## 1

#### Interpretation: If the aff reads a rob, then the aff must explicitly specify in the form of a text in the 1AC where they clarify how 1)offense links back to the role of the ballot, such as whether post-fiat offense or pre-fiat offense matters and 2)what constitutes that offense with implications on how to weigh and 3) what comes first theory or the AC

#### Violation: they don’t

#### Standards:

#### 1. Engagement – Knowing what counts as offense is a prerequisite to making arguments, so its impossible to engage the aff. Our interp ensures that I read something relevant to your method, and knowing how to weigh gives us a standard. Especially true since there is no norm on what “performative engagement” like there is for util offense

#### Few impacts:

#### a) Education – When two ships pass in the night we don’t learn anything - This also guts novice inclusion because now they can never learn arguments in round.

#### b) Turns the aff – Your impacts are premised on engaging with issues of oppression, but no one will take seriously a position that can’t be clashed with

#### c) Strategy Skew – You can recontextualize your ROTB to make up reasons why my offense doesn’t link in the 1AR

#### Framing: You can’t use your ROB to exclude my shell. My shell simply constrains how you read your ROTB. My method is your ROTB with specification, so if I’m winning comparative offense, the shell outweighs even if method debates in general preclude theory. If they go for the Aff first that proves the abuse of my shell since they should have specified in the AC.

## 2

### Framing

#### P/P negate

1. More ways a statement is false
2. Aff has to prove its unjust, permisibilty denies it is unjust

#### Ethics must begin apriori

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in relatvism since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which concedes its authority and equally proves agency as constitutive.

#### That implies universality

#### [1] Apriori truths are true for everyone, i.e. the sum of interior angles in a triangle equaling 180 can’t only be true for me but not you

#### [2] Principle of equality- There is nothing apriori distinct between agents thus our obligations should be equal, which means even if we aren’t bound to the categorical imperative, universality is still a side constraint on other frameworks.

#### Freedom follows

#### [1] Its impossible to will a violation of freedom, since it necessarily entails a violation of your own freedom thus violating your will.

#### [2] We could not hold agents responsible for their actions if we did not assume them to have the freedom to control their actions for themselves.

**And the universality of freedom justifies a libertarian state.**

**OTTESON 9 brackets in original** James R. Otteson (professor of philosophy and economics at Yeshiva University) “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter 2009

In a crucial passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the “Universal Principle of Right” is **“‘[e]very action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else** in accordance with a universal law is right.’” He concludes, “Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law” (1991, 133, emphasis in original).5 This stipulation **becomes** for Kant **the grounding justification for the existence of a state**, its raison d’être, and **the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure this sphere of maximum freedom compatible with the same freedom of all others**. **Because this freedom must be complete**, in the sense of being **as full as possible** given the existence of other persons who demand similar freedom, it entails that **the state may**—indeed, must—**secure this condition** of freedom, **but undertake to do nothing else because any other** state **activities would compromise the very autonomy the state seeks to defend**. Kant’s position thus outlines and implies a political philosophy that is broadly libertarian; that is, it endorses a state constructed with the sole aim of protecting its citizens against invasions of their liberty. For Kant, **individuals create a state to protect their moral agency, and** in doing so **they consent to coercion only insofar as it is required to prevent themselves** or others **from impinging on** their own or **others’ agency**. In his argument, individuals cannot rationally consent to a state that instructs them in morals, coerces virtuous behavior, commands them to trade or not, directs their pursuit of happiness, or forcibly requires them to provide for their own or others’ pursuits of happiness. And except in cases of punishment for wrongdoing,6 this severe limitation on the scope of the state’s authority must always be respected: “The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance” (Perpetual Peace, 1991, 125). The implication is that a Kantian state protects against invasions of freedom and does nothing else; in the absence of invasions or threats of invasions, it is inactive.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with with a libertarian state of non-interference.

#### Prefer the standard:

#### [1] Resource Disparities- a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since huge evidence files aren’t required.

#### [2]Past experiences have no effect on causality or internal link to continuity, i.e. raining yesterday doesn’t mean rain today.

### Offense

#### Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system.

In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today.

For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears.

Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being.

Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### Property rights in space can be consistent with international law

Simberg 12 [(Rand, MSE in technical management from West Coast University, recognized as an expert in space transportation by the Office of Technology Assessment) “Homesteading the Final Frontier A Practical Proposal for Securing Property Rights in Space,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, April 2012, <https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Rand-Simberg-Homesteading-the-Final-Frontier.pdf>] TDI

But is it true that any recognition of off-planet property claims is de facto a violation of the Outer Space Treaty? Not necessarily. For instance, one could argue that the existence of the Moon Treaty is in and of itself a refutation of the notion that the Outer Space Treaty outlaws private property in space, or else there would be no need for another treaty that essentially explicitly does so. And there is at least one potential loophole that could be exploited by appropriately worded legislation.

There are two key assumptions in the legal argument used by opponents of off-planet property claims: 1) that the recognition by a government would only recognize claims by its own citizens; and 2) that it would defend them by force. That need not necessarily be so. Under the treaty, it would in fact be possible for a government, or group of governments, to recognize the property claims of anyone who met specified conditions, regardless of their citizenship or nationality. Such cooperation would obviate the need for physical force to defend claims. The argument that the treaty permits individual property rights was actually made from the very beginning. In 1969, two years after the treaty went into force, the late distinguished space-law professor, Stephen Gorove, noted that under it, “[A]n individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies.”32 This clearly provides support for the concept of individual claims off planet under Article II.

