#### **The starting point of morality is practical reason.**

#### **1] Bindingness: A theory is only binding when you can answer the question “why should I do this?” and not continue to ask “why”. Only practical reason provides a deductive foundation for ethics since the question “why should I be rational” already concedes the authoritative power of agency since your agency is at work. Bindingness ow**

#### **a) its meta-ethical, so it determines what counts as a warrant for a standard, so absent grounding in some metaethical framework, their arguments aren’t relevant normative considerations**

#### **b) Absent a binding starting point frameworks would all share equal value. Weighing between them would be infinitely regressive as it presupposes there is a higher metric to determine who has the better justifications. That would make contestation vacuous as any locus of moral duty is sufficient since it would have an uncontested obligatory power.**

#### **2] Action theory: only evaluating action through reason solves since reason is key to evaluate intent, otherwise we could infinitely divide actions. For example: If I was brewing tea, I could break up that one big action into multiple small actions. Only our intention, to brew tea unifies these actions if we were never able to unify action, we could never classify certain actions as moral or immoral since those actions would be infinitely divisible.**

#### **3] Empirical uncertainty – Evil demon deceiving us or inability to know others’ experience make empiricism/induction an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.**

#### **And, reason must be universal –**

#### **[1]a reason for one agent is a reason for another agent. I can’t say 2+2=4 is true for me but not for you – that’s incoherent. any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others universalizability acts as a side constraint on all other frameworks.**

#### **[2]Also key for following rules since rules are arbitrary since the agent can form a unique interpretation and understanding which makes it impossible to verify a violation. Only universality solves since universalizing a violation of freedom entails a violation of your own freedom, thus a recognizable violation appears also**

#### **The standard is consistency with a libertarian state of non-interference.**

#### **Prefer:**

#### **[1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify the neg arguments/standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.**

#### **[2] Resolvability: Clarity of weighing under our framework: perfect duties above imperfect duties. Duties in right. Explicit categories that supersede other categories. All other FWs are consequentialist that use unquantifiable prob, mag, or prob x mag.**

#### **[3] Consequentialism fails-**

#### **A]Induction- there is no reason for why past trends continue in the same way in the future. Induction is justified by induction working in the past which proves its circular-**

#### **B]Aggregation fails – you cant tell how many headaches equal a broken leg, and there are multiple chemicals that make the brain happy with no way to compare them**

#### **C]Butterfly effect- When one action is done, that results in an infinite of other chain events which eventually makes any two actions the same since there is so non-arbitrary cutoff to calculations.**

#### **D]No Culpability- We can never evaluate the ethicality of an action until after we observe the effects of the action, so its not action guiding**

**[4] Inclusion isn't a voter**

**1] The ballot is always determined off inequalities**

**2] No brightline for how much inclusion is enough**

**3] It's impossible because it would require giving each debater the same amount of prep and coaching staff**

**4] its a fallacy of origin — just because its a prerequisite doens't make it more**

### **Offense**

#### **Affirm**

#### **1]Intellectual property is coercive by restricting what people can do with their property**

**Krawisz 9** [Krawisz, Daniel. “The Fallacy of Intellectual Property.” Mises Institute, 8 Aug. 2009, mises.org/library/fallacy-intellectual-property.//dhs NJ]

