# 1nc vs kant

## 1AC – Framing

### Generic

#### The standard is minimizing suffering

#### 1. Government must be practical and cannot concern itself with metaphysical questions – its only role is to protect citizens’ interests

Rhonheimer 05 [(Martin, Prof Of Philosophy at The Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome). “THE POLITICAL ETHOS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PLACE OF NATURAL LAW IN PUBLIC REASON: RAWLS’S “POLITICAL LIBERALISM” REVISITED” The American Journal of Jurisprudence vol. 50 (2005), pp. 1-70]

It is a fundamental feature of political philosophy to be part of practical philosophy. Political philosophy belongs to ethics, which is practical, for it both reflects on practical knowledge and aims at action. Therefore, it is not only normative, but must consider the concrete conditions of realization. The rationale of political institutions and action must be understood as embedded in concrete cultural and, therefore, historical contexts and as meeting with problems that only in these contexts are understandable. A normative political philosophy which would abstract from the conditions of realizability would be trying to establish norms for realizing the “idea of the good” or of “the just” (as Plato, in fact, tried to do in his Republic). Such a purely metaphysical view, however, is doomed to failure. As a theory of political praxis, political philosophy must include in its reflection the concrete historical context, historical experiences and the corresponding knowledge of the proper logic of the political. 14 Briefly: political philosophy is not metaphysics, which contemplates the necessary order of being, but practical philosophy, which deals with partly contingent matters and aims at action. Moreover, unlike moral norms in general—natural law included,—which rule the actions of a person—“my acting” and pursuing the good—, the logic of the political is characterized by acts like framing institutions and establishing legal rules by which not only personal actions but the actions of a multitude of persons are regulated by the coercive force of state power, and by which a part of citizens exercises power over others. Political actions are, thus, both actions of the whole of the body politic and referring to the whole of the community of citizens. 15 Unless we wish to espouse a platonic view according to which some persons are by nature rulers while others are by nature subjects, we will stick to the Aristotelian differentiation between the “domestic” and the “political” kind of rule 16 : unlike domestic rule, which is over people with a common interest and harmoniously striving after the same good [despotism] and, therefore, according to Aristotle is essentially “despotic,” political rule is exercised over free persons who represent a plurality of interests and pursue, in the common context of the polis, different goods. The exercise of such political rule, therefore, needs justification and is continuously in search of consent among those who are ruled, but who potentially at the same time are also the rulers.

#### 2 impacts

#### i. Government actions inevitably lead to trade-offs between citizens since they benefit some and harm others; the only justifiable way to resolve these conflicts is by benefitting the maximum possible number of people since anything else would unequally prioritize one group over another. This also proves side constraint theories are useless for states since they’ll inevitably violate some constraint. Even if util fails, non-consequentialist moral theories prevent any action which is worse than not being able to use util

#### ii. People psychologically prefer util – governments are obligated to use it since it’s more justifiable for citizens

Gino et al 2008 [Francesca Gino Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Don Moore Tepper Business School, Carnegie Mellon University, Max H. Bozman Harvard Business School, Harvard University “No harm, no foul: The outcome bias in ethical judgments” http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-080.pdf] AT

The present studies provide strong evidence of the existence of outcome effects in ethically-relevant contexts, when people are asked to judge the ethicality of others’ behavior. It is worth noting that what we show is not the same as the curse of knowledge or the hindsight bias. The curse of knowledge describes people’s inability to recover an uninformed state of mind (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989). Likewise, the hindsight bias leads people to misremember what they believed before they knew an event’s outcome (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). By contrast, we show that that outcomes of decisions lead people to see the decisions themselves in a different light, and that this effect does not depend on misremembering their prior state of mind. In other words, people will see it as entirely appropriate to allow a decision’s outcome to determine their assessment of the decision’s quality.

#### Impacts:

#### This answers standard indicts since it proves util is not counter-intuitive or hard to calculate since most people already believe in it.

#### Turns autonomy negs since util best achieves the interests of people – even if people say they prefer something else, util achieves the aim that they try to serve with their decisions

#### 2. Experience is the only sound justification for ethics

Schwartz - “A Defense of Naïve Empiricism: It is Neither Self-Refuting Nor Dogmatic.” Stephen P. Schwartz. Ithaca College. pp.1-14. No date Cited”

The empirical support for the fundamental principle of empiricism is diffuse but salient. Our common empirical experience and experimental psychology offer evidence that humans do not have any capacity to garner knowledge except by empirical sources. The fact is that we believe that there is no source of knowledge, information, or evidence apart from observation, empirical scientific investigations, and our sensory experience of the world, and we believe this on the basis of our empirical a posteriori experiences and our general empirical view of how things work. For example, we believe on empirical evidence that humans are continuous with the rest of nature and that we rely like other animals on our senses to tell us how things are. If humans are more successful than other animals, it is not because we possess special non-experiential ways of knowing, but because we are better at cooperating, collating, and inferring. In particular we do not have any capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. There is no known mechanism by which such knowledge would be made possible.

