### 1

#### **No one knows what information is for anymore. Information is just crammed down our throats, so incessantly that we lack the air needed to cry out for meaning. In contributing to this obscene proliferation of information, debate is no better than televised media. TV was supposed to represent the world but became fixated on representing itself. The causality between media and reality reverses poles: media do not exist to report the real; the real unfolds so that it can be reported on media. A summer of social protest and activism – all for more re-tweets! The medium has swallowed the message. Debate used to be about politics, but it has collapsed into a self-reporting loop, a meaningless signifier, a sign that announces nothing but itself. Every debate is about debate. This doesn’t just make the game meaningless; it reverses the causal relationship between debate and the real. Debate does not exist to report the real; the real exists for us to debate it. Reality is debate’s sacrificial lamb. Goodbye reality; goodbye politics; goodbye meaning. Hello reruns; hello partisanship; hello backfiles!**

Baudrillard (Jean, “TV Fantasies,” Screened Out, trans. Chris Turner, Verso, pp. 186-190) green highlighting = short highlighting

-information is circular and self-reporting which is why objectivity doesn’t solve it only creates new meaningless information

Television has been in the news a lot lately. It is supposed to exist to speak to us about the world. And, like any self-respecting medium, it is also supposed to put events first and its own concerns second. But for some time now, it seems either to have lost this respect for itself or to have come to regard itself as the event. Even the 'Guignols' on Canal Plus have started to target the confused goings-on in the little world of TV and radio, including those on their own channel.33 Not to mention all the movements of star presenters, channel heads and programme direc- tors between the different companies, and the intrigue and corruption which one supposes is endemic in that jungle, but which has now been transferred to the screen and is served up to the audience as a TV show in its own right. There seemed little chance the media would escape the compulsive syndrome of investigation, whitewashing, rehabilitation and repentance the political class and big business have been going through for some time now. All forms of power are currently afflicted with the depressive syndrome of power - the justification complex which besets all power once it grows to excess and no longer has any representative function. This is the case with political power, and today also with media power. If television has begun to revolve around its own concerns and to engage endlessly in examining its own convulsions, this is because it is no longer capable of finding a meaning outside itself, of getting beyond itself as a medium, and finding its purpose: to produce the world as information and give meaning to that information. Through using and abusing events with images - to the point of coming under suspicion of conjuring events up out of nothing - television has become virtually disconnected from the world and has begun to turn back in on its own universe like a meaningless signifier, desperately seeking an ethic to replace its failing credibility, a moral status to replace its lack of imagination (once again, the same applies with the political class). It is at this point that it begins to become corrupt. It is challenged on all sides and incapable of responding to the basic question, which is at the same time the major charge levelled against it: how do things stand with images and their meaning, how do things stand with the very myth of information and television which is every- where trumpeted shamelessly? Where is your responsibility in all this? The media world as a whole, incapable of replying to these questions, or doubtless even of asking them, prefers to pick at its own sores, to put its own conflicts, rivalries, profligacy and bad management on show. But this is merely a diversion. Excessive pay deals, settlings of old scores, the polemic between public service broadcasting and the private companies — all these things which make the headlines today are merely masking the fundamental fact that television has lost both any idea of what it is doing and the ability to imagine the real world. As a result, it is talking only to itself or to an unidentified audience whose role is merely to provide viewing figures — which amounts to the same thing. It is consequently losing its credibility with the public, and losing all credit in its own eyes. In the light of the latest goings- on, it seems it no longer has any illusions about its own practices. The vice here is circularity. The vice of the medium for the medium's sake, as in the past we had art for art's sake. It is the vice of all institutions which begin to operate autarkically, no longer showing any concern for their object or their function. Immense bachelor machines whose whole energy goes into fuelling and reproducing themselves. This is our dilemma, one that comes to us from the depths of simulation: what if the sign did not relate either to the object or to meaning, but to the promotion of the sign as sign? And what if information did not relate either to the event or the facts, but to the promotion of information itself as event? And more precisely today: what if television no longer related to anything except itself as message? This is where McLuhan's formulation can be seen to be absolutely brilliant: the medium has swallowed the message and it is this, the multi-medium, which is proliferating in all directions. And we are, indeed, seeing terrestrial and cable channels and services proliferating while actual programme content is disappearing and melting away — the TV viewer's almost involuntary channel-hopping here echoing television's own obsession with its own channels. But this is not where the true corruption lies. The secret vice, already pointed out by Umberto Eco, lies in the way the media become self-referring and speak only among themselves. The multimedium is becoming the intermedium. This already problematic situation is aggravated when it is a single hypermedium — television — eyeing itself. All the more so as this tele-centrism is combined with a very severe implicit moral and political judgement: it implies that the masses basically neither need nor desire meaning or information — that all they ask for is signs and images. Television provides them with these in great quantities, returning to the real world, with utter - though well- —nouflaged — contempt, in the form of 'reality shows' or vox-pops — that is to say, in the form of universal self-commentary and mocked- up scenarios, where both the questions and the answers are 'fixed'. Of course, television is not alone in being confronted with this destiny - this vicious circle: the destiny of all those things which, no longer having an objective purpose, take themselves for their own ends. In so doing, they escape all responsibility, but also become bogged down in their own insoluble contradictions. This is, however, more particularly the critical situation of all the current media. Opinion polls themselves are a good example. They have had their moment of truth (as, indeed, did television), when they were the representative mirror of an opinion, in the days when such a thing still existed, before it became merely a conditioned reflex. But perpetual harassment by opinion polls has resulted in their being no longer a mirror at all; they have, rather, become a screen. A perverse exchange has been established between polls which no longer really ask questions and masses who no longer reply. Or rather they become cunning partners, like rats in laboratories or the viruses pursued in experiments. They toy with the polls at least as much as the polls toy with them. They play a double game. It is not, then, that the polls are bogus or deceitful, but rather that their very success and automatic operation have made them random. There is the same double game, the same perverse social relationship between an all-powerful, but wholly self-absorbed, television and the mass of TV viewers, w h o are vaguely scandalized by this misappropriation, not just of public money, but of the whole value system of news and information. You don't need to be politically aware to realize that, after the famous dustbins of history, we are now seeing the dustbins of information. Now, information may well be a myth, but this alternative myth, the modern substitute for all other values, has been rammed down our throats incessantly. And there is a glaring contrast between this universal myth and the actual state of affairs. The real catastrophe of television has been how deeply it has failed to live up to its promise of providing information - its supposed modern function. We dreamed first of giving power - political power - to the imagination, but we dream less and less of this, if indeed at all. The fantasy then shifted on to the media and information. At times we dreamed (at least col- lectively, even if individually we continued to have no illusions) of finding some freedom there — an openness, a new public space. Such dreams were soon dashed: the media turned out to be much more conformist and servile than expected, at times more servile than the professional politicians. The latest displacement of the imagination has been on to the judiciary. Again this has been an illusion, since, apart from the pleasing whiff of scandal produced, this is also dependent on the media operation. We are going to end up looking for imagination in places further and further removed from power - from any form of power whatever (and de initely far removed from cultural power, which has become the most conventional and professional form there is). Among the excluded, the immigrants, the home- less. But that will really take a lot of imagination because they, w h o no longer even have an image, are themselves the by-products of a whole society's loss of im- agination, of the loss of any social imagination. And this is indeed the point. We shall soon see it is no use trying to locate the imagination somewhere. Quite simply, because there no longer is any. The day this becomes patently obvious, the vague collective disappointment hanging over us today will become a massive sickening feeling.

