# R5 Gvine

### Apocalypse Link

#### The aff says is pure fearmongering – no weed = nuke war? - this apocalyptic rhetoric links is securitization which leads to endless war

Neocleous 2012

Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy, Politics and History @ Brunel University, London, “‘Don’t Be Scared, Be Prepared’: Trauma-Anxiety-Resilience,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 2012 37: 188 originally published online 13 June 2012, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0304375412449789?journalCode=alta>

The idea of trauma is now deeply engrained in our political, cultural, and intellectual universe. What in the seventeenth century was a surgeon’s term to describe a physical wound, transformed in the nineteenth century to include psychic ailments comparable to shock, morphed into ‘‘shell shock’’ and ‘‘nervous trauma’’ by the end of World War I (WWI) and from there eventually became a psychiatric category now used to describe experience of war, genocide, and catastrophe. The history of the category could be described as moving from the idea of physical damage to the mental health system and on to the social management of major disasters.1 This is most obviously true in the discourse surrounding war and conflict—at some point in the future, note the editors of one collection of essays on the trauma of war, historians looking back at the wars of the 1980s, 1990s, and early twentieth century will notice ‘‘trauma projects’’ appearing alongside food, health, and shelter interventions.2 Yet the historians will also see a highly traumatized society in general, as trauma has become the discourse through which not only catastrophic events are articulated, but through which virtually all sufferings are expressed: ‘‘That was really traumatic!’’ is now thought to be an appropriate response to any event that would once have been described as ‘‘rather unpleasant’’ or ‘‘quite difficult.’’ It is this everydayness, or naturalness, of trauma talk that I want to engage here. When categories and concepts take on an increasing appearance of being the natural categories through which we are encouraged to think, critical theory needs to be on the alert. Such is the case with trauma. My main purpose is to explore what all this trauma talk might be doing, ideologically and politically. Such a task places us on the terrain of the relationship between security and anxiety. A glance at any security text, from the most mundane government pronouncement to the most sophisticated literature within academic ‘‘security studies,’’ reveals that through the politics of security runs a political imagination of fear and anxiety. I want to first explore this relation before connecting it with the question of trauma. In so doing I suggest that the management of trauma and anxiety has become a way of mediating the demands of an endless security war: a war of security, awar for security, awar through security; a war whose permanence and universality has been established to match the permanence and universality of our supposed desire for security. The article therefore has nothing to say about ‘‘governing traumatic events.’’ Rather, it seeks to understand the emergence of a hypertrophied concept of trauma and the proliferation of discourses of anxiety as ideological mechanisms deployed for the security crisis of endless war; deployed, I will argue, as a training in resilience. As such, I want to suggest that the language of trauma and anxiety, and the training in resilience that is associated with these terms, weds us to a deeply conservative mode of thinking, with the superficial ‘‘humanitarianism’’ supposedly captured in the discourse of trauma in fact functioning as a means of cutting off political alternatives.

#### The ontology of realism necessitates a security state – thereby reinforcing a cycle of insecure anticipation and violent action – calculative ordering is the root cause of threats. The security state sacrifices MILLIONs for its own interest – ows the aff impacts on cyclicality and magnitude.

**Burke 07** – (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, and author of many books, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Truth & Existence, 10:2)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of **hegemonic forms of knowledge** about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it **drives out every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but **by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence**. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from **calculative, 'empirical' discourses of** scientific and political **truth** rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being.Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, **policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- **available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate** -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then **preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses**, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

#### Examining the securitizing effect and epistemology of the 1AC must come before enactment of the policy – we cannot have effective policy without examining underlying assumptions

**Bruce 96**—[Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9] //neth recut

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable **part of the problem** to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. **Before engaging in** the **policy debate** the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is **integral** to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation **that** terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has **direct practical implications** for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a **necessary prelude** to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, **then specific policies may follow**. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

#### The alt is to reject the 1AC’s securitization representations—this opens new possibilities, like challenging dominations as well as allowing the starting of questioning about current frameworks

Burke, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland 2002 [Anthony, Alternatives 27] https://www.jstor.org/stable/40645035?seq=1#metadata\_info\_tab\_contents

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available—and where they are not, the ef­fort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effec­tive when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired—which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was condi­tional on it being credible to the governed as well as the govern­ing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refusewhat we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frame­works of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first as­serts the space for *agency,* both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of re­bellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discur­sive order and influence its shifting boundaries. ... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many-levels—that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cul­tural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Con­nolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical rela­tionship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might, allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"—an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"—a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world *after* security, and what its shimmering possi­bilities might be.

