# 1nc

CW – There’s brief mentions of sexual harassment/ rape within this performance

### 1

#### The 1ac’s usage of realism within their understanding of IR reinscribes gendered violence - focus on large-scale extinction-level events obscures the on-going structural violence committed by the Western drive for military dominance and search for security which is a fundamentally insatiable appetite.

Conway 20 - Co-Founder & Executive Director of the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy | Forbes 30 Under 30 | PhD Politics, University of Bristol https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy\_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf

Feminist Foreign Policy Foreign policy has the potential to be a mechanism for equality, justice, solidarity, and peace, and the adoption of FFP is the best way to fully and meaningfully implement these values into government policy. First launched by the Swedish government in 2014, other countries followed suit by engaging to varying degrees with FFP or feminist policies, including Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Mexico, Spain, and Luxembourg (Feminist Foreign Policy, 2020). FFP has slightly different applications and interpretations within the context of each state and is understood differently in policy, activist, and academic circles. However, there are a few key themes that run throughout most understandings. FFP is a political framework centred around the wellbeing of marginalised people. It is more than just a mechanism to enhance women’s rights; FFP is concerned with the systems of power that oppress the marginalised, and how social categories, including gender, race, sexuality, class, and ability, for example, are key determinants of a person’s ability to have access to power. By utilizing a feminist lens and questioning power dynamics within a society and between states, the destructive forces of patriarchy, including colonisation, heteronormativity, capitalism, racism, imperialism, and militarism, become of central focus. The violent global systems that leave millions in perpetual states of vulnerability are thus of primary concern to an FFP framework (Feminist Foreign Policy, 2020). Feminist Foreign Policy and Killer Robots FFP addresses the root causes of violence and insecurity by calling for an institutional overhaul of foreign policy and national security. Our world is structured around the patriarchy and naturally, its systems and power hierarchies will be reflected in the weapons we produce. This report will highlight some of the issues revealed when a feminist lens is turned onto killer robots. In Chapter 1, militarisation and masculinity will be explored, including how ideas about masculinity influence a militarised approach to national security. In Chapter 2, gender-based violence and the question of accountability are discussed. The distinction between combatant and civilian are blurred within a patriarchal and racist context, and the ability for killer robots to commit sexualised violence is highlighted. Lastly, in Chapter 3, racism and imperialism is analysed, with a look at how existing societal biases are built into any new technology we would produce. Finally, the report concludes with a summary of the policy recommendations included throughout each of the three chapters. Militarisation and Masculinity For decades, feminists have campaigned against the violent patriarchal structures that sustain conflict and keep an elite few in power. By building societal hierarchies so that only a small and [makes sure that] specific group of people have access to the top - which often in Western countries means straight white men - particular ideas about who is best suited to lead become intrinsically linked to gender and gendered traits. This means the lens through which foreign policy is often conducted has its roots in stereotypical masculine characteristics that have historically been accepted as best for policymaking. These traits include things like being rational, strong, and assertive, while avoiding more feminine-coded traits like emotion or empathy. These ideas about gender feed directly into how national security is understood as a militarised space Gender (referring to someone’s identity as a man, woman, or gender non-conforming) and gendered traits (referring to concepts about masculinity and femininity) are overlapping but not entirely synonymous. Reference to masculinity here is done so with the understanding that it is a social construct based upon stereotypes to fuel a patriarchal hierarchy of power. The ability to exercise such traits, however, is not exclusive to men, and this report is not interested in reinforcing dated and static ideas of men as masculine and women as feminine. As bell hooks notes, “Black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent, militaristic in their support and maintenance of racism” (hooks, 1995). Anyone is capable of expressing a wide variety of characteristics. Furthermore, including other social categories like race or class into this consideration likewise continues to reveal a complicated system of power dynamics based around identity that play out both between individuals as well as states. The power dynamics found in much of today’s foreign and security policy are framed around realism, an ideology that understands state relationships through the lens of power optimisation. Part of this process means developing new weapons technology in order to continually seek military dominance. Killer robots fit in well with this strategy, and sustain a system that values maintaining power and security through military dominance. The means of keeping peace, then, rests upon the ability to threaten or inflict violence (Conway, 2016; Starr, 2020). Military domination becomes an easily justifiable form of peacekeeping, and masculine-coded traits like aggression and dominance are seen not just as fundamental to security policy, but [and] taken as objective truth within security policy. In this sense, masculinity is systematised by associating ideas about manliness with the willingness to exercise violence (Cohn, 1993). By centring masculine traits as preferential in security policy, “human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity - all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse” (Cohn, 1992), get left out. By making it clear that ideas or traits that are coded as feminine are not legitimate, alternative ideas and approaches to security policy are silenced. However, an FFP framework is interested specifically in these silenced ideas, both to explore the fresh perspective they offer and to understand why they were silenced in the first place. A feminist framing of security also takes a step back from the realist and masculine lens through which much of security policy is developed, and instead is interested in what makes the average person secure and safe. Much more immediate needs must be met when security is reframed with the average individual, rather than the state, in mind. Access to safe housing, healthy food, ood education, and affordable healthcare become some of the most prominent indicators of someone’s health and wellness. The ability to lead a life free from discrimination due to gender, race, class, sexuality, or ability are also much better indicators for how sustainability peaceful a society is (Hudson, 2014). A strong military and extravagant weapons arsenal falls low on the lit of priorities in comparison. An FFP would then call for investment not into weapons technology and the military, but instead into the infrastructure of a society and programs to increase equality. As long as militarisation is the lens through which security policy is developed, and gendered traits remain driving factors behind ideas about security, sustainable peace is not possible. By investing in new weapons technology, we are continuing down a path that guarantees violence rather than challenges it. Killer robots will not contribute to peace, but sustain a system where a narrow and patriarchal understanding of security is supported, continuing to leave many vulnerable and at risk of violence.