#### Democratic institutions are a cruel façade: they feign participation and representation while continually shaming the masses. The mechanisms of democracy – voter-rolls, donor lists, and ID laws – all act as means of surveillance. Media reform makes people feel like they are changing the political when the political ceases to exist.

Lindsey [Dr. Jason Royce; “Rethinking the Political: Taking Baudrillard’s “Silent Majorities” Seriously”; International Journal of Baudrillard Studies; https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/rethinking-the-political-taking-baudrillards-silent-majorities-seriously/; 2007; Jason Royce Lindsey received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 2004 and is currently Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Cloud State University in Minnesota. His specialization is political theory though he also researches the politics of Eastern Europe and travels there extensively.; LCA-BP]

According to their imaginary representation, the masses drift somewhere between passivity and wild spontaneity, but always as a potential energy, a reservoir of the social and of social energy; today a mute referent, tomorrow when they speak up and cease to be the ‘silent majority’, a protagonist of history.2 Thus, for those with political agendas, the people are always the hero, the victim, or the chief obstacle. For the modern political left, the masses are the victim suffering from false consciousness but are also a latent hero. Thus, the revolutionary can awaken this fettered colossus and stride into the next stage of history. Or, when these projects fail, the people are the ignorant masses who remain enslaved due to their narrow vision of the world. For the modern political right, the masses can be a useful political ally, but also an ignorant and dangerous one. Thus, they must be disciplined and talked to on a level they can comprehend like a child that does not know its own strength. This is the object that Baudrillard confronts us with: the crowd of Le Bon, subject to unpredictable spasms of violence, Burke’s decent but ignorant citizens, the rural idiocy that Marx laments, or the heroic everyman lacking proper consciousness, which must be supplied by Lenin’s vanguard.3 Yet, Baudrillard does not intend to criticize this reification of the masses as a sloppy concept. Instead, the masses are useful to study as an endpoint. The deconstruction of class, socio-economic status, race, and other categories shows that these “better” tools of analysis, or better candidates for the idea of the masses: “have also only ever been muddled notions themselves, but notions upon which agreement has nevertheless been reached for mysterious ends: those of preserving a certain code of analysis”.4 Instead, the idea of the masses is a useful endpoint, a solid immovable barrier that we cannot pass. Our inability to dissect the mass into classes or discernible categories shows the flaw in our idea of the social. According to Baudrillard, our desire to study society, to have a science about human life, meets its match here. Instead of finding a subject for study, the modern project of social science crashes into this unmovable, unknowable first particle, the masses. All of the work of social science is confronted with the fact that there is no discernible object of study, just, “a black hole which engulfs the social”.5 This impenetrability of the masses and their rejection of elite cajoling, is a rejection of meaning. This is a deeper point that Baudrillard argues is overlooked or deliberately ignored. The tendency in modernity has always been to lament the ignorance of the docile masses. Instead, Baudrillard argues that within the masses indifference to political events, history, art, and culture there is: “nothing in this to deplore, but everything to analyze as the brute fact of a collective retaliation and of a refusal to participate in the recommended ideals, however enlightened”.6 Yet, social thinking does not take this observation as its starting point. Rather than facing what Baudrillard says is the truly important point, social and political philosophy ducks the issue by asking how to enlighten this poor victim. This quest to enlighten the masses has led to the social sciences inventing new forms of contact: surveys, polls, and tests. This maneuver has extended the life of the social and political because the masses do, after all, exist. However, Baudrillard argues that, “their representation is no longer possible”.7 Politics has been forced to rely on simulations of the people as a substitute. Thus, the media reports to us through newscasts what Americans, Britons, Germans, etc. are thinking. The masses that do exist are not engaged but simulated or at best probed by the technology of social science: “No Longer being under the reign of will or representation, it falls under the province of diagnosis, or divination, pure and simple – whence the universal reign of information and statistics”.8 No longer a participating subject, the masses are simulated for the political class to engage with through the media and probed for some sign of their desires, hopes, and fears by social scientists. In the political class’s efforts to engage with the simulation of the silent majorities and with social science’s attempts to study this silent mass, there is a transmission of information. However, the mass Baudrillard describes transmits and accepts all information. In the consumer preferences and demands detected within the mass we find all leanings and wants. Thus, the mass that contains traces of everything is in the end nothing intelligible to those wanting to objectify it. So the silent majorities, today on a global scale, contain a bit of everything. They are like a material in a laboratory that contains all elements and thus, becomes an unknowable, unclassifiable, and uncategorized lump. Those individuals still committed to the modern ideal of the political will tend to react to Baudrillard’s argument by discussing reality and the seriousness of the issues within the political domain. However, this again flows into Baudrillard’s argument. The silent majorities in contemporary society are not interested in reality and seriousness. Although our society is good at creating consumer demand, Baudrillard argues that our technicians of social science and our political leaders have failed to stimulate demand for meaning. Or, perhaps we should say, demand for any particular meaning.9 In the face of this looming silence, what are policymakers to do? What does it mean for politics if the majorities decline to participate? We have seen a real world example recently in Russia where the authorities have removed “against all candidates” from future election ballots. This action was taken precisely because they were