#### Power is located not within personhood, but within institutions which are responsible for distributing knowledge. Knowledge is not content-neutral but implicitly contains value judgements meant to uphold ideological truth regimes which exceed the personal. Debate is a space where students are uniquely able to challenge supposedly neutral conceptions of knowledge and power. Thus the Role of the Ballot is to endorse interrogations of these conceptions of power.Giroux:

Giroux ’06 [Henry A. Giroux, McMaster University Professor for Scholarship in the Public Interest and The Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy.] *America on the Edge: Henry Giroux on Politics, Culture, and Education*, 2006, Palgrave MacMillan

The National Association of Urban Debate Leagues (UDLs) represents a promising, innovative effort to reinforce substantive democratic education and tradition by fostering rigorous and passionate discussions about social change and how it is to be achieved. The Urban Debate League approaches matters of school equity, reform, and agency through the use of academic debate as a way to help urban public school students learn the skills, disciplines, knowledge, and values that enable them to become critically literate and effectively engaged citizens. It organizes debate teams in urban public schools, holds competitions among schools all over the country, and supports the ongoing education of urban school teachers helping them to recognize the political, pedagogical, and civic value of debate leagues while actively learning how to organize and engage students in such debates. What is so important about the UDL program is that it is not merely interested in teaching debating skills to students— though learning how to do library research, electronic retrieval, critical analysis, and policy evaluation is not inconsequential, it is simply not enough. Instead, debating is 15\_Amed\_14.qxd 11/1/06 11:30 AM Page 229 viewed as a form of critical literacy that empowers students, especially underrepresented races, ethnicities, and females, not only with high-powered academic skills but also with the essential critical knowledge and beliefs necessary to convince them that they can become both effective advocates for democracy and leaders in a world that they must learn how to influence and govern. Operating with the assumption that to be voiceless is to be powerless, the UDL organizes high school debates around the understanding that to have a voice students must learn from and construct pedagogical practices that make knowledge meaningful in order to be critical and critical in order to be transformative. And the space of the debate provides exactly the public sphere where students learn how to invest in ideas, engage in dialogue with others, respect the positions of those different from their own, and do so in the spirit of contributing to both a wider public discourse and a more vibrant public life. The UDL believes that excellence cannot be abstracted from equity, and that historically academic debate was largely the province of white, privileged youth from affluent suburban and private schools. The interscholastic debate experience provided these students with important communicative skills, modes of literacy, research opportunities, and the ability to travel and meet students from similar privileged backgrounds.

### 2

#### Interp: Reduce is immediate---present tense

Pasttenses n.d [Reduce past tense, <https://pasttenses.com/reduce-past-tense>] RM

reduce verb forms

Infinitive Present Participle **Past Tense** Past Participle

reduce reducing reduced **reduced**

#### Interpretation – Reduce means decreasing an existing quantity – it excludes preventing a future increase/implementation

**Popattanachai 18** – PhD dissertation at Nottingham Trent University (NAPORN, “REGIONAL COOPERATION ADDRESSING MARINE POLLUTION FROM LAND-BASED ACTIVITIES: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 207 OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION FOCUSING ON MONITORING, ASSESSEMENT, AND SURVEILLANCE OF THE POLLUTION” <http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33374/1/Naporn%20Popattanachai%202018.pdf>

