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## 1

#### Tech can solve infrastructure concerns but needs to be integrated – operators are key.

Jacobs 5/31 [Lionel; Senior Security Architect in the Palo Alto Networks ICS and SCADA solutions team. Coming from the asset-owner side , Lionel has spent more than 20 years working in the IT/OT environment, with a focus on ICS systems design, controls, and implementation. He was a pioneer in bridging the IT-OT security gap and implementing next-generation security into performance and safety critical process control areas. During his tenure, he successfully deployed a large scale ICS/SCADA security architecture composed of over 100 next-generation firewalls, hundreds of advanced endpoint protection clients and SIEM, distributed over dozens of remote plants and a centralized core, all based on a "Zero Trust" philosophy. Lionel graduated from Houston Baptist University with a double degree in Physics and Mathematics and has held certifications as a MCSE, CCA, CCNP, CCIP, CCNA, CSSA, and GICSP; “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Physical and Cyber Security Both Matter,” eSecurity Planet; 5/31/21; https://www.esecurityplanet.com/networks/critical-infrastructure-protection-physical-cybersecurity/]//SJWen

Segmentation based on business criteria

Segmentation is not just breaking apart the network based on the IP-Address space. True segmentation requires identifying and grouping devices into Zones or Enclaves based on meaningful business criteria to protect better vulnerable devices found within the address space. Access to devices in the zone needs to be restricted by users, groups, protocols, networks, and devices. In some instances, you may even consider restricting access by time of day.

IoT/IIoT is beginning to take hold in the energy industry, which means there are going to be more devices attached to these networks gathering information and possibly running on a vendor’s proprietary software and hardware, which more than likely will not be managed or patchable by the operator of the system. So O&G needs to have a definite plan on how they will address this growing trend, and a zero trust-based strategy offers the best means of doing this integration in a safe, secure, and, most important, reversible manner.

Camera and sensor security

Segmentation will also include the zoning of radio frequency (RF) technologies like Wi-Fi, Microwave, satellite, and cellular. ICS and SCADA systems operators must remain mindful of the possibility of an upstream attack by threat actors who have managed to compromise their RF facilities. Remote facilities and devices often have cameras and sensors to alert when a door has been opened. Still, because they are remote, attackers have time to enter the facilities and plant a device that can go completely unnoticed.

Another option physical access affords them is the opportunity to compromise the runtime operating systems and/or OS of the devices they find. The only way you will find these would be to do a physical search of the facility or cabinet and run an audit of the OS to ensure nothing has been tainted.

Zoning limits damage

So the reason why the zone trust segmentation (zoning) is so important is if you don’t have the time to perform these acts to confirm that the site is not compromised. With proper zoning enforcement, you can limit and isolate the damage to a region or just that location.

Zones in a Zero Trust network also serve as an inspection point for traffic entering and exiting the enclave. The enabling of IPS, IDS, and virtual sandboxing technology can be applied on a per-zone basis, allowing for customized protection for the vulnerable devices contained within. Implementing these security measures is a best practice even on zones where devices can receive updates and have some form of endpoint protection.

With proper design and device consideration, zoning with the different inspection technologies enabled can also be a remediating factor for those devices in your network that cannot be patched, updated, and even those that are end-of-life. In short, zoning with inspection technology enabled helps to ensure IT and OT network systems’ safe operations. In even the most secure environments, it is never safe to assume that data traffic transversing the network is free of a potential threat.

#### Increased strikes send a clear signal to terrorists that critical US infrastructure is vulnerable by weakening organizations.

Davies 6 [Ross; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty, The Green Bag; “Strike Season: Protecting Labor-Management Conflict in the Age of Terror,” SSRN; 4/12/06; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=896185]//SJWen

Strikes (and, to a lesser extent, lockouts) are painful but necessary parts of private-sector American labor-management relations. Even if they weren't - even if sound public policy called for their eradication - we couldn't stop them. They are an inevitable byproduct of the conflicting interests and limited resources of organized workers and their employers. History shows that this is true even in times of warfare overseas or crisis at home: labor-management strife lessens at the beginning of a conflict and then bounces back. Now, however, we are confronted with warfare at home, a phenomenon that the United States has not had to deal with since the Civil War - before the rise of today's unprecedentedly large, complex, and interdependent economy and government.