#### Everyone takes pain as a reason to avoid an action

#### 1. Government policy is constrained by limitations on resources. Any government decision must account for tradeoffs, which only utilitarian ethics can quantify.

#### 2. Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

#### 3. Moreover, all other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat them as instrumentally valuable.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27

#### 4. Extinction comes first!

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### The standard is maximizing expected net well-being.

#### 2 impacts

#### A) Absolute truth is unnecessary. Your starting credence in intuitions is high enough to disprove foundational theories that contradict those intuitions since the chance at least one premise of a foundational theory is incorrect is higher than the chance your most fundamental beliefs are flawed.

#### 5. No act omission distinction for states since their implicit approvals of actions still entail moral responsibility

Sunstein [Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. The University of Chicago Law School. “Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs.” JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 239. The Chicago Working Paper Series. March 2005] AJ

In our view, both the argument from causation and the argument from intention go wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. Whatever the general status of the act-omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,38 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government.39 The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything, or refusing to act.40 Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action—for example, private killing—becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action, but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it.

## 1

#### Russian federalism is on the brink. Overreaches of federal authority threaten to undermine the entire structure – clashes over federalism are coming now

Krasheninnikov 14 [(Fyodor, author for Moscow times) “Russia Can't Ignore Federalism Forever” Moscow Times Sep 01, 2014] AT

The recent torrent of perverse Kremlin propaganda has tarnished the worthy concept of federalism. First, the Russian government turned it into "federalization" and began persecuting a neighboring country with it. They began calling the pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine "armed supporters of federalization," turning what had been an absurd political vaudeville act into a full-scale bloody drama, simultaneously eclipsing the growing domestic debate over federalism as it applies to Russia. In fact, federalism is a burning issue in Russia, however much national leaders and their loyal local elites pretend that the problem does not exist. Vast areas of Russia are poorly governed: The Kremlin often haphazardly appoints local officials based solely on their absolute loyalty to the federal center and their willingness to sacrifice local interests at the first sign from the top. In most cases, the power vertical extends all the way down to the municipal level, with the result that, whenever the occasion demands, even the interests of major cities are also easily sacrificed to the Kremlin's short-term interests. Unfortunately, Russia's current model of political authority precludes the existence of any local interests, rights or meaningful local government whenever the federal center feels its interests are at risk. The Kremlin makes exceptions for several national regions like Chechnya, but that only exacerbates the problem. In turns out that the authorities grant special rights and preferences not for good behavior but for bad, thereby dangerously undermining the entire state structure. There is no forum in Russia for discussing federalism, nobody to discuss it with, and very real danger for anyone who tries. In fact, the people who should have a vital interest in federalism make every effort to avoid the topic because they know the authorities will respond quickly and cruelly if they make any attempt to discuss an expansion of their rights. The collective silence of local elites does not signify their solidarity with the Kremlin as is commonly believed. It is simply a sign of the universal fear that prompts people to sacrifice even their most pressing interests for the sake of career, wealth and personal freedom. But Russia is too large and has too many problems for this situation to last forever. This country will inevitably have to engage in a serious discussion of federalism at some point.

#### Conditions for breakthroughs in regional diversity are in place – the counterplan’s use of unified regional action independent of central government policy allows an effective system of Russian federalism to emerge, whereas the plan would crush federalism

Makarychev 9 [(Andrey Makarychev, Nizhny Novgorod Civil Service Academy) “New Challenges to Russian Federalism” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 75] AT