alarmed at the growing number of the masses choosing this option. In the case of some Western democracies we have seen the introduction over the years of compulsory voting.10 Yet, compulsory voting or the limiting of choices to opt out is a mere administrative device for papering over this deep chasm in contemporary politics. If the silence of the majorities shows the hollowness of the social and the political, then what option is there for political thinking? Baudrillard encourages us to embrace the problem head on. We should seize upon his observations as a starting point for thinking about what is after the modern political. Yet, what would this look like? Baudrillard’s, In the Shadows of the Silent Majorities, originally appeared in 1978, and in its English translation in 1983. Over 20 years later, we still find much contemporary (especially Anglo American) political theory and social science uninterested in the trajectory of Baudrillard’s thought. If one accepts his argument, then is there a way to move forward? Or, does Baudrillard’s description of the political for contemporary society undermine any political thinking? The answer to this question is “not necessarily”. For Baudrillard, the silent majorities prove that politics is an artifact. It is and always has been an elite activity, despite the attempts of modern democracy to conservatively conceal or progressively transform this fact. The continuing silence shows that there is no ignorance to overcome, no mass Prometheus to unbind. Instead, the silent majorities decline participation because they do not want politics. However, what is their alternative? As of yet, there is no new project of politics to replace the modern. No movement has emerged that expresses the dissatisfaction of our contemporary majorities. Without a choice of positive or kinetic action, the masses stockpile their potential energy. Given this situation, Baudrillard argues that silence is the best strategy: People do in fact defend themselves, they have their defensive and even offensive strategies; but this time, through indifference. …There is still something at stake, there is still an antagonism, there is certainly a struggle between the strategy of simulation at the level of political power, or what is left of political power, and a strategy of indifference, which is to say that the masses also manage to neutralize power, but by their silence, by their indifference. It’s no longer a strategy of subversion. …You up a bid of neutralization with more neutralization. So it becomes a game, at this point, it’s become something else. It is no longer exactly a historical or political space.11 This rejection undermines the pretension of political activity and its practitioner’s claims. Instead, what the masses actively engage with in contemporary life is elsewhere. So, from this perspective, what should political theorists and social scientists think about? We should think more deeply about the history of political activity and its possible replacement. Maybe this replacement is politics in a new form.12 Perhaps its replacement is a different form of social activity for contemporary societies that addresses the questions once answered by politics. In either case, Baudrillard shows that our discipline should devote more effort to investigating what the masses are concerned with. Rather than maintaining this fiction that they are silent through ignorance, political observers should accept that the masses silence in politics is due to their engagement elsewhere. For political theorists and social scientists this shift would involve study of contemporary, popular culture. An activity they have often relegated to those interested in “postmodernism” or “cultural studies.” Yet, studying popular culture and activities can arguably tell us more than traditional social science methods have. For example, the fact that consumers in America are saving at an “irrational” negative rate tells us much about what the masses really care about. Writing in an earlier context, Baudrillard describes this difficulty: To their amazement, economists have never been able to rationalize consumption, the seriousness of their ‘theory of need’ as the general consensus upon the discourse of utility being taken for granted. But this is because the practice of the masses very quickly had nothing (or perhaps never had anything) to do with needs. They have turned consumption into a dimension of status and prestige, of useless keeping up with the Joneses or simulation, of potlatch which surpassed use value in every way.13 One could study this phenomenon as a social scientist lamenting the ignorance of the American consumer. Or, one could probe deeper and think about what this activity proves about economic “science” and the actual desires of the majority. Similarly, a turn by political theorists and social scientists to what the masses are concerned with can serve as a starting point for criticizing and reconstructing contemporary politics. Baudrillard argues that: The people have become a public. It is the football match or film or cartoon which serve as models for their perception of the political sphere. The people even enjoy day to day, like a home movie, the fluctuations of their own opinions in the daily opinion polls. Nothing in all this engages any responsibility.14 Thus, we should look to these cultural models for help with our political thinking. Baudrillard himself has provided an example of how the idea of the silent majorities is useful for understanding contemporary politics. In his analysis of the 2005 French referendum on the proposed European constitution, Baudrillard argues that the vigorous support for the no vote was not about the merits of the constitutional draft.15 Instead, we can understand the energy of the no campaign only when we look at this referendum as a chance for the silent majorities to lash out. In this case they seized the opportunity to say no to the whole range of politicians and political institutions attempting to guarantee this weak link. Thus, for Baudrillard the no vote is a “reflex” in that inert, unclassifiable lump that is the public. Written before the vote, Baudrillard’s cultural interpretation is very effective at capturing the sense of frustration that led to the no vote winning the day. On the other hand, Baudrillard’s observations may be wrong. Perhaps he has misinterpreted or distorted the silent majorities. Arguably, the society that Baudrillard argues is the most post modern and thus, presumably, the most post political is the United States.16 Yet, we have seen in recent years very close elections in the United States with higher levels of voter participation than in the past. From this perspective, Baudrillard’s argument seems less convincing or perhaps more applicable to Europe.

