# 1nc alta rd 6

### 1

#### c/I – neg debaters may exclude certain parts of the aff that solvency advocates

#### only certain parts of lit that you can expect

#### no mooting the aff – they can take the aff back by 1. Doing research 2. Impact turn the net benefit 3. Creative perms

#### heg is a really impact turnable thing

#### advocacy skills – good debate is hard debate – pics force the aff to have a more rigorous defense of the plan – outweighs since advocacy skills is the only unique and portable skill we get from debate

Vote on reasonability – competing interps leads to a race to the top that makes theory too strategic and crowds out substantive debate.

#### CP Text – A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right for non-military workers to strike.

#### Armed forces can’t strike now

LII 6 [Cornell Legal Information Institute, 2006, "10 U.S. Code § 976," Cornell Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/976]/Kankee

(a)In this section: (1)The term “member of the armed forces” means (A) a member of the armed forces who is serving on active duty, (B) a member of the National Guard who is serving on full-time National Guard duty, or (C) a member of a Reserve component while performing inactive-duty training. (2)The term “military labor organization” means any organization that engages in or attempts to engage in— (A)negotiating or bargaining with any civilian officer or employee, or with any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces; (B)representing individual members of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such member in the armed forces; or (C)striking, picketing, marching, demonstrating, or any other similar form of concerted action which is directed against the Government of the United States and which is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (i)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of military service of any member of the armed forces, (ii)recognize any organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with complaints and grievances of such members arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces, or (iii)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of military service of individual members of the armed forces. (3)The term “civilian officer or employee” means an employee, as such term is defined in section 2105 of title 5. (b)It shall be unlawful for a member of the armed forces, knowing of the activities or objectives of a particular military labor organization— (1)to join or maintain membership in such organization; or (2)to attempt to enroll any other member of the armed forces as a member of such organization. (c)It shall be unlawful for any person— (1)to enroll in a military labor organization any member of the armed forces or to solicit or accept dues or fees for such an organization from any member of the armed forces; or (2)to negotiate or bargain, or attempt through any coercive act to negotiate or bargain, with any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of service of such members; (3)to organize or attempt to organize, or participate in, any strike, picketing, march, demonstration, or other similar form of concerted action involving members of the armed forces that is directed against the Government of the United States and that is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (A)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of service of any member of the armed forces, (B)recognize any military labor organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with any complaint or grievance of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces, or (C)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of service in the armed forces of individual members of the armed forces; or (4)to use any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by this subsection or by subsection (b) or (d). (d)It shall be unlawful for any military labor organization to represent, or attempt to represent, any member of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces. (e)No member of the armed forces, and no civilian officer or employee, may— (1)negotiate or bargain on behalf of the United States concerning the terms or conditions of military service of members of the armed forces with any person who represents or purports to represent members of the armed forces, or (2)permit or authorize the use of any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity which is for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by subsection (b), (c), or (d). Nothing in this subsection shall prevent commanders or supervisors from giving consideration to the views of any member of the armed forces presented individually or as a result of participation on command-sponsored or authorized advisory councils, committees, or organizations. (f)Whoever violates subsection (b), (c), or (d) shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000. (g)Nothing in this section shall limit the right of any member of the armed forces— (1)to join or maintain membership in any organization or association not constituting a “military labor organization” as defined in subsection (a)(2) of this section; (2)to present complaints or grievances concerning the terms or conditions of the service of such member in the armed forces in accordance with established military procedures; (3)to seek or receive information or counseling from any source; (4)to be represented by counsel in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations; (5)to petition the Congress for redress of grievances; or (6)to take such other administrative action to seek such administrative or judicial relief, as is authorized by applicable laws and regulations.

Amendments 1997—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 105–85 substituted “shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000.” for “shall, in the case of an individual, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and in the case of an organization or association, be fined not less than $25,000 and not more than $250,000.” 1987—Subsec. (a)(1) to (3). Pub. L. 100–26 inserted “The term” after each par. designation and struck out uppercase letter of first word after first quotation marks in each paragraph and substituted lowercase letter. 1986—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 99–661 struck out the second of two commas before “(B)”. 1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–525 added cl. (B) and redesignated existing cl. (B) as (C). Findings; Purpose Pub. L. 95–610, § 1, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3085, provided that: “(a)The Congress makes the following findings: “(1)Members of the armed forces of the United States must be prepared to fight and, if necessary, to die to protect the welfare, security, and liberty of the United States and of their fellow citizens. “(2)Discipline and prompt obedience to lawful orders of superior officers are essential and time-honored elements of the American military tradition and have been reinforced from the earliest articles of war by laws and regulations prohibiting conduct detrimental to the military chain of command and lawful military authority. “(3)The processes of conventional collective bargaining and labor-management negotiation cannot and should not be applied to the relationships between members of the armed forces and their military and civilian superiors. “(4)Strikes, slowdowns, picketing, and other traditional forms of job action have no place in the armed forces. “(5)Unionization of the armed forces would be incompatible with the military chain of command, would undermine the role, authority, and position of the commander, and would impair the morale and readiness of the armed forces. “(6)The circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of the armed forces to perform their mission are not comparable to the circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of Federal civilian agencies to perform their functions and should be viewed in light of the need for effective performance of duty by each member of the armed forces. “(b)The purpose of this Act [enacting this section] is to promote the readiness of the armed forces to defend the United States.”