#### Only univeralizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

### Case

#### AT Theory of Power - Racial capitalism fails as a theory.

Go 21 – Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago (Julian, “Three Tensions in the Theory of Racial Capitalism”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 38-47, 2021)

What Is the “Race” in Racial Capitalism? We can now turn to the three tensions in the racial capitalism literature, beginning with the issue of race. This is critical. If the term racial capitalism is to have implications for social theory, it must offer rigorously defined concepts constituting a transposable conceptual apparatus. Surely one of those concepts would have to do with “race.” But what exactly is “race”? The problem is that “race” is not typically defined in the existing literature, so it is unclear whether other categories marking difference, such as ethnicity, are more appropriate than race. Should we be thinking about “ethnic capitalism” rather than racial capitalism? Robinson’s (2000) work is a prime example. Nearly all scholars claim that one of Robinson’s key contributions is to show that capitalism was forged from precapitalist racial divisions in Europe. Capitalism is “racial,” according to Robinson, “because racialism had already permeated Western feudal society,” and capitalism was built upon that racialism (Kelley 2017; Táíwò and Bright 1996). The problem is that Robinson himself was not entirely clear that precapitalist social differences were actually “racial.” On one hand, he did use the term race in his analysis. “Racism,” Robinson (2000:2; see also pp. 26–27, 66–67) wrote, served to structure “the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples” prior to capitalism, and capitalism seized on racism as it developed. On other hand, when discussing some of the presumably “racial” groups in feudal Europe, Robinson (2000:10–11) referred to linguistic rather than phenotypical differences, thus equating racial groups with linguistic groups. In fact, when discussing how migratory and immigrant labor formed the basis for the armies of the Absolutist states and for the production of value in early agrarian capitalism, he oscillated between calling them “races” and “ethnic” groups. For instance, Robinson (2000:23) used the phrase “ethnic divisions of sixteenth century immigrant labor,” and he referred to “national” differences when presumably speaking about premodern “racial” differences. Given these ambiguities, Robinson’s argument could be read differently from how it is conventionally taken. It is not that capitalism was built on prior racial differences; rather, capitalism served to racialize the preexisting ethnic division of labor, thereby turning religious, cultural, or linguistic differences into “racial” ones to legitimate its new exploitative structure. In this view, racialization—the process of turning groups into biological entities called “races”—was a part of modern capitalism, not its precursor (cf. Omi and Winant 1986). In some passages, Robinson (2000) said this exactly: “the tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into ‘racial’ ones” (p. 26). Of course, whether “race” preexisted capitalism does not alter the larger argument of the racial capitalism approach, which is that racial differentiation and capitalism are mutually supportive. Still, the tension in Robinson’s work manifests the deeper issue of whether “racial” capitalism refers to race or other identities. This issue permeates Walzer’s (2020) recent criticism of the racial capitalism concept. Walzer points to examples such as Russia and China, where capitalism does not rely on racial differences but rather on ethnic and religious differentiation. “It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia,” he wrote, “but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group.” On this basis, Walzer rejected the racial capitalism concept as limited at best and analytically debilitating at worse. Skeptics of Walzer have offered a rebuke: his argument misses the global dimensions of capitalism. At issue is not whether racial stratification articulates with capitalism within any single country but whether it permeates the world-capitalist system. Proponents of this argument could readily assemble evidence to show that, on a global scale, the vast majority of the world’s proletariat, subproletariat, and dispossessed—whether cultivating grapes or coffee on the farms of the Americas, cleaning up office floors in London, or making clothes in the sweatshops of New Delhi—are, to borrow DuBois’s (1935) phrase, “yellow, brown and black.” Against Walzer, this would retain the main claim of the racial capitalism approach that race and capitalism are intertwined. Yet this scaling upward of capitalism to a global level brings its own complications. It carries the danger of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) called “the cunning of imperialist [racialist] reason”: an analytic operation by which U.S.-centered scholars impose presumably U.S.-centric classifications (in this case, “race”) onto the rest of the world, thereby imposing racial classifications into contexts where they might not be operative. We would be obliged, for instance, to impose racial classifications onto Latin American contexts such as Brazil, where the salience of racial classifications is debatable (Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2015). In short, if we are to insist on the global character of racial capitalism, we must assume that analysts’ racial classifications are global as well. They may very well be, but racial capitalism’s founding texts, and more recent discussions, have not sufficiently problematized this tension.2 Can this tension be resolved? One way to do so is to raise the possibility that the racial capitalism concept works best for groups that have been undoubtedly racialized, such as members of the African diaspora in North America.3 Racial capitalism would thus refer mainly to the black ex-slave population, which has suffered some of the clearest and most virulent forms of racism. This might explain why the literature on racial capitalism has focused on African Americans and transatlantic slavery rather than other groups elsewhere in the world. Yet this seeming resolution would significantly reduce the scope of the racial capitalism concept. Racial capitalism would no longer depict a global system. Perhaps the best resolution is one that arrives through more reflexive research. We can explore how “race” is connected to capitalism in diverse sites and across historical periods, but we must be more conscious about whether we are referring to analysts’ definition of race or a category of practice. Put simply, we can arrive at a resolution only through careful research that more clearly defines “race.” The Inadequacy of Existing Theory A second tension in the racial capitalism literature has to do with the relationship between this literature and existing social theories of capitalism, in particular, Marxian theories of capitalism. Animating the racial capitalism approach is the claim that Marxian theories of capitalism are inadequate because they obfuscate the racial foundations of capitalism. For Robinson (2000), “Western Marxism . . . has proven insufficiently radical to expose and root out the racialist order that contaminates its analytic and philosophic applications” (p. 317). Historians’ use of the racial capitalism approach is premised on the idea that Marxism does not adequately acknowledge slavery’s role in capitalism or the ongoing importance of colonialism and “primitive accumulation,” which Marx presumably relegated to the margins of his theory (Smallwood 2018). This is exactly why scholars in this tradition insist on the term racial capitalism: because Marxian theory fails to theorize race, we must add the qualifier race to the signifier capitalism. But what if Marxian theory does in fact take into account race, slavery, imperialism, and colonialism, and proponents of the racial capitalism approach merely misread Marx? If so, the warrant, if not the entire premise, for Robinson’s and others’ work on racial capitalism would crater by an unfortunate misreading of Marxian theory. A number of scholars, in fact, already push against the notion that Marxist thought does not account for race, slavery, or colonialism. Drawing largely on Marx’s journalistic writings, they show that Marx not only discussed race, slavery, and colonialism but saw them as central for capitalism. According to this argument, Marx saw race as so crucial for capitalism that his theory saw the true proletariat as black, brown, and yellow—directly contrary to Robinson’s claim that Marxist theory only saw the white European proletariat as the true subject of history (Anderson 2010; Foster, Holleman, and Clark 2020; Ralph and Singhal 2019). If true, the racial capitalism literature is based on a “misguided reading of Marx” (Ralph and Singhal 2019:864). How might this apparent aporia in Marxian theory be resolved, if at all? It is imperative here to register a distinction between Marx’s theory of capital and his theory of capitalism. 