## 1

#### 1] Interpretation - Reduce means permanent reduction – it’s distinct from “waive” or “suspend.”

**Reynolds 59** (Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13] The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### 2] Violation – the plan waives intellectual property protections temporarily, which is an indefinite suspension. That’s 1AC [Lindsey], it says waiver

#### . Securing a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments would thus establish a salutary precedent that, in emergencies of this kind, governments should employ other, more direct means to incentivize the development of new drugs.].

#### Waiver is temporary.

Green 5/6 [Andrew Green (Devex Contributing Reporter based in Berlin, his coverage focuses primarily on health and human rights and he has previously worked as Voice of America's South Sudan bureau chief and the Center for Public Integrity's web editor). “US backs waiver for intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines”. Devex. 06 May 2021. Accessed 7/31/2021. <https://www.devex.com/news/us-backs-waiver-for-intellectual-property-rights-for-covid-19-vaccines-99847> //Xu]

In a stunning reversal, U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration came out in favor of waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines Wednesday. The move follows months of U.S. opposition that began under former President Donald Trump to a proposal from South Africa and India to temporarily set aside intellectual property rights around products that would protect, contain, and treat COVID-19. Its supporters have argued that the proposal, first tabled at the World Trade Organization in October and now backed by more than 100 countries, is necessary to expand vaccine production and overcome global shortages.

#### [Pre-empting the We Meet] – Plan Text in a Vacuum is a useless guideline since words are contextually defined based on function – the only basis for determining Topicality should be if the implementation of the Plan as per their 1AC solvency evidence follows the directional meaning of the Topic’s intent – anything else allows the 1AR to re-contextualize what the Plan says forcing the 1NC to predict infinite 1AR spin since they’re not tied to their evidence.

#### 3] Vote neg for limits and neg ground – re-instatement under any infinite number of conditions doubles aff ground – every plan becomes either temporary or permanent – you cherry-pick the best criteria and I must prep every aff while they avoid core topic discussions like reduction-based DAs which decks generics like Pharma Innovation and Bio-Tech.

#### 4] Paradigm Issues –

#### a] Topicality is Drop the Debater – it’s a fundamental baseline for debate-ability.

#### b] Use Competing Interps – 1] Topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical and 2] Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### c] No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

## 2

#### Climate Patents and Innovation high now and solving Warming but COVID waiver sets a dangerous precedent for appropriations - the mere threat is sufficient is enough to kill investment.

Brand 5-26, Melissa. “Trips Ip Waiver Could Establish Dangerous Precedent for Climate Change and Other Biotech Sectors.” IPWatchdog.com | Patents & Patent Law, 26 May 2021, www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/05/26/trips-ip-waiver-establish-dangerous-precedent-climate-change-biotech-sectors/id=133964/. //sid

The **biotech** industry is making remarkable **advances towards climate change solutions**, and it is precisely for this reason that it can expect to be in the crosshairs of potential IP waiver discussions. President Biden is correct to refer to climate change as an existential crisis. Yet it does not take too much effort to connect the dots between President Biden’s focus on climate change and his Administration’s recent commitment to waive global IP rights for Covid vaccines (TRIPS IP Waiver). “This is a global health crisis, and the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic call for extraordinary measures.” If an IP waiver is purportedly necessary to solve the COVID-19 global health crisis (and of course [we dispute this notion](https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/04/19/waiving-ip-rights-during-times-of-covid-a-false-good-idea/id=132399/)), can we really feel confident that this or some future Administration will not **apply** the **same logic to** the **climate crisis**? And, without the confidence in the underlying IP for such solutions, what does this mean for U.S. innovation and economic growth? United States Trade Representative (USTR) [Katherine Tai](https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/05/05/tai-says-united-states-will-back-india-southafrica-proposal-waive-ip-rights-trips/id=133224/) was subject to questioning along this very line during a recent Senate Finance Committee hearing. And while Ambassador Tai did not affirmatively state that an IP waiver would be in the future for climate change technology, she surely did not assuage the concerns of interested parties. The United States has historically supported robust IP protection. This support is one reason the United States is the center of biotechnology innovation and leading the fight against COVID-19. However, a brief review of the domestic legislation arguably most relevant to this discussion shows just how far the international campaign against IP rights has eroded our **normative position**. The Clean Air Act, for example, contains a provision allowing for the mandatory licensing of patents covering certain devices for reducing air pollution. Importantly, however, the patent owner is accorded due process and the statute lays out a detailed process regulating the manner in which any such license can be issued, including findings of necessity and that no reasonable alternative method to accomplish the legislated goal exists. Also of critical importance is that the statute requires compensation to the patent holder. Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act contemplates mandatory licensing of patents covering inventions of primary importance in producing or utilizing atomic energy. This statute, too, requires due process, findings of importance to the statutory goals and compensation to the rights holder. A TRIPS IP waiver would operate outside of these types of frameworks. There would be no **due process**, no particularized findings, no **compensation and** no **recourse**. Indeed, the fact that the World Trade Organization (WTO) already has a process under the TRIPS agreement to address public health crises, including the compulsory licensing provisions, with necessary guardrails and compensation, makes quite clear that the waiver would operate as a free for all. Forced Tech Transfer Could Be on The Table When being questioned about the scope of a potential TRIPS IP waiver, Ambassador Tai invoked the proverb “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” While this answer suggests primarily that, in times of famine, the Administration would rather give away other people’s fishing rods than share its own plentiful supply of fish (here: actual COVID-19 vaccine stocks), it is apparent that in Ambassador Tai’s view waiving patent rights alone would not help lower- and middle-income countries produce their own vaccines. Rather, they would need to be taught how to make the vaccines and given the biotech industry’s manufacturing know-how, sensitive cell lines, and proprietary cell culture media in order to do so. In other words, Ambassador Tai acknowledged that the scope of the current TRIPS IP waiver discussions includes the concept of forced tech transfer. In the context of climate change, the idea would be that companies who develop successful methods for producing new **seed technologies and sustainable biomass, reducing greenhouse gases** in manufacturing **and** transportation, **capturing** and sequestering **carbon** in soil and products, and more, **would be required to turn over their proprietary know-how** to global competitors. While it is unclear how this concept would work in practice and under the constitutions of certain countries, the suggestion alone could be devastating **to voluntary international collaborations**. Even if one could assume that the United States could not implement forced tech transfer on its own soil, what about the governments of our international development partners? It is not hard to understand that a U.S.-based company developing climate change technologies would be unenthusiastic about partnering with a company abroad knowing that the foreign country’s government is on track – with the assent of the U.S. government – to change its laws and seize proprietary materials and know-how that had been voluntarily transferred to the local company. Necessary Investment Could Diminish Developing climate change solutions is not an easy endeavor and bad policy positions threaten the likelihood that they will materialize. These products have long lead times from research and development to market introduction, owing not only to a high rate of failure but also rigorous regulatory oversight. Significant investment is required to sustain and drive these challenging and long-enduring endeavors. For example, synthetic biology companies critical to this area of innovation [raised over $1 billion in investment in the second quarter of 2019 alone](https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/Climate%20Report_FINAL.pdf). If investors cannot be confident that IP will be in **place to protect important climate change technologies** after their long road from bench to market, **it is unlikely they will** continue to **invest at** the current and **required levels.**