#### Military unions wreck civilian military relations and US hegemony

Caforio 18 [Giuseppe Caforio, Brigadier General with degrees in law, political science, and strategic studies (FYI, the author died ~2015, but this was republished in 2018 in an anthology book), 5-20-2018, "Unionisation of the Military: Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2\_19]/Kankee

THE OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES But if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionization issue for the armed forces? Why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel? The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which is summarized thusly by David R. Segal: Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on the firing line is required to make a commitment of a different order from that made by the worker on the assembly line. (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 28). Bernhard Boene, in a study devoted to a different research topic (Boene, 1990), is both precise and efficacious in differentiating military "work" from civilian work. Military specificity, writes Boene, does not lie only in the area of the risks to which one supposes the combatant is exposed, but also in the limits of application of common rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression of social norms that it entails. This implies a particular type of socialization. Notwithstanding partial analogies, according to Boene, civil emergencies belong to a different reality than military ones do. An officer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a "call," consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare, acceptance of risking his life, and submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to the military profession. SOME THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE Discussing a sample survey, David Segal observes that in the United States, in the absence of a union for military personnel, there is a considerable "misfit" between soldiers' perception of the characteristics of their role and the preferred characteristics, while in an analogous sample of civilian manpower this misfit is much smaller. In examining the attempted remedies, Segal states: "Any change to be achieved through organizational interventions, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have" (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 46). According to Segal, unionization can solve this problem, but it presents two dangers that must be carefully weighed: the first is that it tends to extend its influence also to aspects of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it involves a politicisation of the personnel. Gwyn Harries Jenkins examines the consequences that unionisation would have on the operational efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three fundamental ones: 1. The creation of a dual authority structure: Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes: it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, creating a dual authority structure while modifying the traditional basis of compliance. (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 70) 2. A much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of civilian management. The new tasks and the introduction of unionization would require commanders to possess skills and orientations more and more like those of civilian managers. 3. An abdication by the officer of his traditional image. Indeed, if the officer "wishes to retain his self-image and ideas of honor, then the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with substantial dysfunctional consequences" (H.Jenkins, 1977, p. 71). Harries Jenkins concludes, however, by affirming that, as a radical criticism of the existing military system, "the unionization of the armed forces can only result in an improvement to an otherwise defective situation" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 69). According to William Taylor and Roger Arango (Taylor et al., 1977b), many reasons offered in the United States for or against the unionization of military personnel appear to be rhetorical and not sufficiently investigated. Those who take a negative critical stance, for example, contend that unionization would lead to a breakdown in discipline; threaten the chain of command; and, especially, undermine the military's ability to carry out its assigned mission. Through a concrete field analysis, these authors believe they can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Among the advantages are the acquisition of a greater sense of individual security, a valorization of the dignity of individuals, improved social communication, and greater competitiveness with other occupations and professions in recruiting personnel. The real drawbacks would essentially be reduced to two: a risk of divisiveness within units, due to acquired strife between personnel categories; and an increase in personnel costs. Carlo Jean (Jean, 1981) states that in itself, the creation of unions would inevitably produce increased confrontation; without it, the union representatives would have neither prestige nor credibility. He does not believe, however, that the biggest drawback that would derive from it would be that of undermining the internal cohesiveness of the armed forces and their operational capacity. According to this author military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands out of necessity to avoid internal breakup. An unacceptable corporative force would be produced that sooner or later would inevitably oppose it to the political power. The danger that a union of military personnel involves for civil society is, in his opinion, much greater than its negative implications on the efficiency of the military itself. Along the same line is the fear expressed by Sen. Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, cited essay) that unionization might reinforce the military establishment and increase its influence over society at large, decreasing the capacity for political control. This issue had already been treated by Cortright in another essay (Cortright and Thurmond, 1977b), where on the one hand he argued that unionization in the armed forces would help to prevent any form of separateness from civil society while noting on the other that little attention was given to the possibility that unionization substantially strengthens the military's ability to wield influence. Thurmond, again, judges the European experience negatively and asks himself how unionized troops would respond in battle. However, to remain faithful to his position, Thurmond conceives the armed forces as a separate body from civil society, argues that military personnel are not comparable to other labor force categories, and advances the fear that union representation of the interests of military personnel would bring the defence budget to unacceptable levels. Of the countries included in our study, unions for military personnel exist in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Unionization is prohibited in England, the United States, Canada, France, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Strikes are allowed only in Austria and Sweden. ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES THROUGH THE THOUGHT OF VARIOUS AUTHORS

#### Heg solves arms races, land grabs, rogue states, and great power war

Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

## 2

#### **Their legalistic discourse—valorizing legal rights and procedures, derived from technical rationality and utilitarian efficiency—creates an idealized fantasy of order and consensus. It legitimizes domination, ignores hierarchies of workplace domination and subordination, and represses alternative visions of social life, both as it is and might be.**

Gordon 87 - Robert W. Gordon, Professor of Law at Stanford University, 1987 [“Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches To Law,” Florida State University Law Review (15 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 195), Summer, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis] LADI//KK

