# 1ac R4

**All ethical frameworks must address the question of the Other- we understand ourselves through our relations to the ever-changing external world. My identity as a debater is only stable based on those who are not debaters. Ethical inclusion must entail never-ending attempts to understand the Other and reconcile differences, even while I recognize the Other’s precarious nature and our ultimately permanent distinctions.** Butler 1 Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566427> LG

Levinas speaks of a passivity prior to passivity, and there he means to indicate the difference between the passivity that a subject undergoes and relates to through a certain act of reflexivity, and a passivity that is prior to the subject. the condition of its own subjectivation. its primary impressionability. We might relate this to the Freudian insight that the infant will be disposed to love any and everything that emerges as an "object" (rather than not love at all). And this is a scandal, since it shows us that love from the outset is without judgment, and that, to a certain extent, it remains without judgment, or at least without good judgment, for the rest of its career. What I am trying to describe is the condition of the subject, but it is not mine:I do not own it. It is prior to what constitutes the sphere of what might be owned or claimed by me. By virtue of its status as a continuing condition of subjectivation, it persistently undoes the claim of "mineness," mocks it, sometimes gently, sometimes violently. Primary impressionability is not a feature of myself so that I might say, by way of a warning, "I am impressionable.'' I mean, I can say that, but it would be a paradoxical form of speaking. It is a way of being constituted by an Other which precedes the formation of the sphere of the mine itself. But at this level, we are not yet referring to boundaries in the process of formation, we are not yet seeking recourse to a capacity for reflexivity, for self-reference, the linguistic support for self-possession. This is a domain in which the grammar of the subject cannot hold, for dispossession in and through another is prior to becoming an "I" who might claim, on occasion, and always with some irony, to possess itself. You may think that I am in fact telling a story about the prehistory of the subject, one that I have been arguing cannot be told. And there are two responses to this: (1) that there is no final or adequate narrative reconstruction of the prehistory of the speaking "I" does not mean we cannot narrate it. It only means that at the moment when we narrate we become speculative philosophers or fiction writers. And (2) it is this prehistory which has never stopped happening and, as such, is not a prehistory in any chronological sense. It is not done with, over, relegated to a past, which then becomes part of a causal or narrative reconstruction of the self. On the contrary, it is that prehistory which interrupts the story I have to give of myself, which makes every account of myself partial and failed (and constitutes, in a way, my failure to be fully accountable for my actions, my final "irresponsibility," one for which I may be forgiven only because I could not do otherwise, and that not being able to do otherwise is our common predica- ment). Indeed, consider that the way in which that prehistory continues to happen is that every time I enunciate myself, I undergo something of what cannot be captured or assimilated by that "I," that I always come too late to myself (remember Nietzsche's bees) and, in that sense, can never provide the account of myself which both certain forms of morality as well as models of mental health require, namely, that the self deliver itself through coherent narrative. The "I" is the moment of failure in every narrative effort to give an account of oneself. It remains the unaccounted for and, in that sense, constitutes the failure that the very project of self-narration requires. It is the failure that every effort to give an account of oneself is bound to encounter and upon which it founders. To tell the story of oneself is already to act, since telling is a kind of action, and it is performed with some addressee, generalized or specific, as an implied feature of this action. So it is an action in the direction of an Other, but also an action that requires an Other, for which an Other is presupposed. The Other is thus in the action of my telling, and so it is not simply a question of imparting information to an Other who is over there, beyond me, waiting to know. On the contrary, the telling is the performing of an action that presupposes an Other, posits and elaborates the Other, is given to the Other, or by virtue of the Other, prior to the giving of any information. So if, at the beginning-and we must laugh here, since we cannot narrate that beginning with any kind of authority, indeed, such a narration is the occasion in which we lose whatever narrative authority we might otherwise enjoy-I am only in the address to you, then the "I" which I am is nothing without this "you," and cannot even begin to refer to itself outside the relation to the Other by which its capacity for self-reference emerges. I am mired, given over. Even the word "dependency" cannot do the job here. And what this means is that I am also formed in ways that precede and enable my self-forming and that this particular kind of transitivity is difficult, if not impossible, to narrate. So what will responsibility look like according to such a theory? And haven't we, by insisting on something non-narrativizable, limited the degree to which we might hold ourselves or others accountable for their actions? I want to suggest that the very meaning of responsibility must be rethought on this basis; it cannot be tied to the conceit of transparency. Indeed, to take responsibility for oneself is to avow the limits of any self-understanding and to establish this limit not only as a condition for the subject, but as the predicament of the human community itself. But I am not altogether out of the loop of the Enlightenment if I say, as I do, that reason's limit is the sign of our humanity. It might even be understood as a legacy of Kant to say so. My account of myself breaks down, and surely for a reason, but that does not mean that I can supply all the reasons that would make my account whole. There are reasons that course through me that I cannot fully recuperate, that remain enigmatic, that abide with me as my own, familiar alterity, my own private, or not so private, opacity. I speak as an "I," but do not make the mistake of thinking that I know precisely all that I am doing when I speak in that way. I find that my very formation implicates the Other in me, that my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others. Do I need to know myself in order to act responsibly in social relations? Surely, to a certain extent, yes. But is there an ethical valence to my unknowingness? I am wounded, and I find that the wound itself testifies to the fact that I am impressionable, given over to the Other in ways that I cannot fully predict or control. I cannot think the question of responsibility alone, in isolation from the Other, or if I do, I have taken myself out of the mode of address that frames the problem of responsibility from the start.