#### Offensive realist understandings of China are products of a psychological anxiety that results in scapegoating and makes conflict inevitable – TURNS POPESCU – your advocacy is a direct link as well as violently orientalist

\*\*\*theory informs practice

Liru 16—Former President, China Institutes Of Contemporary International Relations (Cui, 6/15/16, “Managing Strategic Competition Between China and the U.S.” http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/managing-strategic-competition-between-china-and-the-us/, Accessed 7/15/17, HWilson)

Danger of Mearsheimer theory

The core argument of John J. Mearsheimer’s classic The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is that a “security dilemma” is an unavoidable structural problem between great powers. He concludes that for great powers, vying for hegemony is the best choice in the pursuit of security. He further induces that this is an inevitable goal of China’s rise, therefore confrontation is inescapable between China and the US. On such a basis, he advocates that the US needs to carry out all-round containment against China in a Cold-War manner. In his interpretation of the Obama administration’s rebalancing to Asia, he claims Obama’s entire set of strategic measures centered on containing China, yet they have concealed realistic moves with liberalist rhetoric. Given his authoritative scholarly impacts in international studies, his theories have exerted considerable negative influences on academic and diplomatic circles in both countries. His own intentions aside, Mearsheimer’s theories and proposals are actually providing a foundation for the US to implement power politics and preserve its hegemony, which is why they have been favored by hardliners in the US. In fact, theories on international relations always serve a country’s foreign policies. Realistic theories have gained prominence precisely because they met the needs of the US as it became the No.1 world power in the 20th century, providing theoretical support for its implementation of power politics in international relations. This “tragedy factor” is a worrying influence on China-US relations.

The new pattern of relations between China and the US is a complex body of contradictions consisting of multiple dynamics. Simplistically diagramming China-US relations has been an outstanding problem in the past few years. Too many experts in both countries have resorted to the approaches adopted by Hollywood blockbusters and interpreted the disagreements and tensions between China and the US as rising structural contradictions that resulted from changes in their comparative strengths. This has led to cross-validation of corresponding “threat” theories in both countries. In the US, the mention of “China’s rise” is usually associated with “challenging US leadership”, “threatening US security interests”, or “stealing American jobs”, which has almost become synonymous with “China threat”. On the other hand, experts, scholars and think tanks constantly release theses and research reports, arguing that the US is not in decline, remains the strongest in economy, technology, military, education and innovation, and that the US should always maintain its position as No.1 world power and its dominance in Asia, never allowing China to succeed in its challenges.