**Intellectual property is the principle that the creator of an idea has a right to certain controls over all the physical forms in which his idea is recorded. The extent of this control may be different depending on whether the idea is considered copyrighted, patented, or trademarked, but the essential principle is the same in all cases**.[1] This presumed right of the creator of an idea is often believed to be similar to the right that a homesteader has to land he has settled, but the analogy is false. Intellectual property **is necessarily a statist doctrine.** The Nature of Property People cannot be expected to agree unanimously on what the world ought to be like and what each person should do, nor are people necessarily coordinated and patient enough to arrive at a consensus through deliberation. Instead they will tend to be apart from one another, desiring immediate action and lacking established procedures of efficiently coming to decisions. When people disagree and are unwilling to deliberate, one person's decision must prevail without regard to the others' desires. Whose decision prevails may be determined in two ways: physical conflict, or deferral to a system of property. With a system of property in place, it is necessary only to ask who owns a thing, rather than to endure the costs of deliberation or to resort to violence. Without the possibility of two persons attempting to control any one thing, defining property rights would be a mere psychological game without any consequences for human action. If persons were bodiless ghosts able to pass through one another without interacting, or if everyone lived in his own universe without being able to move from one to another, all disagreements about what to do with the world would be irrelevant. The purpose of property rights is the prevention of physical conflict. An essential characteristic of property is exclusivity, meaning that the use of an object by one person prevents it from being used by another.[2] In addition to property rights, political theorists have proposed many other kinds of rights. All such rights must resolve into rights over physical things. When we speak of a right to free speech or a right to one's labor, for example, we really mean a right over one's own physical body. All rights, therefore, are ultimately property rights. Ultimately, though we might speak of ownership over abstract things, it is only physical things, which can actually be fought over, that are owned. This we must keep in mind, for it is possible to sound reasonable and humane when discussing in abstract terms rights that would sound monstrous if they were described in terms of property. Libertarians have often noted, for example, that the "right" to health care, a job, or a minimum income implies a property right over the people capable of providing such things and is therefore really a form of slavery. Similarly, the right to a vote is really a joint ownership between all citizens over the people, land, and everything else within a particular jurisdiction. Libertarians themselves are at times confused over this issue. For example, they sometimes claim that in a free market broadcast industry, broadcasters would own certain frequencies in a given region and would therefore have the right to broadcast without interference by a pirate radio station on the same frequency. Yet it is clearly not the frequency that is owned, because a frequency is not a physical object but rather an abstract property of all waves. It is the land over which that frequency is broadcast that is owned, albeit only for the purposes of broadcasting that frequency. Ownership of a radio frequency is ultimately a property right over a region of space, which allows someone to broadcast at a given frequency over it.[3] This example demonstrates that ownership is not necessarily over entire objects but rather over decisions to be made with regard to them. An object can be owned by many different people because there are many kinds of decisions that can be made about it. Since different frequencies of radio waves can pass through one another without interfering, the same territory can be owned separately for the purposes of broadcasting at each frequency without leading to a conflict.[4**] Ideas cannot themselves be controlled with physical force, but instead must be controlled by way of other things — paper, printing presses, computers, and people. It is therefore in these things that intellectual property consists. To own a patent in a given invention is to have rights over everything in the universe that might be used to replicate that invention. This ownership is limited; one only owns things to the extent of being able to prevent others from arranging them in a particular way. Similarly, to have a copyright in a song or a book is to have a property right over all paper, printing presses, computers — even over all people — everywhere. The owner may prevent the copying or public performance of his work by them all.** Intellectual property is, like socialism, a kind of slavery, albeit a limited kind. Unlike socialism, however, intellectual property does not limit itself to the people and property in a given town or nation, or even the entire world. Since most matter in the universe could be used to encode an idea, intellectual property is a claim over the entire universe. "Intellectual property is necessarily a statist doctrine." Rather than seeing intellectual property as a particularly expansive kind of physical property, many people see it as a separate, analogous, and equally fundamental construction. To copy an intellectual work is therefore a form of theft analogous to burglary; however, I insist that there is no analogy. Intellectual property and physical property cannot exist side-by-side as logically independent legal constructions. **Anything that gives control over physical things necessarily limits others' control of those things, and therefore acts exactly like a physical property right. If you have an intellectual property right to your monograph, you may prevent me from copying it, thereby limiting the physical property right I have in my ink, pen, and paper.**

#### **2]Intellectual property is internally contradictory since ideas are abstract things, not things people can have ownership off- contradictions affirm**

**Wikiwand**. “Principle of Explosion.” Wikiwand, 0AD, [www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle\_of\_explosion](http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion). //Massa

The principle of explosion (Latin: ex falso (sequitur) quodlibet (EFQ), "from falsehood, anything (follows)", or ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet (ECQ), **"from contradiction, anything (follows)"), or the principle of** [**Pseudo-Scotus**](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Pseudo-Scotus), is the law of [classical logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Classical_logic), [intuitionistic logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Intuitionistic_logic) and similar logical systems, according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.[[1]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote1) That is, once a contradiction has been asserted, any proposition (including their negations) can be inferred from it. This is known as **deductive explosion**.[[2]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote2)[[3]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote3) The proof of this principle was first given by 12th century French philosopher [William of Soissons](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/William_of_Soissons).[[4]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote4)

