

Util

The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

1] Only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – all other frameworks collapse.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] TDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.² The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.³ As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”⁴ Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

2] Moral uncertainty means any risk of extinction outweighs under any framework – you can never be 100 sure about any ethical framework, so you must keep people alive to make future

Bostrom 12 [(Nick Bostrom, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford) “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy, 2012] TDI

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

3] Actor specificity: A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefit some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. C] Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings.

Plan

Plan Text: Resolved: The United States Federal Government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike

Adv—Growth

The advantage is Workforce Retention.

The Great Resignation is here: the world is entering an era of unprecedented labor shortage with no end in sight. Tharoor 10/18

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In the United States, the phenomenon dubbed as the "Great Resignation" seems to be picking up speed. A record 4.3 million U.S. workers quit their jobs in August, according to new data from the Labor Department — a figure that expands to **20 million** if measured back to April. Many of these resignations took place in the retail and hospitality sectors, with employees opting out of difficult, low-wage jobs. But the quitting spans a broad spectrum of the American workforce, as the toll of the pandemic — and the tortuous path to recovery — keeps fueling what Atlantic writer Derek Thompson has described as "**a centrifugal moment in American economic history.**" Wages are up and **businesses face staffing shortages**, while the experience of **a sustained public health emergency** has prompted myriad Americans to reevaluate their work options. "This **[pandemic] has been going on for so long**, it's affecting people mentally, physically," Danny Nelms, president of the Work Institute, a consulting firm, told the Wall Street Journal. "All those things are continuing to make people be reflective of their life and career and their jobs. Add to that over 10 million openings, and if I want to go do something different, it's not terribly hard to do." The "Great Resignation" in the United States was preceded by a far greater — decades-long, arguably — **stagnation in worker wages and benefits**. In lower-end jobs, earnings have not matched the pace of inflation, while work grew more informal and precarious. Workers' rights activists now see a vital moment for a course correction. **October has been a banner month for** American **organized labor**, with major strikes across various industries sweeping the country. "Workers are harder to replace and many companies are scrambling to manage hobbled supply chains and meet pandemic-fueled demand for their products. That has given unions new leverage, and made striking less risky," my colleagues reported. For the average worker in a developed Western economy, there are reasons for encouragement. "The truth is people in the 1960s and '70s quit their jobs more often than they have in the past 20 years, and the economy was better off for it," wrote Thompson in the Atlantic. "Since the 1980s, Americans have quit less, and many have clung to crappy jobs for fear that the safety net wouldn't support them while they looked for a new one. But Americans seem to be done with sticking it out. And they're being rewarded for their lack of patience: Wages for low-income workers are rising at their fastest rate since the Great Recession." In social democratic Western Europe, a stronger safety net has led to somewhat less disruption in the workforce. But similar trends are at play: "Data collated by the OECD, which groups most of the **advanced industrial democracies**, shows that in its 38 member countries, about **20 million fewer people are in work than before the coronavirus struck,**" noted Politico Europe. "Of these, **14 million have exited the labor market** and are classified as 'not working' and 'not looking for work.' Compared to 2019, 3 million more young people are not in employment, education or training." A survey published in August found that a third of all Germany companies were reporting a dearth in skilled workers. That month, Detlef Scheele, head of the German Federal Employment Agency, told Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper that the country would need to import 400,000 skilled workers a year to make up for shortfalls in a host of industries, from nursing care to green tech companies. **Pandemic-era border closures** and rising wages in Central and Eastern European countries have led to shortages of meatpackers and hospitality workers in countries like Germany and Denmark. "**Frankly, this is a pay issue.**" said Andrew Watt, head of the European economics unit at the Macroeconomic Policy Institute at the German trade unions' Hans Böckler Foundation, to Politico. "Wages will have to increase in these sectors to get people back into tough, low-paid jobs. That's no bad thing." But the story gets a bit more uneven, and certainly more grim, in the developing world. In Latin America and the Caribbean, **26 million people lost their jobs** last year amid **pandemic-era shutdowns**, according to the U.N.'s International Labour Organization. The vast majority of **jobs that have returned are in the informal sector**, an outcome that often means even **lower pay and greater precarity** in a **region already defined by** profound **economic inequality**. "These are jobs that are generally **unstable**, with **low wages**, without social protection or **rights**," said Vinicius Pinheiro, regional director for the ILO, at a