In China, there is the popular assumption that decline of the US is already an obvious matter of fact, the US is increasingly bogged down in domestic and international difficulties; therefore, in order to prevent China from taking its place, the US is beginning to contain China’s development in an all-round manner, disseminating “China Threat” theories, instigating neighboring countries to make trouble for China, creating an Asian version of the NATO to hedge and contain China, plotting to create a financial crisis in China, thus a “new cold war” against China has begun.

It is thought-provoking that in the rhetorical context of “China threat” theories, the American side has displayed intensifying anxiety, while the Chinese side has demonstrated increasing self-confidence. In fact, the American anxiety derives mainly from the country’s own economic, political, social and diplomatic troubles, as well as confusion about the future and increasing sense of insecurity. The question is, how could such anxiety be correlated to China’s rise, assigning it the scapegoat’s role? Simplistic and one-sided causation in propaganda and political manipulation by interest groups can’t be underestimated here.

China Case

#### China threat reps are rooted in a racist otherization of china that turns itself and should be rejected – further proven by the fact that your authors are all white, western scholars, or both.

Pan 04 (Chengxin Pan, Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University, “The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3 (June-July 2004), pp. 305-331)

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated.

Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hardline stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93

For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely.

Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist, on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives.

Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

#### War is not an event, it’s a continuum threaded at every point by gender—the aff misdiagnoses the problem by adopting a disembodied lens of analysis. Attempts to solve violent impacts without addressing the root cause -- patriarchy -- will always fail. Masculinized IR will always reproduce the same harms it tries to prevent – the aff is a bandaid over a bullethole

Hutchings 08

Kimberly is a Professor at the London School of Economics, Men and Masculinities Vol 10 No 4, “Making Sense of Masculinity and War,” p. Ebsco