President Medvedev has to manage increasing levels of regional diversity, fragmentation, and asymmetry in Russia, manifested in spheres of identity, economics, and security. It is quite feasible that, under certain circumstances, claims for greater autonomy and diversification will be formulated in ways that more directly challenge the existing balance of power between federal and regional governments. In times of crisis, regional publics will likely increase pressure on the federal center, demanding more managerial efficiency and economic justice. Even so-called donor regions – the wealthiest of the regions - have started to tacitly complain about their deteriorating financial conditions. The Kremlin does not oppose the recognition of a variety of regional identities and interests. For instance, the three most recent Russia–EU summits were held outside of Moscow: in Samara, which could have been interpreted as a confirmation of this region’s importance in terms of promoting its European credentials; Khanty-Mansiisk, a city representative of Russia’s vast energy resources and one of the country’s strongest bargaining cards in its relations with Europe; and Khabarovsk, an overt allusion to Russia’s potential to position itself within the Asia-Pacific and Far Eastern context. In some cases, Moscow even seems to be favorably disposed to the geo-cultural ambitions of certain regions. Ekaterinburg, a city promoting itself as Russia’s “Eurasian capital,” hosted both the BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits. Moscow is equally supportive of regional participation in Finno-Ugrian networking projects (linking some Russian regions to Finland and Hungary) as a possible pathway for Russian integration with Europe. As Medvedev puts his own stamp on regional policy, it is difficult to say whether a more decentralized type of federalism will emerge. He has disavowed the importance of merging smaller regions into wider federal units, a strategy that was a meaningful element of Putin’s concept of effective federalism. He has also questioned the practicality of transferring certain administrative functions from Moscow to other large cities, an idea that has been bandied about for more than a decade. In the nearest future, it is conceivable that the Kremlin will have to rely upon the regions with the strongest potential, basically measured in terms of managerial efficiency, and thus look for the best practices and models of regional governance. This could mean sending a message to regions, compelling them to acknowledge that the Kremlin is not the only source of development assistance in Russia and that strong local leadership is necessary for the country’s modernization. It is clear that Medvedev wishes to keep open as many administrative channels as possible in order to influence the appointment of new chief executives in the regions. These include the party mechanisms of United Russia, the ruling party; the so-called “presidential reserve” of reliable regional managers; and political nominations based upon informal bargaining rather than administrative procedures. What is less certain is how the inevitable regional diversification of the country can be reconciled with the still unified style of governance practiced by the “party of power” in the Kremlin. As for the regions themselves, the key problem is that most of them are investing heavily in forging singular identities at the expense of promoting collective regional action and coalition-building. The resulting disjointed regionalism is as vulnerable to the assertion of central hegemony as it was a decade ago. Only regional collective action could truly challenge the re-centralization policies of the Kremlin, yet this perspective remains as remote as it was when Russian federalism made its first steps almost twenty years ago.

#### Excessive reliance on central authority undermines Russian federalism, and political culture is becoming tolerant of local authority, which the plan would crush. Only the counterplan reclaims the federal model.

Kempton 1 [(Daniel, associate professor and chair at the Department of Political Science at Northern Illiois University) “Russian federalism: Continuing myth or political salvation”] AT

Leonid Smyrnygin, Yeltsin's former regional specialist, complained that Russia's centralization "engenders many disappointing defects in the political culture of the Russian people, such as the habit of seeing `real authority' only in the leadership of Moscow, making it responsible for everything, and resigning oneself to the tyranny of local authorities."85 Similarly, as Midkhat Farukshine argues, the aspects of Russian culture that work against federalism include not only a limited democratic tradition, but "a centuries old tradition of rigid bureaucratic centralized decision making"86 Yet there is evidence that Russian political culture is becoming more tolerant of multiple loyalties. A recent study of Russian center-periphery relations found that in all six of the subekty analyzed there was significant support for greater local control over economic resources and policy.87 Yet in five of the six subekty-Chechnya was the obvious exception- there was no tangible support for a break with the Russian Federation. In short, although people are generally disillusioned with government in general, the people of the Russian Federation appear to be developing an attachment to local government and its importance without abandoning their commitment lo the Russian state. Even in Sakha and Tatarstan, both of which are led by non-Russian presidenta, any support for independence that once existed has waned. If nothing else, citizens of the Russian Federation now particípate ¡in electing both subekt and national officials and expect returns from both levels of government. This dual identity is still developing in Russia, but it may engender support for federalism in the long term.

#### Russian federalism key to Russian stability

Kempton 1 [(Daniel, associate professor and chair at the Department of Political Science at Northern Illiois University) “Russian federalism: Continuing myth or political salvation”] AT

Russia's choice of federalism was not unusual. A century ago, federalism was seen as a weak and inherently temporary form of government. English constitutional authorities such as Lord Bryce characterized federalism as "no more than a transitory step on the way to constitutional-governmental unity." 1 In the 1930s, Laski saw federalism as a pragmatic but temporary way for Britain and other colonial authorities to shift power to more local authorities within their empires. Friedrich believed the process more frequently moved in the opposite direction, but portrayed federalism in a similar fashion. Federalism arose when a group of previously autonomous states, typically driven by the defense imperative, formed a single central government. All three saw federalism as a transitory step rather than as an end goal. 2 Today, however, federalism is considered the hallmark of a stable, diverse state. It is a feature of many modern democracies including Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. It has been adopted to manage ethnic and religious tension in Canada, Belgium, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Spain, and South Africa. Federalism has become fashionable because of its perceived benefits. It can accommodate diverse minority groups within a single state. Federalism provides religious, ethnic, and cultural minority groups with a safe political base