briefing last month. He also noted the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on the region's youth. According to one study earlier this year, 1 in 6 people aged between 18 and 29 in Latin America and the Caribbean had left work since the pandemic began. In Asia's diverse economies, other pains are being felt. China is seeing its own version of the "Great Resignation," with a younger generation of workers more disenchanted by their prospects and turned off by the relatively low wages in the manufacturing centers that powered China's economic rise. Authorities in Beijing warn of a growing shortage of skilled workers in its crucial tech industry, a challenge for China's leadership as it tries to steer the national economy toward more skilled sectors. And as global demand picks up after the fallow months of the pandemic, China's factories are feeling the pinch of labor shortages. Another labor-related pandemic phenomenon is crystallizing in neighboring Vietnam: Many migrant workers who left for their rural homes when jobs in big cities dried up amid lockdowns are not coming back. "It's clear that there was extreme hardship faced by both businesses and workers during the prolonged lockdown," said Mary Tarnowka, executive director of AmCham Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City, to the Financial Times. "And there was particular pain and hardship for people at lower income levels who didn't have money for rent or food." In their villages, many of Asia's working poor can at least count on roofs over their head and food to eat. It's another form of resignation. Those who clung to what jobs they could keep were often coping with more dire conditions. When the pandemic snarled fast-fashion supply chains, millions of garment workers in South Asia, as a recent study by the Asia Floor Wage Alliance documented, had to swallow wage losses and endure work arrangements marked by widespread human rights abuses. In a survey interviewing 1,140 garment workers in Myanmar, Honduras, Ethiopia and India, researchers from Britain's University of Sheffield and the U.S.-based Worker Rights Consortium found that a majority had been forced to borrow money and many incurred greater debt over the course of the pandemic. About a third of workers who changed jobs reported worse working conditions, including lower pay and more risk. "Workers were already not being paid fair wages and had little savings at the beginning of the pandemic," said Zameer Awan, field worker with the Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research, to Reuters. "Now most are deep in debt and those who have found jobs again find themselves in more abusive conditions but without a voice anymore."

A right to strike is crucial to negotiating conditions for workforce retention—but unchecked, companies lash out with dismissals. Bogage 10/17

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Marcial Reyes could have just quit his job. Frustrated with chronic understaffing at the Kaiser Permanente hospital where he works in Southern California, he knows he has options in a region desperate for nurses. Instead, he voted to go on strike. While Americans are leaving their jobs at staggering rates — a record 4.3 million quit in August alone — hundreds of thousands of workers with similar grievances about wages, benefits and quality of life are, like Reyes, choosing to dig in and fight. Last week, 10,000 John Deere workers went on strike, while unions representing 31,000 Kaiser employees authorized walkouts. Some 60,000 Hollywood production workers reached a deal Saturday night, averting a strike hours before a negotiation deadline. All told, there have been strikes against 178 employers this year, according to a tracker by Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which records only large work stoppages, has documented 12 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers so far this year. That's considerably higher than 2020, when the pandemic took hold, but in line with significant strike activity recorded in 2019 and 2018. The trend, union officials and economists say, is an offshoot of the phenomenon known as the Great Resignation, which has thinned the nation's labor pool and slowed the economic recovery. Workers are now harder to replace, especially while many companies are scrambling to meet heightened demand for their products and manage hobbled supply chains. That has given unions new leverage, and made striking less risky. In interviews, workers and labor leaders said union members are angry with employers for failing to raise pay to match new profits and are disappointed by the lack of high-quality jobs. They also are frustrated that wage growth is not keeping pace with inflation. Although the average U.S. worker's hourly pay was up 4 percent in September compared with a year ago, according to the St. Louis Federal Reserve, inflation grew 5.4 percent over the same period. "The strikes are sending a signal, no doubt about it, that employers ignore workers at their peril," AFL-CIO President Liz Shuler said in an interview with The Washington Post. "I think this wave of strikes is actually going to inspire more workers to stand up and speak out and put that line in the sand and say, 'We deserve better.'" Not all work stoppages have been successful. More than 1,000 Alabama miners have been