As a demonstration of the principle, **consider two contradictory statements – "All lemons are yellow" and "Not all lemons are yellow"**, and suppose that both are true. If that is the case, **anything can be proven**, e.g., **the assertion that "unicorns exist", by using the following argument:**

**1.** We know that **"All lemons are yellow"**, as it **has been assumed to be true.**

**2.** **Therefore**, the two-part statement **"All lemons are yellow OR unicorns exist” must also be true**, since the first part is true.

However, **since we know that "Not all lemons are yellow"** (as this has been assumed), **the first part is false, and hence the second part must be true, i.e., unicorns exist**

### **Underview**

#### **1] Aff gets 1ar theory since the neg can be near infinitely abusive, drop the debater, no rvi, competing interps, aff theory 1st**

#### **a) the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance and is a bigger time investment 1/4 vs 1/7**

#### **b) dta is severance which is bad b/c neg can uplayer**

#### **c) competing interps means the 2n can’t dump on a reasonability bright-line that excludes only what they did wrong**

#### **d) no rvi because the neg has time advantage on the theory layer e) eval the theory debate after the 1ar cuz 6 mins 2nr means they always win cuz I only have 3 mins in 2ar to respond, and key to recirpoicty cuz 1 speech on theory**

#### **2] Interp: the neg may not contest the aff framework.**

#### **Prefer- 1] Time skew- Winning the negative framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense and forces a 1AR restart against a 7 min 1NC – that outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility – I can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse.**

#### **2] Topic Ed- Every debate would just be a framework debate which crowds out our ability to have core debates about the topic – that outweighs-**

#### **A] Time Frame- We only have 2 months to debate the topic**

#### **3] Aff fairness comes prior to NC arguments cuz its key to compensate structural skew**

**Shah 19** [Sachin Shah, 2019, "A Statistical Analysis of Side-Bias on the 2019 January-February Lincoln-Douglas Debate Topic," NSD Update, http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/] AG accessed 6-22-2019

As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds from 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (2017 – 2019 YTD), the negative won 52.99% of ballots (p-value < 0.0001) and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics.

### **Advantage**

#### **Plan – The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines by implementing a one-and-done approach for patent protection.**

#### **The Plan solves Evergreening.**

**Feldman 3** Robin Feldman 2-11-2019 "‘One-and-done’ for new drugs could cut patent thickets and boost generic competition"<https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/11/drug-patent-protection-one-done/> (Arthur J. Goldberg Distinguished Professor of Law, Albert Abramson ’54 Distinguished Professor of Law Chair, and Director of the Center for Innovation)//SidK + Elmer

