral because these systems create economic disparities and life threatening environmental injustices; therefore, they are set up in a way that we could 16 not rationally will everyone to act the way they act either here on Earth or in space. Also, Kantian ethicists would ask whether the action of extending neoliberal and capitalist policies to space would respect the goals of extra-terrestrial intelligent life if any rather than merely using them for humans’ own purposes? If the answer is no, then the participating agent must not perform the action. Kant wrote on the possible existence of extra-terrestrial intelligent species in the final pages of the last book that he published, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht] (1978). In this publication, Kant hinted that the highest concept of the Alien species may be that of a terrestrial rational being [eines irdischen vernünftigen ]; however, he argued that it will be difficult to describe its characteristics because there is no knowledge available of a non-terrestrial rational being [nicht irdischen Wesen] which could be used as a reference in regards to its properties and ultimately classify that terrestrial being as rational. This dilemma will continue until extraterrestrial intelligent life is discovered because comparing two species of rational beings has to be on the basis of experience, but that experience has not been possible yet (Kant, 237-238).

#### 4] Space is not subject to property rights – a). It has no physical manifestation as space is by definition the absence of matter which means it cannot be measured, bordered, or divided, thus it cannot be owned b). Owning unexplored planets/space is incoherent –it can’t be deemed an agents property unless agents have a rational conception of it. C) The International Institute of Space Law proves

Sean Blair 2011 is a space journalist and is currently working for the European Space Agency, 08-01-2011, "Space property: who owns it?," BBC Science Focus Magazine, <span class="skimlinks-unlinked">[https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/space-property-who-owns-it</span>/](https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/space-property-who-owns-it%3c/span%3e/) // Dulles VN

While the deep-sea salvage claim here on Earth appears to show that possession will be sufficient, we’re still to discover exactly what will happen when someone lands a craft on a celestial body with the intention of claiming it, or at least part of it. There are some who believe that regardless of what’s happened on Earth, you simply can’t own something in space. “For us it is clear that private property rights over parts of outer space are not permitted,” says Tanja Masson-Zwaan, President of the International Institute of Space Law. “There is no consensus on property rights in space, as there will always be people who continue to challenge what the law says.”

#### 5] Libertarianism turns don’t apply:

#### A] Privatization of space inherently relies on an anti-libertarian state-based model

Shammas and Holen 19 [(Victor L. Oslo Metropolitan University, Tomas B. Independent scholar) “One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space,” Palgrave Communications, 1-29-19, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9] TDI //recut Dulles VN

But the entrepreneurial libertarianism of capitalistkind is undermined by the reliance of the entire NewSpace complex on extensive support from the state, ‘a public-private financing model underpinning long-shot start-ups' that in the case of Musk’s three main companies (SpaceX, SolarCity Corp., and Tesla) has been underpinned by $4.9 billion dollars in government subsidies (Hirsch, 2015). In the nascent field of space tourism, Cohen (2017) argues that what began as an almost entirely private venture quickly ground to a halt in the face of insurmountable technical and financial obstacles, only solved by piggybacking on large state-run projects, such as selling trips to the International Space Station, against the objections of NASA scientists. The business model of NewSpace depends on the taxpayer’s dollar while making pretensions to individual self-reliance. The vast majority of present-day clients of private aerospace corporations are government clients, usually military in origin. Furthermore, the bulk of rocket launches in the United States take place on government property, usually operated by the US Air Force or NASA.Footnote13 This inward tension between state dependency and capitalist autonomy is itself a product of neoliberalism’s contradictory demand for a minimal, “slim” state, while simultaneously (and in fact) relying on a state reengineered and retooled for the purposes of capital accumulation (Wacquant, 2012). As Lazzarato writes, ‘To be able to be “laissez-faire”, it is necessary to intervene a great deal' (2017, p. 7). Space libertarianism is libertarian in name only: behind every NewSpace venture looms a thick web of government spending programs, regulatory agencies, public infrastructure, and universities bolstered by research grants from the state. SpaceX would not exist were it not for state-sponsored contracts of satellite launches. Similarly, in 2018, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the famed origin of the World Wide Web—announced that it would launch a ‘responsive launch competition', meaning essentially the reuse of launch vehicles, representing an attempt by the state to ‘harness growing commercial capabilities' and place them in the service of the state’s interest in ensuring ‘national security' (Foust, 2018b).