on strike at Warrior Met Coal since April. That same month, 14 oil workers staged a walkout against United Metro Energy in New York; eight have since been fired, according to the local Teamsters branch. And roughly 1,400 workers at Kellogg Co. cereal factories in four states are entering their third week on the picket line. Still, the labor movement has drawn support from the White House. President Biden made a public statement supporting the Amazon union drive in Alabama — a rare move by a sitting president. And his constant calls to raise the federal minimum wage to \$15 an hour have delighted labor leaders. In Fontana, Calif., Reyes is hopeful. As a covid-19 patient who spent a month in the same Kaiser hospital where he works, he has a unique perspective on pandemic-related staffing shortages. “I think I got the best care that I could have gotten at Kaiser,” he said. “Now it’s time to pay back the nurses that took care of me” by striking for additional resources. The strike drives in 2021 run the gamut of American industry: Nurses and health workers in California and Oregon; oil workers in New York; cereal factory workers in Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Tennessee; television and film production crews in Hollywood; and more. The surge in strike activity has yielded mixed results, economists say. Though work stoppages this summer at Nabisco and Frito-Lay helped secure higher raises and new vacation allowances for workers, employers have not made meaningful increases in their workforces or compensation structures. Both sides acknowledge the benefit of retaining workers. Management more often would rather deal with a brief strike than absorb higher costs associated with turnover and training new staff. For the employee, a new job isn’t necessarily a better one. A “There’s a cost to searching and a cost to leaving your current employer,” said William M. Rodgers III, director of the Institute for Economic Equity at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. “And maybe some of the desire to strike is predicated out of a level of loyalty that these people have been with this company for a good duration.” Unions increasingly are seeking changes in the workplace and corporate culture. Some strike drives are pushing for better safeguards against sexual harassment and coronavirus safety protocols, including one at El Milagro, a Chicago-based tortilla manufacturer. Workers at a West Virginia producer of industrial pump parts went on strike Oct. 1 seeking better seniority rights. Some are attempting to claw back perks that vanished years ago during economic downturns. Striking John Deere workers contend that the company’s massive profit during the pandemic — earnings nearly doubled to a record \$1.79 billion last quarter — should be reflected in their compensation, particularly retirement benefits. More than 60,000 members of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), which represents Hollywood production workers, had planned to strike Monday unless they reached a deal with the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers. The two sides arrived at a tentative agreement Saturday night that guarantees workers meal breaks, weekends and breaks between shifts, plus significant raises. “They do have to change the way they do business,” IATSE President Matthew D. Loeb said, “to avoid a strike, to have good morale and to have safe, healthy employees.” A spokesman for the television and film producers alliance did not respond to a request for comment. Labor leaders have defined wage demands as a new frontier for workers’ rights. Unions helped deliver the 40-hour workweek, they note, and the coronavirus crisis has reinforced the need to secure living wages and safer workplaces. “Especially during the pandemic, where people have worked overtime, they’ve sacrificed. They want to be acknowledged and appreciated,” Shuler said. Workers took notice when their companies publicly praised them as heroic and essential in the early days of pandemic, labor leaders and experts say, and it made them angry. Many saw a disconnect between the accolades and the realities of their jobs, and now interpret “essential” more broadly: They’re not only crucial to helping put food on families’ tables or treating patients, they’re essential to very companies they serve — and can inflict pain by shutting down or slowing operations. “A strike is really the last resort. That’s labor’s power, a worker’s power is to withhold their labor,” said Kim Cordova, president of the Colorado branch of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union. “A company can function without a CEO, but they can’t function without the workers to actually go do the work.”

1AC—I/L—Tech

Unions are critical to R&D and innovation.