4 The former is sketched in Marx’s mature social theory in Capital and related writings such as The Grundrisse (Postone 1996). These writings offer a formalized and abstract representation of the inner workings of capital, its accumulation, its contradictions, and its necessary demise through a series of central categories that capture the key elements of the capitalist system. At this level of abstraction, the main categories of the theory (e.g., “value,” “surplus value,” “concrete labor,” “abstract labor,” “capital,” “socially necessary labor time”) are devoid of any historical specificity or social content and as such can be applied to distinct historical phases or social formations (e.g., capitalism in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world or Russia in 1998, or the twenty-first-century global system). Categories of race, gender, or ethnicity are therefore not central, because they are too concrete. Alternatively, a theory of capitalism refers to capitalist development and dynamics in their empirical specificity. It is meant to explain and describe specific capitalist formations and developments as they really exist in the world, not their abstract conceptual form. This theory can be extracted from Marx’s journalistic writings and other essays, and it is here where issues such as slavery and ethnicity arise: the essays refer to real events and pressing issues in actually existing capitalism, such as the Civil War or the Irish question (Anderson 2010). But these observations or statements on concrete processes and relations such as slavery in actually existing capitalism—that is, Marx’s theory of capitalism—do not disturb or reconfigure his theory of capital, which remains focused on the relations of wage labor induced to a highly abstract level from his analysis of textile production. If and when he did discuss things such as slavery, such as in “The Working Day” section in Capital, he treated slavery as a passing phase or outside capital’s inner logic, a sort of heuristic to better apprehend and illuminate the latter (Marx [1867] 1906:328–30; on slavery as a heuristic, see Smallwood 2018). This distinction between Marx’s theory of capitalism and his theory of capital helps us better approach the debate generated by the racial capitalism literature. When Robinson or other proponents of the racial capitalism idea critique Marx’s theory for eliding or deliberately occluding race, slavery, and colonialism, they are critiquing his theory of capital, not his theory of capitalism. Here proponents of the racial capitalism approach are on solid ground. Marx’s theory of capitalism does take into account race, slavery, and colonialism, but his theory of capital renders these things marginal at best.5 Hence the warrant for the racial capitalism approach: because Marx’s theory of capital does not center race, the racial capitalism concept and the research and theorizing that go under its banner can fill the void. The concept may provide the basis for an alternative theory not only of racial capitalism but also of racialized capital. Necessity, Contingency, and Difference The final tension within racial capitalism is whether the interconnectedness of racial difference and capitalism is a logical or contingent necessity.6 If, as the racial capitalism literature suggests, slavery and its associated logics of racism have been crucial for the development of capitalism, and if global capitalism today remains intertwined with racial stratification, to what extent are these relations intrinsic to capitalism or accidental? Put differently, is capitalism necessarily racist (Fraser 2019; Lemann 2020)?7 For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference, and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capitalism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideological necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9 So what is the answer? Again, it helps differentiate between a theory of capital and a theory of capitalism. A theory of capitalism might demonstrate that race has been historically necessary for capitalist accumulation by reference to empirical reality: historically, capitalism and race have always been intertwined. But the claim that race is a logical necessity to capitalism would have to derive from a theory of capital, not from empirics alone. One would have to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory, the necessity of racism or racial differentiation in society. On this score, the arguments for the logical necessity of capitalism’s entanglements with race fall short. Consider the argument that racism is necessary for capitalism because capitalism requires racist ideology to divide the working class. This is a functionalist argument that is not functionalist enough, for it effaces the logical possibility of functional substitution. We may find that racism has historically always functioned to divide the working class, but in theory other “isms” could serve the same function. There is nothing inherent to the logic of capital that requires race to be the ideology of division (Lebowitz 2006:39).10 Why not ethnicity? Why not sexuality? Consider Fraser’s argument that expropriation is intrinsic to capitalism and that racial differentiation must be too. It is plausible and indeed persuasive to claim that expropriation is necessary for capitalism, but it is less persuasive to claim that racial difference is logically necessary for expropriation. Gender could easily serve as the main axis of dependent classification (and, to feminist-Marxist thought, it has served that function), as could ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or citizenship. Fraser would have to show that expropriation, and hence capitalism, requires a racial classification as opposed to other social categories. This is a task left unfulfilled.11 A different and possibly more productive route would be to reframe the issue as one of social difference rather than race. Is racism necessary for capitalism? There are good reasons, as just mentioned, to think not. But is social difference of various types (from race to gender to ethnicity) necessary for capitalism?12 This is more demonstrable, both empirically (by reference to actually existing capitalism) and theoretically (by reference to the logic of capital accumulation). For example, Fraser’s argument about expropriation could be reformulated in the following manner: expropriation is logically necessary for exploitation, which is in turn necessary for capital accumulation, and expropriation requires differentiation among workers. This differentiation could be along racial lines, or it could be along other lines such as gender, but differentiation there must be. Note that this argument logically insinuates a racial component but remains abstract enough to account for other possible identities across different capitalist formations. It can account for racialized slave labor in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world (where “race” was a key axis of differentiation), twentieth-century Russia (where ethnicity or religion might be the important axis), or gender across all these formations. This is just one possibility. There are others. Chakrabarty (1993), for instance, seized on Marx’s categories of “abstract” and “real” labor to write difference into Marx’s theoretical architecture. “Abstract labor” generated by capitalism refers to a homogeneity among different and otherwise incommensurable labors. It is the register of the juridical free subject. But “real” labor marks have heterogeneity that registers the incommensurability of different labors. It therefore refers to a difference that stands “only as a Derridean trace of something that cannot be enclosed” (Chakrabarty 1993:1096). Exactly how persuasive is Chakrabarty’s rereading remains to be seen. The point is that this effort, and others like it, speak to theoretical possibilities that the racial capitalism literature opens up but has yet to pursue thoroughly. More could be done.13