Now a central tenet of CLS work has been that the ordinary discourses of law—debates over legislation, legal arguments, administrative and court decisions, lawyers' discussions with clients, legal commentary and scholarship, etc.—all contribute to cementing this feeling, at once despairing and complacent, that things must be the way they are and that major changes could only make them worse. Legal discourse accomplishes this in many ways. First by endlessly repeating the claim that law and the other policy sciences have perfected a set of rational techniques and institutions that have come about as close as we are ever likely to get to solving the problem of domination in civil society. Put another way, legal dis-course paints an idealized fantasy of order according to which legal rules and procedures have so structured relations among people that such relations may primarily be understood as instituted by their consent, their free and rational choices. Such coercion as ap-parently remains may be explained as the result of neces-sity—either natural necessities (such as scarcity or the limited human capacity for altruism) or social necessities. For example, in a number of the prevailing discourses, the ordinary hierarchies of workplace domination and subordination are explained: (1) by ref-erence to the contractual agreement of the parties and to their rel-ative preferences for responsibility versus leisure, or risk taking versus security; (2) by the natural distribution of differential tal-ents and skills (Larry Bird earns more as a basketball player be-cause he is better); and (3) by the demands of efficiency in produc-tion, which are said to require extensive hierarchy for the purposes of supervision and monitoring, centralization of investment deci-sions, and so forth. There are always some residues of clearly un-happy conditions—undeserved deprivation, exploitation, suffer-ing—that cannot be explained in any of these ways. The discourses of law are perhaps most resourceful in dealing with these residues, treating them as, on the whole, readily reformable within the pre-vailing political options for adjusting the structures of ordinary practices—one need merely fine tune the scheme of regulation, or deregulation, to correct them. But the prevailing discourse has its cynical and worldly side, and its tragic moments, to offset the gen-eral mood of complacency. In this mood it resignedly acknowledges that beyond the necessary minimum and the reformable residues of coercion and misery there is an irreducible, intractable remain-der—due to inherent limits on our capacity for achieving social knowledge, or for changing society through deliberate intervention, or for taking collective action against evil without suffering the greater evil of despotic power.

These discourses of legal and technical rationality, of rights, con-sent, necessity, efficiency, and tragic limitation, are of course dis-courses of power—not only for the obvious reasons that law's com-mands are backed by force and its operations can inflict enormous pain, but because to have access to these discourses, to be able to use them or pay others to use them on your behalf, is a large part of what it means to possess power. Further, they are discourses that—although often partially constructed, or extracted as conces-sions, through the pressure of relatively less powerful groups strug-gling from below—in habitual practice tend to express the inter-ests and the perspectives of the powerful people who use them. The discourses have some of the power they do because some of their claims sound very plausible, though many do not. The claim, for example, that workers in health-destroying factories voluntarily "choose," in any practical sense of the term, the risks of the work-place in return for a wage premium, is probably not believed by anyone save those few expensively trained out of the capacity to recognize what is going on around them. In addition, both the plausible and implausible claims are backed up in the cases of law and of economics and the policy sciences by a quite formidable-seeming technocratic apparatus of rational justifica-tion—suggesting that the miscellany of social practices we happen to have been born into in this historical moment is much more than a contingent miscellany. It has an order, even if sometimes an invisible one; it makes sense. The array of legal norms, institu-tions, procedures, and doctrines in force, can be rationally derived from the principles of regard for individual autonomy, utilitarian efficiency or wealth creation, the functional needs of social order or economic prosperity, or the moral consensus and historical tradi-tions of the community. There are several general points CLS people have wanted to as-sert against these discourses of power. First, the discourses have helped to structure our ordinary perceptions of reality so as to sys-tematically exclude or repress alternative visions of social life, both as it is and as it might be. One of the aims of CLS methods is to try to dredge up and give content to these suppressed alternative visions. Second, the discourses fail even on their own terms to sus-tain the case for their relentlessly apologetic conclusions. Carefully understood, they could all just as well be invoked to support a politics of social transformation instead.' Generally speaking, the CLS claims under this heading are that the rationalizing criteria appealed to (of autonomy, functional utility, efficiency, history, etc.) are far too indeterminate to justify any conclusions about the inevitability or desirability of particular current practices; such claims, when unpacked, again and again turn out to rest on some illegitimate rhetorical move or dubious intermediate premise or empirical assumption. Further, the categories, abstractions, con-ventional rhetorics, reasoning modes and empirical statements of our ordinary discourses in any case so often misdescribe social ex-perience as not to present any defensible pictures of the practices that they attempt to justify. Not to say of course that there could be such a thing as a single correct way of truthfully rendering so-cial life as people live it, or that CLS writers could claim to have discovered it. But the commonplace legal discourses often produce such seriously distorted representations of social life that their cat-egories regularly filter out complexity, variety, irrationality, unpre-dictability, disorder, cruelty, coercion, violence, suffering, solidarity and self-sacrifice.

#### The aff’s portrayal of civil rights as the light at the end of the tunnel for progressive movements obscures the reality of these movements simply being co-opted into legal frameworks that regress progress. \*reunderline

Horwitz et al 17 [Morton J. Horwitz is Charles Warren Professor at Harvard Law School, where he teaches Torts and American Legal History. Abram Chayes, William Fisher, Morton Horwitz, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Charles Nesson, Todd Rakoff Critical Perspectives on Rights. The Bridge. 7/2/17 <https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/rights.htm>] LADI 7/29/17

Losing a case based on a claim of rights may in some cases lead the public to think that the claims have no merit and need not be given weight in policy debates.