And history is repeating itself again. After a lull at the beginning of the war with terrorists, work stoppages have returned to their pre-war levels. The overall rate of strike activity is substantially lower than it was during previous wars (it has been slowly declining, along with overall union membership in the private sector, for decades). Today's war, however, is being fought in part on American soil, and against enemies who operate worldwide, but whose attacks tend to be small and local, seeking advantage from the unpredictability and brutality of the damage they inflict rather than from its scale. Thus, even small, localized, and occasional work stoppages - not just the large-scale strikes that arguably affected the military-industrial complex and thus the war efforts in the past - have the potential to increase risks to critical infrastructure and public safety during the war on terror. In other words, persistent strike activity at current levels poses risks of public harm, albeit risks that are difficult to anticipate with specificity in the absence of much experience or available data. This justifies taking some reasonable precautions, including the proposal made in this Article.

By its very nature, a labor strike increases the vulnerability of that employer's operations to a terrorist attack. A strike is an act specifically designed to disrupt and weaken an employer's operations, for the (usually) perfectly lawful purpose of pressing for resolution of a dispute with management. A weakened organization or other entity is, of course, less capable of resisting and surviving exogenous shocks, whether they be commercial competition or terrorist attacks. In the United States, with its fully extended and endlessly interconnected critical infrastructure that touches everything from food processing to energy distribution to water quality, a strike in the wrong place at the wrong time that disrupts and weakens some part of that infrastructure could be decisive in the success or failure of a terrorist attack of the small, local sort described above, on such a weakened link in some infrastructural chain. Of course, none of this is to suggest that any union or its members (or any employer or its managers) would knowingly expose their fellow citizens or their property to a terrorist attack. To the contrary, experience to date suggests that union members are at least as patriotic and conscientious as Americans in general. In fact, the effectiveness of the proposal made in this Article is predicated in part on the assumption that neither workers nor their employers will knowingly contribute to the incidence or effectiveness of terrorist attacks. The concern addressed here is, rather, that innocent instigators or perpetuators of a work stoppage might unwittingly facilitate a successful terrorist attack or aggravate its effects.

#### Attacks on critical infrastructure collapses the economy through multiple avenues.

FAS 6 [DCSINT Handbook No. 1.02; Info directly from US army and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; “Critical Infrastructure Threats and Terrorism,” DCSINT/FAS; 8/10/6; https://fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup2.pdf]//SJWen

Agriculture

In 1984, a cult group poisoned salad bars at several Oregon restaurants with Salmonella bacteria as the first recorded event of bioterrorism in the United States. This resulted in 750 people becoming sick.24 A review of the agriculture infrastructure results in vulnerable areas such as the high concentration of the livestock industry and the centralized nature of the food processing industry. The farm-to table chain contains various points into which an attack could be launched. The threat of attack would seriously damage consumer confidence and undermine export markets. Understanding the goal of the threat points to the area most likely attacked. If the intent was economic disruption the target would be livestock and crops, but if the intent was mass casualties the point of attack would be contamination of finished food products. Damage to livestock could be very swift, the USDA calculated that foot-and mouth disease could spread to 25 states in 5 days.25 CDC is presently tracking and developing scenarios for the arrival of Avian Flu.

Banking

Prior to the destruction of the Twin Towers, physical attacks against the banking industry, such as the destruction of facilities, were rare. Unfortunately, evidence indicates that may change, in March 2005 three British al-Qa’ida operatives were indicted by a U.S. federal court on charges of conducting detailed reconnaissance of financial targets in lower Manhattan, Newark, New Jersey, and Washington, D.C. In addition to video taping the Citigroup Center and the New York Stock Exchange in New York City, the Prudential Financial building in Newark, and the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Washington D.C., the men amassed more than 500 photographs of the sites.26 The Banking infrastructures primary weakness is along its cyber axis of attack. Through phishing and banking Trojan targeting specific financial institutions, attackers reduce confidence among consumers. Recently American Express posted an alert online, including a screenshot of a pop-up that appeared when users log in to its secure site.27

The attack not only attempts to obtain personal information that can be used for various operations, but also launches a virus into the user’s computer. CitiBank, and Chase Manhattan Bank have both been victim during 2005 and 2006 to phishing schemes misrepresenting their services to their clients.