## 2

#### Policies must account for their tradeoffs with non-human animals.

**Katz and Oechsli 93** (Eric, Vice President of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Lauren, Biology at Columbia, *Environmental Ethics*, vol 15 no 1, 1993 “Moving beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon”)

Can an environmentalist defend a policy of preservation in the Amazon rain forest without violating a basic sense of justice? We believe that the mistake is not the policy of preservation itself, but the anthropocentric instrumental framework in which it is justified. Environmental policy decisions should not merely concern the trade-off and comparison of various human benefits. If environmentalists claim that the Third World must preserve its environment because of the overall benefits for humanity, then decision makers in the Third World can demand justice in the determination of preservation policy: preservationist policies unfairly damage the human interests of the local populations. If preservationist policies are to be justified without a loss of equity, there are only two possible alternatives: either we in the industrialized world must pay for the benefits we will gain from preservation or we must reject the anthropocentric and instrumental framework for policy decisions. The first alternative is an empirical political issue, and one about which we are not overly optimistic. The second alternative represents a shift in philosophical world view.¶ We are not providing a direct argument for a nonanthropocentric value system as the basis of environmental policy. Rather, our strategy is indirect. Let us assume that a theory of normative ethics which includes nonhuman natural value has been justified. In such a situation, the human community, in addition to its traditional human-centered obligations, would also have moral obligations to nature or to the natural environment in itself. One of these obligations would involve the urgent necessity for environmental preservation. We would be obligated, for example, to the Amazon rain forest directly. We would preserve the rain forest, not for the human benefits resulting from this preservation, but because we have an obligation of preservation to nature and its ecosystems. Our duties would be directed to nature and its inhabitants and environments, not merely to humans and human institutions.¶ From *this* perspective, questions of the trade-off and comparison of human benefits, and questions of justice for specific human populations, do not dominate the discussion. This change of emphasis can be illustrated by an exclusively human example. Consider two businessmen, Smith and Jones, who are arguing over the proper distribution of the benefits and costs resulting from a prior business agreement between them. If we just focus on Smith and Jones and the issues concerning them, we will want to look at the contract, the relevant legal precedents, and the actual results of the deal, before rendering a decision. But suppose we learn that the agreement involved the planned murder of a third party, Green, and the resulting distribution of his property. At that point the issues between Smith and Jones cease to be relevant; we no longer consider who has claims to Green’s wallet, overcoat, or BMW to be important. The competing claims become insignificant in light of the obligations owed to Green. This case is analogous to our view of the moral obligations owed to the rain forest. As soon as we realize that the rain forest itself is relevant to the conflict of competing¶ goods, we see that there is not a simple dilemma between Third World develop- ment, on the one hand, and preservation of rain forests, on the other; there is now, in addition, the moral obligation to nature and its ecosystems.¶ When the nonanthropocentric framework is introduced, it creates a more complex situation for deliberation and resolution. It complicates the already detailed discussions of human trade-offs, high-tech transfers, aid programs, debt- for-nature swaps, sustainable development, etc., with a consideration of the moral obligations to nonhuman nature. This complication may appear counterproduc- tive, but as in the case of Smith, Jones, and Green, it actually serves to simplify the decision. Just as a concern for Green made the contract dispute between Smith and Jones irrelevant, the obligation *to the rain forest* makes many of the issues about trade-offs of human goods irrelevant.12 It is, of course, unfortunate that this direct obligation to the rain forest can only be met with a cost in human satisfaction—some human interests will not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the same can be said of all ethical decisions, or so Kant teaches us: we are only assuredly moral when we act against our inclinations.¶ To summarize, the historical forces of economic imperialism have created a harsh dilemma for environmentalists who consider nature preservation in the Third World to be necessary. Nevertheless, environmentalists can escape the dilemma, as exemplified in the debate over the development of the Amazon rain forest, if they reject the axiological and normative framework of anthropocentric instrumental rationality. A set of obligations directed to nature in its own right makes many questions of human benefits and satisfactions irrelevant. The Amazon rain forest ought to be preserved regardless of the benefits or costs to human beings. Once we move beyond the confines of human-based instrumental goods, the environmentalist position is thereby justified, and no policy dilemma is created. This conclusion serves as an indirect justification of a nonanthropocen- tric system of normative ethics, avoiding problems in environmental policy that a human-based ethic cannot.13¶ VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS¶ Policy makers and philosophers in the Third World may not be pleased with our conclusions here. Indeed, Ramachandra Guha has recently criticized the focus on biocentrism (i.e., nonanthropocentrism) and wilderness preservation that per-¶ vades Western environmentalism. These Western concerns are at best, irrelevant to, and at worst, destructive of Third World societies. According to Guha, any justifiable environmental movement must include solutions to problems of equity, “economic and political redistribution.”14 We agree. Thus, as a final note, let us return from the abstract atmospheres of axiological theory and normative frameworks to the harsh realities of life in the non-industrialized world. If our argument is sound, then any destructive development of the natural environment in the Third World is a moral wrong, and a policy of environmental preservation is a moral requirement. Recognition of this moral obligation to preserve the natural environment should be the starting point for any serious discussion of developmental policy.¶