For the second question, the provision demonstrates that the goal of adoption of such laws and regulations must be to ‘prevent, reduce, and control’ MPLA. In so doing, the LOSC obliges States to ‘taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards, and recommended practices and procedures’.480 Having considered the ordinary meanings of the term ‘prevent, reduce, and control’, ‘prevent’ means ‘to stop something from happeningor someone from doing something**.**’481 The word ‘reduce’ means ‘to make something smaller in size, amount, degree, importance etc.’482 and the word ‘control’ means ‘to order, limit, or rule something or someone's actions or behaviour.’ 483 From the meanings, the term ‘prevent’ suggests an action to stop the future occurrence of something, whereas the terms ‘reduce**’** and ‘control’, noting their difference, point to an action dealing with something that has already happened and continues to occur, but needs to be made smaller, limited or regulated. Also, control also applies to future pollution in the sense that it limits the future pollution to be created or emitted not to exceed the specified level. Therefore, the preliminary reading of these terms suggests that laws and regulations adopted to deal with MPLA must yield the result that conforms with these terms. In so doing, the adoption of laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control MPLA can be done by legislating primary or secondary regulations with the use of various legal techniques and procedures and are underpinned by some rules and principles of international law discussed in the previous chapter. These legal techniques and procedures can be used to achieve the prevention, reduction and control of MPLA depending on the design and use of them. Noting that the measures outlined below are not exhaustive and not exclusively limited to implement any specific obligation, these are typical legal techniques and procedures used to prevent, reduce, and control pollution and therefore protect the environment. They can be categorised into two groups, that is, (1) substantive and (2) procedural legal techniques and measures. They can be discussed hereunder.

#### Violation: Delay means to postpone

USLegal n.d. [“Delay law and legal definition” https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/delay/] RM

Delay means the act of postponing or slowing. For example, the counsel asked continuance solely for the purpose of delaying the case. It also means an instance at which something is postponed or slowed. For example, the delay in starting the trial made it difficult for all the witnesses to attend. It also refer to the period during which something is postponed or slowed.

In Civil law delay refers to the period within which a party to a suit must take some action, such as perfecting an appeal or responding to a written-discovery request.

#### THEY DON’T REDUCE—THEY DELAY THE ENFORCEMENT OF STATUS QUO PROTECTIONS

#### Their interpretation allows any aff that postpones or indefinitely postpones a reduction of IP—

#### 1] Ground---they can no link out of every DA because the plan does not occur until later or read non-inherent advantages that are predicated on future reductions of IP. Independently leads to shiftiness.

#### 2] limits---That explodes the caselist to IP for nonexistent medicines such as 3D printed drugs, new precision medicine technology, and infinite drugs that are still being produced which leads to non-inherent affs thhat skirt the core topic controversy.

#### 3] Precision—their interp justifies arbitrarily ignoring words in the resolution which deck predictability and turn functional limits. Slippery slope of affs.

### 3

#### Interpretation – Marijuana isn’t a Medicine

Mosley 20, Mark. "Medical Marijuana Is a Dangerous Lie." Emergency Medicine News 42.8 (2020): 2-3. (Dr. Mark Mosley is an emergency medicine physician in Wichita, Kansas and is affiliated with Wesley Healthcare Center. He received his medical degree from University of Oklahoma College of Medicine and has been in practice for more than 20 years.)//Elmer

**Marijuana is not a medical drug.** It is a **slang term for** a **plant of the Cannabis family that contains more than 60 different cannabinoid substances and more than 80 biologically active compounds**. Using the term marijuana in place of THC would be like using willow tree in place of acetylsalicylic acid, the active ingredient in aspirin.

#### FDA and CDC definitions prove.

CDC ’18 (CDC; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 3-7-2018; “**Is marijuana medicine**?”; CDC; <https://www.cdc.gov/marijuana/faqs/is-marijuana-medicine.html>; Accessed: 9-4-2021; AU)

The marijuana plant has chemicals that may help symptoms for some health problems. More and more states are making it legal to use the plant as medicine for certain conditions. But there isn’t **enough research** to show that the whole plant works to treat or cure these conditions. Also, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) **has not recognized** or **approved** the marijuana plant **as medicine**. Because marijuana is often smoked, it can damage your lungs and cardiovascular system (e.g., heart and blood vessels). These and other damaging effects on the brain and body could make marijuana more harmful than helpful as a medicine. Another problem with marijuana as a medicine is that the ingredients aren’t exactly the same from plant to plant. There’s no way to know what kind and how much of a chemical you’re getting.