#### These self-concepts are based on interpersonal norms that govern our relations with the world and recognition of others. Butler 2 Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003**.** <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566427> LG

In all the talk about the social construction of the subject, we have perhaps over- looked the fact that **the very being of the self is dependent not just on the existence of the Other-in its singularity, as Levinas would have it, though surely that-but also on the possibility that the normative horizon within which the Other sees and listens and knows and recognizes is also subject to a critical opening.** This opening calls into question the limits of established regimes of truth, where a certain risking of the self be- comes, as Levinas claims, the sign of virtue [see Foucault]. Whether or not the Other is singular, **the Other is recognized and confers recognition through a set of norms that govern recognizability**. So whereas the Other may be singular, if not radically personal, **the norms are to some extent impersonal and indifferent, and they introduce a disorientation of perspective for the subject in the midst of recognition as an encounter.** For if I understand myself to be conferring recognition on you, for instance, then I take seriously that the recognition comes from me. But in the moment that I realize that the terms by which I confer recognition are not mine alone, that I did not singlehandedly make them, then I am, as it were, dispossessed by the language that I offer. In a sense, I submit to a norm of recognition when I offer recognition to you, so that I am both subjected to that norm and the agency of its use. As Hegel would have it, **recognition cannot be unilaterally given. In the moment that I give it, I am potentially given it, and the form by which I offer it is one that potentially is given to me. In this sense, one might say, I can never offer it**, in the Hegelian sense, as a pure offering, **since I am receiving it, at least potentially and structurally, in the moment, in the act, of giving**. We might ask, as Levinas surely has, what kind of gift this is that returns to me so quickly, that never really leaves my hands. Is it the case that recognition consists, as it does for Hegel, in a reciprocal act whereby I recognize that the Other is structured in the same way that I am, and I recognize that the Other also makes, or can make, this very recognition of sameness? Or is there perhaps an encounter with alterity here that is not reducible to sameness? If it is the latter, how are we to understand this alterity? On the one hand, the Hegelian Other is always found outside, or at least it is first found outside, and only later recognized to be constitutive. This has led critics of Hegel to conclude that the Hegelian subject effects a wholesale assimilation of what is external to it into a set of internal features of itself, and that its characteristic gesture is one of appropriation. There are other readings of Hegel, however, that insist that the relation to the Other is ecstatic,' that **the "I" repeatedly finds itself outside itself, and that it cannot put an end to this repeated upsurge of its own exteriority**. I am, as it were, always other to myself, and there is no final moment in which my return to myself takes place. In fact, the encounters I undergo, if we are to follow the Phenom- enology of Spirit, are those by which I am invariably transformed; **recognition becomes the process by which I become other than what I was** and, therefore, also, the process by which I cease to be able to return to what I was. **There is, then, a constitutive loss in the process of recognition, a transformation that does not bring all that once was forward with it, one that forecloses upon the past in an irreversible way. Moreover, it is one in which the "return to self' becomes impossible for another reason as well: there is no staying inside. I am compelled and comported outside myself; I find that the only way to know myself is precisely through a mediation that takes place outside of me, exterior to me, in a convention or a norm that I did not make, in which I cannot discern myself as an author or an agent of its making**. In this sense, then, the subject of recognition is one for whom a vacillation between loss and ecstasy is inevitable. The possibility of the "I," of speaking and knowing the "I," resides in a perspective that dislocates the first-person perspective whose very condition it supplies. **The perspective that both conditions and disorients me from the very possibility of my own perspective is not reducible to the perspective of the Other, since the perspective is also what governs the possibility of my recognizing the Other, and the Other recognizing me. We are not mere dyads on our own, since our exchange is mediated by language, by conventions, by a sedimentation of norms that are social in character**. So how are we to understand the impersonal perspective by which our personal encounter is occasioned and disoriented?