#### Climate Patents are critical to solving Warming – only way to stimulate Renewable Energy Technology Investment.

Aberdeen 20 Arielle Aberdeen October 2020 "Patents to climate rescue: how intellectual property rights are fundamental to the development of renewable energy" <https://www.4ipcouncil.com/application/files/4516/0399/1622/Intellectual_Property_and_Renewable_Energy.pdf> (Caribbean Attorney-at-Law with extensive experience in legal research and writing.)//Elmer

**Climate change is** the **most pressing** global **challenge** and with the international commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement,1 there **needs to be a global energy revolution** and transition.2 This is where **innovative technology can help** meet the challenge of reducing our dependency on finite natural capital resources. The development and deployment of innovative technology play a pivotal role in enabling us to replace fossil fuel use with more sustainable energy solutions. **Patents** have **facilitated** the **development of such innovative technologies** thus far **and** will **continue to be the catalyst for this transition**. Patents are among a group of intellectual property rights (‘IPRs’). 3 These are private and exclusive rights given for the protection of different types of intellectual creations. IPRs are the cornerstone of developed and knowledge-based economies, as they encourage innovation, drive the investment into new areas and allow for the successful commercialisation of intellectual creations. IPRs are the cornerstone of developed and knowledge-based economies. Empirical evidence has shown that a **strong IPRs** system **influences** both the **development and diffusion of technology**. Alternatively, **weak IPRs** protection has been shown to **reduce** **innovation**, **reduce investment** and prevent firms from entering certain markets.4 Once patent protection has been sought and granted, it gives a time-limited and exclusive rights to the creator of an invention. This allows the inventor or patentor the ability to restrict others from using, selling, or making the new invented product or process. Thereby allowing a timelimited monopoly on the exploitation of the invention in the geographical area where it is protected. During the patent application procedure, the patentor must make sufficient public disclosure of the invention. This will allow others to see, understand and improve upon it, thereby spurring continuous innovation. Therefore, the patent system through providing this economic incentive is a successful tool which has encouraged the development and the dissemination of technology. Patents like all IPRs are key instruments in the global innovation ecosystem.5 When developing innovative technology, patents play a role throughout the “technological life cycle”,6 as shown in Figure 1. This lifecycle involves the invention, research and development (‘R&D’), market development and commercial diffusion. Patents are most effective when sought at the R&D stage. Once a patent has been granted, it becomes an asset which can then be used to7: Gain Market Access: Patents can create market advantages; to develop and secure market position; to gain more freedom to operate within a sector and reduce risks of infringing on other patents; protect inventions from being copied, and removes delaying by innovative firms to release new or improved technology and encourage the expansion of their markets. Negotiation leverage: Patents can build a strong brand or company reputation which can enhance the company’s negotiation power and allow for the creation of equal partnerships. Funding: Patents can generate funding and revenue streams for companies. Having a strong patent portfolio especially in small businesses or start-ups can be used to leverage investor funding; while also be a source of revenue for companies through licensing fees, sales, tax incentives, collateral for loans and access to grants and subsidies. Strategic value: Patents can be used to build “synergistic partnerships”8 through which collaboration on R&D and other partnerships; be used to improve in-house R&D and build and/ or develop more products. As such, obtaining and managing patent as part of a patent and broader IPRs strategy are key tools for business success, especially within highly innovative and technology-driven industries.9 Renewable Energy: The Basics Renewable energy is derived from natural unlimited sources which produce little to no harmful greenhouse gases and other pollutants. 10 Innovative renewable energy technologies (‘RETs’) have created the ability to tap into these sources and convert them to energy which can then be stored, distributed, and consumed at a competitive cost. RETs have developed into a technology ecosystem which consists of alternative energy production, energy conservation and green transportation.11 For energy production, RETs have been developed to generate energy from six main sources. These are: Wind energy: Technology, via off-shore and/or on-shore wind turbines, harnesses the energy produced by the wind. Solar energy: Technology either through concentrated solar power (‘CSP’)and solar photovoltaic (‘PV’) harnesses the energy produced by the sun. Hydropower: Technology either through large-scale or small-scale hydropower plants, captures energy from flowing water. Bioenergy: Technology is used to convert organic material into energy either through burning to produce heat or power or through converting it to a liquid biofuel. Geothermal: Technology is used to capture the energy from the heat produced in the earth’s core. Ocean/Tidal energy: Technology is used to capture the energy produced from waves, tides, salinity gradient energy and ocean thermal energy conversion. Out of these six sources, the wind, solar and hydropower energy sectors are the biggest, the most developed and the most widely used. While geothermal and ocean energy sources are used in a more limited capacity. In particular, the RETs in ocean energy is still at its infancy and thus presents an opportunity for future innovation and commercialisation. Renewable energy is the fastest-growing energy source, with the electricity sector showing the fastest energy transition. 12 In 2016, renewable energy accounted for 12% of final global energy consumption and in 2018, a milestone was reached with renewables being used to generate 26% of global electricity. The source of this energy has been driven by renewable hydropower, as shown in Figure 2, with wind and solar energy trailing behind in energy production. However, the International Energy Agency (‘IRENA’) forecasts that Solar PV will lead RETs to increase capacity in the upcoming years. 13 This rise in renewable energy is due to the increased investment into the sector and the development, diffusion and deployment of innovative RETs. For the period between 2010 and 2019, there were 2.6 trillion US dollars invested in renewable energy. 14 The majority of which being focused on solar energy. 15 This investment has surpassed the investment made into the traditional fossil fuel energy 16 and has been heavily driven by the private sector. 17 The International Energy Agency recent report showed that its members increased the public budgets for energy technology R&D, with the biggest increase in the low-carbon sectors.18 The geographic sources of this investment shown in Figure 3, reveals that the European Union, the United States and Japan are part of the largest investors. This reflects the historic involvement these countries have had in the renewable energy arena and the development of RETs. However, there is now the emergence of China, India and Brazil as large investors in this field. This trend in investment has also coincided with the increase in patenting technology in renewable energy compared to fossil fuels.19 Reports from the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), have shown that there has been a **steady increase in patent filing rates in RETs since the mid-1990s**.20 This increase has occurred in the four major renewable sectors, 21 where RETs patents applications were growing steadily from 2005 until reaching a peak in 2013.22 Post-2013, there has been a slight decline in patent filings, which can indicate a maturing of sectors and deployment of technologies.23 Each renewable energy sector is at a different stage of maturity and thus there is a variation of patent ownership. The wind sector is the most mature and consequently has the highest intellectual property ownership and patent grants compared to that of the biofuel sector. 24 IRENA also provides a comprehensive and interactive database for RETs patents. As seen in Figure 4 below, they have collected patent data from the major patent filing jurisdiction25 which shows the breakdown of the patents per type. This information reveals that there is a dominance of patent filings focused on solar technology. This data corresponds to the focus of the investment in renewable energy into solar energy. Upon closer look at the data, the geographic source of these patents shows that RETs patents have been concentrated in a few developed OECD countries and China. This also corresponds to the source of investment shown in Figure 3 and reflects the historical concentration of RETs innovation within these countries. 26 The latest WIPO report for 2019, which looks at the data for PCT patent applications, shows that 76 % of all PCT patent application came from the United States, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea and China.27 China is the newest entry into the top ten list and has made one of the largest jumps to become one of the biggest RETs patent filers at the PCT. This geographic data is also mirrored by IRENA’s statistics, as shown in Figure 5 below. This data also reflects China’s emerging renewable dominance. China is heavily **investing in solar energy** **technology** and has filed numerous patents in this area and the underlying technologies.28 The successful flow of investment in this sector can only **occur in** the **presence of a strong IPRs system** and protection. Government policies and initiatives to improve the **patent system** can be used to promote the development of RETs and drive private capital and investment into this area.29 This direct **effect on RETs** through policies was **shown in** the United States with the ‘**Green Tech Pilot Program’**.30 This was a special accelerated patent application procedure developed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office for inventions falling under the green technology category. This program ran from 2009-2011 and led to a boost in RETs patent applications, with the office issuing 1062 RETs patents from the programme. Other jurisdictions, such as the European Union and China have used policy and incentives to promote the development of RETs and the advancement of their renewable energy sector. In particular, the European Union and China began the renewable energy path at different starting points but are now both dominant players in this area.