## 1AC - Plan

#### Text – Member nations of the Outer Space Treaty ought to rule that appropriation of outer space by private actors is unjust by explicitly applying Article II of the Outer Space Treaty to private actors.

#### To Clarify – this is a whole resolution Affirmative that’s defends implementation through the Outer Space Treaty.

## 1AC – Advantage

#### Advantage 1 is the OST:

#### Vagueness in the OST that reflect democratized advances in Space cause ambiguity concerns – risks rendering the OST extinct.

CFR 17 10-10-2017 "The Outer Space Treaty’s Midlife Funk" <https://www.cfr.org/blog/outer-space-treatys-midlife-funk> (Council of Foreign Relations)//Elmer

Today marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty’s entry into force. The UN agreement, which took effect on October 10th, 1967, created a binding legal regime for the cosmos (Earth notwithstanding). Declaring outer space to be the “province of all mankind” and dictating that it be used for peaceful purposes, the treaty eased U.S.-Soviet tensions, helping to lay the groundwork for the détente of the following decade. The agreement was, in many respects, a triumph for multilateralism. More on: Space Global Commons Global Governance Technology and Innovation Half a century later, however, the Outer Space Treaty has entered something of a funk. Despite the universal aspirations of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which molded the document into its completed form, many of the principles enshrined within the text are less suited to the present than they were to their native Cold War milieu. While the anachronism has not reached crisis levels, current and foreseeable developments do present challenges for the treaty, heightening the potential for disputes. At the crux of the matter is the ongoing democratization of space. During the 1950s and ‘60s, when the fundamental principles of international space law took shape, only large national governments could afford the enormous outlays required for creating and maintaining a successful space program. In more recent decades, technological advances and new business models have broadened the range of spacefaring actors. Thanks to innovations such as reusable rockets, micro- and nanosatellites, and inflatable space station modules, costs are decreasing and private companies are crowding into the sector. This flurry of activity, known as New Space, promises nothing less than a complete transformation of the way that humans interact with space. Asteroid mining, for example, could eliminate the need to launch many essential materials from Earth, lowering logistical hurdles and enabling largescale in-space fabrication. Companies like Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries, by extracting and selling useful resources in situ, could help to jumpstart a sustainable space economy. They might also profit from selling valuable commodities back on terra firma. As a recent (bullish) Goldman Sachs report noted, a single football-field-sized asteroid could contain $25 to $50 billion worth of platinum—enough to upend the terrestrial market. With astronomical sums at stake and the commercial sector kicking into high gear, legal questions are becoming a major concern. Many of these questions focus on Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits national appropriation of space and the celestial bodies. Since another provision (Article VI) requires nongovernmental entities to operate under a national flag, some experts have suggested that asteroid mining, which would require a period of exclusive use, may violate the agreement. Others, however, contend that companies can claim ownership of extracted resources without claiming ownership of the asteroids themselves. They cite the lunar samples returned to Earth during the Apollo program as a precedent. Hoping to promote American space commerce, Congress formalized this more charitable legal interpretation in Title IV of the 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. Luxembourg, which announced a €200 million asteroid mining fund last year, followed suit with its own law in August. Controversies like the one surrounding asteroid mining are par for the course when it comes to the Outer Space Treaty. The agreement’s insistence that space be used “for peaceful purposes” has long been the subject of intense debate. During the treaty-making process, Soviet jurists argued that peaceful meant “non-military” and that spy satellites were illegal; Americans, who enjoyed an early lead in orbital reconnaissance, interpreted peaceful to mean “non-aggressive” and came to the opposite conclusion. Decades later, the precise meaning of the phrase remains a matter of contention.

#### Legal Ambiguity collapses OST Credibility – results in a space free-for-all – clarification to prevent appropriation by Private Actors is key to maintain relevance.