#### Violation – the resolution calls for reductions on IP protections for medicines, but the aff prevents future patents for cannabis-derived products.

#### Vote neg for limits and ground. Expanding the definition of “medicine” to anything that could be used in a medical setting floods the neg with cases to prep for – everything from new methods of chemo to upgrading stethoscopes becomes topical.

#### At best – they’re extra-T since Cannabis isn’t intrinsically medicinal, it just has medicinal uses so they would reduce Recreational Marijuana patents too which isn’t topical and explodes limits.

Johnson 20 Ian Johnson 1-20-2020 "Cannabis Patents 2000 – 2019: Trends Following Legalization" <https://plantlaw.com/2020/01/20/cannabis-trends-medical-recreational/> (Registered Patent Agent, Plant & Planet Law Firm)//Elmer

These findings correspond to the overall increase in **cannabis-related patents** and demonstrate that the recreational patent sector is growing at an even greater rate than cannabis patents generally. This supports the theory that recreational markets and expansion of legal personal use of cannabis have resulted in an increase in patent activity in the industry. Again, publication totals are not necessarily the most accurate reflection of patent behavior by cannabis businesses. Therefore, it is useful to examine filing and provisional trends for recreational patents. These results are subject to the same 18-month delay problems noted above, and therefore actual and projected values are provided. Using actual filing data for 2017, there has been a 181% increase in filing activity since 2012. Using projected filing data for 2019, there has been a 257% increase in recreational filing activity since 2012. Using actual priority claims for 2017, there has been a 196% increase in provisional filing activity since 2012. Using projected priority claims for 2019, there has been a 289% increase in recreational provisional filing activity since 2012. The following charts demonstrate recreational filing trends from 2012 to 2019. Patents **that could be classified as recreational** **made up approximately 53% of all filings** between 2000 and 2011. However, **following legalization** the percent of patents and applications considered recreational has **increased to** approximately **77% of filings in 2018**. The chart below demonstrates the growth of the recreational sector’s share of cannabis patent activity.

#### C/A Paradigm Issues

### framing

#### Util fails –

#### A) Infinite consequences – any action can lead to anything because of the butterfly effect that leads to infinitely divisible action.

#### B) Securitization creates flawed utilitarian calculus – we aren’t weighing life equally

#### C) Normativity: Only intent-based ethics are normative because if you’re held responsible for things you don’t intend, then there’s no reason to be moral because you can’t help your actions being immoral, because you’re held responsible for unintended effects. This controls the link to ethics because otherwise there’s no reason to follow morality and ethics are circular.

#### On Actor Spec –

#### 1] Is – Ought fallacy, just because govs use util doesn’t mean they ought too

#### 2] Empirically denied Govs don’t act for util – why did we let a million people dye for covid

#### 3] Prefer the K framing, we still rely on consequences but its more specific

#### their view of the world, which means their exaggerated impacts obscure the systemic inequalities present in the status quo

#### And there’s a double bind – either the aff’s impacts are true and extinction is inevitable because fiat isn’t real or their impacts are constructed, which means you should vote neg on presumption

## Case

No 1AR Theory—

1] The 2NR must overcover theory since they get 3 minute 2ar collapse on one of the layers and persuasiveness advantage of a 3 minute 2ar

2] Responses to my counter interp will be new which means 1ar theory necessitates intervention---outweighs because it makes the decision arbitrary

3] I only have one chance to respond after it is introduced while they have two chances

### A2 Cartels

#### Expanding legalized weed doesn’t collapse cartels- they are diversified – no IL whatsoever

Killebrew 11 (Robert. June. Colonel Robert Killebrew, usa (Ret.), is a senior Fellow at the Center for a New American security. “Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond” Prism. Published by the Center for Complex Operations. Vol 2. No. 3) 5/30/14 RK