#### Warming causes Extinction

Kareiva 18, Peter, and Valerie Carranza. "Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back." Futures 102 (2018): 39-50. (Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA)//Re-cut by Elmer

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (**climate change**, global **freshwater** cycle, **and** ocean **acidification**) do **pose existential risks**. This is **because of** intrinsic **positive feedback loops**, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all **directly connected to** the provision of **food and water**, and **shortages** of food and water can **create conflict** and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. **Ample clean water** is not a luxury—it **is essential for human survival**. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes **Humans** are remarkably ingenious, and **have adapted** to crises **throughout** their **history**. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). **However**, the many **stories** **of** human ingenuity **successfully** **addressing** **existential risks** such as global famine or extreme air pollution **represent** environmental c**hallenges that are** largely **linear**, have immediate consequences, **and operate without positive feedbacks**. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, **the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops**. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that **very warming can cause more CO2 release** which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that **forest fires will become more frequent** and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This **catastrophic fire** embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that **could catch humanity off-guard and produce a** true **apocalyptic event.** Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that **runaway climate change,** and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks **portends** even greater **existential risks**. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

## 3

#### Text – the United States ought to

#### anonymously invest $25 billion into 25 production lines dedicated solely to COVID-19 vaccines to boost global vaccine production managed by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority.

#### distribute 8 billion doses of COVID vaccines using an equitable distribution framework prioritizing developing countries in the Global South.

#### The CP solves the entirety of the case and does it faster.

Stankiewicz 21 Mike Stankiewicz 5-6-2021"Opinion: For just $25 billion, the U.S. could jump-start a project to quickly vaccinate the entire world against COVID" <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/for-just-25-billion-the-u-s-could-jump-start-a-project-to-quickly-vaccinate-the-entire-world-against-covid-11614898552> (a press officer in Public Citizen's communication's department, where he focuses on legislative policy and health-orientated advocacy)//Elmer

Despite wealthy countries such as the U.S. ramping up COVID-19 vaccination efforts, **it** still **may** **take years to vaccinate the world**, especially poorer countries, and the economic and humanitarian impacts could be devastating. But **an injection of** **just $25 billion** **into global vaccine production efforts by the U.S.** government **could save millions of lives** and help prevent economic disaster. The most up-to-date numbers paint incredibly different futures between wealthy and low-income countries. At the current rate of vaccination, analysts predict that developing countries, including almost all of Southeast Asia, may not reach meaningful vaccine coverage until 2023. Comparatively, President Joe Biden has promised that the U.S. will have enough vaccine doses to inoculate every adult within the next three months. Increased fatalities And as wealthy countries such as the U.S. are starting to see lower death, transmission and hospitalization rates, low-income countries are experiencing increased hardship and fatalities. Countries such as Hungry are being forced to tighten restrictions as infection rates increase, and deaths in Africa have spiked by 40% in the past month, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). No country can be left behind in this global pandemic, and the U.S. is in a unique position to make sure every country gets the ample amount of vaccines they need. **Public Citizen research has found that just a $25 billion investment in COVID-19 vaccine production by the U.S. government would produce enough vaccine for developing countries, potentially shaving years from the global pandemic**. Public Citizen estimates that **8 billion doses of** National Institutes of Health-**Moderna MRNA**, +1.98% vaccine can be **produced** **for** just over **$3 per dose**. To bolster production and supply the necessary 8 billion doses, it would take **$1.9 billion to fund** the necessary **25 production lines**. Another **$19 billion** would pay **for materials and labor**, and **$3 billion** would **compensate** **Moderna** **for making technology available to manufacturers** in other countries. An additional $500 million would cover costs to staff and run **a rapid-response federal program that provides technical assistance and facilitates technology transfer to manufacturers and works with the WHO’s technology hub.** In total, vaccinating the world would cost less than 1.4% the total of Biden’s $1.9 trillion COVID relief plan. But such a program also needs to be properly managed to be successful. To help facilitate these efforts, the Biden administration should also **designate** the government’s Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (**BARDA**) **to lead** the world-wide **vaccine manufacturing effort**. BARDA has the **necessary experience to coordinate** **an initiative of this scale** with the WHO, building on its partnership to build pandemic flu manufacturing capacity in developing countries after the bird-flu scare of 2006. Widespread vaccines would help U.S. economy These efforts would dramatically increase access to vaccines in developing countries and speed up global vaccination by years, saving countless lives. But allowing the current vaccine supply crisis to continue is not just inhumane, it is also not in our own economic interest to do so.

## Case

### No 1ar theory

#### 1~ Responses to my counter interp will be new which means 1ar theory necessitates intervention—-outweighs because it makes the decision arbitrary

#### 2~ Deters the 1NC from checking abuse out of fear for 1AR meta-theory, which destroys me since it's also preclusive. Turns their infinite abuse args.

#### 3~ Resolvability double bind—either you automatically accept 2AR responses to 2NR counter-standards which means they always win since I can't answer those responses, or you have to intervene to determine the credence you give those 2AR responses, which makes it irresolvable and unfair. Also turns infinite abuse since intervention allows the judge to be infinitely abusive to either side if they want to be.

### 1NC- AT Covid

#### AT McPherson –

#### 1] Internal Link is predicated on shutdowns – we’ve been out of them for a year AND no evidence we’re going back – empirically disproves your scenario since those shutdowns should have caused Extinction.