#### The affirmative’s speech act exemplifies reinforcement of the system through its opposite. The debate space is a prime example of the sterilization of meaning, and construing the ballot as a locus of resistance to the harms of [x] is a sham.

**Mitchell ‘98,** [Gordon R., Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, “PEDAGOGICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR ARGUMENTATIVE AGENCY IN ACADEMIC DEBATE” Argumentation & Advocacy, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p41-60 AK]

While an isolated academic space that affords students an opportunity to learn in a protected environment has significant pedagogical value (see e.g. Coverstone 1995, p. 8-9), the notion of the academic debate tournament as a sterile laboratory carries with it some disturbing implications, when the metaphor is extended to its limit. To the extent that the academic space begins to take on characteristics of a laboratory, the barriers demarcating such a space from other spheres of deliberation beyond the school grow taller and less permeable. When such barriers reach insurmountable dimensions, **[A]rgumentation in the academic setting unfolds on a purely simulated plane, with students practicing critical thinking and advocacy skills in strictly hypothetical thought-spaces.** Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach, **students witness argumentation** beyond the walls of the academy **as spectators, with** little or **no** apparent **recourse to directly participate in or alter the course of events** (see Mitchell 1995; 1998)**. The sense of detachment** associated with the spectator posture **is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to** news accounts of **human death and misery, debaters** overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to **concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their** academic debate **arguments.** For example, news **reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherency of an affirmative case"** (in the technical parlance of debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality [is] as one of the most politically debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, **one could easily conclude that the principle purpose of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into** mute and **uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life"** (1991, p. 8)**.**

#### The impact is two-fold:

#### First, capitalism destroys value to life and makes land, time, and existence itself scarce – this turns the root cause of the aff, which means they can’t solve.