No subject is liable to be more controversial than the question of whether to legalize drugs in the United States. The often repeated belief that legalization would defeat the cartels breaks down on the data. As stated previously, the drug cartels have reached a stage of development that would ensure their continued operation during any transition to legalized drugs on the part of the United States and beyond. It is highly unlikely that the legalization of drugs— some or even all drugs—in the United States would end the threat from these organizations. The cartels and other drug trafficking organizations are multifaceted criminal enterprises dedicated to making profits from any activity that brings in money. Although the majority of their income comes from illicit drugs, they also engage in other violent and white-collar crimes. The assorted cartels—the Mexican cartels, the FARC, and other organizations—are a new kind of transnational criminal organization, taking advantage of the global black economy not only to move drugs, but also to support human trafficking, prostitution, identity theft, arms trading, illicit financial transactions, and so forth. They have powerful state sponsors in a global network of illicit commerce. For the United States to turn to legalization as a primary strategy against the cartels would be a shot in the dark, particularly when other strategies to decrease drug use have been effective.

#### Mexico stable now

Stott 6-13 Michael Stott 6-13-2021 "Why López **Obrador’s Mexico is stable** **in protest-prone Latin America**" <https://www.ft.com/content/552951be-7e8f-4fbc-a85d-7814cc519265> (Michael Stott is the Latin America editor of the Financial Times based in London. He was previously in Tokyo as managing editor of the Nikkei Asian Review, a sister publication covering Asian business and politics. Prior to that he was the FT's UK news editor.)//Elmer

As Latin America’s presidents battle a pandemic that has hit their people and economies harder than any other region, something uniting them is their unpopularity. Chile’s Sebastián Piñera and Colombia’s Iván Duque have approval ratings of roughly 18 per cent; Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro’s rating stands at 24 per cent and Argentina’s Alberto Fernández is on 32 per cent, according to recent surveys. Peru has gone through four presidents in a year. **Social unrest is sweeping the region**. Long but ineffective lockdowns, scandals over early vaccinations for the well-connected, overloaded public health services and inadequate support for the most vulnerable have fuelled popular anger. Even before the pandemic, most Latin Americans had little faith in their governments. “In May, 80 per cent of Latin Americans said their country was on the wrong track,” said Jean-Christophe Salles, Latin America chief of the pollster Ipsos. “In this context, Latin American presidents appear with a very low level of approval”. **The exception**, he added, **was Mexico**. Nearing the midpoint of his six-year term on Sunday last week, President Andrés Manuel López **Obrador** and his allies **won a string of state governorships and** a fresh **congressional majority** — victories his peers in the region could only dream about. As he revelled in his electoral successes at a news conference on Tuesday, López Obrador heard his ministers announce that almost **one in three of Mexico’s adult population had been vaccinated and schools were reopening**. “As we faced the pandemic and there was an economic crisis . . . what did they ask me to do?” the president said, referring to Mexico’s elite. “To rescue those at the top — and we opted to support from the bottom up, because that is how it should be, for the sake of humanism, social justice and security”.

#### Decreasing cartel revenue causes cartel lash-out and diversification.

Murray et al 11 Chad Murray et al 11, Ashlee Jackson Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden Elliott School of International Affairs/Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report April 26, 2011 “Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization” //re-cut by Elmer

Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime. Perhaps the most obvious short-term effect of marijuana legalization is that this would rob the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of up to half of their total revenue.117 The economic strain placed on the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel may not necessarily help Mexico in the short term. The short-term effects of **legalization could** very well create chaos for Mexico. “The cartels compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into other criminal activities--kidnapping, murder-for-hire, contraband, illegal ¶ 29 ¶ immigrant smuggling, extortion, theft of oil and other items, loan-sharking, prostitution, selling protection, etc.”118 This means that if the social and economic environment remains the same then “they are not going to return to the licit world.”119 If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion, it could lead to a spike in violence that would prove to be destabilizing in those organizations‟ areas of operation. ¶  *The Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel might splinter into smaller groups.* In addition, the loss of more than 40% of revenue would probably force them to downsize their operations. Like any large business going through downsizing, employees will likely be shed first in order to maintain profitability.120 These former DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers. Therefore it is possible that the legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories currently under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel to become more violent than they are today. This is troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of Mexico.121