Davis 18 Malcolm Davis .16 Jul 2018. Avoiding a free-for-all: the Outer Space Treaty revisited. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/avoiding-a-free-for-all-the-outer-space-treaty-revisited/> [Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI. Edited image courtesy of the European Space Agency] // CVHS SR

One theme considered at ASPI’s recent annual Building Australia’s Strategy for Space conference was the growing importance of space law as space becomes more contested, congested and competitive. The basis of space law remains the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), but a lot has happened since it was signed. Perhaps it’s time to review and refresh the treaty. Article IV of the OST states that: States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station weapons in outer space in any other manner. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used … exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden … Article IV doesn’t ban the weaponisation of space outright. Nor has there been any other legal agreement that bans such systems, despite ongoing international efforts in recent decades. US adversaries (including China and Russia) are developing a suite of sophisticated counter-space capabilities, including direct ascent and co-orbital ‘hard kill’ and ‘soft kill’ systems (see here and here). The US and its allies must respond seriously to these challenges and protect their critical space-based infrastructure. A ‘space Pearl Harbor’ could quickly remove the traditional information-based war-fighting advantage of Western liberal democracies, leaving the US and its partners deaf, dumb and blind at the outset of a conflict. Part of the solution is to bolster space deterrence, to dissuade the use of counter-space capabilities by adversaries. The US and its allies, including Australia, need to work together to achieve that objective. Strengthening the 1967 OST’s provision on space weapons is also a must, but it will be difficult to get other major space powers such as China and Russia to agree to new legal constraints on capabilities that they’re already developing and testing. It will also be difficult to get agreement on what a space weapon is and what constitutes a counter-space attack. Earth-based soft-kill systems—such as cyberattacks that could create scalable, reversible effects—offer deniability to the aggressor. Article IV bans the militarisation of the moon and other celestial bodies by states, but it has a weakness: it allows ‘use of military personnel for scientific research or for other peaceful purposes’ and includes a vague statement that ‘use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited’. Defining ‘peaceful purpose’ activities isn’t easy either, particularly when states such as China have space programs run by the military. As China looks towards crewed lunar missions by the 2030s, there’s a risk that it may exploit ‘grey zone’ phenomena on the high frontier in support of its national strategic ambitions, which include contesting the US advantage in space. The OST was signed at a time when commercial space actors simply didn’t exist. However, Article VI implies the possibility of such actors: States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by government agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. Yet that doesn’t address activities by commercial space corporations that are acting alone and independently of national guidance—or at least those that declare that they’re doing so. For example, the potential resource wealth of the moon and near-Earth asteroids opens up the prospect for private space corporations to make vast profits from those resources. Article II of the OST says, ‘Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by other means.’ But what about the actions of private corporations, perhaps supported by private security contractors, that seek to safeguard a valuable resource claim? The OST does nothing to regulate the actions of such entities. The US’s 2015 Space Act created opportunities for future lunar and asteroid mining by US commercial space companies, and US competitors aren’t likely to sit back and passively watch US companies gain an advantage. That implies a challenge to Article II of the OST, because acquiring a resource and then selling it for profit implies ownership. If Article II is weakened indirectly through commercial activity, competitors may see an opportunity to claim territory on the moon and other celestial bodies. The rationale might be control of a valuable resource or exploitation of high ground in astrostrategic terrain for military advantage. That would undermine the OST at its most fundamental level. This isn’t a justification for imposing draconian governmental or international regulation on the rapidly growing commercial space sector. Such a step would smother innovation and reduce incentives for commercial space activities, slowing the growth of a future off-Earth space industry. Going back to Space 1.0 is entirely the wrong path. The OST needs to be updated to address some of the potential risks in a more contested, congested and competitive space domain extending from low-Earth orbit out to cislunar space and beyond. That would make the treaty more relevant to the future Space 2.0 paradigm in which the fastest progress is led by the commercial sector, a significant portion of which is untethered by government direction. In particular, managing the impact of new commercial space actors that will seek access to and profit from space resources should be a high priority if the OST is to remain relevant. The 1979 Moon Treaty sought to expand on the OST and address some of its shortcomings. It wasn’t ratified by the US, the Russian Federation or China, and so isn’t binding. Alongside an updated OST, a new Moon Treaty that facilitates peaceful commercial activities on the moon and other celestial bodies would be a good step forward. But the updates need to address the shortcomings of both treaties. They should clearly delineate the boundaries between normal commercial activities in what should be a global commons and state or state-owned actors that could compete for national gain. The alternative is a free-for-all on the high frontier, with dangerous risks for major-power competition in a contested space environment.