#### Racial Capitalism thesis is incorrect – connection between Race and Cap is circumstantial not necessary

Walzer 20 Michael Walzer 7-29-2020 "A Note on Racial Capitalism" <https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/a-note-on-racial-capitalism> (a prominent American political theorist and public intellectual. A professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey)//Elmer

I have been puzzled for many months by the appearance of the phrase “racial capitalism” in the left press (see, for example, the article by K. Sabeel Rahman in the Summer 2020 issue of Dissent). What does it mean? Perhaps the adjective “racial” is simply an ordinary qualifying adjective. Racial capitalism is one kind of capitalism, and then there must be other kinds, requiring other adjectives. Here in the United States we have a kind of capitalism where the majority of exploited workers or a majority of the most exploited workers are people of color. The underclass and the reserve army are defined both racially and economically. Of course, no leftist writer would be indifferent to the exploitation of white workers, who might still make up the majority of the American workforce—and who are certainly the majority of exploited workers in Europe. The point of the adjective, then, is simply to focus our attention, for good reasons, on non-white workers. But is the exploitation of these workers a necessary feature of American capitalism? The phrase “racial capitalism” leaves us unclear about whether the hierarchical location of non-white workers is determined by race or by capitalism or by the two somehow working together. To begin to answer that question, we need to look at some examples of non-racial capitalism. The form of capitalism sponsored by the **Chinese communists** is obviously non-racial. Though the exploited workers are, in Western terminology, people of color, Western terminology is out of place here. If the Chinese imported white workers to take on the most menial jobs, that might make Chinese capitalism “racial,” **but no such importations have been reported**. The predatory version of capitalism that prevails in Putin’s Russia is also non-racial. It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia, but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group. But no one is doing that. I have no statistics, but from what I read about China and Russia, I doubt that the rate of exploitation is higher in the United States, in racial capitalism, than it is in those two countries, **where capitalism is non-racial**. **Capitalism “works” with and without a racialized underclass** and reserve army. But is that right? The adjective “racial” sometimes makes a much stronger claim: it isn’t a qualifying but rather a definitional adjective. Capitalism is necessarily, inherently, racist. Forget about China and Russia, which are capitalist latecomers. Western capitalism is the prototypical version, and it has been racist from day one (if we can agree on day one)—always and forever racist. Does this mean that Manchester in 1844, as Engels described it, where all the exploited workers were white, wasn’t capitalist? No, for those workers were producing fabrics from cotton raised and harvested by Black slaves in the American South. That’s true enough, but I am not sure it is sufficient for an argument about necessity. Consider a counterfactual possibility: had no Black slaves been available, the recruitment of Irish workers would have started much earlier than it did. The rise of capitalism would not have been halted had the slave trade never begun. But the Manchester/Southern plantation example suggests what we all now know: capitalism is a global economic system, and it depends on the exploitation of people of color around the world. Here, however, it seems clear that the key **issue is exploitation, not racism**. Given global demography, the majority of workers in any global economy will be people of color. Even in a democratically or social democratically regulated global system, the majority of workers and the majority of managers—the underclass and the overclass—will be non-white. Indeed, it would be the refusal of any transnational corporation to hire people of color that would rightly be called racist. (In the Pennsylvania town where I grew up, the local steel company did not hire, and therefore did not exploit, Jews or Black people. I suppose that this is also an example of racial capitalism.) All this suggests that capitalism and racism **have to be analyzed separately**. They overlap sometimes, as they do today in the United States. But the overlap is **circumstantial, not necessary**. **The two phenomena are distinct. They don’t rise and fall together. Each one, for different reasons, requires severe criticism and sustained opposition.** Many years ago, socialist writers argued that the triumph of the working class would liberate women, Jews, Black people, and everyone else. Separate political struggles against sexism, anti-Semitism, or racism were unnecessary—indeed they were a distraction from the all-important class war. Today some people on the left seem to believe that the end of racism will bring with it the downfall of capitalism. Both these theories are wrong. Overthrowing racism will still leave us with capitalism; overthrowing capitalism will still leave us with racism. Putting the adjective and noun together gives us a false sense of the **relationship** between the two phenomena. It might make sense, then, to ban the phrase from the pages of left newspapers and magazines. But since I am opposed to bans of that sort, I would only suggest that the phrase should always be queried by the editors. Do the writers who use it have some idea about what it means? Or are they just against racial capitalism, whatever it means?

#### 1] The Aff stifles Innovation – means the neg is a massive impact turn

Vaidyanath 17 Rahul Vaidyanath 3-1-2017 "How Communism Stifles Innovation" <https://www.theepochtimes.com/how-communism-stifles-innovation_2228620.html?welcomeuser=1> (Rahul Vaidyanath is a journalist with The Epoch Times in Canada. His areas of expertise include the economy, financial markets, China, and national defence and security. He has worked for the Bank of Canada, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp., and investment banks in Toronto, New York, and Los Angeles.)//Elmer

**Research shows** that the **political ideology of communism** **restricts innovation**, **which is** the **panacea for economic growth and long-term prosperity** today. In broad strokes, the **communist tenets of state ownership of business and property**, under strict government supervision, **lead to a risk-averse culture**. People in these societies work in an environment **that discourages ambition and creativity**. This is the polar opposite of the conditions that foster innovation. The **2017 I**nternational **I**ntellectual **P**roperty **I**ndex, recently published by the Global Intellectual Property Center (GIPC), **ranks** the **current bastion of communism, China**, **as No. 27** and formerly communist Russia as No. 23—behind the smaller economies of Malaysia, Mexico, and Turkey, for example.