Shin et al '19 [Ilhang Shin, College of Business & Economics, Gachon University; Sorah Park, Ewha School of Business, Ewha Womans University; Seong Pyo Cho, School of Business, Kyungpook National University; Seungho Choi, Ewha School of Business, Ewha Womans University; "The effect of labor unions on innovation and market valuation in business group affiliations: new evidence from South Korea"; 10/26/19; Asian Bus Manage 19, 239–270 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41291-019-00089-9>; Accessed 7/7/20; NT] *Edited for readability

In contrast, unions can facilitate innovation by reducing grievances and staff turnover or by improving employees' moral and training (Freeman and Medof 1984). Ulph and Ulph (1989) argued that an increase in union power can actually increase R&D as the union bargains over employment and wages. Furthermore, unions may allow firms to increase the speed of diffusion and implementation of technology and, hence, increase the firm's incentive to invest (Menezes-Filho et al. 1998a, b). For instance, in the European studies, there was no compelling evidence that unions have a detrimental effect on R&D (e.g., Menezes-Filho et al. 1998a, b; Schnabel and Wagner 1992). Menezes-Filho et al. (1998a) showed that a negative relationship between unions and R&D investment disappears when unions could control the availability of innovative technology in the industry in the UK. Furthermore, Menezes-Filho et al. (1998b) showed that unions in the UK improve a firm's relative R&D performance. In addition, Schnabel and Wagner (1992) showed that unions do not impede innovation in Germany, because of the more cooperative nature of industrial relations. Strong labor unions may act as a corporate governance mechanism that monitors the agency problems, thereby mitigating managerial myopia. This may eventually encourage risk taking and innovative behaviors. According to Chen et al. (2011), labor unions can effectively monitor managerial actions because they can acquire their firms' information more easily than can outside stakeholders can. Also, unions exert their power on management by using their bargaining power to increase the corporate transparency. For instance, affiliated labor unions in Korea have asked management to share information and to allow their participation in decision making in order to monitor whether managers harm the transparency and betray the trust of stakeholders.²

Declines in R&D cede tech dominance to China.

Davidson '17 [Paul; Reporter for USA Today; "Why China is beating the U.S. at innovation"; 4/17/17; USA Today; <https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/04/17/why-china-beating-us-innovation/100016138/>; Accessed 7/7/20; NT]

The U.S. has also given birth to a Smithsonian-worthy collection of breakthrough technologies — including flat-panel displays, digital mobile handsets, notebook computers and solar panels — only to fumble away their development to other countries, particularly China and Japan. The BCG study concludes the U.S. has the potential to reverse the trend through better collaboration among private industry, universities and research consortia. Such a shift would increase annual manufacturing output by 5%, or \$100 billion, and add 700,000 factory jobs and another 1.9 million in other sectors through ripple effects. Yet while President Trump is focused on narrowing the nation's trade deficit, his proposed budget would slash federal funding for R&D, potentially snuffing out a significant source of U.S. manufacturing jobs that could help accomplish that goal. Last year, the U.S. had an \$83 billion trade gap in advanced technology products, according to the Census Bureau. The country is still the global leader in "basic and applied" R&D, which makes early discoveries and further refines them. About a third of the \$500 billion the country spends on R&D is funneled to those activities. But while two-thirds of the total goes to later-stage "development" R&D, China invests 84% of its R&D money on advances that yield commercial products. For the past decade, "development" R&D has been growing 20% a year in China, versus 5% in the U.S., the BCG report says. As recently as 2004, the U.S. spent four times as much as China. In China, many technology companies are state-owned and so they don't have to worry if massive R&D spending yields losses until a product is commercialized, and even the research of private firms is often subsidized by the government, says Robert Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. The Chinese government, he says, also gives the private sector specific timetables for achieving dominance in areas such as solar, printers, robots and drones. And China routinely steals technology and fails to enforce patent laws, Atkinson says "They have huge advantages," he says.

US tech dominance is critical to sustain nuclear deterrence – collapse ensures nuclear conflict.