Energy

Recently the oil industry occupied the headlines, and the criticality of this infrastructure is not lost on terrorists. In mid-December 2004, Arab television aired an alleged audiotape message by Usama bin Laden in which he called upon his followers to wreak havoc on the U.S. and world economy by disrupting oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to the United States.28 The U.S. uses over 20.7 million barrels a day of crude oil and products and imports 58.4% of that requirement.29 On 19 January 2006 al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden announced in a video release that, “The war against America and its allies will not be confined to Iraq…..”, and since June of 2003 there have been 298 recorded attacks against Iraqi oil facilities.30 Terrorists conduct research as to the easiest point to damage the flow of oil or to the point where the most damage can be done. Scenarios involving the oil fields themselves, a jetliner crashing into the Ras Tanura facility in Saudi Arabia could remove 10 percent of the world’s energy imports in one act.31 Maritime attacks are also option for terrorists; on October 6, 2002 a French tanker carrying 397,000 barrels of crude oil from Iran to Malaysia was rammed by an explosive laden boat off of the port of Ash Shihr, 353 miles east of Aden. The double-hulled tanker was breached, and maritime insurers tripled the rates.32 Energy most travel often long distances from the site where it is obtained to the point where it is converted into energy for use, a catastrophic event at any of the sites or along its route can adversely impact the energy infrastructure and cause ripples in other infrastructures. The security of the pipeline in Alaska increases in importance as efforts are made to make America more independent on energy use.

Economy

The U.S. economy is the end-state target of several terrorist groups as identified in the introduction quote. The means by which terrorists and other threats attempt to impact the economic infrastructure is through it’s linkage to the other infrastructures. Attacks are launched at other infrastructures, such as energy or the Defense Industrial Base in an effort to achieve a “cascading” result that impacts the economy. Cyber attacks on Banking and Finance are another effort to indirectly impact the economy. The short term impacts of the 9/11 attacks on Lower Manhattan resulted in the loss of 30% of office space and a number of businesses simply ceased to exist. Close to 200,000 jobs were destroyed or relocated out of New York City. The destruction of physical assets was estimated in the national accounts to amount to $14 billion for private businesses, $1.5 billion for state and local government enterprises and $0.7 billion for federal enterprises. Rescue, cleanup and related costs are estimated to at least $11 billion for a total direct cost of $27.2 billion.33 The medium and long term effects cannot be accurately estimated but demonstrate the idea of cascading effects. The five main areas affected over a longer period were Insurance, Airlines, Tourism and other Service Industries, Shipping and Security and military spending. At various times terrorist rhetoric has mentioned attacks against Wall Street proper, but the more realistic damage to the economy will come through the indirect approach of cascading effects.

Transportation

The attack on commuter trains in Madrid in March of 2004 and the London bombings in July of 2005, which together killed 243 people, clearly indicated the threat to the transportation infrastructure. Statistics provided by the Brookings Institute in Washington DC show that between 1991 and 2001 42% of worldwide terrorist attacks were directed against mass transit. Transportation is viewed by terrorists as a “soft target” and one that will impact the people of a country. Mass Service Transportation (MST) is the likely target of a terrorist attack.

MST caters to large volumes of people, crammed into narrow confined spaces

MST is designed to move large numbers of people quickly and efficiently, which is often counter to protective measure

MST assets are enclosed, serving to amplify explosions

MST attacks can result in “cascading effects” because communications and power conduits are usually collocated in proximity to their routes

The Department of Homeland Security sent a “public sector notice” in May of 2006 based on two incidents of “suspicious videotaping” of European mass-transit systems.34 The individual had several tapes besides the one in his camera, none of which showed any tourist sites. The tapes focused on the insides of subway cars, the inside and outside of several stations and exit routes from the stations. In June of 2003 the FBI arrested Iyman Faris, a 34 year old naturalized American citizen who had been in contact with Al Qaeda conducting research and reconnaissance in an effort to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge.35 Mr. Faris had traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2000, meeting with Osama bin Laden, he returned to the U.S. and began gathering information concerning the Brooklyn Bridge and communicating via coded messages with Al Qaeda leaders. An attack on the bridge would have not only damaged the transportation infrastructure, but also a known American landmark. On 24 May 2006, a Pakistani immigrant was convicted on charges of plotting to blow up one of Manhattan’s busiest subway stations in retaliation for the U.S. actions at the Abu Ghraib prison.36

Terrorist threats to the transportation infrastructure extend beyond land to the sea. Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, said “one of my nightmares would be a maritime terrorism attack in the Strait of Malacca”.37 “There is a strain of al-Qaida in Southeast Asia, called Jemaah Islamiya. They are actively pursuing a maritime terrorism capability that includes diving and mining training.”38 As how this might impact on the economy, $220 billion in trade comes through the Seventh Fleet area of responsibility and 98% of the commerce is moved by sea. Just as ports can be viewed a SPOF within the maritime transport system, there are certain waterway chokepoints or heavily trafficked areas that can be viewed as a high payoff target to a terrorist or result in catastrophic damage from a natural disaster.