#### 2] Capitalism is sustainable - Tech Innovation drives dematerialization that makes Cap Sustainable AND solves warming

McAfee 19, Andrew. More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next. Scribner, 2019. Props to DML for finding. (Cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, former professor at Harvard Business School)//Elmer

The decreases in resource use, pollution, and other exploitations of the earth cataloged in the preceding chapters are great news. But are they going to last? It could be that we're just living in a pleasant interlude between the Industrial Era and another rapacious period during which we massively increase our footprint on our planet and eventually cause a giant Malthusian crash. It could be, but I don't think so. Instead, I think we're going to take better care of our planet from now on. I'm confident that the Second Machine Age will mark the time in our history when we started to progressively and permanently tread more lightly on the earth, taking less from it and generally caring for it better, even as we humans continue to become more numerous and prosperous. The work of Paul Romer, who shared the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics, is one of the sources of this confidence. Growth Mindset Romer's largest contribution to economics was to show that **it's best not to think of new technologies as something that companies buy and bring in from the outside, but instead as something they create themselves** (the title of his most famous paper, published in 1990, is "Endogenous Technological Change"). These technologies are like designs or recipes; as Romer put it, they’re "the instructions that we follow for combining raw materials." This is close to the definitions of technology presented in chapter 7. Why do companies invent and improve technologies? Simply, to generate profits. They come up with instructions, recipes, and blueprints that will let them grow revenues or shrink costs. As we saw repeatedly in chapter 7, capitalism provides ample incentive for this kind of tech progress. So far, all this seems like a pretty standard argument for how the first two horsemen work together. Romer's brilliance was to highlight the importance of two key attributes of the technological ideas companies come up with as they pursue profits. The first is that they're nonrival, meaning that they can be used by more than one person or company at a time, and that they don't get used up. This is obviously not the case for most resources made out of atoms—I can't also use the pound of steel that you've just incorporated into the engine of a car—but it is the case for ideas and instructions. The Pythagorean theorem, a design for a steam engine, and a recipe for delicious chocolate chip cookies aren't ever going to get "used up" no matter how much they're used. The second important aspect of corporate technologies is that they're partially excludable. This means that companies can kind of prevent others from using them. They do this by keeping the technologies secret (such as the exact recipe for Coca-Cola), filing for patents and other intellectual-property protection, and so on. However, none of these measures is perfect (hence the words partially and kind of). Trade secrets leak. Patents expire, and even before they expire, they must describe the invention they're claiming and so let others study it. Partial excludability is a beautiful thing. It provides strong incentives for companies to create useful, profit-enhancing new technologies that they alone can benefit from for a time, yet it also ensures that the **new techs will eventually "spill over**"—that with time they’ll diffuse and get adopted by more and more companies, even if that's not what their originators want. Romer equated tech progress to the production by companies of nonrivalrous, partially excludable ideas and showed that these ideas cause an economy to grow. What's more, he also demonstrated that this **idea-fueled growth** doesn't have to slow down with time. It's **not constrained by** the size of the **labor** force, the amount of natural **resources**, or other such factors. Instead, economic growth is limited only by the idea-generating capacity of the people within a market. Romer called this capacity "human capital" and said at the end of his 1990 paper, "The most interesting positive implication of the model is that an economy with a larger total stock of human capital will experience faster growth." This notion, which has come to be called "increasing returns to scale," is as powerful as it is counterintuitive. Most formal models of economic growth, as well as the informal mental ones most of us walk around with, feature decreasing returns—growth slows down as the overall economy gets bigger. This makes intuitive sense; it just feels like it would be easier to experience 5 percent growth in a $1 billion economy than a $1 trillion one. But Romer showed that as long as that economy continued to add to its human capital—the overall ability of its people to come up with new technologies and put them to use—it could actually grow faster even as it grew bigger. This is because the stock of useful, nonrivalrous, nonexcludable ideas would keep growing. As Romer convincingly showed, economies run and grow on ideas. The Machinery of Prosperity Romer's ideas should leave us optimistic about the planetary benefits of digital tools—hardware, software, and networks—for three main reasons. First, countless examples show us how good these tools are at fulfilling the central role of technology, which is to provide "instructions that we follow for combining raw materials." Since raw materials cost money, profit-maximizing companies are particularly keen to find ways to use fewer of them. So they use digital tools to come up with beer cans that use less aluminum, car engines that use less steel and less gas, mapping software that removes the need for paper atlases, and so on and so on. None of this is done solely for the good of the earth—it's done for the pursuit of profit that's at the heart of capitalism—yet it benefits the planet by, as we've seen, causing us to take less from it. Digital tools are technologies for creating technologies, the most prolific and versatile ones we've ever come up with. They're machines for coming up with ideas. Lots of them. The same piece of computer-aided design software can be used to create a thinner aluminum can or a lighter and more fuel-efficient engine. A drone can be used to scan farmland to see if more irrigation is needed, or to substitute for a helicopter when filming a movie. A smartphone can be used to read the news, listen to music, and pay for things, all without consuming a single extra molecule. In the Second Machine Age, the global stock of digital tools is increasing much more quickly than ever before. It's being used in countless ways by profit-hungry companies to combine raw materials in ways that use fewer of them. In advanced economies such as America's, the cumulative impact of this combination of capitalism and tech progress is clear: **absolute dematerialization** of the economy and society, **and thus a smaller footprint on our planet**. The second way Romer's ideas about technology and growth are showing up at present is via decreased excludability. Pervasive digital tools are making it much easier for good designs and recipes to spread around the world. While this is often not what a company wants—it wants to exclude others from its great cost-saving idea— excludability is not as easy as it used to be. This isn't because of weaker patent protection, but instead because of stronger digital tools. Once one company shows what's possible, others use hardware, software, and networks to catch up to the leader. Even if they can't copy exactly because of intellectual-property restrictions, they