In this article, my interest is not in a first-order investigation of the relation between war and masculinity, but rather in the ways in which this relation is construed in two different modes of theorizing about war in the study of international relations. The first mode of theorizing is to be found in scholarship explicitly concerned with gender and war; the second is located in accounts and explanations of the changing nature of war, in particular, in advanced industrial societies. I will argue that the link between masculinity and war made in both these literatures has nothing to do with the substantive meaning of either masculinity or war, or with a straightforward causal or constitutive relation between the two; rather, war is linked to masculinity because the formal, relational properties of masculinity as a concept provide a framework through which war can be rendered both intelligible and acceptable as a social practice and institution. In the first part of the article, I examine the gender and war literature. As we will see, accounts of the masculinity–war relation in theories of gender and war differ in many respects. However, I will argue that they also have something in common. In each case, the necessity of the war–masculinity relation is grounded, even if only contextually, in a set of substantial commonalities. For instance, qualities such as aggression, rationality, or physical courage are identified both as an essential component of war and also of masculinity at a given place or time. Yet, at the same time, the war and gender literature has increasingly made clear that the meaning of masculinity in relation to war shifts across a continuum of varied and sometimes mutually contradictory values. Moreover, recent work in both feminist and masculinity studies literatures has shown how privileged versions of masculinity feed off contrasts both with alternative masculinities and with an oppositional, feminized “other.” In contrast to this, the meaning of war in the gender and war literature is treated as settled and straightforward since war is usually understood in traditional, Clausewitzian terms. I will argue that two ways of understanding the war–masculinity relation are opened up by the gender and war literature. The first directs us to the way in which war plays a special role in anchoring the concept of masculinity, providing a fixed reference point for any negotiation or renegotiation of what masculinity or, in particular, hegemonic masculinity may mean. This way of understanding reinforces the common-sense status of assumptions about the material necessity of the relation between war and masculinity and can work to block a full appreciation of quite how the war–masculinity relation works, not only as a given social reality, but also as a framework for thought. The second way of understanding the war–masculinity relation focuses less on the substantive characteristics of either masculinity or war and more on the work done by the formal, relational properties of masculinity as a concept. This latter way of thinking enables more radical questions to be asked, not only about causal or conditional connections between war and masculinity, but also about the grip exerted by the idea of those connections on our social scientific imagination. In the second part of the article, I explore some influential accounts of how war has changed or is changing. In different ways, all these accounts of the changing nature of modern warfare disrupt the substantive grounds on which the war–masculinity link has been made in both traditional war studies accounts and in the gender and war literature. Nevertheless, in spite of this, I will argue that in each case, we find a reinvention of that link as the medium through which the different authors both make sense of and evaluate what they see. In this case, we can see how masculinity provides an interpretive reference point for the description and evaluation of contemporary developments in warfare. Even though gender is not the primary concern of any of these thinkers, their argument can be analyzed as a renegotiation of the meaning of hegemonic masculinity in relation to war, as a way of making sense of the way in which war is changing. However, we also see that the role of masculinity in these arguments is not tied to any fixed content. Instead, it is the formal properties of masculinity as a relational concept, drawing its meaning from a logic of contrast (between different masculinities) and a logic of contradiction (between masculinity and femininity),that enable it to act as a prism through which to see, and make sense of, war. I will conclude that the implication of the argument concerning masculinity in both gender and war and war studies literatures is that we need to look more closely at the formal properties that enable the concept of masculinity to make war intelligible,both analytically and normatively, regardless of the ways in which war may be changing. The overwhelming message of existing scholarship on war and gender is that masculinity is crucial to the ways in which war gains its meaning and legitimacy in social life. This idea has even gained recognition in the international policy community, which has recently begun to take on board the view that masculinity can be seen as a significant explanatory variable in political violence and therefore as a problem that needs to be addressed by institutional actors seeking to limit levels of political violence in the twenty-first-century world (Breines, Connell, and Eide 2000). These arguments suggest that the relation between masculinity and war is in some sense either causal or constitutive, though different authors differ about how precisely the relation works. On some accounts, masculinity figures as the key underlying cause of war (Hartsock 1989); on other accounts, it is the social practice of war that requires the production and reproduction of masculine men (Goldstein 2001). Alternatively, scholars may see the relation as mutually constitutive and mutually reinforcing, with masculinity acting as an enabling condition of war, and vice versa (Elshtain 1995; Enloe 2000; Barrett 2001). These differences reflect differences in the accounts of gender on which scholars of gender and war rely. For some scholars, the war–masculinity relation is grounded in underlying structures of gendered psychic formation that explain sexual difference (Hartsock 1989). For others, gender is a socially constructed reflection of the functional needs of societies, which include the need to make war (Goldstein 2001). For others, the relation between gender and war is discursively, rather than materially, produced or caused (Elshtain 1995; Barrett 2001). A variety of feminist theorists in the 1980s focused their attention on how both the practice and legitimization of war (for both men and women) depended on and reinforced a clear and hierarchical distinction between masculinity and femininity. Although much of this feminist work was primarily concerned with exploring the consequences of this for the role of women and the feminine in relation to war, feminist attention also focused specifically on the role of men and masculinity in war.3Hartsock (1989) argued that the ideology of masculinity, which, she claimed, reflected the interests of particular elite groups of men across time, was the **root cause of war and militarism in Western cultures**. Cohn (1989) demonstrated the ways in which an association with masculine qualities permeated the discourse of nuclear defense intellectuals and enabled them to give meaning and value to their work. In her book Women and War, Elshtain (1995) demonstrated how discourses of patriotism and just war are fundamentally gendered masculine and reflect and reinforce a sexual division of labor in war as well as providing resources to legitimate war. In all these arguments, the link between masculinity and war lies in shared norms. The standards that govern the being and conduct of men overlap with the standards that govern the being and conduct of war makers, from foot soldiers to weapons experts to generals and political leaders. At the same time, however, this picture is complicated by the fact that the norms of masculinity are variable and enforce not only hierarchical distinctions between men and women, but also between different men.

#### The ontology of masculinized realism necessities a security state – thereby reinforcing a cycle of insecure anticipation and violent action – calculative ordering is the root cause of threats. The security state sacrifices MILLIONs for its own interest – ows the aff impacts on cyclicality and magnitude.

**Burke 07** – (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, and author of many books, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Truth & Existence, 10:2)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of **hegemonic forms of knowledge** about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it **drives out every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but **by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence**. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from **calculative, 'empirical' discourses of** scientific and political **truth** rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being.Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, **policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- **available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate** -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then **preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

#### Vote negative to endorse the feminist ethic of care—this means refusing seemingly progressive solutions that don’t grapple with the violent history of foreign policy in favor of creating equal relationality. It is an unflinching refusal of fearmongering security politics in favor of critical analysis and relational solutions.