#### Extinction.

Liu '18 [Qian; 11/13/18; Managing Director of Greater China for The Economist Group, previously director of the global economics unit and director of Access China for the Economist Intelligence Unit, PhD in economics from Uppsala University; "The next economic crisis could cause a global conflict. Here's why," <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-conflict-heres-why/>] // Re-Cut SJWen

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labor markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. And Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilize and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterized also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalization, political polarization, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington , considering such a scenario could help us avoid it, because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised, while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

## 2

#### Business recovery is strong. Business confidence is high.

Halloran ’9-14 [Michael; 2021; M.B.A. from Carnegie Mellon University, former aerospace research engineer, Equity Strategist; Janney, “Despite Potential Headwinds, Key Labor Market Indicators Bode Well for the Economy,” https://www.janney.com/latest-articles-commentary/all-insights/insights/2021/09/14/despite-potential-headwinds-key-labor-market-indicators-bode-well-for-the-economy]

However, we remain encouraged by the recovery that has been unfolding since the economy began reopening. We continue to see improvement in important cyclical sectors of the economy while consumers are historically healthy and still have pent-up demand. Business confidence has rebounded with strong corporate profits that should support further capital spending and hiring (there are now more job openings than there are unemployed people by a record amount).

We expect to see further improvement in the international backdrop, supported by unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus and accelerating rates of vaccination. Although the impact of the Delta wave is still being felt, recent evidence confirms the effectiveness of vaccines in limiting deaths and hospitalizations. With the pace of vaccination now picking up in the areas most impacted by this wave—Asia and Australia—the case for fading headwinds leading to improving economic growth later this year remains positive.

The signals from financial markets themselves remain positive. Despite consolidating last week, stocks remain near record highs while the 10-year Treasury remains well above the lows of earlier this summer when concerns about Delta first emerged.

These factors support our view of a durable economic recovery from the pandemic that should continue supporting stock prices. A healthy labor market is a critical element for a sustainable recovery that supports profit growth and last week’s news from the labor market remains encouraging.

#### Unions devastate growth and worsen inequality – gains for workers shift costs to other parts of the economy

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

This continued trend has elicited howls of protest from union supporters who, of course, want to see an increase in union membership. It has also led several Democratic presidential candidates to make calls to reconfigure labor law. Bernie Sanders wants to double union membership and give federal workers the right to strike, as well as ban at-will contracts of employment, so that any dismissal could be subject to litigation under a “for cause” standard. Not to be outdone, Elizabeth Warren wants to make it illegal for firms to hire permanent replacements for striking workers. They are joined by Pete Buttigieg in demanding a change in federal labor law so that states may no longer pass right-to-work laws that insulate workers from the requirement to pay union dues in unionized firms. All of these new devices are proven job killers.

The arguments in favor of unions are also coming from some unexpected sources in academia, where a conservative case has been put forward on the ground that an increase in union membership is needed to combat job insecurity and economic inequality.

All of these pro-union critiques miss the basic point that the decline of union power is good news, not bad. That conclusion is driven not by some insidious effort to stifle the welfare of workers, but by the simple and profound point that the greatest protection for workers lies in a competitive economy that opens up more doors than it closes. The only way to achieve that result is by slashing the various restrictions that prevent job formation, as Justin Haskins of the Heartland Institute notes in a recent article at The Hill. The central economic insight is that jobs get created only when there is the prospect of gains from trade. Those gains in turn are maximized by cutting the multitude of regulations and taxes that do nothing more than shrink overall wealth by directing social resources to less productive ends.