#### We must center normative claims around the precariousness of life- social norms render some lives grievable and some not- this is the root cause of violence inflicted on the Other since it determines who matters. Butler 3 Judith. “Frames of War.” Verso Press. 2009 LG

**To say that a life is precarious requires not only that a life be apprehended as a life, but also that precariousness be an aspect of what is apprehended in what is living. Normatively construed, I am arguing that there ought to be a more inclusive and egalitarian way of recognizing precariousness, and that this should take form as concrete social policy regarding such issues as shelter, work, food, medical care, and legal status.** And yet, I am also insisting, in a way that might seem initially paradoxical, that precariousness itself cannot be properly recognized. It can be apprehended, taken in, encountered, and it can be presupposed by certain norms of recognition just as it can be refused by such norms. Indeed, there ought to be recognition of precariousness as a shared condition of human life (indeed, as a condition that links human and non-human animals), but we ought not to think that the recognition of precariousness masters or captures or even fully cognizes what it recognizes**. So although I would (and will) argue that norms of recognition ought to be based on an apprehension of precariousness, I do not think that precariousness is a function or effect of recognition, nor that recognition is the only or the best way to register precariousness. To say that a life is injurable, for instance, or that it can be lost, destroyed, or systematically neglected to the point of death, is to underscore not only the finitude of a life** (that death is certain) **but also its precariousness (that life requires various social and economic conditions to be met in order to be sustained as a life). Precariousness implies living socially, that is, the fact that one's life is always in some sense in the hands of the other**. It implies exposure both to those we know and to those we do not know; **a dependency on people we know, or barely know, or know not at all**. Reciprocally, it implies being impinged upon by the exposure and dependency of others, most of whom remain anonymous. These are not necessarily relations of love or even of care, but constitute obligations toward others, most of whom we cannot name and do not know, and who may or may not bear traits of familiarity to an established sense of who "we" are. In the interest of speaking in common parlance, we could say that "we" have such obligations to "others" and presume that we know who "we" are in such an instance. **The social implication of this view, however, is precisely that the "we" does not, and cannot, recognize itself, that it is riven from the start, interrupted by alterity, as Levinas has said, and the obligations "we" have are precisely those that disrupt any established notion of the "we."** Over and against an existential concept of finitude that singularizes our relation to death and to life**, precariousness underscores our radical substitutability and anonymity in relation both to certain socially facilitated modes of dying and death and to other socially conditioned modes of persisting and flourishing**. It is not that we are born and then later become precarious, but rather that **precariousness is coextensive with birth itself** (birth is, by definition, precarious), which means that it matters whether or not this infant being survives, and that its survival is dependent on what we might call a social network of hands. Precisely because a living being may die, it is necessary to care for that being so that it may live. Only under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of the life appear. **Thus, grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters**. For the most part, we imagine that an infant comes into the world, is sustained in and by that world through to adulthood and old age, and finally dies. We imagine that when the child is wanted, there is celebration at the beginning of life**. But there can be no celebration without an implicit understanding that the life is grievable, that it would be grieved if it were lost, and that this future anterior is installed as the condition of its life.** In ordinary language, grief attends the life that has already been lived, and presupposes that life as having ended. But, according to the future anterior (which is also part of ordinary language), grievability is a condition of a life's emergence and sustenance.7 The future anterior, "a life has been lived," is presupposed at the beginning of a life that has only begun to be lived. In other words, "this will be a life that will have been lived" is the presupposition of a grievable life, which means that this will be a life that can be regarded as a life, and be sustained by that regard**. Without grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something living that is other than life. Instead, "there is a life that will never have been lived," sustained by no regard, no testimony, and ungrieved when lost. The apprehension of grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of precarious life.** Grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of the living being as living, exposed to non-life from the start.