### A2 Monopolies

#### 1] Big Pharma patent monopolies have failed – their Thailand example proves – the patents were indefinitely banned.

Reuters 19 Staff. “Thailand to Revoke Foreign Patent Requests on Marijuana.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 28 Jan. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-cannabis/thailand-to-revoke-foreign-patent-requests-on-marijuana-idUSKCN1PM1FU. //sid

Thailand on Monday effectively revoked all foreign patent requests for the use of marijuana, after fears foreign firms would dominate a market thrown open last month when the government approved the drug for medical use and research. The junta-appointed parliament in Thailand, a country which until the 1930s had a tradition of using marijuana to relieve pain and fatigue, voted to amend the Narcotic Act of 1979 in December in what it described as “a New Year’s gift to the Thai people”. While countries from Colombia to Canada have legalized marijuana for medical or even recreational use, the drug remains illegal and taboo across much of Southeast Asia. But in Thailand, the main controversy with the legalization involved patent requests by two foreign firms, British giant GW Pharmaceuticals and Japan’s Otsuka Pharmaceutical, filed before the change to the law. Thai civil society groups and researchers feared domination by foreign firms could make it harder for Thai patients to get access to medicines and for Thai researchers to get marijuana extracts. ADVERTISEMENT The military government issued a special executive order on Monday enabling the Department of Intellectual Property to revoke all pending patents that involve cannabis, or remove marijuana from those patents, within 90 days. “The pending patent requests are illegal,” Somchai Sawangkarn, a member of parliament responsible for amending the Narcotic Act told Reuters. “This NCPO order is beneficial for Thai people across the country because it prevents a monopolistic contract,” he said referring to the junta by its official name, the National Council for Peace and Order. Reuters did not have contact details for spokesmen for either of the two foreign firms and the companies did not immediately respond to emailed requests for comment.

#### 2] Barnett has no internal to innovation in medical marijuana – it’s specific to farmers not being able to grow weed to sell, not medical research.

#### 3] No impact to marijuana innovation – we don’t need new types of weed. This doesn’t turn our innovation arguments because our link is that reduction in IP chills innovation for all medicine due to fear of spillover

#### 4] No Uniqueness – Biden wont’ legalize Marijuana at a federal level.

Kane 21 Kris Kane 3-26-2021 "Enjoy Marijuana? Joe Biden Doesn’t Care About You" <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kriskrane/2021/03/26/enjoy-marijuana-joe-biden-doesnt-care-about-you/?sh=4dec240e651d> (Senior Contributor at Forbes on the Weed Industry)//Elmer

This pattern of legalization supporters backpedaling to appease Joe Biden dates back to the campaign itself, where **Biden’s** **campaign** seemingly **sought to roll back years of progress** made by the Democratic Party since President Obama left office. In 2016 the Democratic Party platform included language calling for a “pathway” to legalization. Yet in 2020 **Biden’s campaign rejected** such language, removing any mentions of **meaningful cannabis policy reform** from the platform. When supporters tried to add a legalization plank back into the platform, even co-chair of the Congressional Cannabis Caucus Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) voted against it, presumably not to run afoul of the wishes of her party’s standard bearer despite her own strong support for legalization. Of course, none of this should be especially surprising. Joe **Biden’s record on marijuana**, drugs and crime **is** arguably **the worst** and most punitive of any Democratic politician of the past 50 years not named Diane Feinstein. He was an author and **champion** of the 1994 Crime Bill that is largely responsible **for** the current **mass incarceration** crisis in this country, and was the lead sponsor of the RAVE Act, one of the last pieces of draconian drug policy legislation passed by Congress that punished concert venue owners and promoters if drugs were used or sold at their events, even if they had no knowledge or involvement in the drug related activity. This is a politician who in 1974 said, “I don’t think marijuana should be legalized,” repeating that sentiment **as recently as 2010** when he **stated** “**I think legalization is a mistake**.” As Vice President in 2012 Biden had ““serious doubts that decriminalization would have a major impact on the earnings of violent criminal organizations,” and that “on examination you realize there are more problems with legalization than with non-legalization.”