#### Unions crush competitiveness

Griswold 10 [Daniel is Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute “Unions, Protectionism, and U.S.Competitiveness” Cato Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2010). P 181-195]

While globalization has affected labor unions in surprising ways, unions have also had a measurable effect on the ability of firms to compete in the global economy. The 1984 publication of What Do Unions Do?,by Freeman and Medoff, launched a growing body of research into the effects of labor unions on the performance of unionized firms compared to nonunionized firms. The evidence indicates that unions and globalization are not a happy mix for companies with unionized workforces.¶ Freeman and Medoff noted in their landmark work that the impact of unions on the workplace reveals itself in two faces, a “monopoly face,” which tends to reduce the efficiency of the affected firm, and the “collective voice/institutional response face,” which can raise productivity by encouraging worker loyalty and reducing turnover.¶ The monopoly face of unions can be seen in their efforts to fix wages and benefits at levels above those of a competitive labor market. A labor union is, among other things, a cartel or monopoly that attempts to exert market power to extract a higher price for the labor it offers to a firm. Like monopolies in product markets, the result can be a misallocation of resources. Higher wages cut into firm profits, reducing investment and employment levels in the affected industry. Unions can also impose restrictive work rules and featherbedding that reduce productivity and stifle innovation. An emphasis on seniority over merit in pay and promotion can reduce the incentive for worker effort. One result can be the inability of management to respond in a timely way to changing market conditions, putting the firm at a competitive disadvantage. Strikes and other industrial action can damage a firm’s ability to retain market share.¶ On the positive side, as summarized in Bennett and Kaufman (2008: 3), unions can reduce worker turnover and increase their sense of loyalty to the firm, thus reducing transaction costs to the firm for hiring and training. The effect is consistent with the efficient- wage theory, which argues that paying workers an above-market wage can yield benefits to the firm that more than offset higher payroll costs. The protection of a union can empower individual workers to suggest workplace improvements, exercising the option for “voice” rather than “exit.” The organizing of a union can shock management into organizing production more efficiently to maintain competitiveness. Unions can enhance the representation of older, more experienced workers rather than allowing wages and benefits to be determined by more mobile, “marginal” workers who tend to be younger and single.¶ Freeman and Medoff came to the conclusion in their influential book that the voice/representational face of organized labor tends to predominate the monopoly face, with the result that unions on balance play a positive role in enhancing the output and competitiveness of unionized firms. Twenty-five years later, however, the evidence does not support their more optimistic view of the impact of organized labor on the competitiveness of U.S. companies in the global markets.

#### Recessions cause global crises – ensuring continued growth is key

Baird ’20 [Zoe; October 2020; C.E.O. and President of the Markle Foundation, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group and former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations, J.D. and A.B. from the University of California at Berkeley; Domestic and International (Dis)order: A Strategic Response, “Equitable Economic Recovery is a National Security Imperative,” Ch. 13]

A strong and inclusive economy is essential for American national security and global leadership. As the nation seeks to return from a historic economic crisis, the national security community should support an equitable recovery that helps every worker adapt to the seismic shifts underway in our economy.

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a bedrock of America’s economic and political strength—both domestically and in the international arena. A strong and equitable recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a powerful testament to the resilience of the American system and its ability to create prosperity at a time of seismic change and persistent global crisis. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without bold action to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the United States risks undermining the legitimacy of its institutions and its international standing. The outcome will be a key determinant of America’s national security for years to come.

An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor’s degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market.

To achieve these goals, American policy makers need to establish job growth strategies that address urgent public needs through major programs in green energy, infrastructure, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers’ needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement.

Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset

A strong economy is essential to America’s security and diplomatic strategy. Economic strength increases our influence on the global stage, expands markets, and funds a strong and agile military and national defense. Yet it is not enough for America’s economy to be strong for some—prosperity must be broadly shared. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream— creates credibility and legitimacy for America’s values, governance, and alliances around the world.

After World War II, the United States grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the model of the free world—setting the stage for decades of American political and economic leadership. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is core to the legitimacy of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government’s ability to meet the needs of the people.

The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk

For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement.

Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America’s most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor’s degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3

The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4

The Case for an Inclusive Recovery

A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority around the world. It will send a strong message about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people’s ability to adapt to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO’s ability to solve shared geopolitical and security challenges. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a position of economic strength will enable us to address global crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and refugees. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity.