#### 2] Second Wave won’t cause end of “industrial activity” which is their Internal Link.

Villegas 8-1 Paulina Villegas 8-1-2021 "Fauci says shutdowns probably won't return, despite more 'suffering' ahead from delta variant" <https://archive.is/Z9TBg#selection-279.0-668.0> (Reporter covering breaking news and national stories for the Washington Post)//Elmer

At the beginning of the summer, many Americans sighed with relief, thinking the worst of the coronavirus pandemic was over. But as the **delta variant** of the virus **surges** nationwide, fears about returning to the dark days of shutdowns have also spread. But **shutdowns** probably **will not return**, **despite more “pain and suffering**” on the horizon, Anthony S. **Fauci**, the **White House’s chief medical adviser**, **said** Sunday during an interview on ABC’s “This Week.” “**I don’t think we’re going to see lockdowns.** I think we have enough of the percentage of people in the country — not enough to crush the outbreak — but I believe enough to not allow us to get into the situation we were in last winter,” said Fauci, who is also the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

#### AT COVID causes Conflict –

#### 1] Be extremely skeptical of the link for this – COVID has happened for nearly two years and we have yet to see a great power conflict. This means the UQ flows the other way, as long as we have covid, china and the US won’t go to war.

#### Scapegoating happened, trump did it, but no impact to it.

#### “bring system down”- our 4 point empirically denies it.

#### 2] No Correlation and best studies show COVID decreases Conflict.

Salemi 20 Colette Salemi 10-15-2020 "Does COVID-19 raise the risk of violent conflict? Not everywhere" <https://archive.is/h591O#selection-309.0-312.0> (Colette Salemi is a PhD student in applied economics at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on conflict, forced displacement, environmental degradation and their intersections.)//Elmer

How we did our research We **used** the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (**ACLED**), a **database** **that counts** the **number of conflict events daily around the world**. For 2019 and 2020, ACLED includes more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe — and tracks three categories of violent conflict: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence. We examine trends in the number of conflict events over time. To see whether the trend changes in response to covid-19, we look at what happened after the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic (March 11) or the country declared a lockdown. [Don’t miss any of TMC’s smart analysis! Sign up here for our newsletter.] The **relationship between pandemics and conflict is theoretically unclear.** In some countries, job losses from the covid-19 pandemic mean people have fewer income-generating options — that can make participation in violence seem a more viable alternative. But if **market disruptions** and reduced global demand are **driving down** the **value of natural resources** such as oil wells, then **we** may **see less conflict** over control of such resources. We then **conducted** case **studies** based **on** our knowledge of countries with high rates of violent conflict before **covid**-19. These include countries with active civil wars (such as Syria) as well as countries with violent militia groups (such as the Philippines). Conflict during the coronavirus pandemic varies greatly **Worldwide**, **we didn’t observe an increase in violent conflict**. **If anything, conflict has decreased**, as the figure below shows. **Violent conflict** between March and August 2020 **was 23 percent lower** than violent conflict during the same period in 2019. Comparing these time periods, battles are down 20 percent and remote violence and bombings are down 40 percent. But violence against civilians — the deliberate attack of unarmed noncombatants by armed groups — continued at similar rates globally.

Chart, histogram

Description automatically generated

#### 3] Cooperation and Solidarity Check.

Ide 21, Tobias. "COVID-19 and armed conflict." World development 140 (2021): 105355. (School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, 221 Bouverie St, Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia Institute of International Relations, Brunswick University of Technology)//Elmer

**COVID**-19 might also **provide** a **chance to demonstrate solidarity and good intentions**, and hence lessen grievances. The literature on health diplomacy, for example, discusses how **cooperation on** shared h**ealth challenges can increase** the **prospects for peaceful relations**. The empirical success of such efforts is so far been limited (Kelman, 2019). However, research on environmental peacebuilding has revealed that low-level, mutually beneficial cooperation can yield peace dividends in certain contexts (Ide, 2019). Furthermore, **ceasefires** **to deliver health benefits** **have** at least temporally **reduced armed conflict intensity** on several occasions **in the past** (Chattu & Knight, 2019). **In response to the pandemic** (and António Guterres’ call), **armed groups in 14 countries have announced ceasefires** to support responses to COVID-19 (Rustad, 2020).

#### 4] Actors turn inward NOT outward.

Ide 21, Tobias. "COVID-19 and armed conflict." World development 140 (2021): 105355. (School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, 221 Bouverie St, Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia Institute of International Relations, Brunswick University of Technology)//Elmer

However, **COVID**-19 might also **shape** **opportunity costs in a way** **to reduce armed conflict risks**, at least temporarily. If a **state’s capability is strained** and there is an **urgent need to deal with a health emergency**, **military offensives are** certainly **unlikely** (Price-Smith, 2009). Furthermore, existing as well as potential **rebel groups** and militias **face similar challenges** in the face of the pandemic. They need to raise money and food to supply to their fighters during an economic recession, convince their members to take part in operations rather than staying at home (to reduce infection risks and support their family or community), and deal with the logistical constraints of lockdowns and border closures. **Starting** or intensifying **attacks** **during** the **COVID**-19 crisis is **likely to decrease** the local (and international) **legitimacy** of armed groups, especially if health infrastructure is affected. The ceasefire declarations by armed conflict parties in several countries can also be interpreted as a sign that COVID-related capability and legitimacy concerns are warranted.

#### 5] Nuke War doesn’t cause Extinction but Warming does.

* Modified for Suicide Rhetoric

McDonald 19 Sam Miller McDonald 1-4-2019 <https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation> (writer and geography PhD student at University of Oxford studying the intersection of grassroots movements and energy transition)//Elmer