I believe that one period of protection **should be enough**. We should make the legal changes necessary to prevent companies **from building patent walls** and piling up mountains of rights. This could be accomplished **by a “one-and-done” approach** for patent protection. Under it, a drug would receive just one period of exclusivity, and no more. The choice of which “one” could be left entirely in the hands of the pharmaceutical company, with the election made when the FDA approves the drug. Perhaps development of the drug went swiftly and smoothly, so the remaining life of one of the drug’s patents is of greatest value. Perhaps development languished, so designation as an orphan drug or some other benefit would bring greater reward. The choice would be up to the company itself, based on its own calculation of the maximum benefit. The result, however, is that a pharmaceutical company chooses whether its period of exclusivity would be a patent, an orphan drug designation, a period of data exclusivity (in which no generic is allowed to use the original drug’s safety and effectiveness data), or something else — but **not all of the above** and more. Consider Suboxone, a combination of buprenorphine and naloxone for treating opioid addiction. The drug’s maker has extended its protection cliff eight times, including obtaining an orphan drug designation, which is intended for drugs that serve only a small number of patients. The drug’s first period of exclusivity ended in 2005, but with the additions its protection now lasts until 2024. That makes almost two additional decades in which the public has borne the burden of monopoly pricing, and access to the medicine may have been constrained. Implementing a one-and-done approach in conjunction with FDA approval underscores the fact that these problems and solutions are designed for pharmaceuticals, not for all types of technologies. That way, one-and-done could be implemented through **legislative changes to the FDA’s drug approval system**, and would apply to patents granted going forward. One-and-done would apply to both patents and exclusivities. A more limited approach, a baby step if you will, would be to invigorate the existing patent obviousness doctrine as a way to cut back on patent tinkering. Obviousness, one of the five standards for patent eligibility, says that inventions that are obvious to an expert or the general public can’t be patented. Either by congressional clarification or judicial interpretation, many pile-on patents could be eliminated with a ruling that the core concept of the additional patent is nothing more than the original formulation. Anything else is merely an obvious adaptation of the core invention, modified with existing technology. As such, the patent would fail for being perfectly obvious. Even without congressional action, a more vigorous and robust application of the existing obviousness doctrine could significantly improve the problem of piled-up patents and patent walls. Pharmaceutical companies have become adept at maneuvering through the system of patent and non-patent rights to create mountains of rights that can be applied, one after another. This behavior lets drug companies keep competitors out of the market and beat them back when they get there. We shouldn’t be surprised at this. Pharmaceutical companies are profit-making entities, after all, that face pressure from their shareholders to produce ever-better results. If we want to change the system, we must change the incentives driving the system. And right now, the incentives for creating patent walls are just too great.

#### **Reforming the Patent Process would lower Drug Prices and incentivize Pharma Innovation by revitalizing the Market.**

**Stanbrook 13**, Matthew B. "Limiting “evergreening” for a better balance of drug innovation incentives." (2013): 939-939. (MD (University of Toronto) PhD (University of Toronto))//Elmer

At issue in the Indian case was “evergreening,” a now widespread practice by the pharmaceutical industry designed to extend the monopoly on an existing drug by modifying it and seeking new patents.2 Currently, half of all drugs patented in Canada have multiple subsequent patents, extending the lifetime of the original patent by about 8 years.3 Manufacturers, in defence of these practices, predictably tout the advantages of new versions of their products, which often represent more potent isomers or salts of the original drugs, longer-lasting formulations or improved delivery systems that make adherence easier or more convenient. But the new versions are by definition “**me too” drugs**, and demonstration that the resulting **incremental benefits** in efficacy and safety are clinically meaningful **is often lacking**. Moreover, the original drugs have often been “blockbusters” used for years to improve the health of millions of patients. It seems hard to argue convincingly why such beneficial drugs require an upgrade, often just before their patents expire. Rather than the marginal benefits accrued from tinkering with already effective agents, patients worldwide are in desperate need of new classes of pharmaceuticals for the great many health conditions for which treatments are presently inadequate or entirely lacking. But developing truly innovative drugs is undeniably a high-risk venture. It is important and necessary that pharmaceutical companies continue to take these risks, because they are usually the only entities with sufficient resources to do so. Therefore, companies must continue to perceive **sufficient incentives** to continue investing in innovation. Indeed, there is evidence that the prospect of future evergreening has become part of the incentive calculation for innovative drug development.4 But surely it is perverse to extend unpredictably a period of patent protection that the government intended to be clearly defined and predictable, and to maintain incentives that drive companies to divert their **drug-development resources away from innovation**. **Current patent legislation may not be optimal** for striking the right balance between encouraging innovation and facilitating profiteering. Given the broad societal importance of patent legislation, ongoing research to enable active governance of this issue should be a national priority. In the last decade, Canada’s laws have been among the friendliest toward evergreening in the world.5 We should now reflect on whether this is really in our national interest. Governments, including Canada’s, would do well to take inspiration from India’s example and tighten regulations that currently facilitate evergreening. This might involve **denying future patents for modifications** that currently would receive one. An overall reduction in the duration of all secondary patents on a therapy might also be considered. Globally, a more flexible and individualized approach to the length of drug patents might be a more effective strategy to align corporate incentives with population health needs. Limits on evergreening would likely reduce the **extensive patent litigation** that contributes to the **high prices of generic drugs** in Canada.3 Reducing economic pressure on generic drug companies may facilitate current provincial initiatives to lower generic drug prices. As opportunities to generate revenue from evergreening are eliminated, research-based pharmaceutical companies would be left with no choice but to invest more in innovative drug development to maintain their profits.