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Feminist care ethics and feminist foreign policy In this final section, I want to suggest how an ethic of care might inform a feminist for- eign policy in ways that allow it to challenge, rather than reinforce, gendered binaries between realism and idealism, order and justice and masculine and feminine. I suggest that there are three attributes of an ethic of care that allow it to achieve this: relationality, contextualism and revisability. As seen by Carol Gilligan, one of the first theorists of ‘care’ as a voice of resistance to dominant modes of ethical reasoning, the ethics of care sees people not as ‘standing alone’, but as gaining their selfhood through their relations with others. Self and other are different but connected rather than separate and opposed (Gilligan, 1993: 147). Morality, on this view, is about responding to the needs of others in ways that are characterized by attentive listening, patience and understanding. Universal moral principles of right – so rational, clean and appealing – give way here to the messy, relentless juggling act of navigating complex moral dilemmas and balancing the competing needs of real, embod- ied others. This means constant re-evaluation of beliefs and reflexivity regarding our own claims to knowledge. It is a feminist ethics, not because it ‘belongs’ to women or because it is anti-men or somehow against the ethics of justice, but because it demands a questioning of the script of patriarchy. As Gilligan puts it, in the culture of patriarchy, the different voice with its ethic of care sounds feminine. Heard in its own right and on its own terms, it is a human voice (Gilligan, 2011: 25). Relationality has been a key feature of the ethics of care since Carol Gilligan’s first edition of In a Different Voice. On this view, all selves are the product of relations, all the way down. The apparently autonomous self, so often seen in men and gendered masculine, is a product not of some essential feature of ‘manhood’ but of a response by men to conform to the codes of gender within patriarchy. Over the past 40 years, research into human psychology has undergone a radical shift towards accepting the interpersonal and relational nature of human development (Gilligan and Snider, 2017: 191). Recognizing this and accepting the relational voice not as morally or psychologi- cally immature, but as a human voice that is thwarted by pervasive gender norms, is the first step towards reaching across divides of difference hierarchy and building real connection with others. Relationality is not a static ethical concept or set of principles – like ‘rights’ or ‘jus- tice’ – rather, it is a way of seeing the world that addresses not only ontology – the relational self – but also epistemology. Thus, knowledge is also understood relationally – we must ask who makes the knowledge claims and from what vantage point, what material circumstances and what degree of power (Minow, 1990: 178). As famously argued by Martha Minow, relationality is perhaps most significant in the way that it shifts our understanding of the problem of ‘difference’; seeing difference relationally means a shift from a focus on the distinctions between people to a focus on the rela- tionships within which we notice and draw distinctions (Minow, 1990: 15). Thus, rela- tional approaches, unlike, say, dominant liberal rights analysis, enquire into the institutional practices that determine a norm against which some people seem differ- ent, or deviant. To address relationships, Minow (1990) argues, is to resist abstraction and to demand context (1990: 216). Clearly, there is a close connection between relationality and context. An ethic of care eschews universalizable moral principles that can be applied across time and space. By contrast, it demands attention to context – to the particularities of social location, historical background, structural conditions and relationships between rele- vant moral actors. In this sense, it is opposed to the logic of traditional moral theory, which demands abstraction from context in order to gain objectivity. But this objectiv- ity is elusive; more than this, it acts to create a dichotomy between those who are the knowers, keepers and enforcers of moral principles, and those who are compelled – sometimes through ‘foreign policy’ – to enact those principles. **The morality of arms cannot be assessed outside of the context of both the violent histories of colonialism and the liberal militarism that defines the contemporary world. Feminist foreign policy will not be transformative if it is reduced to enacting a set of moral principles, or seeking to protect, promote or empower women (often because this is, in the long run, good for ‘national security’ or ‘economic growth’**). A foreign policy that works towards feminist goals is more likely to be a slow, plodding process which considers historical and contemporary relations between actors and recognizes the importance of context in making decisions and policies. Finally, revisability refers to the requirement of epistemological humility – the need to embrace uncertainty and recognize that there are only better or worse courses of action at any given time and in any context. When ‘Amy’, one of Gilligan’s (1993) subjects, responds to a question posed regarding an abstract moral dilemma, she says, ‘Well, it depends’ (1993: 35). As Gilligan explains, when considered in the light of Kohlberg’s