The global economy is hurtling humanity toward extinction. Greenhouse gas emissions are on track to warm the planet by six degrees Celsius above preindustrial averages. A six-degree increase risks **killing most life on earth**, as global warming did during the Late Permian when volcanoes burned a bunch of fossilized carbon (e.g., coal, oil, and gas). Called the Great Dying, that event was, according to New York Magazine, “The most notorious [extinction event…]; it began when carbon warmed the planet by five degrees, accelerated when that warming triggered the release of methane in the Arctic, and ended with 97 percent of all life on Earth dead.” Mainstream science suggests that **we’re on our way there**. During the winter of 2017, the Arctic grew warmer than Europe, sending snow to the Mediterranean and Sahara. The planet may have already passed irreversible thresholds that could **accelerate further feedback loops like permafrost melt and loss of polar ice**. Patches of permafrost aren’t freezing even during winter, necessitating a rename (may I suggest ‘nevafrost’?). In the summer of 2018, forests north of the Arctic Circle broke 90 degrees Fahrenheit and burned in vast wildfires. We’re reaching milestones far faster than scientists have even recently predicted. As Guardian columnist George Monbiot noted, “The Arctic meltdown […] is the kind of event scientists warned we could face by 2050. Not by 2018.” **Mass marine death** that rapidly emits uncontrollable greenhouse gasses is another feedback loop that seems ready to strike. The ocean is now more acidic than **any time in the last 14 million years**, killing everything from snails to whales. It’s growing rapidly more acidic. Meanwhile, from the global South to wealthier industrialized countries, people are already dying and being displaced from the impacts of extreme climate change via extreme droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, and conflicts like the Syrian civil war. Authoritarianism is on the rise due directly to these climate emergencies and migrations. The IPCC has recently alerted the world that we have about a decade to dramatically cut emissions before collapse becomes inevitable. **We could prevent human extinction if we act immediately.** But the world is unanimously ignoring climate change. Nations will almost certainly fail to avert biosphere collapse. That is because doing so will require a rapid decarbonization of the global economy. But why does decarbonization--an innocuous enough term--seem so implausible? Well, let’s put it this way: a sufficient transition to non-carbon energy would require all the trains, buses, planes, cars, and ships in the world to almost immediately stop and be replaced with newly manufactured vehicles to run on non-carbon fuel, like hydrogen cells, renewable electricity, or some carbon-neutral biofuel. All this new manufacturing will have to be done with low-carbon techniques, many of which don’t exist yet and may be impossible to achieve at scale. This means all the complex supply chains that move most of the world’s food, water, medicine, basically all consumer goods, construction materials, clothing, and everything else billions of people depend on to survive will have to be fundamentally reformed, in virtually every way, immediately. It also means that all the electric grids and indoor heating and cooling systems in the world must be rapidly transformed from centralized coal and gas power plants to a mixture of solar, wind, and nuclear—both distributed and centralized—dispersed through newly built micro-grids and smart-grids, and stored in new battery infrastructure. These new solar panels, batteries, and nuclear plants will somehow have to be built using little carbon energy, again something that may be impossible to achieve at a global scale. The cost of this transition is impossible to know, but surely reaches the tens of trillions of dollars. It needs to happen in just about every industrialized nation on the planet and needs to happen now—not in 2050, as the Paris Agreement dictates, or the 2030s, as reflected in many governments’ decarbonization goals. The engineering and administrative obstacles are immense; disentangling century-old, haphazard electric grid systems, for example, poses an almost unimaginable cascade of institutional and logistical hurdles. Imagine the difficulty of persuading millions of municipalities around the world to do anything simultaneously; now, imagine convincing them all to fundamentally shift the resource infrastructure on which their material existence depends immediately. Perhaps even more daunting are the political obstacles, with diverse financial interests woven together in a tapestry of inertia and self-interest. Virtually all retirement funds, for instance, are invested in fossil fuel companies. Former and current fossil fuel industry managers sit on all manner of institutional committees in which energy and investment decisions are made: trustee boards of universities, regulatory commissions, city councils, congressional committees, philanthropic boards, federal agencies, the Oval Office couch. Lots of people make lots of money from fossil fuels. Will they sacrifice deeply vested interests to prevent collapse? They certainly have not shown signs of doing so yet, when the stakes are as dire as they’ve ever been; most have instead ruthlessly obstructed meaningful action. Will enough people be willing to do what it takes to forcibly remove them from the most powerful institutions in the world? That also seems unlikely, given meager public involvement in this issue so far. This is the obstacle of collective action: everyone has to sacrifice, but no one wants to start. Who will assent to giving up their steady returns from fossil fuels if everyone else refuses? When people are living so precariously as it is (43% of American can’t afford basic necessities), how can we ask them to undertake energy transition? The US drags its feet on decarbonizing and justifies it by arguing that China has not made strong enough commitments. Which country will voluntarily give up access to strategic fossil fuel reserves? Much of our geopolitical dynamics and wars have revolved around access to mineral resources like oil. Is the US going to put itself in a disadvantaged position for the climate? Shell withdraws research funding for renewables because ExxonMobil goes full steam ahead on oil, and, hey, they must compete. Fossil fuel funded politicians of both parties certainly will not aid transition. If untangling the webs of influence, interests, and engineering preventing decarbonization weren’t daunting enough, the world will also have to suck billions of tons of greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere that have already been emitted. Keeping the planet to even a deadly 1.5 degrees Celsius increase of warming depends on it. This sounds simpler than it is, as if a big vacuum cleaner could siphon particulates from the sky. But no one really knows how to extract and sequester carbon at the scale necessary to prevent catastrophic climate change. Engineers have thrown out a lot of ideas—some more plausible than others—but most scientists who have looked at proposals generally agree that it’s wishful thinking. As Huffington Post quotes Clive Hamilton, “In order to capture just a quarter of the emissions from the world's coal-fired power plants we would need a system of pipelines that would transport a volume of fluid twice the size of the global crude-oil industry.” Of course, manufacturing, shipping, and constructing those pipelines would require immense carbon energy inputs and emissions. And that’s just to capture the emissions from coal! Like energy transition, carbon capture and sequestration requires governments to act collectively to invest trillions of dollars in risky, experimental, and probably mostly ineffectual sequestration technologies. Again, it’s a collective action problem: nobody wants to be the one to sacrifice while no one else is putting themselves on the line. And the miniscule likelihood that energy transition will occur under a Trump-Digs-Coal presidency—and the Trumpian nationalists winning elections across the world—casts further doubt on the possibility of rapid decarbonization. The administration’s energy department has projected that, “The carbon footprint of the United States will barely go down at all for the foreseeable future and will be slightly higher in 2050,” as InsideClimateNews notes. The world, today, is still setting records for carbon emissions and there’s no sign that will change anytime soon. The only period in US history the nation has undertaken anything near the magnitude of collective action necessary for mitigation was during the Second World War and the rebuilding effort in its aftermath. But even those projects involved a fraction of the capital and coordination that will be necessary for sufficient energy transition and carbon sequestration. More importantly, today’s collective action will have to be politically justified without the motivation of defeating a personified enemy—a Hitler, if you will. Today, with interpersonal alienation running rampant and extremely consolidated wealth and power, industrial economies seem infinitely far from a cultural, political atmosphere in which collective action policies are even close to possible. To the contrary, wealthy countries are all still slashing public goods, passing austerity budgets, and investing heavily in fossil fuel infrastructure. Even most elected Democrats are dragging their feet on passing climate policy. The world is going in the exact opposite direction from one in which humans can live. We’ve tied ourselves in a perfect Gordian knot. The global economy is a vast machine, operating beyond the control of even the most powerful individuals, and it has a will of its own to consume and pollute. It’s hard to believe that this massive metal beast will be peacefully undone by the people who survive by it, and we all survive by it in some way, often against our wills; it bribes and entraps us all in ways large and small. But a wrench could clog the gears, and maybe only a wrench can stop it. One wrench that could slow climate disruption may be a large-scale conflict that halts the global economy, destroys fossil fuel infrastructure, and throws particulates in the air. At this point, with insane people like Trump, Putin, Xi, May, and Macron leading the world’s biggest nuclear powers, large-scale conflagration between them would probably lead to a nuclear exchange. Nobody wants nuclear war. Rather, nobody sane and prosocial wants nuclear war. It is an absolute horror that would burn and maim millions of living beings, despoil millions of hectares, and scar the skin of the earth and dome of the sky for centuries, maybe millennia. With proxy conflict brewing between the US and Russia in the Middle East and the Thucydides trap ready to ensnare us with an ascendant China, nuclear war looks like a more realistic possibility than it has since the 1980s. A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less ~~suicidal~~ civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.