#### **The anthropocentricism of Western ethics is rooted in Kantian dualism.**

Wu 14 [(Wu, Su-chen, Assistant Professor, Foreign Languages and Cultures Department, Fo Guang University) "Anthropocentric Obsession: The Perfuming Effects of vāsanā (Habit-energy) in ālayavijñāna in the Lan˙ kāvatāra Sūtra." Contemporary Buddhism 15.2 (2014): 416-431.] TDI

Anthropocentrism is present in the epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics of Western society. It describes the tendency for human beings to regard themselves as the central and most significant entities in the universe. Thus, human beings interpret anthropocentrism as the assessment of reality through an exclusively human perspective. The worldview of Western anthropocentrism features dualism. A dualistic worldview is a perspective that looks at spirit and material, mind and body, human and nature as two separate entities. A dualistic worldview also leads to the emergence of discrimination. The reason lies in its predisposing the very way human beings think about themselves and the nonhuman world toward hierarchy and domination. In this sense, the issue of anthropocentrism may be more about ethics than epistemology, since dualism would get involved with the category of value. In the literature of environmental ethics, the distinction between instrumental value and intrinsic value has been of considerable importance. The instrumental value is the value of a thing as a means to further some other end, whereas intrinsic value, is an end in itself regardless of whether it is also useful as means to other ends. Many traditional Western ethical perspectives are anthropocentric or human-centred in that they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone. Implicit in the notion of instrumental value is the inherent tendency toward the domination of nature (Leiss 1994, 58 –59). Some Western philosophical thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant and Bertrand Russell, illustrate how human beings with anthropocentric viewpoints hold that human needs and interests are of the highest value and importance. Immanuel Kant, in his essay ‘Rational Beings Alone Have Moral Worth’, argued that ‘our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity’ (Kant 2012, 61). From Kant’s perspective, we have no duties to nonhumans, only duties to other humans. In Kant’s views, nonhumans are only valuable because they could be used to achieve goals set by the values. They are means to an end but not an end in themselves. Bertrand Russell also wrote: ‘I am unable to believe that, in the world as known, there is anything that I can value outside human beings, and, to a much lesser extent, animals’ (qtd. in Paul Arthur Schilpp 1989, 19 –20). In this sense, nonhumans are regarded as instruments to human interests and values.

#### Viewing humanity as distinct from and in relation to “nature” is inherently violent – concerns about purity and contamination spill into violent discourses of race, sexuality, and immigration that culminate in eugenics.

Carroll 18 [(Myles, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto, Ontario), “Narrating technonatures: discourses of biotechnology in a neoliberal era”, Journal of Political Ecology, Volume 25 Issue 1,2018, https://journals.librarypublishing.arizona.edu/jpe/article/id/2078/

Although they may have been strategically useful for mobilizing public awareness and concern over the surreptitious introduction of GM foods into the food system, nature purity discourses are problematic for two reasons. First, appeals to nature have been used to justify racist, sexist, heterosexist and colonial systems of oppression and domination, whilst underpinning common conservative justifications for material inequality (Sturgeon 2009). Instead of being part of the struggle for a more socially just world, the nature purity side of the anti-GMO campaign acts to further entrench nature-essentialism. Central to feminist, antiracist, queer and postcolonial struggles is the destabilization and problematization of truth claims rooted in nature (Soper 1995). This is because "nature" has been used as a justification for white, male and Western superiority. The ideas that women are "naturally" more emotional, weaker, or less intelligent than men; that colonized peoples are "closer to nature" and therefore less civilized than Westerners; that the sexuality of queer people is inherently "unnatural"; that it is "human nature" to be greedy and selfish; or that "natural selection" is what determines who is rich and who is poor have long been mobilized as justifications for systemic oppression. It is not only transgenic crops that are seen as monstrous, contaminating and polluting. We must ask which forms of human corporeality and self-expression come to be similarly framed and defamed