#### Loopholes that allow Commercial Appropriation are weaponized to undermine Article II of the OST.

Stockwell 20 Samuel Stockwell 7-20-2020 "Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies" <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> (Writer at E-IR)//Elmer

On 30th April 2020, NASA – the US government’s space agency ­– awarded three private space companies a joint-contract worth $967m to complete a lunar mission by 2024, in what was celebrated as “the last piece that [America] need[s] in order to get to the moon” by NASA administrator Jim Brindestine (The Telegraph, 2020). Yet, whilst this development was widely covered in the media, less coverage has focused on the extent to which existing international legislation surrounding outer space endeavours appropriately applies to private entities. Indeed, the prospect of a corporate foothold within the extra-terrestrial domain has thrown up both a mixture of optimism and concern regarding the potential benefits of expanding capital projects into space (Adolph, 2006; Dickens & Ormrod, 2007). By adopting the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty (OST) as an analytical framework in relation to the rise of the so-called US ‘NewSpace’ actors, this essay argues that there are significant legal ambiguities regarding the status of private space companies in orbital space. Such loopholes allow the US government to circumvent its own obligations to the OST, whilst simultaneously undermining the notion of space as a ‘global commons’ through a commodification process. The lack of specificity within the OST surrounding private property rights over extra-terrestrial resources risks the prospect of reinforcing Earth-bound wealth inequalities and US dominance in space, by restricting the potential economic benefits for the broader global citizenry in favour of a narrow class of wealthy American investors. Moreover, the OST’s weak clause regarding the regulation of space surveillance risks the incentivisation of a ‘global panopticon’ network of US satellites. The rise of dual-use technology is blurring the boundaries between military and civilian observations, raising serious ethical concerns over the nature of US space-based data collection. Finally, the increasing number of private satellite constellations is facilitating the possibility of cataclysmic space debris collisions which could exacerbate geopolitical tensions. Such developments are also contributing towards the contamination of the broader space environment in ways that the OST had never envisioned.

#### Credible OST solves Space War.

Johnson 17 Christopher Johnson 1-23-2017 “The Outer Space Treaty at 50” , <http://thespacereview.com/article/3155/1> (graduate of Leiden University’s International Institute of Air and Space Law and the International Space University)//Elmer