#### Thus, the ROB and the standard is recognizing the grievability of lives. Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Pre-req to other ethics: Lives that aren’t seen as grievable face various burdens at disproportionate rates and we become inclined to feel indifference to their pain, so they are excluded from our calculus. Butler 4 Judith. “Frames of War.” Verso Press. 2009

#### Such frames are operative in imprisonment and torture, but also in the politics of immigration, according to which certain lives are perceived as lives while others, though apparently living, fail to assume perceptual form as such. Forms of racism instituted and active at the level of perception tend to produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable. The differential distribution of grievability across populations has implications for why and when we feel politically consequential affective dispositions such as horror, guilt, righteous sadism, loss, and indifference. Why, in particular, has there been within the US a righteous response to certain forms of violence inflicted at the same time that violence suffered by the US is either loudly mourned (the iconography of the dead from 9/11) or considered inassimilable (the assertion of masculine impermeability within state rhetoric)? If we take the precariousness of life as a point of departure, then there is no life without the need for shelter and food, no life without dependency on wider networks of sociality and labor, no life that transcends injurability and mortality. We might then analyze some of the cultural tributaries of military power during these times as attempting to maximize precariousness for others while minimizing precariousness for the power in question. This differential distribution of precarity is at once a material and a perceptual issue, since those whose lives are not "regarded" as potentially grievable, and hence valuable, are made to bear the burden of starvation, underemployment, legal disenfranchisement, and differential exposure to violence and death. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether the "regard"-or the failure of "regard"-leads to the "material reality" or whether the material reality leads to the failure of regard, since it would seem that both happen at once and that such perceptual categories are essential to the crafting of material reality (which does not mean that all materiality is reducible to perception, but only that perception carries its material effects).

#### [2] Only our theory can accurately combat violence. All other ethical theories fail without an accurate understanding of life itself. Butler 5 Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566427>

**One might**, for instance, **believe in the sanctity of life or adhere to a general philosophy that opposes violent action of all kinds against sentient beings**, and one might invest powerful feelings in such a belief**. But if certain lives are not perceivable as lives**, and this includes sentient beings who are not human, **then the moral prohibition against violence will be only selectively applied** (and our own sentience will be only selectively mobilized). **The critique of violence must begin with the question of the representability of life itself: what allows a life to become visible in its precariousness and its need for shelter, and what is it that keeps us from seeing or understanding certain lives in this way?** The problem concerns the media, at the most general level, since a life can be accorded a value only on the condition that it is perceivable as a life, **but it is only on the condition of certain embedded evaluative structures that a life becomes perceivable at all.**