Saalman '20 [Dr. Lora; Associate Senior Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and a Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute.; "THE IMPACT OF AI ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED STATES"; 4/14/20; East-West Center; <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/the-impact-ai-nuclear-deterrence-china-russia-and-the-united-states>; Accessed 7/7/20; NT]

HONOLULU (14 April 2020)—Artificial intelligence (AI) is an increasingly important component of weapons systems, with both positive and negative implications for nuclear deterrence. Integration of AI into military platforms has the potential to allow weaker nuclear-armed states to reset the imbalance of power, but at the same time it exacerbates fears that stronger states may further solidify their dominance and engage in more provocative actions. China, Russia, and the US are all engaged in developing and integrating AI applications into their military modernization programs. These applications include machine learning, neural networks, and autonomy that feature in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. They also include the deployment of unmanned weapons-delivery and defense platforms. AI has both defensive and offensive applications. At the defensive level, AI has a strong allure for countries that have less capable early-warning systems and smaller and weaker nuclear and conventional arsenals. Machines have the capacity to make decisions based on objective criteria, avoiding the pitfalls of human error, and they can provide faster anticipation and response to an incoming attack. These capabilities are compelling for countries such as China and Russia that have concerns about deficiencies in their early-warning capabilities in the face of improving US capacity to mount high-precision, stealthy, and swift attacks. At the offensive level, Russia, China, and the US are all developing unmanned platforms with varying levels of AI integration and autonomy that can be used to deploy nuclear or conventional weapons. These unmanned platforms include underwater vehicles, combat aerial vehicles, and spaceplanes. One risk is that such platforms could potentially select and engage targets without meaningful human control. The three countries' differing—and at times contradictory—definitions of what constitutes a lethal autonomous weapon system (LAWS) impede consensus on how to avoid such risks. Roles are shifting. The US remains one of the largest drivers of AI and nuclear trends. In part this is because the US system is relatively transparent, thereby eliciting countermeasures and imitation. It also stems from the history of US military deployments in East Asia and elsewhere. US development of unmanned combat aerial and underwater vehicles, as well as spaceplanes, has raised the attention of Russia and China, given their longstanding concerns over US attempts to gain an absolute strategic advantage. Not surprisingly, both Russia and China have engaged in similar, and in some cases more expansive and unpredictable, AI-driven weapons developments and deployments of their own. The Chinese military has been leveraging AI research and development in private industry and universities under "military-civil fusion" (军民融合), with a focus on autonomous decision-making, early-warning, guidance, and targeting systems optimized by machine learning. China has also worked to integrate neural networks that can enhance the maneuverability of its hypersonic glide vehicles and unmanned underwater and aerial vehicles. These are currently thought to be platforms for conventional weapons, but they could serve as AI-enabled nuclear platforms in the future. While Russia was late in releasing its national AI strategy, it has made strides in developing and testing a suite of AI-enabled platforms and gearing them toward nuclear delivery. These include an AI-equipped missile-carrying bomber, hypersonic glide vehicles that can deliver both nuclear and conventional payloads, and a nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle that will reportedly carry a nuclear weapon. Unlike China that has hedged on the ultimate payload of its platforms, Russia has been much more explicit about its intention to use these systems for nuclear weapons. Such Chinese and Russian advances have overturned the traditional view that these two countries are simply responding to the US. As revealed by the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review and the growing interest in low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and cruise missiles (SLCMs), the US is increasingly reacting to China and Russia. China's hedging on the ultimate payload and future aims of its hypersonic (DF-ZF) and unmanned systems, as well as Russia's substantial tactical nuclear assets and projects to enhance survivability and nuclear delivery, such as the Poseidon (Status-6) unmanned underwater vehicle, are driving US strategic evolution. Arms control

mechanisms need to be revitalized In light of these developments and threat perceptions, unmanned weapons platforms controlled by **AI** systems could **increase** the **risk of nuclear escalation**, in particular **through** the **unintentional or intentional collision of unmanned vehicles**. Despite these emerging challenges, current **arms control** mechanisms **remain mired in** decades of historical **grievances**. Both the **multilateral** Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference and the largely stalled bilateral China-US and Russia-US strategic **dialogues are plagued with ossified definitions** of weapons platforms and nuclear deterrence.

Economic crisis causes global war---defense is wrong

Qian **Liu 18**, Managing Director of Greater China for The Economist Group, previously director of the global economics unit and director of Access China for the Economist Intelligence Unit, PhD in economics from Uppsala University, Sweden, 11/13/18, "The next economic crisis could cause a global conflict. Here's why," <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-conflict-heres-why/>

The **response to the 2008** economic **crisis** has **relied far too much on monetary stimulus**, in the form of quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates, **and** included **far too little structural reform**. This means that **the next crisis could** come soon – and **pave the way for** a **large-scale military conflict**.