As mentioned, many of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty were borrowed from previous UN General Assembly resolutions. But as resolutions alone, these documents were non-binding and did not require states to alter their behavior. And while UN General Assembly resolutions are not normally law-making exercises, they do record the commonly-held expression of intentions by the states in the General Assembly, and make political recommendations to UNGA Members (or to the UN Security Council). UNGA Resolutions can also set priorities and mold opinion for inclusion in subsequent treaties. The prohibition on the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space or their installation on celestial bodies was taken from UNGA Resolution 1884 of 1963. The resolution: [s]olemnly calls upon all States… [t]o refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner. This prohibition was transferred to the Outer Space Treaty, and thereby remade into international treaty law. As President Johnson pointed out in his recommendation to Congress to ratify the Outer Space Treaty, “the realms of space should forever remain realms of peace.”5 He continued: We know the gains of cooperation. We know the losses of the failure to cooperate. If we fail now to apply the lessons we have learned, or even if we delay their application, we know that the advances into space may only mean adding a new dimension to warfare. If, however, we proceed along the orderly course of full cooperation we shall, by the very fact of cooperation, make the most substantial contribution toward perfecting peace.6 The agreement contained in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty reflects an agreement between the US and the USSR, as obligations restricting their freedom of action. Why would a state intentionally place a restriction on itself? Isn’t it better to merely keep outer space as unregulated as possible? Since there were only two states then capable of venturing into outer space, why did either state agree to rules governing its actions? It may seem counterintuitive, but the deeper rationale behind security arrangements like this is that the parties actually benefit in the long-term from placing mutual restrictions on their behavior. Agreeing to restrict your freedom of action has deep links to the usefulness or utility of law itself. Consider driving a car: in order to get a license, you agree to observe certain rules, and the license signals your obligation to obey these rules. However, sometimes adhering to those rules is not only inconvenient (such as stopping at stop signs when there’s nobody else at the intersection), it is also against your short term-interests (you have an appointment or will otherwise suffer from observing the rules.) However, agreeing to operate within a system where your freedoms are sometimes restricted can have the effect of actually increasing your freedom over the long term. Wouldn’t you rather live in a state where traffic laws exist, and other drivers agree to observe them? Isn’t that system preferable to living in a state without traffic rules? Indeed, a system with traffic rules increases not just freedom in general, but overall safety and orderliness. Consequently, because the system with rules is preferable to the system without rules, your willingness to use the roads allows you to travel with greater security and ease. You are better assured of the likelihood that you will get to your intended destination without some other driver crashing into you. Knowing that safe travel is likely, you are more willing to take trips more often, and to farther destinations. Your freedom is actually increased over the long term because you are willing to suffer temporary, short-term restrictions such as inconvenient red lights. Long-term rationality warrants adherence to efficient systems of law. Correctly-balanced rules help increase long-term benefits (like safety and security) that would otherwise be unattainable without a system of rules. It is this rationale that also underpins international treaty-making. Today, the current absence of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space attests to the bargain struck in the Outer Space Treaty being a successful one, where security (and the liberty and freedom possible with security) were furthered by the mutual exchange of restrictions that states placed upon themselves. The more than 50 years of peaceful uses of outer space, including cooperation between states who remain rivals elsewhere, are the rich long-term gains resulting from the Outer Space Treaty.

#### Space War cause Nuclear War.

Gallagher 15 “Antisatellite warfare without nuclear risk: A mirage” <http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346> (interim director of the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland, previous Executive Director of the Clinton Administration’s CTBT Treaty Committee, an arms control specialist at the State Dept., and a faculty member at Wesleyan)//Elmer

In recent decades, however, as space-based reconnaissance, communication, and targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military operations, strategists and policy makers have explored whether carrying out antisatellite attacks could confer major military advantages without increasing the risk of nuclear war. In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice, it is almost certainly no. Hyping threats. No country has ever deliberately and destructively attacked a satellite belonging to another country (though nations have sometimes interfered with satellites' radio transmissions). But the United States, Russia, and China have all tested advanced kinetic antisatellite weapons, and the United States has demonstrated that it can modify a missile-defense interceptor for use in antisatellite mode. Any nation that can launch nuclear weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles has the latent capability to attack satellites in low Earth orbit. Because the United States depends heavily on space for its terrestrial military superiority, some US strategists have predicted that potential adversaries will try to neutralize US advantages by attacking satellites. They have also recommended that the US military do everything it can to protect its own space assets while maintaining a capability to disable or destroy satellites that adversaries use for intelligence, communication, navigation, or targeting. Analysis of this sort often exaggerates both potential adversaries’ ability to destroy US space assets and the military advantages that either side would gain from antisatellite attacks. Nonetheless, some observers are once again advancing worst-case scenarios to support arguments for offensive counterspace capabilities. In some other countries, interest in space warfare may be increasing because of these arguments. If any nation, for whatever reason, launched an attack on a second nation's satellites, nuclear retaliation against terrestrial targets would be an irrational response. But powerful countries do sometimes respond irrationally when attacked. Moreover, disproportionate retaliation following a deliberate antisatellite attack is not the only way in which antisatellite weapons could contribute to nuclear war. It is not even the likeliest way. As was clearly understood by the countries that negotiated the Outer Space Treaty, crisis management would become more difficult, and the risk of inadvertent deterrence failure would increase, if satellites used for reconnaissance and communication were disabled or destroyed. But even if the norm against attacking another country’s satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still increase the risk of nuclear war. If, for instance, US military leaders became seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack, pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian strategic forces. Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris during a crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict, leaders might mistakenly assume that a space war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened. Such scenarios may seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the development and use of antisatellite weapons.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

* Checked

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.