can use digital tools to explore other means to the same end. So, many farmers learn to get higher yields while using less water and fertilizer, even though they combine these raw materials in different ways. Steve Jobs would certainly have preferred for Apple to be the only provider of smartphones after it developed the iPhone, but he couldn't maintain the monopoly no matter how many patents and lawsuits he filed. Other companies found ways to combine processors, memory, sensors, a touch screen, and software into phones that satisfied billions of customers around the world. The operating system that powers most non-Apple smartphones is Android, which is both free to use and freely modifiable. Google's parent company, Alphabet, developed and released Android without even trying to make it excludable; the explicit goal was to make it as widely imitable as possible. This is an example of the broad trend across digital industries of giving away valuable technologies for free. The Linux operating system, of which Android is a descendant, is probably the best-known example of free and open-source software, but there are many others. The online software repository GitHub maintains that it's "the largest open source community in the world" and hosts millions of projects. The Arduino community does something similar for electronic hardware, and the Instructables website contains detailed instructions for making equipment ranging from air-particle counters to machine tools, all with no intellectual-property protection. Contributors to efforts such as these have a range of motivations (Alphabet's goals with Android were far from purely altruistic—among other things, the parent of Google wanted to achieve a quantum leap in mobile phone users around the world, who would avail themselves of Google Search and services such as YouTube), but they're all part of the trend of technology without excludability, which is great news for growth. As we saw in chapter 10, smartphone use and access to the Internet are increasing quickly across the planet. This means that people no longer need to be near a decent library or school to gain knowledge and improve their abilities. Globally, people are taking advantage of the skill-building opportunities of new technologies. This is the third reason that the spread of digital tools should make us optimistic about future growth: these tools are helping human capital grow quickly. The free Duolingo app, for example, is now the world's most popular way to learn a second language. Of the nearly 15 billion Wikipedia page views during July of 2018, half were in languages other than English. Google's chief economist, Hal Varian, points out that hundreds of millions of how-to videos are viewed every day on YouTube, saying, "We never had a technology before that could educate such a broad group of people anytime on an as-needed basis for free." Romer's work leaves me hopeful because it shows that it's our ability to build human capital, rather than chop down forests, dig mines, or burn fossil fuels that drives growth and prosperity. His model of how economies grow also reinforces how well capitalism and tech progress work together, which is a central point of this book. The surest way to boost profits is to cut costs, and modern technologies, especially digital ones, offer unlimited ways to combine and recombine materials—to swap, slim, optimize, and evaporate—in cost-reducing ways. **There's no reason to expect that the two horsemen of capitalism and tech progress will stop** riding together anytime soon. Quite the contrary. Romer's insights reveal that they're likely to gallop faster and farther as economies grow. Our Brighter, Lighter Future The world still has billions of desperately poor people, but they won't remain that way. All available evidence strongly suggests that most will become much wealthier in the years and decades ahead. As they earn more and consume more, what will be the impact on the planet? The history and economics of the Industrial Era lead to pessimism on this important question. Resource use increased in lockstep with economic growth throughout the two centuries between James Watt's demonstration of his steam engine and the first Earth Day. Malthus and Jevons seemed to be right, and it was just a question of when, not if, we'd run up against the hard planetary limits to growth. But in America and other rich countries something strange, unexpected, and wonderful happened: we started getting more from less. We decoupled population and economic growth from resource consumption, pollution, and other environmental harms. Malthus's and Jevons's ideas gave way to Romer's, and the world will never be the same. This means that instead of worrying about the world's poor becoming richer, we should instead be helping them upgrade economically as much and as quickly as possible. Not only is it the morally correct thing to do, it's also the smart move for our planet. As today’s poor countries get richer, their institutions will improve and most will eventually go through what Ricardo Hausmann calls "the capitalist makeover of production." This makeover doesn't enslave people, nor does it befoul the earth. As today’s poor get richer, they'll consume more, but they'll also consume much differently from earlier generations. They won't read physical newspapers and magazines. They'll get a great deal of their power from renewables and (one hopes) nuclear because these energy sources will be the cheapest. They’ll live in cities, as we saw in chapter 12; in fact, they already are. They'll be less likely to own cars because a variety of transportation options will be only a few taps away. Most important, they'll come up with ideas that keep the growth going, and that benefit both humanity and the planet we live on. Predicting exactly how technological progress will unfold is much like predicting the weather: feasible in the short term, but impossible over a longer time. Great uncertainty and complexity prevent precise forecasts about, for example, the computing devices we’ll be using thirty years from now or the dominant types of artificial intelligence in 2050 and beyond. But even though we can't predict the weather long term, we can accurately forecast the climate. We know how much warmer and sunnier it will be on average in August than in January, for example, and we know that global average temperatures will rise as we keep adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. Similarly, we can predict the "climate" of future technological progress by starting from the knowledge that it will be heavily applied in the areas where it can affect capitalism the most. As we've seen over and over, tech progress supplies opportunities to trim costs (and improve performance) via dematerialization, and capitalism provides the motive to do so. As a result, the Second Enlightenment will continue as we move deeper into the twenty-first century. I'm confident that it will accelerate as digital technologies continue to improve and multiply and global competition continues to increase. We’ll see some of the most striking examples of slim, swap, evaporate, and optimize in exactly the places where the opportunities are biggest. Here are a few broad predictions, spanning humanity's biggest industries. Manufacturing. Complex parts will be made not by the techniques developed during the Industrial Era, but instead by three- dimensional printing. This is already the case for some rocket engines and other extremely expensive items. **As 3-D printing** improves and becomes cheaper, it will spread to automobile engine blocks, manifolds and other complicated arrangements of pipes, airplane struts and wings, and countless other parts. Because 3-D printing **generates virtually no waste** and doesn't require massive molds, it accelerates dematerialization.