#### [3] The lack of a clear consensus of what constitutes life and death implies the necessity for a frame to make these decisions. Butler 6 Judith. “Frames of War.” Verso Press. 2009

Those norms draw upon shifting schemes of intelligibility, so that we can and do have, for example, histories of life and histories of death. Indeed, **we have ongoing debates about whether the fetus should count as life**, or a life, or a human life; we have further debates about conception and what constitutes the first moments of a living organism**; we have debates also about what constitutes death, whether it is the death of the brain, or of the heart, whether it is the effect of a legal declaration** or a set of medical and legal certificates. **All of these debates involve contested notions of personhood and, implicitly, questions regarding the "human animal" and how that conjunctive (and chiasmic) existence is to be understood. The fact that these debates exist, and continue to exist,** does not imply that life and death are direct consequences of discourse (an absurd conclusion, if taken literally). **Rather, it implies that there is no life and no death without a relation to some frame.** Even when life and death take place between, outside, or across the frames by which they are for the most part organized, they still take place, though in ways that call into question the necessity of the mechanisms through which ontological fields are constituted. If a life is produced according to the norms by which life is recognized, this implies neither that everything about a life is produced according to such norms nor that we must reject the idea that there is a remainder of "life"-suspended and spectral-that limns and haunts every normative instance of life. **Production is partial and is, indeed, perpetually haunted by its ontologically uncertain double. Indeed, every normative instance is shadowed by its own failure, and very often that failure assumes a figural form. The figure lays claim to no certain ontological status, and though it can be apprehended as "living," it is not always recognized as a life. In fact, a living figure outside the norms of life not only becomes the problem to be managed by normativity, but seems to be that which normativity is bound to reproduce: it is living, but not a life. It falls outside the frame furnished by the norm, but only as a relentless double whose ontology cannot be secured, but whose living status is open to apprehension.**

#### [4] Subjectivity: Absent a system of recognition, we fail to become moral subjects because we haven’t been recognized by the Other as subjects. o/w on bindingness since insofar as we aren’t subjects we can’t be bound to any moral theory and thus have no obligation to be moral

#### [5] Only the orientation of institutional arrangements, not the consideration of consequences, can solve oppression, because misrecognition is an improper way of relating our wills to how we act, not about events outside of what we will.

#### [6] Performativity: Engaging in debate concedes the validity of the framework; all your arguments presuppose that the judge will recognize you as a valid individual whose words hold value

#### [7] Actor Specificity: You can only generate obligations as to what agents should do if you understand yourself and others as a subject so we should accept the harms of recognition because without recognition, there is no way to take actions because obligations take the form of agent x out to do y

## Offense

I affirm the resolution: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I defend the resolution as a general principle and implement through normal means.

#### Many status quo workers are seen as disposable and thus ungrievable—especially in pandemic conditions. Wade 20 Francis Wade; The Nation; Judith Butler on the Violence of Neglect Amid a Health Crisis; MAY 13, 2020; <https://www.thenation.com/article/culture/judith-butler-force-of-nonviolence-interview/>

Judith Butler: A single act cannot stand for repeated patterns or for structural or institutional forms of violence. The physical blow is most graphic and imaginable, and when violence takes that form, it is easier to find and hold the person accountable for its delivery. Accountability becomes more complex and no less urgent when the person who strikes the blow claims to be following an unjust police or prison policy or acting in the name of national security. And it is complex in another way but still no less urgent if whole populations are “left to die,” as Foucault put**. Farmworkers crammed into small housing spaces and deprived of medical care are exposed to serious illness and death under the present conditions of pandemic**. Something quite similar could be said about the population of Gaza, where confinement is imposed by force and where a slow genocide may well take place. **In such cases, we also hold to account the state, the conditions of siege, carceral institutions, the policy-makers, and even the economic system that treats some workers as dispensable and replaceable**. The way I see it**, it is less a matter of who is a friend and who is an enemy but who counts as a life that matters and whose lives are regarded as dispensable**. Prisons tend to keep those populations inside the nation but with a disenfranchised status, and in the US they are instruments for containing and suppressing black and brown lives to a disproportionate degree. **With migrants, they are meant to be kept outside. But the border and its modes of indefinite detention are neither quite inside nor outside. That kind of threshold can be a special kind of hell.**