Robert Gordon similarly argues that even noted legal victories for blacks, for labor, for the poor, and for women did not succeed in fundamentally altering the social power structure. "The labor movement secured the vitally important legal right to organize and strike, at the cost of fitting into a framework of legal regulation that certified the legitimacy of managements making most of the important decisions about the conditions of work." Robert Gordon, "Some Critical Theories of law and Their Critics," in The Politics of Law 647 (David Kairys ed., third edition, Basic Books: New York, 1998). Moreover, rights are double-edged, as demonstrated in the content of civil rights. "Floor entitlements can be turned into ceilings (you’ve got your rights, but that’s all you’ll get). Formal rights without practical enforceable content are easily substituted for real benefits. Anyway, the powerful can always assert counter-rights (to vested property, to differential treatment according to "merit," to association with one’s own kind) to the rights of the disadvantaged. "Rights" conflict and the conflict cannot be resolved by appeal to rights." Id., at 657-68.

The content of contemporary American rights in particular must be understood as failing to advance progressive causes. Current constitutional doctrine, for example, heavily favors so-called negative liberties (entitlements to be free of government interference) over positive liberties (entitlements to government protection or aid) and thus reinforces the pernicious "public/private" distinction. That distinction implies that neither government nor society as a whole are responsible for providing persons with the resources they need to exercise their liberties, and indeed, any governmental action risks violating private liberties. Current freedom of speech doctrine accords protection to commercial speech and pornography, limits governmental regulation of private contributions to political campaigns, and forbids sanctions for hate speech. Such rules operate in the often-stirring language of individual freedom, but their effect is more likely to be regressive than progressive.

#### This legitimizes structures of injustice, racism, and dehumanization and turns case.

West 11 [West, Robin L, Georgetown University Law Center "Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama." Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 53 (2011): 713.]

Rights harm us, according to the Bill of Particulars put forward by the rights critics of the 1980s, in three distinct ways. First, even apparently liberating rights thatseemingly expand the sphere of individual liberty also subordinate,at least according to the first and perhaps the most important of the rights critics' charges. Rightsto privacy protect not only private decision making against the prying and moralistic eye of the state but also, even if inadvertently or indirectly, private subordination of vulnerable family members.' Rights to liberty of contract protect private choices of individuals but also the economic subordination of laborers by employers," and rights to speech protect ideas but also, arguably, pornography and private verbal, racial, or sexual harassment.' Whatever else rights do, Horwitz, Tushnet, MacKinnon, and other critics argued, rights that protect spheres of privacy, liberty, or autonomy against state intervention also, and by virtue of that protection, facilitate the subordination of the weak by the strong**,** within whatever spheres of insularity, entitlement, and nonintervention from the government the particular right in question creates. Thus, the first charge: rights subordinate. Second, by protecting against particularized but well-defined sorts of unfair relations in the private realm, even those rights that do operate to specify limits on a generalized liberty in the interest of equality—such as limits on our liberty to intentionally discrimi-nate—also run the risk of legitimizing the larger unjust social world within which those particularized moments of injustice are framed. The censure of the intentional discriminator, and our right to be free of him, for example, legitimates not only structural or unintentional racism but also an unjust classism. Our condemnation of the errors in an error-ridden meritocracy legitimates the unjust stinginess of the ways we construct merit and blame, and even a purified and idealized meritocracy legitimates our nonresponsiveness to human need.' Miranda rights, critics argued, and more largely procedural protections in the criminal justice system, legitimate not only on-going interrogation abuses that they only partially address but an overly punitive and blatantly racist system of excessive incarcera-tion as well." The targeting of gender-based "stereotypes" so as to free the nonconforming woman legitimate the belittling and cramped opportunities that attach to voluntarily assumed tradi-tional gender roles." Attempts to secure rights to a "minimum wage" render all the more difficult attempts to ensure a livable family wage—and so on.' Rights harm, then, not only because of the subordination they protect and valorize but also because they distract our critical gaze, thereby legitimating larger injustices. In brief, rights legitimate.' Lastly, critics argued, rights alienate, even those rights that seemingly empower the weakest of us in a hostile world. They alien-ate us from the dreaded other from whom they claim to protect us," from our communities,' and from a recognition of even the possibil-ity of unmediated human connection.' Rights do have a function: they facilitate essential trade between withdrawn selves, as elu-cidated by Peter Gabel's artful description of us as deeply and paranoically fearful of others, the state, and human community." But by so doing, rights intensify the very withdrawal from human life to which they then offer their poison pill as a necessary reme-diation. In short: rights alienate.

#### The alternative is a non-essential legal pluralism. Only a rejection of the aff’s fixed notions can liberate law from its self-referential ordering, allowing us to better analyze, describe, and utilize law’s sociology to line up with empirical realities.