Bifo ’11, [(Franco Berardi, Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism) “After the Future” 09/20/11]

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economist the central dogma of growth, profit and competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation is not perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective¶ reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal¶ spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we¶ confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof¶ and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s¶ assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof¶ and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is¶ not radical enough, and does not touch the legitimacy of the economic¶ episteme.¶ Animal Spirits is the title of an other book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008).¶ Pasquinelli’s book deals with bodies and digits, and parasites, and goes much¶ deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its eponymous¶ publication: “Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it¶ subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential” (Pasquinelli¶ 2008: 93). “Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers¶ experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their¶ everyday life” (Pasquinelli 2008: 15).¶ Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social¶ production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the¶ prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living¶ energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of financial craziness, but also the effect of the devitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in the last two centuries. Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that¶ the answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. ¶ Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word “science” means the creation of concepts for the understanding and¶ description of an object, economics is not a science. Its object does not exist. The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object that exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme. Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a technique, a process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value, bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity, demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do¶ tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a process of production of scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth is making scarce both water and air. Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried work. In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple. But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost?

#### Second, semiocapitalism causes extinction – laundry list of scenarios.

Bifo '19, Franco “Bifo” Berardi, [Italian communist philosopher, theorist and activist], "Game Over", e-flux journal, 3-15-2019, accessed 9-3-2021, https://www.e-flux.com/journal/100/268601/game-over/ Dulles//JL

The establishment of a conventional standard for measuring space and time, and the ensuing reduction of all entities to commensurability, is the core of modern science. It is also the precondition of capitalism, a social system that is based on the conventional equalization of all produced goods, both material and semiotic. Since the common measure of value is based on socially necessary labor time, time itself has been reduced to computation. The mechanical computabilization of time was at the core of the Industrial Revolution. The objectivation of time as a computable extension is the foundation of the social, economic, and cultural dynamics of capitalism. Thanks to the mathematization of the world and to the computabilization of time, the mental sphere emancipates itself from the dimension of perishability. Abstraction is not subject to the rule of death. Outside the walls of the Circle all was noise and struggle, failure and filth. But here, all had been perfected. The best people had made the best systems and the best systems had reaped funds, unlimited funds, that made possible this, the best place to work. —David Eggars, The Circle Abstraction Eternity Extinction Paradoxically, however, the insertion of abstraction into social life and the cycles of the natural environment is leading to the extinction of concreteness, and of life itself. The damnation (or salvation?) of death is denied in the realm of abstraction; extinction is not a possibility in the sphere of pure mathematical relations. This is why capitalism is eternal, and (unluckily enough) this is why humankind seems to be doomed. The eternity of capitalism, in fact, is based on the annihilation of life through the process of abstraction: abstract value has taken the upper hand and has subjugated the concreteness of life, of production, consumption, and language. Thanks to digital networks, financial capitalism has detached the economy from the sphere of perishable things. The concrete activity of producing useful things has been subsumed, recoded, and finally abolished by the mathematic rule of financial capitalism. The unintended consequence of this is the annihilation of life. The eternal survival of capitalism is enabled by the expansion of death, so that in the end, we dwell inside the corpse of abstraction. Never, not for a single day do we have pure space before us in which the flowers are always unfolding. It’s forever world and never Nowhere-without-Not: the pure and unwatched-over air we breathe, know infinitely and do not want. As when sometimes a child gets lost in the silence and has to be shaken back. —Rilke, The Eighth Elegy Dark Zeitgeist The contemporary subconscious is marked by two powerful gravitational pulls: extinction and immortality, which feed into each other. The insertion of mathematical exactitude into the living continuum of the vibrational organism has led to the ossifying of biodiversification. The insertion of digital connection into the continuum of bodily conjunction has led to the syntactic ossifying of the creative ambiguousness of sensibility. The allure of extinction and immortality has polarized the social unconscious. A nihilistic drive emerges in aesthetics and politics: decline, and the fear of extinction, **is fuelling ethno-nationalist cultures worldwide, and in particular a wave of aggressive white supremacism. This is the reaction of the white male when he perceives that he will soon be replaced.** But the while male, in his historical domination, has produced the conditions for a larger extinction: climate change, global civil war, and psychotic collapse. These might lead to the real extinction of life on the planet (unlike the imagined extinction of the white supremacists). At the same time, a frozen immortality emerges in the form of the global cognitive automaton. This immortality results from the unravelling of the semiocapitalist abstraction, and from the insertion of bio-info-techno devices into language and life. The insertion of inorganic intelligence into the conjunction between organic bodies acts as an extinguisher of life and of living consciousness. Thus, extinction looms on the horizon as the ultimate destiny of history. I didn’t intend any of this to happen. And it’s moving so too fast. The idea of Completion, it’s far beyond what I had in mind when I started all this, and it’s far beyond what’s right. It has to be brought back into some kind of balance … I was trying to make the web more civil. I was trying to make it more elegant. I got rid of anonymity. I combined a thousand disparate elements into one unified system. But I didn’t picture a world where Circle membership was mandatory, where all government and all life was channeled through one network … There used to be the option of opting out. But now that’s over. Completion is the end. We are closing the circle around everyone—it’s a totalitarian nightmare. —Ty Gospodinov in Dave Eggars, The Circle What Extinction Am I Talking About? The answer to this question is not clear to me. Does this extinction concern the human race, or the cultural construct that we call “human civilization”? Social integration is collapsing, but at the same time, the process of civilization has culminated in the self-construction of the automaton, which impassively takes shape in the connective space of digital computation. **Environmental collapse, global civil war, nuclear proliferation, and epidemics of panic and depression are steps towards extinction.** But this is not the end of the world, since abstraction has created a world of its own, subsuming social language and prescribing the social forms of interaction. **Twentieth century medicine aimed to heal the sick. Twenty-first century medicine is increasingly aiming to upgrade the healthy … In the twentieth century, medicine benefited the masses because the twentieth century was the age of the masses**. **Twentieth century armies needed millions of healthy soldiers, and economies needed millions of healthy workers.** —Yuval Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow Expansion and acceleration have been fostered by the cultural erasure of transitoriness. Investing time in economic value has been a way to simulate eternity: private property, accumulation, and the sacrifice of the present on the altar of the future. This cycle of sacrifice, investment, and expansion has been the strength of capitalism. Now it’s over. **The physical resources of the planet and the nervous energies of society are on the path to final exhaustion**. The collapse of visions of the future has paved the way for reflecting on a previously forbidden subject: extinction. Trans-humanist utopians, for their part, indulge in fantasies about imminent promises of high-tech immortality. Both hypocritical tech-cheerfulness and contemporary nihilism are based on a shared vision of the ineluctable: it’s too late to stop devastation and climate change, and it’s too late to stop the psychotic collapse of the hyper-connected mind. This helps to explain the nonsensical increase of inequalities that marks the wealth distribution of our time: the predators think that it is impossible to stop the extinction process. In their calculation, all they can do is protect themselves and their families, and this alone may prove enormously expensive. Panic and cynicism prevail in the terminal psychosphere.