### 1NC – AT WTO Impact

#### No I/L to Shaffer – 1] Its not casual – ev is about coordination at things like “G7 and NATO summits” – WTO not key, 2] The Cooperation part is a second recommendation NOT that WTO dispute settlement ensures that they cooperate because its based on individual leaders, and 3] WTO is seen as in the pocket of China so no I/L spill-over

#### No Impact to US-China Relations, Strong Co-Op is impossible BUT Total Collapse is impossible

Blackwill 09 – former US ambassador to India and US National Security Council Deputy for Iraq, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Robert D., RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession – A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf)//Elmer

Alternatively, will the current world economic crisis change relations between China and the United States in a much more positive and intimate direction, producing what some are calling a transcendent G-2? This seems improbable for seven reasons. First, the United States and China have profoundly **different visions of Asian security**. For Washington, maintaining U.S. alliances in Asia is the hub of its concept of Asian security, whereas, for Beijing, America’s alliance system is a destabilizing factor in Asian security and over time should wither away. These opposing concepts will be an enduring source of tension between the two sides. Second, these two countries systematically prepare for war against one another, which is reflected in their military doctrines, their weapons procurement and force modernization, and their deployments and military exercises. As long as this is the case, it will provide a formidable psychological and material barrier to much closer bilateral relations. Third, the United States is critical of China’s external resource acquisition policy, which Washington believes could threaten both American economic and security interests in the developing world. Fourth, despite their deep economic dependence on each other, U.S.-China economic relations are inherently fragile. China sells too much to the United States and buys too little, and the United States saves too little and borrows too much from China. This will **inevitably lead to a backlash** in the United States and a Chinese preoccupation with the value of its American investments. Fifth, Chinese **environmental policy** will be an increasing problem, both for U.S. policymakers who are committed to bringing China fully into global efforts to reduce climate degradation and for Chinese leaders who are just as determined to emphasize domestic economic growth over international climate regimes. Sixth, China and the United States have wholly different domestic political arrangements that make a sustained entente difficult to manage. Americans continue to care about human rights in China, and Beijing resents what it regards as U.S. interference in its domestic affairs. This will be a drag on the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future. And seventh, any extended application by Washington of “Chimerica,” as Moritz Schularick of Berlin’s Free University has called it,23 would so alarm America’s Asian allies, beginning with Japan, that the United States would soon retreat from the concept.24 Nevertheless, these factors are unlikely to lead to **a substantial downturn** in U.S.-China bilateral ties. In addition to their economic interdependence, both nations have important reasons to keep **their interaction** more or less **stable**. As Washington wants to concentrate on its many problems elsewhere in the world, especially in the Greater Middle East, Beijing prefers to keep its focus on its domestic economic development and political stability. Neither wants the bilateral relationship to get out of hand. In sum, a positive strategic breakthrough in the U.S.-China relationship or a serious deterioration in bilateral interaction both seem doubtful in the period ahead. And the current economic downturn will not essentially affect the abiding primary and constraining factors on the two sides. Therefore, the U.S.-China relationship in five years will probably look pretty much as it does today – part cooperation, part competition, part suspicion – unaffected by today’s economic time of troubles, except in the increasing unlikely event of a cross-strait crisis and confrontation.

#### Reject Laundry List Cards – allows them to group a bunch of scenarios w/o an extinction impact or warrant and claim they solve – forces us to LBL AND evaluate their arguments as just words w/o a warrant for how each scenario causes Extinction

#### Low WTO causes regional trade – yes trade-off

Isfeld 14 Gordon Isfeld 3-17-2014 business.financialpost.com/2014/03/17/with-rise-of-shot-gun-trade-agreements-is-the-wto-even-relevant-anymore/ “With the rise of 'shot-gun' trade agreements, is the WTO even relevant anymore” //Elmer

OTTAWA — It’s getting awfully crowded out there in the free-trading world. The seemingly endless hunt for new global partners is redefining the traditional and hard-fought rules of engagement between nations. So much so, observers say, the old world order — remember the WTO, and GATT before it — has increasingly become a sideshow to the proliferation of bilateral, **trilateral** **and**, often, **multi-lateral** agreements. Even the term “free trade” no longer accurately describes the “new world” of negotiations — one that encompasses far more than what and how products are permitted to slide under domestic tariff radars. For Canada, we can now add South Korea and the European Union — deals long in the making but only weeks in the signing — after a string of minor agreements since the landmark free trade act 25 years ago with the United States, and later to include Mexico. Now, as the growing mass of country-to-country, region-to-region agreements has made apparent, it’s open season on anything that moves between borders — not only products, investments and intellectual property, but also new rules on competition, and the inclusion of labour laws and environmental guidelines. These are just some of the areas of possible disputes that the World Trade Organization “does not deal with,” said Debra Steger, a professor of law at University of Ottawa, specializing in international trade and development. “These are new models. These are not traditional trade agreements, per se.” Ms. Steger, who worked for the federal government on the Uruguay Round of negotiations that led to formation of the WTO, said the framework of recent deals goes “way beyond subjects that NAFTA dealt with.” “Trade, even in the WTO, isn’t only about tariffs. It’s not just about customs and border measures,” she said. “But it’s not about behind-the-border regulatory matters, like environmental regulation and labour standards, competition policy and human rights, corruption, and on and on it goes.” Free trade, between where ever, has become the go-to issue for politicians, business leaders, public-policy makers and private interest groups. Note, this month’s sudden but long-rumoured announcement by the Harper government of a free-trade deal with South Korea, nearly 10 years after talks began and stumbled, and resumed again. Arguably, the deal was finally done as a result of the resolution to Canada’s drawn-out dispute with Seoul over our beef exports — the so-called “mad cow” disease leading to a ban in that county and others. Of course, the United States, the European Union and Australia, among others, already had agreements in hand with South Korea. A few months earlier, Ottawa inked its EU deal — the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement — which was again the outcome of a seemingly endless circle of negotiations that still left Canada trailing similar pacts by the U.S. and others. Even so, these pacts “affect the WTO and WTO negotiations for a number of reasons. That’s a major problem,” said Ms. Steger. “The major developed countries have gone off and started these efforts to negotiate these big FTAs [free trade agreements] as a response to the declining situation in the Doha Round. The WTO — reborn in 1995 out of the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade, the original body created in 1948 — has been struggling to maintain its relevance as the global arbiter of trade agreements and dispute resolution. The cachet of the 159-member body, however, has been diminished in recent years as countries moved to seal their own free-trade deals with major partners in the absence, some would argue, of any significant movement by the WTO on its own 2001 trade liberalization initiative, launched in Doha, Qatar. Late last year, members managed to agree to only limited movement on trade under the Doha Round of talks. Even now, details remain to be worked out. “One of the reasons why we’re seeing this sort of shot-gun approach [to trade agreements outside of the WTO] is because a number of countries are concerned that the big global deals are probably next to impossible at this stage, given how the Doha Round went and what we ended up with there, which was next to nothing,” said Douglas Porter, chief economist at BMO Capital Markets in Toronto. “They did manage to reach a tiny deal when all was said and done, but it was very modest in terms of its scope.” The move toward bilateral or multi-lateral agreements “is a symptom of the problems that we were running into at the WTO,” Mr. Porter said. “Important players are probably quietly questioning the future for the WTO…. Is it that death knell for the WTO? I don’t think so. [But] it just means we might not be able to accomplish grand, global deals in the future.” However, “there’s really no other way to approach trade disputes with, say, a country like China, then through that body at this point.” “Even 10 years ago, I think it was more straightforward to come to global trade rules. You had two major players, Europe and the U.S., and a few next tier players, including Japan,” Mr. Porter said. “Now, though, you have all kinds of important big players that have a huge chunk of global trade, and have very different goals and aims, and it might be the nature of the global economy now — the reality that we have many different groups in many different regions. “It might be impossible to square that circle.” Over the course of 25 years, Canada has piled on more than a dozen free trade agreements. The first — taking effect on Jan. 1, 1989 — was with the United States. A heated political issue in the 1988 federal election, which Brian Mulroney’s Conservatives won, the FTA was expanded in 1994 to include Mexico and rebranded as NAFTA. Other free trade deals, though much smaller, were signed in subsequent years, some yet to take effect: Israel, Jordan and Chile, followed later by Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, Honduras and Colombia, leading up to the pacts with EU and South Korea. Negotiations are ongoing for at least another dozen agreements. For countries such as Colombia, which has had an agreement in effect with Canada since 2011, the goal is “to insert our economy into the world economy,” said Alvaro Concha, trade commissioner of Proexport Colombia, based in Toronto. “At the beginning of this decade, we had only our preferential access to over 500 million consumers,” Mr. Concha said. “With all the potential FTAs we’ve been signing with potential markets and with potential partners, we believe that not just the potential buyers of our products, but also the potential investors in our country, we have opened our preferential access to over 1.5 billion consumers.” Likely to push the WTO further into the shadows of global trade will be the Trans Pacific Partnership. “In many ways, the Trans Pacific Partnership will be, if it is successful, an updating of the NAFTA, because the U.S. and Mexico are involved, as well as some [trading] partners we already have within Latin America, like Peru,” said Ms. Steger, at the University of Ottawa. “But [there are] also some key countries in Asia that we don’t have agreements with yet. And some other developed countries in that regional, New Zealand and Australia, that we don’t have agreements with,” she adds. “So that [TPP] agreement is very, very important. It’s also the first major plur-lateral agreement that the world has seen.”