#### **Evergreening keeps Drug Prices high.**

**Amin 18** Tahir Amin 6-27-2018 "The problem with high drug prices isn't 'foreign freeloading,' it's the patent system" [High drug prices caused by US patent system, not 'foreign freeloaders' (cnbc.com) https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/high-drug-prices-caused-by-us-patent-system.html](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/high-drug-prices-caused-by-us-patent-system.html) (co-founder of nonprofit I-MAK.org)//Elmer

**'Evergreening'** Instead of going to new medicines, the study finds that 74 percent of new patents during the decade went to drugs that already existed. It found that 80 percent of the nearly 100 best-selling drugs extended their exclusivity protections at least once, and 50 percent extended their patents more than once—with the effect of **prolonging** the **time before generics** could reach the market **as drug prices continued to rise**. The strategy is called “evergreening”: drug makers add on new patents to prolong a drug’s exclusivity, even when the additions aren’t fundamentally new, non-obvious, and useful as the law requires. One of the most expensive cancer drugs on the market, **Revlimid**®, is a case in point: **priced at** over $**125,000** per year of treatment, Celgene has sought **105 patents** on Revlimid®, many of which have been granted, extending its monopoly until the end of 2036. That gives the Revlimid® patent portfolio a lifespan of 40 years, which is being used to block or deter generic competitors from entering the market. But a recent I-MAK analysis finds that several of Celgene’s patents are mere add-ons—not fundamentally new to deserve a patent. And because of the thicket of patents around Revlimid®, **payers** are **projected to spend $45 billion** **in excess costs** on that drug alone as compared to what they could be paying if generic competitors were to enter when the first patent expires in 2019. Meanwhile, Celgene is also among the pharmaceuticals that have been recently scolded by the FDA for refusing to share samples with generic makers so they can test their own products against the brands in order to attain FDA approval. **In the absence of** genuine **competition** in the U.S. prescription drug market, **monopolies are yielding reckless pricing schemes and prohibitively expensive drugs** for Americans (and people around the world) who need them. In 2015, for example, U.S. Senators Wyden and Grassley found after an 18-month bipartisan investigation that the notorious $84,000 price tag for the hepatitis C drug made by Gilead was based on “a pricing and marketing strategy designed to maximize revenue with little concern for access or affordability.” Gilead’s subsequent hepatitis C drug Harvoni® was introduced to the market at a still higher cost of $94,500. Who benefits when drugs are priced so high? Not the 85 percent of Americans with hepatitis C who are still not able to afford treatment.

#### **That pushes people into poverty – our internal is causal.**

**Hoban 10** Rose Hoban 9-13-2010 "High Cost of Medicine Pushes More People into Poverty"<https://www.voanews.com/science-health/high-cost-medicine-pushes-more-people-poverty> (spent more than six years as the health reporter for North Carolina Public Radio – WUNC, where she covered health care, state health policy, science and research with a focus on public health issues. She left to start North Carolina Health News after watching many of her professional peers leave or be laid off of their jobs, leaving NC with few people to cover this complicated and important topic. ALSO cites Laurens Niens who is a Health Researcher at Erasmus University Rotterdam)//Elmer