definition of the stages and sequence of moral development, her moral judgements appear to be a full stage lower in maturity than those of the boy. They appear to reveal an inability to think systematically about the concepts of morality or law and a reluctance to examine the logic of received moral truths (Gilligan, 1993: 30). But from the perspective of an ethic of care, Amy’s reluctance to make universalized judgements stems from a heightened perception of the role of context and the nature of relationships in moral judgement. It is this willingness to live with uncertainty that defines feminist care ethics as critical and will allow it to be, potentially, transformative in the long term. As Kimberly Hutchings (2001) argues, ‘Critique is premised on the impossibility of a definitive answer to the conditions of its own possibility and can only content itself with the acknowledgment of the revisability of any grounds on which its specific claims are based’ (2001: 90). The implication of this is that we must let go of the idea of feminist foreign policy as ‘principled foreign policy’. Principles have an unmistakable allure; they work very well when we take what Raymond Geuss (2008) calls an ‘ethics-first’ approach to politics – where we attain an ideal theory of how we should act, and then, in a second step, apply that ideal theory to the action of political agents (2008: 8). But the dominance of this kind of thinking in the realm of ‘ethical foreign policy’ has led to a ‘hyper-rationalist’ (Rengger, 2000: 769) approach to the suffering of the peoples of the world, where ‘useful knowledge’ has blinded us to contingency, context, embodiment and emotion. Revisability in ethics is not the same thing as moral relativism. As Susan Hekman points out, the category of ‘relativism’ is parasitic on its opposite, the possibility of abso- lute knowledge. Perspectival, connected, discursive knowledge does not obviate the pos- sibility of truth, evidence or critical judgement (Hekman, 1995: 31). It does not mean that states cannot make judgements in their foreign (and domestic) policy about the allocation of resources towards programmes and policies that aim to increase the participation and representation of women in, for example, formal peacemaking and peace-building processes. There is a requirement, however, to view each policy and programme on its own terms and in its own context and to recognize the ever-changing context of actors- in-relation across multiple, intersecting locations and scales – across racial, socio-economic and ethnic divides and from the household to the ‘global’ level. Conclusion: Rethinking ethics in feminist foreign policy I have argued that feminist foreign policy can and indeed should be ‘ethical’ foreign policy, but not where ethics is understood as a set of fixed, absolute principles based on Western liberal notions of human rights or ‘justice’. This, I have argued, is damaging for feminism in two ways: first, it reifies the gendered binaries between ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ in international politics; gendering ‘the ethical’ in this way means that it will always be played off the masculine, ‘real’ world of self-interest and destined to be dismissed as ‘soft’ and ‘feminine’. Second, it fails to recognize the way in which this approach to eth- ics is itself constituted through a patriarchal binary which associates masculinity with universality and objectivity, silencing alternatives or dismissing them as immature, par- ticularistic or relativist. On this binary, ‘global justice’ (or ethical feminist foreign policy) is enacted by a series of powerful, Western states for the benefit of racialized Others; not only is this narrative partial and inadequate but it also serves to both produce and rein- force relations of domination. This kind of ethical foreign policy will ultimately harm, rather than help efforts to achieve global justice by delegitimizing local forms of knowl- edge in poor areas and undermining the mutual respect necessary for collaboration and deliberation (Kohn, 2013: 193). A feminist ethic of care does not offer a ‘feminine’ ethic that stands in opposition to liberal-internationalist principles of justice; the values and practices of care – listening attentively, responding with patience and openness to the other’s point of view – are not ‘feminine’ and ‘better’ ways of being, but the voice of struggle against the script of patri- archy. The voice of care is a voice that struggles to be heard within ethico-political cul- tures of patriarchy, which are constituted and supported by hierarchical and binary logics. The work of a feminist ethic of care is to reveal and challenge the way that patriarchy serves to institutionalize hierarchical relations in global politics while dismissing or ridi- culing the capacity for attentive listening and empathy. As Gilligan and Snider (2017)

#### The Role of the Judge is to deconstruct rhetorical violence — Representations must precede policy discussion – they determine what is politically thinkable – the kritik functions on a higher layer as any link means that the discourse you have produced within this space is a violent mode of education.

Crawford 02 —Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 19-21

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately **so much** as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical importof representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.