#### Regionalism promotes trade and stops war – avoids their impact because our regionalism is different than protectionist blocs.

Brkić 13, Snježana, and Adnan Efendic. "Regional Trading Arrangements–Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?." 5th International Conference «Economic Integration, competition and cooperation», Croatia, Opatija. 2013. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2239275 (Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo) //Elmer

Besides those advocating the optimistic or pessimistic view on regionalism effect on global trade liberalization, some economists, such as Frankel and Wei, hold a neutral position, in a way. Frankel and Wei believe that forms and achievements of international economic integrations can vary and that, for this reason, regionalism can be – depending on circumstances – linked to greater or smaller global trade liberalization. In the years-long period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the integration processes were becoming particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was taking place during the capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the world market. Economic integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness of international trading system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism". The next two waves of **regionalism** occurred in the years following the world wars. Since the disintegration processes caused by the wars usually spawned economic nationalisms and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war regionalisms were marked by discriminatory international economic integrations, primarily at the level of so-called negative integration, with expressedly “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that resulted in considerable trade deviations. This particularly refers to the regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the consequences of Big Economic Crisis. The current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the world to a far greater extent than any previous one did: it has covered almost all the continents and almost all the countries, even those which have mis to join all earlier regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China. Integration processes, however, do not show any signs of flagging. Up till now, over 200 RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more than 150 of them being still in force, and most of these valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years. Specific in many ways, this wave was dubbed "new regionalism". The most specific **characteristics** of new regionalism **include: geographic spread** **of RTAs** **in** terms of **encompassing entire continents;** **greater speed**; integration forms success; deepening of integration processes; **and**, the most important for this theoretical discussion, generally **non-negative impact on outsiders, world economy as a whole, and** the **multilateral liberalization** process. Some theorists (Gilpin) actually distinguish **between** the "**benign**" **and** "**malign**" **regionalism**. On the one hand, **regionalism can advance** the **international economic stability**, multilateral liberalization **and world peace**. On the other, it can have mercantilist features leading to economic well-being degradation and increasing international tensions and conflicts. Analyses of trends within the contemporary integration processes show that they mainly have features of "benign" regionalism. Reasons for this are numerous. **Forces driving** the **contemporary** **regionalism** development **differ from** those that used to drive **earlier** regionalism periods in the 20th century. The **present regionalism emerged in** the period characterized by the **increasing economic inter-dependence** between different world economy subjects, countries attempts to resolve trade disputes and multilateral framework of trade relations. As opposed to the 1930s episode, contemporary regional initiatives represent **attempts to make** the members' **participation in the world economy easier**, rather than make them more distant from it. As opposed to 1950s and 1960s episode, new **initiatives** are **less frequently motivated** **exclusively by political interests**, and are **less frequently** being used **for mercantilist purposes**. After the Second World War, more powerful countries kept using the economic integration as a means to strengthen their political influence on their weaker partners and outsiders. The examples include CMEA and European Community arrangements with its members' former colonies. As opposed to this practice, the new regionalism, mostly driven by common economic interests, yielded less trade diversion than previous one, and has also **contributed to** the **prevention of military conflicts of greater proportions**. Various analyses have shown that many regional integrations in earlier periods resulted in trade deviations, particularly those formed between less developed countries and between socialist countries. In recent years, however, the newly formed or revised regional **integrations** primarily seem to **lead to trade creation**. Contrary to the “beggar thy- neighbor” model of former international economic integrations, the integrations now offer certain advantages to outsiders as well, by stimulating growth and spurring the role of market forces. The analyses of contemporary trends in world economy also speak in favor of the "optimistic" proposition. The structural analysis shows that the world trade is growing and that this growth results both from the increase in intra-regional and from the increase in extra-regional trade value (Anderson i Snape 1994.)28. Actually, the intraregional trade has been growing faster, both by total value and by its share in world GDP. The extra-regional trade share in GDP was increasing in some regions – in North America, Asia-Pacific and Asian developing countries. However, the question arises as to whether the extra-regional trade would be greater without regional integrations or not? The answer would primarily depend both on the estimate of degree of some countries' trade policy restrictedness in such circumstances, and on factors such as geographic distance, transport communications, political relations among states. One should also take into account certain contemporary integration features – the primarily economic, rather than strategic motivation, and continuous expansion, which mostly includes countries that are significant economic partners. With respect to NAFTA, many believe that the negative effects on outsiders will be negligible, since the USA and Canada have actually been highly integrated economies for a long time already, while the Mexican economy is relatively small. The same view was pointed out by the EU, with respect to its expansion. It particularly refers to the inclusion of the remaining EFTA countries, because this will actually only complete, in institutional terms, the EU strong economic ties with these countries. Most EFTA countries have been part of the European economic area (EEA), i.e. the original EC-EFTA agreement, for a few years already, and conduct some 70% of their total international exchange with the Union countries. EU countries are also the most significant foreign-trade partners of Central and East Europe countries, and the recent joining the Union of several of them is not expected to cause a significant trade diversion. Besides, according to some earlier studies, during the previous wave of regionalism, in the 1967-70 period, the creation of trade in EEC was far greater than trade diversion: trade creation ranged from 13 to 23% of total imports, while trade diversion ranged from 1 to 6%. In Latin America, the new regionalism resulted in the faster growth of intra-regional trade, while the extra-regional exports and imports also continued to grow. Since early 1990s, the value of intra-regional imports registered the average annual