Walby ‘7 (Kevin Walby, Associate Professor and Chancellor’s Research Chair in the Department of Criminal Justice at University of Winnipeg, “Contributions to a Post-Sovereigntist Understanding of Law: Foucault, Law as Governance, and Legal Pluralism,” SOIAL & LEGAL STUDIES SAGE Publications, Vol. 16(4), 551–571, 12/1/7, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0964663907082735?legid=spsls%3B16%2F4%2F551&patientinform-links=yes>) LADI//DS

A number of conclusions useful for informing a post-sovereigntist understanding of law can be drawn from the foregoing analysis. Law must always be seen as a process, or else analyses of law become self-referential. Typologies should retain the speciﬁcity of legal and normative ordering yet acknowledge interpenetrating tendencies. The ﬁction of law as a uniﬁed phenomenon subsidiary to the liberal democratic state does not correspond with empirical reality. Knowledge in legal and normative ordering and the spilling of legal ordering into normative ordering must be a primary variable in future analyses. Social scientists ought to look for a plurality of legal and normative ordering strategies across social practices and not simply in, as Tamanaha (2000: 315) puts it, ‘self-regulated semi-autonomous social ﬁelds’. Focus on technologies and techniques of governance provides a methodological sensitizing device useful for social scientiﬁc inquiry. Finally, while continuing to recognize that actors are active participants in all forms of ordering, examining the ‘plurality of resistances’ that are the counter-stroke of plural legal and normative ordering strategies should take priority in our academic practice. If, as Tamanaha hints, NELP is the only viable version of legal pluralism, the foregoing analysis has implications for the future of legal pluralism as an approach capable of standing on its own. Twining (2003) and Cotterrell (1995) suggest we drop the language of legal pluralism. Little is gained, however, by announcing the death of legal pluralism, and the results of my critique are not that devastating. As I have argued, NELP offers some insight if placed within the broader set of questions Foucault raised about power and government. The typology of law resulting from the reading of the LAG approach with NELP does not lose sight of the speciﬁcity of legal and normative modes of social ordering while acknowledging their interrelatedness. Concentrating on what the law is doing, as process, as verb, instead of as a ﬁxed set of rules, as constitutionalism, as noun, is the progressive backdrop for a new paradigm of sociologically-informed thought about the carrying out of law in the everyday.

## 3

#### Tech can solve infrastructure concerns but needs to be integrated – operators are key.

Jacobs 5/31 [Lionel; Senior Security Architect in the Palo Alto Networks ICS and SCADA solutions team. Coming from the asset-owner side , Lionel has spent more than 20 years working in the IT/OT environment, with a focus on ICS systems design, controls, and implementation. He was a pioneer in bridging the IT-OT security gap and implementing next-generation security into performance and safety critical process control areas. During his tenure, he successfully deployed a large scale ICS/SCADA security architecture composed of over 100 next-generation firewalls, hundreds of advanced endpoint protection clients and SIEM, distributed over dozens of remote plants and a centralized core, all based on a "Zero Trust" philosophy. Lionel graduated from Houston Baptist University with a double degree in Physics and Mathematics and has held certifications as a MCSE, CCA, CCNP, CCIP, CCNA, CSSA, and GICSP; “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Physical and Cyber Security Both Matter,” eSecurity Planet; 5/31/21; https://www.esecurityplanet.com/networks/critical-infrastructure-protection-physical-cybersecurity/]//SJWen

Segmentation based on business criteria

Segmentation is not just breaking apart the network based on the IP-Address space. True segmentation requires identifying and grouping devices into Zones or Enclaves based on meaningful business criteria to protect better vulnerable devices found within the address space. Access to devices in the zone needs to be restricted by users, groups, protocols, networks, and devices. In some instances, you may even consider restricting access by time of day.

IoT/IIoT is beginning to take hold in the energy industry, which means there are going to be more devices attached to these networks gathering information and possibly running on a vendor’s proprietary software and hardware, which more than likely will not be managed or patchable by the operator of the system. So O&G needs to have a definite plan on how they will address this growing trend, and a zero trust-based strategy offers the best means of doing this integration in a safe, secure, and, most important, reversible manner.

Camera and sensor security

Segmentation will also include the zoning of radio frequency (RF) technologies like Wi-Fi, Microwave, satellite, and cellular. ICS and SCADA systems operators must remain mindful of the possibility of an upstream attack by threat actors who have managed to compromise their RF facilities. Remote facilities and devices often have cameras and sensors to alert when a door has been opened. Still, because they are remote, attackers have time to enter the facilities and plant a device that can go completely unnoticed.

Another option physical access affords them is the opportunity to compromise the runtime operating systems and/or OS of the devices they find. The only way you will find these would be to do a physical search of the facility or cabinet and run an audit of the OS to ensure nothing has been tainted.

Zoning limits damage

So the reason why the zone trust segmentation (zoning) is so important is if you don’t have the time to perform these acts to confirm that the site is not compromised. With proper zoning enforcement, you can limit and isolate the damage to a region or just that location.

Zones in a Zero Trust network also serve as an inspection point for traffic entering and exiting the enclave. The enabling of IPS, IDS, and virtual sandboxing technology can be applied on a per-zone basis, allowing for customized protection for the vulnerable devices contained within. Implementing these security measures is a best practice even on zones where devices can receive updates and have some form of endpoint protection.

With proper design and device consideration, zoning with the different inspection technologies enabled can also be a remediating factor for those devices in your network that cannot be patched, updated, and even those that are end-of-life. In short, zoning with inspection technology enabled helps to ensure IT and OT network systems’ safe operations. In even the most secure environments, it is never safe to assume that data traffic transversing the network is free of a potential threat.

#### Increased strikes send a clear signal to terrorists that critical US infrastructure is vulnerable by weakening organizations.