#### Labor strikes are a form of nonviolence that are key to breaking free from exploitation and for grievable workers to persist by asserting their own worth. Butler 20 Judith Butler; Judith Butler on Rethinking Vulnerability, Violence, Resistance; Vesro Books; 06 March 2020; https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4583-judith-butler-on-rethinking-vulnerability-violence-resistance

**The ties that potentially bind us across zones of geopolitical violence can be unknowing and frail, freighted with paternalism and power, but they can be strengthened through transversal forms of solidarity that dispute the primacy and necessity of violence.** The sentiments of solidarity that persist are those that accept the transversal character of our alliances, the perpetual demand for translation as well as the epistemic limits that mark its failures, including its appropriations and effacements. **To avow vulnerability not as an attribute of the subject, but as a feature of social relations, does not imply vulnerability as an identity, a category, or a ground for political action. Rather, persistence in a condition of vulnerability proves to be its own kind of strength, distinguished from one that champions strength as the achievement of invulnerability**. That condition of mastery replicates the forms of domination to be opposed, devaluing those forms of susceptibility and contagion that yield solidarity and transformational alliances. Similarly, the prejudice against nonviolence as passive and useless implicitly depends upon a gendered division of attributes by which masculinity stands for activity, and femininity for passivity. No transvaluation of those values will defeat the falsehood of that binary opposition. Indeed, the power of nonviolence, its force, is found in the modes of resistance to a form of violence that regularly hides its true name. **Nonviolence exposes the ruse by which state violence defends itself against black and brown people, queer people, the migrant, the homeless, the dissenters—as if they were, taken together, so many vessels of destruction who must, for “security reasons,” be detained, incarcerated, or expelled**. The “soul force” that Gandhi had in mind was never fully separable from an embodied stance, a way of living in the body and of persisting, precisely under conditions that attack the very conditions of persistence. Sometimes continuing to exist in the vexation of social relations is the ultimate defeat of violent power. **To link a practice of nonviolence with a force or strength that is distinguished from destructive violence, one that is manifest in solidarity alliances of resistance and persistence, is to refute the characterization of nonviolence as a weak and useless passivity**. Refusal is not the same as doing nothing. The hunger striker refuses to reproduce the prisoner’s body, indicting the carceral powers that are already attacking the existence of the incarcerated**. The strike may not seem like an “action,” but it asserts its power by withdrawing labor that is essential to the continuation of a capitalist form of exploitation.** Civil disobedience may seem like a simple “opting out,” but it makes public a judgment that a legal system is not just. It requires the exercise of an extra-legal judgment**. To breach the fence or the wall that is designed to keep people out is precisely to exercise an extra-legal claim to freedom, one that the existing legal regime is failing to provide for within its own terms. To boycott a regime that continues colonial rule, intensifying dispossession, displacement, and disenfranchisement for an entire population, is to assert the injustice of the regime, to refuse to reproduce its criminality as normal**. For nonviolence to escape the war logics that distinguish between lives worth preserving and lives considered dispensable, it must become part of a politics of equality. Thus, **an intervention in the sphere of appearance**—the media and all the contemporary permutations of the public sphere—**is required to make every life grievable, that is, worthy of its own living, deserving of its own life. To demand that every life be grievable is another way of saying that all lives ought to be able to persist in their living without being subject to violence, systemic abandonment, or military obliteration**.