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: **in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged** economic **crisis**, combined with rising income **inequality, could** well **escalate into a major global military conflict**.

The **2008–09** global financial crisis **almost** bankrupted governments and **caused systemic collapse**. Policymakers managed **to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus**, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates.

But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labor markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies.

Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. And Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment.

The **lack of structural reform has meant** that the **unprecedented excess liquidity** that central banks injected into their economies **was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008**.

In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929.

As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger **another economic crisis** – one that **could be even more severe** than the last, **because** we have built up a tolerance to our **strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of** regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and

unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilize and stimulate the economy.

If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard's Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterized also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war.

For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun.

To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict.

According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels.

This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalization, political polarization, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis.

Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world's unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald Trump's US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen.

Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us avoid it, because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised, while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

Slow growth causes extinction

Richard N. Haass 13, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/30/13, "The World Without America," <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haass>

Let me posit a radical idea: The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is not a rising China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system, and slow economic growth – in short, the domestic foundations of American power. Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in America's difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between America's practices and its principles understandably provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America's imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for.

America's failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a steep price. Indeed, the rest of the world's stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, America's capacity to consume other countries' goods and services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to

drive global economic recovery. The US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the world's citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally, **the US has long been a leading example of what market economies and democratic politics can accomplish.** People and **governments** around the world **are far more** likely to become more **open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding.** Finally, **the world faces many serious challenges ranging from the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, fight climate change and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts.** **These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out.** While Adam Smith's "invisible hand" may ensure the success of free markets, it **is powerless in the world of geopolitics.** **Order requires the visible hand of leadership** to formulate and realize **global responses to global challenges.** Don't get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world's problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But **multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and implement.** Right **now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook.** This brings me back to the argument that **the US must put its house in order – economically, physically, socially, and politically – if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the world.** Everyone should hope that it does: **The alternative** to a world led by the US **is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all.** Such a world would almost certainly be **characterized by chronic crisis and conflict.** That would be bad not just for Americans, but **for the vast majority of the planet's inhabitants.**

Default to status quo hegemony – it's sustainable and creates a structural disincentive for great power war and escalation—collapse causes cascading prolifer and extinction
Brands 15 (Hal Brands is on the faculty at the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University The Elliott School of International Affairs The Washington Quarterly Summer 2015 38:2 pp. 7–28)

The fundamental reason is that **both U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence.** Regarding influence, **the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway** over those allies' policies.⁴³ During the Cold War and after, for instance, **the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies' pursuit of nuclear weapons, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements,** and even to affect the composition of allied nations' governments.⁴⁴ More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. **One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war order.** As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, **the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the "American pacifier" has suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior.** As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States "effectively acts as a night watchman," lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.⁴⁵ **What would happen if Washington backed away from this role?** The most logical answer is that **both U.S. influence and global stability would suffer.** With respect to influence, the United States **would effectively be surrendering the most**

powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional **agendas for decades**. **The consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned**. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that **removing the American pacifier would liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled**. Long-dormant **security competitions might reawaken** as countries armed themselves more vigorously; **historical antagonisms** between old rivals **might reemerge** in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, **countries that seek to revise existing regional orders** in their favor—think **Russia in Europe**, or **China in Asia**—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but **they might** just as plausibly **feel empowered to more assertively press their interests**. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then **“take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.”**⁴⁶ Scanning the global horizon today, **one can easily see where such trouble might arise**. In Europe, **a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region**. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the **threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race**, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, **a rising China is challenging the regional status quo** in numerous ways, **sounding alarms among its neighbors**—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, **removing the American pacifier would likely yield not low-cost stability, but increased conflict and upheaval**. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, **would be quite damaging to U.S. interests** even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. **It is hard to imagine**, for instance, **that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational threats from pandemics to piracy**. **More problematic still might be the economic consequences**. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous **progress toward global prosperity and integration** that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) **has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the United States**.⁴⁷ **One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy**. Perhaps the greatest risk that a strategy of offshore balancing would run, of course, **is that a key region might not be able to maintain its own balance following U.S. retrenchment**. That prospect might have seemed far-fetched in the early post-Cold War era, and it remains unlikely in the immediate future. But **in East Asia particularly, the rise and growing assertiveness of China has highlighted the medium- to long-term danger that a hostile power could in fact gain regional primacy**. If China’s economy continues to grow rapidly, and if Beijing continues to increase military spending by 10 percent or more each year, **then its neighbors will ultimately face grave challenges in containing Chinese power even if they join forces in that endeavor**. This possibility, ironically, is one to which leading advocates of retrenchment have been attuned. “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China,” Mearsheimer writes, “because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.”⁴⁸ If this is true, however, then **offshore balancing becomes a dangerous and potentially self-defeating strategy**. As mentioned above, it **could lead countries like Japan and South Korea to seek nuclear weapons**, thereby **stoking arms races and elevating regional tensions**. Alternatively, and perhaps more worryingly, **it might encourage the scenario that offshore balancers seek to avoid, by easing China’s ascent to regional hegemony**. As Robert Gilpin has written, **“Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power, and thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals.”**⁴⁹ In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely **because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own**. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or

bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.⁵⁰ In the same vein, retrenchment would compromise alliance relationships, basing agreements, and other assets that might help Washington check Chinese power in the first place—and that would allow the United States to surge additional forces into theater in a crisis. In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will be unable to counter China themselves, then reducing U.S. influence and leverage in the region is a curious policy. Offshore balancing might promise to preserve a stable and advantageous environment while reducing U.S. burdens. But upon closer analysis, the probable outcomes of the strategy seem more perilous and destabilizing than its proponents acknowledge.

Unipolarity is sustainable and creates a structural disincentive for great power **The world is more peaceful than ever – hegemony collapse guarantees nuclear annihilation**

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It is worth first examining the larger picture: **We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence.** That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because **if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire."** We'll be engaging in the same sort of **system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order** since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended.** Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation.** But the world did not keep sliding down that **path of perpetual war.** Instead, **America** stepped up and **changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace.** We introduced the **international liberal trade order known as globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its shaggy pread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. **As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars.** That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, **these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war.** We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both

encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

1AC—I/L—Education

Higher wages increases student performance, Evans 19

David Evans, 5-3-2019, "Does Raising Teacher Salaries Improve Performance?," Pacific Standard, <https://psmag.com/education/what-do-teacher-salaries-do-to-teacher-performance>

RAISING SALARIES ATTRACTS AND KEEPS GOOD TEACHERS In Texas, increasing teacher pay reduced turnover, which in turn increased student performance. Likewise, national studies from the United States and the United Kingdom also find that students do better when teachers have relatively better wages. Studies from Latin America have looked specifically at the pull factor of higher wages for civil servants—of which teachers are a subset. In Brazil, higher wages for civil servants drew more educated candidates into the service. In Mexico, higher salaries for civil servants attracted more candidates who were more conscientious and who had higher IQs. But higher salaries also attract less qualified candidates. In education, one challenge is selecting those candidates who will go on to be great teachers, which brings us to the topic of higher standards for teachers. REFORMS BEYOND JUST SALARY INCREASES ARE NEEDED What countries that have made large gains in learning have shown is that combining salary increases with other critical reforms is the way to success. Setting higher standards to enter the teaching profession is a way to both pay teachers what they're worth while making sure the very best candidates are teaching. Finland and Singapore, two countries known for high performance on international tests, have highly competitive entry into the teaching profession. In both countries, a small fraction of applicants to teacher training schools are accepted, allowing teacher training schools to only accept those applicants with excellent academic credentials. By contrast, a recent study of teacher preparation graduate programs in the U.S. found that fewer than half required a 3.0 grade point average. Ecuador provides a clear example of how increasing teacher selectivity can lead to gains. Ecuador doubled teachers' starting salaries in 2009. At around the same time, it introduced a national hiring exam and teacher evaluation systems, and it made getting into teacher training colleges and subsequently getting a job as a teacher more selective. The country also instituted incentives for high performing teachers. Ecuador went on to register the highest student literacy gains of any country in Latin America on regional tests conducted between 2006 and 2013. In other countries, the key reforms may be different. Brazil registered large learning gains in the first decade of this century after a series of reforms in the 1990s. These reforms increased teacher salaries while also increasing the educational requirements to become a teacher, expanding in-service support for teachers, ensuring more financing for rural schools, and, later, introducing better measurement and publicity around student learning results. Kenya recently saw student learning rise with a nationwide program that included detailed teachers' guides, professional development, and coaching for teachers. THE OPTIMAL EDUCATION SYSTEM In a recent study, the World Bank highlighted how many education systems seem to be stuck in a low-learning trap, where teachers and schools lack both the support and the motivation to give students what they need. Low teacher salaries, together with inadequate support for teachers and little selectivity in teacher preparation, can keep U.S. schools far below their potential. But increased pay is not enough. As experiences from around the world show, higher pay must be accompanied by an array of other reforms—ranging from increased selectivity into the field to more mentoring and coaching to help teachers already in the field give their best to our students.