#### Thus, the alternative is to engage in depression politics - this entails a withdrawal from all aspects of the system of semio-capitalism- a starting point of exhaustion is the only create a post capitalist society.

Bifo 11 [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism “Chapter 4 Exhastion and Subjectivity.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 107-108 // DHS NJ]

In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of 107 death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best deconstructs semiocapitalist modes of thought.

#### Status quo education is permeated by semiocapitalist thought which means all analysis within pedagogical spaces such as debate operates under this lens - we must collapse the system to access any knowledge.

Carlin ‘14, Matthew Carlin, Jason Wallin, “Deleuze & Guattari, Politics and Education,” Bloomsbury, 2014, accessed 9-3-21 Dulles//JL

Education is under attack. The privatization of the educational system has been one of the tenets of the neo-liberal counter-revolution during the past thirty years. In the wake of the financial crisis in the West and the concomitant calls for ‘austerity’, cuts to public funding have had a profound effect on cultural institutions, on all levels of schooling, and on all forms of university and scientific research. This has been particularly noticeable in Europe, where the privatization of the education system is a relatively new phenomenon in comparison to the United States. The effect of this process of financialization and privatization is easy to predict: growing ignorance, violence, misery and precarity. The destruction of the educational system, converging with the acceleration of the Infosphere and the growing complexity of the semiotic environment, is one of the main features of the contemporary spasm. The protests of students and teachers in defence of public education systems (particularly in Europe) are not enough. New educational institutions have to be conceived and built as chaoids, healers of the spasmodic mind and the spasmodic body of society. The modern educational process has been conceived as a process of critical transmission of knowledge. Because of the spasmodic condition of the social brain, the mind-format of teaching is diverging from the mind-format of the learner. As a result, the formal educational process is less and less effective in transmitting knowledge. The transmission of knowledge is becoming more and more dysfunctional and empty. The mind-format of the connective generation is scarcely interacting (or not interacting at all) with the mind-format of the alphabetical generation. The spreading phenomenon of ‘attention deficit disorder’ is only one of the many examples and aspects of the decreasing functionality of educational systems in the present transition that is marked by the spasm. In the connective sphere of techno-communication, mental energy is incorporated into the semiocapital process of production. This incorporation implies a standardization and formatting of the cognitive body. Bodily meaning and meaningful bodies become an impossibility as a result of the formatting process. A decisive step in this process of subsumption of nervous energy and intellectual work by the techno-financial articulations of semiocapital is the destruction of the modern institution of the university, and the building of a recombinant system of knowledge exploitation that demands the cancellation of knowledge autonomy while reducing the learning process to a mere acquisition of operational skills. Autonomy was crucial in the conception and purpose of the modern university. Autonomy was not only independence from academic institutions, but the methodologies of scientific research and artistic practice as well. In the humanistic sphere of modern bourgeois civilization, each field of knowledge was expected to autonomously establish its own laws: conventions, aims, procedures, forms of verification and change. Consistently the university was based on two pillars: the first was the relation of the intellectuals to the city (i.e. the ethical and political role of reason and of research); and the second was the autonomy of research, teaching, discovery, innovation, and the production and transmission of moral, scientific and technical acquisitions. The entrepreneurial bourgeois owner was strongly linked to the territory of his properties. He was also interested in the development of these properties, and knew that the autonomy of knowledge was necessary for achieving productive results. The long process of emancipation from theocratic dogma deeply influenced bourgeois culture and identity throughout modern times. The financialization of the economy in the post-bourgeois era has led to the de-localization of work and information. The main trend of this transformation has been the formation of the homo oeconomicus (Michel Foucault, 2010) in which every act and thought has been translated into economic terms. This transition implies the abolition of the autonomy of knowledge, as the semiocapitalist economy gets hold of every space of social life. Economics, which is now more a technology for the crystallization of time into capital than a science, has progressively assumed the central place in the system of knowledge and research. Every act of research, of teaching, of learning, and of inventing is subjected to the following questions: Is it sellable? Is it profitable? Is it helping capital accumulation? Is it meeting the demands of corporate finance? Those who do not recognize the primacy of the economic principle in the field of education, or those who refuse to worship the central dogma of the neo-liberal church by condemning the rules of competition, profitability and compatibility, are labelled as sceptics, non-believers, atheists and communists. The fate that awaits such miscreants is marginalization and expulsion. The educational chaoide that we need is a sceptical institution for the re-activation of autonomy of knowledge from economic dogma.