Davies 6 [Ross; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty, The Green Bag; “Strike Season: Protecting Labor-Management Conflict in the Age of Terror,” SSRN; 4/12/06; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=896185]//SJWen

Strikes (and, to a lesser extent, lockouts) are painful but necessary parts of private-sector American labor-management relations. Even if they weren't - even if sound public policy called for their eradication - we couldn't stop them. They are an inevitable byproduct of the conflicting interests and limited resources of organized workers and their employers. History shows that this is true even in times of warfare overseas or crisis at home: labor-management strife lessens at the beginning of a conflict and then bounces back. Now, however, we are confronted with warfare at home, a phenomenon that the United States has not had to deal with since the Civil War - before the rise of today's unprecedentedly large, complex, and interdependent economy and government.

And history is repeating itself again. After a lull at the beginning of the war with terrorists, work stoppages have returned to their pre-war levels. The overall rate of strike activity is substantially lower than it was during previous wars (it has been slowly declining, along with overall union membership in the private sector, for decades). Today's war, however, is being fought in part on American soil, and against enemies who operate worldwide, but whose attacks tend to be small and local, seeking advantage from the unpredictability and brutality of the damage they inflict rather than from its scale. Thus, even small, localized, and occasional work stoppages - not just the large-scale strikes that arguably affected the military-industrial complex and thus the war efforts in the past - have the potential to increase risks to critical infrastructure and public safety during the war on terror. In other words, persistent strike activity at current levels poses risks of public harm, albeit risks that are difficult to anticipate with specificity in the absence of much experience or available data. This justifies taking some reasonable precautions, including the proposal made in this Article.

By its very nature, a labor strike increases the vulnerability of that employer's operations to a terrorist attack. A strike is an act specifically designed to disrupt and weaken an employer's operations, for the (usually) perfectly lawful purpose of pressing for resolution of a dispute with management. A weakened organization or other entity is, of course, less capable of resisting and surviving exogenous shocks, whether they be commercial competition or terrorist attacks. In the United States, with its fully extended and endlessly interconnected critical infrastructure that touches everything from food processing to energy distribution to water quality, a strike in the wrong place at the wrong time that disrupts and weakens some part of that infrastructure could be decisive in the success or failure of a terrorist attack of the small, local sort described above, on such a weakened link in some infrastructural chain. Of course, none of this is to suggest that any union or its members (or any employer or its managers) would knowingly expose their fellow citizens or their property to a terrorist attack. To the contrary, experience to date suggests that union members are at least as patriotic and conscientious as Americans in general. In fact, the effectiveness of the proposal made in this Article is predicated in part on the assumption that neither workers nor their employers will knowingly contribute to the incidence or effectiveness of terrorist attacks. The concern addressed here is, rather, that innocent instigators or perpetuators of a work stoppage might unwittingly facilitate a successful terrorist attack or aggravate its effects.

#### Attacks on critical infrastructure collapses the economy through multiple avenues.

FAS 6 [DCSINT Handbook No. 1.02; Info directly from US army and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; “Critical Infrastructure Threats and Terrorism,” DCSINT/FAS; 8/10/6; https://fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup2.pdf]//SJWen

Agriculture

In 1984, a cult group poisoned salad bars at several Oregon restaurants with Salmonella bacteria as the first recorded event of bioterrorism in the United States. This resulted in 750 people becoming sick.24 A review of the agriculture infrastructure results in vulnerable areas such as the high concentration of the livestock industry and the centralized nature of the food processing industry. The farm-to table chain contains various points into which an attack could be launched. The threat of attack would seriously damage consumer confidence and undermine export markets. Understanding the goal of the threat points to the area most likely attacked. If the intent was economic disruption the target would be livestock and crops, but if the intent was mass casualties the point of attack would be contamination of finished food products. Damage to livestock could be very swift, the USDA calculated that foot-and mouth disease could spread to 25 states in 5 days.25 CDC is presently tracking and developing scenarios for the arrival of Avian Flu.

Banking

Prior to the destruction of the Twin Towers, physical attacks against the banking industry, such as the destruction of facilities, were rare. Unfortunately, evidence indicates that may change, in March 2005 three British al-Qa’ida operatives were indicted by a U.S. federal court on charges of conducting detailed reconnaissance of financial targets in lower Manhattan, Newark, New Jersey, and Washington, D.C. In addition to video taping the Citigroup Center and the New York Stock Exchange in New York City, the Prudential Financial building in Newark, and the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Washington D.C., the men amassed more than 500 photographs of the sites.26 The Banking infrastructures primary weakness is along its cyber axis of attack. Through phishing and banking Trojan targeting specific financial institutions, attackers reduce confidence among consumers. Recently American Express posted an alert online, including a screenshot of a pop-up that appeared when users log in to its secure site.27

The attack not only attempts to obtain personal information that can be used for various operations, but also launches a virus into the user’s computer. CitiBank, and Chase Manhattan Bank have both been victim during 2005 and 2006 to phishing schemes misrepresenting their services to their clients.