The U.S. has unique advantages that give it the tools to emerge from the crisis with tremendous economic strength— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

## 3

#### CP Text – A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right for non-military workers to strike.

#### Armed forces can’t strike now

LII 6 [Cornell Legal Information Institute, 2006, "10 U.S. Code § 976," Cornell Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/976]/Kankee

(a)In this section: (1)The term “member of the armed forces” means (A) a member of the armed forces who is serving on active duty, (B) a member of the National Guard who is serving on full-time National Guard duty, or (C) a member of a Reserve component while performing inactive-duty training. (2)The term “military labor organization” means any organization that engages in or attempts to engage in— (A)negotiating or bargaining with any civilian officer or employee, or with any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces; (B)representing individual members of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such member in the armed forces; or (C)striking, picketing, marching, demonstrating, or any other similar form of concerted action which is directed against the Government of the United States and which is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (i)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of military service of any member of the armed forces, (ii)recognize any organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with complaints and grievances of such members arising out of the terms or conditions of military service of such members in the armed forces, or (iii)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of military service of individual members of the armed forces. (3)The term “civilian officer or employee” means an employee, as such term is defined in section 2105 of title 5. (b)It shall be unlawful for a member of the armed forces, knowing of the activities or objectives of a particular military labor organization— (1)to join or maintain membership in such organization; or (2)to attempt to enroll any other member of the armed forces as a member of such organization. (c)It shall be unlawful for any person— (1)to enroll in a military labor organization any member of the armed forces or to solicit or accept dues or fees for such an organization from any member of the armed forces; or (2)to negotiate or bargain, or attempt through any coercive act to negotiate or bargain, with any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, on behalf of members of the armed forces, concerning the terms or conditions of service of such members; (3)to organize or attempt to organize, or participate in, any strike, picketing, march, demonstration, or other similar form of concerted action involving members of the armed forces that is directed against the Government of the United States and that is intended to induce any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, to— (A)negotiate or bargain with any person concerning the terms or conditions of service of any member of the armed forces, (B)recognize any military labor organization as a representative of individual members of the armed forces in connection with any complaint or grievance of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces, or (C)make any change with respect to the terms or conditions of service in the armed forces of individual members of the armed forces; or (4)to use any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by this subsection or by subsection (b) or (d). (d)It shall be unlawful for any military labor organization to represent, or attempt to represent, any member of the armed forces before any civilian officer or employee, or any member of the armed forces, in connection with any grievance or complaint of any such member arising out of the terms or conditions of service of such member in the armed forces. (e)No member of the armed forces, and no civilian officer or employee, may— (1)negotiate or bargain on behalf of the United States concerning the terms or conditions of military service of members of the armed forces with any person who represents or purports to represent members of the armed forces, or (2)permit or authorize the use of any military installation, facility, reservation, vessel, or other property of the United States for any meeting, march, picketing, demonstration, or other similar activity which is for the purpose of engaging in any activity prohibited by subsection (b), (c), or (d). Nothing in this subsection shall prevent commanders or supervisors from giving consideration to the views of any member of the armed forces presented individually or as a result of participation on command-sponsored or authorized advisory councils, committees, or organizations. (f)Whoever violates subsection (b), (c), or (d) shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000. (g)Nothing in this section shall limit the right of any member of the armed forces— (1)to join or maintain membership in any organization or association not constituting a “military labor organization” as defined in subsection (a)(2) of this section; (2)to present complaints or grievances concerning the terms or conditions of the service of such member in the armed forces in accordance with established military procedures; (3)to seek or receive information or counseling from any source; (4)to be represented by counsel in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations; (5)to petition the Congress for redress of grievances; or (6)to take such other administrative action to seek such administrative or judicial relief, as is authorized by applicable laws and regulations.