**CX checks all theory arguments otherwise grant me an auto I-meet to avoid frivolous debates.**

## AT AC

Fw – util is influenced by the hyperreal – they operate under the code you must address semiocap first

Pain and pleasure not intrinsic – justifies oppression of majority

And even if thye win fw if we win our theory of power u still vote

But even if you buy util – we outweigh under bc extinction

### ADV

No link – we don’t defend status quo they concdde in cross it links to advocacy

Link turn – it’s the empty signs and signifiers of media that polarize the audience

There is no trust in state

#### Democracy is bad –

#### Backsliding solves great power nuclear war.

Muller 15 [Director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, 15, Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49]

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

#### Yes war – Fractured states, Intervention, and Terrorism.

Michael Neiberg 18, Chair of War Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College, 06-19-18, (“Predicting War,” Lawfare, [https://www.lawfareblog.com/predicting-war](about:blank)) Justin

Whether influenced by Hollywood or Santa Monica (the California headquarters of RAND), the history of war as Freedman relates it is essentially conceptual. The end of the dominant Cold War paradigm is a case in point. The ahistorical euphoria of the supposed “end of history” misled many western experts into predicting that an age of perpetual peace would at long last come into view because, as one specialist in this period wrote, the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations,” thus undergirding the rise of global governance ideals of liberal internationalism. The way forward in those early years after the fall of the Iron Curtain seemed therefore not technological, but conceptual. The key to peace lay in finding ways to help this one supposedly empirical historical law to take hold. Rather than bring peace, however, the pursuit of the concept of perpetual security through democracy only produced a new idea of war. It convinced western leaders of the need to advance the speed of historical progress through carefully managed military action against a select number of dictators. As prosecuted by George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and their advisers, the new paradigm not only made it possible for great powers to consider meddling in the domestic politics of smaller states, it impelled them to do so. By making more states democratic, through the use of force if necessary, these interventions would make the world safer. The idea was at least as old as Woodrow Wilson, but the eras of the world wars and the Cold War had made it too difficult to put in practice. After 1989, with the seemingly insurmountable dominance of western military organizations, the absence of a Soviet Union to balance western intervention, and the general post-Cold War hubris of western leaders, the environment was right for it to return. The result, of course, has not been an end of history and perpetual peace, but an extension of conflict and a reawakening of older grievances. The central problem, as “The Future of War” depicts it, was an all-too-eager willingness to accept the basic principle of democratic peace theory without thinking through the limits of the theory or fully examining alternatives. One clear alternative theory had already begun to emerge from the minds of theorists like Mary Kaldor and Rupert Smith. Their works essentially argued that war as once understood no longer existed. The future belonged to the side that could best exploit the disintegration of state authority, control the messaging, and work among the people in the new megacities. Anne-Marie Slaughter saw the inevitable splintering of the “sovereign state” into sub-sovereign centers of governance power, thereby squeezing out sovereignty in favor of power exercised by non-sovereign or less-than-sovereign institutions, on the one hand, and the ascendant rule of supra-national institutions, on the other. One might argue, although Freedman does not, that Hezbollah, FARC, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others have been able to survive against much more technologically sophisticated states because they have indeed made the intellectual shift to the kind of conflict that Kaldor and Smith described. The west has struggled against such adversaries not on the technological level but on the conceptual one. The west had two models on which to draw, neither of which helped them conceptualize the central problem. The “aid to civil power” model suggested building up the capabilities of local authorities so that they could care for their own security needs and maybe even become an exporter of regional security. The second model focused on “peacekeeping,” which required armies to act impartially even when, as in Yugoslavia, such a model indirectly empowered malicious actors like Slobodan Milosevic. Both models were frustrating, but they had just enough successes to keep them viable and allow them to survive intellectual challenges like the ones posed by Kaldor and Smith.