Health economist Laurens Niëns found that drugs needed to treat chronic diseases could be considered unaffordable **for many people in poor countries**. Medicines can be expensive and often make up a large portion of any family's health care budget. And the burden can be even greater for people in poor countries, where the **cost of vital medicines can push them into poverty**. The problem is growing as more people around the world are diagnosed with chronic diseases such as high blood pressure and diabetes. Being diagnosed with a chronic disease usually compells patients to seek treatment for a prolonged period of time. That increases the eventual price tag for health, says health economist Laurens Niëns at Erasmus University in the Netherlands. Niëns examined medication pricing data from the World Health Organization and also looked at data from the World Bank on household income in many countries. Using the data, he calculated how much people need to spend on necessities such as food, housing, education and medicines. "The medicines we looked at are medicines for patients who suffer from asthma, diabetes, hypertension and we looked at an adult respiratory infection," Niëns says. "Three conditions are for chronic diseases, which basically means that people need to procure those medicines each and every day." Niëns focused on the cost of medicine for those conditions. He found the essential drugs could be considered unaffordable for many people in poor countries - so much so that their cost often pushes people into abject poverty. "The proportion of the population that is living below the poverty line, plus the people that are being pushed below the poverty line, can **reach up to 80 percent** in some countries for some medicines," Niëns says. He points out that generic medicines - which are more affordable than brand-name medications - are often **not available in the marketplace**. And, according to Niëns, poor government policies can drive up the cost of medications. "For instance, a lot of governments actually tax medicines when they come into the country," he says. "[They] have no standard for the markups on medicines through the distribution chain. So often, governments think they pay a good price for the medicines when they procure them from the producer. However, before such a medicine reaches a patient, markups are sometimes up to 1,000 percent."

#### **Inequality drives diversionary nationalism which sparks international conflict.**

**Solt 11**, Frederick. "Diversionary nationalism: Economic inequality and the formation of national pride." The Journal of Politics 73.3 (2011): 821-830. (Ph.D. in Political Science from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, Assistant Professor, Departments of Political Science and Sociology, Southern Illinois at the time of publication)//Elmer

One of the oldest theories of nationalism is that states **instill the nationalist myth** in their citizens to **divert their attention from great economic inequality** and so forestall pervasive unrest. Because the very concept of nationalism obscures the extent of inequality and is a potent tool for delegitimizing calls for redistribution, it is a perfect **diversion**, and states should be expected to engage in more nationalist mythmaking when inequality increases. The evidence presented by this study supports this theory: across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread. This result adds considerably to our understanding of nationalism. To date, many scholars have focused on the international environment as the principal source of threats that prompt states to generate nationalism; the importance of the domestic threat posed by economic inequality has been largely overlooked. However, at least in recent years, domestic inequality is a **far more important stimulus for the generation of nationalist sentiments** than the international context. Given that **nuclear weapons**—either their own or their allies’—rather than the mass army now serve as the primary defense of many countries against being overrun by their enemies, perhaps this is not surprising: nationalism-inspired mass mobilization is simply no longer as necessary for protection as it once was (see Mearsheimer 1990, 21; Posen 1993, 122–24). Another important implication of the analyses presented above is that growing economic inequality may increase ethnic conflict. States may foment national pride to stem discontent with increasing inequality, but this pride can also lead to more **hostility towards immigrants and minorities**. Though pride in the nation is distinct from chauvinism and outgroup hostility, it is nevertheless closely related to these phenomena, and recent experimental research has shown that members of majority groups who express high levels of national pride can be nudged into intolerant and xenophobic responses quite easily (Li and Brewer 2004). This finding suggests that, by leading to the creation of more national pride, higher levels of inequality produce environments favorable to those who would inflame **ethnic animosities**. Another and perhaps even more worrisome implication regards the **likelihood of war**. Nationalism is frequently suggested as a **cause of war**, and more national pride has been found to result in a much greater demand for national security even at the expense of civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004, 36–37) as well as preferences for “a more **militaristic foreign affairs posture** and a more interventionist role in world politics” (Conover and Feldman 1987, 3). To the extent that these preferences influence policymaking, the **growth in economic inequality** over the last quarter century should be expected to **lead to more aggressive foreign policies and** **more international conflict**. If economic inequality prompts states to generate diversionary nationalism as the results presented above suggest, then **rising inequality could make for a more dangerous world**. The results of this work also contribute to our still limited knowledge of the relationship between economic inequality and democratic politics. In particular, it helps explain the fact that, contrary to median-voter models of redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981), democracies with higher levels of inequality do not consistently respond with more redistribution (e.g., Bénabou 1996). Rather than allowing redistribution to be decided through the democratic process suggested by such models, this work suggests that states often respond to higher levels of inequality with more nationalism. Nationalism then works to divert attention from inequality, so many citizens neither realize the extent of inequality nor demand redistributive policies. By prompting states to promote nationalism, greater economic inequality removes the issue of redistribution from debate and therefore narrows the scope of democratic politics.