Educational innovation solves extinction.

Peter **Serdyukov 17**. National University, La Jolla, California. 03/27/2017. "Innovation in Education: What Works, What Doesn't, and What to Do about It?" Journal of Research in Innovative Teaching & Learning, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 4–33.

Introduction Education, being a social institution serving the needs of society, is indispensable for society to survive and thrive. It should be not only comprehensive, sustainable, and superb, but must continuously evolve to meet the challenges of the fast-changing and unpredictable globalized world. This evolution must be systemic, consistent, and scalable; therefore, school teachers, college professors, administrators, researchers, and policy makers are expected to innovate the theory and practice of teaching and learning, as well as all other aspects of this complex organization to ensure quality preparation of all students to life and work. Here we present a systemic discussion of educational innovations, identify the barriers to innovation, and outline potential directions for effective innovations. We discuss the current status of innovations in US education, what educational innovation is, how innovations are being integrated in schools and colleges, why innovations do not always produce the desired effect, and what should be done to increase the scale and rate of innovation-based transformations in our education system. We then offer recommendations for the growth of educational innovations. As examples of innovations in education, we will highlight online learning and time efficiency of learning using

accelerated and intensive approaches. Innovations in US education **For** an individual, a nation, and **humankind to survive and progress, innovation and evolution are essential**. Innovations in **education** are of **particular importance** because **education plays a crucial role in creating a sustainable future**. “Innovation resembles mutation, the biological process that **keeps species evolving so they can better compete for survival**” (Hoffman and Holzhter, 2012, p. 3). **Innovation, therefore, is to be regarded as an instrument of necessary and positive change. Any human activity (e.g. industrial, business, or educational) needs constant innovation to remain sustainable. The need for educational innovations has become acute**. “It is widely believed that countries’ **social and economic well-being will depend** to an ever greater extent **on** the quality of their citizens’ **education**: the emergence of the so-called ‘knowledge society’, the transformation of information and the media, and increasing specialization on the part of organizations all call for high skill profiles and levels of knowledge. Today’s education systems are required to be **both effective and efficient**, or in other words, to reach the goals set for them while making the best use of available **resources**” (Cornali, 2012, p. 255). According to an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, “**the pressure to increase equity and improve educational outcomes for students is growing around the world**” (Vieluf et al., 2012, p. 3). **In the USA, underlying pressure to innovate comes from political, economic, demographic, and technological forces from both inside and outside the nation. Many in the USA seem to recognize that education at all levels critically needs renewal**: “Higher education has to change. It needs more innovation” (Wildavsky et al., 2012, p. 1). This message, however, is not new – in the foreword to the 1964 book entitled Innovation in Education, Arthur Foshay, Executive Officer of The Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute of School Experimentation, wrote, “It has become platitudinous to speak of the winds of change in education, to remind those interested in the educational enterprise that a revolution is in progress. Trite or not, however, it is true to say that changes appear wherever one turns in education” (