Amendments 1997—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 105–85 substituted “shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, except that, in the case of an organization (as defined in section 18 of such title), the fine shall not be less than $25,000.” for “shall, in the case of an individual, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and in the case of an organization or association, be fined not less than $25,000 and not more than $250,000.” 1987—Subsec. (a)(1) to (3). Pub. L. 100–26 inserted “The term” after each par. designation and struck out uppercase letter of first word after first quotation marks in each paragraph and substituted lowercase letter. 1986—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 99–661 struck out the second of two commas before “(B)”. 1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–525 added cl. (B) and redesignated existing cl. (B) as (C). Findings; Purpose Pub. L. 95–610, § 1, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3085, provided that: “(a)The Congress makes the following findings: “(1)Members of the armed forces of the United States must be prepared to fight and, if necessary, to die to protect the welfare, security, and liberty of the United States and of their fellow citizens. “(2)Discipline and prompt obedience to lawful orders of superior officers are essential and time-honored elements of the American military tradition and have been reinforced from the earliest articles of war by laws and regulations prohibiting conduct detrimental to the military chain of command and lawful military authority. “(3)The processes of conventional collective bargaining and labor-management negotiation cannot and should not be applied to the relationships between members of the armed forces and their military and civilian superiors. “(4)Strikes, slowdowns, picketing, and other traditional forms of job action have no place in the armed forces. “(5)Unionization of the armed forces would be incompatible with the military chain of command, would undermine the role, authority, and position of the commander, and would impair the morale and readiness of the armed forces. “(6)The circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of the armed forces to perform their mission are not comparable to the circumstances which could constitute a threat to the ability of Federal civilian agencies to perform their functions and should be viewed in light of the need for effective performance of duty by each member of the armed forces. “(b)The purpose of this Act [enacting this section] is to promote the readiness of the armed forces to defend the United States.”

#### Military unions wreck civilian military relations and US hegemony

Caforio 18 [Giuseppe Caforio, Brigadier General with degrees in law, political science, and strategic studies (FYI, the author died ~2015, but this was republished in 2018 in an anthology book), 5-20-2018, "Unionisation of the Military: Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2\_19]/Kankee

THE OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES But if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionization issue for the armed forces? Why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel? The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which is summarized thusly by David R. Segal: Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on the firing line is required to make a commitment of a different order from that made by the worker on the assembly line. (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 28). Bernhard Boene, in a study devoted to a different research topic (Boene, 1990), is both precise and efficacious in differentiating military "work" from civilian work. Military specificity, writes Boene, does not lie only in the area of the risks to which one supposes the combatant is exposed, but also in the limits of application of common rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression of social norms that it entails. This implies a particular type of socialization. Notwithstanding partial analogies, according to Boene, civil emergencies belong to a different reality than military ones do. An officer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a "call," consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare, acceptance of risking his life, and submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to the military profession. SOME THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE Discussing a sample survey, David Segal observes that in the United States, in the absence of a union for military personnel, there is a considerable "misfit" between soldiers' perception of the characteristics of their role and the preferred characteristics, while in an analogous sample of civilian manpower this misfit is much smaller. In examining the attempted remedies, Segal states: "Any change to be achieved through organizational interventions, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have" (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 46). According to Segal, unionization can solve this problem, but it presents two dangers that must be carefully weighed: the first is that it tends to extend its influence also to aspects of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it involves a politicisation of the personnel. Gwyn Harries Jenkins examines the consequences that unionisation would have on the operational efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three fundamental ones: 1. The creation of a dual authority structure: Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes: it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, creating a dual authority structure while modifying the traditional basis of compliance. (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 70) 2. A much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of civilian management. The new tasks and the introduction of unionization would require commanders to possess skills and orientations more and more like those of civilian managers. 3. An abdication by the officer of his traditional image. Indeed, if the officer "wishes to retain his self-image and ideas of honor, then the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with substantial dysfunctional consequences" (H.Jenkins, 1977, p. 71). Harries Jenkins concludes, however, by affirming that, as a radical criticism of the existing military system, "the unionization of the armed forces can only result in an improvement to an otherwise defective situation" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 69). According to William Taylor and Roger Arango (Taylor et al., 1977b), many reasons offered in the United States for or against the unionization of military personnel appear to be rhetorical and not sufficiently investigated. Those who take a negative critical stance, for example, contend that unionization would lead to a breakdown in discipline; threaten the chain of command; and, especially, undermine the military's ability to carry out its assigned mission. Through a concrete field analysis, these authors believe they can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Among the advantages are the acquisition of a greater sense of individual security, a valorization of the dignity of individuals, improved social communication, and greater competitiveness with other occupations and professions in recruiting personnel. The real drawbacks would essentially be reduced to two: a risk of divisiveness within units, due to acquired strife between personnel categories; and an increase in personnel costs. Carlo Jean (Jean, 1981) states that in itself, the creation of unions would inevitably produce increased confrontation; without it, the union representatives would have neither prestige nor credibility. He does not believe, however, that the biggest drawback that would derive from it would be that of undermining the internal cohesiveness of the armed forces and their operational capacity. According to this author military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands out of necessity to avoid internal breakup. An unacceptable corporative force would be produced that sooner or later would inevitably oppose it to the political power. The danger that a union of military personnel involves for civil society is, in his opinion, much greater than its negative implications on the efficiency of the military itself. Along the same line is the fear expressed by Sen. Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, cited essay) that unionization might reinforce the military establishment and increase its influence over society at large, decreasing the capacity for political control. This issue had already been treated by Cortright in another essay (Cortright and Thurmond, 1977b), where on the one hand he argued that unionization in the armed forces would help to prevent any form of separateness from civil society while noting on the other that little attention was given to the possibility that unionization substantially strengthens the military's ability to wield influence. Thurmond, again, judges the European experience negatively and asks himself how unionized troops would respond in battle. However, to remain faithful to his position, Thurmond conceives the armed forces as a separate body from civil society, argues that military personnel are not comparable to other labor force categories, and advances the fear that union representation of the interests of military personnel would bring the defence budget to unacceptable levels. Of the countries included in our study, unions for military personnel exist in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Unionization is prohibited in England, the United States, Canada, France, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Strikes are allowed only in Austria and Sweden. ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES THROUGH THE THOUGHT OF VARIOUS AUTHORS