#### 3] Capitalist Peace Theory is True – it’s anti-Imperialist.

Mousseau 19, Michael. "The end of war: How a robust marketplace and liberal hegemony are leading to perpetual world peace." International Security 44.1 (2019): 160-196. Props to DML for finding. (Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida)//Elmer

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3 This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order

#### 4] Yes Transition Wars and they cause Extinction

Nyquist 5 J.R. Nyquist 2-4-2005 “The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash” [www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html](http://www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html) (renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations)//Elmer

Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of **anti-capitalist** majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America’s strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the **U**nited **S**tates from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would **catastrophically impact an international system that presently allows 6 billion** people to live on the earth’s surface in relative peace. Should anti-capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet’s economy would contract and untold **millions would die of starvation**. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be **waged with mass destruction weapons** and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti-capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs.

#### Turns their impact – the transition magnifies every flaw of capitalism

Avrum 97 Mark Avrum 1997 <http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT05/Papers/Gubrud/> “Nanotechnology and International Security” (Graduate Research Assistant – Center for Superconductivity Research at the University of Maryland)//Elmer

With molecular manufacturing, international trade in both raw materials and finished goods can be replaced by decentralized production for local consumption, using locally available materials. The decline of international trade will undermine a powerful source of common interest. Further, artificial intelligence will displace skilled as well as unskilled labor. A world system based on wage labor, transnational capitalism and global markets will necessarily give way. We imagine that a golden age is possible, but we don’t know how to organize one. As global capitalism retreats, it will leave behind a world dominated by politics, and possibly feudal concentrations of wealth and power. Economic insecurity, and fears for the material and moral future of humankind may lead to the rise of demagogic and intemperate national leaders. With almost two hundred sovereign nations, each struggling to create a new economic and social order, perhaps the most predictable outcome is chaos: shifting alignments, displaced populations, power struggles, ethnic conflicts inflamed by demagogues, class conflicts, land disputes, etc. Small and underdeveloped nations will be more than ever dependent on the major powers for access to technology, and more than ever vulnerable to sophisticated forms of control or subversion, or to outright domination. Competition among the leading technological powers for the political loyalty of clients might imply reversion to some form of nationalistic imperialism.

#### Our evidence is way better, it’s the only one that cites emperics which ow on verifiability

#### 2. Environment:

#### A. Uniqueness goes aff – the environment is getting better despite pessimism

Environmental Policy Alliance, ’15 (Environmental Policy Alliance; 2/11/15; EPA, citing Bob McKinnen, environmentalist; Environmental Policy Alliance, “THE ENVIRONMENT IS IMPROVING,” http://environmentalpolicyalliance.org/the-environment-is-improving/)

The crux of modern day environmentalism is that things are getting worse. Today we hear all kinds of hyperbolic claims that without action to eliminate the use of fossil fuels, we’re facing mass extinction. However, not only have environmentalists been wrong for decades, but the environment has improved significantly. Environmentalists’ Doomsday Prophecies If you think environmentalists are overzealous today when they (falsely) link fracking to serious health and environmental problems, take a look at their long track record of silly doomsday predictions. Back in 1970, in the lead up to the first Earth Day celebration, environmentalists made a host of ridiculous claims. Harvard Biologist George Wald claimed, “Civilization will end within 15 or 30 years unless immediate action is taken against problems facing mankind.” Life Magazine predicted, “In a decade, urban dwellers will have to wear gas masks to survive air pollution… by 1985 air pollution will have reduced the amount of sunlight reaching earth by one half.” Ecologist Kenneth Watt argued, “By the year 2000, if present trends continue, we will be using up crude oil at such a rate… that there won’t be any more crude oil. You’ll drive up to the pump and say, ‘Fill ‘er up, buddy,’ and he’ll say, ‘I am very sorry, there isn’t any.’” Civilization hasn’t ended, urban dwellers aren’t wearing gas masks, and gas stations are well-stocked. Despite little accuracy to their claims, environmentalists continued to make outlandish predictions. Environmentalist Bill McKibben (founder of 350.org) warned in the 1980s that “a few more decades of ungoverned fossil-fuel use and we burn up, to put it bluntly.” Amazingly, these environmentalists are holding strong to their false premonitions. Stanford University biologist Paul Ehrlich, one of the most outspoken doomsday prognosticators, said in the 1970s, “Population will inevitably and completely outstrip whatever small increases in food supplies we make. The death rate will increase until at least 100-200 million people per year will be starving to death during the next ten years.” While that obviously failed to come true, Ehrlich stated that “My language would be even more apocalyptic today” in 2015 than it was decades earlier. Environment Improving as Fossil Fuel Use Increases We’ve heard doomsday predictions about mankind and energy use for 45 years. Yet over this time period, we’ve increased our fossil fuel use while improving air quality at the same time. Data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency show air quality has improved dramatically since the 1970s. Measures of the six major pollutants: carbon monoxide, ozone, lead, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter (PM2.5) have declined significantly over the past decades—even as the U.S. population and its fossil fuel use has increased. We’ve also reduced our emissions intensity—that’s the ratio of carbon dioxide to economic output, usually expressed as emissions per dollar of gross domestic product. As data from the Energy Information Administration show, the carbon intensity of the U.S. economy has been decreasing steadily since the late 1940s.