growth of 18%. In the same time, the extra-regional exports were also growing, although at a lower rate of 9% average a year; its share in the total Latin America exports at the end of decade amounted to 18% as compared to 12% in 1990. In the 1990-1996 period, the intraregional imports grew by some 18% a year. The extra-regional imports were also growing very fast, reaching the 14% rate. These data reflect a great unbalance in the trade with extra-regional markets, since the imports from countries outside the region grew much faster the exports.30 Since the described trends point to the continued growth of extra-regional imports and exports, they also show that regional integration in Latin America has had the open regionalism character. Besides, the pending establishment of FTAA – Free Trade Area of Americas will gather, in the same group, the so-called "natural" trade partners – countries that have had an extremely extensive mutual exchange for years already, and the outsiders are therefore unlikely to be affected by strengthening of regionalism in this part of the world. Contemporary research shows that intra-regional trade is growing, however, same as interdependence between North America and East Asia and between the EU and East Asia. It can also be seen that the biggest and the **most powerful** countries, i.e. **blocs**, **are extremely dependent** **on the rest of the world in terms of trade.** For the EU, besides the intra-European trade, which is ranked first, foreign trade has the vital importance since it accounts for 10% of European GDP. In early 1990s, EU exchanged 40% of its foreign trade with non-members, 16% out of which with North America and East Asia together. EU therefore must keep in mind the rest of the world as well. The growing EU interest in outsiders is confirmed by establishing "The Euro-Med Partnership", which proclaimed a new form of cooperation between the EU and the countries at its South periphery32. Besides, the past few years witnessed a series of inter-regional agreements between the EU on the one hand, and certain groups from other regions on the other (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN and GCC). In case of North America the ratio between intra-regional and inter-regional trade is 40:60, and in East Asia, it is 45:55. Any attempt to move towards significantly closed blocs ("fortresses") would require overcoming the significant inter-dependence between major trading blocs. Besides the analysis of contemporary trends in extra- and intra-regional trade, other research was conducted that was supposed to point to the reasons why the **new regionalism has** mainly a **non-negative impact on** outsiders and **global liberalization**. The distinctive features of new regionalism were also affected to characteristics of international economic and political environment it sprouted in. In the 1980s, economic nationalisms were not so expressed as in the interventionism years following the Second World War; however, the neo-liberalism represented by GATT activities did not find the "fertile ground” in all parts of the world. Regionalism growth in the circumstances of multilateral system existence is, among other things, the consequence of distrust in multilateralism. „The revival of the forces of regionalism stemmed from frustration with the slow pace of multilateral trade liberalization... If the world trade regime could not be moved ahead, then perhaps it was time for deeper liberalization within more limited groups of like-minded nations... Such efforts would at least liberalize some trade... and might even prod the other nations to go along with multilateral liberalization.“33 Kennedy's round and Tokyo round of trade negotiations under GATT auspices brought a certain progress in the global trade liberalization. However, the 1980s witnessed significant changes in the world economy that the GATT trade system was not up to. Besides. GATT had not yet managed to cover the entire trade in goods, since there were still exceptions in the trade in agricultural and textile products that particularly affected the USA and developing countries. GATT system of conflict resolutions, and its organizational and administrative mechanism in general also required revision. In this vacuum that was created in promoting trade and investment multilateralism from the point when GATT inadequacy became obvious until the start of the Uruguay round and the establishment of World Trade Organization, the wave of regionalism started spreading across the world again. Prodded by the Single European Act and the success of European integration, many countries turned to an alternative solution – establishment of new or expansion and deepening of the existing economic integrations. Even the USA, the multilateralism bastion until then, made a radical turn in their foreign-trade policy and started working on designing a North American integration.

#### That outweighs—multilateral trade causes wars with a larger impact

Thoma 7 Mark Thoma July 2007 “Trade Liberalization and War” <http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/07/trade-liberaliz.html> (Economics Professor at the University of Oregon)//Elmer

Globalisation is by construction an increase in both bilateral and multilateral trade flows. What then was the net effect of increased trade since 1970? We find that it **generated an increase in the probability of a bilateral conflict by** around **20%** for those **countries separated by less than 1000kms,** the group of countries for **which the risk of disputes that can escalate militarily is the highest.** The effects are much smaller for countries which are more distant. Contrary to what these results (aggravated by our nationality) may suggest, we are not anti-globalisation activists even though we are aware that some implications of our work could be (mis)used in such a way. The result that bilateral trade is pacifying brings several more optimistic implications on globalisation. First, if we think of a world war as a war between two large groups or coalitions of countries, then globalisation makes such a war less likely because it increases the opportunity cost of such a conflict. Obviously, this conclusion cannot be tested but is a logical implication of our results. From this point of view, our work suggests that globalisation may be at the origin of a change in the nature of conflicts, less global and more local. Second, our results do confirm that increased trade flows **created by regional trade agreements** (such as the EU) are indeed **pacifying** as intended. Given that most military conflicts are local, because they find their origins in border or ethnic disputes, **this is not a small achievement**. These beneficial political aspects of regional trade agreements are not usually considered by economists who often focus on the economic distortions brought by their discriminatory nature. Given the huge human and economic costs of wars, this political effect of regional trade agreements should not be discounted. This opens interesting questions on how far these regional trade agreements should extend – a topical issue in the case of the EU. The entry of Turkey in the EU would indeed pacify its relations with EU countries (especially Greece and Cyprus), but also increase the probability of a conflict between Turkey and its non-EU neighbours. However, our simulations suggest that in this case, the first effect dominates the second by a large margin. More generally, our results should be interpreted as a word of caution on some political aspects of globalisation. As it proceeds and weakens the economic ties of proximate countries, those with the highest risk of disputes that can escalate into military conflicts, local conflicts may become more prevalent. Even if they may not appear optimal on purely economic grounds, regional and bilateral trade agreements, by strengthening local economic ties, may therefore **be a necessary political counterbalance to economic globalisation**.