#### Heg solves arms races, land grabs, rogue states, and great power war

Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

## Case

### Framing

#### Framing is the same, justice is nothing but util. The maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain is the underlying logic behind justice, which promotes the spreading of pleasure.

### T/L

#### 1] Strikes allows for domination by exercising coercion.

**Gourevitch 18** [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy **recognizes** that workers have a **right** to **strike**. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose **serious** **problems** for **liberal** **societies**. They involve **violence** and **coercion**, they often violate some **basic** **liberal** **liberties**, they appear to **involve** group rights having **priority** over **individual** **ones**, and they can **threaten** **public** **order** itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of **disruptive** **collective** **protest** in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ **froze** major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as **statewide** in **West** **Virginia**, **Oklahoma**, **Arizona**, and **Colorado**; a **strike** by taxi drivers played a **major** role in debates and court decisions regarding **immigration**; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises **far** more **issues** than a **single** **essay** can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its **relation** to **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. I argue that strikes present a **dilemma** for liberal societies because for **most** **workers** to have a reasonable chance of **success** they need to use some **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. But these coercive strike tactics both **violate** the law and **infringe** upon what are widely held to be **basic** **liberal** **rights**. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know **why** workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of **understanding** the right to strike is as a right to **resist** the **oppression** that workers face in the **standard** **liberal** **capitalist** **economy**. This way of **understanding** the right explains why the use of **coercive** **strike** **tactics** is not morally **constrained** by the requirement to respect the **basic** **liberties** nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] No offense: Strikes quit working, not the job which still allows for instances of domination.

**Gourevitch 16** [Alex; Brown University; “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike,” 2016; [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592716000049]](https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592716000049%5d) Justin

The further point is that, short of quasi-socialist redistribution or of giving everyone universal rights to ownership of capital, workers are **justified** in turning to some other way of resisting their structural domination. The legal fact of being able to quit a job is **cold comfort** because it allows workers to leave a **specific boss**, but not the **labor market itself.** Insofar as workers are forced into contracts with employers, and into work associations with other workers, they can only resist their structural domination from within. Here we have an insight into why the right to strike includes the **perplexing claim that workers refuse to work yet maintain a right to the job**. The typical worker can quit the job, but she cannot quit the work. To avoid being exploited she turns the table: she quits working **without** quitting the job.

#### 3] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits – that allows for instances of domination.

**Dolsak and Prakash 19** [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build **solidarity** among their supporters, they are susceptible to **collective action problems**. This is **because** **the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits**. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be **enjoyed** by both **strikers** and **non**-**strikers**. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of **free-riding problems**, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.

#### Government recognition doesn’t mean that the right to strike will actually be upheld, it just means they government says it exists – this is terminal defense to the aff’s solvency and outweighs on legal precision.

Law Dictionary ‘ND [The Law Dictionary; Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed.; No Date; “What is RECOGNIZE?”; https://thelawdictionary.org/recognize/; Accessed 10-28-2021] AK

To try; to examine in order to determine the truth of a matter. Also to enter into a recognizance.