#### B. Capitalism allows us to innovate and solve environmental crises

Shireman, Eco Activist & Author, ’15 (Bill; 2/19/15; Eco Activist, author, and CEO at Future 500; The Guardian, “Envisioning a future with less doom and gloom: opportunities for the next generation of optimists,” http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/feb/19/realistic-optimists-post-carbon-economy-nature-environment-business)

When it comes to stories about the fate of the earth, headlines are usually dominated by tales of gloom and doom. And there’s certainly a great deal to be depressed about: global temperatures hit their highest levels ever last year, oceans are growing so warm and acidic that fisheries could be lost, and food and water systems are in decline. A big reason for focusing on the negative is that bad news tends to drive action. According to research by my organization, sustainable business nonprofit Future 500, negative messages typically yield two and a half times as much fundraising and five times as much media attention as positive ones. But as effective as the doom-and-gloom storyline is, there’s another important environmental narrative that’s waiting to be told. Following the work of environmental pioneers like William McDonough, Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins and other eco-designers, it’s clear that there’s an audience – and a desperate need – for a new generation of realistic optimists to help us envision a genuinely prosperous post-carbon economy. There is much to be optimistic about. In its 2013 report The 3% Solution, wildlife nonprofit World Wildlife Fund says that the key challenge facing developed countries is the need to reduce carbon emissions by roughly 3% a year. The McKinsey Global Institute says that’s not only doable, but it’s exactly what the economy needs to grow sustainably and overcome its economic deficits. Specifically, it says, the US needs to squeeze a third more value out of the energy it uses in the next decade, and improve that efficiency by 3% a year or more thereafter, to avoid painful economic and environmental consequences. The quest for that 3% solution may prove challenging, but it will also open up a wide range of business opportunities. Here are some of the biggest potential opportunities and the companies trying to tap them: Creating living farms, oceans and forests The industrial agriculture system treats land like a machine. It’s based on the assumption that, if farmers feed the earth the right fuel and keep out contaminants, the engine will run smoothly and generate massive agricultural output. That can be true, but nature offers a much more productive and sustainable model: life. Farms, forests and oceans have the capacity to create more value than they consume, something that machines can’t do. What’s more, they’re inherently sustainable. One step that large-scale agriculture could take towards adopting the nature-based model would be to shift to carbon-reducing agriculture. Fertile soil is a complex system with millions of carbon-sequestering microorganisms per square inch. Tilling, a common agricultural practice, burns fuel, releases poisonous exhaust gasses and strips the soil. The standard solution – pumping in pesticides, herbicides and nitrogen – only adds to the problem by contaminating groundwater and polluting oceans with runoff. Studies have shown that more natural soil amendments, like compost, manure and charcoal products, like those produced by the Biochar Company, can reduce atmospheric carbon and keep soils highly productive. In terms of water usage, treatment alternatives developed by companies like Algae Systems purify water at low cost, while generating carbon-negative fuels and fertilizers that are chemically identical to petroleum-based products. On the retail end, Whole Foods is driving mainstream consumer demand for approaches like these. At the same time, organic, slow and local food movements are also continuing to gain momentum. For further-reaching substantive change, however, major food companies and manufacturers will need to get involved in order to make any broader systemic changes mainstream. The sustainable seafood movement could offer a useful model for businesses and activists looking to change the agriculture system. Increasingly, careful fisheries management and the support of retailers like Walmart and Safeway are making sustainable seafood more commonplace. At the same time, groups like Environmental Defense Fund are continuing to push the needle forward. Admittedly, the aquaculture battle is still raging and oceans are still in crisis. Carbon emissions are making them warmer, more acidic and less productive, and resource competition is driving fishing well beyond sustainable yields. So how can a living agriculture approach further benefit the seas? One way is to end the race for fish through “catch shares,” a market based system that sets aside a secure share of fish for individual fishermen, communities or fishing associations. Forestry is another industry that could potentially offer a useful agricultural model. On the market end, brands like Nestle and Staples are helping to shift the market towards more sustainable forest practices. In this case, too, the problem is far from over, and activist groups are continuing to ramp up pressure on customers of companies like April and a host of other palm oil and paper producers. The “zero deforestation” effort, championed by Greenpeace and others, has driven attention and engagement to a critical international issue. Prosperity, not consumption, by design Another business opportunity lies in the shift from excessive consumption to impressive design. Traditional business models are moored in consumption. The industrial economy, for example, propelled consumption by accelerating the speed of extraction. Natural systems, on the other hand, develop value through efficient, smart design. AT&T, Advanced Micro Devices and Cisco are already putting this lesson to work, bringing productivity leaps to the non-digital economy. The internet of things is connecting computing devices and the Internet in factories, farms, buildings and homes. To put this in context, while industrial companies find it difficult to achieve 25% productivity gains, AMD expects a 2,500% gain in energy productivity for its computer processors by 2020. New technologies are also following nature’s lead when it comes to design. Rather than following the traditional model of extracting complex raw materials from the earth, AMD is producing microchips and solar cells that take plentiful raw materials like silica and inscribe on them a value-creating design, building value up. That’s why – as Future 500 has documented – innovations in microchips, telecommunications, and the Internet often yield productivity gains of 1000% or more. If producers and consumers can use these innovations wisely – admittedly, a big “if” – it will be possible for the economy to harness nature’s value-creating strategy. The sharing economy is another step forward. When digital technologies come into contact with consumptive industrial-era practices, the result can be positively disruptive. How many fewer hotels, rental cars, and taxis do we need, now that AirBNB, Zipcar and Uber enable consumers to share what they already have? Putting a price on carbon The third strategy also applies a core principle of nature: feedback and adaptation. While Congress delays on overarching federal climate policy, hundreds of companies are acting on their own, supporting an internal carbon price that drives down energy costs and carbon emissions simultaneously. Carbon taxes in British Columbia and Sweden, for example, outperform regulations and emission trading systems combined. Critics argue that a carbon tax can’t happen broadly, but environmental groups have more carbon-pricing allies than they think. Even oil company ExxonMobil, a major carbon producer, is a genuine supporter – a fact that many simply can’t comprehend. But Exxon Mobil’s data tells it that, in the long term, it’s smart policy to insure that carbon pays its way. Adopting a carbon tax shift is one systemic way to put a price on an atmospherically dangerous byproduct. And while the quest for that 3% solution will be difficult, it will open up a wide range of opportunities as well. So let’s begin to think outside the standard gloom-and-doom mentality to make systemic, positive environmental changes that benefit multiple interests. When we do, we might very well discover that the technological, corporate, and political support needed to save the planet is well within our reach.