#### The right to strike turns the law against itself, and the right being unconditional prevents the state from controlling and circumcising the right to strike. Crepon 19 MARC CRÉPON; The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s “Toward the Critique of Violence”; CRITICAL TIMES 2:2; AUGUST 2019

First, **is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence**? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benja­ min dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits**. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning**, in other words**, the right to strike against the law itself**. **The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class strugles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law**. The diference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “**The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional**,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed uncondi­ tionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other**.**

## Underview

#### [1] Independently, each life improved solves an existential catastrophe.

Kaczmarek 17 – Patrick Kaczmarek, PhD at the University of Glasgow, a Senior Researcher at Effective Giving, Visiting Researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford and a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. [How Much is Rule-Consequentialism Really Willing to Give Up to Save the Future of Humanity? Utilitas, 29(2), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/how-much-is-ruleconsequentialism-really-willing-to-give-up-to-save-the-future-of-humanity/F867301151A79F7DA566A14DF71749B3]//BPS

Notice, the problem can be cast two different ways. First, the loss associated with humanity's premature extinction is so great that even if the probability of a catastrophic event is very low, an expected value calculation suggests that we should strive to prevent its possible occurrence**. And yet, there is something deeply puzzling about ruining the lives of all actual persons for the sake of humanity eking out a longer stay in the universe. Second, you may have realized that the above implication bears close resemblance to the dreaded Repugnant Conclusion.** The Repugnant Conclusion states that for any population**, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some larger imaginable population whose existence, all else being equal, would be better despite their lives being barely worth living**.19The mistake, as countless critics have noted, is that quantity (that is, size of population) should not be able to compensate for a stark reduction to their average quality of life. I'm inclined to agree that this looks worrisome**. For some, if this were the end of the story, it would surely act as a reductio ad absurdum of the view. But this is not the full story. In setting out our earlier comparison of the two populations it was assumed that only costs go up, never benefits. That is to say, A was fixed and the total sum of goods went up merely because the size of the population grew, despite internalization costs reducing average quality of life.** Colouring in the picture, this corresponds to the scenario where, all else being equal, existential threats are directly targeted. To illustrate, this could amount to putting a lot of resources towards asteroid deflection programmes.**20 I now wish to argue that we could instead reduce existential risk by indirect means, and in so doing make the world in two ways go better. As noted earlier, we would prolong humanity's place in the cosmos. Furthermore, an indirect approach improves the average welfare of persons, particularly the worse-off in our population**. Certainly, it would be a mistake to concentrate exclusively on indirectly lowering the probability of doomsday. Returning to our earlier example, reducing global poverty cannot prevent an Earth-bound asteroid the size of Texas from making impact. **Nevertheless, if we were also to adopt an indirect approach, then this would contribute to existential risk reduction by curbing the negative ripple effects of readily preventable illnesses, global hunger, and so forth**. Ripple effects are a class of phenomena that affect the far future in significant ways, shaping how our history unfolds over time.21A ripple effect is initiated by a particular event that has some causal influence on the course of events that follow it. These events, in turn, may have their own impact on how further events play out**. And so on it goes, reaching wider and wider as time passes. Consider the following example. A doctor is in a position to cure some infant's blindness.** Sure, the infant will probably have a better life after the operation. Most of us are quick to hone-in on this feature of the situation. And many other goods go unacknowledged by us as a result**. Just a few of the proximate advantages we might reasonably expect to find after curing the infant's blindness include: her parents will be less worried about her, subsequently finding more free time to develop their own personal projects; the government will spend fewer resources on providing her education; this child will grow up with more opportunities, as well as perhaps being inspired to start a grassroots initiative or develop an anti-malarial drug**. All of these consequences will have some role in shaping our future due to their own ripple effects. **This network of ripple effects might go so far as causing '[her] country's economy to develop very slightly more quickly, or make certain technological or cultural innovations arrive more quickly'**.22

#### [2] 1ar theory is legit – it’s the only way to check back infinite neg abuse and 4-6 timeskew means I get to uplayer

#### [a] fairness is a voter—debate is a game so it has to be constitutive so that both players have an equal chance at accessing the round