Energy

Recently the oil industry occupied the headlines, and the criticality of this infrastructure is not lost on terrorists. In mid-December 2004, Arab television aired an alleged audiotape message by Usama bin Laden in which he called upon his followers to wreak havoc on the U.S. and world economy by disrupting oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to the United States.28 The U.S. uses over 20.7 million barrels a day of crude oil and products and imports 58.4% of that requirement.29 On 19 January 2006 al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden announced in a video release that, “The war against America and its allies will not be confined to Iraq…..”, and since June of 2003 there have been 298 recorded attacks against Iraqi oil facilities.30 Terrorists conduct research as to the easiest point to damage the flow of oil or to the point where the most damage can be done. Scenarios involving the oil fields themselves, a jetliner crashing into the Ras Tanura facility in Saudi Arabia could remove 10 percent of the world’s energy imports in one act.31 Maritime attacks are also option for terrorists; on October 6, 2002 a French tanker carrying 397,000 barrels of crude oil from Iran to Malaysia was rammed by an explosive laden boat off of the port of Ash Shihr, 353 miles east of Aden. The double-hulled tanker was breached, and maritime insurers tripled the rates.32 Energy most travel often long distances from the site where it is obtained to the point where it is converted into energy for use, a catastrophic event at any of the sites or along its route can adversely impact the energy infrastructure and cause ripples in other infrastructures. The security of the pipeline in Alaska increases in importance as efforts are made to make America more independent on energy use.

Economy

The U.S. economy is the end-state target of several terrorist groups as identified in the introduction quote. The means by which terrorists and other threats attempt to impact the economic infrastructure is through it’s linkage to the other infrastructures. Attacks are launched at other infrastructures, such as energy or the Defense Industrial Base in an effort to achieve a “cascading” result that impacts the economy. Cyber attacks on Banking and Finance are another effort to indirectly impact the economy. The short term impacts of the 9/11 attacks on Lower Manhattan resulted in the loss of 30% of office space and a number of businesses simply ceased to exist. Close to 200,000 jobs were destroyed or relocated out of New York City. The destruction of physical assets was estimated in the national accounts to amount to $14 billion for private businesses, $1.5 billion for state and local government enterprises and $0.7 billion for federal enterprises. Rescue, cleanup and related costs are estimated to at least $11 billion for a total direct cost of $27.2 billion.33 The medium and long term effects cannot be accurately estimated but demonstrate the idea of cascading effects. The five main areas affected over a longer period were Insurance, Airlines, Tourism and other Service Industries, Shipping and Security and military spending. At various times terrorist rhetoric has mentioned attacks against Wall Street proper, but the more realistic damage to the economy will come through the indirect approach of cascading effects.

Transportation

The attack on commuter trains in Madrid in March of 2004 and the London bombings in July of 2005, which together killed 243 people, clearly indicated the threat to the transportation infrastructure. Statistics provided by the Brookings Institute in Washington DC show that between 1991 and 2001 42% of worldwide terrorist attacks were directed against mass transit. Transportation is viewed by terrorists as a “soft target” and one that will impact the people of a country. Mass Service Transportation (MST) is the likely target of a terrorist attack.

MST caters to large volumes of people, crammed into narrow confined spaces

MST is designed to move large numbers of people quickly and efficiently, which is often counter to protective measure

MST assets are enclosed, serving to amplify explosions

MST attacks can result in “cascading effects” because communications and power conduits are usually collocated in proximity to their routes

The Department of Homeland Security sent a “public sector notice” in May of 2006 based on two incidents of “suspicious videotaping” of European mass-transit systems.34 The individual had several tapes besides the one in his camera, none of which showed any tourist sites. The tapes focused on the insides of subway cars, the inside and outside of several stations and exit routes from the stations. In June of 2003 the FBI arrested Iyman Faris, a 34 year old naturalized American citizen who had been in contact with Al Qaeda conducting research and reconnaissance in an effort to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge.35 Mr. Faris had traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2000, meeting with Osama bin Laden, he returned to the U.S. and began gathering information concerning the Brooklyn Bridge and communicating via coded messages with Al Qaeda leaders. An attack on the bridge would have not only damaged the transportation infrastructure, but also a known American landmark. On 24 May 2006, a Pakistani immigrant was convicted on charges of plotting to blow up one of Manhattan’s busiest subway stations in retaliation for the U.S. actions at the Abu Ghraib prison.36

Terrorist threats to the transportation infrastructure extend beyond land to the sea. Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, said “one of my nightmares would be a maritime terrorism attack in the Strait of Malacca”.37 “There is a strain of al-Qaida in Southeast Asia, called Jemaah Islamiya. They are actively pursuing a maritime terrorism capability that includes diving and mining training.”38 As how this might impact on the economy, $220 billion in trade comes through the Seventh Fleet area of responsibility and 98% of the commerce is moved by sea. Just as ports can be viewed a SPOF within the maritime transport system, there are certain waterway chokepoints or heavily trafficked areas that can be viewed as a high payoff target to a terrorist or result in catastrophic damage from a natural disaster.

#### Extinction.

Liu '18 [Qian; 11/13/18; Managing Director of Greater China for The Economist Group, previously director of the global economics unit and director of Access China for the Economist Intelligence Unit, PhD in economics from Uppsala University; "The next economic crisis could cause a global conflict. Here's why," <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-conflict-heres-why/>] // Re-Cut SJWen

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labor markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. And Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilize and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterized also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalization, political polarization, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington , considering such a scenario could help us avoid it, because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised, while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

## 4

#### Unions cause protectionism – that slows growth and causes tariffs

Epstein 16 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Rise of American Protectionism." https://www.hoover.org/research/rise-american-protectionism]

This point explains why the American labor movement has historically opposed free trade. The essence of unionism is, and always will be, the acquisition of monopoly power. There is no way for a union to obtain that monopoly power in the marketplace. It can only secure it through legislation. The first step in that process was the exemption of unions from the antitrust laws under Section 6 of the Clayton Act of 1914. The second major step was the legitimation of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which gave the union the exclusive bargaining rights against the firm once it was successful in a union election. These major statutory benefits strengthened private sector unions and imposed inefficiencies on unionized firms. This, in turn, opened the field for new firms, like the Japanese automobile companies, to organize outside the union envelope. In response, labor’s strategy went one step further. It pushed hard on trade and tariff barriers to keep out foreign imports, and exerted political influence to encourage local zoning boards to exclude new businesses that do not use union labor. Add to these issues the aggressive rise of minimum wage laws and other mandates like Obamacare and family leave statutes, and you construct a regulatory fortress that defeats the corrective forces of free trade and renders the nation less economically resilient and productive than before.