#### Pursuit unsustainable – Russia backlash leads to extinction.

Babayan 15 (Nelli Babayan is a senior researcher at the Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universita¨t Berlin. “The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad” Democratization, 2015 Vol. 22, No. 3, 438 – 45)

How did Russia counteract EaP in Armenia? Since its independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia has welcomed democracy promotion efforts and committed to the regional policies of the EU and the US, including democracy promotion. The expulsion of Russian military bases from Georgia after the 2008 conflict and their move to Armenia made the latter last remaining stronghold of Russian military power in the region. The entire spectrum of Russia's instruments in counteracting democracy promotion or for that matter any EU/US policy deemed as challenging were particularly evident in the case of Armenia's 2013 “U-turn”59 from the EU AA to Russia's Customs Union. The case of Armenia demonstrates that Russia is most prone to counteract the EU and the US when faced with imminent effectiveness of democracy promotion supported by local actors or when faced with challenges to its geostrategic interests. As Delcour and Wolczuk show in this special issue, this logic also applies to Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine. By the employment of economic and military instruments and through the promotion of alternative regional institutions, Russia counteracted EU policy, which has also been supported by the US. Thus, Russian efforts for counteracting the initiatives within the EaP peaked with success in September 2013: Armenia turned to the Eurasian Customs Union and in November 2013 Ukraine withdrew from initialling the AA despite a wave of domestic protests in both countries.60 Energy, more specifically gas, and the protracted conflicts are the main pressure points used by Russia in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Devoid of natural energy resources and with a protracted conflict at hand, Armenia makes a compliant target for Russia's energy and military pressures. In the mid-2000s Russia successfully blocked the diversification of Armenia's gas sources by imposing restrictions on the pipeline from Iran.61 Regular Armenian concessions in terms of infrastructure and cooperation with other neighbours secured comparatively lower gas prices. However, after Armenia concluded the sixth round of DCFTA negotiations leading to the initialling of the AA, in July 2013 Russia threatened to increase gas prices by 60%, while suggesting that the costs may be subsidized and not increase in the next five years should Armenia join the Customs Union.62 Consequently, Armenia entered negotiations for an 18% rise. It allowed Russian gas-monopoly Gazprom to acquire the remaining 20% of shares of the gas procuring company ArmRusGazprom, which had previously belonged to the Armenian government. Russian media, which is also widely viewed in Armenia, publicized a number of preferential agreements and possible subsidies promised by Putin to Armenia's President Serzh Sargsyan in return for joining the Customs Union. In addition, Russia promised larger investments into prolonging the exploitation of the Armenian nuclear power plant and other factories, regarded as obsolete or environmentally hazardous by the EU and the US.63 Besides economic threats, Russia has also been taking advantage of the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh region. While Azerbaijan's energy industry has allowed it to exponentially multiply its military budget, Armenia has been largely reliant on Russia for its security against possible military actions by Azerbaijan. While Armenia

### Theory

I literally asked them before round if they wanted me to meet any interps – grant me an I meet

Asking solves – I have my contact info on the wiki and it says contact to meet any interps

1] you check my academic integrity bc I still send case so this is n/u

2] accessibility – I disclose after the tourney, not disclosing for one rd is not going to cause that much loss in prep

3] research should be done on your own w/o relying on others

4] clash – Im reading a diff position doesn’t solve clash

Ci – defend the vio

Their interp means novices would have to disclose and trad debaters would have to disclose at locals – reject amb interp

Inclusiveness – theres no distinction on who discloses

Critical thinking – having to deal w all types of arguments on the spot helps policy making

Yes rvis RVIs--- Reciprocity/timeskew , Logic, Deters tricks/friv theory, (edited)

Reasonability -- substance / avoids tricks

#### Use reasonability on the brightline of in-round abuse -- Competing interps ensures endless theory debates -- empirically proven by the overwhelming norm of competing interps and the strategic value it gives theory in LD. Reasonability is critical to ensure theory checks abusive practices that tangibly impact the debate rather than a strategic device to run from substance.