#### [b] no RVIs for the neg—aff has shorter speeches so i would have to overcommit if I ever want to call out abuse, denying neg RVIs is the only way to check this AND it’s the only way to prevent a 2nr collapse on 1ar theory which is illogical because they shouldn’t win for proving they aren’t abusive and disincentivizes calling out abuse since I would have to collapse a 6 minute speech into 3 minutes

#### [c] 1ar theory is drop the debater — I can’t re-do the 1ar after the abuse has already been done- you should be held accountable for it

#### [d] competing interps over reasonability—6-3 split means the neg has time to prove their practice is good and prevents a race to the bottom

#### [3] neg offense (ie k links or spec shell violations) must be generated from the content of the 1ac, not the omission of something – there’s infinite things I can mention in the aff but I only have 6 minutes so it places an infinite burden on me so just ask in cx

#### [4] Nothing in the aff triggers presumption or permissibility but it affirms –

#### A] If I told you my name was Lily, you would assume that was true until told otherwise- you assume the resolution true absent offense to prove it false

#### B] There are always infinite ways to prove something true- 5+2=7 but so does 4+3

#### C] Aff side bias means you presume aff. Shah 2-13

Sachin Shah, [LHP Debater, Attended TOC 2018 and TOC 2019, Broke at TOC 2019, 5 on AP Stats, Computer Science Major, Experience with side bias stats] February 13, 2020, “A Statistical Analysis of Side-Bias on the 2020 January-February Lincoln Douglas Debate Topic by Sachin Shah”<http://nsdupdate.com/2020/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2020-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic-by-sachin-shah/?fbclid=IwAR2P0AZqQtSiwMZlCpia-Fy1zFOdHn6JrGtcYgGulqeimd-V0a1xbaIMYYs> //LHP AV

It is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds **from 142 TOC bid-distributing tournaments (September 2017 – 2020 YTD), the neg**ative **won 52.75%** of ballots (p-value < 0.0001, 95% confidence interval [52.3%, 53.2%]). This suggests **the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans nine different topics** [3]. Given a structural advantage for the negative, **the affirmative may be justified in being granted a substantive advantage to compensate** for the structural skew. This could take various forms **such as** granting the affirmative **presumption ground, tiny plans, or framework choice**. Whatever form chosen should be tested to ensure the skew is not unintentionally reversed. Therefore, this analysis confirms that affirming is in fact harder again on the 2020 January-February topic. So, once again, don’t lose the flip!

#### D] Presuming neg is a bad ethic- if someone claims they were assaulted we shouldn’t default to not believing them

#### [5] No permissibility in the aff but it affirms –

#### A] All obligatory acts are permissible, but no prohibited acts are permissible, so it’s more likely to affirm than negate.

#### B] Praiseworthy actions only need to be permissible.

#### Timmons 02 [Mark Timmons. “Moral Theory: An Introduction.” Pg. 8. 2002.]

When the term is used broadly, right action is the opposite of wrong action**: an action is right, in the broad sense of the term, when it is not wrong**. For instance, to say of someone that what she did was right conveys the idea that her act was morally in the clear---that it was alright for her to do, that what she did was not wrong. **Since actions that are not wrong include the categories  of both the obligatory and the optional, talk of right action (in the broad sense) covers both of these categories.**

#### C] Dictionary.com defines “ought”: as “used to express moral rightness, or the like” and “wrong” as “not in accordance with what is morally right or good” – proving something isn’t wrong means it’s right.

#### D] We don’t have to justify doing morally neutral things like drinking water

#### [6] No 2n theory – they can overload the 2ar with multiple shells that are impossible to answer because I get half the speech time BUT I need to spend time reading a counter-interp or a brightline and respond to their interp—worsened by the fact that they have the chance to read frontlines to my 2ar responses. ALSO it invites judge intervention since the judge will always have to decide if the 2ar responses were good enough in comparison to the 2nr.