It is easy to say that people are “screwed” by free trade if you only look at the stories of those individuals who lose their jobs. It is much more difficult to make that case after taking into account the simple but powerful truth that overall levels of profitability and wealth increase under free trade. The short-term relief that targeted groups get from protectionist measures mask the larger inefficiencies that slow down the rate of growth. Despite what the Democrats think, transfer programs are no substitute for growth. Indeed, the imposition of new taxes without return benefits on the firms taxed only depresses the rate of return on investment further, which will necessarily compound the problem.

#### New trade conflicts cause global war and undermine cooperation on collective action problems

Dr. Michael F. Oppenheimer 21, Clinical Professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, Senior Consulting Fellow for Scenario Planning at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Former Executive Vice President at The Futures Group, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, The Foreign Policy Roundtable at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, and The American Council on Germany, “The Turbulent Future of International Relations”, in The Future of Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction, Ed. Ankersen and Sidhu, p. 23-30

Four structural forces will shape the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the “non-westernization of IR”3); and secular economic stagnation, a product of longer term global decline in birth rates combined with aging populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. Environmental events, global health challenges, internal political developments, policy mistakes, technology breakthroughs or failures, will intersect with structure to define our future. But these four structural forces will impact the way states behave, in the capacity of great powers to manage their differences, and to act collectively to settle, rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade.

Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity (inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president. 7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9

But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10

Secular Stagnation

This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations, accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call “secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains:

…rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result.

Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth…

This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible.

…in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development.

Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates.

Illiberal Globalization

Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically pro- Trump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them.

What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18

As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end.

Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods:

We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20

The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the pre- World War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present:

Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago.

…In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports.

…The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable.

…the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry.

## Case

### Framing

#### Extinction comes first!

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

### T/L

#### 1] Strikes allows for domination by exercising coercion.

**Gourevitch 18** [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy **recognizes** that workers have a **right** to **strike**. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose **serious** **problems** for **liberal** **societies**. They involve **violence** and **coercion**, they often violate some **basic** **liberal** **liberties**, they appear to **involve** group rights having **priority** over **individual** **ones**, and they can **threaten** **public** **order** itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of **disruptive** **collective** **protest** in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ **froze** major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as **statewide** in **West** **Virginia**, **Oklahoma**, **Arizona**, and **Colorado**; a **strike** by taxi drivers played a **major** role in debates and court decisions regarding **immigration**; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises **far** more **issues** than a **single** **essay** can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its **relation** to **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. I argue that strikes present a **dilemma** for liberal societies because for **most** **workers** to have a reasonable chance of **success** they need to use some **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. But these coercive strike tactics both **violate** the law and **infringe** upon what are widely held to be **basic** **liberal** **rights**. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know **why** workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of **understanding** the right to strike is as a right to **resist** the **oppression** that workers face in the **standard** **liberal** **capitalist** **economy**. This way of **understanding** the right explains why the use of **coercive** **strike** **tactics** is not morally **constrained** by the requirement to respect the **basic** **liberties** nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] No offense: Strikes quit working, not the job which still allows for instances of domination.

**Gourevitch 16** [Alex; Brown University; “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike,” 2016; [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592716000049]](https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592716000049%5d) Justin

The further point is that, short of quasi-socialist redistribution or of giving everyone universal rights to ownership of capital, workers are **justified** in turning to some other way of resisting their structural domination. The legal fact of being able to quit a job is **cold comfort** because it allows workers to leave a **specific boss**, but not the **labor market itself.** Insofar as workers are forced into contracts with employers, and into work associations with other workers, they can only resist their structural domination from within. Here we have an insight into why the right to strike includes the **perplexing claim that workers refuse to work yet maintain a right to the job**. The typical worker can quit the job, but she cannot quit the work. To avoid being exploited she turns the table: she quits working **without** quitting the job.

#### 3] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits – that allows for instances of domination.

**Dolsak and Prakash 19** [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build **solidarity** among their supporters, they are susceptible to **collective action problems**. This is **because** **the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits**. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be **enjoyed** by both **strikers** and **non**-**strikers**. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of **free-riding problems**, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.

#### Government recognition doesn’t mean that the right to strike will actually be upheld, it just means they government says it exists – this is terminal defense to the aff’s solvency and outweighs on legal precision.

Law Dictionary ‘ND [The Law Dictionary; Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed.; No Date; “What is RECOGNIZE?”; https://thelawdictionary.org/recognize/; Accessed 10-28-2021] AK

To try; to examine in order to determine the truth of a matter. Also to enter into a recognizance.